FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of
Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that
a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and
PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27,
1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of petitioners election and proclamation on the
ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had
not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified
to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines
because his naturalization as an American citizen was not
impressed with voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he
was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American
citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a
citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself
after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien,
he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His
election did not cure of this defect because the electorate
could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for
public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American
citizenship did not and could not have the effect of
automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed
that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient
act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged
FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at
Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that for
the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and
the CEO of the Subic Authority.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to
the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an
elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art.
IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be
appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may
have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No
elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject
proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is
precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent
a situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government, and
thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase shall be
appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example,
an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post,
may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet
position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President
the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has
no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The
power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at
the same time limit the choice of the President to only
one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it
may be viewed that the proviso merely
the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Since the ineligibility of
elective official for appointment remains all throughout his
tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit
for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible
for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible
for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance
with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said
provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of
its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as
chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
sets Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also
an contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary
power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the
constitutional prescription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public
officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded
with a public office that is a full time job to let them function
without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority
which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the
first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall
assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the
appointing authority the congress gives to the President is
no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to
exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his
choice.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION,
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a
government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense
and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial
NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over
said responsibility to their representatives who were
paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on
October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed
on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives
amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to
June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment
intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by
mere designation from the ex officio members who were
themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an
appointment and designation. An appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to
claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to
receive the salary of the position.
Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R.
Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan
T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were
consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices
or positions in addition to their primary positions. The
pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is
required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary,
or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality
because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other
than those provided in the constitution. According to the
petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in government are those provided in
the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2
of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of
article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order
No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article
VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition their primary position to not more that two
positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate
of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in
this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the
constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members
of the Cabinet Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The
Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284
is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that
it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment
in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and
the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate
of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Monroy vs CA
FACTS
Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal when on
September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections was filed with the COMELEC. On September 18,
Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of
candidacy. However, on September 21, 1961, R, then vice-
mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office on the theory that
Monroy has forfeited the said office upon his filing of the
certificate of candidacy in question.
ISSUES
Whether R is entitled to the salary of the office from
September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said
office?
HELD
Yes. De facto officer liable to reimburse salaries received to
rightful incumbent
General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the
latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though
he entered into the office in good faith and under color of
title.
The possession of the title of office is decisive. A de
facto officer not having good title takes the salaries at his 15,1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the
risk and must account to the de jure officer the amount of first district of Rizal in theforthcoming elections was filed
salary he received during his wrongful tenure. with the Comelec. Three days later, or on September
Where a mayor withdrew his certificate of candidacy for 18,1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of
Congressman and then reassumed the position, thus candidacy. The Comelec approved the withdrawal. But on
preventing the vice-mayor from discharging the duties of September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor
the position of mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the
vice-mayor, as the rightful occupant of the position of theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his
mayor, the salaries which he had received. filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. Did
The Rodriguez ruling that reimbursement should not be Monroycease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certific
made is not applicable since it involved a duly proclaimed ate of candidacy was filed onSeptember 15, 1961?
elective official who was later ousted.
HELD:
The de facto doctrine was formulated for the protection of
the public and individuals who get involved in the official Yes. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not
acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without restore petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev.
being lawful officers. Election Code (which reads Any elective provincial,
The withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy does not municipal or city official running for an office, other then the
restore Monroy to his former position. It does not render the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
withdrawal void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself certificate of candidacy) makes the forfeiture automatic
be subsequently withdrawn. and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate
of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
Monroy v. CA
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited
FACTS: forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official
Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
when on September