CASE #11

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

REFORM, through the HON. SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -

SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ,

JR., President and General Manager,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP.,
represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., President and General Manager,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 178895

January 10, 2011

FACTS:

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161
hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On 1991,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with
regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under
Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657.Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office (PARO) an Application for Exemption, as the said parcels of land with a total
area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of
cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity
of the (CARL). The MARO then conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land
confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, denied the application for
exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the
same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application,
petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area, and such was
affirmed by the DAR on appeal. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2)
parcels of land was approved. The CA partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded
the two (2) parcels of land from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the Decisions of
the Regional Directorand the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption with
respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296. These lots were already covered by a new title under the
name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356).

ISSUE:

Whether the subject lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock
business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

HELD:
In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,the Court declared
unconstitutional the CARL provisionsthat included lands devoted to livestock under the
coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands
devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not
agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform.
Under the rules then prevailing, it was the (MARO) who was primarily responsible for
investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded; and for
ascertaining whether the area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to
livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988. As the primary official in charge of investigating the
land sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MAROs findings on the use and nature of
the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight,
if not finality. The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the
MARO in determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently
conducted or has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR
Regional Director - are to be accorded great probative value, owing to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties.

The Court finds that the Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for
livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL while the Limot lands are
not actually and directly being used for livestock and thus, should be covered by the CARL.
CASE # 12

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and

HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines
Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN
SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.

Facts:
On December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial
governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or
possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.

The San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
province to take possession of the properties.
The San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the
CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the
province to expropriate properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert
the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).

The CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation
of the property until the province has acquired the approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by the local government unit is subject
to the prior approval of the DAR Secretary.

Ruling:

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose
to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such
authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or
tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being
an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public
use.

CASE # 13

G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and
BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by public
respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Secretary, the Hon.
Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein
petitioner and the private respondent. The landholding subject of the controversy, which
consists of only sixty (60) square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes (petitioner), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by
Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of
about 500 square meters, situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. In 1975, before the sale in
favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house
on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of 2.00 to the owner, Andrea
Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing
that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. Abajon planted corn
and bananas on the landholding. For four years, he paid the 2.00 rental for the lot occupied
by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to the owner. As the property was sold, the
new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they needed the property, but
Abajon refused. On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that
immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the
banana plants on the property worth about 50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief
was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the
banana plants, had been done by Abajon). Upon motion of the respondent in open court, the
trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office of the Public Respondent for
a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. The Regional Director of
DAR held that there is the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. On
appeal by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR, reversed the decision of the Regional
Director. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the New DAR
Secretary sets aside the previous decision and finds the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:
 There is none. The Higher Court laid down the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship.
All requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. This does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof
especially when the area tilled is only 60 square meters and located in an urban area and in
the heart of an industrial or commercial zone. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a
parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is
more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live
in the premises and to have a garden of some sort rather than a tenant. Agricultural
production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement is a clear proof that the
private respondent was never a tenant.

CASE # 14

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA, respondents.

Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a 25,000-
sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired laborer
Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the
termination of his services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and
continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court
found Gelos as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals. DHACES
Issue:
What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held:
The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. It was clear
that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private
respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The
court stressed many cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a
person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money
or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear that it is not a
tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer
relationship.

CASE # 15

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.

Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint against Eusebio Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a
169,507 sq. m. fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a
yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be
terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff,
the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally
leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that
which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that
he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.
The trial court rendered a decision stating that the the lease contract is a civil lease
governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case. Motion for Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to
this Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the relationship of plaintiff and defendant was that of a civil lease and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
HELD:
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The
leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or
urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need
not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold
tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil
Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. The land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. The land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. There must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. The land belongs to another; and
5. The use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an
agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec
4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as
above enumerated are complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of
appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent
upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included
in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available
from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not
actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he
pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No.
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between
the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy
under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.