Civ Cases

RULE 9
Teresita Monzon vs. Sps. James & Maria Rosa Nieves Relova and Sps. Bienvenido &
Eufrancia Perez vs. Addio Properties (intervenor)
September 17, 2008
Doctrine:
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to appear at
the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default.
While there are instances when a party may be properly defaulted, these should be the
exception rather than the rule, and should be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or
inordinate neglect to comply with the orders of the court.
Summary:
Spouses Relova and Perez filed a petition for injunction since Monzon issued promissory notes
to the respective spouses with lots as security (2A- Perez, Lot 2B- Relova). Monzon was
indebted to Coastal Lending which foreclosed the property due to the non-payment of Monzons
3.4 million debt. Addio was the highest bidder in the sale. There was an excess of 1.6 M from
Addios payment of 5M. The Spouses contend that they should be given the residue, which is
with Atty. Luna (clerk of court). Due to the absence of Monzon in a hearing, the RTC, granted an
oral Motion by the 2 spouses by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte presentation of
evidence. The RTC rendered a favorable decision to the 2 spouses allowing the ex parte
presentation of evidence by spouses. Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that the RTC
gravely erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents presented their evidence
ex parte without giving her a chance to present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due
process of law. The Court held that the RTC erred in not giving Monzon the right to present her
defenses. The Court held that the case should be remanded back to trial court for the reception
of evidence for the defense of Monzon. The Court held that the failure to appear at the hearing
is not a ground for an order of default.
Facts:
Spouses Relova and Perez filed a petition for Injunction against Atty. Ana Liza Luna and Teresita
Monzon. They allege that Monzon issued a promissory note in favor of sps. Perez. The amount
was P600K and secured by Lot2A in Brgy Kaybagal, Tagaytay City with about 300 sqm. A deed
of absolute sale over the parcel of land was later executed in favor of the Perez spouses.
The spouses also claimed that the same thing happened with sps. Relova wherein a promissory
note in the amount of P200k was issued secured by Lot2B with about 200 sqm. There was a 5%
interest per month. A deed of conditional sale over the parcel of land was later issued in favor of
sps. Relova.
Monzon was indebted to the Coastal Lending Corporation. Coastal Lending then extrajudicially
foreclosed the property of Monzon which included Lots 2A and 2B. The winning bidder in this
extrajudicial foreclosure was Addio properties. Of the amount paid by Addio, there was a residue
of roughly P1.6M (indebtedness of Monzon was only around P3.4M while Addio paid P5M for
the property thats why theres an excess). This residue is in the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch
Clerk of Court.
CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Monzon, in her Answer, claimed that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. Also, she argues that she has already fulfilled her obligation to the
spouses via dacion en pago evidenced by the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of
Absolute Sale. She claimed that petitioners could still claim the portions sold to them if they
would only file the proper civil cases. As regards the fund in the custody of Atty. Luna,
respondents cannot acquire the same without a writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of
garnishment in accordance with the provisions of Rule 57 and Section 9(c), Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 5 December 2001, the RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
hearing date despite due notice, granted an oral Motion by the 2 spouses by issuing an
Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the 2 spouses.
RTC: rendered a favorable decision to the 2 spouses. The Decision also mentioned that the
Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by spouses was due to the continuous and
incessant absences of Monzon and counsel. Also, the TC ordered Atty. Luna to deliver the
residue to spouses Relova and Perez.
Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court. Monzon claims that the
RTC gravely erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents presented
their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to present her evidence, thereby
violating her right to due process of law.
At this point in time, Addio properties intervened.
CA:
Affirmed RTC, denied Monzons appeal. Accdg. to CA, Monzon showed interest in having the
case resolved with dispatch. Monzon cannot complain she was denied of due process since she
was given ample opportunity to defend and asserts her interests in the case.
Issue: Whether or not Monzon is in default? -NO
Held:
The Court held that the case should be remanded back to trial court for the reception of
evidence for the defense of Monzon.
The Court held that the failure to appear at the hearing is not a ground for an order of default.
The sole ground according to the book of former Justice Florenz D. Regalado is the failure to file
a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
First, Monzon claims that she was never declared in default by the TC. Despite this, the RTC
still applied the effects of a default order against Monzon. The Court discussed that this
amounts to the circumvention of the rigid requirement of a default order.
In the case at bar, Monzon had not failed to file her answer. Neither was notice sent to
Monzon that she would be defaulted, or that the effects of default shall be imposed upon
her. Mere non-appearance of defendants at an ordinary hearing and to adduce evidence
does not constitute default, when they have already filed their answer to the complaint

within the reglementary period. It is error to default a defendant after the answer had
already been filed. It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have every
litigants case tried on the merits as much as possible; it is for this reason that judgments
by default are frowned upon.
Additional Notes:
Effects of Default are followed only in 3 instances: (Accdg to Justice Regalado)
When there is an actual default for failure to file a responsive pleading
Failure to appear in the pre-trial conference
Refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29
Requirements of a Default Order:

The Court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by
service of summons or voluntary appearance
the defendant failed to file his answer within the time allowed therefor
there must be a motion to declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter.

GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN
DOCTRINE: Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in
default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he
has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him
(Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
SUMMARY:
Montalban obtained a loan from Gomez and then failed to pay so Gomez filed a complaint for
collection of money plus damages etc. Montalban failed to file an Answer to the complaint and
was declared to be in default so Gomez was ordered to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in
favor of Gomez. Montalban filed a petition of relief from judgment saying that it was thru fraud,
mistake, negligence etc that she was not able to answer the charges against her and there was
no proper service since the complaint was served to a certain dela Torre who was not
authorized to receive in her behalf. RTC granted Montalbans petition and then changed their
earlier decision saying that they do not have jurisdiction. Gomez alleged that RTC erred in
granting the petition of relief from judgment of Montalban. SC ruled that RTC erred since petition
for relief from judgment is only available in exceptional cases when there is no other available
remedy and then the SC provided for the available remedies Montalban should have availed
after being declared in default and petition of relief from judgment is not one of them.
FACTS:
Gomez filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and payment of attorneys
fees against Montalban.
The Complaint alleged, among other things, that: on or about 26 August 1998, Montalban
obtained a loan from Gomez in the sum of P40,000.00 with a voluntary proposal on her part to
pay 15% interest per month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent issued in
favor of petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check No. 0215632, postdated 26 October 1998, in
the sum of P46,000.00, covering the P40,000.00 principal loan amount and P6,000.00 interest
charges for one month; when the check became due, respondent failed to pay the loan despite
several demands; thus, petitioner filed the Complaint praying for the payment of P238,000.00,
representing the principal loan and interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded as
attorneys fees, as well as the cost of suit.
Summons was served, but despite her receipt thereof, respondent failed to file her Answer.
Consequently, she was declared in default and upon motion, petitioner was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
After considering the evidence presented by petitioner, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
Gomez

Montalban filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no effective service
of summons upon her since there was no personal service of the same. The summons was
received by one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who was not authorized to receive summons or other
legal pleadings or documents on respondents behalf.
Montalban attributes her failure to file an Answer to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. She claimed that she had good and valid defenses against petitioner and that the
RTC had no jurisdiction as the principal amount being claimed by petitioner was only
P40,000.00, an amount falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
RTC granted Montalbans Petition for Relief from Judgment and set aside its Decision on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Gomez filed an MR but was denied by RTC hence, this present petition filed before SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents relief from judgment is proper during the period for filing a motion
for reconsideration and appeal.
HELD:
On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of Montalbans Petition for Relief from Judgment,
the Court finds and so declares that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so.
A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a final and
executory judgment. Since respondent allegedly received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May
2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28 May 2004,
judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x.
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, Montalban contended that judgment
was entered against her through mistake or fraud, because she was not duly served with
summons as it was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not authorized to receive
summons or other legal processes on her behalf.
SC held that there was no fraud, mistake or negligence present in the case.
Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Montalban on account of the
non-service upon her of the summons and complaint, the remedy of Montalban was to file a
motion for the reconsideration of the 4 May 2004 Decision by default or a motion for new trial
within 15 days from receipt of notice thereof. This is also without prejudice to respondents right
to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the order
of default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held including the decision, the writ
of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued by the RTC, on the ground that it acted without
jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, however, Montalban opted to file a Petition for Relief from the Judgment of the
RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was the wrong remedy.
In Tuason v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from
judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional
cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.
In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would
have prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review
on certiorari of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort to a Petition for Relief from
Judgment was unwarranted.
The Supreme Court notes that when respondent was declared in default for her failure to file an
Answer to the Complaint, she did not immediately avail herself of any of the remedies provided
by law. Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in
default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious
defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him
(Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
If respondent is really vigilant in protecting her rights, she should have exhausted all the legal
remedies above-mentioned to nullify and set aside the order of default against her, and should
no longer have waited for the judgment to be rendered. Respondent does not deny that she did
receive the summons, although she alleges that it was not properly served upon her, yet she
chose to sit on her rights and did not act immediately. For respondents failure to act with
prudence and diligence in protecting her rights, she cannot now elicit this Courts sympathy.

Gajudo v Traders Royal Bank || Gr no 151098 || 14 March 2008
Note: Petitioners here are the 4 Gajudos and 1 Chua and that the property was owned by them
in common. (Thus, Id refer to them as the Gajudos, Chua, or petitioners (all of them).
Doctrine: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in
the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of
evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If
the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be
dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any
countervailing evidence.
Summary: Chua obtained a loan from TRB secured by a Real Estate Mortgage of a property
owned in common by Chua and the Gajudos. They failed to settle the loan and thus there was
an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property in which the winning bidder was the bank. The
petitioners contend that they were allowed by the bank to repurchase the property but it was
sold to another. The petitioners state that that said new defendants they included in their
amended complaint conspired with the bank in canceling the notice of lis pendens by falsifying a
letter sent to and filed with the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, purportedly for the
cancellation of said notice so now they are claiming for damages. Summons were served on the
bank but they failed to file their answer. Thus, the petitioners were allowed to present ex parte to
claim for damages. The petitioners contend that since the bank was declared in default the
pieces of evidence they presented must already be sufficient for them to have a favorable
judgment. But evidence presented not sufficient. Hence, doctrine.
Facts:
In mid 1977 Danilo Chua obtained a loan from the Traders Royal Bank in the amount of
P75,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land.
The loan was not paid and thus the bank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the property. The auction sale of the property was set on 10 June 1981, but was reset to 31
August 1981, on Chus request, which, however, was made without the knowledge and
conformity of the other petitioners (Gajudos). On the rescheduled auction sale, the Sheriff of
Quezon City sold the property to the bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of
P24,911.30.
The other petitioners (Gajudo) assailed this because bid price was shockingly or
unconscionably, low; that the other [petitioners] failed to redeem the property due to their lack of
knowledge of their right of redemption, and want of sufficient education; that, although the
period of redemption had long expired, Chua offered to buy back, and bank also agreed to sell
back the foreclosed property, on the understanding that Chua would pay the bank the amount of
P40,135.53, representing the sum that the bank paid at the auction sale, plus interest and that
Chua made an initial payment thereon in the amount of P4,000.00 duly receipted by the bank;
that, in a sudden change of position, the bank wrote Chua asking that he could repurchase the
property, but based on the current market value thereof; and that sometime later, the bank wrote
Chua anew, requiring him to tender a new offer to counter the offer made thereon by another
buyer.

The bank, filed its answer with counterclaim, asserting that the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property was done in accordance with law; and that the bid price was neither
unconscionable, nor shockingly low; that petitioners slept on their rights when they failed to
redeem the property within the one year statutory period; and that bank, in offering to sell the
property to Chua on the basis of its current market price, was acting conformably with law, and
with legitimate banking practice and regulations.
A big conflagration hit the City Hall of Quezon City, which destroyed, amongst other things, the
records of the case. After the records were reconstituted, the petitioners discovered that the
foreclosed property was sold by the bank to the Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice
of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, had already been
cancelled. Accordingly, with leave of court, the petitioners amended their complaint, but the
Trial Court dismissed the case without prejudice due to their failure to pay additional filing
fees.The petitioners refiled the complaint impleaded as additional defendants the Ceroferr
Realty Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna Roque, and included an additional cause of
action, to wit: that said new defendants conspired with the bank in canceling the notice of
lis pendens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, purportedly for the cancellation of said notice.
Summons was served on the bank. Supposing that all the defendants had filed their
answer, the petitioners filed a motion to set case for pretrial, which motion was, however,
denied by the Trial Court in its Order on the ground that the bank has not yet filed its
answer. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, thereunder alleging that they
received by registered mail, on 19 October 1990, a copy of the banks answer with
counterclaim, dated 04 October 1990, which copy was attached to the motion. The trial Court
denied for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration, therein holding that the answer with
counterclaim filed by the bank referred to another civil case pending before Branch 90 of the
same Court.
The petitioners filed a motion to declare the bank in default, thereunder alleging that no
answer has been filed despite the service of summons on it on 26 September 1990. The
Trial Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon submission by petitioners of proof
of service of the motion on the bank. Upon proof that petitioners had indeed served the
bank with a copy of said motion, the Trial Court issued an Order of default against the
bank. On petitioners motion, they were by the Court allowed to present evidence ex
parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered the new questioned partial decision.
Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial decision by default against Traders
Royal Bank and admit their Answer with counterclaim: thereunder it averred, amongst others,
that the erroneous filing of said answer was due to an honest mistake of the typist and
inadvertence of its counsel.
The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Even if the CA stated that the erroneous docket
number placed on the Answer filed before the trial court was not an excusable negligence by the
banks counsel and that these were binding on the bank, the petitioners had not convincingly
established their right to relief as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale
of the mortgaged property. They stated that an extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not require
personal notice to the mortgagor, that there was no allegation or proof of noncompliance with
the publication requirement and the public posting of the notice of sale, and that there was no
showing of inadequacy of price as no competent evidence was presented to show the real
market value of the land sold or the readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that

at which the property had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that the bank had
agreed to sell the property back to them. After pointing out that the redemption period had long
expired, respondents written communications to Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the
former had made a proposal for the latter to buy back the property at the current market price.
The petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a default
order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule
133 (Preponderance of Evidence rule - which basically states that the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence)
Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to apply the provisions of Sec 3, Rule 9 ([and in
applying instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court.) - No
Held: No, the CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would
preclude the application of either one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure the
trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision,
the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading
may warrant," subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the presentation of
evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of
the relief that may be granted.
Basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle
holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence
because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be
granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence
required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants
are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has
ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by
the presenting party. Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights
except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. Although the
defendant would not be in a position to object, if the evidence presented should not be sufficient
to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed.
While petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they
were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof
under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Moreover, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the evidence for the following
reasons.
The petitioners were not deprived of their property without cause. There has been no allegation
or proof of noncompliance with the requirement of publication and public posting of the notice of
sale. Neither has there been competent evidence to show that the price paid at the foreclosure
sale was inadequate. Thus, there was no ground to invalidate the sale.
The petitioners have not convincingly established their right to damages on the basis of the
purported agreement to repurchase. Without reiterating our prior discussion on this point, we
stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory damages must be proved even under
Section 3 of Rule 9.

In sum, the petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the strength of their position,
notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed in presenting their evidence ex parte. Not in
every case of default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically.
Hence, the petition is denied.

Cavili v. Florendo
Doctrine: A party in default can be a witness. A witness is only called upon to testify to what he
has seen, heard or observed. He takes no active part in the trial.
Summary: Case for partition, accounting and damages was filed against Cavilis. Perfecta Cavili
failed to file an answer on time and so she was declared in default. During trial, Perfecta was
the first witness to be presented but respondents contend that as a party in default, she already
lost her standing in court and so should not be allowed to take part in the trial even as a witness.
Court held in favor of Cavilis saying that a party in default can still be a witness.
Facts: Private respondents (di sinabi names) filed a case for partition, accounting and damages
against the Cavilis. Summons was issued to the 3 Cavilis. Process server went back to the court
saying that Quirino and Primitivo Cavili were not contacted and that according to Perfecta Cavili,
they stay in Negros Occidental.
Perfecta Cavili (through Atty. Alamillo) filed a motion for extension to answer. (since Perfecta is
still about to inform the other 2 about the case) But still, they failed to file their answer within the
requested period. And so upon motion of the other party, Perfecta was declared in default on
October 5, 1979 (a judgment by default was promulgated by Judge Villarin)
(Atty. Alamillo filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the persons
of Quirino and Primitivo and with a defense that the properties they want to partition have
already been the subject of a written partition agreement. Court granted the motion.
Private respondents filed for a motion for reconsideration of the order granting new trial. Denied.
A pre-trial and trial was scheduled to be presided by Judge Florendo. Perfecta Cavili is to
be the first witness.
Private respondents moved for her disqualification as witness saying that she already
lost her standing in court and so she could not be allowed to participate in all
proceedings, even as witness.
Judge Florendo disqualified Perfecta from testifying.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Perfecta who is already in default can still testify as a witness. YES.
Held: Respondents are invoking Rule 18, Section 2 which says that a party in default is not
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings nor take part in the trial.
Court says that a party in default only loses his standing in court. Loss of Standing only means
the forfeiture of ones rights as a party litigant. He only loses his right to present his defense,
control the proceedings and examine and cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect
that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court.
A witness is merely a beholder, a spectator, or onlooker, called upon to testify what he has seen,
heard or observed. As such, he takes no active part in the contest of rights between the parties.
A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by the other defendants who have standing in
court. The incidental benefit on the part of the party in default to present evidence is of minor
consequence. To reject Perfectas presentation of testimony would be to treat Primitivo and
Quirino as if they too were in default.
Additional Info:
Witness- all persons who, having organs of sense, can perceive, may be witnesses. Persons
interested in the outcome of the case, those convicted of crime, any person on account of his
religious beliefs be excluded.
The definition exemplifies the generosity of the Rules as to who can be a witness.

Rules provide for those who are disqualified to testify. Since a party in default is not among
those specified, it is deemed not included in accord with a Statcon principle.
Those provided are:
Section 19- mentally incapacitated, children with tender age
Section 20- those with conflicts of interest
Section 21- those with privileged communications

RULE 10
PPA v. Gothong
DOCTRINE: Under the new rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of
action or defense. This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding
SUMMARY: WG&A leased the marine slip way of PPA. The term was until June 30, 2001 or
until such time PPA will turnover its operations to the winning bidder of the north harbor
modernization and that the improvements will turn over to PPA. On November 2001, PPA
demanded WG&A to vacate, WG&A refused. WG&A filed an injuction suit with prayer for TRO.
Later on, WG&A amended it complaint for the first time, which said that if it vacated, it should be
refunded for the improvements it introduced. RTC denied so WG&A filed a motion to admit a
second amended complaint, which added reformation of the lease contract. RTC denied the 2nd
amendment because it alters the cause of action, CA reversed. SC held that CA was correct
and said that the current ROC allows a second amendment (even that which changes the cause
of action) as long as a motion was filed and that it prevents delay.
FACTS:
William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A), is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in
the shipping industry.
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is a government-owned and controlled company mandated

under its charter to operate and administer the country's sea port and port facilities.
WG&A and PPA entered into a lease agreement wherein WG&A leased the Marine Slip way in
the North Harbor.
The lease was for the period January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that PPA turns over
its operation to the winning bidder for the North Harbor modernization.
Improvements made in the area will be turned over to PPA at the end of the lease.
(Other terms: Rent of 12.15 per square meter or 886,950 monthly rental; utility expenses borne
by WG&A; Real estate taxes also borne by WG&A.)
On November 12, 2001, PPA sent a letter demanding VG&A to vacate on November 30 and to
turn over the improvements because it believed that the lease already expired on June 30,
2001.
VG&A requested PPA to reconsider its decision but it was denied by PPA.
(November 28, 2001) VG&A filed an injunction suit before the RTC-Manila. VG&A claims that
PPA unjustly, illegally, and prematurely terminated the lease. VG&A also prayed for a TRO to
stop the evacuation and recovery of damages for breach of contract.

(December 11, 2001) WG&A amended its complaint for the first time. WG&A added that PPA is
estopped from denying that the correct period of lease is until such time that the North Harbor
Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the winning bidder.
A third cause of action was also added, if WG&A vacated, then it should be refunded for the
value of the improvements it has introduced.
RTC denied the TRO.
WG&A then filed for a MOTION to admit attached Second Amended Complaint. The
second amended complaint was captioned as one for injunction with prayer for TRO and/or writ
of preliminary injuction with damages and/or reformation of contract. A fourth cause of action
and additional relief was also added, which was the reformation of the contract as it failed to
express or embody the true intent of the parties.
PPA opposed the second amendment claiming that it was a substantial amendment because it
will alter the cause of action and theory of the case.
RTC denied the admission of the second amended complaint.
CA reversed and allowed the admission of the complaint based on Section 3, Rule 10 of the
ROC.
ISSUE: W/N the second amendment should be allowed
HELD: The court held that the second amendment should be allowed and that the CA was
correct in ruling that the RTC committed GADALEJ in denying the amendment.
The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its amendment by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
OLD ROC:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is set for hearing, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause
of action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and
an opportunity to be heard.
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter
the cause of action or defense."
This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause
of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules
which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

[G.R. No. L-7076. April 28, 1955.]
ERIBERTO P. ROSARIO and PAZ UNTALAN DE ROSARIO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
FILOMENO CARANDANG, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
DOCTRINE: Although amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the
furtherance of justice, it is obvious that when it appears from the very face of the complaint that
the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, an amendment of the
complaint cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Court. Before an answer or a
motion to dismiss has been filed, the original complaint is amendable, and the amendment can
supersede the original pleading, as of right, without leave of court being required, and without
the court taking cognizance at all of the original complaint.
SUMMARY: Rosarios filed a complaint in the CFI against Carandang because Carandang
illegally entered his land. In the complaint, the allegations point to forcible entry. CFI dismissed
the case because forcible entry is cognizable only by the justice of the peace courts. Rosarios
tried to amend the complaint into recovery of ownership and possession para pasok na sa CFI.
SC says bawal. Because see doctrine
FACTS:
Rosario and de Rosario (Rosarios) applied to register a parcel of land in Pangasinan in

their name
Carangdang filed an opposition to the registration
-furthermore, Carangdang illegally entered into the premises, destroyed the nipa plants,
and made dikes to convert the place into a fishpond
Rosarios filed a complaint with the CFI specifically alleging that they are the owners and
possessors of the land.
-they also alleged all the things Carangdang did to their land
Carangdang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
a) CFI had no jurisdiction, since this is a case of forcible entry, Justice of the Peace
Court dapat
b) CFI had no jurisdiction, since the claim for damages did not exceed 2000 (sakto
2000 lang yung claim, eh pag CFI kelangan exceeding 2000)
c) There is another action pending between the same parties and for the same
cause (Land Registration Cases) in which the title and ownership of the land in
question is involved and contested
The lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Rosarios moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal and prayed as well for the
admission of an amended complaint.
-the amended complaint converts Rosarios action from forcible entry to recovery of
ownership and possession. (para maging pasok sa CFI)
The lower court denied both the MR and the admission of an amended complaint.
Hence, this appeal

ISSUE:
1. WON the CFI has jurisdiction
2. WON Rosarios should be allowed to amend their complaint
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. The case pleaded was a clear action for forcible entry. Therefore, the justice of the
peace courts have exclusive and original jurisdiction.
-it is the allegations (forcible entry) of the complaint, and not the prayer (that they be
declared owners of the land) that determines the jurisdiction of the court.
-also, the real claim for damages is only 2k. not 2500. The extra 500 is the expenses
incurred due to the filing of this case. Remember that expenses for filing of suit are
excluded from the jurisdictional amount that confer jurisdiction. Therefore, the basis
should be 2k only. Hence, CFI has no jurisdiction.
2. NO. The Rule authorizing the amendment of a defective pleading should be liberally
construed and the courts, whenever possible, should incline in favor of the amendment;
but when it appears patent that the pleading is not susceptible of amendment upon the
grounds above set out, the appellate courts should not hold that the former have abused
their discretion in not permitting the amendment and in dismissing the case
o Appellants original complaint, as we have already determined, is one for forcible

entry and detainer, over which the Court below has no jurisdiction. Not having
acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower
court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the
admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since
it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order
to act validly therein
o The case might be different had the amendment been made before an answer or
a motion to dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint was then
amendable, and the amendment could supersede the original pleading, as of
right, without leave of court being required, and without the Court taking
cognizance at all of the original complaint.
-PERO wait lang, diba motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading? So ibig
sabihin kahit may motion to dismiss pwede parin mag amend as a matter of
right? Eh sa case na to walang minention na Answer, motion to dismiss lang.
hmmm pero 1955 pa kasi yung case so baka old doctrine.

IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO RESLIN, and JOSE RESLIN vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA BENEDICTO-PAULINO
Doctrines: During the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a dismissal of the original
complaint and when the defendants only filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff can amend his
original complaint as a matter of right even without filing a motion.
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading as envisioned in Sec. 2, Rule 10.
Summary
IMA filed a complaint for conveyance of 65% of shares from FEMII and UEC. The RTC
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. IMA moved for reconsideration and
during pendency of it, she filed an amended complaint adding as co-plaintiff two residents of
Batac, Ilocos Norte which the RTC allowed. The CA reversed the RTC decision saying that
there was no original complaint to amend since it has been dismissed already. The SC held that
the CA failed to take into consideration the motion for reconsideration. Since the motion for
reconsideration is not yet final and the defendants only filed a motion to dismiss (which is not a
responsive pleading), IMA has the right to amend the complaint. (*Take note that the defendants
never filed an answer. All they filed since the beginning is a motion to dismiss.)
Facts:
- Ambassador Benedicto, through the Benedicto Group organized Far East Managers and
Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corp. (UEC).
- Later on, Irene Marcos-Araneta (IMA) alleged that FEMII and UEC were organized pursuant
to an arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his
associates, as trustees, the shares of stock of FEMII and UEC for the benefit of IMA. (65%
of shares for IMA)
- IMA demanded for the 65% of the shares but the Benedicto Group refused.
- IMA instituted before the RTC two complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting,
and receivership against the Benedicto Group. (first complaint UEC, second complaint
FEMII)
- Benedicto and his daughter, Francisca, filed motions to dismiss for the two complaints
based on the following grounds: (1) the case involves intra-corporate issue hich should be
filed under SEC, (2) venue was improperly laid, (3) complaint failed to state a cause of
action as there was no allegation therein that Benedicto accepted the trust arrangement
- Benedicto and Francisca presented the testimonies of Gilmia Valdez, Catalino Bactat, and
Conchita Rasco, household staffs of IMAs mansion in Batac, Ilocos Norte. They testified
that IMA did not maintain residence in said place as she only visited the mansion twice, she
did not vote in the national elections, and she is staying in her husbands home in Makati.

- IMA presented community tax certificate to refute the testimonies.
- RTC dismissed both complaints on the ground that the venue was improperly laid because
the action constituted real actions and IMA did not reside in Ilocos Norte. (June 29, 2000)
- IMA moved for reconsideration. Pending resolution of this, she filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint in order to include Daniel Rubio, Orlando Reslin, and Jose Reslin as
additional plaintiffs who are all residents of Ilocos Norte and who claims that they are IMAs
new trustees. (July 17, 2000)
- The RTC admitted the amended complaint predicated on the following premises: (1)
pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 10 IMA may opt to file an amended complaint as a matter of right,
(2) the additional plaintiffs cured the defect on venue
- RTC also denied the motion to dismiss the amended complaint by Francisca and Julita. RTC
added that the amended complaint ipso facto superseded the original complaint, the
dismissal of which has not yet become final at the time of filing the amended complaint.
- CA set aside the RTC decision on the ground that the amendment came after the RTC had
ordered with finality the dismissal of the original complaint. (*check the dates above)
- Hence, the present petition of IMA and her new trustees. They argue that the CA failed to
take into account the pending motion for reconsideration when they filed the amendment.
Issue: W/N the admission of the amended complaint is proper. YES
Held:
Sec. 2, Rule 10. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or in the case of a reply, at
any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Clearly, the plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right (without leave of court)
before any responsive pleading is filed or served. Responsive pleadings are those that seek
affirmative relief and/or set-up defenses like an answer.
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Although the original complaint has been
dismissed by the RTC, it should be pointed out that the finality of such dismissal is not yet final
as IMA seasonably sought a reconsideration of it. Thus, when IMA filed the amended complaint,
(1) the order of dismissal is not yet final and (2) Julita and Francisca have not filed an answer
yet, implying there was no legal impediment to her amending the complaint. As a matter of fact,
a motion to amend the complaint is not even necessary.
Dates:
Oder of dismissal June 29, 2000
Filing of amended complaint July 17, 2000

Resolution of motion for reconsideration August 25, 2000

Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles, RTC- Br. 58, Makati, Metro Manila,
People of the Philippines and Allied Banking Corporation
April 27, 2000 (SORRY FRIENDS ANG PANGIT NG CASE SWEAR!)
Doctrine:
Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings
and cease to be judicial admissions. However, if this is used as a tactic to delay the
proceedings, the original complaint is used.
Summary: Ching and ABC entered into a TRA. ABC filed 4 estafa cases against Ching in RTC
Makati. Ching and Philippine Bloomingmills also filed a civil case against ABC for the
declaration of nullity of the documents in RTC Manila. Ching filed to stop the criminal cases from
proceeding because of prejudicial question. This request was denied by RTC Makati. Ching filed
with the CA requesting to stop RTC Makati from proceeding with the criminal cases. Ching filed
an amended complaint with RTC Manila saying that the transactions were pure loans and not
TRA. The Court held that there is no prejudicial question and that the criminal cases can
proceed. The Court also tackled the issue what the nature of the transactions were. The Court
held that the transactions were in the form of TRA. Chings allegation in his original complaint
clearly showed that he entered into a TRA with ABC and the documents were collateral or
security was preferred by the SC and not Chings amended complain. Despite the amendment
of Chings claims in his amended complaint that was admitted by RTC Manila, the SC held that
the amendment complaint was filed after 18 months from the filing of the original complaint. The
length of time was sufficient to enkindle suspicion as to the true intentions of Ching regarding
the early disposition of the pending cases.
Facts:
Ching executed a trust receipt agreement in favour of Allied Banking Corporation in
consideration of the receipt by the said accused of goods described as 12 Containers Magtar
Brand Dolomites; 18 Containers Magtar Brand Dolomites; High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle
Bricks; and High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks under the terms that Ching agreed to
sell the same for cash with the express obligation to remit to Allied Banking the proceeds of the
sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. But Ching, once in possession of
said goods, did not comply with his obligation and misappropriated and converted to his own
personal use and benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale and despite repeated
demands, failed and refused and still fails and refuses, to account for and/or remit the proceeds
of sale to the Allied Banking.
Feb 4, 1992: Ching was charged before RTC Makati with 4 counts of estafa in relation to the
Trust Receipts Law. (criminal case)
Feb. 10, 1992: Ching filed Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Information, or in the Alternative to
Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary Investigation, and to Suspend in the
Meantime Further Proceedings in these Cases.
Feb 13, 1992: RTC acted on the omnibus motion and required the prosecutors office to conduct
a preliminary investigation and suspended further proceedings in the criminal cases.
Mar. 5, 1992: Ching with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. filed a case before RTC Manila for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. (civil case)

Aug. 7, 1992, Ching filed in RTC Makati for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question. Prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for suspension, which was
replied by Ching.
Aug. 26, 1992, RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition for suspension and
scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal cases. As a result, Ching moved to
reconsider to which the prosecution filed an opposition.
Sept. 04, 1992: RTC Makati issued an order which denied Chings motion for reconsideration
and set the criminal cases for arraignment and pre-trial.
Ching filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA to declare the nullity of the orders
and to prohibit the RTC Makati from conducting further proceedings in the criminal cases.
-DENIED
Ching filed an MR to the CA- Denied for lack of merit.
Nov. 19, 1993: RTC Manila admitted Chings amended complaint, which requested for
1. Declaration of the trust receipts null and void for failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties.
2. Declaration of the transaction as a pure and simple loan without any trust receipt agreement
and the annexed documents as mere loan documents.
Allied Banking submitted its amended answer and said that the transaction applied was a letter
of credit/trust receipt accommodation and not a pure and simple loan with the trust receipts as
mere additional or side documents
Ching seeks the intervention of the SC through Rule 45 and prays the suspension of the
criminal cases.
Issue:
1. Whether the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of nullity of documents,
specifically trust receipts, warrants the suspension of criminal proceedings instituted for
violation of estafa in relation to Trust Receipts Law? -No prejudicial question (NOT
IMPORTANT)
2. Whether the transactions are in the nature of a loan or trust agreement? - TRUST
Agreement
3. Whether or not the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint? -NO (CIVPRO)
Held:
The Court ruled on the true nature of the transactions and of the documents. The records
showed that Ching executed an application and agreement for a commercial letter of credit to
finance the purchase of imported good. Also, it is undisputed that Ching executed trust receipt
documents in favour of Allied Banking. However, in the amended complaint of Ching filed
after the CA rendered its assailed decision, it urges that the transaction entered into
between the parties was a pure loan without any trust receipt agreement. According to
Ching, the trust receipt documents were intended merely as additional or side
documents covering the said loan contrary to Chings allegation in his original complaint
that the trust receipts were executed as collateral or security.

On March 5, 1992 alleged that the trust receipt were collateral or security and not as additional
or side documents. This allegation in the complaint is tantamount to a judicial admission on the
part of Ching to which he must be bound.
However, RTC-Manila admitted the amended complaint, which stated that the documents were
additional and side documents because the transaction was a loan. By the RTCs admission of
the amended complaint, the judicial admission made in the original complaint was superseded.
The amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned
and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record.
In the instant case, the original complaint is deemed superseded by the amended
complaint. Corollarily, the judicial admissions in the original complaint are considered
abandoned. Nonetheless, we must stress that the actuations of Ching, as sanctioned by
the RTC-Manila, through its order admitting the amended complaint, demands stern
rebuke from this Court. Certainly, this Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by
Ching specifically in filing the amended complaint only after the promulgation of the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. It bears noting that a lapse of almost eighteen
months (from March 1992 to September 1993), from the filing of the original complaint to the
filing of the amended complaint, is too lengthy a time sufficient to enkindle suspicion and
enflame doubts as to the true intentions of Ching regarding the early disposition of the pending
cases.
Although the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial court and such discretion would not normally be disturbed on appeal, it is
also well to mention that this rule is relaxed when evident abuse thereof is apparent. Hence, in
certain instances we ruled that amendments are not proper and should be denied when delay
would arise, or when the amendments would result in a change of cause of action or defense or
change the theory of the case, or would be inconsistent with the allegations in the original
complaint.
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status
as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized
against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be
formally offered in evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not
be considered. Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as
a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. In virtue thereof, the
amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and
ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms
part of the record.

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIESINC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM and LELY KUNG LIM V.
SECURITY BANK ET AL
DOCTRINE:
This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the
plaintiffs supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.
A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a
complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.
SUMMARY:
DMI and the Lims leased the property of Security Bank. Security Bank terminated the Lease
and offered to DMI to purchase the property. While the negotiation was ongoing, according to
the Lims, the guards hired by the Security Bank prevented them from, going inside the property
and retrieve their properties and machineries the guards even harrassed them. DMI and the
Lims prayed for the issuance of a TRO. According to Security Bank, they never prevented DMI
and the Lims from enetering so they have no problem with the issuance of TRO. When DMI and
Lims enetered the property to retrieve their properties and machineries, hey said that it was
nowhere to be found so they filed a supplemental complaint asing for 27M actual damages as
value of the lost properties. RTC granted the supplemental complaint. Accdg to Security Bank,
they did not pay filing fees for the supplemental complaint hence the RTC has no authority to
grant damages. SC said: they should have paid the filing fees for the supplemental complaint.
FACTS:
Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim
(the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled
P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real
properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it
stands (the property), located at Pasig City.
The Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals
Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part of the
property as their residence. DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from
October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the
lease. The contract also provided that DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
The Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999.
Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of
its purchase.

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the
property in their business. But the Bank posted at the place private security guards
The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the
Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances
to the place and barred the Lims as well as DMIs employees from entering the property.
The Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and
personal items left at the property.
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary
injunction against the Bank and its co-defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA (guards), and
Gil Silos.
Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the
property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal.
The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never
prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the building. For this reason, the
RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things
they left there. The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable
to find the movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the
Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual
damages to them of over P27 million.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It ordered the Bank to pay the
plaintiffs P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But the court absolved
defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the
RTCs authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their
supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the latter found
for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiffs
supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees
on the amounts of damages they claim in it
HELD:
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that DMI and the Lims failure to pay
the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.
What DMI and the Lims failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental
Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs action from the moment they filed
their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.

The DMIE and the Lims non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional
claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.
As to the damages that DMI and the Lims claim under their supplemental complaint, their
stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not
paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment
award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful
execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed
or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of these
circumstances obtain in this case.
The supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the DMI
sought against the Bank. Still DMI and the Lims paid no filing fees on the same. And, while
DMI and the Lims claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no
reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet
pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint
is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid
upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of
supplemental complaints.
To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure
to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to
make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of
course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no
excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the
trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
DMI and the Lims of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of
additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The
implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment
of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can
grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are
embodied in its rules.

RULE 12 ( NO RULE 11 CASES)
Bantillo vs IAC (and Sumcad) || Gr no 75311 || 18 October 1988
Doctrine: Knowledge of the identity or identities of petitioners alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs
and of the basis of petitioners claimed authority to represent the latter, would obviously be
useful to respondent in preparation of a responsive pleading.
Summary: Bantillo claims a lot by virtue of her being an heir of the original owners. Sumcad
claims the same lot under an Original Certificate of Title. A Complaint for reconveyance was filed
by Bantillo. Sumcad filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars asking to specify the legal capacity of
Bantillo as an heir of the original owners. Bantillo stated that such matters was are not proper
subjects of a motion for bill of particulars. The court held that it was a proper subject. The court
also stated that it should be filed within from notice. However, in the interest of substantial and
expeditious justice, the court held that Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and
ordered stricken from the record.
Facts:
A Complaint for Reconveyance, dated 19 April 1982, was filed by Bantillo against respondent
Sumcad with the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato. Rosita Zafra Bantillo was alleged
to be the surviving heir of the deceased spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra.
She has been in the possession of Lot No. 63 (240 sqm lot in Midsayap, North Cotabato) under
the claim of ownership since 1950 or ever since the death of the spouses. She also represents
the Zafra spouses and the heirs of the spouses as a surviving heir and that she has been in
open and continuous possession of the lot.
Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad, by virtue of an Original Certificate of Title issued in her name, claims
ownership. She sought to remove Bantillo from possession.
Sumcad filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars in response to the complaint. In that motion,
respondent Sumcad requested that petitioner Bantillo be directed by the court: (a) 'to specify
what kind of surviving heir she is ...;" and (b) "to specify by what right or authority she
represents the socalled 'heirs of the spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra ...
and to show the papers under which she is authorized to represent them in court, and also
(to specify and Identify these other heirs by name and the nature of their heirship.'
Bantillo questioned the proprietary of Motion for Bill of Particulars. Bantillo stated that
the Matters mentioned in the motion were not essential/needed to enable Sumcad to file
an answer and that such matters are not proper subjects of a Motion for Bill of

Particulars. But, in the end, Bantillo agreed to specify the names of the heirs she represents
and submit the Special Power of Attorney executed by the heirs in her favor.
The motion was granted. Bantillo must specify the names of the heirs, submit the SPA, and
furnishing an amended pleading. Sumcad, on the other hand, must file a responsive pleading
within 15 days from receipt of the amended pleading.
The counsel for Sumcad filed a motion to dismiss stating that Bantillo failed to comply. Bantillo
opposed this by saying that he failed to comply since there is no presiding judge so it would be
useless to file since it wouldnt be acted upon yet.
Sumcad interposed a Rejoinder with Motion to Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleadings stating
that Bantillo is delayed for more than 1 year when ROC requires a response for Bill of
Particulars to be within 10 days (Sec. 1(c), Rule 12, ROC).
Bantillo filed a Rejoinder to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the late
compliance to the lower court's Order was excusable under Section 1, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court which allows amendment of pleadings without regard for mere technicalities.
The TC finding the Motion to Strike Out/ Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleadings, filed by Sucmad
meritorious, grants the same and orders the dismissal of the complaint and the striking out
of the amended complaint.
CA upon appeal by Bantillo dismissed the case based on: Guilty of unreasonable delay in
complying with theorder. Rule 12, Section 1(c) requires 10 days. Bantillo submitted onJune 22,
1983. Amended complaint should be filed within a seasonable time and in a manner consistent
with the Order. The alleged vacancy judge lasted only for over 2 months (January-March).
Issue(s):
1. W/N Sumcads Motion for Bill of Particulars is proper YES

2. W/N the period in Section 1, Rule 12 should be applied when the Court Order
states the submission of an amended complaint and not a bill of particulars - YES
3. W/N Rule 10 should be applied NO, that provision does not apply in situations where it
is the court that orders a party litigant to amend his or her pleading.
Held:

1. YES, Bantillos basis for representation of the heirs can help Sumcad formulate a
responsive pleading which is the purpose of Bill of Particulars. Section 1, rule 12 states
that a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of part of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial
Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter
vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for "a more definite
statement" or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submission of such statement or bill,
further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive
pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.
The title of the (original) Complaint stated that Bantillo had then brought suit "for herself and in
representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candido Zafra and Maria Pimentel Zafra."In paragraphs
2 and 3 of the Complaint, Bantillo alleged her capacity personally to maintain the judicial action
for reconveyance, manifesting that she is the "surviving heir" of the Zafra spouses, the alleged
original owners of the land under litigation. The Court notes, however, the absolute lack of
allegations in the Complaint regarding the petitioner's capacity or authority to bring suit
in behalf of her alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs. On this matter, Section 4 of Rule 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that: Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue
or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred.
Bantillo having failed to allege a factual matter which, under the rules, must be alleged or
pleaded, respondent Sumcad was not unjustified in moving for clarification of such matter.
Knowledge of the identity or identities of petitioners alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs
and of the basis of petitioners claimed authority to represent the latter, would obviously
be useful to respondent in preparation of a responsive pleading, respondent Sumcad
should be given sufficient opportunity to intelligently contest these matters and possible raise
the same issues in her answer.
2. YES, the 10 days period should be applied.
The trial court did not in its Order of 5 July 1982 expressly direct Bantillo to submit a bill of
particulars. What was in fact required of was an amended complaint, which would incorporate
the "amendments" mentioned in the first paragraph of the
Order. This singular circumstance, however, does not preclude application in this case of
Rule 12,Section l(c) of which provides:
c) Refusal.If an order of the court to make a pleading more definite and certain or for a bill of
particulars is not obeyed within ten (10) days after notice of the order or within such other time

as the court may fix, the court may order the striking out of the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such other order as it deems just. It may, upon motion, set aside the
order, or modify it in the interest of justice.
Under the above provision, the court may upon motion in appropriate cases direct the adverse
party (a) to file a bill of particulars, or (b) to make the pleading referred to in the motion more
definite and certain, either by amending or supplementing the
same. The trial court's disputed Order of 5 July 1982 falls squarely within the second category.
As the Order itself did not specify the period for compliance with its terms, Bantillo was
bound to comply therewith within ten (10) days from notice. (deadline = July 15).
Ruling of the Court: (You can only read the boldfaced portion if you lack the time)
Court concludes that an unreasonable time had already elapsed (11months delay) so the
amended complaint is filed out of time. BUT, in the interest of substantial and expeditious
justice, the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken
from the record.
The amendment of the original complaint consisted simply of deletion of any

reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance;
Bantillo, in other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and heir and therefore was no
longer suing also in a representative capacity.
In the second place, this amendment imposed no substantial prejudice upon Sumcad and was
thus formal in character. As a matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive pleading
at all and had not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of ownership of Lot No. 63.
The issues had not yet been joined.
Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was already before the trial court and it could have and should
have proceeded with the case. Alternatively, if it be assumed that the Amended Complaint was
properly dismissed, such dismissal should not, for the same reasons of substantial and
expeditious justice, be deemed as having the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and
hence should be regarded as without prejudice to Bantillos right to re-file her complaint in its
amended form. Under this alternative hypothesis, to require petitioner to re-file her complaint in
a new action, would appear little more than compelling her to go through an idle ceremony.
Public policy favors the disposition of claims brought to court on their merits, rather than
on any other basis.
LOWER COURT REVERSED. RTC is DIRECTED to ADMIT the AMENDED COMPLAINT.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Doctrine: The grant of a motion to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars has the effect
of lifting the default order.
Summary: Marcos died in Hawaii in exile while the case was pending, since he and his family
fled to Hawaii in February 1986 during the people power revolt in Manila. He was declared in
default and his representative failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless,
Bongbong as executor of Ferdinands estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive
pleading, 3 motions for extensions to file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of
which were granted by the anti-graft court. Hence, the propriety of filing and granting of a motion
for a bill of particulars filed for the estate of a defaulting and deceased defendant is the main
issue in this case. Court ruled in favor of the Marcoses.
Facts: Aquino administration sued Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their alleged cronies to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth they amassed during the former presidents 20-year rule.
Roman Cruz, the president of GSIS, PAL, Hyatt, Manila Hotel, and the Chairman of Commercial
Bank of Manila, is the alleged crony in this case.
PCGG filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages alleging that Cruz and the Marcoses
stole public assets and invested them in several institutions here and abroad. Among those are
2 lots and 2 condos, in Baguio, a Makati residential building, a residential land in Manila and a
land and 6 condos in California.
Cruz filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and for a bill of particulars but they were denied as the
expanded complaint sufficiently states causes of action and that the matters are already specific
enough to allow Cruz to prepare a responsive pleading and trial.
Nov. 10, 1988: alias summonses on the Marcoses were served in Honolulu, Hawaii.
But they failed to file an answer and so were declared in default by the Anti-Graft Court on April
6, 1989. (In the case of Marcos v. Garchitorena, the validity of Marcoses default was upheld)
Sept. 29, 1989: Ferdinand Marcos died.
In 1992: Imelda filed a Motion to set aside Order of Default which was granted by the anti-graft
court considering that they had a meritorious defense and the failure to respond was due to
excusable negligence considering the deteriorating health of Ferdinand then and the various
suits filed against them.
1995: Imelda filed an answer arguing that their wealth is not ill-gotten.
Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) filed a Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading as executor of
his late fathers estate, which the court granted. (Note that PCGG opposed this motion citing as
a ground the absence of a motion to set aside default order)
Bongbong asked for 3 extension totaling 35 days to file an answer. Court granted giving
him until July 17, 1999. BUT! Instead of filing an answer, Bongbong filed a Motion for Bill
of Particulars on July 16, praying for clearer statements of the allegations, which he
called mere conclusions of law, too vague to enable them to intelligently answer. PCGG
opposed but then again the anti-graft court sided with the Marcoses saying that the

accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of Ferdinands participation in Cruzs
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
Issue: WON the anti-graft court committed GADALEJ in granting the motion for a bill of
particulars considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the
motion was filed. NO.
Held: The effect of granting the motions to file a responsive pleading and a bill of particulars,
while there exists a default order, has the effect of lifting the default order against Ferdinand
Marcos.
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, court found that the
allegations against Marcoses appear to be couched in general terms. It did not cite the ultimate
facts to show how Marcoses acted in unlawful concert with Cruz in amassing the public funds
and assets, except that Ferdinand was the president at the time. While the allegations as to the
alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague as to the acts of the Marcoses.
The statements like in flagrant breach of public trust as public officers with grave abuse of right
and power, unjust enrichment, arrogated unto himself all powers of the government are just
accusations by generalization. They are mere motherhood statements. In Justice Laurels
words: the administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork; the name of the game
is fair play and not foul play. The facile verbosity with which the accusation against Marcoses
were couched in general terms, must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that the
respondent can properly prepare for an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this
case will proceed as expeditiously as possible.
This is further supported by the 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine which says that a motion for a bill of
particulars (not MTD) is the proper remedy for ambiguity in the complaint for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth. That doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of Bongbong when he filed
his motion for a bill of particulars.
Additional Info but most likely to be asked pa rin: Failure to file a motion to lift a default
order is not procedurally fatal as a defaulted party can even avail of the following remedies:
(remedies against a default order)
1. Motion to set aside the default order at any time after discovery and before judgment
(If defendants failure to file an answer is due to FAME- fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence and theres a meritorious defense)
In this case, the fact that Marcos was held in exile when he was declared in
default, and that he died still in exile, makes the belated filing of his answer
understandably excusable.
2. Motion for new trial (15 days from receipt) before said judgment becomes final and
executory
3. Appeal within 15 days from receipt of judgment
4. Petition for relief from judgment (60 days from notice of judgment and within 6
months from entry)
5. Petition for certiorari in exceptional circumstances
Rules of Procedure should be liberally construed to promote the objective to obtain a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of the case. A motion to lift a default order need no

hearing. It need not be under oath or be accompanied by an affidavit. It can be filed at any time
after notice and before judgment. Thus, the act of the court in entertaining the motion to file a
responsive pleading during the pre-trial stage effectively meant that Marcos has acquired a
locus standi in this case.
That he filed a motion for bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue,
because as the defendant in this case, he is allowed to do so to be able to file an intelligent
answer. It follows that the filing of a bill of particulars is merely a condition precedent to the filing
of an answer.

Heirs of Miranda v. Pablo Miranda
DOCTRINE:
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case,
the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of
receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private
courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we
cannot consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
jurisprudence that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not
to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court; instead, the date of actual receipt by the
court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. Records show that the Notice of Appeal was
mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the
reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
SUMMARY:
In August 30, 1999, Pablo Miranda won against the Heirs of Miranda, the RTC granted him
ownership over the subject property. Heirs did not appeal so the decision became final and
executory. In 2005, Pablo filed for a demolition order, which was denied because the writ of
execution already prescribed since 5 yrs has passed. So Pablo filed for a revival of judgment,
which was granted on June 20, 2006. On July 13, 2006, Heirs filed a notice of appeal via LBC,
which was denied by RTC and CA. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court because it was
belatedly filed. Since it was via ordinary mail, then the date of actual receipt is the date of filing.
Hence, it was on the 16th day.
FACTS: (di ko alam pano naging 16th day ang July 13, 2006 sa case na to kasi June 20,
2006 ang day ng decision ng revival of judgment)
In 1994, the heirs of Numeriano Mirando, Sr. filed a complaint before the RTC-Muntinlupa for
annulment of titles and specific performance against Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo.
On August 30, 1999, RTC rendered a decision which upheld the validity of the 3 TCTs.
RTC ruled that Pablo Miranda is the rightful owner of the subject property and ordered Pablo to
reimburse the HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA for 12/13 of the market value of the property.
RTC, also, ordered the HEIRS to vacate the residential house and pay Pablo for a monthly
rental of 2,000.
HEIRS did not appeal hence the decision became final and executory.
On December 11, 2001, RTC issued a writ of execution which was not implemented.
On July 8, 2005, Pablo filed for a break open and demolition order, which was denied because 5
years has already lapsed from the time the writ of execution should have been enforced.
Because of the RTCs denial, Pablo filed a petition for revival of judgment.
On June 20, 2006, RTC granted the revival of judgment.

On July 13, 2006, HEIRS filed a notice of appeal via LBC, which was opposed by Pablo on the
ground that the decision dated Aug. 30, 1999 has long become final and executory.
RTC denied because it was barred by prescription and CA denied the notice of appeal because
it was filed out of time.
ISSUE: W/N the notice of appeal was belatedly filed
HELD:
The court held that the notice of appeal was belatedly filed.
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally
or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case,
the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier,
a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot
consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not
to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the
court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading."
Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the
court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled
that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
Neither can petitioners use typhoon "Florita" as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of
Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13,
2006, the day petitioners Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC.
And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the
result would still be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit.
The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory.
Other CIVPRO doctrines:

An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from
the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a decision
of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the
merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final and
executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.
An action for revival of judgment may be filed either in the same court where said judgment
was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. In this case,

respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the
Decision dated August 30, 1999.

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RULE 9

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

At this point in time, Addio properties intervened.

Issue: Whether or not Monzon is in default? -NO

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Requirements of a Default Order:

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Hence, the petition is denied.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is a government-owned and controlled company mandated

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

RTC denied the TRO.

RTC denied the admission of the second amended complaint.

ISSUE: W/N the second amendment should be allowed

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Rosario and de Rosario (Rosarios) applied to register a parcel of land in Pangasinan in

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

o Appellants original complaint, as we have already determined, is one for forcible

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading as envisioned in Sec. 2, Rule 10.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Issue: W/N the admission of the amended complaint is proper. YES

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Ching filed an MR to the CA- Denied for lack of merit.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

Bantillo vs IAC (and Sumcad) || Gr no 75311 || 18 October 1988

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

1. W/N Sumcads Motion for Bill of Particulars is proper YES

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

2. YES, the 10 days period should be applied.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

The amendment of the original complaint consisted simply of deletion of any

LOWER COURT REVERSED. RTC is DIRECTED to ADMIT the AMENDED COMPLAINT.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

On June 20, 2006, RTC granted the revival of judgment.

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

ISSUE: W/N the notice of appeal was belatedly filed

Other CIVPRO doctrines:

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

CHUA CHU DE CHAVEZ SAMONTE SANTOS VILLAROSA YEE YU

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