Aguilar 1

Elizabeth Aguilar

Nikola Mirilovic

INR 4074-0001

3 April 2017

Do states control immigration outcomes?

Although sectors of migration that are hard to regulate exist, they do not cancel the

States ability to control immigration outcomes. Through implementing restrictive or permissive

policies, in relating to admissions and rights, states guide immigration in the direction they want.

To show how states control outcomes, this paper will analyze both the policy (ex. programs) and

outcomes (ex. foreign born population percentages) of the according to the areas of immigration

in a number of states, including the United States of America, France, Germany, and the GCC.

By considering the differences or correlation between policy and outcomes, it will be possible to

assess states control of immigration outcomes.

States control of immigration outcomes is seen through the correlation between the

policies and outcomes. Policies such as legalization, temporary foreign-born worker programs,

and regional integration demonstrate the steps taken to sway immigration in a certain direction.

Countries such as Japan and South Korea have been able to limit immigration by establishing

strict naturalization rules. The GCC has been able to provide for its labor with foreign-born

immigrants, who are sent back to their country of origin after their designated time is over.

Countries in the EU allow for free migration, little of which is permanent since all EU member

states are relatively equally developed. In situations such as these, there is a high correlation

between established policies and outcomes, which demonstrates the impact of states.
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Opposing views on the states ability to control immigration point to the ineffectiveness

of employer sanctions, presence of refugees, human smuggling and trafficking, which often

contradict the policies of the state as evidence that states are not in control of immigration

outcomes. Although immigration is hard to regulate in regards to irregular migration (ie. human

smuggling, trafficking, and refuges), if the states is said to have control over immigration, they

should be able to reduce it in these areas as well. Instead, these types of immigration are

growing. The Syrian Crisis has created a large influx of refugees, close to 5 million registered.

Employer sanctions meant to reduce the hiring of undocumented individuals has had little to no

impact, as well. The consistent inability to control this type of immigration shows that states do

not control immigration.

The success implementation of legalization programmes serve as evidence that states

control outcomes. France took an active role in routinely legalizing undocumented workers after

1947. In 1981, the new Socialist President sought to make changes to the legalization process.

Another key factor that allows this to be successful is the assistance provided by a Leftist

majority in the National Assembly, trade unions, and immigrant associations, and the

mobilization of additional personnel to process applications. Legalization between 1981 to 1983

was considered a major success by the French government, with about 120,000 to 150,000

legalized applicants (Castles, Haas, MIller 218). The aims of the government at this time was to

counter the illegal immigration and employment, which they began to do with this

implementation. It is important to note that while this approach did not solve the underlying

problems, it did address it in part. When states seek to control immigration, they do so knowing

that this broad issue will require time to fruit results. Being able to provide a statistic of how

many were impacted by legalization goes a long way in addressing the problem long term.
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Choosing to host temporary foreign worker admissions programmes, or not, allow the

state to have control over immigrants. The GCC (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) have effectively managed to control high immigration for

labor, while assuring that they return to their countries. This program is called the Kafala system,

and requires that an expatriate worker have a national sponsor. Through this system, the right to

stay and work in a GCC country tied to a particular sponsor and a particular job. Policymakers in

the GCC tend to have a high numbers, low rights approach to immigration. While they

encourage large amount of immigrants to come from India, Pakistan, and other non-Arab areas,

they provide only the most basic rights. For example, the right to stay is conditional on a

particular job. Other rights that are limited are the right of assembly, speech, holding a strike, and

to address grievances. There are also restrictions on social interactions, meant to highlight the

differences between natives and these foreign workers. GCC governments have concerns that the

local cultural and the national identity are being eroded are the driving force behind the restricted

rights of expatriates. Yet the demand of labor encourages the GCC to continue the program. The

GCC has been highly effective in controlling immigration, keeping steady employment through

foreign labor, while preserving their culture. This is accomplished by assuring that these

temporary foreign-born workers return to their country of origin once their employment lapses.

Percent foreign born is important to note when considering immigration outcomes, as it

reflects how the policies carried out by the state have impacted the local immigration population.

The world average is 3.1%. The average for high-income states is significantly higher at 10.3%

since these states are desired destinations. Meanwhile, developing countries are well under 3%.

Below are the averages for the case studies. (Saudi Arabia and Qatar both fall under the GCC.)

US. 13.8%, France 10.3%, Germany 13.2%, Saudi Arabia 26.7%, Qatar 74.6%
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The U.S. is above average of the high-income country average, which correlates with their

lenient immigration policies. France, on the other hand, is on the more conservative side, which

explains its average. Meanwhile, the GCCs more liberal admissions (albeit conservative

integration) explains Saudi Arabia and Qatars high percentages, even higher than the world and

high-income country average.

While critics of state control of immigration point to irregular migration as evidence, so

too do supporters. Germany had a liberal asylum class for persons persecuted for political

reasons enjoying the right of asylum, known as the 1949 Basic Law. This clause served to

strengthen Germanys image as a reformed state after World War II. For several decades,

Germany saw an increase of asylym seekers but not enough for a restriction to be issued.

However, in the early 1990s. with the collapse of communism and a civil war in Yugoslavia,

more refugees were produced. Soon thereafter, tougher asylum rules were established. The

revisions to the clause required foreigners to apply for asylum in first safe country in their reach.

As Germany is surrounded by safe (i.e. EU) states, the number of asylum applications in

Germany dropped significantly. This demonstrates that states have the influence to obtain the

outcome they desire.

The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions also shows that states do not has a much

control over immigration as they think. Going back as far as the 1970s, there have been attempts

to prohibit the unauthorized hiring of undocumented individuals. To increase the appeal of these

programs to undocumented individuals, these rules included legalization programmes that

afforded work and residence permits-- so long as one met certain criteria. These policies

intended to remove the incentives for undocumented work. However, the proved to be

ineffective due to execution. There was insufficient personnel, poor coordination between
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agencies, inadequate judicial follow up and the adoption to enforcement measures (Castles,

Haas, and Miller 215). It is important that a policy be set, but even more important that it is

applied. It did not help that employers with political sway influenced officials to push for easier

mediums of legalization or to ignore the hiring of undocumented workers. This policy also

ignored that strong push for immigrants to hold down a job, fearing they could lose their income,

or have difficulty finding another job.

Ineffective employer sanctions and legalization often contradict the policies of the state.

One such example is the United Statess Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed in

1986 by President Ronald Reagen. IRCA was passed in order to control the illegal immigration

to the United States. It made the hiring of undocumented individuals illegal, while providing a

medium by which undocumented individuals could prove eligibility and become legalized. There

was a significant gap between this policy and the outcomes. The documents that proved

employment eligibility were easy to forge, so that is what many did. Instead of reducing

undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S., there was a significant spike in the years to

come.

Although arguments arguing the states limited ability to regulate certain types of

migration such as human smuggling and trafficking made valid points, the evidence nonetheless

supports that states have control over outcomes more than they do not. Temporary foreign-born

worker programs, legalization, admissions of refugees and asylum seekers demonstrate this by

showing the impact it has had on the state and the participants. Although irregular migration

continues to lack regulation, it is not as huge an issue as it is made out to be. It consists of a small

number of the total global migration population. States can control migration around their

borders, even if global migration is harder to guide in the desired direction of a state.
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Works Cited

Castles, Stephen, et al. The Age of Migration. 5th ed., The Guilford P, 2014.