Green Notes 2016
Political Law
2015-2016 JURISPRUDENCE
GOV. JAVIER VS COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. 215847, January 12, 2016
The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a
different date of the election period.
The Constitution authorizes the Commission to
fix the dates of the election period. Article IX-
C, Section 9 provides: Unless otherwise fixed
by the Commission in special cases, the
election period shall commence ninety days
before the day of election and shall end thirty
days thereafter.
Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the
default election period. The Commission is not
precluded from fixing the length and the
starting date of the election period to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. This is not merely a statutory but a
constitutionally granted power of the
Commission.
CRUZ & DELA CRUZ VS
PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB
G.R. 188213
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether
it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement,
in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance
per se, when it affects the immediate safety of
persons and property, which may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
which "depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance, it may only be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose and may not be summarily abated
without judicial intervention.
A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate
harm or danger to anyone but is merely an
object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature,
injurious to rights of property, of health or of
comfort of the community and, thus, it may
not be abated as a nuisance without the
benefit of a judicial hearing. Moreover, the
district health officer has the responsibility for
the abatement of a nuisance.
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SAGUISAG VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. 212426, January 12, 2016
Under the Constitution, the President can to
enter into executive agreements on foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in two
instances: if such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, and if it
merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.
EDCA is an executive agreement that merely
involves adjustments in detail in the
implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty
and the Visiting Forces Agreement, two treaties
entered into by the Philippines and the United
States that allows US military forces to enter
Philippine territory. These treaties were
entered into with the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate and met the requirements of
the Constitution. EDCA merely aims to
implement the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
VFA. Hence EDCA is valid even without Senate
concurrence.
OSMENA III VS DOTC SECRETARY ABAYA
G.R. 211737, JANUARY 13, 2016
The sworn certifications submitted by GMR
Infrastructure & Megawide Consortium set out
the required certification on facts which
indicate compliance with the rules on Conflict
of Interest.
There being no violation of any law,
regulation or the bidding rules, nor any
arbitrariness or unfairness committed by public
respondents, the presumption of regularity of
the bidding for the MCIA Project must stand.
DR. AQUINO VS COMELEC
G.R. 211789-90, March 17, 2015
Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed
the act of making or causing the reassignment
of the affected PHIC officers and employees
before the start of the election period. In this
sense, the evils sought to be addressed by
Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the
timely exercise of his management prerogative
in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel
within its various offices necessary for the
PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As
Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside
the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he
 Green Notes 2016
cannot be held liable for violation of Section
261(h).
In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when, firstly, it used wrong or
irrelevant considerations when it sought to
hold Aquino liable for violation of Section 261
(h) for issuing orders that were clearly not for
reassignment, but which were simply orders
for retention of position or orders for
temporary discharge of additional duties.
Secondly, the COMELEC also went beyond the
clear contemplation and intention of the law
and of existing jurisprudence when it included
within the prohibition's coverage the
implementation aspect of the reassignment
process - acts that were obviously no longer
within his active and immediate control and
beyond the ambit of making or causing to
which the prohibition applies.
NAPOCOR VS POSADA, ET AL.
G.R. 191945, March 11, 2015
Expropriation proceedings must be dismissed
when it is determined that it is not for a public
purpose, except when:
1. the trial court's order already became
final and executory;
2. the government already took
possession of the property; and
3. the expropriation case already caused
prejudice to the landowner.
The expropriation case is not automatically
dismissed when the property ceases to be for
public use. The state must first file the
appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the
trial court having jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The grant or denial of any
Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation
proceeding is always subject to judicial
discretion.
Respondents have not yet been deprived of
their property since the National Power
Corporation was never able to take
possession. We cannot determine whether
damages have been suffered as a result of the
expropriation. This case needs to be remanded
to the trial court to determine whether
respondents have already been prejudiced by
the expropriation.
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The withdrawal of the Petition before this
court will have no practical effect other than
to make the trial court's order of
condemnation final and executory. In order to
prevent this absurdity, the National Power
Corporation should file the proper Motion to
Withdraw before the trial court. It is now the
burden of the National Power Corporation to
plead and prove to the trial court its reasons
for discontinuing with the expropriation.
Respondents may also plead and prove
damages incurred from the commencement of
the expropriation, if any.
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014
OF PARREO, ET. AL. AGAINST HON.
LIBREA-LEAGOGO, ET AL., RELATIVE TO CA
GR SP NO. 108807
OCA IPI 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015.
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate
court like the CA to resolve a case within 12
months from the submission of the last
required pleading or as set by the court itself.
This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2),
Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Although the case was submitted for decision
by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012
it was the 13th Division of the CA that
promulgated the decision on February 28,
2014, 20 months later. The Court answers the
query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section
1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication
of cases was the responsibility of the assigned
Justice and the Members of the Division to
which he or she then belonged. Determining
who should be administratively accountable
must consider the specific role each of the
respondents played leading to the resolution
of the case. Under the applicable rule of the
2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in
resolving the case might devolve only on the
Members of the 13th Division who
promulgated the decision.
Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited
participation in the case because the
reorganization of the CA ensuing after the
promulgation of the resolution by the Special
16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her
transfer to the 15th Division terminating her
responsibility in the case. Justice Lazaro-Javier
should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a
special Member of the 16th Division. Such
substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular

16th Division, and conformed to the
procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the
2009 IRCA.
Justice Ybaez, as the ponente for the case,
carried the case with him when he was
transferred to the 13th Division. But whether
or not he was administratively liable for the
delay of eight months should depend on the
relevant circumstances. Although often holding
that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to
excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within
the reglementary period, the Court has applied
this rule by considering the causes of the delay.
LEUS VS ST. SCHOLASTICAS
COLLEGE WESTGROVE
The morality referred to in the law is public
and necessarily secular, not religious. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious
beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would
require conformity to what some might regard
as religious programs or agenda. The non-
believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed
by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. The
government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.
Expansive religious freedom therefore requires
that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
Contrary to the labor tribunals declarations,
the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove that the Leuss
indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to
SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCWs
bare allegation, the records are bereft of any
evidence that would prove that her conduct
indeed adversely affected SSCWs integrity in
teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands
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Green Notes 2016
Political Law
for. Leus is only a non-teaching personnel; her
interaction with SSCWs students is very
limited. It is thus quite impossible that her
pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave
scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her
dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the
burden of proving that the dismissal of the
employees was for a valid and authorized
cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent
upon the employer to show by substantial
evidence that the termination of the
employment of the employees was validly
made and failure to discharge that duty would
mean that the dismissal is not justified and
therefore illegal "Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.
REPUBLIC VS HON. MUPAS
G.R. 181892, September 8, 2015
Depreciation involves the loss of value caused
by the propertys reduced utility as a result of
damage, advancement of technology, current
trends and tastes, or environmental changes.
Injustice would result if we award PIATCO just
compensation based on the old value or the
property and disregard the fact that the
Government expropriated a terminal that is
not brand new.
We must remember that the concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to the
property owner alone. In an eminent domain
situation, compensation must likewise be just
to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation. The property owner is entitled
to compensation only for what he actually
loses; what he loses is only the actual value of
the property at the time of the taking.
SILANG VS COA
G.R. 213189, September 08, 2015
The City Mayor of Tayabas and the
Sanggunian are solidarily liable with the
officers of UNGKAT.
The City Mayor of Tayabas and the
Sanggunian should reimburse the amount
because local officials are personally liable if

they are directly responsible for the illegal
expenditures of funds. The local officials in this
case should have known the applicable policies
on CNA incentives but they still approved the
allowances and enacted the ordinances
authorizing the illegal disbursement.
The officers of UNGKAT are also liable
because acted in bad faith. In this case, they
actively participated in the negotiations for the
approval of the disallowed incentives despite
knowledge of UNGKAT's non-accreditation at
the time.
The other rank and file employees who are
passive recipients of the incentives are not
bound to refund the disallowed amounts if
they received the amount in good faith.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE VS DELA CRUZ
G.R. 209331
Respondents were supposed to augment
and reinforce the existing organic personnel
of CPRO. Yet, at the time of respondents
detail, CPRO had not been formally
organized. CPRO had no organic personnel
that had been approved by the DBM upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The
DOF Secretary had yet to promulgate rules
and regulations and to prescribe procedures
and processes to enable CPRO to effectively
exercise its powers and duties, as required by
Section 4 of EO 140.
CATIPON JR. VS JAPSON
G.R. 191787
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that "before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort
to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's
judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to ones cause of action.
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Green Notes 2016
Political Law
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS COMELEC
G.R. 205728
The messages in the tarpaulins are different
from the usual messages of candidates. Election
paraphernalia from candidates and political
parties are more declarative and descriptive
and contain no sophisticated literary allusion
to any social objective. Thus, they usually
simply exhort the public to vote for a person
with a brief description of the attributes of the
candidate.
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate
expressions made by private citizens.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
The tarpaulin and its message are not religious
speech. The Bishop of Bacolod caused the
posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a
bishop amounts to religious expression.
With all due respect to the Catholic faithful,
the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position
of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
REPUBLIC VS LUALHATI,
G.R. 183511, March 25, 2015
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain.

The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying
for registration, who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
ATTY. VELECARIA-GARAFIL VS OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT & CADIZ
G.R. 203372, June 16, 2015
Based on prevailing jurisprudence,
appointment to a government post is a process
that takes several steps to complete. Any valid
appointment, including one made under the
exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the
President signing an appointees appointment
paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal
of the appointment paper (preferably through
the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee, and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee evidenced by
his or her oath of office or his or her
assumption to office.
DIAZ VS PEOPLE
G.R. 188794
Compliance with the examination requirement
is shown by the depositions and the transcript.
In their absence, however, a warrant may still
be upheld if there is evidence in the records
that the requisite examination was made and
probable cause was based thereon. There must
be, in the records, particular facts and
circumstances that were considered by the
judge as sufficient to make an independent
evaluation of the existence of probable cause
to justify the issuance of the search warrant. In
the case at bar, apart from the statement in the
search warrant itself, there is nothing in the
records of this case indicating that the issuing
judge personally and thoroughly examined the
applicant and his witnesses. The records,
therefore, bear no evidence from which we
can infer that the requisite examination was
made, and from which the factual basis for
probable cause to issue the search warrant was
derived. A search warrant must conform
strictly to the constitutional requirements for
its issuance; otherwise, it is void.
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Green Notes 2016
Political Law
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS COLON HERITAGE REALTY
G.R. 203754
It is apparent that what Congress did in this
instance was not to exclude the authority to
levy amusement taxes from the taxing power
of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not
altogether confiscate, the income to be
received by the LGU from the taxpayers in
favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead
of the taxing authority. This is in clear
contravention of the constitutional command
that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue
exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the
power of LGUs to apportion their resources in
line with their priorities.
Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant
to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand-and be enforced. The exception to
this is when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, in which case, the nullity of one part
will vitiate the rest.
PEOPLE VS POSADA & POSADA
G.R. 196052, September 2, 2015
For the successful prosecution of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs the following
essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possesses the said drug.
The prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. It found the search warrant, which led
to the immediate arrest of accused valid and
the chain of custody of the seized items
preserved.
REPUBLIC VS KARBASI
G.R. 210412
Naturalization refers to the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the
present laws, the process of naturalization can
 Green Notes 2016
be judicial or administrative. Judicially, the
Naturalization Law provides that after hearing
the petition for citizenship and the receipt of
evidence showing that the petitioner has all
the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by law, the
competent court may order the issuance of the
proper naturalization certificate and its
registration in the proper civil registry.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine
citizenship should not easily be given away. All
those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the
satisfaction of the Court, that they have
complied with all the requirements of the law.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) VS
COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES
G.R. 203142, August 26, 2015
Courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions
where no actual interests are involved. Thus,
the well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. Where the issues
have become moot and academic, there ceases
to be any justiciable controversy, thus
rendering the resolution of the same of no
practical value. Courts will decline jurisdiction
over moot cases because there is no substantial
relief to which petitioner will be entitled and
which will anyway be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. The Court will therefore
abstain from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for.
The case involves a simple controversy
regarding the application of a clear-cut law
that has become the subject of a number of
precedents; no constitutional question or
paramount public interest is involved.
There were occasions when the Court passed
upon issues although supervening events had
rendered those petitions moot and academic.
After all, the "moot and academic" principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench,
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Political Law
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
However, the case does not fall under any of
the exceptional circumstances.
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
CORPORATION
It is a fundamental rule that the question of
jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on
appeal even if none of the parties raised the
same. The reason for the rule is that a court
without jurisdiction cannot render a valid
judgment.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power is the power of the administrative
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially
executive or administrative in nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental
to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it.
The OPs cancellation and/or revocation of the
FTAA is obviously not an adjudication in the
sense above-described. It cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
OPs cancellation and/or revocation of the
FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that
is purely administrative in nature, and thus,
cannot be treated as an adjudication, again, in
the sense above-discussed. As one of the
contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could
not have adjudicated on the matter in which it
is an interested party, as in a court case where
rights and duties of parties are settled before
an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense, the
OPs cancellation/revocation may be taken as
a decision but only to the extent of
considering it as its final administrative action
internal to its channels. It is not one for which
we should employ the conventional import of
the phrase final and executory, as accorded
to proper judicial/quasi-judicial decisions, and
its concomitant effect of barring further
recourse of a party. To reiterate, being a
government or public contract, the FTAA is
subject to fundamental contract principles, one
of which is the principle of mutuality of
 Green Notes 2016
contracts which would definitely be violated if
one were to accept the view that the OP, a
contracting party, can adjudicate on the
contracts own validity.
The FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself
represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely
exercised a contractual right by
cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely
administrative action which should not be
considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus,
absent the OP's proper exercise of a quasi-
judicial function, the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is,
perforce, null and void. With this, it is
unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary
issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
SPOUSES MARTIN VS TULFO, ET AL.
GR. 205039, October 21, 2015
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo under the
procedural formulation A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
states that the writ was intended to address
and, thus, is presently confined to cases
involving extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. Although it
is regarded as a special remedy for the
enforcement of constitutional rights, the
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
limited the remedy as a response to
extrajudicial killings (killings committed
without due process of law) and enforced
disappearances (arrest, detention, or abduction
of persons by, or with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or
to give on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time) only.
AGUSTIN VS COMELEC & PILLOS
G.R. 207105, November 10, 2015
The Court finds and declares that the
petitioner made no material misrepresentation
in his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual
basis for the cancellation of the CoC. Even so,
he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being
a dual citizen. With his disqualification having
been determined and pronounced by final
judgment before the elections, the votes cast in
his favor should not be counted. Accordingly,
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his rival, respondent Pillos, should be
proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining
the highest number of votes in the elections.
SILANG ET AL. VS COA
G.R. 213189, September 08, 2015
The general rule is that public officials who are
directly responsible for, or participated in
making the illegal expenditures, and those who
actually received amounts from it shall be
solidarily liable for reimbursement. However,
passive recipients in good faith need not
refund the amount. The rank-and-file
employees, apart from the UNGKAT officers,
were in good faith because they had no
knowledge of any irregularity attending to the
release of the incentive, neither were they
privy to the internal workings which led to its
release.
On the other hand, the City Mayor and
Sanggunian are solidarily liable with the
UNGKAT officers for their lack of good faith.
The UNGKAT officers should have known
their lack of authority to bargain, while the
public officials are presumed to know the
applicable policies on CNA incentives.
DOH VS PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING
G.R. 202943, March 25, 2015
The Court finds that there is no substantial
difference between the activities that would
fall under the purview of sales promotion in
RA 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines),
as well as those under promotion in RA 9211
(Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003), as would
warrant a delineation in the authority to
regulate its conduct. In line with this, if the
IAC-Tobacco was created and expressly given
the exclusive authority to implement the
provisions of RA 9211, it signifies that it shall
also take charge of the regulation of the use,
sale, distribution, and advertisements of
tobacco products, as well as all forms of
promotion which essentially includes sales
promotion. Hence, the Court finds that RA
9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions
of RA 7394 with respect to the authority of
the DOH to regulate tobacco sales
promotions. Therefore, with this regulatory
power conferred upon the IAC-Tobacco by RA
9211, the DOH and the BFAD have been
effectively and impliedly divested of any

authority to act upon applications for tobacco
sales promotional permit, including PMPMIs.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS VS COMELEC
It has been held that mere legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities,
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
RISOS-VIDAL VS COMELEC
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek
public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of
the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President
Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot
be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19
of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or
as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
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He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
VILLANUEVA VS JBC
G.R. 211833, April 07, 2015
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the
JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to
the judiciary and only those nominated by the
JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter as
justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC
is burdened with a great responsibility that is
imbued with public interest as it determines
the men and women who will sit on the
judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from
having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.
TESDA VS COA
G.R. 196418, February 10, 2015
COA is generally accorded complete discretion
in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
responsibility to examine and audit
expenditures of public funds, particularly those
which are perceptibly beyond what is
sanctioned by law. Only in instances when
COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court
interfere.
ABAD VS DELA CRUZ
G.R. 207422, March 18, 2015
The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to
maintain the policy of merit and rewards in
the civil service. Since appointments in the civil
service are based on merit and fitness, it is
assumed that the appointments of employees
next in rank are equally meritorious. Still, the
next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on
who to consider for promotion. The rule does
not give employees next in rank a vested right
to the position next higher to theirs should
that position become vacant. Appointment is a
discretionary power of the appointing
authority. So long as the appointee possesses
the qualifications required by law, the
appointment is valid. Who to appoint is a
political question involving considerations of

wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide. For the betterment of
government service, the appointing authority
may consider other abstract criteria aside
from the minimum qualifications set by law in
making appointments: performance, work
history, awards, education, training, potential,
and physical characteristics and personality
traits. The City Government of Muntinlupas
Personnel Selection Board ranked the
applicants based on these criteria and out of
nine (9) applicants, Dela Cruz ranked first with
a grade of 90.67 points. The appointment was
an exception to the three-salary-grade rule
since Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection
process rendering his appointment very
meritorious. To successfully protest the
issuance of an appointment, the employee
next-in rank must prove his or her status as a
qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest
shall be dismissed. In this case, Abad failed to
prove that he was a qualified next-in rank.
LAI VS PEOPLE
G.R. 175999, July 1, 2015
The mere appearance of his name as the public
prosecutor in the records of the case sufficed to
disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and
deciding the case. Having represented the State
in the prosecution of Lai, he could not
sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the
trial judge who would continue to hear the
case. Hence, he should have removed himself
from being the trial judge in the case. The evil
sought to be prevented by the rules on
disqualification had no relation whatsoever
with the judge's degree of participation in the
case before becoming the judge. He must be
reminded that the same compulsory
disqualification that applied to him could
similarly be demanded of the private
prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of
them should be appointed as the trial judge
hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is
to ensure that the proceedings in court that
would affect the life, liberty and property of
the petitioner as the accused should be
conducted and determined by a judge who
was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. His non-disqualification resulted
in the denial of the petitioner's right to due
process as the accused. The case should be
remanded to the RTC for a partial new trial to
remove any of the prejudicial consequences of
the violation of the right to due process. The
case shall be raffled to a Judge who is not
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otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
PABILLO VS COMELEC
G.R. 216098, April 21, 2015
Public bidding as a method of government
procurement is governed by the principles of
transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and
accountability. Case law states that
completion requires not only public bidding
upon a common standard upon the same
thing, matter and undertaking but also that it
be legitimate, fair and honest not to injure the
government.
It is established that all government
procurement shall be done through
competitive public bidding. It is undisputed
that the COMELEC had not conducted a public
bidding and instead resorted to direct
contracting. Direct contracting otherwise
known as Single Source Procurement refers to
a method of procurement that does not
require elaborate Bidding Documents because
the supplier is simply asked to submit a price
quotation or a pro forma invoice together
with the conditions of sale, which offer may be
accepted immediately or after some
negotiations. Direct contracting may be
allowed when the procurement involves
goods of proprietary nature obtained only
from propriety source. It is to be of
proprietary nature when they are owned by a
person who has protectable interest in them.
The goods sought to be procured in this case
refer to the refurbishment maintenance,
diagnostics and repair of the PCOS machines
which are not protected by patents and
copyright owned by Smartmatic-TIM. No
Evidence has shown that it possessed
intellectual property rights over the method
for their repair and refurbishment. Bluntly, The
COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for
direct contracting. It had not shown that any
conditions under section 50 of article XIV of
the GRPA exists.
AKMA-PTM VS COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. 207134, June 16, 2015
COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim
winning candidates if the remaining
uncanvassed election returns will not affect the
result of the elections.

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the
true vote of the electorate unless the board of
canvassers considers all returns and omits
none. However, this is true only where the
election returns missing or not counted will
affect the results of the election.
In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its
national canvass reports for party-list. As of
May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980
votes and ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In
Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of July 18,
2013, AKMA-PTMs total votes slightly
increased to 165,784 votes while ABANTE KA
had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no
significant change in the rankings as per the
latest canvass.
COMELECs allocation of additional seats for
party-list in accordance with the ruling in
BANAT.
Procedure in determining the allocation of
seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941:
1. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
It is clear that party-list groups garnering less
than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify
for a seat in the allocation of additional seats
depending on their ranking in the second
round. This conflicts with the interpretation of
petitioner that those party-list groups with less
than one percent are not entitled to one seat
in the allocation of additional seats.
COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
G.R. 205926, July 22, 2015
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On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds
it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be
able to identify with reasonable accuracy
especially from a distance of around 10 meters,
and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a
speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule
amounts of white crystalline substance inside 2
very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Comerciante as
to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag
that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to
the latter cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and
his companion were showing "improper and
unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag,
the same would not have been sufficient in
order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his
reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact
that he had seen his fellow officers arrest
persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his
trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he
was still assigned in the province are
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed
shabu.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice
Bersamin reminds us that police officers must
not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.
There should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or
none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.
GARCIA VS COMELEC & PAYUMO III
G.R. 216691, July 21, 2015
Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec. 7 of
the same rule of the 2010 Rules of Procedure
in Election Contests before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal Officials provides
for the summary dismissal by the court, motu
proprio, of an election protest on the ground
that the petition is filed beyond the period
prescribed in these Rules. Section 7 also
 Green Notes 2016
provides that an election protest or petition
for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days counted
from the date of proclamation.
Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing
the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory
and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an
election protest beyond the period deprives
the court of jurisdiction over the protest.
Violation of this rule should neither be taken
lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural
lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a
mere technicality but an essential requirement,
the non-compliance of which would oust the
court of jurisdiction over the case.
The Court ruled that it is the manual
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation, not the printed COCP, which
contains the true and exact date of Garcia's
proclamation. It was declared by the
individual members of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) that the proclamation of
Garcia was done on May 14, 2013, coupled
with the issuance of the manual certificate of
canvass and proclamation on the same date.
Having established that Garcia was proclaimed
the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14,
2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo's
election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was
filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period
and ought to be dismissed outright.
In sum, the Court maintains the general rule
that the reglementary period for instituting an
election period should be reckoned from the
actual date of proclamation, not from the date
of notice.
ONG, ET AL. VS IMPERIAL, ET AL.
G.R. 197127
The power to reclassify land is granted by law
to the local government, which was validly
exercised in this case. The subject property
having already been validly reclassified to
residential land by the municipality of Daet
prior to June 15, 1988, when the CARL took
effect, then it is exempt from the coverage of
CARP.
We have unequivocally held that "to be
exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one
valid reclassification of the land from
agricultural to non- agricultural by a duly
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authorized government agency before June 15,
1988, when the CARL took effect."
As to what is a "duly authorized government
agency," the DAR Handbook for CARP
Implementors recognizes and discusses the
LGUs authority to reclassify lands under
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code.
Moreover, in Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land
Bank of the Philippines,the Court held that "[it]
is undeniable that the local government has
the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands." Citing Pasong Bayabas
Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
the Court further held that this power is not
subject to DAR approval, and we
quote:[P]ursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 2264, amending the Local Government
Code, municipal and/or city councils are
empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations in consultation with
the National Planning Commission." It was
also emphasized therein that "[t]he power of
the local government to convert or reclassify
lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural
lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not
subject to the approval of the [DAR].
SEC VS UNIVERSAL RIGHTFIELD
PROPERTY HOLDINGS,
G.R. 181381, July 20, 2015
There is no dispute that violation of the
reportorial requirements under Section 17.119
of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulation of the SRC is a ground for
suspension or revocation of registration of
securities pursuant to Sections 13.1 and 54.1 of
the SRC. However, separate notices and
hearings for suspension and revocation of
registration of securities and permit to sell
them to the public are not required.
The Court has consistently held that the
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Any seeming defect in its
observance is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, and denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
has had the opportunity to be heard on such
motion. What the law prohibits is not the

absence of previous notice, but the absolute
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to
be heard.
PEOPLE VS TOMAS
G.R. 205412, September 9, 2015
The investigation referred to in Section 12 (1)
pertains to custodial investigation. This
commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on
the suspects participation therein and which
tend to elicit an admission.
Applying the foregoing, the accused was not
under custodial investigation when he
admitted, without assistance of counsel that he
stabbed his father to death. His verbal
confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through
questioning by the police authorities. Although
it is true that Macusi asked the accused who
killed his after, he only did so in response to
accuseds initial declaration that his father was
already dead. In this case, the accuseds
confession, even if done without the assistance
of a lawyer, is not in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12 (1), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution since he was not
under custodial investigation yet when he
made such confession
ATTY. RISOS-VIDAL, ER AL. VS
COMELEC & ESTRADA,
G.R. 206666, January 21, 2015
Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code.
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A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The disqualification of former President
Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him
While it may be apparent that the proscription
in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides
a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for
and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
SPOUSES MERCADO VS LANDBANK
G.R. 196707, June 17, 2015
The rule is that the RTC must consider the
guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657
and as translated into a formula embodied in
DAR A.O. No. 5. However, it may deviate
from these factors/formula if the circumstances
warrant or if the situations before it do not
warrant its application. In such a case, the RTC
must clearly explain the reason for deviating
from the aforesaid factors or formula. The RTC
merely stated in general terms that it exercised
its judicial prerogative and considered all the
facts of the case, including the evidence and
applicable laws, to conclude that the amount
of P25.00 per square meter is reasonable just
compensation for the subject portion which is
not fully supported by evidence on record.
The Court reminds the RTC to observe the
following guidelines for the proper
 Green Notes 2016
determination of just compensation: (1) just
compensation must be valued at the time of
taking of the property expropriated, or the
time when the owner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property; (2) interest may be
awarded as may be warranted by the
circumstances of the case; and, (3) just
compensation must be arrived at pursuant to
the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657 and outlined in a formula provided in
DAR A.O. No. 5. If the RTC finds these
guidelines inapplicable, it must clearly explain
the reasons for deviating therefrom and for
using other factors or formula in arriving at the
reasonable just compensation for the property
expropriated
NHA VS ROXAS
G.R. 171953
The mantle of the State's immunity from suit
did not extend to the NHA despite its being a
government-owned and -controlled
corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential
Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the
NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA
was not immune from the suit of Roxas. There
is no question that the NHA could sue or be
sued, and thus could be held liable under the
judgment rendered against it. But the universal
rule remains to be that the State, although it
gives its consent to be sued either by general
or special law, may limit the claimant's action
only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution. As to the
claim with the NHA, Roxas is enjoined to file
his claim with the COA.
SEN. ESTRADA VS BERSAMIN, ET AL.
G.R. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a
copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers
to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits
of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be
attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance
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of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied
Sen. Estradas Request.
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that [t]he respondent
shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may
not have been furnished and to copy them at
his expense. A respondents right to examine
refers only to the evidence submitted by the
complainant. Thus, whether under Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or
under Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of
Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever
that the affidavits executed by the co-
respondents should be furnished to a
respondent.
Sen. Estradas present Petition for Certiorari is
premature. He did not file any pleading,
much less a motion for reconsideration, to the
27 March 2014 Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313.
He immediately proceeded to file this Petition
for Certiorari before this Court. Sen. Estradas
resort to a petition for certiorari before this
Court stands in stark contrast to his filing of his
7 April 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of
the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution finding
probable cause. The present Petition for
Certiorari is premature.
A motion for reconsideration allows the public
respondent an opportunity to correct its
factual and legal errors. Sen. Estrada, however,
failed to present a compelling reason that the
present Petition falls under the exceptions to
the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is required prior to the filing of
a petition for certiorari. This Court has
reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion
for reconsideration is mandatory before the
filing of a petition for certiorari.
TESDA VS COA, ET AL.
G.R. 196418, February 10, 2015.
It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI
Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. Hence, the GAA should be purposeful,
deliberate, and precise in its contents and
stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when
it held that the provisions of the GAA were
not self-executory. This meant that the
execution of the GAA was still subject to a
program of expenditure to be approved by
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the President, and such approved program of
expenditure was the basis for the release of
funds.

Considering, however, that all the parties here

acted in good faith, we cannot countenance
the refund of subject incentive benefits for the
year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have
already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad
faith can be detected under the attendant facts
and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of
offices concerned disbursed such incentive
benefits in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter
accepted the same with gratitude, confident
that they richly deserve such benefits.

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