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eceiu rating agency reports attack "material impairment" (either an uncured pay-
R
DOUGLAS J. LUCAS
is dirL'ctor <it t^DO :\ iong-held assumption ot partic- ment detanit or a dtjwngrading to C'a or C")
Research at UBS m ipants in the structured finance over tive years.
New York Cit\-,
market: that asset-backed securities Almost all market participants think tiie
d«uglas.lucas@ubs.com
(ABS), connnercial mortgage-backed securi- default rate tor BBB Resi B^"(~ has been much
LAURIE S . G O O D M A N ties (CMBS), .md residential mortgage- backed lower than 4.0%, let alone 13.4%. In fact, it is
IS a managing diRTtor and securities (RMBS) have lower historical default generally taken for granted that these assets
co-head of Global Fixed rates than equivalently rated corporate debt. default less frequendy than corporate bonds,
Intoinc Research at UBS
The implication ot this is important, not only which have 3.2% and 2.3% five-year default
ill Ncu- York City.
laurie.go(tdman@ubs.t'oni
for investors in these assets, but also tor investors rates according to SikP and Moody's. It is
in structured finance collateralized debt oblig- common, tor example, for SF C D O structurers
F R A N K J. FABOZZI ations (SF CDOs) backed by these assets. to use a base case of 0.36% defaults per year,
is the Frederick Fniiik For example, Cloodm.m and F.ibozzi or 1.80% defaults over five years, in their cash
adjunct professor of flow models of BBIi Resi B&C collateral.
[2002] argue that because the rating agencies
finance at the School of
Management of Yale Uni- ignore the historically low default rate ot struc- Investors care more about/iifKfc default
versity' in New Haven, C~T. tured finance collateral, they are more con- rates than pdst def'ault rates in SF CDOs and
fab«zzi32l@a()l.Ci)m servative in their ratings of SF CDOs than we are constantly reminded of the variability
CDOs backed by corporate bonds, and SF in credit quality of assets with the same rating.
CDOs thus otl^er investors relative value. It the But still. It would be nice if we could be a lot
rating agency reports are accepted at tace value, more certain of the past than is implied by a
it would appear that the Goodinan-Fabozzi range of five-year detault rates ranging from
conclusion lacks empirical support. 1.8% to 13.4%i.
Let s consider one important example tor We explore the discrepancy between the
investors in the CT^O market—BBB tranches default rates calculated by the rating agencies
from B and C credit qtiality first lien residen- and market intuition. We get into the nitty-
tial mortgages (Resi B&C, also known as sub- gritty of bow rating agency statistics are
prime home equities or home equities). SikP constructed betore we come to our own con-
published a statistic recently suggesting that an clusions. We find, to take one example, that a
average of 4.0% of BBB Resi B&C tranches more accurate historical default rate for BBB
are downgraded to D {S&l's default rating cat- Resi B ^ C over tive years is ].9% rather than
egory) over five years (see Hu, Pollsen, and the 4.0% to 13.4%. of the SixP and Moody's
Elengical |2OO3]). Hu, Cantor, Silver, Phillip, reports. Our estimate ot past pertormance is m
and Snailer [2()03| report a statistic suggesting line with the 1.8%, detault rate that SF C D O
that an average of 13.4% of these tranches suffer structurers commonly use to model the future.
EXHIBIT 3
S&P Average 1978-2000 RMBS Transition Matrix Minus 1978-2002 Transition Matrix
Rating at End of One Year
ing
BB 0.00% 0.00% -1.13% -4.13% 4.36% 0.21% 0.40% 0.13% 0.00% 0.06%
EC B 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% -2.30% 3.86% -1.81% 0.23% 0.00% -0.12%
EXHIBIT 5
S&P ABS Defaults
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Auto 1 - - - 1 2
Credit Card .- - 2 2 4
Franchise Loan - - - 9 22 31
Manufactured Housing - - - 1 32 33
Other - 9 - - 1 10
Total 1 9 0 12 58 80
Soiinv: Brink, j20()Jj.
while SikP\ five-year matrix shows 4.00%. Tbis, inci- finance transitioTi rates are similar, but usually a little lower
dentally, is consistent with the SF C D O structurer assump- than for the U.S. ABS. It would seem that S&P faced
tions of a 1.8% default rate over five years for BBB Resi more surprises from strange U.S. ABS asset categories
B&C. We also see that CMBS gain what we thmk is their than from international ABS asset categories. On average,
rightful place at the top of structured finance credit quality U.S. C O O transitions are worse than U.S. CMI5S and
with the lowest transition rates. RMBS. but not as bad as U.S. ABS. European C D O tran-
Yet for ABS, the effect is the opposite, as transition sitions win the booby prize, being worse than U.S. ABS.
rates calculated by the multiplying method are higher than Also interesting are the international categories we
the five-year rate. This is because ABS credit performance could not calculate transition to D rates for: European
since 199S has been much poorer than prior to I99H. C'MBS, European RMBS. Asian structured finance, and
Tbis recent poorer credit performance is captured only by Australia/New Zealand strnctured finance. These cate-
the multiplying method. As we mentioned before, the gories have never had a transition to D. Of course, there
poor performance of ABS in recent years has mainly come are not as many tranches making up their statistics, par-
from new and untested asset classes. ticularly low-rated tranches, as in the U.S. structured
Exhibit 5 shows S&Ps classification of recent ABS finance categories.
defiuilts.
S&P Study Conclusion
Five-Year Transitions of International
Structured Finance and CDOs We think our method ot multiplying six-month
transition matrices from S&P's report by Ertuk, Eleng-
S&P has also carefully calculated six-month transi- ical, and Gillis |2(K)3| is better at assessing tlie long-term
tion rates tor CDOs and structured finance transactions credit quality of structured finance tranches than the five-
backed by assets originated outside the United States. year transition matrices in S&P's three studies published
Exhibit 6 shows transition to D rates tor the geographies in January and February 2003. The multiplication method
and structured fmance categories that could be calculated. includes data h-om all years in arriving at long-term results
European ABS and emerging market structured and eliminates the problem that short-term transition rates
EXHIBIT 11
All Structured Finance Cumulative Impairment Rates
5%
Years
0.6%
0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
EXHIBIT 13
those we achieve by multiplying S&Ps six-month tran-
Moody's Five-Year Material Impairment Rates-
Original Issue Cohorts sition matri.x shows Moody's defiult results are still gen-
erally higher. Again, part ot the relatively high structured
Corporate fmance deflmlt rate is attributable to the expansive defi-
Default
ABS CMBS RMBS Rate nition ot material impairment versus default, and part is
Aaa 0.05% 0,00% 0,58% 0,12% due to the partial elimination of withdrawn ratings.
Aa 2.83% 0,00% 1,01% 0.26% Using the ratio of HEL defaults to total ABS defaults
A 1,10% 0,23% 0,63% 0.51 % from Exhibit 1 {again blindly, since we still don't know
Baa 1 4,38% 0,83% 6,00% 2,25%
how to apply it to specific ratings), we arrive at an average
Ba 19,70% 1,77% 4,98% 11,36%
B 39,53% 5,66% 13,66% 32,31%
five-year Baa Resi B&:C. transition rate of 2.11%. We show
these calculations in Exhibit 14. This Moody's Resi B&C
Soitra-: Hii. Cmnor, Silver, Phillip, tiiid Siiailcr [2
transition rate is higher than the 1.62% S&P BBB RMBS
EXHIBIT 14 transition rate, but it is lower, and we feel much more
Moody's Baa Resi B&C Five-Year Material Impairments accurate, than Moody's all-ABS Baa default rate.
Baa
All ABS Material IV. CONCLUSION
Impairments 4,38%
Relative Frequency of Resi
In determining default rates for structured finance
B&C and All ABS Material 48.15% tranches, we think the most reliable sources are the S&P
Impairments multiplied five-year transition to ][) rates presented in
Resi B&C Transitions 2.11% Exhibit 4 and the Moody s original issue material impair-
Bxhihits I tvid
ment rates presented in Exhibit 13. We thus average the
two to produce the five-year default rates shown in Exhibit
calculation of five-year corporate default rates. Boxed in 15, We also take Moody's ABS rate and multiply it by
the exhibit is the Moody's category that includes BBB 0.4K to arrive specifically at Resi B&C default rates.
Resi B&C. The origin:il cohort methodology produces Obviously, there is a lot ot Kentucky windage in
lower material impairment rates than the rolling cohort our historical default estimates. Yet historical results, what-
methodology; especially for ABS and especially for the ever their exact number, are pictures of a rear-view mirror.
Baa category including Resi B&C. CMBS defaults are And in this case, they reflect the difficulty of conducting
now lower than corporate defaults, hut ABS and RMBS an investigation of structured finance det'aults and the
defaults are still higher than corporates. almost random etYect of corporate credit events on struc-
Comparison of these original issue results against tured finance.