An Interpretation of Plato's "Cratylus"

Author(s): Simon Keller

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Nov., 2000), pp. 284-305
Published by: BRILL
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 An Interpretation of Plato's Cratylus

SIMONKELLER

ABSTRACT
Plato's main concern in the Cratylus, I claim, is to argue against the idea that
we can learn about things by examining their names, and in favour of the claim
that philosophersshould, so far as possible, look to the things themselves. Other
philosophical questions, such as that of whether we should accept a naturalistor
a conventionalisttheory of namng, arise in the dialogue, but are subordinate.This
readingof the Cratylus,I say, explains certain puzzling facts about the dialogue's
structureand dramaticemphasis, as well as making the dialogue look better on
philosophical grounds. In support of my claim, I argue that Hermogenes' con-
ventionalist theory of naming is quite sensible, and is not refuted by Socrates;
that the main purposeof the etymological section is to undermineour confidence
in etymology as a form of philosophical enquiry; and that the apparentlytan-
gential and inconclusive discussions in the final section of the dialogue are best
understoodas illustrationsof Plato's thesis about philosophical methodology.

There was once a BBC radio show on which celebrity guests were chal-
lenged to produce spontaneous etymologies of common English words. A
guest on the show is asked to explain the origin of the word 'gold'. "Ah
yes", she quickly replies, "this word has its origin in the venerable cus-
tom of giving gold watches as gifts to retiring employees. When a cere-
mony was held to honour a retiring worker, the manager of the company
would present him or her with a timepiece made of the as-yet-unnamed
substance. As the watch was passed over, the manager would whisper in
the ear of the former employee, 'Gee, you're old'. As time passed, the rit-
ualised phrase was shortened to, 'Gee, old', and then, 'Gold'. Eventually,
people began referring to 'gold watches', and so 'gold' became the name
of the material from which the watches were made".
I suppose that the guest's story supports a conventionalist theory of
names, because it says that it was only because of an historical accident
that gold became 'gold'. Then again, it might support a naturalist theory,
because it reveals the close relation between the name 'gold' and the
proper function of the named substance. In any case, the story teaches us
nothing whatsoever about the nature of gold, and that's not just because
it is so obviously fanciful. The etymology may be creative and clever -
conceivably, it might even be true - but if we are interested in learning
about the substance gold, as opposed to the way in which we talk about

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2000 Phronesis XLV14

 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 285

it, thenwe shouldnot be tryingto come up with etymologies.This, I want

to suggest, is the primarymessage of the Cratylus.
I'll offera readingof the Cratylusaccordingto which the guidingtheme
of the dialogue is Plato's attackupon etymology as a form of philosoph-
ical inquiry.Otherphilosophicalquestionscome up, but they are subor-
dinate. In particular,I will say, commentatorshave overestimatedthe
extent to which the Cratylusis concernedwith the question of the cor-
rectness of names - the question of whether names come to be correct
throughconvention,or by virtueof standingin some more profoundrela-
tionshipto the things that they name. A certainanswerto this questionis
presupposedby those who employ the etymologicalmethod,and it is in
this capacity,I claim, that the questionarises in the Cratylus.Ratherthan
setting out to resolve the debate between conventionalistand naturalist
theoriesof names, Plato engages in the debatejust to the extent required
by his defence of his own way of doing philosophy.
There are two broadconsiderationsthat recommendthis reading.First,
it offersan improvedunderstanding of Plato'sdramaticemphasis.It is espe-
cially helpful, I will argue, in explaining why the etymological section
is so long, and why the dialogue ends as it does. Second, the interpreta-
tion that I will defend makes the Cratylusa better piece of philosophy.
Plato soundly refutes the claim that etymologies are valuable philoso-
phical tools, but the debate between naturalismand conventionalismis
not satisfactorilysettled. Further,when Socrateshas the resourcesavail-
able to dispose completely of a certain form of naturalism,he declines
to do so. This suggests, I think, that it is not some theoryof names that
Plato is really after.
In supportof my interpretationof the dialogue, I have three claims to
defend. First, Hermogenes'conventionalisttheory of namingis not at all
absurd,and Socratesdoes not come close to refutingit. Second, the main
purposeof the etymologicalsection is to undermineour confidencein ety-
mology as a form of philosophicalenquiry.Third,the final section of the
dialogue does not resolve, and is not intendedto resolve, the questionof
the correctnessof names, nor is it a directattackupon Heraclitusand the
doctrinethat all is in flux; rather,the purposeof the final section is to
make explicit the problemswith etymology that have been gesturedat in
the previouspartsof the dialogue.Only the thirdof these claims, by the
way, is new, althoughthey are all controversial.'I will try to show how
they can be put togetherto yield a unifiedview of the dialogue.

Accepted February 2000

' The first claim has been recently defended by Rachel Barney; see her 'Plato on
286 SIMON KELLER

1. Hermogenes' Conventionalism
The Cratylus opens with the appearance of a disgruntled Hermogenes,
frustrated in his efforts to elicit from Cratylus an explanation of the nat-
ural correctness of names. Cratylus is said to believe that there is a cor-
rect name for each thing, and that this correctness holds regardless of the
naming practices actually in play and regardless of whether one is a
speaker of Greek or of some other language. Hermogenes is intrigued by
the theory, but cannot see how it could be true. No one has been able to
convince him that "the correctness of names is determined by anything
besides convention and agreement" (383d).2
Under questioning from Socrates, Hermogenes accepts, as consequences
of his view, that any name given to a thing is a correct name, that any
new name that we give is as correct as the old, and that if a person
chooses to give several names to a single thing, then all those names are
names of that thing. In particular, Hermogenes agrees that if a person uni-
laterally decides to apply the name 'horse' to the thing that we presently
call 'man', then the same thing will have the public name 'man' and the
private name 'horse' (383a). Pressed further, Hermogenes confesses to
having sometimes felt that his doctrine pushes him towards the Pro-
tagorean claim that "things are for each person as he believes them to be",
although he would like to avoid this extreme relativism if he possibly
can (386c).
Some critics of the Cratylus have claimed that Hermogenes' version of
conventionalism is crude and untenable. Bernard Williams, for example,
calls Hermogenes' theory the "radical Humpty-Dumpty view", and says
that it can be rejected in favour of a more sensible conventionalist the-
ory.3 The thought is that Hermogenes takes things too far when he allows
all private namings to be legitimate, and that it is because of this mistake
that he cannot discriminate between true and false ways of speaking.4 If

Conventionalism',Phronesis XLII/2, 1997, pp. 143-162. The second claim receives its
best and most complete defence in Timothy M.S. Baxter,The Cratylus:Plato's Critique
of Naming, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992. Some critics of these claims are discussed below.
2 All references to Plato are to Plato, Cratylus, translatedby C.D.C. Reeve, in John

M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works,Indianapolis:Hackett, 1997.

1 Bernard Williams, 'Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation', in Malcolm
Schofield and MarthaNussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos, Cambridge,1982, p. 90.
See also Baxter, The Cratylus:Plato's Critique of Naming, pp. 17-22. Other defend-
ers of this view of Hermogenes are surveyed in Barney, pp. 143-145.
4 Talk of private acts of naming, of course, brings to mind Wittgenstein's argu-

ments against the possibility of a private language. As far as I can tell, however,
Wittgenstein's worries do not apply to the sorts of cases that concern us here (and
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 287

we think of Hermogenes' position in this way, then we can see the argu-
ments that Socrates brings against it as arguments against a particular,
misguided form of conventionalism, rather than conventionalism as a gen-
eral theoretical approach. Then, when Socrates argues against naturalism
at the end of the dialogue, we can say that he is endorsing the more
sophisticated conventionalist theory that most of us, after all, believe.
A more sympathetic view is offered by Rachel Barney. Hermogenes'
theory, Barney argues, is "a comparatively reflective and plausible" way
of defending the idea that all the names we actually use are correct, and
"his legitimation of private naming is merely an unavoidable corollary to
this defence".5If this is right, then the consequencesthat Hermogenes
sees for his account are consequences that any conventionalist might have
to face. Before trying to adjudicate between the two interpretations of
Hermogenes' theory, it will be worth saying a little more about what the
conventionalist theory of language amounts to.
David Lewis is a contemporary conventionalist, arguing that it is just
convention that makes words correct and keeps languages alive (Lewis
does not claim to tell us how languages originate).6 A language, accord-
ing to Lewis, is "something which assigns meanings to certain strings of
types of sounds or marks", and which does so in an arbitrary way.7 The
assignments are arbitrarybecause there are many different ways in which
sounds could be assigned to meanings, none of which is intrinsically bet-
ter than the others. English, for example, assigns the same meaning to
'dog' as French assigns to 'chien', but it could just have easily have been
the other way around; if we English speakers used 'chien' instead of
'dog', we would be no worse off and no less correct.
On Lewis's theory, the question of which strings of sounds are assigned
to which meanings within a given community - the question of which lan-
guage the community uses - is settled through an ongoing cooperative
process. All members of the community have an interest in there being a

criticshave not, as far as I know, used suchworriesto criticiseHermogenes).Hermogenes

is not thinking of an individual whose language exists only in her mind, but of very
small and unstable linguistic communities. Conceivably, this community might con-
tain only one person;as David Lewis suggests in a slightly differentcontext, "we might
think of the situation as one in which a convention prevails in the population of dif-
ferent time-slices of the same man". See David Lewis, 'Languages and Language', in
David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Oxford, 1983, p. 182.
5 Barney, p. 146.
6Lewis, p. 181.
Lewis, p. 163.
288 SIMON KELLER

single prevailinglanguage,and so they all conformto what they take to

be the governing linguistic laws. Membersof the communityregularly
producesentencesthat they believe to be true accordingto the dominant
language,and they trustthat those aroundthem are doing the same, and
so a single languageis spokenwithin the community.8The essentialcon-
ventionalistclaims are, first,that thereexist several alternativelanguages
that any communitycould equallywell adopt,and, second, thatthe mem-
bers of a communitycooperateto ensure that some language- any lan-
guage - is dominant.
If we take Lewis's theory to representsensible contemporaryconven-
tionalism,then we can assess the reasonablenessof Hermogenes'position
by looking for points at which the two theoriesdiverge.They will agree
that "no name belongs to a particularthing by nature,but only because
of the rules and usage of those who establishthe usage and call it by that
name",and they will agree thatwhen a communitytakes up a new name
for something,the new way of speakingis no less correctthan the old
(384d). Things become less clear when we considerthe giving of names
by individuals,ratherthan by communities.Should a sensible conven-
tionalistagree with Hermogenes'assertionthat any name given is a cor-
rect name, even if it is not backedup by a publicconvention?Shouldhe
agree that a single thing could have the public name 'man' and the pri-
vate name 'horse'?
Thereis a restrictedsense in which the conventionalistview does allow
us to say thata certaininstanceof name-givingis incorrect.Whenan indi-
vidual decides to call a man 'horse', we can say that she is incorrectly
namingthe man becauseshe is not using the namethathas by publiccon-
vention been designated the relevant meaning; she has an interest, we
assume,in communicatingwith those aroundher, and so she makesa mis-
take when she compromisesher ability to do so. This, however,is as far
as our criticismcan go. When the recalcitrantname-giverreplies that she
doesn't care aboutour conventions(andif she did she wouldn'tbe assign-
ing alternativenames), we are left with no groundson which to criticise
her. There is nothingbeyond our conventionthat makes 'man' the right
name and 'horse' the wrong name, so there is nothingabout our choice
of name thatis intrinsicallybetterthanhers.Perhapswe could try to con-
vince her that she should follow our convention because it is in her
best intereststhata single languageprevail,butwe mightbe wrongabout-
this. If we think hard enough, we can imagine the existence of an indi-

I Lewis, p. 167.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 289

vidual so perversethat she has no interestin being part of a public lin-

guistic community.
Withinthe boundariesof our linguisticcommunity,it is correctto call
a man 'man', but within the boundariesof the deviantname-giver'svery
small linguisticcommunity,it is correctto call a man 'horse'.The deviant
language,in its limited sphere,is just as correctas ours. When someone
decides to call a man 'horse', she is not wrong in any absolutesense. She
is wrong accordingto our rules, but she has no reasonto pay attentionto
our rules if it doesn't suit her to do so.
Conventionalismtells us thatthereis no standardof correctnessagainst
which differentinstances of name-givingcan be judged, but it does not,
as Barneypoints out, force us to say that every use of every name is cor-
rect. "On Hermogenes' view", Barney says, "one names incorrectlyin
using a name in a way which does not accordwith the relevantbaptism:
the name-inverterwho decides to call humans'horses' and vice versagets
somethingwrongif he subsequentlyuses the names in the ordinaryway."9
If someone generally does speak in accordancewith the rules of a lin-
guistic community,then he, unlike the personwho resolves always to call
a man 'horse', is subjectto those rules and makes a mistakewhen he fails
to follow them.
The conventionalistcan make use of the distinctionbetween baptism
and usage. Put roughly,we are using a name when we are employingit
in order to evoke some meaning that we take the name to alreadypos-
sess, and we are baptisingwhen we are engaged in activities which are
intendedto make it the case that a certainname has a certainmeaning.
Now, in those rare cases in which a baptism consists simply in an
announcement- "I hereby name this carrot'Hercules"'- the distinction
is clear. In other cases, words enter a language graduallyand their ori-
gins are hazy, and the distinctionbetween baptism and usage is not a
sharpone. Nevertheless,the distinctionis there, and the conventionalist's
point is thatwhile baptismsare answerableonly to some very liberalstan-
dards(I'll describethem shortly),there are strictrules governingthe use
of a name by someone who aspiresto conformto a certainbaptism.For
those of us who almost always speak in accordancewith a public con-
vention, and who realise that it is in our intereststo maintainthat con-
vention, the standardsof our linguistic communityare the standardsto
which we can legitimatelybe held.

I Barney, p. 153 (her italics).

290 SIMON KELLER

On what we have seen so far, Hermogenes'conventionalismis neither

radical nor absurd.He accepts that every baptismis as correctas every
other, but this is a naturalimplicationof the conventionalisttheory.The
cases that he considers are those in which it is decided that a certain
thing should be given a new name, so these are all cases of baptism.
There is no indication that Hermogenes is committed to the stronger
claim that no use of a name can ever be wrong, and there is no reason
why he, as a conventionalist,should be forced to make such a claim.
Hermogenesis not the 'anything goes' conventionalistthat some have
taken him to be.
The second reason why Hermogenes'theory might be thoughtabsurd
is that it leads him towardsProtagoreanrelativism.Socratesbrings this
possibilityto our attention,and Hermogenesadmitsthat it concernshim.
We are not told why this is a dangerfor Hermogenes,but I supposethat
the worry is somethinglike this. Anything can be given any name, so
when I say that the grass is 'green' and you say that it is 'blue', neither
of us is reallywrong.The colourof the grassis equally'green'and 'blue';
it doesn't matterwhat you call it. But then the grass is 'green'for me and
'blue' for you, so its essence is not somethingfixed and independentof
us. Whateverwe say or think aboutthe grass is, from one point of view,
correct.No-one is any wiser than anyone else. All my beliefs are correct
for me, and all your beliefs are correctfor you.
This is not a good argument.If the conventionalistis careful to dis-
tinguishsoundsfromtheirmeanings,and if she remembersthatthe mean-
ings of sounds are fixed under any conventional language, then she need
not become a relativist about being. The grass is green, and that is an
absolute, mind-independent fact. We could have called green 'blue', but
then when we said that the grass is 'blue' we would be meaning what
we mean now when we say that the grass is 'green'. Meanings are fixed
absolutely, the conventionalist can say, but names are not. Once it has
been established by convention that green is named 'green', it is incor-
rect for people who are subject to that convention to say that the grass
is 'blue'. A speaker of English who believes that the grass is 'blue' is
wrong, and a speaker of English who believes that the grass is 'green'
is right; all beliefs are not equal. There may be some instances in which
it is difficult to tell whether a speaker has an incorrect belief or is speak-
ing a different language, but this difficulty is merely practical. Hermo-
genes can be a conventionalist about language but an absolutist about
being.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 291

2. Socrates' Arguments Against Conventionalism

I have suggested that Hermogenes' conventionalism is not absurd and does
not lead to Protagorean relativism. Under this view, the arguments that
Socrates gives against Hermogenes assume a new importance. If Socrates
refutes Hermogenean conventionalism, then he refutes the conventional-
ism that many of us would like to maintain.
Socrates gives three arguments. Here's the first. "Things have some fixed
being or essence of their own", and an action is a type of thing. Speaking
is a type of action, so there is a way of speaking that accords with that
action's fixed essence. So a speaker "will accomplish something and suc-
ceed in speaking if he says things in the natural way to say them, in the
natural way for them to be said, and with the natural tool for saying them"
(386e-387c). The conclusion is that there is some particularway of speak-
ing that is natural, and hence correct, and so conventionalism is wrong.
Hermogenes goes along with this argument, but he doesn't have to.
We can make a distinction between two types of linguistic correctness; a
language can be correct because it gives the right names or because it
names the right things. With regard to the first sort of correctness, the con-
ventionalist can say that there exist only the loosest of standards. Names
have a purpose, and in order to meet that purpose they should not be so
long or so difficult to pronounce as to make communication difficult. But
these standards fall far short of requiring of each particular thing that it
be given a particular name. With regard to the second sort of correctness,
some more stringent standards can be endorsed. For example, the con-
ventionalist can say, we act in accordance with the natural divisions of
being when we give a single name to the class of all mammals, but we
would be acting against those natural divisions if we gave a single name
to the class of all mammals, orange things and eating utensils. These
things are not connected in nature, so they should not be connected by a
name. It is naturally correct, the conventionalist can say, to give a name
to the class of mammals, but there is no particular name that it is natu-
rally correct to give.
In reply to Socrates, Hermogenes should agree that naming is an action
with a fixed essence, but only to the extent that there are natural rules that
say which things should be brought under the same name. Hermogenes
should add that there are no natural rules that tell us what those names
are to be. If the claim that all actions have a natural correctness is sup-
posed to include the act of assigning particular sounds to meanings, then
Socrates' premise begs the question against conventionalism. This is one
292 SIMON KELLER

type of action, accordingto the conventionalist,which does not have a

fixed essence.
Socrates'second argumentis this. Some statementsare true and some
statementsare false. If a statementis true, then all of its parts are true,
and if a statementis false, then at least one of its parts is false. But a
name is the smallest part of a statement,so it must be possible to say a
true or a false name. So some names are true and some names are false,
contraryto conventionalism(385b2-dl).
I cannot see how this can be made into a good argument."'Richard
Robinsondismisses it as a fallacy of division,claimingthat namesdo not
in fact have truth-values."Names certainlydo not have truth-valuesin
the way that sentencesdo, and it seems wrong to say that the truth-value
of an atomicsentencelike 'Socratesis wise' is somehowderivedfromthe
truth-valuesof its parts.As far as I can tell, this argumentshouldnot sway
the conventionalist,and Hermogeneswould have been withinhis rightsto
reject it.
The third argumentis similar to the first. When we name, we name
with something,so a name is a sort of tool. "Justas a shuttleis a tool for
dividingwarp and woof, a name is a tool for giving instruction,that is to
say, for dividing being"(388b). Now, a good shuttleis one that is made
to best performthe tasks naturallyrequiredof a shuttle,and it takes an
expert carpenterto producesuch a tool. In the same way, then, a good
name will be a tool that is naturallysuited to the task of dividingbeing,
and such a thingcould only be producedby a rule-setterwho knows"how
to embodyin soundsand syllablesthe namenaturallysuitedto each thing"
(387c-389d). So thereare naturalnames for things,and it takes an expert
to determinewhat they are.
Like Robinson,I thinkthat this "is not so much an argumentas a free
developmentof the nature-theoryon the assumptionthat a name is a tool
like a shuttle".'2The conventionalistcan say that a name is a tool, but
not a particularlyspecialisedtool. A nameis like a paper-weight.A paper-
weight is a tool with an importantfunction,but it need not be made by
an expert craftsman;if the paper-weightconforms to the undemanding
standardsof havingone flat surfaceand a size andweight withina certain

'0 Baxter surveys some attempts to find a better argument in this passage. See
Baxter, pp. 34-36.
" Richard Robinson, 'A Criticism of Plato's Cratylus', The Philosophical Review
LXV:3, July 1956, p. 328.
12 Robinson, p. 329.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 293

generousrange, then it will do its job perfectlywell. In the same way, a

name has a very importantfunction,and thereare some requirementsthat
apply to its creation.It shouldnot be too long, it shouldnot be too difficult
to pronounceand it shoulddividebeing in the way in which being is actu-
ally divided.Like the paper-weight,however,the specific shape and con-
stitutingmaterialof the name are not important.Whateverthe particular
(pronounceable)sounds that make up the name, it will do the job. Once
again, Hermogenescan resist Socrates'argumentby denyinghis premise.
A name is a tool, but it is not a tool like a shuttle.
I have arguedthat Hermogenes'view of names is not outlandish,and
that it is not refuted by Socrates' criticisms.I will shortly come to the
questionof why Plato might have placed the argumentsin the dialogue.
But, given that they are there, why does Hermogenessubmit to them so
readily?Because his own theoryis not fully worked-out,becausehe lacks
the confidenceto defend it againstSocrates'sophisticatedattack,and be-
cause a defiantHermogeneswould have been of no use to Plato.
Hermogenesis a common-senseconventionalist,but he is not quite cer-
tain of the implicationsof his own theory.While he realises thathe needs
to respect the privatenames given by individuals,he regardssuch names
as legitimateonly because he "can'tconceive of any otherway in which
names could be correct"(385d). And while he wants to deny relativism
about being, he is not sure whetherthis denial is consistentwith his con-
ventionalism. We should also rememberthat Hermogenes is eager to
learn;he is frustratedby Cratylus'unwillingnessto talk and he is keen to
hear the opinions of Socrates(384a). The text makes clear Hermogenes'
statusas an intellectualapprentice.Further,Socrates'argumentativetactic
is to proceedby stealth,eliciting Hermogenes'agreementto premisesthat
sound reasonablebut in fact presupposethe naturalisttheory of names.
It is not all that surprisingthat Hermogenes,with his under-developed
theoryandhis desireto hearhis teacher'sopinions,fails see throughSocrates'
arguments.
There is also a dramaticreason for having Hermogenessubmitto nat-
uralism.In the next partof the dialogue, Socrateswill explore the possi-
bilities of an etymologicalinvestigationinto the natureof reality.No one
who believes that names are based purelyon conventionis going to take
such an investigation seriously, and so a conventionalist Hermogenes
would hardlybe a cooperativeinterlocutor.But as a willing young stu-
dentwho has recentlycome to believe in the naturalcorrectnessof names,
Hermogenesmakes for an ideal Socratic adversary.He is open-minded,
thinkingon his feet, and ready to go where Socratesleads him.
294 SIMON KELLER

Still, the assertion that Plato deliberately gives Socrates five pages
worth of bad arguments does sound a little desperate. Baxter claims that
Socrates' arguments point towards a prescriptive theory of naming, ac-
cording to which baptisms should be informed by the philosopher's insights
into the natures of the things named. While this alternative to thorough-
going conventionalism receives only a rough sketch, says Baxter, there is
reason to believe that Plato found the theory plausible.'3 This may well
be true (and I will later suggest that something like this theory may be in
Socrates' mind in the last section of the dialogue). The failure to fully
articulate this theory, however, together with the poor quality of the argu-
ments advanced in its favour, suggests that Plato's central concern is else-
where. Plato may be toying with a form of naturalism, and he may think
that there is something in Socrates' arguments against conventionalism.
What really matters, though, is that the arguments are presented in such
a way as to convince Hermogenes, and to leave him primed for the ety-
mologies to follow.

3. The Etymologies
When he is asked at the beginning of the dialogue to speak about the
correctness of names, Socrates says, "To be sure, if I'd attended Prodicus'
fifty-drachma lecture course... there'd be nothing to prevent you from
learning the precise truth about the correctness of names straightaway. But
as I've heard only the one-drachma course, I don't know the truth about
it" (384b). As the etymological section begins, Socrates tells Hermogenes
that, if he wants to learn about the correctness of names, "the most cor-
rect way is together with people who already know, but you must pay
them well and show gratitude besides - these are the sophists" (391b).
Socrates claims to have no special knowledge in this area, but he is
prepared to see what an amateur examination might achieve. The strong
suggestion, however, is that he will be examining not just the hidden
meanings that lie behind names, but the pretensions of those who demand
large sums of money for their opinions on the subject.
Socrates' investigation into the correctness of names begins on what is
taken to be relatively safe ground. In the Homeric legends, we find that
the same river is called 'Skamandros' by humans and 'Xanthos' by the
gods, so it seems likely that 'Xanthos' is closer to being the correct name
(391d-392a). We also find that Hector's son was called 'Astyanax' by the

't See Baxter, ch. 2.

 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 295

men of Troy, but 'Skamandrios' by the women, and to Socrates this is

good evidence that 'Astyanax' is correct. Indeed, there is a certain appro-
priateness about 'Astyanax', because it means 'lord of the city', and this
is a fitting description of Hector's son (392b-e). Socrates goes on to pro-
duce a number of etymologies of this sort, becoming less and less rigorous
as he progresses. 'Atreus' can be thought to mean 'stubbornness', 'bold-
ness' or 'destructiveness', any of which is appropriate(395b). 'Tantalus' may
be a corruptionof 'Talantatos', which means, fittingly, 'Most-weighed-upon'
(395d-e).
The etymologies continue. Claiming to be working under Euthyphro's
apparently mystical inspiration, Socrates is able to etymologise anything.
Many of his explanations sound quite reasonable, and may well be his-
torically correct (in that they tell the true story of how a name was
coined), but some strike the reader as clearly fanciful. When he seems
about to run into trouble over 'anthropoi', he tells us to "bear in mind the
following point about names: we often add letters or take them out and
change the accents as well, thus swerving aside from what we want to
name" (399a). Having given himself permission to rearrange letters and
accents, Socrates is able to say that 'anthr6poi' in fact comes from the
appropriate 'anathr6n ha opoe' (398e-399c).
Another useful tactic is introduced in order to solve a difficulty over
'pur', the Greek name for 'fire'. Rather than providing an etymology for
the word, Socrates suggests that it has been imported from some foreign
land, and that this excuses him from finding an explanation of its cor-
rectness (409d-410a). This device arises again when Socrates finds him-
self unable to explain the origin of 'kakon'; he simply says that it must
have a foreign origin and saves himself the trouble (416a).
Reaching the end of his examination of names whose correctness can
be explained in terms of the meanings of their parts, Socrates observes
that "if someone asks about the terms from which a name is formed, and
then about the ones from which those terms are formed, and keeps on
doing this indefinitely, the answerer must finally give up" (421d-e). To
break the infinite regress, we are going to have to introduce some way of
explaining those names which are "the elements of all the other statements
and names". "For, if these are indeed elements, it cannot be right to sup-
pose that they are composed out of other names" (422a). The point is that
a derivative name can only be a natural name if the primary names of
which it is comprised are themselves natural, and so there must be some
way of telling what it means for a primary name to be naturally correct.
A primary name is correct, Socrates says, if it imitates the thing that it
296 SIMON KELLER

names (423b). This imitationcannot be an imitationof the sound that a

thing makes,becausethatwould meanthatthose who make animalnoises
are naming the animals (423c). (Such a view would also have trouble
explaininghow we could name things like colours, which do not make
any noise.) Primarynamesshouldratherimitate"thebeing or essence that
each thing has", and this will not be a matterof simply reproducinga
sound (423e).
After saying that his views on primarynames seem, even to him, to be
"outrageousand absurd",Socratessuggests a way in which a word may
be an imitationof the essence of a thing (426b). He gives a numberof
cases in which a primaryname seems to be naturalbecause the essence
of the named thing is imitatedby the tongue or mouthwhen the letters
that makeup the word are pronounced.The letter'r', for example,is used
to signify motion, because the tongue is at its most agitatedwhen pro-
nouncingthis sound. '1' is an appropriatecomponentof the Greekwords
for 'glide' and 'smooth' and 'sleek', because the tongueglides acrossthe
mouth as it producesthe sound (426e-427b).The long etymologicalsec-
tion ends with Socrates' brief and uncriticalexposition of these ideas
about the correctnessof primarynames. His putativetheory will scruti-
nised in the following discussionwith Cratylus.
By the time that Cratylusentersthe dialogue,we have been given sev-
eral reasons to be suspicious of the etymological project.There can be
several etymologiesfor the one name. If there is no obvious explanation
of the originof some name, then the etymologistcan just explainthe cor-
rectnessof a similarword and say that the name that we actuallyuse is
a corruption.Or he can play aroundwith the lettersand the accents until
he gets a word that he can explain. If all else fails, the etymologistcan
say that the word is of foreign origin. Our feeling that the providingof
etymologiesis a singularlyunscientificactivityis reinforcedby comments
at various points in the exchange, such as when Hermogenessays that
Socrates' etymology for 'Hephaestus' sounds as though it is correct,
"unlessyou happento have anotheropinionon the matter.And you prob-
ably do" (407c). And Socratesascribeshis prowess to the inspirationof
Euthyphro,a man who, as is suggested by Plato's (presumably)earlier
dialogueof the same name, is not the sort of personwho would normally
be regardedas a sourceof intellectualinspiration.'4 Further,the invocation

1' In the Euthyphro, the title-characterclaims that his special "knowledge of the

divine" makes him "superiorto the majority of men" (4e-5a), but he in fact comes
across as petulant, shallow and flat-footed. Socrates, indeed, adopts rathera mocking
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 297

of EuthyphrodistancesSocratesfrom the argumentsthat he gives in this

section, and suggests that the sophists' intellectual reputationdepends
upon their mystique.The ability to produceetymologies at the drop of a
hat is charismatic,but it is not scientific. And, as will be shown in the
later discussionwith Cratylus,even when etymologistsget it right, their
results are of limited importance.
My commentsaboutthe etymologicalsectionare in supportof an inter-
pretationthat has been thoroughlyand, to my mind, convincinglyarticu-
lated by Baxter.'"The thoughtis that Plato wants to expose the weak-
nesses of a way of doing philosophythatwas popularduringhis lifetime.
Baxter offers speculative but plausible opinions as to which of Plato's
contemporariesused the etymologicalmethod,and which of them are the
targetsof which etymologies in the Cratylus.'6 If this way of readingthe
etymologies is correct (and it is, of course, what I am claiming to be
the correctway of readingthe entiredialogue),then we can begin to see
why the etymologicalsection is so long.'7
Part of Plato's purposein the etymologies is to give an exhibitionof
the sort of discussionthat might take place in the philosophicalcircles of
PlatonicAthens, and in particularin the expensive courses taughtby the
sophists.His ironictechniquemakesus believe thatwe are seeing a fairly
accurateportrayalof such a discussion, and at the same time makes us
awareof its absurdity.Producinghis etymologiessmoothly,spontaneously
and, in many cases, correctly,Socratesplays the role of the brilliantety-
mologist, but he also, as we have seen, draws our attentionto the arbi-
trarinessof his methods.Perhapsthe etymological section is so long in
orderto give Socratesroom to do both of these things. He can carryon
the conversationas a sophist would, while droppinghis self-deprecating
commentsjust every now and then. If Plato had made all of the points
that he wantedto make in a shorterdiscussion,then it might have looked
more like a crude parodyand we would have been less likely to believe
that we were seeing the real thing. Well, that might not be true for read-
ers of our time, who are not disposed to take etymological philosophy
seriously,but it may well have been truefor readersof Plato's time, who

tone in parts of the dialogue, announcinghis humble desire to share in the wisdom of
his interlocutor,a man who he has just shown to be quite silly (15d-e, for example).
'5 See Baxter's chs. 4 and 5.
16 Baxter, ch. 5.
'7 See Baxter's comments on pp. 97-99.
298 SIMON KELLER

were.8 As it stands,the etymologicalsection is a convincingsatire,even

thoughit does not make for grippingreading.
The approachto the etymologies that I have endorsedin this section
has been forcefullyquestionedin a recent article by David Sedley.'9On
Sedley's view, Plato is not being ironic in the etymologicalsection;Plato
offers the etymologies seriously,takingmost all of them to be etymolog-
ically, if not philosophically,correct.21'That is to say that even if Plato
does not think that we should be doing philosophyby doing etymology,
he does thinkthatthe providingof etymologiesis a useful and respectable
way of findingthe hidden meaningsof words. Sedley providesevidence
in favor of his claim that Plato had a genuine interestin etymology,and
pointsout that Plato's ancientinterpreters,so far as we know, all took the
etymologies seriously.2'Further,Sedley shows that the etymologies are
deliberatelyorganised,and that their structurecan be seen to anticipate
the later division of philosophyinto physics, ethics and logic.22The pur-
pose of the etymologies, Sedley suggests, is to reveal the ancient philo-
sophical views, some true and some mistaken,that are embeddedin the
languagethat Plato and his contemporarieshave inherited.23
I won't try to refute Sedley's interpretation, but I think that there are
two points worth making. First, it is very difficult(for me, anyway) to
read the references to the sophists, the invocations of Euthyphro,and
Hermogenes'commentsat 407c as doing anythingotherthanestablishing
an ironic distancebetween Plato and the etymologies. And Sedley does
not give reasonswhy Socratesshouldbe takenseriouslyin the partof the
etymological section that seems most ridiculous- the part in which he
speaks of how sounds can imitatethe essences of things.24
Second, it may be that we can accept many of Sedley's insightswith-
out giving up the view that the etymologies have an ironic purpose.
It would certainly be silly to cling dogmatically to the claim that the

18 I have not said anything in defense of the claim that etymology-as-philosophy

was popular in ancient Athens - again I refer the reader to Baxter, chs. 4 and 5. See
also David Sedley, 'The Etymologies in Plato's Cratylus',Journal of Hellenic Studies
118, 1998, p. 141.
19
Sedley, pp. 140-154.
20
Sedley, pp. 140-141.
21
Sedley, pp. 142-146.
22 Sedley, pp. 148-150.

23 Sedley, pp. 150-152.

24 But see Sedley, p. 148.

 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 299

etymological section is just a piece of satirical theatre. Perhaps the correct

story is as follows. Plato believes that the Attic Greek language was con-
structed so as to reflect certain ancient philosophical views, and he
believes that it is possible (not to mention fun) to use etymologies to spec-
ulate as to what these views may be. He has an interest in cataloguing
the ancient views, and this is part of what he is up to in the etymologi-
cal section. He also, however, thinks that etymology-as-philosophy is a
misconceived and insufficiently rigourous activity, and he wants to show
up the sophists for the charlatans that they are. Perhaps Plato thinks that
etymology has its place, but is concerned to see that it stays there.

4. Cratylus
Socrates tells Cratylus that if he has something better to say about the
correctness of names, then "you may sign me up as a student in your
course", suggesting that Cratylus may be one of the professional etymol-
ogists whose pretensions are at issue (428b).25Whatever the case, Cratylus
is a naturalist about names, saying that he agrees with all the opinions
and etymologies that Socrates has presented (428c). His naturalism
goes so far as to include the belief that if a name is to be a name at all,
then it must be a naturally correct name. He thinks that the name
'Hermogenes', for example, has not really been given to Hermogenes;
"people take it to have been given to him, but it is really the name of
someone else, namely, the very one who also has the nature" to which the
name 'Hermogenes' refers (429c). Cratylus' view leads him to say that
"one can neither speak nor say anything falsely", but for him this is not
a relativist claim (429e). Those whose speech does not accord with the
stringent rules of natural correctness are not really speaking, they are just
making noise.
Against Cratylus' extreme claim, Socrates presents a pair of ingenious
arguments (which I will only briefly describe). First, Socrates points out
that we can know that a certain action is an attempt to name, even if the
name ascribed is incorrect. When I step up to a man and say, 'This is
your name', and then present the name 'woman', I am ascribing a false
name (430e-431a). Second, if a correct name is one made up of letters
which imitate the essence of the thing named, then it is possible to have
a name that includes a little too much or leaves a little something out.

" On Cratylus' biography and philosophical views, see Baxter, pp. 25-30.
300 SIMON KELLER

Such a name will be imitationof the thing, and hence a name, but it will
be an inferiorimitation,and hence a false name (43lb-433b). Even if we
accept that there is a naturallycorrectname for each thing, we should
admit that there are some words which are not naturallycorrectnames,
but are names nonetheless.
Cratyluscan think of no way aroundthese considerations,but is still
"not satisfiedthat somethingis a name if it isn't well given" (433c). So
Socratesintroducesa crucial argument.The Attic word for 'hardness'is
'sklerotes',and the Eretrianword is 'skleroter'.Both namesseem to have
some naturalcorrectness,because they both end with letters, 's' and 'r',
thatare thoughtto signify hardness.'1', on the otherhand,appearsin each
of the words, but it is thoughtto signify softness. But perhapsthe 'P'has
been incorrectlyinserted into the words; despite the interlopingletter,
Cratylussuggests, the words are close enough to correctfor us to know
what they mean. But then, Socrates replies, what are we to say about
'skleron',the word for 'hard'?While 'skleron'containsthe letters's' and
'r', it is apparentlynot pronouncedin a way that allows these lettersto
signify 'hardness',and there is no 's' or 'r' at the end of the word to
make it an imitationof what it names.Yet, Socratespointsout, we under-
standwhat people are saying when they use the word. That is true, says
Cratylus,but only because of usage (434b-e).
Grasping onto this comment, Socrates forces Cratylusto agree that
his 'usage' is nothing more than convention. If you know that you
mean 'hard' when you say 'skleron', then "you have entered into a
convention with yourself, and the correctnessof names is a matter of
conventionfor you, for isn't it the chance of usage and conventionthat
makes both like and unlike letters express things?"(435a). The point is
that even names which are not naturallycorrectcan be made meaningful
by convention. Socrates has proven that there exist names which are
meaningfuland correct,even if they are not naturallycorrectin the sense
requiredby Cratylus.
Taken alone, Socrates' argumentdoes not destroythe core naturalistic
thesis. A naturalistcould agree that there are names in use which are
incorrectaccordingto nature,and agree that these names have a conven-
tional correctness,while still insistingthat thereis a single naturallycor-
rect name for each thing. It might be possible, the naturalistcan say, to
weed out the names whose correctnessis sustainedonly by convention
and to replacethemwith naturallycorrectterms.So, we mightthink,there
is life left in naturalism.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 301

In the speech in which he makes his point, however,Socratesdelivers,

as if in passing, a devastatingargumentagainst the naturalistictheoryof
language.
Consider numbers,Cratylus, since you want to have recourse to them. Where do
you think you'll get names that are like each of the numbers,if you don't allow
this agreement and convention of yours to have some control over the correct-
ness of names? (435b)

Numbersare things whose essences cannot be imitatedby the mouth or

the tongue. The tongue can glide or click as much as it likes, the mouth
can contortitself into all sorts of shapes,but they will never successfully
imitate 'two' or 'thirty-seven';no name could ever be the naturallycor-
rect name of a number.26 And this is probablythe thin end of the wedge.
The powerful argumentagainst naturalismis that there is no particular
reason to believe that the essence of a given thing will be susceptibleto
vocal imitation.Many entities will not have naturalnames, and we will
need a conventionif we are to name such things.
Is Plato committinghimself to conventionalism?Socratescontinues:
I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possible,
but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as
Hermogenes suggested, and that we have to make use of this worthless thing,
convention, in the correctness of names. For probably the best possible way to
speak consists in using names all (or most) of which are like the things they
name (that is, are appropriateto them), while the worst is to use the opposite
kind of names. (435c)

At first glance, Socrates' position is clear enough. He has shown that the
names of many things - the numbers, for example - must be determined
by convention, but he thinks that we should give naturally appropriate
names whenever we can. It would be nice to say that all our names could
be correct, but to defend such a view would be as difficult as hauling a
ship up a sticky ramp. Convention is sometimes required, but we should
use natural names where possible.
Others have seen this passage as endorsing a thoroughgoing conven-
tionalism. Malcolm Schofield, for example, tells us that Socrates' natu-

"I Well, we could perhapsimitate the essence of numbersby using one click of the
tongue to name the number one, two clicks to name the numbertwo, and so on. But
this gives rise to another problem: for large numbers, we would have to count the
clicks to work out which number is being named, and what could we use to do the
counting? (Thanks to Sarah Broadie for pointing this out.)
302 SIMON KELLER

ralistic sentiment is "nothing more than an expression of vain regret"."7

But I can see no reason to suppose that Socrates' words are not to be
taken at face value. There is certainly no inconsistency between his posi-
tion here and what is said in the rest of the dialogue. I agree, however,
that Socrates could dispose of naturalism if he chose to do so; the class
of things whose essence can be imitated in words seems very small, and
the descriptions of how these essences are imitated are not very convinc-
ing. But Socrates does not launch an outright attack upon naturalism, and
this passage is not (as Schofield seems to suggest)21the grand conclusion
to the dialogue. Socrates moves on to other matters.
Socrates asks, "What power do names have for us? What's the good
of them?", and Cratylus replies, "To give instruction, Socrates. After all,
the simple truth is that anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the
thing" (435d). Teaching the meaning of names, Cratylus says, is "the best
and only way" to give instruction about the things that are (435e). For the
remainder of the dialogue, Socrates argues against this claim.
The first problem with the idea is epistemic. Anyone who "investigates
things by taking names as his guide" is at the mercy of the presupposi-
tions of those who first gave the names (436b). Attic Greek, Socrates says,
does not yield a consistent picture of reality when examined under the nat-
uralistic theory, but there are indications that the language was developed
by people who believed the Heraclitean doctrine that everything is in flux.
In any case, the methods used by etymologists are not sufficiently precise
for us to reach a reliable conclusion as to the metaphysical theory embod-
ied in our language. "If one took the trouble", says Socrates, "I think one
could find many other names from which one could conclude that the
name-giver intended to signify not that they were moving and being swept
along, but the opposite, that they were at rest" (437c). And even if a con-
sistent view were to emerge, it would only tell us what the original name-
givers thought, and they might have been wrong.
Second, if the study of names is the only way to learn about reality,
then we cannot explain how the name-givers came to have the opinions
they had. They must have gathered their knowledge from somewhere, and
it cannot have been through language (438b). Moreover, if we are going
to be able to work out which names are well given and which are not,
then "we'll have to look for something other than names, something that

27 Malcolm Schofield, 'The denouementof the Cratylus', in Malcolm Schofield and

MarthaNussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos, Cambridge, 1982, p. 67.

2X Schofield, p. 81.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 303

will make plain to us without using names which of these two kinds of
names are the true ones" (438d). There must be some way to examine
things directly, rather than via their names, and this direct method of
investigating reality will be in every way superior. Only by looking straight
to the things themselves can we gain knowledge that is not susceptible to
the biases of others.29
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates gives a brief explanation of why
he rejects Heraclitus's theory, regardless of what any etymological inves-
tigation might say (this explanation begins at 439c and ends at 440b).
Socrates' argument, as Baxter notes, seems out of place and, on some
interpretations, pretty bad.30My own view is that it is not meant to be a
knock-down argument against Heracliteanism. Socrates is just expressing
his opposition to the Heraclitean doctrine that Cratylus favours, and in
doing so providing us (and Cratylus) with an example of a deep philo-
sophical disagreement - the sort of disagreement that etymological inves-
tigations could never satisfactorily resolve. Socrates is not launching into
a tangential discussion of metaphysics, but is continuing to express his
broader point. In drawing the dialogue to a close, Socrates certainly sug-
gests that the debate between himself and Heracliteanism remains unre-
solved. He concludes:

So whether I'm right about these things or whether the truthlies with Heraclitus
and many others isn't an easy matter to investigate. But surely no one with any
understandingwill commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to names, or trust
them and their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows something -
condemning both himself and the things that are to be totally unsound like leaky
sinks - or believe that things are exactly like people with runny noses, or that
all things are afflicted with colds and drip over everything. It's certainly possi-
ble that things are this way, Cratylus, but it's also possible that they are not. So
you must investigate them courageously and thoroughlyand not accept anything
easily - you are still young and in your prime after all. (440c-d)

The discussion of Heracliteanism is but another stop on the way to the

dialogue's main conclusion: we should not do philosophy through ety-
mology.3' As is appropriate for a discussion of methodology, the dialogue

29 It is not entirely clear what it means to "look to the things themselves". A plau-

sible and straight-forwardinterpretationof the phrase, I think, is that to look to a thing

itself is think about or observe the thing, rather than thinking about or observing the
name of the thing.
30 Baxter, pp. 176-183.

3" Plato's disapprovalof the etymological approachto philosophical questions may

well be an instance of a more general view that there is no close link between lan-
304 SIMON KELLER

ends with the metaphysicaldispute unresolved,and with Socrates and

Cratylusencouragingeach other to keep thinkingabout it (440d-e).

5. The Interpretation
Withregardto the questionof what makesa namecorrect,the Cratylus
is ambivalent.Neitherconventionalismnornaturalismemergesfavourably.
Hermogenes'conventionalismis reasonable,but poorly thought-out,and
it is quickly discardedin the face of Socrates'cunningarguments.These
arguments,however, are fallacious, and a more confidentand thoughtful
conventionalistwould not have succumbed.While Socrateslaterespouses
a partiallyconventionalistview, he does not reconsiderhis earlierargu-
ments, and Hermogenes' theory, as far as the dialogue is concerned,
remainsdead. Naturalism,the dialogue demonstrates,can never provide
an explanationof the correctnessof all names, because there are at least
some names whose correctnessrelies upon convention. But naturalism
about language is never explicitly rejected;indeed, Socrates,in the end,
has some sympathyfor the theory.
It seems reasonableto think that if the Cratyluswere primarilycon-
cerned with the debate between naturalismand conventionalism,then
Plato would have spent considerablymore time on the issue than he did.
He would have subjectedthe argumentsagainstconventionalismto a more
careful analysis and he would have exploredmore thoroughlythe impli-
cations for naturalismof the argumentsgiven in the last section of the
dialogue.He would certainlyhave put more effortinto an exposition,and
perhapsa defence, of Socrates'hybridview. As the dialogue stands,the
questionof conventionalismand naturalismdoes not receive a satisfying
philosophicaltreatment.
In contrast, the Cratylus presents a vigorous and compelling case
againstthe idea that we can learn aboutrealityby learningaboutnames.
In the etymologicalsection, we see that those who investigatethe natural
correctnessof namesare involvedin an activitywhich is arbitrary,untrust-
worthy, and governedby rules designed to make the etymologist's task
as easy as possible. In the discussion with Cratylus,we learn that the

guage and reality, and, hence, that a concern with language can sometimes be an
impedimentto the philosopher'sattemptsto understandthings as they really are. Some
textual evidence for such a view may be found in Letter VII, at 342a-344c, for exam-
ple (but note the disagreementover whetheror not Plato wrote the Letters).Also, some
such view seems to be about in the Laws - see, for example, Book XIII, 965a onwards.
 AN INTERPRETATIONOF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 305

investigationof reality throughnames is based upon flawed suppositions.

Even when names have been constructedso as to be naturallyappropri-
ate to the things named,they will be appropriateonly in the eyes of those
who subscribeto the metaphysicalviews of the name-givers,and these
views mightbe wrong.If our aim is to acquiresturdy,reliableknowledge
about the world, Plato concludes,then we should stop spendingintellec-
tual energy on the correctnessof names, and should look to the things
themselves.
If we accept that Plato's main purposeis to dispose of etymology as a
way of investigatingthe things there are, then we can begin to see why
the dialogue is structuredas it is. The referencesto the sophists,the long
etymologicalsatire and the emphasisin the dialogue's conclusionare all
importantto the buildingof a case against etymology. And if we accept
this interpretation,
then we can see why Plato may not have felt the need
to resolve the debate between conventionalismand naturalism.He has
shown that naturalismmust be limited in scope, and that we can only
know whethera thing's name is naturallycorrectif we alreadyknow all
about the thing. Whetherconventionalismor a restrictedversion of natu-
ralism is correct,we should proceedby looking to the things themselves
and not to their names. It may be that some names are naturallycorrect,
or it may be that names are correct only by convention.But as far as
philosophicalinquiryis concerned,it just doesn't matter.32

Dept. of Philosophy
Princeton University

32 I owe a large debt to Sarah Broadie, whose comments have been incorporated

at several points in the paper. Thanks also to the Phronesis editors for their helpful
comments.