Anglo-American Rivalry For Military Aviation in Southern China in The 1930s

Anglo-American Rivalry for Military Aviation in Southern
China in the 1930s

Guangqiu Xu
Iowa Wesleyan College
In the 1930s, the Nationalist government in Nanking faced two major

problems: warlord rebellions and Japans invasion. Established in 1928,
the Nationalist government led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
exerted power in North China after suppressing the rebellions in that
area in 1930, but the local governments in South China maintained
their own armies and bases largely directed against this central gov-
ernment. Political divisions and tensions persisted. In May 1931, the
Canton authorities rebelled against the Nationalist government, and
a new full-scale civil war seemed imminent. The Manchurian Incident
and subsequent invasion and occupation of Manchuria by the Japa-
nese Army served to bolster national patriotism against Japan and, in
response to public pressure, the Nanking and Canton governments
held a series of peace conferences. The Canton government was forced
to abolish its Nationalist Government, yet Kwangtung and Kwangsi
Provinces remained functionally independent of Nanking until 1936.
In the 1930s the weight and influence of the air forces became in-
creasingly important in settling political and military differences in
China. The provincial governments in South China strove on their own
to develop air power because it was helpful not only in maintaining
local control, but also in protecting themselves against Nankings at-
tempts to dominate the South. Like the central government, the local
authorities sought foreign assistance in developing a military aviation
program. Foreign businessmen took the opportunity to extend their
influence in South China by sending air missions, building aircraft
factories, and establishing flying schools, which led to the American
domination of military aviation in Kwangtung and the British in
Kwangsi.
American and British manufacturers became the two major com-
petitors for aircraft orders in South China, a rivalry that inevitably
embroiled their governments in a major dispute over aircraft sales to
the Nationalist governments internal opponents in South China. How
did the Americans and the British help the Chinese to develop their
military aviation in South China in the 1930s? How did the Americans
compete with the British in the airplane market in South China? What
The Journal of AmericanEast Asian Relations, Vol. 7, Nos. 34 (FallWinter 1998)
Copyright 1998 by Imprint Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.
187
188 The Journal of AmericanEast Asian Relations
was the implication of the Anglo-American aircraft competition on

China? The answers to these questions will help to clarify aspects of
the Anglo-American relationship in China before the Sino-Japanese
War.1 They will also offer better understanding of the conflicts between
the central and local governments in the 1930s, and shed light on U.S.
China policy during this period. No answers to these questions are
readily at hand in existing literature. This essay draws upon govern-
ment documents and manuscript materials in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Peoples Republic of China. Many docu-
ments, manuscripts, and personal papers with regard to these ques-
tions are preserved in the archives of these countries. This paper will
examine how the Americans and the British helped the Chinese de-
velop military aviation in South China in the 1930s. It will also study
the nature of Anglo-American aircraft competition, and explore the
consequences of that conflict.
American Influence
The unilateral revocation of the ban on the export of commercial planes
by the U.S. government in June 1928 opened a new market for Ameri-
can aircraft manufacturers and marked a new epoch in the history of
Chinese aviation. Oddly, Canton, rather Nanking, served as the venue
for the earliest sales of U.S. aircraft in China after the lift of the China
Arms Embargo.2 The first modern American airplane delivered to
China since 1922 reached Canton on 9 October 1928, and it was a plane
purchased by General Chang Wei-chang, a young Chinese flying of-
ficer who was the director of the Canton Aviation Bureau. Inspired by
the news of Charles A. Lindberghs solo trans-Atlantic flight in 1927,
Chang was anxious to acquire an American plane similar to the Spirit
of St. Louis, and he approached an official of the Commerce Depart-
ment. After considerable cabling back and forth between China and
the United States, Chang placed an order with the B. F. Mahoney Air-
craft Corporation of San Diego for a Ryan Brougham monoplane
1. As to relations between Britain and the United States with respect to East Asia in
the 1930s, some historians see positive elements in the cooperation between those two
countries. Gerald E. Wheeler, for example, stresses instances of British and American
cooperation but neglects important disagreements between Washington and London.
See Gerald E. Wheeler, Isolated Japan: Anglo-American Diplomatic Cooperation,
19271936, Pacific Historical Review 30 (1961). Other historians, however, contend that
competition prevailed over cooperation between those two countries. See, for example,
Max Beloff, The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth, in Martin Gilbert,
ed., A Century of Conflict, 18501950: Essays for A. J. Taylor (London, 1966).
2. For the study of the China Arms Embargo, see James Stephen, A Policy of Such
Common Interest: The United States and the Diplomacy of the China Arms Embargo
(Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 1989) and Chen Jien-kong, Lien-chian tui Chung-kuo
te chun-fo chin-yun, 19191929 (Arms embargo on China by the powers) (Taipei, 1983).
Anglo-American Rivalry 189
equipped with a Wright Whirlwind engine similar to the Spirit of St.

Louis. When that plane was shipped to Canton, Chang appropriately
named it the Spirit of Canton, and assembled it with the help of a fel-
low officer who had also received some flying training in the United
States. A second Ryan Brougham, identical to the first plane, arrived
in Canton a month later. The general took his Ryan on a dramatic tour
of China in November. That successful flight established Chang as the
Lindbergh of China and awakened wide interest among the Chi-
nese in aviation and in American aircraft.3
To increase its influence in China, Mahoney-Ryan appointed the
Lloyd E. Gale Company as its agent in China. The Gale Company was
the first American trading company in China to represent directly a
U.S. airplane manufacturer.4 In early December 1928, Lloyd Gale con-
tracted the Wuhan Civil Aviation Company, Ltd. of Hankow to pur-
chase five Ryan airplanes manufactured by Mahoney Air Corporation.
These planes, consigned to the Wuhan military authority, arrived in
Wuhan in mid-February 1929.5
Lloyd succeeded in signing a second contract with the Canton Avia-
tion Bureau to purchase five Waco airplanes at a total cost of US$55,125.
At the same time, the local military authority of Yunnan province in
Southwest China also purchased two Ryan-Mahoney airplanes for
US$34,000. And finally, nine planes totalling US$118,000 were pur-
chased by the Chinese authorities in South China during that spring.6
The hopes of American manufacturers were quickly fulfilled. In July
1931, twenty Douglas planes, each equipped with two aircraft guns
and two bomb racks, were permitted by the State Department to leave
the United States for Macao as commercial airplanes.7 In the follow-
ing years, Americans continued to sell more airplanes to Canton and
captured the aircraft market before the Sino-Japanese War.
3. China Weekly Review, 26 Jan. 1929, 354, 360; Jenkins to secretary of state (SecSt), 12
Dec. 1928, 893.113/Airplanes/18, Department of State General Records, RG 59, National
Archives (hereafter NA), Washington D.C.
4. Gale first visited China in 1914 as a civil engineer with the Standard Oil Company,
and later joined the American Trading Company, managing its Hankow branch for five
years. When that organization closed the office, Gale took over many of its principal
agencies and began his own business. Later he specialized in motor vehicles and came
to own the finest motor car service station in China. China Weekly Review, 23 Feb. 1929,
526.
5. Adams to SecSt, 18 Dec. 1928, 893.113 Mahoney Aircraft Corp./26, RG 59, NA;
American Planes Tested at Hankow; Mrs. Gale Flies, China Press (Shanghai), 20 Feb.
1929, 1.
6. Adams to SecSt, 4 Apr. 1931, 893.113 Mahoney Aircraft Corp./26, RG 59, NA.
7. There could have been doubt that the final destination of those planes was Canton
and additional armaments would be added to those planes when they were delivered to
Canton. American Minister Nelson Johnson expressed his bewilderment as to how these
twenty Douglas planes were permitted to leave the country as commercial planes.
Johnson to State Department, 1 Aug. 1931, 893.113 Douglas Aircraft Co./32, RG 59, NA.
Several reasons account for the success of the American aircraft

sales to Canton. First, a handful of Cantonese pilots were familiar with
American aircraft. The United States had previously sold eleven Ameri-
can-made sea planes to M. Ricou, a French financier in Macao, in 1919.
Those planes were used briefly for the short run between Macao and
Hong Kong. Later, Walter D. Bonner, an American pilot and former
naval officer, arrived to take charge of the operations. Owing to a short-
age of financial support for an airline at that time, the project col-
lapsed a year after its inauguration; the airplanes were purchased by
Chu Che-wen, director of the Canton Aviation Bureau, and moved to
that city up the Pearl River. In Canton, the airplanes were converted
from sea planes to land plane, and were absorbed eventually into the
Canton Flying School, which was operated by the Bureau. In addi-
tion, four Curtiss JN-6 planes, formerly used by the U.S. Army, were
smuggled into Canton from Manila. Those planes were purchased by
the Cantonese in Manila and entered Canton through the port of
Kwangchow Wan, a French-leased territory on the Luichow penin-
sula in Kwangtung province. In 1928, the Canton authorities were still
using those twelve-year-old planes equipped with OX engines.8
Moreover, most of the Cantonese aviators were familiar with U.S.
airplanes because they, including General Chang Wei-chang, received
their training in the United States. General Wang Ping-hang learned
to fly in Emeryville, California, a short distance north of Oakland.
Wang Yu-pei and Wang Yu-chuan, who were both born in nearby
Marysville, California, trained at a commercial school in Chicago in
1921. Captain C. Y. Lau learned to fly in Chicago in 1921 and returned
to China in 1922 with Wang Yu-pei and Wang Yu-chun.9 Because of
their training in the United States, the Cantonese aviators nurtured
natural preferences for American planes with which they were
familiar.
Furthermore, American diplomats in Canton, including Consul
General Douglas Jenkins, proved extremely solicitous in assisting
American businessmen to open the China market. Jenkins took a keen
interest in the potentiality of the South China market for American
planes and used every opportunity to establish friendly contacts with
General Chang Wei-chang and other officers connected with the Can-
ton Aviation Bureau. In November 1928, the Bureau selected the Ad-
vance Aircraft Company of Troy, Ohio to supply ten Waco planes for
training commercial and military pilots in connection with the Can-
ton Flying School. It was Consul Jenkins requested the State Depart-
8. Lincoln C. Reynolds, Aviation in China, 1935, 893.796/193, ibid.; Douglas Jenkins,

Aviation Situation in Canton, 14 Dec. 1928, 893.113 Advance Aircraft Co./5, ibid.
9. Reynolds, Aviation in China, 1935.
ment for a bid on those planes. After receiving Jenkinss cable, Assis-
tant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr passed it on to the Commerce
Department, which in turn contacted the Advance Company. A few
days before Christmas, Jenkins received a telegram of quotations and
transmitted it promptly to the Canton Aviation Bureau.10 In March
1929, Earl Baskey, a representative of the Gale Company, arrived in
Canton with a letter of introduction from the American consul gen-
eral in Hankow, Walter A. Adams.11 During the negotiations, Jenkins
transmitted Earls telegram in the gray consular code through the Navy
Department to his superior principal at Hankow when Baskey failed
to communicate. The Canton consulate also put Earl in contact with
the local branch of the National City Bank of New York, through which
agreements were finally made for the issuance of letters of credit to
facilitate payment. Finally, on 2 April, the Canton Aviation Bureau
entered into an agreement with the Gale Company of Hankow for the
purchase of five Waco airplanes. The assistance of U.S. diplomats in
China proved timely in helping to establish the China market for
American aircraft.
Americans not only sold airplanes but also sent an air mission to
train Chinese aviators. Founded in 1924, the Canton Aviation School
was reorganized in 1928 with General Chang Wei-chang as comman-
dant. British Avro-Avion training planes were used for primary train-
ing because they were lighter and easier to handle than American
planes. Advanced students were required to receive some instructions
in American Ryan Brougham and Waco planes.12 Following up on his
role in the John Jouett mission,13 Edward Howard, the American com-
mercial attach in Shanghai, began promoting an air mission for the
Canton Aviation School. When he submitted his plan to Leighton
Rogers of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Commerce Department,
the latter agreed with his project and recommended the second alter-
10. Jenkins, Aviation Situation in Canton, 14 Dec. 1928.

11. Baskey, an erstwhile squadron commander with the U.S. forces during World War
I, associated himself with the Mahoney Aircraft Corporation after the Great War. Jenkins
to SecSt, 6 Apr. 1929, 893.113 Airplanes/26, RG 59, NA.
12. Students were all volunteers with at least a high school education. Primary in-
struction consisted of a short ground course followed by fifteen hours of elementary
flying, after which the student was expected to fly solo. Among other things, students
were required to take off, land, loop, split S, and Immelmann before being qualified for
their licenses. Thirty-five students received their pilot licenses in 1928, and about 100
students and 50 mechanics were trained in the next year. See Jenkins to SecSt, 23 Oct.
1928, 893.113 Airplane/15, RG 59, NA; Major Magruder, Field Artillery, China Avia-
tion, report 7723, file 2078, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs,
RG 165, NA.
13. On the Jouett mission, see William Leary, Wings for China: The Jouett Mission,
19321935, Pacific Historical Review 38 (1969).
native.14 With Rogers approval, Howard traveled to Canton in De-

cember 1932, with his proposition for an unofficial American mission
on a much less elaborate scale than Jouetts in Hangchow. At the same
time, the Canton Air Force asked the British Far East Aviation Com-
pany in Hong Kong to send to Canton an air mission of one pilot and
one aircraft engineer.15 For fear of losing this opportunity to the Brit-
ish competitors, Rogers lost no time in selecting Edward Deeds, a man
with considerable experience in aviation training in United States, as
head of the prospective mission, whose members included a number
of airmen.
Things were running smooth. On 8 February 1933, the air techni-
cians appointed by the Commerce Department sailed from Seattle for
Canton. Deeds was a cautious and loyal man at the school. He would
not allow the Chinese pilots to fly newer and faster American planes
until he had personally tested each of the planes. Unfortunately, when
he tried out a new Curtiss Hawk on 1 July 1933, a high-speed pursuit
plane, it crashed and killed him.16
The Canton authorities requested that Deeds be replaced with an-
other American instructor, preferably a captain or major, who had an
equal knowledge of pursuit, army cooperation, gunnery, observation,
and map-making. On 6 July, Julean Arnold, commercial attach in
Shanghai, suggested that Rogers cooperate with William Pawley, presi-
dent of Intercontinent Aviation Incorporated, to choose a flight instruc-
tor for the Canton Aviation Bureau. Two months later, Captain John
Claiborne, appointed by the Commerce Department, was en route from
14. The plan composed of either three flying instructors (bombardment, pursuit, ob-
servation) and one chief mechanic, with monthly salaries of $200 each or one adviser
and one mechanic, with salaries of $600 and $200 respectively. The first alternative, ac-
cording to Rogers, offered salaries too low for capable pilots, yet mechanics were the
same ($200) in both plans. Rogers to Smiley, 21 Dec. 1932, file 560, box 503, Records of
the Bureau of Foreign and Commerce, Department of Commerce, RG 151, NA.
15. The Canton Aviation Bureau insisted that they needed only two pilots of non-
commissioned officer type who would receive $200 a month and two mechanics $150.
In spite of the competitively low pay, the pilots must be competent to instruct in all
phases of combat flying, including artillery observation, bombardment, and pursuit, and
the mechanics must instruct in gunnery and photography. Further, one of the ground
men should be qualified to set up a complete photographic laboratory. These instruc-
tors, in place of more highly qualified and richly paid advisers, were to work under the
command of Cantonese officers. See Evans to Orde, 13 Dec. 1932, F8613/16/10, General
Correspondence, Record Class FO 371, Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office
(hereafter GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO), London.
16. That mission included Captain Edward Deeds, Lieutenant Clarence Terrell, and
Lieutenant Stuart Baird. McClean to Rentscher, 26 Jan. 1933, U.S. Senate Special Com-
mittee, Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry (73rd
Cong. and 74th Cong.), 6:155455; see also Mondell to Rogers, 25 Apr. 1933, file 560, box
503, RG 151, NA.; Canton-Body of American Aviator Deeds, Killed in Crash, July 1,
Shipped to U.S., New York Times, 18 July 1933, 5.
Los Angeles to Canton. In 1934, the Canton Aviation School employed

four Americans as instructors who contributed to the successful de-
velopment of the Canton Air Force. From January 1933 to July 1936,
the aviation school graduated approximately 150 pilots trained by
American instructors. The graduates of this school formed the bulk of
the flying personnel of the Canton air corps. More importantly, Ameri-
can instructors extended American influence on military aviation in
South China by introducing the U.S. system, but did not stop here.17
Americans also helped the Cantonese to build a modern aircraft
factory. Aircraft assembly and fabrication began in South China in the
1920s, although initially at a very modest level. Further progress was
not made until Mei Lun-gan, who studied aviation in the United States,
returned to Canton in 1927. He enlarged the repair shop, enrolled more
talented workers, and fashioned the shop into an airplane factory at
Tungshan, Canton. The next winter, Chinese mechanics manufactured
a monoplane, Yangcheng, constructed entirely with Chinese materials
except for the engine. With these small achievements behind them,
the Canton military authorities decided in 1933 to appeal for Ameri-
can assistance in building a modern airplane factory in Kwangtung
province. American businessmen who were constructing an aircraft
factory in Hangchow for the Nanking government were interested in
this projected factory in South China.18 William Pawley forwarded the
news that The Curtiss Wright Corp. agreed to purchase for the ac-
count of the Canton Air Force of machinery, tools, and equipment nec-
essary for a factory capable of producing sixty airplanes per year.19
17. W. S. Drysdale, Survey of Military Aviation in China, 4 Dec. 1933, report 8700,
file 2078, RG 165, NA; Wang Han-yen, A Brief History of Kwangtung Aviation (in
Chinese), Kwangtung wen-shih tzu-liao (Sources of literature and history of Kwangtung)
4 (1961): 17988; After suppressing the Chen-Lee rebellion in July 1936, the Nanking
government took over the Canton Aviation School and renamed it the Central Aviation
School at Canton. See The Record of the Canton Air Force Flying to Nanking (in Chi-
nese), Chuan-chi wen-hseh (Biographical literature) (Taipei), 30:1, 6668.
18. As early as 1922, Yang Sen-yi, who studied aviation in the United States, returned
to Canton, accompanied by two Americans, hundreds of cases of airplane equipment
and accessories as well as three assembled JN 9 and one JN 4 American airplanes. With
support and advocacy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, president of the Canton Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, an airplane repair shop was built in Tashatu, Canton. A training plane, de-
signed by Americans and equipped with an American engine was successfully
manufactured at the repair shop in July 1923, the first plane manufactured in China.
Yangcheng had modest capabilities, a top speed of 100 m.p.h. and a ceiling of 15,000 feet,
but it made a successful test flight on 29 December 1928 and proved serviceable thereaf-
ter. From 1928 to 1933, the aircraft factory at Tungshan manufactured a number of
Yangcheng. See the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, Kung-chn yen-ke-shih chu-
kao (Primary draft of the history of the development of the air force), file 581, Record
Group 787, Second Historical Archives of China, Nanking.
19. W. D. Pawley, Proposal for the Management of an Airplane Factory, Pawley to
Wong, 13 Dec. 1933, F3675/218/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO.
Meanwhile, Canton sent an official request to the United Aircraft Ex-

port, but it refused to provide financial assistance to the proposed
factory.20 Finally, Pawley concluded a contract in June with Kwangtung
province for the sale of US$140,000 worth of machinery and special
tools to be used in the projected factory. The factory was to produce
three bombers or six two-seater training planes each month.21
To recruit aircraft engineers, General Wong Kong-yue, commander
of the Canton Air Force, went to the United States in June 1934. Charles
Headly Day, formerly associated with the New Standard Aircraft Cor-
poration of Patterson, New Jersey, was hired to assist in directing the
operations of the new airplane factory being constructed at Shiuchow,
200 miles north of Canton. With Days recommendation, two mechan-
ics were hired for the Canton Air Force.22 One of them was Constantine
L. Zakhartchenko. On 1 August 1934, he contracted with the First
Group Army Corps of Canton as assistant engineer-in-chief at
Shiuchow Aircraft Works.23 In January 1935, over half a million dol-
lars worth of airplane materials, accessories, and engines were deliv-
ered to Canton. In July, Arthur D. Engle, vice president of the Austin
Company of New York, who was supervising the construction of the
airplane factory in Hangchow, was assigned to the Kwangtung fac-
tory. Under Engels supervision, the projected airplane factory began
construction in the city of Shiuchow.24
Charles Day, the chief engineer, reached Canton in mid-autumn of
1935. On 1 December 1935, the Shiuchow Aircraft Factory came into
20. On 22 February 1934, the Canton Aviation Bureau wrote a letter to Francis H.
Love, president of the United Aircraft Export, asking that company to establish an air-
plane factory on Cantons account. Several days later, Love replied that We could take
no financial part in the proposed factory but would render all assistance feasible in a
technical way. See Love to Canton Aviation Bureau, 27 Feb. 1934, box 18, Records of the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, RG 38, NA.
21. Machinery and tools for the factory would be shipped from the United States on
or before 9 July 1934, and the factory should be in production before the end of 1935.
Unlike the factory under constructed at Hangchow for the Nationalist government, the
Kwangtung factory was financed entirely with Chinese capital. Intercontinent Aviation
refused to float a loan. See Cunningham to SecSt, 21 June 1934, 893.20, RG 59, NA.
22. Day, a noted flyer and designer, served as the vice president and chief engineer of
New Standard Aircraft Corporation, Paterson, New Jersey, from 1927 to 1930. See Spiker
to Johnson, 31 May 1935, 893.113 Aeroplane/109, ibid.
23. Zakhartchenko,a Russian-American in his mid-forties, was educated at the Rus-
sian Imperial Naval Academy and received a Master s degree at Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. From 1923 to mid-1934, he was employed as a design engineer by
various aircraft designers and manufacturers. C. L. Zakhartchenkos biography, C. L.
Zakhartchenko Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford Uni-
versity, Calif.
24. Half a Million Dollars Worth of American Aircraft Machinery Arrives at Can-
ton, China Weekly Review, 26 Jan. 1935, 123; North China Herald, 23 Jan. 1935, 126.
existence and the assembly of twenty planes began without fully de-
tailed designs.25 The factory and its personnel, independent of the
Canton air force, was directly subordinate to Marshal Chen Chi-tang.
Chou Pao-hang, superintendent of Canton Customs, served as gen-
eral supervisor of the airplane factory which had approximately 450
employees and five American engineers.26 Demonstrating outstand-
ing flying characteristics and performance, the first craft, named
Fushing, was test flown on 20 May 1936.27
Because of the success of American engineers at Shiuchow, the Can-
ton military authorities asked them to enlarge the small airplane fac-
tory at Tungshan, mentioned earlier as having begun in 1928 as little
more than a small repair shop to manufacture Fushing airplanes. The
Shiuchow Aircraft Factory would produce only Vultee and Hawk
planes, and five American engineers replaced Day and his associates
at the Shiuchow factory.28 Cantons rebellion against Nanking in June
1936 interrupted this program, and the Nationalist government took
25. In December 1935, design of an all-purpose plane was 60 percent completed and
design of the bomber was 13 percent completed. Zakhartchenko to Day, 5 Dec. 1935,
Zakhartchenko Papers.
26. The five American engineers included Charles H. Day (chief engineer, in charge
of technical organization and management), C. L. Zakhartchenko (assistant chief engi-
neer, in charge of design), William Zebrouski (shop engineer), William Beardslee (draft-
ing engineer), and Harry M. Campbell (welder). On 3 and 10 February 1936, Intercontinent
Aviation signed two contracts with the First Group Army Headquarters of Kwangtung.
Under the first contract, Intercontinent Aviation would supply the Kwangtung military
with one Vultee and one Hawk airplane as models, as well as with the necessary mate-
rials to manufacture twenty-nine planes of each type. Most of the materials were due to
arrive at Canton in June 1936. The Shiuchow Aircraft Factory was to be turned over to
the Intercontinent Aviation before 15 July. See Marshal Chen Chi-tang, Order From
General Headquarters, 2 June 1936, ibid.
27. The Design Department immediately started to work on a more advanced design
while production continued on the basis of the original design program that called for
ten advanced trainers and ten all-purpose planes based on the original design. C. L.
Zakhartchenko, History of Fushing Airplane Development, ibid.
28. In June 1936, Charles W. Hunter, American manager of the Central Aviation Fac-
tory in Hangchow, arrived Canton. In July, L. R. Dooley, a representative of Intercontinent
Aviation in South China, and his assistant, J. Y. Lum, a Chinese-American, established
an office in the Victoria Hotel, Shamen, Canton. They made plans for the new airplanes
when the materials arrived. Formerly under control of Colonel Mei Lun-gan, the factory
in Tungshan was in need of refurbishing and modernization, and Day submitted a plan
to the Canton military authorities for roughly $30,000 in equipment to be ordered from
the United States, a very small investment indeed. The Shiuchow Factory was to trans-
fer all unfinished airplanes and materials to Tungshan, and Zakartchenko and other
engineers were to be transferred. Zakartchenko grandly claimed that the engineer de-
partment will be in position to produce designs at least three or four years in advance of
the rest of the world. See Zakartchenko to Chow, 13 June 1936, and Chow to Chen 13
June 1936, ibid.
over the factory after suppressing the rebellion. The Shiuchow factory
increased American influence in South Chinas military aviation be-
tween 1934 and 1936.29
British Influence
In the 1930s, British aircraft businessmen also were active in South
China. Four leading firms in Hong Kong represented British aircraft
manufacturers, the Far Eastern Aviation Company; Messrs. Arnold
and Company; Reiss, Massey and Company; and the Jardine Engi-
neering Corp. On 1 April 1928, the Arnold firm established an Avia-
tion Department for the purpose of selling aircraft to China,30 but the
Far Eastern Aviation Companyestablished in Hong Kong in 1930
with business offices in Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien provinces
was the most active company in South China. The Far East Company
was particularly interested in the potential market in Kwangsi. After
the Kwangsi Air Corps became independent of the Kwangtung mili-
tary clique in 1931, it underwent steady development with the guid-
ance and advice of R. Vaughan-Fowler, managing director of the Far
East Company.31
The Kwangsi government established an aviation school in Liuchow
in 1932 with two classes: one flying and one mechanics, each of which
had thirty students initially. The instructors were all Royal Air Force
reservists who were closely affiliated with the Far Eastern Company.32
In addition to sending instructors, the Far Eastern Company furnished
all equipment, including thirty or so Armstrong Whitford pursuit
29. As the factory transfer continued, General Chen of Kwangtung province and
General Lee of Kwangsi declared independence from the Nanking government on 1 June
1936, although as mentioned, in only two months the Nationalist government suppressed
the rebellion. Chen was forced to flee to Hong Kong in August. As a result, Nankings
National Aviation Commission simply assumed an ownership and control of the
Shiuchow Aircraft Factory. Although it underwent only slight modifications, the old
personnel were retained, including Americans on substantially the same terms and in
the same capacities they formerly enjoyed. See C. K. Gauss, Chart of Organization of
Shiukwan Aircraft Works of the National Aviation Commission, 6 Nov. 1936, 893.20/
587, RG 59, NA.
30. Jones to Garstin, 4 Sept. 1929, file 4030, Embassy and Consular Archives, China:
Correspondence: Series I 1834 to 1930, Record Class FO 228, PRO.
31. The directors of the company included G. N. Tinson (chairman), A. Ritchie, F. R.
Smith, R. Voughan Fowler, and D. S. Scott. See Jones to Cadogan, 1 Aug. 1935, 599/202/
10, ibid.
32. The British instructors included J. R. Brown (chief adviser), C. B. Musson (flying
instructor), P. R. May (flying instructor), E. Hutchings (wireless and air photography
instructor), D. H. Steven (technical instructor), and F. Fidler (technical instructor). Willock
to Cadogan, 12 Apr. 1935, F3915/202/10, ibid.
planes and Avro planes, all shipped between 1933 and 1935.33 The Brit-
ish, therefore, dominated the aircraft market in Kwangsi.
The Kwangsi authorities not only imported aircraft, but also started
to build an aircraft factory at Liuchow in July 1932. After completion,
the new factory employed 120 mechanics and 100 apprentices and
was able to produce two planes per month. Twelve Avro Avians and
two Avro Cadets had already been assembled by April 1935; and six
Avro Cadets were in the course of construction.34
To increase the British influence in aviation in South China, John
Higgins, chairman of the Board of Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft,
decided to establish a flying school in Hong Kong. On 1 March 1934,
the Far East Flying Training School under the control of the Far East
Aviation Company began operations at the enlarged Kai Tak (Kowloon)
airdrome with four instructors.35 The expansion of the airfield cost
HK$100,000 and created a facility large enough to accommodate sev-
enty planes. It housed not only the planes of the Royal Air Force, but
those of the school as well. The establishment of this school height-
ened British influence on aviation immediately. For example, students
from the Kwangsi Aviation School were compelled to attend the Far
East Flying School for advanced training. As R. P. Willock, British air
attach, confidently commented, At the present time, the majority of
Chinese pilots and mechanics are American trained. The Far East Fly-
ing School, by means of bringing Chinese in touch with British aircraft
and methods of training, should go a long way in assisting British
aviation interests in China in future.36
With British assistance, the Kwangsi Air Force underwent rapid
growth. In 1935, Kwangsi had a total of forty-six planes in the air, all
of which were British manufactures.37 The entire force was located
within the province of Kwangsi with its principal base and school at
Liuchow. Other airfields within the province were known to be at
Nanning and Wuchow. The air corps was directly under the control of
the provincial military leader, Lee Chung-yen.
33. Report of the American consulate general at Canton, April 1935, 6, Political Re-
ports, 19341938, China, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
RG 84, NA.
34. Ibid.
35. The British instructors in the school included W. F. Murray (commandant and
chief instructor), Lord Douglas Hamilton (assistant flying instructor), W. Waldron (chief
ground instructor), and H. Willock (assistant ground instructor). Willock to Cadogan, 18
May 1934, 4423/218/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO; Jenkins to State Department, 12
Oct. 1933, 893.113 Airplanes/88, RG 59, NA.
36. Pelham to the British legation in Peking, 22 Feb. 1934, 1962/218/10, GC/RC FO
371, FOA, PRO; Willock to Cadogan, 18 May 1934, 4423/218/10, ibid.
37. Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, Kung-chn yen-ke-shih chu-kao.
To help its nationals to compete with America in the aeronautics

market in South China, the British government decided to send a rep-
resentative to South China. London tried to provide assistance to Brit-
ish businessmen much as did the Commerce Department and some
desks within the State Department for U.S. business interests. In 1932,
E. M. B. Ingram, British ambassador in Peking, first urged London to
dispatch an air attach to China: As to the air side of the picture, I
have long been thinking that if we had an Air Attach out here we
might have been able to do more than we have and that the Air Mis-
sion would have not come to nothing. Later, Ingram again stressed
the significance of an air attach and encouraged the Foreign Office to
arrange to send one when possible. London was not taking proper
advantage of its opportunity and was letting other countries espe-
cially the United States surpass the British. Americans, for example,
had established their new flying school at Hangchow and had been
able to attach aviation experts to their legation.38 Ingram tried to draw
the attention of the British government to the Chinese aircraft market
by waving the red flag of successes. As a result, Anthony Eden,
undersecretary of foreign affairs, announced on 3 July 1933 in the House
of Commons that steps were being taken to appoint an air attach to
the British legation in Peking, who several months later was identi-
fied as Wing Commander R. P. Willock, the first occupant of such a
post. The Times claimed that this appointment would prove of value
in connection with the growth of aviation in the Far East.39
Arriving in Shanghai in early 1934, Willock assumed his duties with
headquarters in Shanghai rather than Peking. He met with British air-
craft representatives including C. H. Arnold (Messrs. Arnold and Com-
pany), F. A. E. Smith (Far East Aviation Company), and Brian Lewis
(Reiss Massey and Company) so as to coordinate their efforts through-
out China. Hope rose among the local representatives of British air-
plane manufacturers that the air attach could stimulate the interest
of the Chinese government in British machines. To increase the sale of
British aircraft in South China, Willock went to Canton in April to
visit the headquarters of the Kwangtung Air Force, accompanied by
Herbert Phillips, the British consul-general. While touring, Willock
invited General Lum Fuk-yun of the Kwangtung Air Force to visit
Hong Kong for the purpose of seeing the British flying boats.40 Im-
38. Ingram to Simon, 24 Oct. 1932, Documents on British Foreign Policy 19191939, 11
vols. (London, 1970), 11:60; Ingram to Simon, 17 Nov. 1932, ibid., 61.
39. The Times (London), 23 Sept. 1933, 9, and 28 Dec. 1933, 15.
40. Ingram to Simon, 29 Jan. 1934, 1384/218/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO; China:
Current Aviation Activities, 13 Feb. 1934, report 8766, file 2078, RG 165, NA. See also
North China Herald, 24 Jan. 1934, 130; China: Current Aviation Activities, 13 Feb. 1934,
report 8766, file 2078, ibid.
pressed by the British aircraft, the Kwangtung Air Force reached an

agreement in October with the Far East Aviation Company, providing
the company would sell one Vickers Bygrave Bombing airplane to
Canton. That was the first contract obtained by British aircraft busi-
nessmen with the Canton Air Force since 1932. Although the order
was small, it had important significance. As Herbert Phillips com-
mented, It marks the beginning of the attempt by a British organiza-
tion to break the strong American monopoly in air matters at Canton.41
In the following years, the British increased its aircraft sales to South
China.
The Anglo-American Dispute

Between 1930 and 1936 relations between the Canton and the Nanking
governments were not always cordial. The Nationalist government
did not issue permits to the Canton government for the importation
of airplanes from other countries, but at times when the Canton gov-
ernment was not openly hostile to Nanking, Nanking documents were
sometimes available to the Canton authorities. Even so, the Canton
government declined to approach Nanking with what it saw as a de-
meaning request for import permits for airplanes to be imported; it
was regarded as a loss of face.
As mentioned previously, both the Americans and British increased
their activities in the aircraft market in South China during the 1930s.
The war and continuing conflicts between the Nanking and Canton
governments offered those businessmen welcome opportunities. Mili-
tary airplanes purchased by South China provinces from abroad
alarmed the Nanking government. In 1929, Nanking promulgated and
disseminated orders that no military planes be purchased by individual
military units or provincial governments, granting import permits only
for training and commercial planes. Moreover, in May 1930, Nanking
decreed that war materiel imported into China would be considered
illegal unless the Nanking government approved each particular
consignment through its diplomatic representative in the exporting
country.42
In order to strengthen the National government and to reduce the
power of the local governments, the State Department complied with
Nankings decree of May 1930, issuing a statement in July mandating
that firms wishing to make shipments of arms, including military
41. Phillips to Cadogan, 16 Oct. 1934, 7338/218/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO.
42. Johnson to SecSt, 9 May 1930, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930 (hereafter
cited as FRUS), 2:619.
planes, must have Nankings import permits as well as export licenses

issued by the State Department. Export licenses were not required for
commercial aircraft except for planes that could easily be converted
for military use.43
However, the sale of aircraft to South China was complex. Under
the terms of the Barcelona Convention of 1921, direct military sup-
plies were permitted to pass through Hong Kong to Canton if the
latters permits were obtained. Military shipments originating in Hong
Kong were also allowed in Canton. The Hong Kong escape hatch pro-
vided Americans a channel to sell military airplanes to Canton in spite
of Nankings dismay. In addition to military craft, they sold com-
mercial aircraft that could be converted easily into military planes.44
The Canton authorities were in urgent need of fighting planes when
they rebelled against the Nationalist government in Nanking in May
1931. In July, twenty-four American fighter planes ordered by the
Kwangtung Air Force were delivered to Hong Kong to be transported
to Canton. At this time the Canton Aviation Bureau informed the
American consul general at Canton that an order had been placed
with an American company for twelve additional military airplanes
to be exported as commercial aircraft to Hong Kong where they were
to be armed with Browning machine guns and then delivered to
Canton.45
Since these purchases drew the attention of the Nanking govern-
ment, Finance Minister T. V. Soong informed American Consul Gen-
eral Willys R. Peck that the Canton government had purchased 8
Lockheed Vega planes manufactured in Burbank for immediate deliv-
ery consigned to Canton by way of Hong Kong. To stop the delivery
of American airplanes to Canton, Nanking asked Washington in late
July 1931 to take all steps possible to prevent the issuance of export
licenses for planes consigned to Canton, or to destinations which would
make it evident that Canton was to be the ultimate destination. Sev-
eral days later, Minister Nelson Johnson informed the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs that the State Department was taking active steps to
prevent the shipment of the Lockheed Vega planes.46
43. U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, 7 June 1930, 273.

44. Multilateral Convention and Statute on freedom of transit, signed on 20 April
1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, 7:11; C. J. Spiker, Importation of Airplanes and
Airplane arts into Canton, 17 July 1936, 893.113/1642, RG 59, NA.
45. Kung-chn yeh-kan (Air force monthly) (Kwantung Air Force Command Head-
quarters), 13 July 1931, 17, Archives of Kwangtung Province, Canton; Johnson to acting
secretary of state, 11 July 1931, FRUS, 1931, 3:101920.
46. Peck to the acting secretary of state; Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Nanking
(Reynolds) of a Conversation with Major Wu Hsieh-shek of the Aviation Bureau of
Nanking, 31 July 1931; Johnson to acting secretary of state, 19 Aug. 1931, FRUS, 1931,
3:102025.
At the State Department, Joseph Green, chief of the Division of

Western Affairs, suggested that if the export of arms to China via Hong
Kong became a serious problem, the U.S. government should insist on
export licenses. Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far East-
ern Affairs, firmly supported this proposal.47 After some discussions,
the State Department decided to restrict the export of arms from the
United States to South China in order to discourage the civil wars in
China. William Castle, acting secretary of state, later instructed Min-
ister Johnson that under current political conditions in China, the State
Department viewed the exportation from the United States to Hong
Kong and to Macao of arms and munitions of war, including military
aircraft, as destined presumably for China. Such exportation should
be accompanied by an export license duly issued by the department.48
As a result, the Cantonese turned to the British. In July the
Kwangtung government purchased six Armstrong-Whitworth air-
planes fitted with military equipment from the Far Eastern Aviation
Company. Nanking protested to the British legation in Peking, request-
ing that transport of the consignment to Kwangtung be prevented.49
For fear of losing the aviation market in China, the local agent of
the Lloyd E. Gale Company complained to the American consul gen-
eral in Hong Kong that shipments of military supplies of various kinds
were being made freely from several European countries to Canton,
while the U.S. government refused to permit the export of similar ship-
ments to Canton. Thomas H. McConnell, vice president of United Air-
craft Export Company, complained to Consul General Peck that the
British authorities at Hong Kong placed no restrictions in the
way of sales of fighting planes by British merchants to the Canton
authorities.50
To deal with these complaints, in July 1931 the State Department
telegraphed U.S. Ambassador Charles G. Dawes in London to inquire
informally of the appropriate British authorities with regard to British
policy and procedure respecting these shipments.51 Within days, the
embassy replied that Londons policy was that no arms or munitions
of war including military airplanes could leave Britain without export
licenses issued by the Board of Trade. The Foreign Office gave its con-
currence to shipments destined for China only with the sanction of
47. Hornbeck to Castle, 17 July 1931, 893.113/1307, RG 59, NA.

48. Acting secretary of state to Johnson, 5 Aug. 1931, FRUS, 1931, 3:1025; memo of
Hornbeck-Rogers conversation, 8 June 1931, ibid., 3:101617; Hornbeck memo, 13 July
1931, 893.113/1307, RG 59, NA.
49. Lampson to Hong Kong government, 29 July 1931, F4177/52/10, GC/RC FO 371,
FOA, PRO.
50. Ibid.
51. Castle to American embassy in London, 27 July 1931, 893.113/1312A, RG 59, NA.
the Nanking government, and the Hong Kong government had been
requested to conform to this policy. But the Foreign Office added that
commercial airplanes could be exported to China or anywhere with-
out reference to the Board of Trade of the Foreign Office.52
Angered by the British sale of Armstrong Whitford pursuit planes
to Canton, the Nanking authorities lodged a protest on 7 September
with the British minister and demanded that the British government
take steps to prevent the delivery of those planes. Two days later, only
one of those planes flew from Hong Kong to Canton, and the others
were held up.53 But the Far East Aviation Company delivered a sec-
ond of the planes to the Canton Aviation Bureau in late October, and
the Bureau confirmed that an order for three more British planes of
the same kind had been signed and that additional purchases of Brit-
ish planes were contemplated. It was not unpredictable that represen-
tatives of the Gale Company complained to Washington that unless
British competitors were prevented from selling military aircraft to
Canton, American aircraft trade would be adversely affected.54
Under the pressure of American businessmen, the State Depart-
ment first registered a protest with the Foreign Office, which did not
respond.55 The State Department then instructed Dawes to draw dis-
creetly and informally the attention of the Foreign Office to the re-
ported delivery to the Cantonese authorities. Almost a month later, an
official of the Colonial Office told Dawes that no license had been is-
sued by the British government for the export of planes destined for
Canton, begging the question.56 In spite of protests from Nanking and
Washington, six more British fighter planes equipped with machine
guns were delivered at Kwangtung in December 1931.57
As far as may be ascertained, the British government took no steps
to prevent the delivery of British planes to Canton. On the contrary,
the British authorities defended the practice. The Foreign Office used
a loose and sliding definition of military airplanes, dividing aircraft
into two categories only, armed and unarmed. So long as aircraft of a
military type were not equipped with machine guns or machine gun
mountings, they were not regarded by the British government as mili-
tary aircraft within the meaning of the arms embargo. Hence, export
52. State Department to American embassy in Peking, 31 July 1931, 893.113/1315,
ibid.
53. Mackillops memo, 7 Sept. 1931, F4853/52/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO; Hong
Kong government to Lampson, 14 Sept. 1931, F4919/52/10, ibid.
54. Johnson to SecSt, 23 Oct. 1931, FRUS, 1931, 3:1026.
55. Roger to Hornbeck, 31 May 1932, 893.113/1387 and Leighton Roger, Policy on
Exports of Military and Civil Aircraft to China, 4 Apr. 1933, 893.113/1502, RG 59, NA.
56. SecSt to Dawes, 13 Nov. 1931, FRUS, 1931, 3:1026; Lampson to Simon, 10 Dec.
1931, F6911/52/10, GC/RC FO 371, FOA, PRO.
57. Kung Chun Yeh Kan, 12 Dec. 1931, 17.
licenses were not required. Under the regulations, British business-

men were able to deliver military planes to South China without ex-
port licenses. When British military planes were delivered to South
China, armaments were sent separately to Canton.58 The State Depart-
ment, on the other hand, defined unarmed military craft as military
weapons. Even commercial planes, which could easily be converted
to military use or were evidently intended for military use, required
export licenses. Licenses were also required when the exportation of
military planes from the United States to Hong Kong or Macao as
destined presumably for China.
In addition to the different definitions, there was another issue
the Hong Kong governments approval of the shipments of military
planes on import permits issued by the local governments in South
China. As American Trade Commissioner Thomas C. Barringer pointed
out, the shipment of aircraft to various South China provinces from
Hong Kong was a comparatively simple matter because both the Hong
Kong authorities and the Chinese Maritime Customs recognized the
import permits issued by the South West Political Council in Canton.59
For this reason, the British were able to sell more airplanes to Canton.
In 1932, for example, only fifteen American planes were exported or
transported through Hong Kong to South China, while forty British
planes were sold in comparison. The Cantonese purchased more Brit-
ish aircraft because they did not need to apply for import permits
from the Nanking government, although they were anxious to ob-
tain American aircraft if possible.60
Under this situation, American diplomats and commercial officers
in China and Hong Kong complained vociferously about the State
Departments China arms policy. Trade Commissioner Barringer
pointed out that American exporters were placed in a noncompetitive
situation, an opinion which Consul Douglas Jenkins confirmed. In the
best diplomatic fashion, Douglas suggested that the Department en-
deavor to ascertain just what the British attitude now is respecting the
shipment of military planes to China especially to Canton via Hong
Kong.61 The China Trade Monthly Report of the Commerce Department
concurred with these views: due to a restriction on export to the south-
ern provinces, the Chinese aircraft market was at least temporarily
lost to American trade resulting in a considerable increase in British
participation.62
58. Atherton to SecSt, 25 Jan. 1932, FRUS, 1932, 4:581.

59. Barringer to Jenkins, 15 Dec. 1932, 893.113/1428, RG 59, NA.
60. Ibid.; Jenkins to State Department, 8 Sept. 1932, FRUS, 1932, 4:592.
61. Jenkins to SecSt, 19 Dec. 1932, ibid., 59293.
62. Review of General Condition: Aviation, China Trade Monthly Report, 1 Jan. 1933,
11.
Expressing irritation with the British relaxation of aircraft sales to

Canton, the State Department was stirred into action. During a meet-
ing of 29 December 1932, Undersecretary of State William Castle ad-
dressed the matter to Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador: if
the British government could not honor restrictions as did Washing-
ton, it might prove necessary to open the field generally. Castle im-
plied that the American government would relax its rigid control of
the sale of military planes to Canton if Britain would not restrict the
sale of military airplanes to Canton. Unfortunately, the conference
produced no agreement.63
In Washington, the debate on this issue renewed in the spring of
1933. Hornbeck admitted that the State Department, in effect, had
placed American commercial interests attempting to serve the mar-
kets of China under a severe handicap. The regulations governing the
export of arms and munitions of war to China might be modified, he
suggested, so as to eliminate the requirement that the Chinese lega-
tion in Washington inform the State Department. Leighton Rogers of
the Aeronautics Trade Division confirmed the ineffectiveness of our
policy in preventing the various Chinese provinces being supplied with
aircraft.64
The complaints of American businessmen, the efforts of the Com-
merce Department, and growing American suspicion of British arms
policy in China gradually effected a change in the State Departments
position. On 30 June 1933, the State Department announced that the
exportation of arms and munitions of war for the use of Chinese offi-
cial authorities would be permitted in all cases when the firms in the
United States desiring to make shipment had submitted to the depart-
ment an application for license to export and the Chinese embassy
failed to notify the State Department that the shipment was prohib-
ited by the central government.65
The previous regulations of the exportation of arms to China pro-
vided that licenses were granted when (a) an application for license to
export had been submitted by the firm or firms in the United States
which desired to make shipments, and (b) the Chinese legation in
Washington had informed the State Department that it was the desire
of the Chinese government that export of the shipment be authorized.
In the new modified regulation, the provisions of section (b) were elimi-
nated. The acting secretary of state explained that section (b) of the
pertinent regulation incur heavy cable charges when American busi-
nessmen attempted to cause the Chinese Government to issue the
63. Memo of Castle-Lindsay conversation, 29 Dec. 1932, FRUS, 1932, 4:596.
64. Stanley Hornbeck, Export of Arms or Munitions of War to China, 28 Mar. 1933,
893.113/1495, RG 59, NA; memo by Rogers, 4 Apr. 1933, 893.113/1502, ibid.
65. FRUS, 1933, 3:563.
necessary instructions to its Legation at Washington.66 The busy work

had proved irksome to buyers in China, particularly in South China,
and valuable orders had been lost to the American trade for no reason
except that the Chinese government was negligent, and other govern-
ments apparently did not insist upon similar procedure. The purpose
of eliminating the provisions of section (b) was to remove the disad-
vantages under which American military airplane exporters to South
China were placed in comparison with exporters of Britain as well as
other countries because military airplanes were a very large portion
of arms exported from the United States to China.67
Chinese customs figures suggest that the U.S. attempt to improve
the conditions under which American manufacturers competed
brought no quick success. At the beginning of 1934, the value of Brit-
ish plane sales to China was over four times more than that of the
United States (see Table 1), although Americans sold more war planes
to China than the British in 1933.68 According to the customs report,
most British aircraft were shipped through Hong Kong into Canton.
The sale of British military airplanes to the South continued to draw
Nankings attention. Through diplomatic channels, the Nationalist
government urged all foreign countries to conform to the Chinese re-
quest to regulate the export of arms and munitions including airplanes
to China. Nanking had an occasion to address Britain directly in March
1934 when it informed Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British minister in
China, that a recent consignment of British war materiel had not been
authorized for import to Canton.69 The Chinese government particu-
larly drew Londons attention to the Hong Kong channel. Cadogan
passed that request on to London.
The Foreign Office was not favorably inclined to the Chinese re-
quest, rationalizing that the United States together with other coun-
tries did not enforce effectively the Nanking governments decree of
1930. Foreign Secretary Simon complained to Cadogan that the Far
Eastern Aviation Company recently had lost a contract with the
Kwangsi government for the supply of aircraft with armaments val-
ued at 115,000 to American and Italian competitors. Without
Nankings permits, the Far Eastern Company was unable to obtain a
66. Phillips to Johnson, 13 July 1933, ibid., 565, 560.
67. According to the statistics prepared by the Commerce Department, in 1933, the
value of export of arms and ammunition from the United States to China was only $23,953
and the value of American airplanes to China was $5,634,000. FRUS, 1934, 3:51618.
68. A gold unit was US$0.40.00. Britain Ahead of U. S. in Aircraft Import to China in
January, China Weekly Review, 17 Mar. 1934, 103; Hornbeck to Phillips, 18 Apr. 1934,
Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford
University.
69. Simon to Cadogan, 9 May 1934, Documents On British Foreign Policy, 19191929,
20:182.
Table 1. Value of Aircraft and Accessory Imports into China (in Customs Gold
Units)
1932 1933 Jan. 1934 Feb. 1934
Great Britain 604,372 217,553 388,514 87,000

United States 516,763 4,594,544 78,204 72,000
license from the Foreign Office. He further emphasized that unless all
nations concerned enforced effectively the Nanking governments
decree of 1930, the Foreign Office would not feel compelled to enforce
it.70
Therefore, the Chinese government turned to the United States, in-
forming Minister Johnson that Kwangtung and other Chinese prov-
inces had secretly ordered and purchased a large number of planes
from the United States, not authorized by Nankings permits. The
Chinese minister in Washington also wrote Secretary of State Cordell
Hull that shipment of war materiel into China must cease without
Nanking permits issued through the proper legation.71
It was clear that were the United States to comply with the Chinese
request, it would mean a restoration of the former procedures of the
State Department. An official of the State Department held that com-
pliance would place South China in the hands of British merchants
and strengthen British views to the effect that aircraft are in no sense
military unless actually armed at the moment of importation.72 As-
sured that London would comply with the Chinese request, the State
Department issued revised regulations on the export of arms and mili-
tary equipment in late May 1934.73 After so much diplomatic negotia-
tion, the State Department simply restored its former procedure. But
at the end of its statement, the department instructed the Consulates
General at Hong Kong and Canton to study carefully British proce-
dure at Hong Kong . . . whether such authorities continue in their past
practice of considering all aircraft as commercial, and therefore not
subject to restrictions unless actually armed at the moment of impor-
tation.74 The department doubted whether the British government
would keep its promise.
70. Ibid., 242.
71. Johnson to SecSt, 13 Apr. 1934, FRUS, 1934, 3:490; Sze to SecSt, 20 Apr. 1934, ibid.,
49091.
72. Memo by Green, 26 Apr. 1934, 893.113/1543, RG 59, NA.
73. On 17 May, the British legation informed the American legation in China that the
British government would comply with the Chinese request provided that the Chinese
government enforce its import regulations and that other countries comply with the
Chinese request. Gauss to SecSt, 3 May 1934, FRUS, 1934, 3:49297.
74. Gauss to SecSt, 3 May 1934, ibid., 49297.
The British government was equally skeptical about Washingtons

promise to comply with the Chinese regulations. Foreign Secretary
Simon instructed Ambassador Lindsay that he must learn whether
the American government had limited their exports along the lines
hitherto consistently followed by His Majestys Government or not,
and, if so, what categories of armaments are covered, whether they
include aircraft in any or all forms.75
The differences between Washington and London remained far from
being. The State Department continued to regard as military aircraft
(a) all types of aircraft actually fitted with armor, guns, machine guns,
gun mounts, bomb dropping or other military devices, and (b) air-
craft presumed to be destined for military use, whether actually fitted
with armament or not. But the Foreign Office still persisted in divid-
ing aircraft into two categories only, namely, armed and unarmed
and did not consider that under existing conditions the application
of the stricter procedure in force in the United States is practical. The
State Department asked the Foreign Office to adopt the same strict
methods as the United States, but the Foreign Office refused unless all
other countries also adopted it, causing the State Department to
threaten that if the continuance of this procedure should be found to
result in placing American exporters at an unjustifiable disadvantage
as compared with their principle foreign competitors, the depart-
ment would not continue to apply this definition in respect to ex-
ports to China.76
There was some movement on the issue, however, as Ambassador
Lindsay informed the State Department in March 1935: the Gover-
nor of Hong Kong was already considering how to deal effectively
with the loophole pointed out in your note of January 10th; and would
be very glad to cooperate with the United States Government with a
view to closing it.77
American aircraft salesmen suffered yet another setback, not only
in vending airplanes but also aircraft parts and accessories in South
China as an outgrowth of the Shiuchow Aircraft Factory established
by Americans. On 18 March 1935, A. L. Paterson, president of the China
Airmotive Company, wrote a letter from Shanghai to Major J. Carroll
Cone, assistant director of Air Commerce, stating that they could not
ship American equipment into Canton without a Nanking permit. The
American manufacturers were losing a great deal of engine and air-
75. Simon to Lindsay, 2 Aug. 1934, Documents on British Foreign Policy 19191938,
20:27576; Osborne to SecSt, 4 Aug. 1934, FRUS, 1934, 3:507.
76. SecSt to Osborne, 10 Aug. 1934, FRUS, 1934, 3:51011; Lindsay to State Depart-
ment, 12 Dec. 1934, ibid., 52122; Osborne to SecSt, 21 Aug. 1934, F5119/15/10, GC/RC
FO 371, FOA, PRO; Lindsay to State Department, 12 Dec. 1934, FRUS, 1935, 3:711.
77. Lindsay to SecSt, 27 Mar. 1935, FRUS, 1935, 3:718.
plane business not only in the Canton area but also in several prov-
inces in South China. The British were getting one hundred per cent of
this business.78 Several months later, the disadvantage at which Ameri-
can exporters were placed still was not removed; American business-
men warned that unless the regulations of the United States
Department of State are amended immediately, many thousands of
dollars worth of American business will be lost to foreign competi-
tors.79 According to Patersons report, Americans had found them-
selves in the unfortunate position with respect to the purchase of raw
materials for the manufacture of these airplanes, complaining that
a great deal of material is coming from Britain and Germany, although
the Canton air force preferred to American materials.80
When Patersons report reached the State Department, Acting Sec-
retary of State William Castle briefly and succinctly informed Ambas-
sador Lindsay on 1 August 1935, the British procedure licenses are
not required for engines, spare parts and equipment for use there-
with. The secretary cited a recent example of a British airplane en-
gine company that sold aircraft engines to Canton. Yet an American
firm was refused an order from the Canton government because the
latter declined to apply for a permit from Nanking.81 The Hong Kong
authorities still approved shipments of aircraft and aircraft engines to
China on the basis of import permits issued by the local governments.
Meanwhile, the British government was still unable to exercise con-
trol over transit shipments through Hong Kong, and the State Depart-
ment remained dissatisfied with what the British government had done
in regard to the exportation of airplanes to China.
Under pressure from the State Department, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment, however, established a new system mandated in London on
1 October 1935, which provided that export permits from the coun-
tries of origin will be required for all shipments of arms and ammuni-
tion passing through the Colony.82 Manufacturers of nonmilitary
airplanes must in some way satisfy the local [Hong Kong] authori-
ties as to their non-military character. State Department officials ex-
pressed great optimism that the new regulation would achieve the
ends desired by both the United States and Britain.
78. Paterson to Cone, 18 Mar. 1935, 893.113 Airplanes/101, RG 59, NA. Paterson,
president of the China Airmotive Company, was the special representative of the Bu-
reau of Air Commerce of the Commerce Department. He was authorized to issue and to
renew aircraft and pilot licenses. See China Weekly Review, 2 Feb. 1935, 325.
79. Beall to Spike, 7 Jan. 1935, 893.113/1591, RG 59, NA.
80. Paterson to Cone, 17 July 1935, file 965, box 453, Records of the Civil Aeronautic
Administration, RG 237, Federal Record Center, Suitland, Md.
81. Acting secretary of state to Lindsay, 1 Aug. 1935, FRUS, 1935, 3:733.
82. Ibid.
Still London was skeptical that the restrictions, adopted only by

the United States and Britain, would settle the matter of military air-
craft sales to South China. Secretary of Air Ministry Samuel Hoare
commented that bi-lateral action confined to the U.K. and U.S. to
control the export to China of such aircraft and aircraft engines etc. by
license would not prove satisfactory.83 When Lindsay informed the
State Department of Londons opinion, the department firmly believed
that the action would do much to achieve their objectives.84
London had many grounds for its suspicion of the restriction
adopted only both two countries because there existed strong compe-
tition among the Europeans in the aircraft market in China in the 1930s.
Like the Americans and British, the Italians were also interested in
Chinas aviation. Benito Mussolini was anxious to spread Italian in-
fluence not only to African and neighboring lands but to Asia as well.
In the winter and spring of 193233, as a special envoy to investigate
the economic and industrial conditions in Europe and the United States,
Minister of Industry and Commerce H. H. Kung took the opportunity
to study the development of Italian military aviation. When he visited
Rome, Mussolini told him that the Italian government would make
available to China 12 million taels (US$20 million) of the remitted Boxer
Indemnity fund if Nanking accepted an Italian aviation mission. The
funds were to be used for the purchase of Italian airplanes and for the
payment of the salaries of the Italian mission. In addition, Italians
would open a flying school and build a factory for the Nationalist
government.85 On his return, Kung lost no opportunity to impress upon
the Nationalist government the continuing necessity to build an ad-
equate air force. In May 1993, the Italians sent a mission of twelve
reserve officers to China.86
By the end of 1934, Kung had completed an agreement with the
Italian aviation mission that provided for the establishment of an Ital-
ian aircraft factory in China. When Kung wrote to Chiang Kai-shek
requesting a location for the new factory, Chiang suggested Nanking.87
After 1934, the Italians increased their influence in Chinese military
aviation. They established a twenty-member mission in Nanchang,
organized a primary training school in Loyang, and built an aircraft
factory in Nanchiang in October 1936.
83. Hoare to undersecretary of state, 17 Dec. 1935, F7947/60/10, GC/RC FO 371,
FOA, PRO.
84. Lindsay to SecSt, 31 Jan. 1936, FRUS, 1936, 4:554; SecSt, to Lindsay, 10 Feb. 1936,
ibid., 557.
85. H. H. Kung, Building Chinas Air Force, the Nations Pride, 1939, Arthur Young
Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University.
86. W. S. Drysdale, Jouett Aviation Mission, 28 Aug. 1934, report 8902, file 2078,
RG 165, NA.
87. Chiang to Kung, 8 Dec. 1934, Chung-hua min-kuo chun-jiao shih-liao chun-pen (The
important historical sources of the Republic of China) (Taipei, 1981), 1:311.
Like the Italians, the German companies also played a central role
in aviation development in China in the 1930s. The German role in
Chinese civil aviation through the Eurasia Corporation was a success
of German industrial effort in China. In 1931, the Chinese government
signed a contract with Lufthansa, the German national airline, estab-
lishing the Eurasia Aviation Corporation, capitalized at US$1 million.
Eurasia inaugurated the Shanghai-Berlin service on 30 May 1931.88 By
1936, Eurasia had developed two main services: one route from Shang-
hai to Lanchow and the other from Peking to Canton. Eurasia aircraft
of Junkers manufacture were among the most modern in the world at
that time.
In the field of military aviation, the German government was de-
termined to gain for German enterprise the right to construct Chinas
first airplane factory. The Junkers firm negotiated with the Chinese to
construct a plant and train Chinese personnel under an arrangement
by which the Nanking government, Chinese banks, and the German
firms would each put up one-third of the capital. Chiang agreed to
this proposal in March 1934, and a preliminary contract was signed
on 29 September, providing that Junkers supply all aircraft materials,
including engines, and train the Chinese in manufacture of the planes.
In the first year, 54 bombers and 24 other aircraft were to be produced
and 200 to 250 airplanes were to be built in the next three years. The
site of the assembly plant was set for Hangchow and construction
was delayed by an Italian desire to construct a similar facility. Italian
competition, however, was dealt a severe blow when the chief Italian
air adviser Alfred Lordi was arrested by the Chinese in 1936 for mix-
ing the work of adviser too greatly with that of a businessman. The
Nanking government approved the final agreement with Junkers on 1
October 1936 and construction began thereafter.89 It is clear that both
Italians and Germans would not adopt the same restriction on aircraft
to South China as both the Americans and the British did.
In spite of its suspicion, under pressure from Washington, London
started to control tightly aircraft sales to China by moving to close the
Hong Kong loophole, but the argument between these two govern-
ments on this issue was not over until the failure of the Canton revolt.
The Canton authorities, the latter-day warlords, established a so-called
88. Harold Woodhead, ed., China Year Book, 1931 (New York, 1934), 25254.
89. Before the factory began production of aircraft, the Sino-Japanese War erupted on
7 July 1937. For an account of German assistance to the Chinese military aviation in the
1930s, see William Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford, Calif., 1984); John P.
Fox, The Development of Germanys Far East Policy, 193336" (Ph.D. diss., London
School of Economics, 1972); Jerry Bernard Seps, German Military Advisers and Chiang
Kai-shek 19271938 (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1972).
Nationalist government on 1 June 1936 and declared war on Nanking,

rejecting Chiang Kai-sheks overtures. A new civil war started between
Nanking and Canton. After putting down this revolt in only two
months, Chiang extend his influence to South China when the Nation-
alist Army occupied Canton.90
The Implications of Anglo-American Rivalry for Military Aviation

The Anglo-American rivalry for military aviation in South China had
some implications. First, the Anglo-American cooperation in helping
the Chinese government to control importation of arms throughout
China proved unworkable. Because the employment of airplanes be-
came a major factor in Chinese internal politics and warfare, the provin-
cial governments in South China sought foreign assistance in
developing their military aviation to maintain themselves in power
locally and to resist the Nationalist air force if Nanking attempted to
dominate the South. In order to make profits, foreign businessmen,
mainly the Americans, British, Germans, Italians, and French, tried to
sell military airplanes to local governments in South China after the
China Arms Embargo was lifted in 1929. To reduce the strength of
those local governments, the Nanking government insisted that other
countries not ship arms, including airplanes, to any authorities in China
without prior permission of the central government.
In order to prevent the possibility of civil wars in China, the Anglo-
American cooperative policy with regard to arms sales to China was
one of a number of important instances of cooperation between those
two governments in East Asian politics. Anglo-American cooperation
was essential in preventing local military authorities from obtaining
Western military airplanes. Therefore, in response to the request of
the Nanking government, the State Department tried to exercise strict
control over such exports to South China and to cooperate with the
British government to check the influx of foreign military airplanes
from Hong Kong to Canton.
But the London allowed the Hong Kong government to permit ship-
ment of military planes to Canton by way of Hong Kong without
Nankings permits and defined military aircraft differently, thus per-
mitting British businessmen to sell more military planes to the Canton
authorities. For fear of placing its nationals at a disadvantage in the
Anglo-American competition, the State Department relaxed its arms
policy to allow Americans to sell more military aircraft to South China.
90. On Cantons rebellion, see James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republi-
can Era in Chinese History, 19121949 (New York, 1975). See also Modern Aviation His-
tory in Kwangtung, Kwangtung wen-shih tzu-liao 63 (1959): 830.
Because of an increasing influx of Anglo-American planes to South

China, Governor Chen Chi-tang of Kwangtung province, still largely
independent of the Nanking government, was able to strengthen his
air force,91 spending over US$1.4 million for purchases of new equip-
ment for the school and air corps between 1933 and 1936. By March
1936, the Canton air force had expanded to nine squadrons with 150
airplanes, 300 pilots, twenty airfields, one airplane factory, one air-
plane repair shop, and one aviation school.92 It became the second
largest air force in China after the Nationalist air force, which had 200
aircraft. In neighboring Kwangsi province, with the help of the Brit-
ish, Lee Chung-yen enlarged his air force to rank third largest in China,
which had about 100 planes. The combination of both Kwangtung and
Kwangsi air forces created the strongest and probably most effective
air force in China.93 With strength in the air, General Chen Chi-tang
and Lee Chung-yen dared to rebel against the Nanking government.
It is obvious that the expansion of air power in Canton partially con-
tributed to its rebellion.94 Anglo-American cooperation in helping the
Chinese government control importation of airplanes was difficult at
best because both governments necessarily served their own commer-
cial interests, especially the interest of a critical defense including
aircraft endangered by the ravages of the Great Depression. Anglo-
American cooperation suffered when their divergent interests
conflicted.
Second, the United States and Britain failed to take concerted ac-
tions to oppose Japanese expansion in China partially due to the Anglo-
American aircraft competition. On 18 September 1931, the Japanese
invaded Manchuria. Without effective international sanction to stop
them, the Japanese occupied Manchuria in several months. The suc-
cess of the Manchurian campaign promoted Japans further encroach-
ment in China. In January 1932, the Japanese attacked Shanghai. In
order to oppose Japans expansion, the State Department suggested
91. Canton to Expand Air Forces50 Planes Bought Abroad to Add to Present Fleet,
North China Herald, 4 July 1934, 11; Canton Aircraft Strength200 Aeroplanes on Or-
der, ibid., 17 Jan., 1934, 96.
92. The Aviation of Kwangtung Province (in Chinese), Chung-kuo te kung-chn
(Chinas air force) (Chengdu), 48 (Sept. 1940), 403. The Aviation of Kwangsi (in Chi-
nese), ibid., 49 (1963), 25.
93. The Kwangsi Air Force, 1 May 1934, report 8818, file 2078, RG 165, NA.
94. On the causes of Cantons rebellion, see The Record of Flying to Nanking of the
Kwangtung Air Corps, Chuan-chi wen-hseh 30 (1959), 1:6668; Ting Chi-hsu, I and the
Kwangtung Air Force, Wen-shih tzu-liao hsuan-chi (Chuan-kuo) (Selected sources of lit-
erature and history, National), 25 (1961): 193212; Nine Kwangtung Planes Desert South
and Land at Nanking, China Weekly Review, 11 July 1936, 198; Wholesale Desertion of
the Canton Air Force to Nanking, ibid., 25 Jan. 1936, 278; Kwangtung Aviation His-
tory, Kwangtung wen-shih tzu-liao, 4:17987.
to the Foreign Office that both countries join in the delivery of a note
to both the Chinese and Japanese governments. This note was to indi-
cate that Washington and London would not recognize any agreement
signed by China and Japan which impaired the Open Door policy. The
Foreign Office reacted coolly to the American proposal, and the State
Department was disappointed with the negative British reaction.95
On 17 April 1934, Eiji Amau, the chief of the Intelligence Depart-
ment of the Japanese Foreign Office thought to have been a spokes-
man for the Japanese Foreign Office, issued a statement to the Japanese
press, articulating the position of Tokyo with regard to aid from the
Western powers to China. This was the so-called Amau statement.96
The statement asserted a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in Asia, which
placed China in Japans sphere of influence. The statement particu-
larly objected to supplying China with war planes, building aero-
dromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers
to China. This declaration, in practice, was to prevent the Chinese
from purchasing Western airplanes as well as other arms.97
As a result, the British attempted to establish an Anglo-American
front to undertake cooperative measure to challenge Japan. On 21 April,
the U.S. embassy in London cabled the State Department that the Brit-
ish press and public opinion were anxious about the Amau declara-
tion and that Sir John Simon had told Ambassador Bingham that he
took a most apprehensive view of the Japanese move. Moreover,
Simon wanted to have a conversation with the State Department, as
he believed the situation called for close Anglo-American coopera-
tion. Two days later, the State Department instructed Bingham to in-
form Simon that it would give careful consideration to any suggestions
or proposals he wished to make. Hornbeck informed the British am-
bassador in Washington that the adoption of parallel policies by sev-
eral governments had the advantage of giving the semblance of a
common front. The British, however, dropped the matter. In contra-
diction to their initial stand, they decided to act individually and to
limit themselves to asking Tokyo to clarify the Amau statement with a
view to determining its relationship to the principles of the Open Door
policy.98
95. For further detail, see C. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League,
and the Far Eastern Crisis of 19311933 (New York, 1973), 400403; Irving Friedman, Brit-
ish Relations with China: 19311939 (New York, 1940), 2933.
96. Harold S. Quigley, Far Eastern War, 19371941 (Westport, Conn., 1973), 56.
97. For further detail, see Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of
19331938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 7892; Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International
Affairs, 1934 (London, 1935), 65051. See also Unofficial Statement by the Japanese For-
eign Office, 17 Apr. 1934, FRUS, Japan: 19311941, 1:22425. See also Word Risks in the
Orient, Wall Street Journal, 28 Apr. 1934, 6.
98. FRUS, 1934, 3:165, 12126, 13135, 141.
There were several reasons why the United States and Britain failed
to take joint measures against Japans aggressive policy in China. The
Anglo-American argument over the aircraft sale to South China might
be one. At that time Washington was furious over what London had
done and pressed it to halt the sale of airplanes to South China. The
State Department and the British Foreign Office were quarreling over
the inflow of military aircraft to Canton by the way of Hong Kong.
Those arguments not only disclosed and underscored the distrust and
accumulated grievances that existed between those governments, but
also increased suspicion between the Americans and the British which
had a negative impact on their cooperative measures. Aircraft compe-
tition together with other Anglo-American economic competition frus-
trated their political cooperation against Japan.99
Third, the Anglo-American aircraft competition shows that there
was internal conflict concerning the China policy of the U.S. govern-
ment, and the lack of a unified China policy by which the various
departments policies were governed during the 1930s. The China arms
policy, an integral and increasingly important part of the broad politi-
cal policy of the American government toward China, was based on
two general principles: to discourage civil strife in China, and to re-
frain from placing American exporters at an unjustifiable disadvan-
tage in competing with other exporting countries. The first principle
was essentially humanitarian although it had obvious political impli-
cations; the second was economic.
But U.S. policy in these matters was not always easily set; there
were conflicting opinions and interests within the Washington estab-
lishment. The China arms policy was not only commercial and eco-
nomic but political as well. The sale of military planes to China changed
the balance of power not only in that country but also in East Asia.
Although the State Department had a priority of economic interest in
formulating the China arms policy, under certain circumstances it had
to consider political consequences. Sometimes it opposed selling air-
planes to China because these sales could adversely affect relations
between Washington and Tokyo. Without consistently considering the
political consequences of aircraft sales within and outside China, the
Commerce Department was anxious to stimulate the sale of military
planes to China and did not want American businessmen to lose the
potential aircraft market in China to British and other competitors.
99. For detailed discussion of this issue, see Evan Luard, Britain and China (Baltimore,
Md., 1962), 4244. See also Davis to Atherton, 12 Sept. 1934, Norman Davis Papers, Di-
vision of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Moffats diary, 21 May 1934, Jay Moffat Di-
ary, Houghton Library, Harvard University; FRUS, 1934, 1:238, 3:65.
For example, when Leighton Rogers was selecting U.S. airmen for
Canton, he sent the proposed list of names to the aircraft companies
including Curtiss-Wright, Douglas, and United, and insisted that those
companies must necessarily handle this very confidentially. While
negotiation with the Canton government was in process, Rogers re-
peatedly instructed Edward Howard that under no circumstance
should there be any publicity on the matter.100 Rogers must certainly
have been aware that the Commerce Department was anxious not to
publicize this mission in light of the Japanese already using the arrival
of the Jouett mission group for propaganda purposes, unfavorable to
both the United States and China. If the Japanese knew of the negotia-
tions between Howard and Canton, it might embarrass the State De-
partment sufficiently to force it to ask the Commerce Department to
stop all activity. Rogers, however, justified his handling of the Canton
project because it is our function . . . to promote the sales of aeronau-
tic equipment and this is an excellent way of doing it.101 Obviously,
the Commerce Department was acting contrary to the arms policy of
the State Department.
The Commerce Department was also acting contrary to the China
policy of the State Department by promoting the sale of American
aircraft to the Nationalist governments internal opponents. In spite
of State Department regulations, some businessmen, with the occa-
sional help of the U.S. commercial attach, still circumvented them in
later years. On 9 December 1932, for example, J. Y. Lum, on behalf of
the Canton Aviation Bureau, signed a contract with Max S. Polin of
China Airway Federal, Inc., which provided for the sale by China Air-
way to Canton of four Curtiss training planes, ten Browning machine
guns, and ammunition. Polin then informed George Westervelt of
China Airway that the planes should be consigned to China Airway,
Hong Kong, rather than to the Canton Aviation Bureau because he
was informed by the local U.S. commercial attachs office that Wash-
ington would require no export permit if these planes were routed to
the Crown Colony. The Canton Aviation Bureau, therefore, requested
that all packing cases be marked CHINA AIRWAY, HONG KONG.
In yet another instance, Donald W. Douglas, president of the Douglas
Aircraft Company, remarked concerning the sale of to DC-2S to Can-
ton, My suggestion to you in selling any airplanes to Canton would
be that you allow yourself enough time to ship them in some other
100. McClean to Johnson, 3 Jan. 1933, U.S. Senate Special Committee, Hearings be-
fore the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry (73rd and 74th Cong.),
6:1554.
101. Rogers to Smiley, 21 Dec. 1932, file 560, box 503, RG 151, NA.
way than directly from here to Canton, in the event of any difficulty
over this license.102
These two examples illustrate methods by which Americans by-
passed or defeated the precise spirit of State Department policy and
regulation. Those cases also reveal continuing differences between
the policies of the State Department and those of the Commerce
Department.
102. Polin to Westervelt, 17 Dec. 1932, Cases Files, 19341935, box 30, U.S. Senate
Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, Records of the United States
Senate, RG 46, NA.; Douglas to Vliegtuigenfabriek, 9 July 1935, box 101, Current Files,
ibid.

Anglo-American Rivalry For Military Aviation in Southern China in The 1930s

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Anglo-American Rivalry For Military Aviation in Southern China in The 1930s

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Anglo-American Rivalry for Military Aviation in Southern

China in the 1930s

In the 1930s, the Nationalist government in Nanking faced two major

was the implication of the Anglo-American aircraft competition on

equipped with a Wright Whirlwind engine similar to the Spirit of St.

Several reasons account for the success of the American aircraft

8. Lincoln C. Reynolds, Aviation in China, 1935, 893.796/193, ibid.; Douglas Jenkins,

10. Jenkins, Aviation Situation in Canton, 14 Dec. 1928.

native.14 With Rogers approval, Howard traveled to Canton in De-

Los Angeles to Canton. In 1934, the Canton Aviation School employed

Meanwhile, Canton sent an official request to the United Aircraft Ex-

To help its nationals to compete with America in the aeronautics

pressed by the British aircraft, the Kwangtung Air Force reached an

The Anglo-American Dispute

planes, must have Nankings import permits as well as export licenses

43. U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, 7 June 1930, 273.

At the State Department, Joseph Green, chief of the Division of

47. Hornbeck to Castle, 17 July 1931, 893.113/1307, RG 59, NA.

licenses were not required. Under the regulations, British business-

58. Atherton to SecSt, 25 Jan. 1932, FRUS, 1932, 4:581.

Expressing irritation with the British relaxation of aircraft sales to

necessary instructions to its Legation at Washington.66 The busy work

1932 1933 Jan. 1934 Feb. 1934

Great Britain 604,372 217,553 388,514 87,000

The British government was equally skeptical about Washingtons

Still London was skeptical that the restrictions, adopted only by

Nationalist government on 1 June 1936 and declared war on Nanking,

The Implications of Anglo-American Rivalry for Military Aviation

Because of an increasing influx of Anglo-American planes to South

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