Read and Memorize: (4) Those who are naturalized in Section 3.
naturalized in Section 3. Philippine citizenship may
1. Citizenship provisions under
the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitution
1935
ARTICLE IV.CITIZENSHIP
SECTION 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine
Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be
lost or re-acquired in the manner
provided by law.
ARTICLE
1973 III
ARTICLE III CITIZENSHIP
SECTION 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
territory with the consent of the
accordance with law.
SEC. 2. A female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien shall
retain her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law, to have
renounced her citizenship.
SEC. 3. Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law.
SEC. 4. A natural-born citizen is one
who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
ARTICLE IV
1987
ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens
of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
be lost or reacquired in the manner Republic of the
provided by law. Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines
of said commission, and taking the
who marry aliens shall retain their
oath of allegiance incident thereto,
citizenship, unless by their act or
states that he does so only in
omission, they are deemed, under
connection with his service to said
the law, to have renounced it.
foreign country: And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens rendering service to, or is
is inimical to the national interest and commissioned in, the armed forces of
shall be dealt with by law. a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
2. CA No. 63 permitted to participate nor vote in
any election of the Republic of the
Section 1. How citizenship may be Philippines during the period of his
lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his service to, or commission in, the
citizenship in any of the following armed forces of said foreign country.
ways and/or events: Upon his discharge from the service
(1) By naturalization in a foreign of the said foreign country, he shall
country; be automatically entitled to the full
(2) By express renunciation of enjoyment of his civil and political
citizenship; rights as a Filipino citizen;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of a foreign country upon (5) By cancellation of the of
attaining twenty-one years of age or the certificates of
more: Provided, however, That a naturalization;
Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner (6) By having been declared
while the Republic of the Philippines by competent authority, a
is at war with any country;
deserter of the
(4) By rendering services to,
Philippine armed forces in
or accepting commission in, time of war, unless
the armed forces of a foreign subsequently, a plenary
country: Provided, That the rendering pardon or amnesty has been
of service to, or the acceptance of granted; and
such commission in, the armed forces
of a foreign country, and the taking of
(7) In the case of a woman,
an oath of allegiance incident
upon her marriage to a
thereto, with the consent of the
foreigner if, by virtue of the
Republic of the Philippines, shall not
laws in force in her
divest a Filipino of his Philippine
husband's country, she
citizenship if either of the following
acquires his nationality.1
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines
has a defensive and/or offensive pact The provisions of this section
of alliance with the said foreign notwithstanding, the acquisition of
country; or citizenship by a natural born Filipino
(b) The said foreign country citizen from one of the Iberian and
maintains armed forces on Philippine any friendly democratic Ibero-
American countries or from the
United Kingdom shall not produce
loss or forfeiture of his Philippine
citizenship if the law of that country
grants the same privilege to its
citizens and such had been agreed
upon by treaty between the
Philippines and the foreign country
from which citizenship is acquired.
Section. 2. How citizenship may be
reacquired. Citizenship may be
reacquired:
(1) By
naturalization: Provided, Tha
t the applicant possess none
of the disqualification's
prescribed in section two of
Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and twenty-seven,3
(2) By repatriation of
deserters of the Army, Navy
or Air Corp: Provided, That a
woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance
with the provisions of this
Act after the termination of
the marital status;4 and
(3) By direct act of the
National Assembly.
3. CA No. 625
Section 1. The option to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance
with subsection (4), section 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution1 shall be
expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is
absent from the Philippines, he may
make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the
Government of the United
States2 authorized to administer
oaths, and he shall forward such
statement together with his oath of
allegiance, to the Civil Registry of
Manila.
4. CA No. 473
Section 1. Title of Act. This Act
shall be known and may be cited as
the "Revised Naturalization Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. Subject
to section four of this Act, any person
having the following qualifications
may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less
than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the
hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have
resided in the Philippines for
a continuous period of not
less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good
moral character and
believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have
conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire
period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation
with the constituted
government as well as with
the community in which he 2. Having established a new
is living. industry or introduced a
useful invention in the
Philippines;
Fourth. He must own real
estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five 3. Being married to a Filipino
thousand pesos, Philippine woman;
currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, 4. Having been engaged as a
profession, or lawful teacher in the Philippines in
occupation; a public or recognized
private school not
Fifth. He must be able to established for the exclusive
speak and write English or instruction of children of
Spanish and any one of the persons of a particular
principal Philippine nationality or race, in any of
languages; and the branches of education or
industry for a period of not
less than two years;
Sixth. He must have enrolled
his minor children of school
age, in any of the public 5. Having been born in the
schools or private schools Philippines.
recognized by the Office of
Private Education1 of the Section 4. Who are disqualified. -
Philippines, where the The following cannot be naturalized
Philippine history, as Philippine citizens:
government and civics are
taught or prescribed as part
of the school curriculum, a. Persons opposed to
during the entire period of organized government or
the residence in the affiliated with any
Philippines required of him association or group of
prior to the hearing of his persons who uphold and
petition for naturalization as teach doctrines opposing all
Philippine citizen. organized governments;
Section 3. Special qualifications. The b. Persons defending or
ten years of continuous residence teaching the necessity or
required under the second condition propriety of violence,
of the last preceding section shall be personal assault, or
understood as reduced to five years assassination for the
for any petitioner having any of the success and predominance
following qualifications: of their ideas;
1. Having honorably held office c. Polygamists or believers in
under the Government of the practice of polygamy;
the Philippines or under that
of any of the provinces, d. Persons convicted of crimes
cities, municipalities, or involving moral turpitude;
political subdivisions
thereof;
 e. Persons suffering from the interest of the nation or contrary as with the community in which uphold and teach doctrines opposing
mental alienation or to any Government announced he/she is living; all organized governments;
incurable contagious policies.
diseases; Sec. 2. After the finding mentioned (d) The applicant must have received (b) Those defending or teaching the
in section one, the order of the court his/her primary and secondary necessity of or propriety of violence,
granting citizenship shall be
f. Persons who, during the education in any public school or personal assault or assassination for
registered and the oath provided by
period of their residence in private educational institution dully the success or predominance of their
existing laws shall be taken by the
the Philippines, have not recognized by the Department of ideas;
applicant, whereupon, and not
mingled socially with the Education, Culture and Sports, where
before, he will be entitled to all the
Filipinos, or who have not Philippine history, government and
privileges of a Filipino citizen. (c) Polygamists or believers in the
evinced a sincere desire to civics are taught and prescribed as
Sec. 3. Such parts of Act practice of polygamy;
learn and embrace the part of the school curriculum and
Numbered Four hundred seventy-
customs, traditions, and where enrollment is not limited to any
three as are inconsistent with the (d) Those convicted of crimes
ideals of the Filipinos; race or nationality: Provided, That
provisions of the present Act are involving moral turpitude;
should he/she have minor children of
hereby repealed. school age, he/she must have
g. Citizens or subjects of Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect enrolled them in similar schools; (e) Those suffering from mental
nations with whom the upon its approval, and shall apply to
United States and the alienation or incurable contagious
cases pending in court and to those
Philippines are at war, (e) The applicant must have a known diseases;
where the applicant has not yet taken
during the period of such the oath of citizenship: Provided, trade, business, profession or lawful
war; however, That in pending cases occupation, from which he/she (f) Those who, during the period of
where the requisite of publication derives income sufficient for his/her their residence in the Philippines,
under the old law and already been support and if he/she is married have not mingled socially with
h. Citizens or subjects of a
complied with, the publication herein and/or has dependents, also that of Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
foreign country other than
required shall not apply. his/her family: Provided, sincere desire to learn and embrace
the United States whose
however, That this shall not apply to the customs, traditions and ideals of
laws do not grant Filipinos
6. RA No. 9139 applicants who are college degree the Filipinos;
the right to become
holders but are unable to practice
naturalized citizens or
their profession because they are
subjects thereof. (g) Citizens or subjects with whom
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject disqualified to do so by reason of
the Philippines is at war, during the
to the provisions of the succeeding their citizenship;
period of such war; and
section, any person desiring to avail
5. RA No. 530
of the benefits of this Act must meet (f) The applicant must be able to
Section 1. The provisions of the following qualifications: (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign
read, write and speak Filipino or any
existing laws notwithstanding, no country whose laws do not grant
of the dialects of the Philippines; and
petition for Philippine citizenship shall Filipinos the right to be naturalized
(a) The applicant must be born in the
be heard by the courts until after six citizens or subjects thereof.
Philippines and residing therein since (g) The applicant must have mingled
months from the publication of the birth; with the Filipinos and evinced a
application required by law, nor shall
sincere desire to learn and embrace 7. RA No. 8171
any decision granting the application
(b) The applicant must not be less the customs, traditions and ideals of
become executory until after two
than eighteen (18) years of age, at the Filipino people.
years from its promulgation and after
the time of filing of his/her petition;
the court, on proper hearing, with the Section 1. Filipino women who have
attendance of the Solicitor General or Section 4. Disqualifications, - The lost their Philippine citizenship by
his representative, is satisfied, and so (c) The applicant must be of good following are not qualified to be marriage to aliens and natural-born
finds, that during the intervening moral character and believes in the naturalized as Filipino citizens under Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
time the applicant has (1) not left the underlying principles of the this Act: citizenship, including their minor
Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself Constitution, and must have children, on account of political or
continuously to a lawful calling or conducted himself/herself in a proper (a) Those opposed to organized economic necessity, may reacquire
profession, (3) has not been and irreproachable manner during government or affiliated with any Philippine citizenship
convicted of any offense or violation his/her entire period of residence in association of group of persons who through repatriation in the manner
of Government promulgated rules, (4) the Philippines in his relation with the provided in Section 4 of
or committed any act prejudicial to duly constituted government as well Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the
applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching
the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or associatEon for
the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes
involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental
alienation or incurablecontagious
diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected
by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau
or Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel
the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
8. RA No. 9225
Section 4. Derivative
Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen (18) years
of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities - Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to
exercise their right of
surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section
1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known
as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective
public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for
holding such public office as
required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any
public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to
practice their profession in
the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for
a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be
elected or appointed to any
public office in the
Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended
to, those who:
(a) are candidates
for or are occupying
any public office in
the country of
which they are
naturalized citizens;
and/or
(b) are in active
service as
commissioned or
non-commissioned
officers in the
armed forces of the
country which they
are naturalized
citizens.
Section 2
1. Co vs. House of
Representatives
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court
asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional
election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for
the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated
November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioners on November 12,
1989. This was, however, denied by
the HRET in its resolution dated
February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
The records show that in the year
1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits
of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was
able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in
1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong
Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the
rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to
Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of
whom is the Jose Ong who was born
in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated
from this country. He decided to put
up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in
Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion
became inevitable. As a result, a
branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila.
In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan,
unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he
cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar,
after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a
Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan
may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong
Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private
respondent) was 9 years old, finishing
his elementary education in the
province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos
insofar as the customs and practices
of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary
education, the private respondent, in
search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and
thereafter took and passed the CPA
Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were
better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines
as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of
his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status
as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal
treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and
solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the
article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the
Constitution found in Article IV read:
The Court interprets Section 1,
Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but
also to those who, having been born
of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The
provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because
Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have
formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years
old.
He could not have divined when he
came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended
to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure
for one who had been a citizen since
he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court
held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a the bar passers. The oath taking
positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship
The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong
Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the
collateral procedure of stripping
respondents father of his citizenship
after his death. An attack on a
persons citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to
declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as
null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he
has already been laid to rest
2. In re: Application for
Admission to the Bar of
Vicente Ching
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of
a Filipino mother and an alien
Chinese father, was born on April 11,
1964 in Tubao La Union, under the
1935 Constitution. He has resided in
the Philippines. He completed his
Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on
July 1998, filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examination. The
Resolution in this Court, he was
allowed to take the bar if he submit
to the Court the following documents
as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by
the PRC Board of Accountancy that
Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued
COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing
that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that
Ching was elected as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of
ceremony was scheduled on May 5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take oath. He was required
to submit further proof of his
citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General
was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935
Constitution, was a Chinese citizen
and continue to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship, under
the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act
providing for the manner in which the
option to elect Philippine citizenship
shall be declared by a person whose
mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching
has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship, and if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not he has elected
Philippine citizenship within "a
reasonable time".
Held:
Since Ching has already elected
Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999,
the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the
governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "(t)hose who
elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five"
are citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are
Philippine citizens.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted
pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section
1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and
C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be
made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-
one (21) years. Based on the
pronouncements of the Department
of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the
age of majority. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of
majority. However, period may be
extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino, yet not definite.
In the present case, Ching, having
been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of
majority. Based on the interpretation
of the phrase "upon reaching the age
of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by election.
Philippine citizenship can never be
treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One
who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right
to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly,
in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this
golden privilege slipped away from
his grasp.
3. Republic vs. Lim
Facts:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an
illegitimate daughter of a Chinese
father and a Filipina mother, who
never got married due to a prior
subsisting marriage of her father. The
respondent petitioned that there
were few mistakes as to her
citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname Yu was
misspelled as Yo. She has been
using Yu in all of her school records
and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her fathers name in her birth
record was written as Yo Diu To (Co
Tian) when it should have been Yu
Dio To (Co Tian).
3. That her nationality was entered as
Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father
and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a
legitimate child on her birth
certificate when in fact, it should
have been illegitimate. Both the trial
court and Court of Appeals granted
the respondents petition.
Issue:
The Republic of the Philippines
appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court on the following
grounds:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the correction of the
citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim
from Chinese to Filipino despite
the fact that respondent never
demonstrated any compliance with
the legal requirements for election of
citizenship.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in allowing respondent to
continue using her fathers surname
despite its finding that respondent is
an illegitimate child.
Held:
1. No. The Republic avers that
respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority as mandated in
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 625. The
Supreme Court held that the two
above provisions only apply to
legitimate children. These do not
apply in the case of the respondent
who was an illegitimate child
considering that her parents never
got married. By being an illegitimate
child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon
birth, and as such, there was no more
need for her to validly elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Also, she registered as a
voter inside the country when she
reached 18 years old. The exercise of
the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
2. No. The Republics submission was
misleading. The Court of Appeals did
not allow respondent to use her
fathers surname. What it did allow
was the correction of her fathers
misspelled surname which she has
been using ever since she can
remember. The court held that
prohibiting the respondent to use her
fathers surname would only sow
confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 which
regulates the use of aliases as well as
the jurisprudence state that it is
allowed for a person to use a name
by which he has been known since
childhood. Even legitimate children
cannot enjoin the illegitimate children
of their father from using his
surname. While judicial authority is
required for a chance of name or
surname, there is no such
requirement for the continued use of
a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such
change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent
that the proposed change of name
would in great probability cause
prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in
general. In this case, the Republic has
not shown that the Yu family in China
would probably be prejudiced or be
the object of future mischief.
4. Tecson vs. COMELEC
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be
helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding
of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to
322 B.C., described the "citizen" to
refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the
holding of an office. Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he
described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in
number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence. The concept grew to
include one who would both govern
and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to
deal with rights and entitlements, on
the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other. In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public
life and fundamentally willing to
submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had
undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the
concept was limited, by and large,
to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property,
personal liberty and justice. Its
meaning expanded during the 19th
century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the
right to participate in the exercise of
political power. The 20th century saw
the next stage of the development
of social citizenship, which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen
to economic well-being and social
security. The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and
final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking
global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.
(Tecson vs. COMELEC)
Under the Jones Law, a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he
was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on
said date, and, 3) since that date, not
a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time,
divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once
and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935
Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines
Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935
Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women
would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women
from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children
and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of
the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers
of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973
Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the
same article also further provided
that
"A female citizen of the Philippines
who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally
adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution
now provides:
The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
(Tecson vs. COMELEC)
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan
Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Fornier based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two
assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004,
the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003
for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on
26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 6 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On
10 February 2004, Fornier assailed
the decision of the COMELEC before
the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would
include GR 161434 and GR 161634,
both challenging the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born
citizen, so as to be allowed to run for
the offcie of the President of the
Philippines.
Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987
Constitution expresses that "No
person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such
election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the
date, month and year of birth of FPJ in relation to Section 74, of the
appeared to be 20 August 1939 Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has
during the regime of the 1935 utterly failed to substantiate his case
Constitution. before the Court, notwithstanding the
Through its history, four modes of ample opportunity given to the
acquiring citizenship naturalization, parties to present their position and
jus soli (place of birth), res judicata evidence, and to prove whether or
and jus sanguinis (blood) had been not there has been material
in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
jus sanguinis, could qualify a person in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
to being a natural-born citizen of must not only be material, but also
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. deliberate and willful. The petitions
Collector of Customs (1912), did not were dismissed.
last long. With the adoption of the
5. RP vs. Sagun
1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
FACTS:
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
Considering the reservations made by
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino
the parties on the veracity of some of
citizen. She was born on August 8,
the entries on the birth certificate of
1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
FPJ and the marriage certificate of his
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
parents, the only conclusions that
the age of majority. In 1992, at the
could be drawn with some degree of
age of 33 and after getting married to
certainty from the documents would
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ
Philippines. Said document was
was born to them on 20 August 1939;
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon
(3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
but was not recorded and registered
were married to each other on 16
with the Local Civil Registrar of
September, 1940; (4) The father of
Baguio City.
Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5)
Sometime in September 2005,
At the time of his death on 11
respondent applied for a Philippine
September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
passport. Her application was denied
years old. The marriage certificate of
due to the citizenship of her father
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
and there being no annotation on her
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
birth certificate that she has elected
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
Philippine citizenship. Consequently,
documents of public record in the
she sought a judicial declaration of
custody of a public officer. The
her election of Philippine citizenship
documents have been submitted in
averring that she was raised as a
evidence by both contending parties
Filipino and she is a registered voter
during the proceedings before the
of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay
COMELEC. But while the totality of
Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and
the evidence may not establish
had voted in local and national
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born
elections as shown in the Voter
citizen of the Philippines, the
Certification. She asserted that by
evidence on hand still would
virtue of her positive acts, she has
preponderate in his favor enough to
effectively elected Philippine
hold that he cannot be held guilty of
citizenship and such fact should be
having made a material
annotated on her record of birth so as
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78,
to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial
court rendered the assailed Decision
on April 3, 2009 granting the petition
and declaring respondent a Filipino
citizen. Upon payment of the required
fees, the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City is hereby directed to
annotate [on] her birth certificate,
this judicial declaration of Filipino
citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly
filed the instant recourse via a
petition for review on certiorari
before us. Petitioner points out that
while respondent executed an oath of
allegiance before a notary public,
there was no affidavit of her election
of Philippine citizenship. Additionally,
her oath of allegiance which was not
registered with the nearest local civil
registry was executed when she was
already 33 years old or 12 years after
she reached the age of majority.
Issues:
Whether or not an action or
proceeding for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship is procedurally
and jurisdictionally permissible;
and,Whether or not an election of
Philippine citizenship, made twelve
(12) years after reaching the age of
majority, is considered to have been
made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence.
HELD: The original ruling was
reversed. POLITICAL LAW:
requirements of citizenship. The
petition is meritorious.
Under our laws, there can be no
action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given
right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission
violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. As an incident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court
may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their
status. Otherwise, such a 1987 Constitution which states that
pronouncement is beyond judicial
power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial
court to make a specific declaration
of respondents Filipino citizenship as
such pronouncement was not within
the court's competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's
petition seeking a judicial declaration
of election of Philippine citizenship, it
is imperative that we determine
whether respondent is required under
the law to make an election and if so,
whether she has complied with the
procedural requirements in the
election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August
8, 1959, the governing charter was
the 1935 Constitution, which declares
as citizens of the Philippines those
whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens
of the Philippines:
x x x x
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the
1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized
in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that [t]hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five are
citizens of the Philippines. Likewise,
this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the
[t]hose born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority are Philippine
citizens. It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in
the acquisition of citizenship for those
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If
the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not
been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.
6. Ma vs. Fernandez
Facts:
Petitioners are children of
Taiwanese father and a Filipino
mother. Upon reaching theage of
majority, they executed their affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship
and took their oath of allegiance
before proper authorities. However,
they failed to have the
necessarydocuments registered in
the civil registry as required under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No.625. It was only 30 years after, in
2005 that petitioners complied with
the said requirement after a
complaint was filed against them
before the Bureau of Immigration
(BI). The BI ruled that theyviolated
Commonwealth Act No. 613, in
relation to BI Memorandum Order
Nos. ADD-01-031and ADD-01-035
respectively. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the CA affirmed the
BIs ruling.
Hence, this present petition for
review.
Issue:
Should children born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien father but who failed to
immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil
registry, beconsidered foreign
nationals?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court laid down the
statutory formalities in electing
Philippinecitizenship: (1) a statement
of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitutionand
Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of
election and of theoath with the
nearest civil registry. In the case at
bar, the Court ruled that the right to
electPhilippine citizenship has not
been lost and petitioners should be
allowed to complete thestatutory
requirements for such election,
subject to any administrative
penalties, if any. This isbecause the
petitioners have complied with the
first two requirements, and even
though they arelate in registering
their documents, they should be
allowed to still do so because of their
positiveacts of citizenship. These
a positive acts were equivalent to
formal registration. In justifying
their ruling, the Court said that
registration is made for the purpose
of notification, and does not addvalue
to the validity of an instrument nor
converts an invalid instrument into a
valid one. In thecase at bar,
registration is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship
has been claimed.
7. RP vs. Batuigas
Facts:
AscuzeanaAzucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur.
Ascuzena was born in Zamboangadel
Sur on September 28, 1941 to
Chinese parents. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education
were taken in Philippine schools She
then practiced her teaching
profession in various schools situated
in the Philippines. In 1968, at the age
of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas (Santiago),a natural-born
Filipino citizen. They have five
children.
After all the jurisdictional
requirements mandated by Section
9of CA 473had been complied with,
the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known
lucrative trade.
Issue:
WON the petition for naturalization
should be granted? YES.
Held:
Foreign women who are married
to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens
Under existing laws, an alien may
acquire Philippine citizenship through
either judicial naturalization under CA
473 or administrative naturalization
under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000"). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to
Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides
that:
"any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women
who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for
them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization
at the time of their marriage nor do
they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization. Copying from
similar laws in the United States
which has since been amended, the
Philippine legislature retained Section
15 of CA 473, which then reflects its
intent to confer Filipino citizenship to
the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.
PROPER PROCEDURE: As stated in
Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an
alien wife to formalize the conferment
of Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be
taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that
she is not disqualified from acquiring
her husbands citizenship pursuant to
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of
said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the
joint affidavit of the petitioner and
her Filipino husband to the effect that
the petitioner does not belong to any
of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen x xx, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition.(
NOTE: in this case, Ascuzena followed
such procedure but it was denied [by
ministry of justice] so she filed the
petition for naturalization)
In this case:However, the case
before us is a Petition for judicial
naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was
denied by the then Ministry of Justice.
The lower court which heard the
petition and received evidence of her
qualifications and absence of
disqualifications to acquire Philippine
citizenship, has granted the Petition,
which was affirmed by the CA.
Azucena is a teacher by profession
and has actually exercised her
profession before she had to quit her
teaching job to assume her family
duties and take on her role as joint
provider, together with her husband,
in order to support her family.
Together, husband and wife were able
to raise all their five children,
provided them with education, and
have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country.
Certainly, this is proof enough of
both husband and wifes
lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a
professional and can resume teaching
at anytime. Her profession never
leaves her, and this is more than
sufficient guarantee that she will not
be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth.
judicial declaration of citizenship
(not authorized) vs naturalization
proceeding
This case however is not a Petition for
judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship but rather a Petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473.
In the first, the petitioner believes he
is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to
declare or confirm his status as a
Philippine citizen. In the second, the
petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to
acquire the privilege of be coming a
Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA
473.Azucena has clearly proven,
under strict judicial scrutiny, that she
is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand
in the way of making her a part of a
truly Filipino family.
8. In the Matter of Petition of
Ban Uan
Facts:
It was shown that petitioner arrived in
the Philippines in 1923, staying first
at 207 Echague St., Manila, from
1923 to 1949. Thereafter he
transferred to Puerto Princesa,
Palawan for the years 1950 to 1951,
then to Coron, also in that province in
1952. In 1959, he went to live at
Cuyo, Palawan, his residence at the
time his petition for naturalization
was heard. He is married to one
Susana Lim with three children,
namely, Grace L. Ong, born on
November 30, 1967; Raymond L.
Ong, born on February 12, 1959; and
Maria Susana Ong, born on April 8,
1961. As set forth in his petition, his
trade or profession was that of an
employee, with an average income of
four thousand pesos. His employer
was his mother-in-law. 1 It must be
added that while his petition spoke of
his place of residence as Cuyo, with
reference likewise to Coron, he did
also testify as to having lived at 207
Echague St., Manila from 1923 to
1949. 2
A simple recital of the undisputed
facts renders clear why, as set forth
at the outset, reversal is called for.
That may explain why appellee did
not even bother to file his brief.
Issue:
WON failure to state in the petition
the present and all the former places
of residence of applicant and lack of a
lucrative income will keep Ong Ban
Uan from being a citizen of the PH
Held:
On the issue of lack of lucrative
employment, Lim Biak Chao v.
Republic 3, decided only last month,
sets forth the applicable doctrine
thus: "It is one of the qualifications
required in the Naturalization Act that
petitioner must be worth either not
less than P5,000.00 or 'must have
some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation.'
Some of the earlier decisions
stressing how essential such a
requirement is came from the pen of
former Chief Justice Bengzon, in the
cases respectively of Lim v.
Republic, Tiong v. Republic, and Swee
Din Tan v. Republic. In Tan v.
Republic, there was a definition of
what lucrative employment signifies
from the pen of Justice Zaldivar. It
'means a gainful employment. It is
not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives
one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one's becoming the object
of charity or a public charge. Under
such a standard, an applicant with an
income of P8,687.50 with five
children, one with P5,980.00 with
three children, a third with an income
of P6,300.00 and only one child and
still another one with an income of
P7,133.29 with four children were all
denied citizenship. Again, from Chief
Justice Concepcion comes the latest
decision applying such a doctrine
consistently adhered to with
undeviating rigidity. Reference is
made to Watt v. Republic, where, in a
sense, a further refinement was
made in the Tan pronouncement
leading to a stricter view of the
matter. In the language of the Chief
Justice: 'It is not enough for an
applicant for naturalization not to be
a financial burden upon the
community. He must, also, have a
"lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." And this qualification
has been construed to mean, not only
that he is not a beggar, a pauper or
indigent, but, also, that his financial
condition must be such as to permit
him and the members of his family to
live with reasonable comfort, in
accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity,
at this stage of our civilization."
2. Considering that the absence of
lucrative income precludes us from
affirming the grant of citizenship,
there is no need to discuss the
question of failure to state all his
places of residence.
9. Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic
Facts:
Chua Kian Lai, the petitioner, was
born on October 27, 1903 in Amoy,
China. He arrived in the Philippines in
1914. In 1922 he married Ty Siok
Cheng at Amoy. They begot ten
children. The eldest was in China. The
last child was born in Quezon City.
Since his arrival in the Philippines
Chua Kian Lai resided at the following
places: (1) Manila; and (2) Quezon
City, back and forth. He is a
businessman with an investment in
various enterprises amounting to
P60,000. His average annual income
before 1961 was P6,500. Damaso L.
Martinez, Delfin Garcia, and Ireneo L.
Bangit, his three character witnesses,
came to know him. The petition for
naturalization was filed in 1959.
Issue:
WON the lower courts decision will
stand
1. One qualification for Philippine
citizenship is that the petitioner
"must be of good moral character".
That circumstance should be
specifically alleged in the petition
(Secs. 2[3rd] and 7, Com. Act No.
473). The State, in its brief, notes
that Chua Kian Lai did not aver in his
petition that he is a person of good
moral character. He simply made a
blanket allegation that he had "all the
qualifications required of
Commonwealth Act No. 473" (6
Record on Appeal). That general
statement is not sufficient. Section 7
of the law provides that the petitioner
should set forth in his petition, inter
alia, "a declaration that he has the
qualifications required by this
Act, specifying the same". The
omission of that specific averment
nullifies his petition (Chua Bon Chiong
vs. Republic, L-29200, May 31, 1971,
39 SCRA 318, 325).
2. Chua Kian Lai averred in his
petition that his residence was at
741-745 Padilla Street, San Miguel,
Manila and that his former residence
was in Amoy, China (2 Record on
Appeal). In his testimony he disclosed
four other places of residence.
The law explicitly requires that the
applicant should indicate in his
petition "his present and former
places of residence" (See. 7, Com.
Act No. 473). That requirement is
designed to facilitate the verification
of petitioner's activities which have a
bearing on his petition for
naturalization, especially as to his
qualifications and moral character,
either by private individuals or by
investigative agencies of the
government, by pointing to them the
localities or places wherein
appropriate inquiries may be made
(Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil.
986). Moreover, the suppression of
that information might constitute a
falsehood which signifies that the
applicant lacks good moral character
and is not, therefore, qualified to be
admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines (Ang Ban Giok vs.
Republic, L-26949, February 22,
1974, 55 SCRA 556, 560).
3. The Solicitor General also points
out that the petitioner, a
businessman, who has ten children,
five of whom were still dependent on
him for support in 1961, when he
testified, and whose annual income
was P6,500, cannot be regarded as
having a "lucrative trade" (Sec.
2[4th], Com. Act No. 473). That
income is not adequate to enable him
and the members of his big family "to
live with reasonable comfort, in
accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity
at this stage of civilization" (Watt vs.
Republic, L-20718, August 30, 1972,
46 SCRA 683 and nine other cases).
Failure to satisfy the property or
income requirement is another
ground for denying applicant's
petition for naturalization.
It is not necessary to resolve the
other issue raised by the State as to
the competency of petitioner's
character witnesses who had not
known the petitioner since his arrival
in the Philippines.
The lower court's order allowing Chua
Kian Lai to take the oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen, is reversed.
10. Li Tong Pek vs. Republic
Facts:
Petitioner was born on August 8,
1921 in Chingkang, China. He arrived
at Manila in1930 where he resided
until 1931. Sometime in 1931, he left
the Philippines for Amoy, China,
where he studied for about three
years. In 1934, he returned to the
Philippines and resided in Manila for
about a year, while in 1935 up to the
present he resided in Naga City. He
married one Josefa Dy Liaco Chua-
Unsu, a Chinese citizen, with whom
he begot eight children, namely,
Peter, Josefina, Lily, Andrew, John,
Tenny, James and Philip, who were all
born in Naga City. Peter, Josefina and
Lily are at present enrolled in the
Anglo-Chinese School, while his son
Andrew is enrolled in the Hope
Christian School, both schools being
recognized by our government where
Philippine history, government and
civics are taught.
Petitioner and his family are all living
in a house which they built situated in
Naga City. In 1947, he was employed
in the Naga Ricemill. In 1957, he also
became the cashier and bookkeeper.
In 1958, his wife worked as a cashier
for one Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of the
La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Company.
Petitioner knows how to speak and
write English and the Bicol dialect,
having obtained the Degree of
Bachelor of Science in Commerce
from the University of Caceres where
he also took some courses leading to
the Degree of Civil Engineering. He is
a person of good moral character. He
believes in the principles underlying
our Constitution. Be has conducted
himself during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in an
irreproachable manner. He has
mingled socially with the Filipinos and
has evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs and ideals
of the Filipino people.
Petitioners application for
naturalization is supported by the
affidavits of Joventino S. Prado,
Justice of the Peace of Milaor,
Camarines Sur, and Domingo
Escante, a Municipal Councilor of
Naga City, who expressed their
opinion that petitioner is a person of
good moral repute and of
irreproachable character.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the
qualification to become citizen of the
PH
Ruling:
We find merit in the contention that
petitioner does not possess a
lucrative income to give him the
economic sufficiency within the
purview of the law for it appears that
considering the wages he was given
during the period he was employed in
the Naga Ricemill, especially
considering the high cost of living
and the low purchasing value of our
currency during the present time.
It is true that petitioners wife, as the
record shows also works as cashier of
a certain Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of
the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Company but such additional income
would appear to be immaterial here
for under the law the petitioner
should be the one to possess "some
known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation" to qualify him to
become a Filipino citizen (Section 2,
par. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473).
We also take note of the claim that
the four children of school age of
petitioner named Peter, Josefina, Lily
and Andrew were only enrolled by
him either in the Anglo-Chinese High
School or in the Hope Christian
School, operated in Naga City, which,
though recognized by our
government, are however run by
Chinese mentors. The least that can
be said is that said institution being
predominantly, if not exclusively,
attended by Chinese students are
operated primarily for the education
of Chinese children, since they are
being supervised by Chinese citizens.
This is an indication that by enrolling
his children in said schools petitioner
has not evinced a sincere desire to
become a Filipino citizen as should be
expected from one who desires to
embrace our citizenship. This
circumstance is in our opinion enough
to disqualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.
11. Chiu Bok vs. Republic
Facts:
The evidence for petitioner shows
that he was born in 1913 in
Tangchich, China. He came to Manila
on June 30, 1930 on board the S/S
Angking, and after a stay of four
months, he went with his relatives to
Cebu City where he resided until
1936. From 1936 to 1938, he
engaged in general merchandising on
board an inter island boat plying
between Cebu City and Dipolog.
During that time, he met and married
his wife, Maria del Rosario Liong, and
then settled permanently with her in
Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte. From
their union, five children were born. It
was shown that his first four children
who are of school age are studying in
schools recognized by the
Government where Philippine
Government, History and Civics are
taught. Petitioner speaks and writes
the English language and the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect. He
submitted evidence to prove that he
had conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his
entire period of residence in the
Philippines. He also tried to show that
he has mingled socially with Filipinos
and that he has contributed funds to
civic and charitable organizations.
Petitioner, it is shown, operates a
store, known as David Trading, which
is located at Dipolog.
On the above findings, the lower
court declared petitioner qualified to
be admitted citizen of the Philippines.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has income that
is lucrative by contemplation of law.
This case is on all fours with that of
Keng Giok v. Republic, where this
Court held that the income of
petitioner therein who lives in Manila,
is not lucrative, considering the size
of his family. In that case, it was
shown that petitioner has a wife and
five children to support and his net
income was found to decline every
year. It is argued by herein petitioner
that the Keng Giok ruling cannot be
applied to his case because the cost
of living in Manila is much higher
than the cost of living in Zamboanga
del Norte. But in the case of Keng
Giok, the net income held to be
insufficient was P8,000, whereas in
the case at bar, petitioners income is
alleged to be P5,000, more or less,
and declining. Certainly, the
difference of P3,000 is more than
enough to cover the disparity in the
cost of living in Manila and in
Zamboanga.
Many other cases have been decided
lately where We have shown that in
order that an alien may be admitted
to Philippine citizenship, he must
have income decent enough to
maintain a family.
Petitioners use of an alias, without
authority, as provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 142, is in
clear violation of that law, the Anti-
Alias Law, and makes him all the
more disqualified to obtain Philippine
citizenship. It shows that the said
petitioner is not a person of
irreproachable character. (See Lim
Bun v. Republic of the Philippines, G.
R. No. L-12822, April 26, 1961).
The decision granting Philippine
citizenship is hereby reversed.
12. Vilando v HRET
Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 elections,
Limkaichong filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental.She won over the
other contender, Olivia Paras.OnMay
25, 2007, she was proclaimed as
Representative by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers on the basis of
Comelec Resolution No. 8062 issued
onMay 18, 2007.OnJuly 23, 2007, she
assumed office as Member of the
House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, petitions involving either
the disqualification or the
proclamation of Limkaichong were
filed before the Commission on question, otherwise moot and
Elections(COMELEC)which reached academic, if it is capable of
the Court. repetition, yet evading review. The
The petitions, which questioned her question on Limkaichongs citizenship
citizenship, were filed against is likely to recur if she would run
Limkaichong by her detractors. again, as she did run, for public
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, office, hence, capable of repetition.
petitioner Renald F. In any case, the Court is of the view
Vilando(Vilando),as taxpayer; and that the HRET committed no grave
Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of abuse of discretion in finding that
the congressional district concerned, Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit
filed separate petitions for Quo as Member of the House of
Warranto against Limkaichong before Representatives.
the HRET.These petitions were Vilandos argument, that the quo
consolidated by the HRET as they warranto petition does not operate as
both challenged the eligibility of one a collateral attack on the citizenship
and the same respondent.Petitioners of Limkaichongs father as the
asserted that Limkaichong was a certificate of naturalization is null and
Chinese citizen and ineligible for the void from the beginning, is devoid of
office she was elected and merit.
proclaimed.They alleged that she was
born to a father (Julio Sy), whose In this petition, Vilando seeks to
naturalization had not attained disqualify Limkaichong on the ground
finality, and to a mother who that she is a Chinese citizen.To prove
acquired the Chinese citizenship of his point, he makes reference to the
Julio Sy from the time of her marriage alleged nullity of the grant of
to the latter.Also, they invoked the naturalization of Limkaichongs father
jurisdiction of the HRET for a which, however, is not allowed as it
determination of Limkaichongs would constitute a collateral attack
citizenship, which necessarily on the citizenship of the father.In our
included an inquiry into the validity of jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
the naturalization certificate of Julio citizenship may only be done through
Sy. a direct action for its nullity.
For her defense, Limkaichong
maintained that she is a natural-born The proper proceeding to assail the
Filipino citizen.She averred that the citizenship of Limkaichongs father
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by should be in accordance with Section
her father was regular and in order 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.As
and had already attained the status held inLimkaichong v. Comelec,thus:
ofres judicata.Further, she claimed
that the validity of such citizenship As early as the case ofQueto v.
could not be assailed through a Catolico, where the Court of First
collateral attack. Instance judgemotu propioand not in
the proper denaturalization
Issue: proceedings called to court various
Whether Limkaichong is a natural grantees of certificates of
born-citizen naturalization (who had already taken
their oaths of allegiance) and
Ruling: cancelled their certificates of
Citizenship, being a continuing naturalization due to procedural
requirement for Members of the infirmities, the Court held that:
House of Representatives, however,
may be questioned at anytime. For x x x It may be true that, as alleged
this reason, the Court deems it by said respondents, that the
appropriate to resolve the petition on proceedings for naturalization were
the merits.This position finds support tainted with certain infirmities, fatal
in the rule that courts will decide a or otherwise,but that is beside the
point in this case. The jurisdiction of
the court to inquire into and rule
upon such infirmities must be
properly invoked in accordance with
the procedure laid down by law. Such
procedure is the cancellation of the
naturalization certificate. [Section
1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in
the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473,
hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon
motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General
or his representatives, or by the
proper provincial fiscal." In other
words, the initiative must come from
these officers, presumably after
previous investigation in each
particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence,
it is the State, through its
representatives designated by
statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter
that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving
the naturalized citizens descendant.
13. Edison So vs. Republic
Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in
Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who
has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St.,
Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an
employee, he derives an average
annual income of
around P100,000.00 with free board
and lodging and other benefits; he is
single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is
exempt from the filing of Declaration
of Intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines pursuant to Section 6
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order8 setting the petition for hearing
at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17,
2002 during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show
cause, if any, why the petition should
not be granted. The entire petition
and its annexes, including the order,
were ordered published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and also in a
newspaper of general circulation in
the City of Manila. The RTC likewise
ordered that copies of the petition
and notice be posted in public and
conspicuous places in the Manila City
Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner
presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who
testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal
consultant and adviser of the So
familys business. He would usually
attend parties and other social
functions hosted by petitioners
family. He knew petitioner to be
obedient, hardworking, and
possessed of good moral character,
including all the qualifications
mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark
Salcedo, testified that he has known
petitioner for ten (10) years; they first
met at a birthday party in 1991. He
and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST)
where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some
school organizations and mingled
well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June
4, 2003.
Respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA on the following
grounds:
Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the
qualification needed to be a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of
merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of
formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing
him or her with the privileges of a
citizen.44 Under current and existing
laws, there are three ways by which
an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative affidavit or testimony is not he signed, specifically, the to be displayed when required and
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. incredible. What must be credible is Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate suppressed when convenient.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization not the declaration made but the Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980. 2. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as person making it. This implies that
amended; and (c) legislative such person must have a good Facts:
naturalization in the form of a law standing in the community; that he is The CID detained Yu pending his
deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a Petitioner yu was originallyissued a
enacted by Congress bestowing known to be honest and upright; that portuguese passport in 1971. On
petition for habeas corpus. An
Philippine citizenship to an alien. he is reputed to be trustworthy and february 10, 1978, he was
internal resolution of 7 November
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 reliable; and that his word may be naturalized as a philippine citizen.
1988 referred the case to the Court
are separate and distinct laws the taken on its face value, as a good en banc. The Court en banc denied Despite hisnaturalization,
former covers all aliens regardless of warranty of the applicants the petition. When his Motion for he applied for and was issued
class while the latter covers native- worthiness. Reconsideration was denied, portuguese passport by the consular
born aliens who lived here in the e do not agree with petitioners petitioner filed a Motion section of the portuguese embassy in
Philippines all their lives, who never argument that respondent is for Clarification. tokyo on july 21, 1981. Said consular
saw any other country and all along precluded from questioning the RTC office certifies that his portuguese
Issue: passport expired on 20 july 1986. He
thought that they were Filipinos; who decision because of its failure to
Whether or not petitioners acts also declared his nationality as
have demonstrated love and loyalty oppose the petition. A naturalization
constitute renunciation of his portuguese in commercial documents
to the Philippines and affinity to the proceeding is not a judicial adversary
Philippine citizenship he signed, specifically, the companies
customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, proceeding, and the decision registry of tai shun estate ltd. Filed in
the intention of the legislature in rendered therein does not hongkong sometime in april 1980.
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make constitute res judicata. A certificate Held:
Express renunciation was held to The cid detained yu pending his
the process of acquiring Philippine of naturalization may be cancelled if deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a
mean a renunciation that is made
citizenship less tedious, less technical it is subsequently discovered that the petition for habeas corpus. An
known distinctly and explicitly and
and more encouraging which is applicant obtained it by misleading not left to inference or implication. internal resolution of 7 november
administrative rather than judicial in the court upon any material fact. Law Petitioner, with full knowledge, and 1988 referred the case to the court
nature. Thus, although the legislature and jurisprudence even authorize the legal capacity, after having en banc. The court en banc denied
believes that there is a need to cancellation of a certificate of renounced Portuguese citizenship the petition. When his motion for
liberalize the naturalization law of the naturalization upon grounds or upon naturalization as a Philippine reconsideration was denied,
Philippines, there is nothing from conditions arising subsequent to the citizen resumed or reacquired his petitioner filed a motion
which it can be inferred that C.A. No. granting of the certificate. If the prior status as a Portuguese for clarification.
473 was intended to be amended or government can challenge a final citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport Issue:
repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the grant of citizenship, with more reason
andrepresented himself as such Whether or not petitioners acts
legislature had in mind was merely to can it appeal the decision of the RTC constitute renunciation of his
prescribe another mode of acquiring within the reglementary period in official documents even after he
had become a naturalized Philippine philippine citizenship
Philippine citizenship which may be despite its failure to oppose the
citizen. Such resumption or
availed of by native born aliens. The petition before the lower court. Held:
reacquisition of Portuguese
only implication is that, a native born Express renunciation was held to
citizenship is grossly inconsistent
alien has the choice to apply for mean a renunciation that is made
Section 3
with his maintenance of Philippine
judicial or administrative citizenship. known distinctly and explicitly and
1. Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago not left to inference or implication.
naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and Facts: While normally the question of Petitioner, with full knowledge, and
disqualifications. Petitioner Yu was originallyissued a whether or not a person has legal capacity, after having
In naturalization proceedings, it is the Portuguese passport in 1971. On renounced his Philippine citizenship renounced portuguese citizenship
burden of the applicant to prove not February 10, 1978, he was should be heard before a trial court of upon naturalization as a philippine
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. law in adversaryproceedings, this has citizen resumed or reacquired his
only his own good moral character
Despite hisnaturalization, become unnecessary as this Court, prior status as a portuguese
but also the good moral character of
he applied for and was issued no less, upon the insistence of citizen, applied for a renewal of his
his/her witnesses, who must be portuguese passport
credible persons. Within the purview Portuguese Passport by the Consular petitioner, had to look into the facts
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in and satisfy itself on whether or not andrepresented himself as such
of the naturalization law, a "credible in official documents even after he
person" is not only an individual who Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular petitioner's claim to continued
Office certifies that his Portuguese Philippine citizenship is meritorious. had become a naturalized philippine
has not been previously convicted of citizen. Such resumption or
passport expired on 20 July 1986. He
a crime; who is not a police character reacquisition of portuguese
also declared his nationality as Philippine citizenship, it must be
and has no police record; who has not Portuguese in commercial documents stressed, is not a commodity or were citizenship is grossly inconsistent
perjured in the past; or whose
with his maintenance of philippine
citizenship.
While normally the question of
whether or not a person has
renounced his philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of
law in adversaryproceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this court, no
less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts
and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued
philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were
to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient.
3. Labo vs. COMELEC
Facts:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. Was elected
as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo
warranto against Labo as Lardizabal
asserts that Labo is an Australian
citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after
he married an Australian. Labo avers
that his marriage with an Australian
did not make him an Australian; that
at best he has dual citizenship,
Australian and Filipino; that even if he
indeed became an Australian when
he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his
marriage with the Australian was
later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that
even if hes considered as an
Australian, his lack of citizenship is
just a mere technicality which should
not frustrate the will of the electorate
of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his
public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who
obtained the second highest vote in
the mayoralty race, can replace Labo
in the event Labo is disqualified.
Held: 1. No. Labo did not question the
authenticity of evidence presented
against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his
marriage to an Australian that made
him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an
oath of allegiance to the government
of Australia. He did not dispute that
he needed an Australian passport to
return to the Philippines in 1980; and
that he was listed as an immigrant
here. It cannot be said also that he is
a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by
law. He lost his Filipino citizenship
when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that
when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a
Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or
repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress
none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve
public office. His claim that his lack of
citizenship should not overcome the
will of the electorate is not tenable.
The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local
Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a
foreigner (curiously, would Baguio
have voted for Labo had they known
he is Australian). The electorate had
no power to permit a foreigner owing
his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand
cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he should
be declared the mayor by reason of
Labos disqualification because
Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as
the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election.
4. Republic vs. De la Rosa
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a
petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the
RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set
the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of
the said order and petition in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for 3 consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least 6 months before
the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the
Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing
and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public
office in the May 1992 elections.
Judge granted the motion and the
hearing was moved to February 21.
No publication or copy was issued
about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing
proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered
the assailed Decision and held that
Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section
25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the
decision made on February 27, 1992
and to nullify the oath of allegiance
taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-
admitted to his citizenship as a
Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that
Private respondent is declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from continuing
to serve as governor of the Province
of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate
his office and to surrender the same
to the Vice-Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. The
proceedings of the trial court was
marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set
ahead of the scheduled date of
hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing,
and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of
the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his
oath of allegiance before the finality
of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of
allegiance without observing the two-
year waiting period.
5. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner on
Immigration
FACTS:
This is a case filed to enjoin the
Commissioner of Immigration from
causing the arrest and deportation of
the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen
Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese
residing in Kowloon, Hongking and
that she desired to take a pleasure
trip to the Philippines and to visit her
great grand uncle for a period of one
month.
When she arrived in the Philippines,
Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake
among others that Lau Yuen Yueng
would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the
period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might
properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner
was allowed to stay until Feb. 13,
1962. But on January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action
of the respondent to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest
deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought this
action for injunction with preliminary
injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted
that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except a
few words she could not speak either
English or Tagalog. She could not
even name any Filipino neighbor, with
a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen
Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen
of the Philippines.
HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No 473, upon
which petitioners rely, reads.
Any woman who is not or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalised shall
be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the
Supreme Court, the phrase, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalised,"
refer to a class or race who might be
lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions
of the naturalization laws was not Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
required. Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
Being the criterion of whether or not however, Cruz enlisted in the US
an alien wife "may be lawfully Marine Corps and without the consent
naturalised," what should be required of the Republic of the Philippines,
is not only that she must not be took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
disqualified under Section 4 but she As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
must also possess the qualifications citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An
enumerated in Section 2, such as Act Providing for the Ways in Which
those of age, residence, good moral Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
character, adherence to the Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
underlying principles of the Philippine Filipino citizen may lose his
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, citizenship by, among other,
lucrative employment or ownership of rendering service to or accepting
real estate, capacity to speak and commission in the armed forces of a
write English or Spanish and one of foreign country.
the principal local languages, Whatever doubt that remained
education of children in certain regarding his loss of Philippine
schools, etc. citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held 1990, in connection with his service
that an alien wife is required to prove in the U.S. Marine Corps.
only that she may herself be lawfully In 1994, Cruz reacquired his
naturalized, that she is not one of the Philippine citizenship through
disqualified persons enumerated in repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
the Section 4 of the law, on order to Providing for Reacquisition of
establish her citizenship status as a Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
fact. Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering
Service To, or Accepting Commission
Section 15 of the Naturalization law In, the Armed Forces of the United
(Commonwealth Act 473), an alien States (1960)]. He ran for and was
woman marrying a Filipino, native elected as the Representative of the
born or naturalised, becomes ipso 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
facto a Filipina provided she is not 1998 elections. He won over
disqualified to be a citizen of the petitioner Bengson who was then
Philippines under Section 4 of the running for reelection.
same law. likewise, an alien woman Subsequently, petitioner filed a case
married to an alien who i for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
subsequently naturalised here follows respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
the Philippines citizenship of her was not qualified to become a
husband the moment he takes his member of the HOR since he is not a
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that natural-born citizen as required under
she does not suffer from any of the Article VI, section 6 of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing
the petition for quo warranto and
6. Bengzon III vs. HRET declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is ISSUE:
at issue in this case, in view of the WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
constitutional requirement that no became an American citizen, can still
person shall be a Member of the be considered a natural-born Filipino
House of Representatives unless he is upon his reacquisition of Philippine
a natural-born citizen. citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their
citizenship may however reacquire
the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3
modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under
various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission
in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath
of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed On November 19, 1987, private
to have recovered his original status respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed
as a natural-born citizen, a status his certificate of candidacy with the
which he acquired at birth as the son COMELEC for the position of
of a Filipino father. It bears stressing Provincial Governor of Cebu Province
that the act of repatriation allows him in the January 18, 1988 local
to recover, or return to, his original elections. On January 22, 1988, the
status before he lost his Philippine
Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council
citizenship.
(Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
7. Altajeros vs. COMELEC represented by petitioner Jose B.
Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
FACTS: Provincial Chairman, filed with the
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
COMELEC to disqualify and deny due disqualification of Osmea on the
course or cancel the certificate of ground that he is allegedly not a
candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the
the ground that he is not a Filipino
United States of America.
citizen and that he made a false
On January 28, 1988, the
representation in his COC that he was
not a permanent resident of the COMELEC en banc resolved to order
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the Board to continue canvassing but
the town he's running for as mayor in to suspend the proclamation. At the
the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos hearing before the COMELEC, Aznar
answered that he was already issued presented the following exhibits
a Certificate of Repatriation by the tending to show that Osmena is an
Special Committee on Naturalization American citizen: Application for Alien
in December 17, 1997. Registration of the Bureau of
Immigration dated November 21,
ISSUE: 1979; Alien Certificate of Registration
Whether or not the registration of dated November 21, 1979; Permit to
petitioners repatriation with the Re-enter the Philippines dated
proper civil registry and with the
November 21, 1979; Immigration
Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite
Certificate of Clearance dated
in effecting repatriation.
January 3, 1980. Osmea on the
RULING: other hand, maintained that he is a
Yes. The registration of certificate of Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
repatriation with the proper local civil legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
registry and with the Bureau of Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late
Immigration is a prerequisite in President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he
effecting repatriation. Petitioner is a holder of a valid and subsisting
completed all the requirements of Philippine Passport issued on March
repatriation only after he filed his 25, 1987; that he has been
certificate of candidacy for a continuously residing in the
mayoralty position but before the Philippines since birth and has not
elections. Petitioners repatriation gone out of the country for more than
retroacted to the date he filed his
six months; and that he has been a
application and was, therefore,
registered voter in the Philippines
qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the since 1965.
May 10, 2004 elections. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC directed
the Board of Canvassers to proclaim
Section 5 the winning candidates. Having
1. Aznar vs. COMELEC obtained the highest number of
votes, Osmena was proclaimed the
FACTS: Provincial Governor of Cebu. On June
11, 1988, COMELEC dismissed the
petition for disqualification for not
having been timely filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that Osmena is not
a Filipino citizen.
ISSUES:
1. WON petition for disqualification
was timely filed.
2. WON Osmena is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
1. NO.
There are two instances where a
petition questioning the qualifications
of a registered candidate to run for
the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to
Section 78 thereof which provides
that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material
representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty five days
from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after the notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the
election.
and
"(2) After election, pursuant to
Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto.
Any voter contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of inelligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the
election."
The records show that Osmena filed
his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that Aznar
filed his petition for disqualification
on January 22, 1988. Since the
petition for disqualification was filed
beyond the twenty five-day period
required in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, it is clear that said
petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of
Osmena cannot also be treated as a
petition for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the same Code as it is
unquestionably premature,
considering that Osmena was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
2. YES.
In the proceedings before the
COMELEC, Aznar failed to present
direct proof that Osmena had lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No.
63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to
an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. From the evidence, Osmea
did not lose his Philippine citizenship
by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that Osmena had been
naturalized as a citizen of the USA,
Aznar merely relied on the fact that
Osmena was issued alien certificate
of registration and was given
clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Aznar
assumed that because of the
foregoing, Osmena is an American
and "being an American", Osmena
"must have taken and sworn to the
Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to
determine who are Filipino citizens
and who are not. Whether or not a
person is considered an American
under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a
Filipino father, the presumption that
Osmena is a Filipino remains. It was
incumbent upon Aznar to prove that
Osmena had lost his Philippine
citizenship however, he failed to
positively establish this fact.
Osmena vehemently denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the
US. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and
has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since
1963 up to the present, both as a
voter and as a candidate. Thus,
Osmena remains a Filipino and the
loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed.
2. Mercado vs. Manzano
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and
Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election,
Manzano garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to
the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears
that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen. The Commission on
Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution
of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed
as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998. Thus the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is
disqualified to hold public elective
office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the
application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. Dual allegiance on
the other hand, refers to a situation
in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's
volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore,
be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship,
such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
When a person applying for
citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation
and application.
The court ruled that the filing of
certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private
respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon
the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of
his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
3. Sobejana-Condon vs.
COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born of
Filipino parents on August 8, 1944.
On December 13, 1984, she became
a naturalized Australian citizen owing
to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an
application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The
application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the
petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the
Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her
hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid.
She again sought elective office
during the May 10, 2010 elections
this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took
her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents
Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P.
Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all
registered voters of Caba, La Union,
filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioners
eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from
holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an
oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual
citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to
be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for
public office is a clear abandonment
of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial
court declaring Condon disqualified
and ineligible to hold office of vice
mayor of Caba La union and nullified
her proclamation as the winning
candidate.
After that the decision was appealed
to the comelec, but the appeal was
dismissed y the second division and
affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
The petitioner contends that since
she ceased to be an Australian citizen
on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was
only a Filipino citizen when she filed
her certificate of candidacy as early
as the 2007 elections. Hence, the
"personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified
from running for elective office due to
failure to renounce her Australian
Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5
(2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention
and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity
of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated
repatriation process that restores
ones Filipino citizenship and all civil
and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section
5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public
office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an
oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year
before she initially sought elective
public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the
renunciation of her Australian
citizenship was invalid due to it was
not oath before any public officer
authorized to administer it rendering
the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections en bane in
EAC (AE
4. Japzon vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private
respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor
of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local
elections of 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted before the COMELEC
a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel
Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation.
He averred that
Ty is a US citizen and had been
residing in the USA for the last
25 years.
When Ty filed his Certificate of
Candidacy he falsely represented
therein that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar
(Barangay 6), for one year
before 14 May 2007 and was not
a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for
the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6 for a
period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of LGC
Reacquisition of citizenship does
not automatically establish his
domicile at Barangay 6.
He had also failed to renounce
his foreign citizenship as
required by Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003
Ty admits that he had indeed lost his
Philippine citizenship when he was
naturalized as a US citizen. However,
he alleges that prior to the election,
he had successfully reacquired his
Filipino citizenship as shown by his
act of executing an Oath of
Allegiance to RP and a duly
notazaried Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship. He had also complied
with the 1-year residencey rule as
shown by the following:
CTC from Barangay 6 (March
2006)
Passport indicating that his
residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct
2005)
Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July
2006)
Pending this case, Ty won the
elections.
COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
Issue: WON Ty complied with the one
(1) year residency requirement under
the Local Government Code.
Held: YES. The term "residence" is to
be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling"
or "habitation," but rather to
"domicile" or legal residence, that is,
"the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by
every person at birth. It is usually the
place where the childs parents reside
and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice). In
Coquilla, the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual
to acquire American citizenship, he
must establish residence in the USA.
Since Ty himself admitted that he
became a naturalized American
citizen, then he must have
necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as
his domicile of origin; and transferred
to the USA, as his domicile of choice.
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still
retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his
domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely
had the option to again establish his
domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his
new domicile of choice. The length of
his residence therein shall be
determined from the time he made it
his domicile of choice, and it shall not
retroact to the time of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile
of choice in Barangay 6 became
apparent when, immediately after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship
on 2 October 2005, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the
Philippines was Barangay 6. For the
years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily
submitted himself to the local tax
jurisdiction of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said
municipality stating therein his
address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty
applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6.
5. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May
2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came
to the Philippines after deciding to
stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she
has been going to and fro between
US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 and
was naturalized as American citizen
in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI
granted her petition declaring that
she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine passport. In 2010,
before assuming her post as an
appointed chairperson of the MTRCB,
she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the
COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that
her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos. The COMELEC
en banc cancelled her candidacy on
the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she
committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the
ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however,
abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
qualifications of candidates (Read
Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the
Constitution provides for the powers
and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack
thereof of a candidate is not one
among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides
that only the SET and HRET tribunals
have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and
qualifications of their respective
members, whereas over the President
and Vice President, only the SC en
banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for
such positions, the Constitution is
silent. There is simply no authorized
proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before
elections. Such lack of provision
cannot be supplied by a mere rule,
and for the COMELEC to assimilate
grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its
rules of procedures would be contrary
to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it
decided on the qualification issue of
Grace as a candidate in the same
case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares
is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read
Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is
considerably a natural-born Filipino.
For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for
presidency.
First, there is a high probability that
Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her
physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be
more than 99% chance that a child
born in such province is a Filipino is
also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based
are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to
accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC
pronounced that foundlings are as a
class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the
deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that
the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While
the 1935 Constitutions enumeration
is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are
automatically conferred with natural-
born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some
of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings
as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the
10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the
requirements of animus manendi
coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely
changed as of May 24, 2005, and not
on July 18, 2006 when her application
under RA 9225 was approved by the
BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in
the country cannot be counted unless
she acquires a permanent resident
visa or reacquires her Filipino the Philippines over the years, it is citizenship and residency because false representations regarding her
citizenship is without merit. Such clear that when Grace Poe returned such facts refer to grounds for qualifications.
cases are different from the on May 24, 2005, it was for good. ineligibility in which the COMELEC In this case, by authority of the
circumstances in this case, in which Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Supreme Court Grace Poe is now
Grace Poe presented an candidacy should be denied or Only when there is a prior authority pronounced qualified as a candidate
overwhelming evidence of her actual cancelled for committing material finding that a candidate is suffering for the presidency. Hence, there
stay and intent to abandon misrepresentations in her COC from a disqualification provided by cannot be any false representations
permanently her domicile in the US. Held: law or the Constitution that the in her COC regarding her citizenship
Coupled with her eventual application No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COMELEC may deny due course or and residency.
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and COC on the ground that she cancel her candidacy on ground of
her familys actual continuous stay in misrepresented facts as to her