CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIV

ERSITY
NECESSITY TO INTERPRET THE
PROVISION OF CONSTRUCTION

Submitted to:

Submitted by:

Dr. S. Ali

Akanksha Priya

(Faculty, ISPL)

Roll no. 907

7th Semester
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Any project completed or done in isolation is unthinkable. This project, although prepared by
me, is a culmination of efforts of a lot of people. Firstly, I would like to thank our Professor for
ISPL, Dr. S. Ali for his valuable suggestions towards the making of this project.

Further to that, I would also like to express my gratitude towards our seniors who were a lot of
help for the completion of this project. The contributions made by my classmates and friends are,
definitely, worth mentioning.

I would like to express my gratitude towards the library staff for their help also. I would also like
to thank the persons interviewed by me without whose support this project would not have been
completed.

Last, but far from the least, I would express my gratitude towards the Almighty for obvious
reasons.

Akanksha Priya
3|Page
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Method of Research

The researcher has adopted a purely doctrinal method of research. The researcher has made

extensive use of the available resources at library of the Chanakya National Law University and

also the internet sources.

Aims and Objectives

The aim of the project is to present an overview of various aspects of the Bhopal Gas tragedy

and role of Supreme Court in the country on an analysis of the various case laws and juristic

opinions in this regard.

Scope and Limitations

Though the current topic is an immense project and pages can be written over the topic but due

to certain restrictions and limitations the researcher has not been able to deal with the topic in
great detail.

Sources of Data:

The following sources of data have been primarily used in the project-

Books

Journals

Cases

Method of Writing:

The method of writing followed in the course of this research paper is primarily analytical.

Mode of Citation

th
The researcher has followed the bluebook method of citation (19 ed.) throughout the course of

this research paper. The author has followed the foot note system for citation.
INTRODUCTION

Words spoken or written are the means of communication. Where they are possible of giving one
and only one meaning there is no problem. But where there is a possibility of two meanings, a
problem arises and the real intention is to be sorted out. It two persons communicating with each
other are sitting together; they can by subsequent conversation clear the confusion and make
things clear. But what will happen if a provision in any statute is found to convey more than one
meaning? The Judges and the Lawyers whose duty it is to interpret statutes have no opportunity
to converse with the Legislature which had enacted a particular statute. The Legislature, after
enacting statutes becomes functus officio so far as those statutes are concerned. It is not their
function to interpret the statutes. Thus two functions are clearly demarcated. Legislature enacts
and the Judges interpret. The difficulty with Judges is that they cannot say that they do not
understand a particular provision of an enactment. They have to interpret in one way or another.
They cannot remand or refer back the matter to the Legislature for interpretation. That situation
led to the birth of principles of interpretation to find out the real intent of the Legislature.
Consequently, the Superior Courts had to give us the rules of interpretation to ease ambiguities,
inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. The rules of interpretation come into play only where
clarity or precision in the provisions of the statute are found missing. Good enactments are those
which have least ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. Bad enactments are gold
mine for lawyers because for half of the litigation the legislative draftsmen are undoubtedly the
cause. The purpose of the interpretation of the statute Is to unlock the locks put by the
Legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for
interpretation and principles of interpretation.
AIDS FOR INTERPRETATION

The aids for interpretation may be divided into two categories, namely, Internal and External.
The Internal Aids are those which are found within the statute. They may be as follows:-

1. Long title of the statute.

2. Preamble of the statute.

3. Chapter Headings of the statute.

4. Marginal Notes to every section of statute.

5. Punctuations.

6. Illustrations given below the sections.

7. Definitions.

8. Provisos.

9. Explanation.

10. Saving Clauses and non-obstante Clauses

External Aid for interpretation are those which are not contained in the statute but are found
else-where. They may be as follows:-

1. Historical background.

2. Statement of objects and reasons.

3. The original Bill as drafted and introduced.

4. Debates in the Legislature.

5. State of things at the time a particular legislation was enacted

. 6. Judicial construction.

7. Legal dictionaries.

8. Commonsense. As stated above, the Superior Courts have formulated certain principles of
interpretation to find out the real intent of. the Legislature.
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETATION

These principles may be enumerated as follows:-

The Literal Rule

Under the literal rule (also: the ordinary meaning rule; the plain meaning rule), it is the task of
the court to give a statutes words their literal meaning regardless of whether the result is sensible
or not. In a famous judgment, Lord Diplock in Duport Steel v Sirs (1980) said The courts may
sometimes be willing to apply this rule despite the manifest absurdity that may result from the
outcome of its application. The literal rule is often applied by orthodox judges who believe that
their constitutional role is limited to applying laws as enacted by Parliament. Such judges are
wary of being seen to create law, a role which they see as being strictly limited to the
elected legislative branch of government. In determining the intention of the legislature in
passing a particular statute, this approach restricts a judge to the so called black letter of the
law. The literal rule has been the dominantapproach taken for over 100 years.

The Golden Rule

The golden rule (also: the British rule) is an exception to the literal rule and will be used where
the literal rule produces the result where Parliaments intention would be circumvented rather
than applied. In Grey v Pealson (1857), Lord Wensleygale said : The literal rule should be used
first, but if it results in absurdity, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

One example of the application of the golden rule is the case of R v Allen
Defendant is charged with bigamy, an offence prohibited in Offences Against Persons Act
1861 which reads whoever is married, marries another commits bigamy. The court held that
the word marries need not mean a contract of marriage as it was impossible for a person who is
already married to enter into another valid contract of marriage. Hence, the court interpreted it as
going through marriage ceremony.
The Mischief Rule

The final rule of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule, under which a judge attempts to
determine the legislators intention; what is the mischief and defect that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy? The classic
statement of the mischief rule is that given by the Barons of the Court of Exchequer in Heydons
Case (1854): for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, four things are to be
discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of
the Commonwealth?
4. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judge is always to make
such construction or shall suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.

Contextual interpretation

Although the meaning of the statutory provision has to be ascertained only from the words
employed by the Legislature, the set up' and context are also relevant for ascertaining what
exactly was meant to be conveyed by the terminology employed. The same words may mean one
thing in one context and another in a different context. In ascertaining the true intention, of the
Legislature, the Court must not only look at the words used by the Legislature but also have
regard to the context and the setting in which they occur, The exact colour and shape of the
meaning of words in an enactment is not to be ascertained by reading them in isolation, The
provisions of the statutes which bear upon the same subject-matter must be read as a whole and
in their entirety, each throwing light on and illumining the meaning of the other. The Court must
have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. It must ascertain
the intention of the Legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to be construed
but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting
in which the clause to be Interpreted occurs. If the context clearly suggests that a particular rule
of grammar is inapplicable then the requirement of context must prevail over the rule of
grammar.

Harmonious construction

Every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a harmonious
one. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are
in such conflict with each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be
so interpreted that effect can be given to both and that a construction which renders either of
them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort. It is the duty of the
Courts to avoid conflict between two provisions, and whenever it is possible to do so to construe
provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. This rule of harmonious construction
applies not only to different provisions in one Act but also to different cognate Acts such as the
Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. Where, however, the words of the statute are
not reasonably capable of the construction canvassed, then It would be unreasonable and
illegitimate for the Court to limit the scope of those words - arbitrarily solely for the purpose of
establishing harmony between the assumed object and the scheme of the Act.

Ejusdem generis:-

The ejusdem generis rule is explained in Halsbury's Laws of England thus:- '"As a rule, where in
a statute there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must
be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, although this, as a rule of construction;,
must be applied with caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in
accordance with the intention of Parliament. For the ejusdem rule to apply, the specific words
must constitute a category , class or genus; if they do constitute such a category, class or genus,
then only things which belong to that category , class or genus fall within the general words "
NEED FOR INTERPRETATION

In his The Law-Making Process, Michael Zander gives three reasons why statutory interpretation
is necessary:

1. Complexity of statutes in regards to the nature of the subject, numerous draftsmen and the
blend of legal and technical language can result in incoherence, vague and ambiguous language.

2. Anticipation of future events leads to the use of indeterminate terms. The impossible task of
anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of indeterminate language. Judges
therefore have to interpret statutes because of the gaps in law. Examples of inderterminate
language include words such as reasonable. In this case the courts are responsible for
determining what constitutes the word reasonable.

3. The multifaceted nature of language. Language, words and phrases are an imprecise form of
communication. Words can have multiple definitions and meanings. Each party in court will
utilize the definition and meaning of the language most advantageous to their particular need. It
is up to the courts to decide the most correct use of the language employed.
EXAMPLES OF MANDATORY PROVISIONS
1. The provisions relating to limitation for seeking remedy in Courts or Tribunals;

2. The provisions relating to principles of natural justice;

3. The provisions relating to registration of certain documents;

Use of negative words shows a clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory-

EXAMPLES;-

Section 80 CPC. Section 87 B, CPC.

Section 77 of Railways Act, 1890,

Section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925,

Section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899.

Section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954,

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

In Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das, the Supreme Court held that-
"The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a Statute must be construed in
accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons. Such as, where a
literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of
the legislature from being carried out. There is no reason why the word "or" should be construed
otherwise than in its ordinary meaning. If the construction suggested by Mr. Desai were to be
accepted and the word "or" were to be construed as meaning "and", it would mean that the
construction should not only be such as materially alters the accommodation but is also such that
it would substantially diminish its value. ...........

In Kamta Prasad Aggarwal v. Executive Engineer, Ballabhgarh, the Apex Court held that
"depending upon the context, "or" may be read as "and" but the Court would not do it unless it is
so obliged because "or" does not generally mean "and" and "and" does not generally mean "or".
Furthermore, again in Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v. Union of India, the Court restated
the rule for interpretation of the words and and or and held as that -

"The language of the rule is plain and simple. It does not admit of any doubt in interpretation.
Provisos 1(i) and 2(i) are separated by the use of conjunction "and". They have to be read
conjointly. The requirement of both the provisos has to be satisfied to avail the benefit."