Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Lt Col Sebastian Arokiaraj William RMAF was commissioned into the Royal
Malaysian Air Force as a General Duty Pilot (GDP) on 25th February 1992. He has
served in various RMAF squadrons as an operational fighter pilot as well as an
Instructor Pilot and Fighter Weapons Instructor (FWI). His last assignment prior to
MAFDC was as the Commanding Officer of No 17 Squadron in Kuantan Airbase,
having flown the MiG29 for 15 years. He has a Diploma in Information Technology
from UNITAR and Diploma in Defence and Strategic Studies from University
Malaya.
ABSTRACT
This study explores the behaviour of big states towards small states in favour of their
own interests as prescribed by Kenneth Waltzs definition of Neo-Realist Theory
where the behaviour of states is explained by their need for survival in the
international system and the environment surrounding them. This paper uses a
qualitative research method and makes a comparison study using Myanmar and North
Korea as units of comparison to explain how the US Foreign Policy differs in
treatment of Myanmar and North Korea although both once were in the same pariah
state category in Washingtons perception. The puzzle that drove this research is to
explore the reasons why the US Foreign Policy is more accommodative towards
Myanmar, but antagonistic towards North Korea although both states showed similar
negative traits and behaviour towards the preservation of human rights and
democracy, which is part of the US Foreign Policys core tenets. The assumption
made through this research is that China plays a significant role in the decisions
made by the US in its Foreign Policy towards Myanmar and North Korea, resulting in
the differential approach towards these two states. This study found that the US
realizes that it is losing its grip on the Asia-Pacific region and is fighting hard to
recover lost ground through its rebalancing policy, and Myanmar has directly
benefitted from US rapprochement efforts. However, North Korea still does not seem
to attract any favour or interest of the US or China to either reforms or economic
assistance. Apart from Pyongyangs pursuit of nuclear weapons capability that has
been condemned by the world community, its deplorable human rights violations and
authoritarian governance is very much similar to that of Myanmar prior to 2009. This
research finds that China plays a major role in the US decision to pivot back to Asia
and Chinas growing influence in the region has resulted in Washington having to
selectively create new partnerships with states, especially those with geo-strategic
importance such as Myanmar. Thus, the differential treatment between Myanmar and
North Korea by Washington in its foreign policy is a direct result of Chinas rise in
the region.
BACKGROUND
The paradox of how the US approaches the two different states in the same region is
perplexing to say the least. Considering that as recent as 2010, Myanmar (Burma as
referred to by the US1) had faced more restrictions and opposition from the US in
comparison to North Korea2. Both states have displayed blatant practices disregarding
human rights and democracy which are among the main pillars of the US Foreign
Policy, namely to promote human rights and democracy in every state they attempt to
engage politically or diplomatically.
The politics of Myanmar (Burma before 1989) has been a tumultuous affair.
Since the military junta had assumed their power in 1962, the oppressive regime
became constantly embroiled in cases of international outcry related to human rights
violations. Washington has been showing great concern towards the governance of
Myanmar since the early 1990s.3 The US had also protested the inclusion of Myanmar
as a member of ASEAN on 23rd July 1997.
In 2006, Myanmar was projected to take over the chair of ASEAN, but due to
overwhelming disputes by the US, European Union and Britain, Myanmar was held
off from holding that appointment.4 However, after US Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clintons visit to Naypyidaw in 2011, followed by President Barack Obamas
visit in 2012, the US went through a complete shift in its policies towards Myanmar.
1
The US, UK and the EU have refused to accept the name change from Burma to Myanmar in
1989 as a sign of defiance to the policies of the Military Junta. Therefore, all references to Myanmar
by these three entities especially in official documents are commonly seen as Burma.
2
Seth, A. 2012. United States Relations With Burma: From Hostility to Hope. Regional Outlook
Paper. 1(36)
3
Hadar, L. T. 1998. US Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html (27 February 2016).
4
Than. T.M.M. 2006. Myanmar: Challenges Galore But Opposition Failed To Score. Southeast
Asian Affairs, 183-207.
This turnaround in policy includes the increased trade and foreign aid in rebuilding
Myanmars economy and infrastructure whilst promoting democracy to the ruling
Myanmar government.5 As a result of this shift in the US policy, the US was able to
accept Myanmar as Chair of ASEAN on 1st January 2014, thus directly helping it to
gain political legitimacy both globally and regionally, as a member of ASEAN in a
stark contrast to the protests by the US against its candidacy as the regional bodys
chair in 2006.6
North Korea on the other hand continues to be in the black book of the US and
its allies. Historically, US and North Korea have fought against each other during the
Korean War that lasted from 1950 to 1953. Both sides suffered heavy losses during
the conflict. Although an armistice is currently in place, the Korean Peninsula is still
technically at war with minor skirmishes and border tit-for-tats which occurs
occasionally. The Problem Statement put forward for this research is that compared to
North Korea, US foreign policy towards Myanmar is considered to be more
accommodative due to differing strategic interests that the US has in the two regions
(Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia). This is despite both Myanmar and North Korea
displaying similar traits of human rights violations, non-democratic governance, and
the way both these states reacted towards Washingtons reconciliatory attempts.
5
US Department of State. 2014. Diplomacy In Action: US Assistance to Burma.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2014/230463.htm (29 May 2016)
6
Brandon, John J. 2014. ASEAN Chairmanship Offers Opportunity for Myanmar - The Asia
Foundation. The Asia Foundation. http://asiafoundation.org/ 2014/01/08/asean-chairmanship-
offers-opportunity-for-myanmar/. (12 Nov 2016)
Pacific region appeared to dwindle and became overshadowed by the increasing
dominance of China and India in the economy and diplomatic relations with regional
states, especially in Southeast Asia.
The Obama Administration saw the lack of strategic focus and gradual decline
in influence in an era, especially when many Asia Pacific states were seeking for a
greater involvement of the US in the region.10 The decision to rebalance or pivot to
Asia came about at a time when the US was re-evaluating its military commitments in
the Middle East and South Asia, with a gradual reduction in force level looming and
increasing calls for a pull-out of US military troops from conflict areas. Seizing this
window of opportunity to re-focus its attention towards Asia, six key efforts or areas
of interest were drawn up for the US to concentrate on for its pivot to Asia.
Alliances
The US has existing alliances in Asia Pacific that it strives to preserve in order to
retain its presence in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that a strong priority
7
Mishra, R. 2015. The US Rebalancing Strategy: Responses from Southeast Asia. Asian
Strategic Review 2014.
https://www.academia.edu/6505539/The_US_Rebalancing_Strategy_Pivot_to_Asia_
Responses_from_Southeast_Asia?auto=download. (10 June 16).
8
Clinton, Hillary. Americas Pacific Century.
9
Turner, Oliver. Parmar et al (eds). 2014. The US Pivot to the Asia Pacific. In Obama and the
World. New York: Routledge. 219.
10
Campbell and Andrews. 2013. Explaining the US Pivot to Asia. Chatham House, 2.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/
0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf. (12 June 16).
was given by Washington in renewing its commitment to existing allies and looking at
the possibility of other potential allies.
Economic Relationship
Recognising that the Asia-Pacific region is fast becoming a major player in global
economics, the Pivots third priority focuses on economic relationships as an
important element in US Foreign Policy. This is in order to strengthen its economic
recovery post 2007 economic crisis. While the existing trade partnerships such as the
US-Korea Free Trade Agreement has already elevated US trade in the region, the
recent launched of Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) has further enhanced
the economic relationship between US and other economies into a single trading
entity.
11
Interview with Tan Sri Razali Ismail, former Chairman of the UN General Assembly and UN Special
Envoy to Myanmar at his residence on 15 April 2016.
Support for Universal Values
The US wants to be seen as a champion of human rights and democracy, and these
values are at the heart of every diplomatic engagement the US has embarked on in the
Asia Pacific. They are considered as an intrinsic part of Americas national identity
and Washington has never been shy of highlighting human rights violations and
undemocratic practices in states it has vested interest in.
President Obama is aware of the fact that the US is still viewed by many Asian
states as their primary partner in security while they also view China as their primary
source for economic prosperity. Therefore, Washington is aware that most Asian
governments would be willing to defer their commitments to the US in favour of
China, especially when the management of the global economic matters is taken into
consideration.14 It is this cautionary matter that drives the US in its rigourous
campaign to recoup its influence especially among growing economies in the region
such as Myanmar. These growing economies are still looking for a sense of economic
security through foreign direct investments, and nations such as Myanmar are the
prospective targets.
Kim Changsus opinion enlightened the study through the South Korean
perspective on the Pivot by concluding that six decades of existential threats from
12
Ibid.
13
Acharya, A. 2013. Why Two Asias May Be Better Than None. World Politics Review, 810.
(18 June 2016).
14
Chan et al. 2010. Obamas Trade Strategy Runs into Stiff Resistance. New York Times. 11
November.
North Korea, existing close ties with Washington since the Korean War, geographic
proximity and increasing interdependence in economy with an increasingly powerful
China, and unresolved disputes with Japan which goes back more than a century are
good enough reasons to have a powerful US presence in the region. 15 While most
South Korean scholars view the pivot as having very little effect on them due to the
existing strong partnership with the US, they do agree that a strategic realignment by
the US towards this region will be supported.16
Much has been speculated about the true intentions and objectives of the US
decision to rebalance or pivot to Asia. Some of these questions hang around the
expected time frame for the US commitment to the rebalance or if it is merely
ephemeral in nature due to the current domination of China in the Asia Pacific region.
Whilst the increased involvement of the US spells a sense of security for some
regional states who are in contention with China for territorial ownership, others
questioned the need for Washington to meddle in the geo-politics of Southeast Asia,
and the Asia Pacific region in fear of igniting a race for power and dominance.
While Washington insists that its motives are innocent and was tailored to
meet the demands of a secure, stable and friendly Asia Pacific. However, China has its
own reservations as to why the US has chosen to refocus its attention to Asia at a time
when China is at the peak of securing its String of Pearls and Maritime Silk Road
through the Asia Pacific. How deep is the involvement and influence of China on
regional states and how much will it affect US own interests? President Obama
himself has embarked on an unprecedented journey to re-establish diplomatic ties with
Asian leaders through his series of official visits and involvement in regional summits,
something his predecessors did very little of. The fact remains that the US sees itself
playing a pivotal role in Asia Pacific through this century and to cement itself as a
friend and confidant to smaller states. Similarly, the depth of relationship China has
with certain states in the region also appears to affect the policies of the US towards
these states. How do they differ, and why does the US seek these different approaches
when dealing with these two states remains to be analyzed and will be deliberated in
this paper.
15
Kim, Changsu. 2014. South Koreas Adaptation to the US Pivot to Asia. In The New US
Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, edited by William Tow and Douglas Stuart, 91.
Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series. London: Taylor & Francis.
16
Tow and Stuart. The New US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot. 3
Myanmars authorities. This became the signs of improvements especially for the
diplomatic relations between the two states. This also paved the way for democratic
elections to be held in November 2010, and the formation of a new civil government
in March 2011. Several measures were taken by the new government to indicate its
willingness to reform. This included the release of political prisoners, removal of
media censorship, ceasefire talks with ethnic minority rebels, and having
parliamentary by-elections.17 The current status of Myanmar is keen to be portrayed as
a civil government and wants to be recognised by other global states. Undoubtedly the
renewed relationship between the US and Myanmar has improved the way Myanmar
is viewed globally and as expectations are high for the elected government to continue
its progress towards establishing an ethical and democratic development.
China views Southeast Asia as its Southwest doorstep, and a potential source
of security threat if it is not managed effectively. Because of this, China viewed US
involvement with any Southeast Asian states as a thorn on its side especially when
Chinese leaders have long considered Myanmar as one of the solutions to its Malacca
Dilemma apart from the proposed Kra Isthmus Canal that has met with much
opposition from other Southeast Asian states.
17
Hill, C. 2012. Burma: Domestic Reforms and International Responses. Parliamentary
Library, no. 22 May 2012. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ParliamentaryDepartments/
Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/Burma. (26 July 2016)
18
Marantidou, V. 2014. Revisiting Chinas String of Pearls Strategy: Places with Chinese
Characteristics and Their Security Implications. Issues & Insights 14 (7).
19
Haacke, J. Myanmar: Now a Site for SinoUS Geopolitical Competition?
and humanitarian aid. At the same time, they envisioned to help improving
Myanmars standing among the international community.
The US Pivot policy to Asia also details a more comprehensive economic and
strategic collaboration with China, though many views the US motives to be more of
competitiveness and containment of Chinas expansion in regional influence.20
However, this Sino-US cooperation, if it works according to the aspirations of the US,
can be a platform of mediation in approaching North Korea as it appears that the US
does intend to use China as a cushion for its policies towards Pyongyang. After all,
China has been a supportive ally and one of the economic pillars to North Korea
amidst the extensive sanctions imposed on it through the years. If Pyongyang was to
look for a shoulder to rely on, Beijing would be the closest and dearest, if historical
accounts are to be taken into account.
However, Myanmar has also been playing it smart not to be seen to be too
dependent on Chinas handout. This is because Myanmar also sees the importance of
keeping a safe distance from China in order to continue attracting the US interest in
developing its economy and also forging their military relationship. Myanmar will be
smart to exploit the USs desperation to garner more diplomatic mileage in the region
to compete with China. Since 2009, Washington has been gradually reducing its
sanctions towards Naypyidaw in light of the latters perceived move towards reforms
and economic investments by US firms has increased significantly. 24 Although some
conditions were set by Washington to ensure the ruling Myanmar government keeps
to its reform efforts, the significance of the US presence in Myanmar goes beyond
just economic assistance from a big state to a small state, but also a stage for keeping
Chinas relationship with Myanmar in check. Chinas OBOR initiative includes a
massive instrastructure development in Myanmars main ports which in turn will
serve as staging ports for the Peoples Liberation Armys Naval vessels plying the
IOR under the pretext of keeping vigilance over its trade routes. This increased
Chinese Naval presence in the IOR puts creates another dent in US ambitions to
regain its military prowess in the region, in addition to the increased tension between
China and the US in the South China Sea.
Both China and the US have been quick to dismiss any notion of strategic
competition in the Asia-Pacific region. Although both seemed obviously irate over
whatever action the other makes, they prefered to portray a perception of co-existence
for mutual benefit. In 2014, US Ambassador to China, Gary Locke spared no efforts
to reiterate US policy towards collaborative engagements with China in Asia. He
stressed that the US looks forward to share the same fundamental goals in the
development of the Asia Pacific because the region presents a significant economic
21
Interview with Senior Colonel Zhang Zhing Min PLA, Defence Attache of China to Malaysia
at his residence on 13 September 2016.
22
Wong, John. 2015. Chinas One Belt, One Road Initiative: Economic Diplomacy With
Chinese Characteristics. Silk Road Forum 2015, 18. Singapore. http://en.drc.gov.cn/ JohnWong.pdf.
(4 October 2016).
23
Ibid.
24
US Companies Investing in Burma. 2014. Houston. http://www.uscampaignforburma.org/
images/USCB_Report_Card_US_Companies_Investing_In_Burma.pdf. (4 October 2016).
vitality for both. He called for more open and frank dialogues towards sustained
engagements and to foster cooperation to avoid unnecessary friction through amicable
problem solving efforts and look forward to a more prosperous mutual future. 25 In
fact, the US has been selling this idea of mutual co-existence with China since 2012
when its rebalancing strategy first resurfaced. Chinas cautious stance towards US
intentions in its rebalancing or pivot to Asia was not unfounded. Asia is home to over
40 percent of the worlds population and contributes to almost 60 percent of global
GDP.26 Asia will undoubtedly have a profound effect on the world economy as a
whole and anyone who owns Asia will systematically own the world. The US
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative to gather more economic partners in the
region closely mirrors Chinas AIIB in terms of motive and strategic values.
CONCLUSION
The 2011 announcement by Washington of its intention to refocus its attention from
the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region certainly caused a conundrum to all states
in this region. It had received mixed feelings of elation for those looking for a bigger
US involvement in the regions economy and security, and a sense of distrust for those
wary of the actual intentions of the US shift. Myanmar is one state which had
identified in this research that has both US and Chinas interest in terms of economy,
diplomatic and military. More significantly, the US is more than willing to put its
earlier condemnation of the ruling Myanmar military regimes past practices through
relaxation of sanctions under the pretext of moving forward with the juntas promise
of human rights reform and democratic governance, two of the most prominent focus
in any the US foreign policy towards other states. North Korea however, poses a
challenge for both the US and China because of its stubborn ruling regime that has
25
Locke, G. 2014. Partnerships For Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. In , 14. Shanghai:
Consulate General of the United States. http://shanghai.usembassy-china.org.cn/123112amb.html. (4
October 2016).
26
Ibid.
repeatedly refused to bow to international pressure in reforming its governance and
human right practices. Even decades of sanctions has not dented the North Korean
ruling regimes to resolve the situation, even if it means that their population will
suffer in the process.
The US realized that its negligence of this region has resulted in it giving away
a valuable pot of influence to other emerging powers such as China. More
significantly, China was gaining influence among the Asian states quickly with its
economic prowess and promises of assistance in developing infrastructure and
massive investments. Washington was too engrossed in carrying out its global war on
terror that it overlooked the importance of its main economic hotspot, Asia.
The US Secretary of State Hillary Clintons visit to Naypyidaw in 2011, and
the subsequent state visit by President Obama in 2012 marked to be the turning point
in the history of Myanmar because it was from this point that Washington declared its
willingness to close an eye to the past turbulent records of the military junta and
seek a path of reconciliation for the betterment of Myanmars economy and its people.
Myanmar held the key to a new and vast pool of natural resources, and also sat pretty
at the mouth of the most important and economically lucrative commercial waterway
in the world, the Straits of Malacca. In essence, Myanmar also was the key to the
Indian Ocean for Chinas commercial and naval vessels. To allow China in taking
total control of this would be considered as a strategic suicide for the US. This is
because China will be able to overcome its Malacca Straits Dilemma and monitor all
shipping from its point of operations in Myanmar.
To the question as to why North Korea does not garner the same interest from
US in comparison to Myanmar, the current regimes unwillingness to reform or
negotiate a peaceful end to its aggression appears to be the biggest stumbling block.
Both the US and China would like to see North Korea reforming, but they know that it
will not happen with the current regime. Thus, it is becoming a game of pushing the
responsibility to the other. Another issue that the US is well aware of is that
economically, North Korea does not possess much natural resources, or serving as a
potentially lucrative market to offer for investment. It has been a failed state for too
long and its hermit like presence puts a doubt on what it has to offer for further
growth. Even if there was a miraculous reform by Pyongyang, the cost of rebuilding
North Korea will be enormous and too costly for either the US or China to bear.
North Koreas ruling regime however is more concerned about its own
regimes survival and fear of being opposed by its own people, has led to a system of
harsh governance and total disregard for human rights. Fear of the regimes harsh
crackdown and punishment of death has resulted in a timid and compliant population.
Externally, North Korea continues to be thorn in the side to its neighbours and
regional states. Its constant threats and display of aggression irks its neighbouring
nations and has drawn worldwide criticisms especially in its open development of
nuclear weapons. North Korea is commonly seen as a very risky investment to any
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Intelligence Division
FORUM
Prof Dr Tosh Minohara. 27 October 2016. Quo Vadis Pax Americana. Faculty of
Social Sciences and Humanities Meeting Room. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia.