63. Salvanera Vs.
People Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
Facts:
1 The petitioner contests the decision of the court
which discharged the accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the information in
Criminal Case for the Murder of Ruben Parane,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires City, to become State witnesses.
2 The appellate court likewise cancelled his bail bond.
The trial court granted bail of the petitioner but
denied the discharge of the accused Abutin and
Tampelix
The prosecution elevated the case to the CA and
argued that the testimonies of the two accused are
absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner
masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane.
The prosecution likewise claimed that it was
premature to allow the petitioner bail as they have
hot even rested their case.
Issue:
Whether there is sufficient ground to discharge the
accused Abutin and Tampelix to be a state witness
against the petitioner.
Held:
Yes. There is sufficient ground. The court is
satisfied that:
a There is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested.
b There is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed
except the testimony of said accused.
c The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points.
d Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty
e Said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
However, the petitioner argued that both Abutin
and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity
to be absolved of any liability by putting the
blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner
argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and
Salazar, who are not accused, do not have
personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they
could not testify to corroborate the statement of
mastermind or the principal by induction.
The court dismissed their reasoning. What is
needed is that the corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of
the very same evidence as will be testified on by
the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that
a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method.
If it is sown that the statements of the conspirator
are corroborated by other evidence, then we have
convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness
has told the truth in other respects.
64. Vda de Manguerra vs. Risos
CONCEPCION VDA. DE MANGUERRA vs.
RAUL RISOS,et al.
GR No. 152643, August 2008
FACTS:
Criminal information was filed on October
29, 1999 which was subsequently amended on
November 18, 1999 before the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 19. Respondents were charged with estafa
through falsification of public document. On
September 10, 1999, Concepcion Manguerra while
on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at
the Makati Medical Center and was advised to stay in
Manila for further treatment. On November 24, 1999,
respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the
Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question. Respondents argued that civil action for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage should first be
resolved. The RTC granted the aforesaid motion of
the respondents but denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of
Concepcion Manguerra filed a motion to take the
latters deposition on account of her sickness and
advanced age. On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted
the motion and directed that petitioners deposition be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25
decision of the RTC and November 3 RTC orders. On
August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a decision granting
the petition of the respondents and setting aside the
RTC orders on August 25, 2000 and November 3,
2000 respectively. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Concepcion
Manguerra.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deposition taken from
petitioner Concepcion Manguerra is in accordance
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
HELD:
No. The taking of the deposition before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City was erroneous and
contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules of Court
that the same be made before the court where the
case is pending.
Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the conditional examination be made
before the court at least before the Judge where the
case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused
be notified, so that he can attend the examination,
subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice. The Rules mandate that it be conducted in the
same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer. The Court cannot
disregard these rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights.
Petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED;
the Court of Appeals decision and resolution dated
August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002 respectively are
hereby AFFIRMED.
65. Jimenez vs. People, G.R. No. 209195
Facts: Montero executed sworn statements
confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby
Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner
Jimenez and four others as his coconspirators.
The statements of Montero which provided the
details on where the alleged steel casing containing
the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the
recovery of a cadaver, encased in a drum and steel
casing, near or practically at the place that Montero
pointed to.
Montero then filed a motion for his discharge as state
witness; the People of the Philippines also filed a
motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for
the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.
Judge Docena granted the motions, arguing that:
1 The crime would have remained undiscovered
and unsolved had it not been for Monteros
extrajudicial confession that narrated in detail the
manner of the abduction and subsequent murder
of Ruby Rose. As the crime was committed in
secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as
Montero, could give direct evidence identifying
the other coconspirators.
2 Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state
witness as he does not appear to be the most
guilty, although he is a principal by direct
participation. The principals by inducement are
more guilty because, without their orders, the
crime would not have been committed.
Jimenez raises the following errors:
1 There is no necessity to discharge Montero as a
state witness because:
a the voluntary sworn extrajudicial
confessions of Montero are all in the
possession of the prosecution which they
could readily present in court without
discharging Montero; and
b there was unjust favoritism in the discharge
of Montero because all the other
conspirators are equally knowledgeable of
the crime.
2 Montero appears to be the most guilty. A
principal by direct participation is more guilty
than the principal by inducement as the Revised
Penal Code penalizes the principal by
inducement only when the principal by direct
participation has executed the crime.
Issue: Whether Judge Docena committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the order which granted the
People of the Philippines motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness in the Criminal Case.
Held: No.
1 Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an
accused sought to be discharged when he or she
alone has knowledge of the crime. In more
concrete terms, necessity is not there when the
testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise
strengthen the prosecutions evidence.
a In the present case, not one of the accused-
conspirators, except Montero, was willing to
testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose
and their participation in her killing. Hence,
the CA was correct in ruling that Judge
Docena acted properly and in accordance
with jurisprudence in ruling that there was
absolute necessity for the testimony of
Montero. He alone is available to provide
direct evidence of the crime.
b That the prosecution could use the voluntary
statements of Montero without his discharge
as a state witness is not an important and
relevant consideration. To the prosecution
belongs the control of its case and this Court
cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge
 of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with.
2 By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest
degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily
mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty by
reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his
degree of participation in the commission of the
offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that
the most guilty would be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized.
a However, the CA is incorrect in finding that
a principal by inducement is automatically
the most guilty in a conspiracy. As a rule, for
purposes of resolving a motion to discharge
an accused as a state witness, what are
controlling are the specific acts of the
accused in relation to the crime committed.
b But neither can the Court agree with
Jimenez that a principal by direct
participation is more guilty than the
principal by inducement as the Revised
Penal Code penalizes the principal by
inducement only when the principal by
direct participation has executed the crime.
The severity of the penalty imposed is part
of the substantive criminal law which should
not be equated with the procedural rule on
the discharge of the particeps criminis. The
procedural remedy of the discharge of an
accused is based on other considerations,
such as the need for giving immunity to one
of several accused in order that not all shall
escape, and the judicial experience that the
candid admission of an accused regarding
his participation is a guaranty that he will
testify truthfully.
c The requirement is that a state witness does
not need to be found to be the least guilty;
he or she should not only "appear to be the
most guilty." From the evidence submitted
by the prosecution in support of its motion
to discharge Montero, it appears that while
Montero was part of the planning,
preparation, and execution stage as most of
his co-accused had been, he had no direct
participation in the actual killing of Ruby
Rose. While Lope allegedly assigned to him
the execution of the killing, the records do
not indicate that he had active participation
in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose,
which allegedly came from accused Lope
and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of
Ruby Rose which was executed by accused
Lennard. Monteros participation was
limited to providing the steel box where the
drum containing the victims body was
placed, welding the steel box to seal the
cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug
boat, and, together with his co-accused,
dropping the steelbox containing the cadaver
into the sea.
66. People vs. De Grano
[GR No. 167710, June 5, 2009]
People of the Philippines, Petitioner,
Vs.
Joven De Grano, et al., Respondents
FACTS:
Joven De Grano, Armando De Grano, and
Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and
Leonardo Genil were all charged for the crime of
Murder. Thereafter, the hearing for the application for
bail ensued, and granted respondents motion for bail.
After the presentation of the parties respective
sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
finding several accused guilty of the offense as
charged. At the promulgation of sentence, only
accused Estanislao was present despite due notice to
the other respondents. Thereafter, the respondents
filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration praying that
the Decision be reconsidered and set aside and acquit
them. Acting on the motion, the RTC acquitted Joven
and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of
Domingo and Estanislao from Murder to Homicide.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA where it alleged that it had no other plain,
adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the
State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. The
CA denied the petition on the ground that the rule on
double jeopardy prohibits the State from appealing a
judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.
HELD:
The petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.

Double jeopardy has the following essential
elements: (1) the accused is charged under a
complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and
he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted,
or the case dismissed, without his express consent.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides that, The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. The proper clerk of court shall give notice
to the accused, personally or though his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at
the promulgation of the decision.
When the Decision was promulgated, only
Estanislao was present. Subsequently thereafter,
without surrendering and explaining the reasons for
their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined
Estanislao in their Joint Motion. In blatant disregard
of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the
arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also
took cognizance of the joint motion. Thus, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double
jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. However,
with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no
reversible error when it entertained the Joint Motion.
He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost
jurisdiction over his person. For Estanislao, and for
him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy
applies.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
67. Asistio vs. People
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA
NEALIGA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200465 April 20, 2015
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation
of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).
The prosecution sought to prove that the accused had
entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for
the sale of softdrink products at the same school. The
school principal then created an audit committee to
look into the financial reports of the Cooperative.
Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola,
including the records of actual deliveries and sales,
and the financial statements prepared by Asistio, the
audit committee found that Asistio defrauded the
Cooperative and its members for three (3) years.
Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative
the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated,
Asistio failed and refused to do so. Thus, the
Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing
the filing of criminal charges against her.
Trial ensued and after the presentation and offer of
evidence by the prosecution, Asistio moved to
dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence
with prior leave of court. She argued, among other
matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as
the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA
6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she
can be held criminally liable.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against the
accused on demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
HELD:
No. The dismissal of the charge by RTC does not
amount to an acquittal.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as
the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had
rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls
for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by
the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer
to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the
issue of Asistios guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the
case, the RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as
an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
68. Cabador vs. People
G.R. No. 186001
October 2, 2009
Ponente: ABAD, J.
Facts:
On June 23, 2000, Antonio Cabador was charged
before the RTC of Quezon City for murder in
conspiracy with others. On February 2006, after
presenting only five witnesses over five years of
intermittent trial, the RTC declared an end to the
prosecutions presentation of evidence and required
the prosecution to make a formal offer of its
documentary evidence. But, the public prosecutor
asked for three extensions of time and still did not
make the required written offer not until August 1,
2006
On the same date, August 1, 2006, Cabador filed a
motion to dismiss, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention
in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating
Cabadors motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion without
leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived
his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial
court deemed the case submitted for decision.
Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this
Order but the RTC denied it.
Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the CA
but the latter denied his petition and affirmed the
lower courts actions. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Cabadors motion to dismiss filed
before the trial court was a demurrer to evidence.
Held:
No, Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer
to evidence.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests
its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity
to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer
in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the
remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files
a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence and the
case shall be considered submitted for judgment.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer
to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must
consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed;
and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of
exhibits, on the same day Cabador filed his motion to
dismiss, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an
opportunity to object to the admission of those
exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer.
And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss before he could object to the
prosecutions formal offer, before the trial court could
act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest
its case, it could not be said that he had intended his
motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court is NULLIFIED. The latter court
is DIRECTED to resolve Cabadors motion to
dismiss based on the circumstances surrounding the
trial in the case.
69. People vs. Tan
625 SCRA 388, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010
Facts:
Two informations were filed against Dante Tan, the
new beneficial owner of Best World Resources
Corporation (BWRC). According to the information
he willfully, unlawfully, and criminally fail to file
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn
statement of the amount of all BWRC shares within
ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner,
in violation of the Revised Securities Act. After
arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty to both
charges and trial ensued. The prosecution made its
Formal Offer of Evidence and in the meantime,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC granted the
motion. The prosecution opposed but the CA ruled
that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of
a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and
operates as an acquittal, for which reason the
prosecution cannoty appeal therefrom for it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether the RTC abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial and in its grant
of respondents demurrer to evidence
Held:
No.
As ruled in People vs. Laguio, Jr., the only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while
certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
However, in this case it was clear that the RTC never
prevented petitioner from presenting its case. The
RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal
offer of evidence after having initially rested its case
and then continue its presentation by introducing
additional witnesses
Even if this Court were to review the action taken by
the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence, no
grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that
the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived
at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As
correctly observed by the CA, the RTC extensively
discussed its position on the various issues brought to
contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for
the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the
absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares
that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks
were divided into, whether there are preferred shares
as well as common shares, or even which type of
shares respondent had acquired.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as
the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls
"for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed,
for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The Petition was dismissed and the
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were affirmed.
70. Imperial vs. Joson
Facts:
At about 2 oclock in the morning of May 11, 2001
along the portion of National Highway in Barangay
Concepcion in Sariaya Quezon an Isuzu Ten Wheeler
truck collided with a Fuso six wheeler truck. Owned
by Petitioner Nelson Imperial, the Isuzu ten wheeler
truck was being driven by respondent Santiago
Giganto Jr. who was at that time was accompanied by
a helper respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding
with the Fuso 6 wheeler truck , the Isuzu Ten wheeler
truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was
in turn, being driven by respondent Arnel Lazo. The
KIA was owned by Noel Tagle who was on board the
vehicle, together with 8 other passengers. As a
consequence of the collision this resulted to the death
of the driver of Kia Besta Van and its 8 passengers, a
criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting
to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries, and Damage to Property was filed against
Petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-99 before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya Quezon.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that the 9 postponements of
the pre-trial conference of the case amounted to a
violation of Franciscos constitutional right to speedy
trial?
Held:
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to the speedy disposition of the
case and a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered (a) length of delay (b) reason for the delay
(c) prejudice of the defendant (d) defendants
assertion of his right. Petitioner Francisco claims that
his right to speedy trial was violated when the Public
Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the 9
hearings scheduled by Sariaya MTC. Far from being
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however the
delays entailed by postponements of the hearings
were, to a great extent attributable to petitioners
Franciscos own pursuit of extraordinary remedies
against the interlocutory orders issued by Sariaya
MTC and the assignment of at least 3 public
prosecutors in the case.
Although Revised rules of Criminal Procedure
mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days
from the receipt of pre-trial order and the continuous
conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days.
Sec 3 a Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from
extra ordinary remedies against interlocutory orders
shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence. In determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial moreover, courts are required
to do more than a computation of postponements of
the scheduled hearings of the case, and give peculiar
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
71. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and
MANUEL G. BARCENAS
Facts :
This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks
to nullify the Sandiganbayans July 26, 2006
Resolution1 which granted private respondents
demurrer to evidence.
The accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a
high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of
Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation
to office, having obtained cash advances from the
City Government of Toledo, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to
liquidate the same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances of P61,765.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On
June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution granting the motion. On June 30, 2006,
private respondent filed his demurrer to evidence.
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated the assailed Resolution, finding the
demurrer to evidence well taken. Granting Demurrer
to Evidence and dismissing the case.
Issue :
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to and
eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.
Ruling:
An order of dismissal arising from the grant
of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an
acquittal unless the order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the
accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal
order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable
but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.The burden is on the petitioner to
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.13
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan
granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove that the government
suffered any damage from private respondents non-
liquidation of the subject cash advance because it
was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions
witness, that private respondent liquidated the same
albeit belatedly. On the other hand, COA Circular
No. 90-33114 or the "Rules and Regulations on the
Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of Cash
Advances" which implemented Section 89 of P.D.
No. 144 that the AO (Accountable Officer) shall
liquidate his cash advance. Failure of the AO to
liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed
period shall constitute a valid cause for the
withholding of his salary. Upon failure of the AO to
liquidate his cash advance within one month for
AOs within the station and three months for AOs
outside the station from date of grant of the cash
advance, the Auditor shall issue a letter demanding
liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation.
Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan
proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the
law and its implementing rules, the error committed
was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order
 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as
the denial of the prosecutions right to due process
or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error
committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature
that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution because it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.
However erroneous the order of respondent
Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex
Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error
cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
72. Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan
G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR. vs. SALLY GO
BANGAYAN
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172792
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN vs. SALLY GO
BANGAYAN
The Facts:
The City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for
bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having
contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that
he was still legally married to Sally Go. Benjamin, Jr.
filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the
criminal case be dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt.
One of his arguments is that the prosecution was
unable to show that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco
Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same
person.
The RTC dismissed the criminal case for
insufficiency of evidence, due to the prosecutions
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z.
Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with Resally.
Sally Go elevated the case to the CA, which granted
her petition, holding that the following pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient
to deny the Demurrer to evidence.
The Issues:
1. Whether the acquittal by virtue of a Demurrer to
evidence can be appealed by the private offended
party.
2. Whether the acquittal by virtue of a Demurrer to
evidence amounts to acquittal on the merits.
The Courts Ruling:
1. No. It has been consistently held that in criminal
cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. Only
the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the
authority to question the order granting the Demurrer
to evidence in a criminal case. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such
acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability
of the accused is concerned.
Thus, Sally Go had no personality to file the petition
for certiorari before the CA.
2. Yes. A Demurrer to evidence is filed after the
prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented
by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient
and grants the Demurrer to evidence, such dismissal
of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent
to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the
rule that the Court cannot review an order granting
the Demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are
doubtless present. Therefore, the CA erred in
reversing the trial courts order dismissing the case
against the petitioners because it placed them in
double jeopardy.
73. People of the Philippines vs. Jose c. Go
G.R. No. 191015 (Aug. 6, 2014)
FACTS: The Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) was designated as the receiver
for Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC)
after the latter bank was ordered closed by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Acting in this capacity,
the PDIC went after some of OCBC's bad loans and
filed two counts of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents against private respondent
Jose C. Go who was the OCBC president. It alleged
that fictitious loans worth a total of P20 million were
misappropriated and used to fund personal checks
issued by him.
After the presentation of all of the prosecutions
evidence, private respondents filed a Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence based on failure
of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Respondent RTC judge agreed,
dismissed the criminal cases and acquitted all of the
accused. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
The prosecution filed an original Petition for
Certiorari with the CA which was denied, along with
a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court held
that the assailed Order of the trial court became final
since the prosecution failed to move for the
reconsideration thereof in a timely manner, and thus
double jeopardy attached. It also ruled that the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion and also prove
the offense charged.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC
decision in granting Demurrer to Evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The order was patently null and void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial
injury to the banking industry and public interest.
Demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt x x x or
such evidence in character, weight or amount as will
legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree
of participation therein by the accused. Thus, when
the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate
whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough
to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of
a grave abuse of such discretion. As to effect, the
grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null
and void.
The prosecution has presented competent evidence to
sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, and that
respondents appear to be perpetrators thereof. What
the trial and appellate courts disregarded however, is
that the OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank
accounts of respondent Go, and were used to fund his
personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto.
These, if not rebutted, are indicative of estafa. Hence,
the petition is granted. Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are reversed and set aside.
74. People vs. Pepino
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA
GOMEZ y CAMPOS, G.R. No. 174471.
January 12, 2016.
The Case: This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino
(Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing
the June 16, 2006 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02026.
Facts: At 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men
and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at
Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paraaque
City, and pretended to be customers. When
Edward was about to receive them, one of the
men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a
gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told
Pepino that the money was inside the cashiers
box. Pepino and the other man looted the
cashiers box, handcuffed Edward, and forced
him to go with them. From the hallway, Jocelyn
Tan Edwards wife, saw Pepino take her husband.
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota
Corolla where three other men were waiting
inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat
on the front passenger seat. The abductors then
placed surgical tape over Edwards eyes and made
him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and
a half hours, they arrived at an apartment in
Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape
from Edwards eyes, placed him in a room, and
then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward
and asked for the phone number of his father so
that he could ask for ransom for his liberty. At
around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers
called Edwards father and demanded a P40
million ransom for his release. Edwards father
told the kidnappers that he did not have that
amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn
who eventually agreed to a P700, 000.00 ransom.
The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the money
into two packages and to drop these at a
convenience store in front of McDonalds at
Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that
Edwards vehicle be used to bring the money.
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio
Gepiga (the family driver) brought the agreed
amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at
Mindanao Avenue as instructed. That evening,
three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made
him board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes.
Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could
remove his blindfold after five minutes. When
Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself
inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman
Campus. He drove home and reported his
kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-
crime crusader. After five months, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward
that they had apprehended some suspects, and
invited him to identify them from a lineup
consisting of seven persons: five males and two
females. Edward positively identified Pepino,
Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise
identified Pepino.10
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their
defense. The defense instead presented Zeny
Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special
Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp.
Narciso Guano (Qano).
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC
convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended) and sentenced
them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also
ordered them to pay Edward P700, 000.00
representing the amount extorted from him;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50, 000 as
exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted
Batijon for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC
held that Edward positively identified Pepino and
Gomez as two of the persons who forcibly
abducted him. The case was automatically
elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to the
CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo. In its decision dated June 16,
2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the amounts of
moral and exemplary damages were increased
from P300, 000.00 and P100, 000.00,
respectively.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the arrest is valid.
2. Whether accused-appellant is
deprived of right to counsel during police lineup.
3. Whether or not Edwards out of court
identification of the suspects
(Gomez) during trial may have been
preconditioned by suggestive identification
therefore inadmissible.
HELD: 1. We point out at the outset that Gomez
did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition
of RTCs jurisdiction over her person. Thus,
Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection
to her warrantless arrest. It is settled that any
objection to the procedure followed in the matter
of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Appellant is now
estopped from questioning any defect in the
manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial. At any rate, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute
the guilty when all other facts on record point to
their culpability. It is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been
arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been
completed, and a judgment of conviction had
been rendered against her.
2. The right to counsel is a fundamental
right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to
admit something false. The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from the accused. Custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation. As a
rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police lineup.
3. In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors,
viz.: (1) the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995),
the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identifications in this
manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted
by the police in various ways. It is done thru show
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.:
(1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we
find Edwards out-of-court identification to be
reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the
three individuals entered Edwards office, they
initially pretended to be customers, and even
asked about the products that were for sale. The
three had told Edward that they were going to
pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun instead. After
Pepinos companion had taken the money from
the cashiers box, the malefactors handcuffed
Edward and forced him to go down to the parked
car. From this sequence of events, there was thus
ample opportunity for Edward before and after
the gun had been pointed at him to view the
faces of the three persons who entered his office.
In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked
to him at least once a day during the four days
that he was detained.
75. Llamas vs. CA
Llamas vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 149588.August 16, 2010
Topic: Rule 120 Judgment
Facts:
Petitioners (spouses Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas) are assailing the decision of the
RTC of Makati City convicting them of the offense
Other Forms of Swindling punishable under Article
316, paragraph 2, of the RPC. It was alleged that the
accused, well knowing that their parcel of land
situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged to the
Rural Bank of Imus, sold said property to one
Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing it to be free
from all liens and encumbrances to the damage and
prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila.
The RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of
the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the
issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the
said motion, petitioners instituted the instant
proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the
appellate courts decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment
can be availed of in criminal cases.
Ruling:
Yes.
In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons,
the Court deems it necessary to re-examine this case.
Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this
case, from the time it was pending in the trial court
until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as
enough basis to dismiss the present motion for
reconsideration. However, considering petitioners
advanced age, the length of time this case has been
pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as
a result of petitioners conviction, the Court resolves
to grant pro hac vice the motion for reconsideration.
This Court has, on occasion, suspended the
application of technical rules of procedure where
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among
other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses on the principle that
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid
application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided.
It is far better and more prudent for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause
grave injustice to the parties.
Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized
that the petition, although captioned differently, was
indeed one for certiorari. Since we have resolved to
treat the petition as one for certiorari, the doctrine in
People v. Bitanga no longer finds application in this
case.
76. People vs. Montesclaros
The present case is an appeal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding appellant Ida Monteclaros
guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.
Facts:
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant
Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident.
Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in
Mabini, CebuCity. On February 19, 1995, Ida and
ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by
Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about
4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house
with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer at
that time. They forced her to drink beer and after
consuming three and one-half (3 ) glasses of beer, she
became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was
lying on the floor of their room, she overheard
Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be
allowed to remedyo or have sexual intercourse with
her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to
leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse
with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus
alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke
up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was
loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain
in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and
noticed that her panties and short pants were stained
with blood which was coming from her vagina. When
her mother arrived home from work the following
morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored
her.
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m.,
she was left alone in the room since her mother was
at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their
room and threatened to kill her if she would report
the previous sexual assault to anyone. He then
forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but
Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to
kill her if she shouted. He undressed himself, spread
ABCs legs, put saliva on his right hand and he
applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis
into ABCs vagina and made a push and pull
movement. After consummating the sexual act, he
left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about
the incident, the latter again ignored her.
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her
mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape
and that her mother sold her. ABC, together with
Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer,
reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9,
1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the
Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National
Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit
7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and
issued a Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Sator testified that
the result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep
healed laceration at the seven (7) oclock position and
a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) oclock
position on ABCs hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints.
She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by
having carnal knowledge of her, against her will,
while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1,
1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that
this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who
gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again,
she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened
with a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her, against her
will.
Agustos B. Costas, M.D. (Dr. Costas), the Head of
the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical
Certification, which showed that appellant Ida was
treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center Psychiatry Department from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was
provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid
type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of
rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and
Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was
found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No.
013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Idas favor
the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without
depriving her of the consciousness of her acts,
pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Ida
Monteclaros as accomplice to the crime of rape
despite failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?
Held:
No, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and
appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an
accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.[47]The following requisites must be
proved in order that a person can be considered an
accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by
the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice
77. Hipos Sr. vs. Bay
Facts:
Petitioners of this case were charged with
two informations for the crime of rape and act of
lasciviousness before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City presided by herein respondent. Private
complainants file a Motion for Reinvestigation to
study the proper informations filed against
petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners filed a
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Cases claiming
that there was no probable cause. After the
reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor
affirmed the informations filed against petitioners.
However, acting on the Joint Memorandum of
petitioners as an appeal, the Resolution was reversed
by the Assistant City Prosecutor holding there was no
probable cause. Consequently, a Motion to Withdraw
Informations was filed before herein respondent but
was denied. Hence, this Petition for Mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be
bound by the Resolution of the Prosecution?
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The trial
court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. When
the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of
Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out
of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its
judicial prerogative.
Furthermore, Mandamus is never available
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either. In other
words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to
Withdraw Informations can be compelled by
mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way like to grant or deny
such Motion.
In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse
to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order
denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the
proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file
a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of
Judge Bay.
78. People vs. Lorenzo
Facts:
Two (2) informations were filed against
Paterno Lorenzo charging him with
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
Conrado Estanislao was also accused of
possessing illegal drugs in violation of the
provisions of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
On arraignment, both accused, with the
assistance of counsel, entered NOT GUILTY
pleas.
The prosecution presented as its lone
witness, PO1 Pineda, who was a member of
the buy-bust team.
As told, Lorenzo handed the shabu to the
informant. PO1 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano
alighted from the tricycle and approached
Lorenzo, and introduced themselves as
police officers and arrested him.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily
searched and PO1 Pineda was able to
retrieve the marked money and 2 other
sachets of shabu from him.
A certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the
police officers and ran, but he was soon
accosted. A search of his pockets yielded
one (1) sachet of shabu.
Next, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to
the police station. The sachets of white
crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo
were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The
results showed that the substance was
positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu.
Interposing the defenses of denial and
frame-up, Lorenzo and Estanislao stood
before the witness stand and presented their
version of the facts.
RTC rendered a Decision convicting
Lorenzo, but acquitting Estanislao.
According to RTC, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
buyer in the buy-bust operation and the
seller, object and consideration, including
the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo
and the payment of the buy-bust money
Lorenzo appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the procedure followed by the
police operatives in the seizure and custody
of the evidence against him.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of conviction rendered by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution discharged its burden of
proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
No. The prosecutions case fails for failure to
establish the identity of the sachets of shabu with
moral certainty.
Specific procedures relating to the seizure and
custody of drugs have been laid down under the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for
Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecutions
burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have
been complied with in proving the elements of the
offense.
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
This failure to follow proper procedure, i.e. inventory
and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises
doubts, as to whether the specimen examined by the
forensic chemist and presented in court were indeed
retrieved from Lorenzo and failed to support
Lorenzos conviction for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165.
Therefore, the presumption of innocence should
prevail.
79. People vs. Baron
People v. Rene Baron y Tangarocan
GR No. 185209; 28 June 2010
Facts:
The accused was found guilty of the crime
of robbery with homicide by the RTC of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental. Said conviction stemmed from
the allegation contained in the information stating
that the accused acted in conspiracy with two (2)
people in taking the tricyle and other personal
belongings of the victim. They pretended to be
passengers of the tricycle owned and driven by the
Juanito Berallo, the same was killed by reason of
multiple stab wounds in a sugarcane plantation. A
witness in the name of Pacitao Caratao, talked to the
deceased before the brutal killing and asked the same
if he was on his way home so that she could ride with
him. The deceased stated that he still had to ferry
passengers. Consequently, the witness saw three (3)
people riding in the tricycle, one of them wearing a
fatigue jacket.
In the sugarcane field where the killing
happened, a fatigue jacket was found, which led to
the filing of the information against the accused and
his two companions. However, only the accused was
tried for the case because the other two (2) remained
at-large to date. The accused invoked the defense of
acting with the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
greater or equal injury. He contended that he has
nothing to do with the killing because he remained
inside the tricycle and he no longer knew what
happened to the deceased when the latter was
dragged to the sugarcane plantation with his hands
tied. Accordingly, they went to Taytay Martesan and
detached the sidecar, took him to a house in Barangay
Origao and he was not allowed to leave. He was then
brought to his house and threatened him and his wife
at gunpoint not to report anything to the police. The
RTC found him guilty of and provided the penalty of
death because of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery. The CA affirmed and modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can validly
invoke his defense of acting under duress.
Held:
No. The accused had the time to escape
while he was inside the tricycle but did not take
advantage of the same. The threat was not real or
imminent to be appreciated. Robbery with homicide
is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. The aggravating circumstance of
treachery is well appreciated to increase the penalty
of death. However, the penalty of death can no longer
be applied because of the passage of RA 9346.
Hence, this court is mandated to apply the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole,
consistent with the CAs modification. The contents
of the judgment of the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals was sufficient in pursuant to Section 2 Rule
120 of the Revised Criminal Procedure. The rule
explicitly provides that the judgment of conviction
shall also state the civil liability or damages caused
by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused
by the offended party, the heirs of the deceased in this
case. The legal qualifications were also discussed as
to the circumstances present.
80. Abellana vs. People
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses
SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA
ALONTO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Abellana extended a loan to spouses Alonto secured
by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over 2 lots.
Subsequently, Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying the mortgaged lots to him which was
signed by spouses Alonto in Manila and notarized in
Cebu City, allegedly without spouses Alonto
appearing before the notary public. Thereafter,
Abellana caused the transfer of the titles to his name
and sold the lots to third persons.
Information was filed charging Abellana with Estafa
through Fasification of Public Document.
RTC found Abellana guilty of fasification of public
document. On appeal, CA acquitted him of the crime
of falsification of public document by a private
individual because the information charged him with
a different offense (estafa through falsification of
public document). However, CA still adjudged him
civilly liable.
ISSUE:
Whether Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal.
RULING:
No. A judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. When the
exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
court should award the civil liability in favor of the
offended party in the same criminal action. In other
words, the "extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability]
might arise did not exist."
While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Hence, for Abellana to be civilly
liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the
acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, Abellana did not
cause any damage to spouses Alonto. Spouses Alonto
indeed signed the document and that their signatures
were genuine and not forged. Even assuming that
spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the
notary public, the non-appearance does not
necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the Deed
of Absolute Sale.
There is no basis to hold Abellana civilly liable to
restore ownership and possession of the subject
properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay
them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the
properties and to pay them nominal damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
81. People vs. Asis, 629 SCRA 250
Facts:
On or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, Asis and Formento, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force
and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there
stabbing one Roy Ching with a bladed instrument on
the different parts of the body and thereafter robbed
the victim against his will. As a result thereof, he
sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death.
When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants
pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were
assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by
an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. After
due trial, appellants were found guilty and sentenced
to death.
On appeal, two things stand out: first, there
were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or to the
homicide; and second, none of the items allegedly
stolen were recovered or presented in evidence.
Appellants argued that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution
are insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution counters that these pieces of
evidence, taken together, necessarily lead to their
conviction.
Issue: WON the evidences of the Prosecution is
sufficient to warrant conviction.
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecutions evidence
does not prove the guilt of appellants beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to
be presumed innocent remains and must be upheld.
Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses
suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not
sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise
the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It
must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and
the accused deserves acquittal.
82. Basilonia vs. Villaruz
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO
CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA,
Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ,
ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ROXAS CITY, BRANCH 16, AND DIXON
ROBLETE, Respondents.
Facts:
On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated
against the petitioners, wherein the court finds the
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of murder of Attorney Isagani Roblete on
September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines with
no aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The
petitioners appealed but was denied by the CA.
After two decades from the entry of judgement
Dixon Roblete the son of the deceased Atty. Roblete
filed a motion for execution on May 11, 2009,
alleging, among others, that despite his request to
the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution,
the judgment has not been enforced because said
prosecutor has not acted upon is request. Pursuant to
the trial court's directive, the Assistant City
Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus
Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest.
That the petitioners would like to avail bail however
they did not appear before the court which forfeited
their manifestation for bail and that the court issued
a writ of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court has jurisdiction to grant
writ of execution which was filed 20 years ago
Held: Yes because the prescription of penalty will
only commence when they were put in custody or in
prison which does not happened in this case for the
longest time, despite that they were sentenced by
final judgment, thus the prescription will not run in
their favor. Therefore the court did not commit any
wrong to grant the execution. Moreover, thus every
criminally liable is also civilly liable therefore the
writ of execution of final judgement does not
expired and the court has jurisdiction to issue and
take eefect the writ of execution.
83. Morillo vs. People
FACTS:
In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and
Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as contractors
with business in Pamanga, bought contraction
materials from Armilyn, worth P500,054.00. Per
their agreement, 20% of the amount should be paid
within seven days, while the remaining 80% shall be
paid within 35 days, with post-dated checks. After
the last delivery, Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued
two post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank,
Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn
deposited the checks in her account with Equitable
PCIBank; they were however dishonoured. When
Armilyn communicated the fact of dishonour to
Richard, the latter replaced the checks with two post-
dated Metrobank checks, which again were
dishonored. Despite demand, Richard and his
partners failed to make good on the checks, hence
Armilyn filed a case for BP 22 against Richard and
Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City.
After trial, the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard
as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing
that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction
over the case. He asserted that since the subject
checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to
petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was
improperly laid for none of the elements of the
offense actually transpired in Makati City. He also
assailed the absence of the public prosecutor, as the
latter delegated the prosecution of the case to the
private prosecutor.
The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts. It ruled
that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, as all
the elements of the crime of BP 22 happened in
Pampanga. Since all the elements of the crime
happened in Pampanga the case should have been
filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the
checks, in Makati City.
Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court.
THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of the place where the
checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a case
for BP 22.
THE RULING:
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. In
such cases, the court wherein any of the crimes
essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of
the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed.
84. Estino v. People
G.R. NOS. 163957-58, April 7, 2009
Rule 121
FACTS:
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the
April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated
Criminal Cases Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and
Ernesto G. Pescadera.
In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino
and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA)
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
failure to pay the Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government
employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11,
petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the
Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) contributions of the provincial government
employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.
In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for
their acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the
guilt of the petitioners in non-payment of RATA in
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING:
YES. Petitioners defense is anchored on their
payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they
submitted documents which allegedly show that they
paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget.
They also claim that the COA Report did not
sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA
because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which
were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as
proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted
with said report.
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of
a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
Although the documents offered by petitioners are
strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that
petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its
production during
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of
a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
Although the documents offered by petitioners are
strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that
petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its
production during trial was unnecessary.
85. Briones vs. People
GR NO 156009
June 5, 2009
FACTS
An Information was filed against Briones for the
crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service
firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached
group where the former is involve in a mauling. S/G
Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found
Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft after
giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as
against the defences of denial and alibi.
On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defence. The
Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery
under Article 293 in relation to par. 5 of Article 294
of RPC and not of theft.
ISSUE
Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.
RULING
No. For new trial to be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the
following conditions must obtain:
a the evidence must have been discovered after
trial;
b the evidence could not have been discovered at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
c the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and
d the evidence must affect the merits of the case
and produce a different result if admitted.26
In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the
trial, the other conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must
be one that could not, by the exercise of due
diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the
court below.27 The determinative test is the presence
of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to
be used as evidence in the trial.
Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that
he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the
firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he
told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm,
which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving.
He also now admits having taken the firearm and
having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house,
adjacent to the place of the incident.28 Hence, even
before the case went to court, he already knew the
location of the subject firearm, but did not do
anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at
the trial below.
In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding
where a certain evidence was not presented, the
defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy
the court that he has a good defense, and that the
acquittal would in all probability follow the
introduction of the omitted evidence.30 The Court find
that Briones change of defense from denial and alibi
to self-defense or in defense of a relative will not
change the outcome for Briones considering that he
failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of S/G
Molina and/or S/G Gual the essential element of
these justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the
Code. The records show that prior to the taking of the
firearm, S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached
Briones and his companions to stop the fight between
Briones group and another person. To be sure, there
was nothing unlawful in preventing a fight from
further escalating and in using reasonable and
necessary means to stop it. This conclusion is
strengthened by evidence showing that at the time of
the incident, Briones was drunk and was with three
companions; they all participated in the mauling.
For these reasons, the Court find that the CA did not
commit any reversible error when it denied Briones'
motion for new trial. Likewise, we find no error in
the RTC and CA conclusion that he is criminally
liable under the criminal information.
86. Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw
Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers without conducting a competitive public
bidding as required by law, which caused damage and
prejudice to the government. An information was
filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by
causing undue injury to the Government. The
information was quashed for failure to prove the
actual damage, hence a new information was filed,
now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused
moved for a new preliminary investigation to be
conducted on the ground that there is substitution
and/or substantial amendment of the first
information.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial
amendment of the information that would warrant an
new preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial
amendment.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing
the offense: either by causing undue injury or by
giving private person unwarranted benefit. That
accused may be charged under either mode or under
both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary.
87. Lumanog vs. People
G.R. No. 182555.February 08, 2011
LENIDO LUMANOG AND AUGUSTO SANTOS,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
I. THE FACTS
Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the
ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the
Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National
Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie
Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at 211
Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where
the ambush-slay happened. As a purported
eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the
fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi,
highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture
in the hands of police officers and denial of
constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-
appellants.
On August 25, 1999, Lumanog filed a motion for
reconsideration.On September 2, 1999, Joel filed a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence to present two witnesses, Merevic S.
Torrefranca and Rosemarie P. Caguioa, who offered
to testify on the whereabouts of Joel on the day of the
incident.
Lumanog likewise filed a motion for new trial for the
presentation of a new witness, who was allegedly on
board a taxi immediately behind Abadillas car, and
who clearly saw that those who perpetrated the
gruesome crime were not the accused
In his Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,
Lumanog assailed the inconsistencies in the
declarations of Alejo, and the non-presentation of
eyewitnesses Minella Alarcon and Metro Aide Aurora
Urbano. In addition, Lumanog pointed to well-
publicized statements of the Alex Boncayao Brigade
(ABB), which claimed responsibility for the killing
of Abadilla, but the investigation got sidetracked by
another angle -- that a political rival of Abadilla paid
money for a contract assassination. He contended that
the police opted for the path of least resistance by
rounding up the usual suspects, indeed another
glaring example of our law enforcers strategy of
instituting trumped-up charges against innocent
people
On January 25, 2000, the trial court issued an Order
ruling on the pending motions:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
resolves:
1. to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration by
accused Lenido Lumanog;
2. to DENY the Motion for New Trial by accused
Joel de Jesus;
3. to consider the Motion for New Trial by accused
Lenido Lumanog as abandoned and/or withdrawn;
4. to DENY the Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration by accused Lenido Lumanog as well
as his addendum thereto and his Manifestation and
Motion dated December 15, 1999 to allow him to
introduce additional evidence in support of his
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration;
5. to DENY the Manifestation and Submission dated
December 14, 1999 by accused Lenido Lumanog;
6. and to ORDER the immediate transmittal of the
records of these cases to the Honorable Supreme
Court for automatic review pursuant to law, the Rules
of Court and the Joint Decision of this court dated
July 30, 1999.
Lumanog challenged before the Supreme Court the
validity of the Orders dated January 25, 26, and 28,
2000 allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge who thereby denied the
accused the opportunity to introduce evidence on the
alleged role of the ABB in the ambush-slay of Col.
Abadilla. O
On September 7, 2001, the Suprme Court denied his
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 142065.
Accused-petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
above decision was denied with finality.
On September 17, 2002, this Court likewise denied
for lack of merit the motion for new trial and related
relief dated April 26, 2002 filed by counsel for said
accused-petitioner.
The CA affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness
testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the
trial court their respective positions and participation
in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to
witness closely how they committed the crime.
II. THE ISSUES
Did the Orders dated January 25, 26, and 28, 2000 of
the Trial Court:
1. DENY the Motion for Reconsideration by accused
Lenido Lumanog;
2. to DENY the Motion for New Trial by accused
Joel de Jesus;
3. to consider the Motion for New Trial by accused
Lenido Lumanog as abandoned and/or withdrawn;
4. to DENY the Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration
issued with grave abuse of discretion?
III. THE RULING
No.
The Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.
To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment
of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be
shown that the evidence was newly discovered
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended.To justify a
new trial or setting aside of the judgment of
conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be
shown that the evidence was newly discovered
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be
considered newly discovered, must be one that could
not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below. Movant
failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during
the trial to secure testimonies from police officers
like Jurado, or other persons involved in the
investigation, who questioned or objected to the
apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the
belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not
qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify
re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment.
In any case, we have ruled that whatever
"A perusal of the pieces of evidence, except the
Omega wristwatch, which are sought to be presented
by the petitioners in a new trial are not newly
discovered evidence because they were either
available and could have been presented by the
defense during the trial of the case with the exercise
of due diligence, such as the alleged newspaper
reports and AFP/PNP intelligence materials on Col.
Abadilla. The wristwatch allegedly belonging to the
late Col. Abadilla is immaterial to the case of murder
while the testimony of F. Roberto Reyes on the turn
over of the said wristwatch by an alleged member of
the ABB who purportedly knows certain facts about
the killing of Col. Abadilla would be hearsay without
the testimony in court of the said alleged member of
the ABB. The document which granted amnesty to
Wilfredo Batongbakal is irrelevant to the killing of
Col. Abadilla inasmuch as Batongbakal does not
appear privy to the actual commission of the crime of
murder in the case at bar. If at all, those pieces of
additional evidence will at most be merely
corroborative to the defense of alibi and denial of
herein petitioners. Petitioners alternative prayer that
this Court itself conduct hearings and receive
evidence on the ABB angle is not well taken for the
reason that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts"
88. Payumo v. Sandiganbayan
654 SCRA 277, July 25, 2011
Facts:
The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case
No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that occurred
on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba,
Zambales. A composite team of Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police
(INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians
instantly killing one and wounding several others.
The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple
Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the
Sandiganbayan.
After four years of trial, the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision dated October
5, 1984, convicting the accused as co-
principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple
Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January 11,
1985, the accused filed their Motion for New Trial,
which was denied. The accused elevated the case to
the Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5,
1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding
the case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case No.
4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was
raffled to the First Division. Accordingly, the First
Division received anew all the evidence of the
parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with
the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions,
Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth
Division.
On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division
promulgated judgment, convicting the accused of the
crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder.
The accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division
could not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid
omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was
constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of
the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On
September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-
2, issued the subject Resolution promulgated on
October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27,
1998 Decision and granting a second new trial of the
case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among
others that a second new trial would enable it to
allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence
including the records of the Judge Advocate General
Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
shed light on the "serious allegations"
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of Criminal
Case
Held:
Yes. The Court finds and so rules that the
Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess
of its jurisdiction. The Court finds the issue to be
devoid of any legal and factual basis. Rule 121,
Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that: new and material evidence
has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment, as
one of the grounds to grant a new trial. The records of
the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident
do not meet the criteria for newly discovered
evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may
be granted only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of rea
sonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted,
would probably change the judgment. It is essential
that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence
in seeking to locate the evidence before or during
trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case,
however, such records could have been easily
obtained by the accused and could have been
presented during the trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records
cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence.
There was nothing that prevented the accused from
using these records during the trial to substantiate
their position that the shooting incident was a result
of a military operation. Accordingly, the assailed
Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.
89. Macapagal vs. People
G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total
amount of P800,000.00 for unreturned and unsold
pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for
reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order
dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly
received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a
Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same
was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed
out of time. Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly
before the Supreme Court in this petition for review
on certiorari alleging that the RTC of Manila gravely
erred in denying their notice of appeal, in convicting
petitioner for estafa and in denying their motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.
ISSUE:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE
HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
HELD:
No. The Court notes that the instant case suffers from
various procedural infirmities. First, petitioner
availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial
courts denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and
3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and
when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken
as follows:
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court
in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court; and
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the
Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must
be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed
from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of
appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is a mode of appeal of a lower courts decision
or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However,
the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is
not a decision or final order from which an appeal
may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically
provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order
disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the
aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a
special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing
of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under
Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65,
the petition merits an outright dismissal.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for
certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Direct resort to
this Court is allowed only if there are special,
important and compelling reasons which are not
present in this case.
Third, the petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the
order denying her motion for reconsideration which
she also assails in addition to the denial of her notice
of appeal. A petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified
true copy or duplicate original of the assailed
decision, final order or judgment.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
90. People vs Morales
Facts: Police Officers Roy and Rivera apprehended M
violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165. During
for the prosecution telling the lower court that th
and presentation in court, were turned over
examination. From the witnesses statements, th
decision of the trial court convicting Morales. In
claimed that the evidence of the corpus delicti ne
the illegal acts such that the two Officers did not
creating serious doubt as to the items and actual qu
the Solicitor General, the testimony of the O
possession and sale of shabu.
Issue: Whether the affirmation of the Court of Appeal p
delicti beyond reasonable doubt
Held: No. Under RA 9165, the apprehending team havi
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physical
presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom
 Issue:
his/her representative or counsel, a representative fromWhether
the mediaorand
notthe
theDepartment
Court of Appeals
of Justiceerred in
(DOJ),
dismissing
and any elected public official who shall be required petitioners
to sign Notice
the copies of of Appeal
the inventory andonbe ground
given a
copy thereof. of lack of jurisdiction.

Held: in court, were not marked, inventoried and taken

Here, the objects seized, which was not even presented
photograph in the presence of the Morales, anyNo. The petition
representative hasmedia,
from the no merit. Upon
the DOJ, or anyBalabas
elective
conviction
official participating in the operation who later signed bythe the RTC, What
inventory. his remedy should
was being done have
was
immediate turn-over of the items. In fine, thebeen anofappeal
identity the to the Sandiganbayan as stated in
beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewiseParagraph 3, Section
a break in the chain of 4(c) of Republic
custody Act fatal
which proves No. to
8249
the
prosecutions case. Thus, since the prosecution(RA
has 8249),
failed towhich reads:
establish the element of
the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of
prohibited drugs. Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the regional trial courts whether in the
91. Balaba vs People exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
IRENORIO B. BALABA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES The Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to
G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009 review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.

Facts: Citing Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, An error in

On October 1993, State Auditors of the Provincial
Auditors Office conducted an examination of the
cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the
Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State
Auditors discovered a shortage of P114, 186.34
traceable to Balaba.
In an Information dated 26 April 1995, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds. During his
arraignment on 17 May 1996, Balaba entered a plea
of not guilty.
designating the appellate court is not fatal to the
appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-
day period to appeal. Once made within the said
period, the designation of the correct appellate court
may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules
of court would apply. The second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: "An
appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright."

On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba
guilty. The dispositive portion of the 9 December
2002 and
sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of 10
YEARS AND ONE DAY as minimum, to 17
YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND ONE DAY of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of
P114, 186.34.
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of
Appeal before the Court of Appeals. On 15
December 2004 the Court of Appeals dismissed it.
The Court of Appeals declared that it had no
jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over the case. On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and was denied. Hence,
this instant petition for review.
Balaba sought the correction of the error only after
the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court
promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002.
Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January
2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision
declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December
2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27
January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to
appeal from the decision of the trial court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any
error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of
lack of jurisdiction.
92. People vs. Olivo
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CHARMEN
OLIVO (G.R. NO. 177768, JULY 27, 2009)
FACTS:
 On November 21, 2000, around 6:30 oclock
in the evening, Maricel Permejo was tending the store
of the victim, Mariano Constantino in Bagong
Silangan, Quezon City. Suddenly, three (3) armed
men entered the store and demanded money. When
Maricel did not accede to the demand, one of the
armed men later identified as appellant Nelson Danda
kicked her in the leg while his other companion,
appellant Joey Zafra got money from the cash
register. When the store owner, Mariano Constantino,
went inside the store and shouted, the third
companion, appellant Charmen Olivo poked a gun at
him. Mariano ran towards the back of the house but
appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him. Thereafter,
Maricel heard successive shots and saw appellants
Danda and Zafra going out of the store while the
bloodied body of Mariano was lying at the stairway
of the house. The victim was taken to the hospital
where he died upon arrival.
Two days after the incident SPO2 Joseph
Dino received information from the Batasan Police
Station that they have three (3) suspects for drug
violations and illegal possession of firearms. He
borrowed the suspects for identification by Maricel.
When presented to her, she identified them as the
men who staged a hold up and shot the deceased.
On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a
decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime
of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:
Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether an accused that has not perfected
an appeal should be included in a decision of
acquittal on appeal by the other co-accused.
HELD:
YES. In view of the foregoing, acquittal of
the accused-appellants is in order. The other accused
Joey Zafra who is identically circumstanced as the
other appellants and who was likewise convicted on
the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected
an appeal from the trial courts judgment. The record
does not show the reason therefore.
Be that as if may the present rule is that an
appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here
with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable
doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to
accused Joey Zafra, should not therefore be treated as
the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal
of his co-accused.
93. Guasch vs. Dela Cruz
GUASCH VS. DELA CRUZ
589 SCRA 297
FACTS:
Arnaldo dela Cruz filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against Mercedita Guasch as the latter transacted
business with him by exchanging cash for checks of
small amount without interest.
On 26 July 1999, Guasch requested Dela Cruz to
exchange her check with cash amounting to P3.3
million. He initially refused but was later convinced
to do so upon the assurance that the former will have
the funds and the bank deposit to cover the said
check by January 2000. However, on its maturity
date and upon presentment, the check was
dishonored as the account from which it was drawn
was already closed. Subsequently, information for
Estafa was filed against Guasch. She then entered a
plea of not guilty and later filed a Motion with
Leave to Admit Demurrer to Evidence, which the
trial court granted, resulting to the dismissal of the
case.
On 28 June 2005, Dela Cruz received a copy of the
aforementioned order, hence, he filed a Motion to
Amend in order to include the finding of civil
liability of Guasch. The counsel of the former
justified his failure to file the said motion within the
period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro
Manila were allegedly closed to give way for the
rally to be held in the area. He also filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the appellate court to set aside the
order granting the demurrer to evidence while the
trial court denied the Motion to Amend as counsel
for respondent was inexcusably negligent. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed but was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the respondents Motion to
Amend?
HELD:
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that
when no motion for reconsideration is filed within
the reglementary period, the decision attains finality
and becomes executory in due course must be
strictly enforced as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays
and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The
purposes for such statutory requirement are two-
fold: to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and to put an end to judicial controversies, which are
precisely why the courts exist.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice
and equity considerations warrant the giving of due
course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement
of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. The
elements considered for the appeal to be given due
course, are as follows: (1) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case,
(3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the
other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
In the case at bar, there is ostensible merit to
respondents cause. The records show that petitioner
admits her civil obligation to respondent. However,
the respondent did not waive, reserve, nor institute a
civil action for the recovery of the civil liability,
hence, the trial court was duty-bound to determine
the civil liability, as it is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. Moreover, it cannot be said that
petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondents
Motion to Amend for the sole purpose of including
the civil liability of petitioner in the order of
acquittal shall be allowed. Respondent concededly
has an available remedy even if his Motion to
Amend was denied, which is to institute a separate
civil action to recover petitioners civil liability.
Nevertheless, to require him to pursue this remedy
at this stage will only prolong the litigation between
the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the
strict enforcement of reglementary periods to
appeal.
It is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear
the seeds of future litigation. Given the
circumstances in this case, the Court ruled that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it denied respondents Motion to Amend.
94. People vs. Taruc
People vs. Taruc , 579 SCRA 682, G.R. No. 185202
February 18, 2009
Doctrine: Once an accused escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to
the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the
Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: SECTION
1. Uniform procedure.Unless otherwise provided
by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the
Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases
shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
1. That on or about November 8, 1998 Francisco
Taruc , with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack , assault and use
personal violence upon Emelito Sualog (Elmer), by
then and there shooting him with a Celiber (sic) 45
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, thereafter, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
2. Upon arraignment on 25 April 2005, accused, duly
assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO), pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
3. RTC: Guility of MURDER, penalty of DEATH
4. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for
automatic review
5. On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through
the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief
6. The PAO lawyer concerned informed the Court
of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from
prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer
claimed that he had no means of knowing the
current whereabouts of the accused-appellant.
Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the Court of
Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial
Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to
the accused-appellants escape.
7. The period of extension granted had lapsed without
the accused-appellant filing his brief; thus, the Court
of Appeals required the PAO to show cause why the
latter should not be held in contempt for failing to file
the same.
8. On 27 February 2008, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision affirming with modification the
Decision of the RTC.
9. On 13 March 2008, accused-appellant, still
represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal
stating that he was appealing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court on questions
of law and fact. And on 29 April 2008, the Court of
Appeals gave due course to accused-appellants
appeal and directed its Records Division to forward
the rollo and records of the case to the Supreme
Court.
10. He remains at large even while his counsel
continues to file various pleadings on his behalf
before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this
Court.
Issue:
Given that the accused-appellant escaped from jail
and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of
whether he has lost his right to appeal his conviction
inexorably ensues.
Held: Yes, By escaping prison, accused-appellant
impliedly waived his right to appeal. The Court of
Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be
waived even by the accused himself, but the right of
appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely
for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or
not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly
or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he
will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal
from the judgment rendered against him x x x.
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal
unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he
cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to
have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court;
and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application
of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself
in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his
chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself
out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the
judgment nugatory at his option.Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of
the appellate court.
Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has
remained at large for most of the proceedings
before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the
pendency of his appeal before the Court of
Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is
pending before this Court. He cannot so
audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court
would succeed. He only hopes in vain.
95. Tiu vs. People
96. Colinares vs. People
ARNEL COLINARES
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182748 : December 13, 2011
FACTS: Arnel Colinares was found guilty of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law
was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.
ISSUE: Whether or not he may still apply for
probation on remand of the case to the trial court
given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for
a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty.
HELD: Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled
to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of
the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that
the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should
be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC. Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that
probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only
to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the
probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no
application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. Since Arnel
appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation. But, firstly, while it is true
that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly
does not have. What he has is the right to apply for
that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail
term should only be 2 years and 4months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of
the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to
decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of
probation, taking into account the full circumstances
of his case. Secondly, it is true that under the
probation law the accused who appeals "from
the judgment of conviction" is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits
of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of
conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional
trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. If the
Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard
position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel
based on the trial court's annulled judgment against
him. He will not be entitled to probation because of
the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty
will also have to bend over to the trial court's
judgment--even if this has been found in error. And,
worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the
trial court's erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation.
Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sakalabaw
(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).
Where is justice there? The dissenting opinion also
expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply
for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals:
.
that the probation law requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case. In Francisco, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found
the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and
sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one
day to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, a clearly probationable
penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to
appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving
his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal
did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would
not of course let him. It served him right that he
wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation. The
Probation Law, said the Court in
Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself
of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element
of speculation on the part of the accused--to wager on
the result of his appeal--that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-
nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an `escape
hatch' thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's
affirmance of his conviction." Here, however, Arnel
did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have
a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in
a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not
to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court's greatly diminished penalty will not
dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that
those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit
their right to apply for that privilege. Besides, in
appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He
claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated,
homicide, which crime called for a probationable
penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level
where the law would allow him to apply
for probation. In a real sense, the Court's finding that
Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only
of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that
for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it
would have found him guilty of the correct offense
and imposed on him the right penalty of two years
and four months maximum. This would have
afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation. The
Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his
right to probation through no fault of his. The
underlying philosophy of probation is one of
liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given
to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes
within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should
be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a
criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
One of those who dissent from this decision points
out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he
appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction
would not be consistent with the provision of Section
2 that the probation law should be interpreted to
"provide an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who
appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is
claimed, shows no penitence. This may be true if the
trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the
wrong crime, frustrated homicide that carried a
penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court
expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the
Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months. Ironically, if the
Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him
straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent
offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation
law. At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC
done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he
would have availed himself of the right had the RTC
done right by him. The idea may not even have
crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got
was not probationable.
97. Villareal vs. People
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 151258
February 01, 2012
Ponente: SERENO, J.
BRIEF
This is are 5 consolidated cases involving the death
of Leonardo Lenny Villa, a freshman law student
of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law,
during initiation rites of the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity.
FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza,
Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis
"Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy,
Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
The neophytes had to undergo initiation rites that
were scheduled to last for three days. Initiation rites
include physical and psychological sufferings such
that the neophytes were punched, given knee blows
to their thighs, paddled and were required to
memorize and recite the principles of the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity.
The neophytes had survived their first two days of
initiation. However, after the neophytes had
concluded their second day of initiation, and after a
while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino, initially refused.
Upon insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. After receiving again
several blows and paddles, the initiation for the day
was officially ended and the neophytes had their
dinner, then they slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly
roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. When his conditioned worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital, but Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, two criminal cases for homicide was
filed against 35 Aquilans, one under Criminal Case
no. C-38340(91) and the other was Criminal Case no.
C-38340. The trial in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
commenced thereafter. On the other hand, the trial
against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case
no. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain
matters that had to be resolved first.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court
ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-
38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26
other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial
court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various
reasons," the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years
after the arraignment of the nine accused.
The trial court in Criminal Case no. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground
of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile,
on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005,
the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA reversed the
trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
The decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the
accused was appealed by the prosecution before the
Supreme Court. The prosecution, to support their
appeal, contends, among others, that such appeal
does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution of the
decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the
accused of the charges violates the accused right
against double jeopardy.
HELD:
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state
from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure
questions of law under Rule 45 of the same
Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy
are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
information; (b) it is filed before a competent court;
(c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the defendants express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals
and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using
its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment
to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional
purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in
the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from
retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty."76 We further stressed that "an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose
as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal."77
XXX XXX XXX
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we
reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties. 88 In People
v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it
allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible
by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a
writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on
double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted
fraternity members.
98. Dungo vs People
LESSON / DOCTRINE:
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL,
JR., petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR No. 209464
01 July 2015
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS
On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega
Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty
other members and officers conducted initiation rite.
MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte
was subjected to physical harm. After the initiation
rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then
called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo
arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and
brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he
gave a false name to the security guard as he heard
that Dungo had done the same. RTC found Dungo
and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of
the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was
bereft of merit. The accused thus appealed to the
Supreme Court the CAs decision arguing that the
amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla." Yet, both the RTC and the CA
found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because
they "[i]nduced the victim to be present" during the
initiation rites.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 was
the proper remedy in this case.
RULING:
No. An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a
decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on
the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. An accused, upon whom the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal
to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review on any question including
one not raised by the parties. Section 13(c), Rule 124
recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction
of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. An accused,
nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an
appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under
the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by
petition for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law.
Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of
conspiracy in their reply, which is a question of fact
that would require an examination of the evidence
presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due
to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems
it proper to open the whole case for review.
99. Manansala vs People
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the
Decision and Resolution of the CA.
The former Vice President of Finance of the UMC,
Kathleen Siy, the private complainant instructed her
secretary to withdraw via ATM a certain amount from
her Metrobank and BPI bank accounts but failed to
do so as the ATM was offline but get such amount
from the Petty Cash Fund custodian, Manansala of
the UMC instead. The secretary forgot to inform Siy
where she got the money.
The Finance Manager informed Siy that as per Petty
Cash Replenishment Report prepared by Manansala,
she alleged that Siy made a cash advance which
remained unliquidated. Upon learning, the latter
immediately issued two checks to reimburse the petty
cash account.
The Finance manager instructed Manansala to revise
the subject report by deleting the entry relating to
Siy alleged cash advance. Then in a certain day, the
said finance manager instructed again Manansala to
retrieve the subject report and re-insert the entry
relating to Siys alleged cash advance therein.
Siy was charged for using office funds for personal
use and was terminated from her job and succeeded
by the Finance Manager. This prompted the former to
pursue the criminal charges against Manansala and
the Finance Manager.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Manansalas conviction for Falsification of Private
Documents.
Held:
The court agrees with the ruling of the courts a quo
convicting Manansala of the crime of Falsification of
Private Documents, but disagrees in the appreciation
of the mitigating circumstance of acting under an
impulse of uncontrollable fear in her favor.
The MeTC, RTC and CA all correctly found
Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crime considering that: (a) as UMCs PC
custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only
truthful statements in the documents she prepares in
connection with her work; (b) she knew all along that
Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized the
proceeds thereof from her personal use; (c) despite
such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the
subject report by inserting therein a statement that
Siy made such cash advance and (d) she caused great
prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her
job on account of the falsified report that she
prepared.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid
crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance of acting
under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the
RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTCs ruling
without correcting the latter courts mistake. Acting
under an impulse of uncontrollable fear is not among
the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article
13 of the RPC but an exempting circumstance
provided under Article 12 (6) of the same code.
100. Miclat vs People
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011
FACTS:
On November 2002 in Caloocan City,
Miclat was arrested for illegal possession of shabu.
The arrest was made, while a team of Caloocan City
Police was conducting surveillance in Palmera Spring
II, Caloocan City. PO3 Antonio peeped inside and
there he saw Miclat, Jr., arranging small pieces of
plastic sachets of which he believed containing
shabu. The team introduced themselves and placed
the suspect under arrest after informing the latter of
his constitutional right. Miclat, Jr., pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment. The RTC convicted him for
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. His
appealed was dismissed, thus he petitioned for review
on certiorari seeking to reverse and revise the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest is lawful and the
seizures of evidence are admissible in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Yes, the arrest is lawful. The right against
warrantless searches and seizures is subject to legal
and judicial exception as in warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The accused was clearly
arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then
committing a crime, a violation of the Dangerous
Drug Act, within the view of the arresting officer. The
accused was caught in the act of arranging the plastic
sachets in plain sight of the arresting officer and the
accused voluntary surrendered said seized items to
the arresting officer upon learning that the latter is a
police officer.
As to admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it too falls within the established
exceptions. The seizure of .24 grams of sachets of
shabu is not only incidental but also falls within the
purview of the plain view doctrine. The accused
merely denied the accusations against him and raised
the defense of frame-up. The appeal was DENIED.
The Court AFFIRMED with modification the
decision of the Court of Appeal. Miclat, Jr., was
sentenced to suffer indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months.
101. People vs Mariacos
G.R. No. 188611
Facts: On October 26, 2005, the night before
appellants arrest, the police received information that
marijuana was to be transported from Barangay
Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the
area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27,
2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the
Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion.
PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle
was in motion, he found the black backpack with an
O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2
Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on
top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no
one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2
Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but one of the women got away.
Issue: Whether the right against an unreasonable
search violated
Held: No.
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable
cause. This had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
In the instances we have recognized as exceptions to
the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary
that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must
have been impelled to do so because of probable
cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must
be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.
Since the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence
Network informed PO2 Pallayoc that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about
to leave for the poblacion, he had probable cause to
search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
The search in this case is valid. The vehicle that
carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about
to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision
and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him
to procure a warrant before conducting the search
under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in
this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain
a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board
the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
102. People vs Tuan
[GR No. 176066, August 11, 2010]
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vs.
Estela Tuan y Baludda, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
An application for search warrant was granted
by Judge Cortes regarding the alleged selling of
marijuana by a certain Estela Tuan at Barangay
Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Upon receipt of the
search warrant, the police operatives implemented the
same by proceeding to the house of the accused and
found nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves and
one (1) unlicensed high-powered firearm. The police
then issued a receipt for the items confiscated and a
certification stating that the items were confiscated
and recovered from the house of the accused and in
the latters presence.
Estela Tuan was charged with illegal possession
of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of RA 6425,
as amended; and illegal possession of firearms under
PD 1866. Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty
to both charges. In its Decision, the RTC found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both
offenses.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of
the accused for the illegal possession of marijuana
but acquitted her on the illegal possession of firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued against the
accused was valid.
HELD:
The search warrant was valid.
The right of a person against unreasonable
searches and seizure is recognized and protected by
no less than the Constitution. Accordingly, Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure laid down the following requisites for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. Therefore, the
validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon
the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complaint
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.
There is no dispute herein that the second and
third factors for a validly issued search warrant were
complied with. What is left for the Court to determine
is compliance with the first and fourth factors.
As to the first factor, Judge Cortes found
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant
for accused-appellants residence after said personal
examination of applicant and the informants. This
was shown in the TSN related to the application of
the warrant in which Judge Cortes carefully reviewed
the testimonies of the applicant and the informants.
As to the fourth factor, the address and description of
the place to be searched in the search warrant was
specific enough. There was only one house located at
the stated address, which was the accused-appellants
residence, constituting of a structure with two floors
and composed of several rooms.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
103. Esquillo vs. People
SUSAN ESQUILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010
Carpio Morales, J.:
FACTS:
PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas were sent to conduct
surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious
snatcher operating in the Pasay area known only as
Ryan.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that
brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he
glanced in the direction of petitioner who was
standing three meters away and seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what
the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious
when petitioner started acting strangely as he began
to approach her. He then introduced himself as a
police officer to petitioner and inquired about the
plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette
case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely
restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to
take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case and thereafter arrested her.
RTC found appellant guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as
illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any
evidence obtained on the occasion thereof
inadmissible. She assails the appellate courts
application of the stop-and-frisk principle in light
of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a
crime was being committed, he having merely
noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case
which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked
if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct
that would arouse the suspicion
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stop-and-frisk principle was
properly applied by the CA.
HELD:
In a stop-and-frisk, it is essential is that a genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk
practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
The circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on
her person was warranted: The police officers were
on a surveillance operation as part of their law
enforcement efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance into her cigarette case. Given his training
as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his
part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her.
That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired
about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more
pricked his curiosity.
From these standards, the Court finds that the
questioned act of the police officers constituted a
valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure
of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners
possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the police
operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated
on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after
PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a
police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner
was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to flee after the police officer had
identified himself. Absent any proof of motive to
falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the findings of the trial court with
respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over
that of petitioner
104. The Constitutional Validity of Warrantless
Search And Seizures of Prohibited Drugs and
Eventual Arrest SKIP
105. Marimla vs. People
Marimla v. People
604 SCRA 57, GR. no. 158467 Oct. 16, 2009
Facts:
Special Investigator (SI) Lagasca of the NBI Anti-
Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications
for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking
permission to search: (1) petitioners house located
on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City
and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V,
Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly
alleged that SI Lagascas request for the issuance of
the search warrants was founded on his personal
knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D.
Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of
surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners house. The purpose of the application for
search warrants was to seize shabu, marijuana
weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner,
rolling papers, and other paraphernalia.
Judge Guaria III found probable cause to issue the
search warrant. The officers conducted a search and
found separate dried flowering tops in different
containers. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
the Search Warrant for it was allegedly filed outside
the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the
court where the crime was committed
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioners Motion to Quash
Search Warrant
Held:
No.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow
the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional
cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this
case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the
petition, as it involves the application of the rules
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-
making power under the Constitution.
Rule 126 of the Criminal Procedures on Search and
Seizure states that:
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant
shall be filed. An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed
(b)For compelling reasons stated in the application,
any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the
heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing
the application for search warrant to their assistant
heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or
other subordinate in every bureau may perform such
duties as may be specified by their superior or head,
as long as it is not inconsistent with law.
The court cannot find any irregularity or abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Viola for denying
petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and
their Motion for Reconsideration. The Orders of the
RTC are affirmed. The Petition for Certiorari is
dismissed.
106. People vs. Punzalan
# 106
People vs. Punzalan
Facts: Seaman 1st class Anulfo, Andal, SNI Antonio
Duclayna, SNI Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo,
SNI Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were
among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for
schooling at the Naval Education and Training
Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio
Zambales.
* On August 10, 2002 at 5 or 6pm they all went to
the All in One canteen to drink and at 10pm
transferred to Aquarius, a videoke bar where SN1
Bacosa and appellant Punzalan got into fight.
* The Navy group walked back to the NETC Camp to
avoid aggravating the conflict. The appellant,
however, drunk drove a maroon Nissan with plate
number DRW 706 and followed the group to the
camp. The navy sentries flagged down Punzalan and
heard him threaten to kill the Navy members he
fought in the bar.
*Punzalan charged forward despite being flagged
down, hit the group of navy personnel from behind,
and sped away resulting to the death of Andal and
Duclayna, and injuries to the rest of the group.
* Punzalan was charged with complex crime of
Double Murder qualified by treachery with
Attempted Murder attended by aggravating
circumstances of the use of motor vehicle.
Issue:
Whether or not search and seizure was appropriate in
the case at bar.
Held:
Section 12 says that search incident to a lawful arrest.
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, withut a
search warrant. Meanwhile. Rule 113 states that a
peace officer or private person may, without warrant
arrest a person: (1) when in his presence a person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense.
In the case at bar, accused was caught in
flagrante, since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was
incident to a lawful arrest and is
constantly valid.