ideas Defense

10 for & Diplomacy

July 2010 | Featured Idea

An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency
 10 Ideas for Defense and Diplomacy
July 2010

National Director
Hilary Doe

National Network Coordinator

Tarsi Dunlop

Lead Strategist for Defense and Diplomacy

Reese Neader

Managing Editor
Gracye Cheng

Editor
Sid Salvi

The Roosevelt Institute Campus Network

455 Massachusetts Ave NW
Suite 650
Washington, DC 20001
Copyright © 2010 by the Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors. They do not ex-
press the views or opinions of the Roosevelt Institute, its officers, or its directors.
 ideas
10 for

Defense
and
Diplomacy
 Congratulations to
Rachel Tecott & Justin Metz,
authors of
American Cotton Subsidies & Pakistan:
An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency

Nominee for
Policy of the Year
 Inside the Issue

P
Mediating Public-Private Relationships: 8
Increasing U.S. Cyber-Security
Joelle Gamble

Decreasing Restrictions for Grants to NGOs: 10

A Reversal of the “Anti-Prostitution Pledge”
Amreen Rahman

Elevating Development as the Third Pillar 12

of American Foreign Policy
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha

Expanding Naval Humanitarian Aid 14

Charlie Piggott

Agricultural Development Teams as Stabilizing Forces 16

Jay Hobbs

American Cotton Subsidies & Pakistan: 18

An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency
Rachel Tecott and Justin Metz

Bringing Investment Freedom to Central Asia 20

Devin Turner

A Sound Approach to European Missile Defense 22

Jesse Hubbard

Recognition of Kurdish Territory Gains 24

Ashley Herzovi

A Comprehensive Approach to Child Labor Eradication 26

in the Bolivian Mines
Marcelo A. Ostria

Roosevelt Review Preview: 29

Elevating Development as the Third Pillar - Extended Paper
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha
p Letter from Washington
W e are pleased and proud to present the second edition of the 10 Ideas Series.
Comprised of six journals, these articles represent the best of our student policy work
across the country. Throughout the past year, our national policy strategists have sup-
ported hundreds of students chapters stretching from New England and Michigan to
California and Georgia. As a peer-to-peer network, our student strategy team is unlike
any other - they are both friends and mentors, strategists and promoters. Instead of
waiting for their ideas to be approved in Washington, our Washington team looks to the
field for our most innovative policies - and it is the student network that votes on the
best proposals of the year.

Within this volume, you will find a variety of ideas in motion. Some are new proposals
being spread for the first time; others have already gained traction in their local com-
munity, as our campus chapters work to enact their policies today. Some will rise to
higher prominence in the months ahead, gathering momentum as the idea is adopted
throughout our national network of 8000 members. A few will be adopted by state
legislatures and city councils; some make it all the way to Capitol Hill.

A year ago, one Colorado student published an idea about improving remote access to
health care via unused television waves; the state of California is now working with him
to make that idea a reality. A pair of students in Chicago postulated that their school
could start a revolving loan fund for energy efficient building and development; they
now help administer such a fund at Northwestern.

Whether intensely localized or built for the nation at large, these ideas all have the po-
tential to become realities. We look forward to what comes next for these authors - and
if you can be a part of that change, we hope you’ll join us.

Sincerely,

Tarsi Dunlop
National Network Coordinator
 Strategist’s Note P
The failures of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era have created the potential
for re-framing the national security debate. The progressive movement has the oppor-
tunity to define the 21st century approach to American foreign policy.

A progressive vision of U.S. foreign policy stresses the application of “smart power” to
promote U.S. national security interests and ensure continued U.S. leadership in the
international community. This strategy employs a “3D” approach to addressing national
security challenges; balancing the use of defense, diplomacy, and development as ef-
fective tools of U.S. global engagement.

In a rapidly globalizing world, the connections between inequity and conflict are clear.
Poverty is a driver for ideological extremism and political violence. Increasing access to
economic security (health care, education, living wages, etc.) decreases the potential
for inter-state and intra-state conflict. War between states is becoming a rare phenom-
enon while war within impoverished, failing states is increasing. Promoting good gov-
ernance (democratization, anti-corruption, etc.) increases the resilience of states that
face development challenges. Promoting sustainable development in the Global South
ensures that developing countries can maintain economic growth and political stability
in the current global system. In addition, promoting sustainable development at home
ensures that the United States can, in the future, reduce its dependency on foreign
oil, maintain an independent foreign policy, and afford to continue supporting a global
system that ensures American prosperity.

The Defense & Diplomacy Center has stressed the importance of two critical themes
in the policy writing process for 10ideas:
• “Natural Security”: stresses the value of equitable access to and stewardship of
natural resources, at home and abroad, in promoting U.S. national security and
developing U.S. foreign policy.
• “Sustainable Security”: stresses the concepts of collective defense and human
security as valuable approaches to formulating a sustainable U.S. national secu-
rity strategy.

We promote a progressive vision of U.S. foreign policy based on the application of

“Defense 3.0”; the synergy of defense, diplomacy, and development to promote global
social and economic integration that provides equal access to ethical markets, encour-
ages sustainable development, and fosters multilateral dialogue.

Wage peace,

Reese Neader
Lead Strategist, Defense & Diplomacy
Mediating Public-Private Relationships:
Increasing U.S. Cyber-Security
Joelle Gamble, University of California Los Angeles

Non-governmental, third party entities should be used to connect cyberspace data

from the public and private sectors. This will address private sector concerns of pub-
lic harm and liability associated with sharing information on cyber-attacks and foster
a much needed public-private relationship on issues of US cyber-security.

In 2007, there were almost 44,000 separate reported incidents of malicious cyber-
activity on US government websites. This marks a 30 percent increase since 2006 and
10 times as much activity as that reported in 2001. The private sector, particularly fi-
nancial service providers, experiences cyber-attack on a regular basis. In November
2008, a cyber-attack compromised the payment processors of an international bank
and permitted fraudulent transactions at over 130 ATMs in 49 different cities, all within
a 30 minute time span.4

In the US, cyber-attacks have been Key Facts

designed to steal valuable financial • In November 2008, the compromised payment
and personal information or desta- processors of an international bank permitted
bilize entire computer networks. fraudulent transactions at more than 130 au-
The CIA reported in 2008 that tomated teller machines in 49 cities within a
malicious cyber-activity against 30-minute period.4
information technology systems • In 2008, industry losses from intellectual
has caused the disruption of elec- property theft through the internet estimate
tric power capabilities, including to as high as $1 trillion.2
• A 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Re-
a multi-city power outage. E-com-
view reported that the private sector is hesi-
merce in 2008 alone amounted to tant to work with government due to govern-
$132 billion in retail sales, making ment information sharing measures that could
private industries a prime target cause reputational harm if shareholders were
for malware.1 In 2007, a single US made aware of their system vulnerabilities.1
retailer experienced data breaches
and losses of personal identifiable
information that compromised over 45 million credit and debit cards. This incident
brings up the question of why US government and private businesses are not collabo-
rating on issues of cyber-security. Both are susceptible to dangerous cyber-activity and
both sectors regularly develop new methods to stymie cyber-attack.4

Analysis
Both President Obama and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano have expressed a de-
sire to work with the private sector in promoting US cyber-security.6 However, private
companies are hesitant to work with the US government for fear that the Freedom of
Information Act and other transparency measures will harm their reputations and ad-
versely influence their shareholders by revealing their data systems’ vulnerabilities to
cyber-attacks. Civil liberties groups are concerned that extending government protec-
tion and classification standards to private businesses will act as a shield against liability
for private business practices.

8
In the United Kingdom, vetted information security providers link data from different
members of the private sector.1 If adapted for use in the United States, the compila-
tion of cyber-security data by a third party will allow the private sector to safely share
cyber-security data without compromising their economic security and, with the proper
regulation, can prevent private companies from claiming government protection as an
excuse for concealing reputation-damaging information. In addition, increasing techno-
logical development in cyber-security can also reduce US reliance or foreign supplies of
cyber-defense technologies and improve our global competitiveness.

Next Steps
The Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) and the EOP Cyber-securi- Talking Points
ty Coordinator, together with private • Cyber attacks are easy to plan and execute;
sector companies, could develop or because there is no immediate physical
hire a third party entity to compile danger to the perpetrators, cyber attacks
cyberspace information that could can be performed by almost any entity or
be utilized by both public and private individual.2
sectors. The Repository of Security • Both the private and public sector are eas-
Incidents (RISI) offers a useful model ily subjected to malicious cyber-activity
and both have independently set up insti-
for what these third-party organiza-
tutions to develop cyber-defense.
tions can look like; RISI combines in- • By combining private and public cyber-se-
dividually reported cyber-attack inci- curity data, the US can improve its market-
dents, as well as incidents reported in competitiveness and boost innovation in
legal databases and news groups. RISI both sectors.
then compiles reports of those inci-
dents and distributes them only to its
members, allowing them to protect themselves against similar attacks.3 Systems of this
nature should be considered for mediating data between the US and private sectors.
Upon development of a system, DHS and private companies must each set guidelines
regarding what information should and should not be shared via the mediating firm.
Shared data should mostly consist of details of cyber-attacks, with less emphasis on
system vulnerabilities.

Endnotes
1. ”Executive Office of the President: Cyberspace Policy Review.” The White House. www.whitehouse.gov/
assets/.../Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (accessed December 29, 2009)
2. Clark, Wesley, and Peter Levin. “Securing the information highway: How to enhance the United States’
electronic defenses.” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009): 2-10
3. ”Unsecured Economies: Protecting Vital Information.” NAUnsecuredEconomiesReport. http://resourc-
es.mcafee.com/content/NAUnsecuredEconomiesReport (accessed December 27, 2009)
4. ”Security Central | Security Central - InfoWorld.” Business technology, IT news, product reviews and
enterprise IT strategies - InfoWorld. http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/retailer-tjx/reports-
massive-data-breach-952 (accessed January 3, 2010)
5. ”Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Global Cyber Security Conference.” Council on Foreign Rela-
tions. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20427/remarks_by_secretary_napolitano_at_the_global_cyber_se-
curity_conference_august_2009.html (accessed December 19, 2009)
6. ”Obama’s Remarks on Securing the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure, May 2009 - Council on Foreign Rela-
tions.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20428/obamas_remarks_on_secur-
ing_the_nations_cyber_infrastructure_may_2009.html (accessed December 19, 2009)

9
Decreasing Restrictions for Grants to NGOs:
A Reversal of the “Anti-Prostitution Pledge”
Amreen Rahman, University of California Los Angeles

To achieve the United States’ goals of increasing global security through the eradica-
tion of HIV/AIDs and other epidemic diseases, the U.S. should eliminate clauses that
restrict NGOs from engaging those most at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other
infectious diseases.

Public health initiatives mixed with ideology have been integrated into numerous bills
directed at addressing infectious diseases, poverty, and public health over the last de-
cade. In 2003, Congress passed the “United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tu-
berculosis, and Malaria Act,” also known as the Global AIDS Act; Section 301 of this
legislation states that no funds should go to an NGO which “does not have a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”1 Initially this requirement was only
stipulated on foreign NGOs, as the Department of Justice advised that applying it to
US NGOs might violate the First Amendment. Later, the DOJ reneged on that recom-
mendation and USAID expanded these funding restrictions to both US and foreign
NGOs. This expansion sparked a series of court cases that have received conflicting
rulings.2

Analysis Key Facts

Initially, the Pledge seems to be an artificial • 16 drop-in centers in Bangladesh
requirement that can be easily met particu- were closed when an umbrella NGO
larly since most NGOs are not “pro” sex traf- signed the Pledge.5
ficking. However, the vague and indetermi- • Brazil refused over $40 million in
nate wording of the pledge has forced many USAID grants based on the Anti-
NGOs that deal directly with sex workers Prostitution Pledge.6
and other underserved populations to refuse
to sign the pledge. NGOs have to develop a
level of trust with sex workers in order to ensure efficacy of their services, whether they
be drop in centers, counseling services, education outreach, etc. Research conducted
by CHANGE found that directors of NGOs say their biggest challenge is identifying
and creating relationships with sex workers. Thus, for many of these organizations who
offer sex workers a safe place to stay or access to HIV/AIDS prevention & treatment,
agreeing to the pledge threatens these hard-won relationships and undermines the
NGO’s program.

In testimony before a House Subcommittee, the Director of the Initiative Against Traf-
ficking in Persons suggested that judgment from an NGO is likely to drive a sex worker
away from the organization.3 Thus the Pledge, in an effort to eradicate prostitution,
increases the likelihood of trafficking and abuse. Many HIV/AIDs-focused NGOs focus
on sex workers in particular because of the high HIV exposure that sex work entails. As
per public health strategies, these NGOs focus primarily on harm reduction strategies,
so while the ideal is complete eradication of prostitution, harm reduction strategies
entail dealing with immediate consequences of sex work. The Anti-Prostitution Pledge
creates a “chilling effect” on NGOs, making them wary of engaging in outreach to sex

10
workers that can be misconstrued as “promoting prostitution.” Thus, key services for
sex workers such as drop-in centers, contraceptive distribution, and educational out-
reach are avoided by NGOs who fear that their funding will get cut off. The Anti-Pros-
titution Pledge undermines major investment the US has made in combating HIV/AIDs,
decreasing the efficicacy of those billions of aid dollars.

Next Steps
In light of the confusing and ambiguous language the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services has proposed revisions to the wording of this
policy. This revision does not entail an elimination of the Pledge, but rather a clarifica-
tion of it, by including further technical and fiscal details concerning how to determine
if the entire NGO gets funding cut off when subsets of the umbrella NGO violate the
pledge.4 In the context of the recent repeal of the Global Gag Rule, this clarification is
taking a step backwards from furthering
the United States’ goals of global health
and security. Talking Points
• Forging connections to sex workers who
are already heavily marginalized by soci-
Instead of analyzing which organizations
ety is a delicate task that requires tre-
will get funding cut off, legislation should mendous time and effort.
eliminate the pledge as a requirement • Sex workers are a primary population at
for USAID grants, and specify specific risk of HIV/AIDs transmission.
activities involving the sex worker popu-
lation which should be promoted and
not restricted. Legislative action is crucial to clarifying and improving global health and
global security. In order to reengage NGOs with underserved populations of sex work-
ers, upcoming foreign aid allocation bills ought to highlight the gap that Anti Prostitu-
tion Pledge has left and allocate funds specifically towards this cause. This would entail
creating a new initiative under USAID dedicated to engaging NGOs who have been
denied or rejected USAID funding in the past on the basis of the pledge.

Endnotes
1. Center for Health and Gender Equality, “Implications of U.S. Policy Restrictions for HIV Programs Aimed
at Commercial Sex Workers (2008), http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/
aplobrief.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010).
2. Center for Health and Gender Equality, “Implications of U.S. Policy Restrictions for HIV Programs
Aimed at Commercial Sex Workers (2008), http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publi-
cations/aplobrief.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010).
3. Ann Jordan, 2007 (Director, Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons, Global Rights Before the House
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism March 20, 2007, http://homeland.
house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070320165954-38416.pdf
4. OMB Watch, “How Will Proposed Anti-Prostitution Rules Impact Nonprofits?.” December 8, 2009.
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10616 (accessed 1/1/2010).
5. Taimur Khan & Devika Iyer, “Critique of the Anti Prostitution Pledge and Its Global Impact (2007),
http://www.sexworkersproject.org/media-toolkit/downloads/20070330-BriefingPaperOnAnti-Prosti-
tutionPledge.pdf. (accessed February 2, 2010).
6. Pathfinder International, “The Anti-Prostitution Loyalty Oath: Undermining HIV/AIDS Prevention and
U.S. Foreign Policy.” 2006. http://www.pathfind.org/site/DocServer/HIV-AIDS3.pdf?docID=5981 (ac-
cessed 1/1/2010).

11
Elevating Development as the Third Pillar
Of American Foreign Policy
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Rukh Paracha, University of California Los Angeles

Congress should extensively reform the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) by implementing critical institutional reforms and integrating it
into a Department of Development that implements untied development methods.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), its policies, its pro-
grams, and especially its field representatives serve as the faces of America throughout
global civil society. In recent years the quantity of foreign aid programs has increased
markedly; however, the incoherent organizational structure of U.S. aid programs has led
to a fragmented, ineffective, and chaotic foreign aid system in urgent need of institu-
tional reform. While President Bush elevated development as the third pillar of national
security policy, this vision has not yet been fully realized. Institutional reform is critical
to ensure the effective utilization of every foreign assistance dollar. Development is soft
power, but it is also an effective tool of
“smart power,” and the future of our
Key Facts
national security strategy is equally
• Under President George W. Bush’s admin-
contingent upon the strength of our istration, official development assistance
defense, diplomacy, and development increased from $10 billion in 2000 to $22
agendas.1 billion in 2003.2
• American foreign aid organizations lack the
Congress should establish USAID structural and organizational capacity to al-
as a cabinet-level department. The locate and utilize their resources effective-
new, more autonomous department ly. In addition, many aid packages are lined
should control its budget and increase with earmarks that divert money to fulfill
political or military purposes.
its operating account to adequately
• The United States is notorious for distrib-
staff, review, and fund its programs. To uting tied aid, which forces recipient coun-
maximize the efficiency of U.S. foreign tries to purchase expensive products and
aid dollars, aid programs within other services from the donor country.3
government agencies should be con-
solidated and streamlined under the
new Development Department. This department, with its new stability and resources,
should actively pursue more sustainable, long-term development goals and institute
more effective implementation by increasing fieldwork, regional research, and tailoring
development projects for specific civil societies to maximize benefits.

In the past few decades, resources reserved for USAID decreased while the State De-
partment and Department of Defense took responsibility for aid programs or started
their own independent aid projects. In 2001, the State Department took complete con-
trol over USAID’s direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget. In
2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established to reduce pov-
erty through sustainable economic development. The Secretary of State was elected
chair of the MCC, rather than a USAID administrator. In 2006, USAID subordinated
itself completely under the State Department. Currently, USAID receives its funding
through a State Department-controlled budget process and the USAID administrator

12
serves as the Director of Foreign Assistance to the State Department and head of
USAID. This clearly increases political pressures and interest bias on U.S. foreign aid
programs to favor national security and foreign diplomacy objectives.5

Analysis
Currently, aid programs are
Talking Points
largely comprised of presi- • Development is a key component of “smart power”
dential initiatives, congressio- and should serve as an independent third pillar in
nal earmarks for healthcare, America’s national security strategy.
HIV/AIDS awareness and pre- • According to The Economist, Britain’s Department
vention, K-12 education espe- for International Development (DFID) is “a model for
cially for girls, microfinance other rich countries,” because DFID established an
programs, and environmental autonomous development agency with an influential
justice issues, because these minister position that refuses to tie aid to economic
or political interests. In 2003, DFID experts project-
have a direct, measurable
ed that the poverty reduction impact of each dollar
impact on civil societies. The of UK aid had increased fourfold since 1990.4
Secretary of Development
and USAID leadership need
to develop specific programs for long-term development initiatives, including anti-cor-
ruption measures, agricultural assistance, democracy-promotion programs, technical
capacity building, and infrastructure improvement measures.

Restructuring U.S. foreign aid assistance needs to happen from the top down. Britain’s
Department for International Development provides a helpful model: experts have
found that when Britain’s DFID completely untied aid from Britain’s primary economic
and political interests, the effectiveness of aid increased between 15-30%.6 In 2003,
the DFID projected that the poverty reduction impact of each dollar of UK aid had
increased fourfold since 1990.4

As an autonomous department, USAID would control its budget and should receive
enough funds to reduce the use of the ineffective contractors it currently relies on be-
cause of the lack of internal staff and technical expertise. In addition, humanitarian and
development programs now assigned to the State Department (refugee projects, PEP-
FAR, and post-conflict reconstruction projects etc.) and to the Defense Department
(democracy promotion programs, aid programs, etc.) should be reassigned to USAID
staff and committees. This effectively re-organizes and streamlines aid funding and bu-
reaucracy, creating one coherent aid strategy where there used to be several compet-
ing agendas, and eliminating some of the unnecessary costs of overlapping aid efforts.

Endnotes
1. “U.S. Foreign Aid: The Need for Fundamental Reform - Brookings Institution.” Brookings Institution. Web. 14 Apr. 2010. <http://www.brook-
ings.edu/events/2007/0727development.aspx>.
2. Atwood, J. Brian, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios. “Arrested Development | Foreign Affairs.” Foreign Affairs. Nov.-Dec. 2008.
Web. 14 Jan. 2010. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64613/j-brian-atwood-m-peter-mcpherson-and-andrew-natsios/arrested-
development>.
3. “OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - Tied Aid Credits.” OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education,
Trade, Finance, Prices...). 18 Nov. 2001. Web. 14 Apr. 2010. <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3089>.
4. Barder, Owen. Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience. Diss. 2005. Print.
5. CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Aid: An Introductatory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 2004, Order Code 98-916. < http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf>.
6. European Commission, Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, 2009, Project No. 2008/170204. <http://ec.europa.eu/
development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf>.

13
Expanding Naval Humanitarian Aid
Charlie Piggott, University of Michigan

Expand the U.S. Navy’s hospital ship programs, including USSOUTHCOM’s Opera-
tion Continuing Promise. By providing the program with a formal place in the budget
and increasing the amount of money allocated to it, the hospital ships of the Navy’s
Military Sealift Command can increase the number of voyages and the duration of
each stay in port so as to reach more patients.

When discussed in the context of international relations, “power” is often conceived

of as the use or threat of force to coerce another nation. This ignores a dimension of
power known as “soft power,” which is the use of positive incentives and aid to influ-
ence another country. The United States Armed Forces, while traditionally considered
an instrument of “hard power,” has the potential to be an effective carrier of soft power.
The Navy in particular has a long history of providing disaster relief since 1960.1 In 2006,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates initiated a proactive humanitarian program involv-
ing sending hospital ships from port to port performing routine medical procedures in
Latin America, western Africa, and Asia.

The hospital ship programs have been suc- Key Facts
cessful in providing much-needed medical • $250 million = Yearly cost of the hos-
pital ship program, less than 1/10th of
aid to those who may not have access oth-
1% of the Defense Department’s $613
erwise, ranging from filling prescriptions billion budget.6
to performing minor surgeries. In two and • 100,049 = Number of Latin Americans
a half months in 2009, medical personnel treated in a single voyage of a single
aboard the USNS Comfort treated over hospital ship.7
100,000 people in seven Latin American
countries.2 The Mercy treated an addition-
al 98,000 people in 12 countries in four months.3 Yet the population served is extremely
small compared to the number of people who need medical attention. In addition to
only helping a small portion of the population, the impact is relatively low. While the
Comfort may be able to fill prescriptions in a town once, medicines for chronic condi-
tions cannot be acquired when the ship leaves for a new port. Additionally, surgeons
aboard the ships are not able to perform procedures that require extensive follow-up
care. By putting more ships into action, the Navy can not only reach a larger portion of
its intended audience, but have a greater impact by staying in port longer and making
return visits.

Analysis
In terms of budget, the Navy estimates that it would take $250 million to properly fund
its humanitarian efforts across the world in 2010. It has currently been funding the
hospital ship programs through various discretionary funds, with no dedicated source
of money for the programs.4 As $250 million is less than 0.1% of the defense budget,
room for expansion may be found in the Pentagon’s $613 billion budget. The program
already works closely with NGOs such as Operation Smile, and increasing partnerships
with these agencies can help defray costs when partners provide their own medical
personnel.5

14
Operation Continuing Promise is a particularly important aspect of the hospital ship
program because it focuses on Latin America, a region which is both strategically im-
portant to the U.S. and also in danger of falling out of America’s sphere of influence. The
leaders of Cuba and Venezuela are both antagonistic toward the United States, and
lending a helping hand in the poorer countries of the region counters the demonization
of the U.S. that comes from those governments. And with China making economic in-
roads in the region, the U.S. may lose Latin America to its growing economic rival unless
it can find a service to provide that China can’t.

Next Steps
1. Obtain a secure source of funds for the
Navy’s humanitarian aid programs. This
can start in the Senate Armed Services
Committee or the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee.
2. The U.S. Navy should create a liaison
between itself and medical and devel-
opmental NGOs to provide more per-
sonnel and supplies.
3. Encourage our NATO allies to create
programs of their own or contribute to
a combined effort. (The Netherlands
has already commissioned its own hos-
pital ship for humanitarian aid.)
Talking Points
• Humanitarian aid programs improve the
reputation of the United States abroad
by associating American troops with
consistent, unambiguously humanitar-
ian activities.
• Meeting the needs of the impoverished
contributes to regional political and
economic stability.
• In Latin America, the program reaches
only a small fraction of those who could
benefit from its services.
• Consistent American humanitarian aid
in Latin America can counter Cuban,
Venezuelan, and Chinese influence in
the region.

Endnotes
1. “Tsunami (Tidal Wave) Disasters and the U.S. Navy.” 10-May-2007. Naval History and Heritage Com-
mand: Frequently Asked Questions. Department of the Navy. <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/
faq130-1.htm>
2. Axe, David. September 2009. “How to Win Friends and Inoculate People: The Navy’s New Strategy for
Saving the World.” Mental Floss 8:5. Pgs 35-39.
3. “Hospital Ship Returns From Four-Month Humanitarian Deployment.” 26 September 2008. Navy.mil.
<http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=40027>
4. Jean, Grace. March 2009. “Greater Demand for ‘Soft Power’ Reveals Shortfalls in The Navy.” National
Defense. <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2009/MARCH/Pages/GreaterDeman
dfor%E2%80%98SoftPower%E2%80%99RevealsShortfallsinTheNavy.aspx>
5. Axe, 2009.
6. Jean 2009.
7. Axe 2009.

15
Agricultural Development Teams
As Stabilizing Forces
Jay Hobbs, The Colorado College

To build trust and increase stability in war-torn nations like Afghanistan, the U.S.
military should prioritize the funding, coordination, and deployment of agricultural
development teams that utilize the expertise of National Guard soldiers who work as
farmers in their civilian lives.

American military forces deployed to Afghanistan confront poverty and underdevelop-

ment as key challenges to Afghan security. Farming makes up more than one-third of
Afghanistan’s GDP, and provides income for nearly three-quarters of the population,
but years of war and Taliban neglect have left farming techniques and infrastructure
lagging far behind most other nations.

In response, a handful of state Na-
tional Guards have deployed agri- Key Facts
culture development teams (ADT) • The Missouri National Guard first deployed
to improve Afghanistan’s agriculture. an ADT unit to Afghanistan in 2008, and by
These teams are made up of volun- the end of 2009, 11 other states planned to
teer soldiers with a background in have ADT units in the warzone.1
farming, and seek to spread modern • Farming makes up nearly 1/3 of Afghani-
agricultural practices, equipment, and stan’s GDP, and provides income to nearly
3/4 of the population, but techniques are
skills. The teams increase stability and
primitive, and much of the effort goes to
build rapport with Afghan farmers and growing 93% of the world’s opium supply.2
leaders, who in turn become partners
in the struggle against insurgents.

The agricultural teams are an innovative answer to severe instability and poverty, and
by utilizing the civilian expertise of National Guard volunteers, they epitomize the Na-
tional Guard’s concept of a citizen-soldier. ADT implementation should be expanded
and should serve as a model for a reinvigorated approach to counterinsurgency. Cur-
rently, the US has deployed only 350 agricultural specialists in this nation of 31 million,
covering nine of 34 Afghan provinces. In a nation where 80% of working-age males are
small-scale farmers, the potential for positive impact far exceeds the capacity of cur-
rent agricultural development teams.3

Background
In 2007, the director of the Army National Guard announced that Missouri would de-
ploy an ADT unit to Afghanistan in late 2008. This idea relied on the collaborative
thinking and efforts of the Missouri Farm Bureau, the University of Missouri and the
National Guard Bureau. The unit was further supported by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Other state National Guards followed suit, and by the end of 2009, twelve states had
plans to put ADT units on the ground in Afghanistan. This idea was preceded by the
State Partnership Program, started in the 1990s, which pairs National Guard units with

16
foreign militaries to teach them how to function in a democracy.

Analysis
In general, it is the expertise of the soldiers and not high spending that makes these
units useful. Currently, most of the costs are covered by military discretionary spend-
ing,3 but an increase in core, stable funding could expand their reach and efficacy. In
Missouri’s pioneering effort, implementation relied on the state National Guard, sup-
port from universities, some federal support, and backing from the Farm Bureau. This
success should be duplicated and further funding should be sought, particularly as ADT
units are popular within military leadership, and expanding the number of state Nation-
al Guard units that utilize this idea could prove beneficial to both state-based partners
and embedded military units.

Next Steps
After states analyze their ability to de-
ploy ADT units, they must support the Talking Points
teams through effective coalition build- • These teams are developing long term
ing, and bipartisan action in the state leg- stability for Afghan citizens while build-
islatures. The utility of these programs ing positive, productive relationships
between the people of Afghanistan and
should also attract funding from the fed-
the U.S. military.
eral government. • ADT units utilize the civilian expertise
of National Guard soldiers, and have the
ADT units should also serve as a model support of upper-level Army officials.
for further innovation which employs the
citizen-soldier’s civilian expertise. Urban
police officers who serve in the National Guard could deploy to Baghdad and work with
local police forces. The skills that National Guard soldiers use in their everyday lives
are an important resource that should be more fully utilized.

Endnotes
1. Staff Army Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy, “Agribusiness teams help Afghan farmers find simple solutions,”
National Guard Bureau, http://www.ng.mil/features/ADT/default.aspx (Accessed April 29, 2010).
2. John Gramlick, “National Guard aids Afghan farmers,” Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/de-
tails/story?contentId=411125 (Accessed April 29, 2010).
3. David Zucchino, “U.S. Army’s farm program tackles Afghan rebuilding from the ground up,” Los Angeles
Times, July 26, 2009, World section.

17
American Cotton Subsidies and Pakistan:
An Economic Approach to Counterinsurgency
Rachel Tecott and Justin Metz, Wesleyan University

The White House should mobilize policymakers against exorbitant price supports for
cotton as part of a sustainable approach to counterinsurgency in Pakistan.

The burgeoning Taliban insurgency in Pakistan, a nuclear power with a weak govern-
ment, poses a profound threat to American security. American military exercises in
Pakistan have fueled anti-American sentiment, facilitating Taliban recruitment. Only
by implementing social and economic measures designed to strengthen the Pakistani
government, ameliorate poverty conditions, and soften anti-American ill-will can the
Obama administration hope to undermine Taliban advances in this pivotal country.

Despite its pledged commitment to se-

curity in Pakistan, the US federal gov- Key Facts
ernment spends on average $2.8 billion • Cotton production accounts for 10% of
a year subsidizing the American cotton
1 Pakistan’s total GDP.5

• Cotton employs 1.3 million Pakistanis6

industry, a protectionist policy that raises
and only 25, 000 Americans.7
supply and lowers the global price of cot- • Cotton subsidies cost the American
ton, limiting production growth by such taxpayer on average$2.8 billion a year.8
developing exporters as Pakistan. Cot-
ton is a vital component of the Pakistani
economy, accounting for 10% of GDP and 55% of export receipts.2 Through technologi-
cal modernization and increased production, Pakistan has demonstrated its commit-
ment to the development of a more robust cotton industry.3 But despite its efforts,
and in large part due to American cotton subsidies, Pakistan’s cotton industry remains
weak.

Cutting price supports for American cotton would facilitate U.S. counterinsurgency ef-
forts in Pakistan in three ways. First, Pakistani farmers could sell cotton at higher prices,
increasing their income, improving their quality of life, and lessening their susceptibility
to Taliban promises of advancement. Second, Pakistani GDP would rise, better equip-
ping the Pakistani government to crack down on Taliban activities. Finally, the gesture
would demonstrate America’s commitment to the Pakistani people, improving relations
and facilitating future cooperation against the Taliban.

Analysis
Congressional support for cotton subsidies is a product of domestic interest group
pressures and requisite pandering to southern state agribusiness. Since its establish-
ment in the wake of the Great Depression, the National Cotton Council (NCC), which
has been called “the most effective agricultural lobby in the industrialized world,”4 has
united agricultural interests into a solid political force with considerable clout at all
levels of government. Although an insignificant percentage of the southern population
works in the cotton industry, policymakers who would undermine it risk mobilizing a
vocal minority dedicated to the defense of their livelihood and lifestyle. Also, while the
lame duck Bush administration took significant strides to scale back cotton subsidies

18
in compliance with the 2005 WTO ruling, Obama, concerned with the electoral map in
2012 and specifically with his prospects in states such as North Carolina and Virginia,
has avoided the issue altogether.

Given recent momentum in the in-

ternational community, such as Bra- Talking Points
• The American cotton industry is unprofit-
zil’s victory in the WTO against US able and on the decline. It is protected by
subsidies in 2005 and increasing an antiquated agricultural policy maintained
international cries for U.S. reform, by a powerful cotton lobby.
the domestic economic climate, and • If the U.S. were to lower price supports for
the impending crisis in Pakistan, the American cotton, it would free up the world
time to drastically reform U.S. cot- market for developing exporters such as
ton policy has come. Exhausted by Pakistan, India, Brazil, Syria, and Mali.
the worst recession since the Great • A profitable cotton industry in Pakistan
would strengthen the government, raise
Depression, the American taxpayer
standards of living, and improve Pakistan-US
is loathe to bear the burden of costly relations, all of which would facilitate more
and counterproductive policies. Un- effective counterinsurgency in Pakistan.
settled by increasingly numerous
demonstrations of anti-American
sentiment, Americans are eager to rebuild foreign partnerships. Fearful of rogue states
with nuclear capabilities, Americans support policies that would help to secure stock-
piles. The American cotton subsidies program squanders tax dollars, stresses US-for-
eign relations, and directly undermines counterinsurgency in a nation that threatens a
nightmarish conflagration of Taliban ascension and nuclear weapons.

Next Steps
The Obama administration should:
• Highlight the direct connection between cotton subsidies and tax dollars, foreign
partnerships, and American security in Pakistan and at home. It must thrust the
issue back into the spotlight and repackage it not as a southern agricultural issue
to be bogged down by congressional politics, but rather, as a matter of national
economic and international security.
• Allow the duty free export of Pakistani cotton into America.
• Invest a portion of the tax dollars saved by cutting cotton price supports directly
into the Pakistani cotton industry.

Endnotes
1. Schnepf, Randy. “Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program: A Brief Overview.” Congressional Research
Service (March 2009): 1-7. http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22187.pdf (accessed January 18, 2010).
2. “The Role of Cotton in Pakistan.” Pakissan. http://www.pakissan.com/english/allabout/crop/cotton/ (accessed January
23, 2010).
3. Carroll, Joe. Pakistan Annual Cotton Report. Edited by Islamabad Staff. http://www.fas.usda.gov/ (accessed January
10, 2010).
4. Heinisch, Elinor. “West Africa versus the United States on cotton subsidies: how, why and what next?” Journal of Mod-
ern African Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 251-274. doi:0.1017/S0022278X06001625 (accessed January 19, 2010).
5. “Facts and Figures.” Pakistan Cotton Ginners’ Association. http://www.pcga.org/pcga_-_home.asp (accessed February
1, 2010).
6. “The Role of Cotton in Pakistan.” Pakissan. http://www.pakissan.com/english/allabout/crop/cotton/ (accessed January
23, 2010).
7. Heling, Madeline, Scott Beaulier, and Joshua Hall. “High Cotton: Why the USA Should Not Provide Subsidies To Cotton
Farmers.” Economic Affairs 28, no. 2 (June 2008). doi:10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00828.x (accessed February 1, 2010).
8. Schnepf, 1

19
Bringing Investment Freedom to Central Asia
Devin Turner, American University

To stabilize U.S. supply lines to Afghanistan, the U.S. should develop an aid program
for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that improves access to foreign direct investment and
reduces corruption.

General Petraeus, during his visit to Central Asia last year, declared that the increased
instability in Pakistan makes NATO cooperation with the region critical to ensuring that
the coalition’s forces in Afghanistan are supplied.4 An expansion of NATO supply routes
in the region would require a stable region that is safe from insurgents. Unfortunately,
the prospect of stability continues to be out of reach due to economic woes.

Increasing economic opportunity in the region is central to building stability. The re-
gion’s poorest countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have the most potential to profit
from foreign investment policy reform. Over 70% of the populations of both countries
were living bellow $2.15 a day in 2003.5 These countries’ problems have only been
exacerbated by the global economic crisis, as both countries faced a drop in real GDP
growth of over 5%.6 Both countries also lack sufficient levels of economic freedom
required for growth. Tajikistan’s investment rating is a paltry 25%, due to its numerous
investment barriers and banning of private property. Kyrgyzstan fares better at 50%,
but it too has placed a series of obstacles in the way of much-needed foreign invest-
ment, including barring foreign investors from owning land.7

Central Asia’s poor economic situation has

played a major role in the growth of funda- Key Facts
mentalism and narco-trafficking. The Islamic • Over 70% of Tajiks and Kyrgyz live
Movement of Uzbekistan, which has been with under $2.15 a day.1
designated as a terrorist organization by • Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have in-
the U.S., has used Tajikistan for training its vestment freedom ratings of 25%
forces to attack Kyrgyzstan and neighboring and 50% respectively.2
• Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have cor-
Uzbekistan. In 2006, these attacks became
ruption perception ratings of 2.0
so severe that the defense minister of Kyr- and 1.9 respectively on a scale of 1
gyzstan labeled them a threat to national se- to 10 (ten being a country with little
curity.8 As opium production in Afghanistan or no corruption perceptions).3
grew to over 43% between 2001 and 2008,
the heroin traffickers began to utilize Tajiki-
stan as base for their trafficking network to Europe. While the country has been able
to make substantial heroin seizures, capturing over 500 KG in the first half of 2008, the
high level of unemployment in the country has helped expand the narcotics business,
as many Tajiks have no other options for economic advancement.9

Analysis
Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is critical for spurring economic growth in both
countries. Increased industrial production would be very effective in developing both
countries’ economies, as both countries continue to have predominately rural popula-
tions. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have urbanization ratings of 26% and 36% respectively,10
suggesting that both nations have much untapped human capital for industry, and the

20
country’s extensive hydropower resources could prove enticing to businesses hoping
to expand into the region. Political transparency must also be coupled with this move to
expand FDI in both countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have corruption perception rat-
ings of 2.0 and 1.9 (out of 10) respectively,11 suggesting that expanding FDI at the moment
would be unwise, unless government transparency reforms were to be undertaken.

Next Steps
The U.S. should offer a series of
short-term development plans to
Talking Points
• Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the least devel-
these countries, consisting of tar- oped countries in Central Asia.
geted loans and grants for busi- • As NATO and U.S. supply lines are further de-
nesses and governments, which veloped in the region, Central Asia’s stability
would be renegotiated ever two becomes more important for the U.S.
to three years to ensure that the • Islamic fundamentalism and narco-trafficking is
countries are taking definite steps rampant in both countries as citizens have ac-
towards FDI regulation reform. cess to few economic opportunities.
The two countries would be rated • The U.S. should use the March 14th, 2008 MCC
agreement with Kyrgyzstan as a basis for devel-
on a series of different economic
opment aid that promotes investment policy
freedoms (i.e. the ability to own reform and reduces government corruption in
property), and would be rewarded the economy.
with extra funds if they manage to
exceed the mandate. Conversely,
financial support for government institutions (but not companies) would be reduced if
the country was found to be falling behind on such reforms. Through such a plan, the
U.S. can ensure that it does not spend large amounts of money in the region without
seeing any progress on reforms.

Endnotes
1. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010).
2. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010), http://www.heritage.
org/Index (accessed April 15, 2010).
3. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” chart, Transparency International, http://media.transparency.
org/imaps/cpi2009/ (accessed April 15, 2010).
4. Congressional Research Service, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Inter-
ests, by Jim Nichol (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf (accessed
April 15, 2010).
5. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010).
6. Martha Olcott, “Asia’s Overlooked Middle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23288 (accessed April 15, 2010).
7. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010), http://www.heritage.
org/Index (accessed April 15, 2010).
8. Congressional Research Service, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Inter-
ests, by Jim Nichol (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf (accessed
April 15, 2010).
9. “Tajikistan Tackles Drug Trafficking,” United Nations Development Programme, http://europeandcis.
undp.org/home/show/E976F4E2-F203-1EE9-BCEDD34DA35723
10. The World Factbook 2009 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009), s.v. “Tajikistan” and
“Kyrgyzstan” (accessed April 15, 2010).
11. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” chart, Transparency International, http://media.transparency.org/
imaps/cpi2009/ (accessed April 15, 2010).

21
A Sound Approach to European Missile Defense
Jesse Hubbard, American University

To ensure the security of our European allies, the United States should build a flexible
and powerful missile defense system utilizing Aegis cruisers in the Mediterranean
and radar sensors in the Caucasus.

The United States must undertake adequate steps to protect itself and its allies from
the potential dangers of a nuclear Iran. To this end, the Bush administration began the
development of a missile defense system based out of Poland and the Czech Republic.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, this plan seemed like a brazen attempt to reignite the
Cold War. Opinion polls in the Czech Republic and Poland showed that the public there
viewed the missile shield with skepticism.1 The Obama administration has indicated it
is planning on abandoning the Bush approach. This decision could provide the U.S. with
the opportunity to build a new missile defense system that is flexible, effective, and
popular with our allies and partners in the region.

Analysis
The Obama administration’s Ballistic
Missile Defense Review outlines the Key Facts
government’s policy priorities regard- • No missile Iran’s current arsenal has a
range greater than 1,300 kilometers.8
ing missile defense. Crucially, the re-
• The Bush plan would not have been fully
view stipulates that missile defense
operational until 2013.9
systems must be realistic, fiscally sus- • A single Aegis cruiser will be able to hold
tainable, and flexible.2 To meet these up to 100 SM-3 missiles.10
objectives the U.S. should partner • Aegis cruisers with missile interceptors
with Russia to jointly operate sensors can be deployed to the waters surround-
closer to Iran and use SM-3 missiles ing Europe as early as 2011.11
launched off of Aegis cruisers as the
interceptor system It might seem dif-
ficult to achieve the high level of political and military cooperation necessary to operate
a joint radar station, but Vladimir Putin has already proposed that the US and Russia
operate a joint system situated at a military base in Azerbaijan.3 The United States
should take this opportunity. This radar system would detect Iranian missiles far earlier
than the proposed Czech radar installation.4

The SM-3 interceptor system would provide our allies flexible missile defense at a re-
alistic price. Critics have justifiably attacked the reliability of Bush’s ground-based in-
terceptor system, but SM-3 interceptors are a far more proven technology. With 19
successful interceptions out of 23 tests,5 the SM-3 system is the most reliable missile
defense the United States possesses.6 Moreover, the mobility of Aegis cruisers gives
the United States greater flexibility in responding to potential threats. The system would
also be inexpensive in comparison to other defense projects; the CBO estimates that
developing and running an SM-3 defense system for 20 years would cost approximately
18-22 billion dollars, including the cost of expanding the Navy’s Aegis cruiser force.7

22
Next Steps
The Obama administration should
press ahead with negotiating the lo-
gistics of shared radar systems in
Azerbaijan. The two sides must come
to an agreement on how information
from the radar sensor will be shared
and what sort of presence U.S. sol-
diers will have at these installations.
Additionally, the government of Azer-
baijan must be consulted regarding
the potential U.S. use of the radar.
The administration should also begin
the process of upgrading Aegis cruis-
ers and deploying them to the waters
of the Mediterranean and the Baltic.
In the long term, more cruisers should
be built in order to ensure a perma-
nent defensive capability.
Talking Points
• A flexible system based off of Aegis cruisers
is less vulnerable to preemptive attack than
a silo-based system grounded in Poland.
• A land-based system would have been
constantly vulnerable to being shut down
at the behest of the host government. No
such danger exists with Aegis cruisers pa-
trolling international waters, where they
answer only to the United States.
• The flexible system would cover all of Eu-
rope by 2015. The Bush plan would have left
crucial NATO capitals like Athens and An-
kara undefended indefinitely.12

Endnotes
1. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/
world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370>
2. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/
bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.>, iii
3. Putin Proposes Joint Radar in Azerbaijan. 7 June 2007. Der Spiegel. 21 January 2010 < http://www.spie-
gel.de/international/world/0,1518,487330,00.html>
4. Lenox, Duncan. Missile Expert Assesses Azerbaijan Radar Proposal. 8 June 2007. Radio Free Europe. 21
January 2010 < http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077011.html>
5. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/
bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf>., 19
6. Time For an All New Navy Missile Shield? July 13, 2009. Wired Magazine <http://www.wired.com/dan-
gerroom/2009/07/time-for-an-all-navy-missile-shield/>
7. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., xvi
8. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/
world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370>
9. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., ix
10. New Missile Defences in Europe. 24 September 2009. The Economist. <http://www.economist.com/
world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370>
11. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. February 2010. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/
bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.>, 24
12. Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. Febuary 2009. Congressional Budget Office www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf., 38

23
Recognition of Kurdish Territory Gains
Ashley Herzovi, Michigan State University

The United States should call upon Iraq to honor Article 140 of the 2005 Constitution,1
which mandates a referendum and census to allow Kurdish people unfairly expelled
by Saddam Hussein to be governed by the Regional Government of Kurdistan.

Comparing Kirkuk to Jerusalem, W. Andrew Terrill notes that “the threat of civil war
remains real.”4 Tensions between the Kurdish and Iraqis plague their border, and it is
vital to international security that these tensions be alleviated. Iraqi Kurdistan is distinct
from Iraq, with a unique culture, social norms, and a semi-autonomous Regional Gov-
ernment of Kurdistan (KRG). The biggest hurdle to peace between Iraqis and Kurds is
that after almost 20 years of semi-independent rule, the Kurds do not to consider them-
selves Iraqis in either a cultural or legal sense. However, Baghdad refuses to relinquish
Kurdistan completely, for a variety of political and economic reasons.

Under the current Iraqi constitution, Article 140 calls for a referendum to potentially
redistrict ethnically Kurdish communities.
Stating that, “normalization and census [will]
conclude with a referendum in Kirkuk and Key Facts
• Drafted in 2005, the Iraqi Constitu-
other disputed territories to determine the tion states that Article 140 shall be
will of their citizens.”5 This clause extends enacted entirely no later than De-
a previous order of the provisional govern- cember 31, 2007.2
ment initiating a commission to investigate • Kurdish people are disaggregated
claims of unfair expulsion of Kurdish resi- across the borders of Northern
dents from Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein. Iraq, Southeast Turkey, and parts
of Eastern Syria and Western Iran.
Analysis Iraqi Kurdistan is the only semi-au-
tonomous territory belonging to the
American occupation of Iraq in 2003 created
Kurdish people.
a new opportunity for the Kurdish people. • Kirkuk is home to approximately
The unofficial Kurdish army, the Pesh Merga, 1.25 million residents.3
took the opportunity to seize additional land
and expand the southern boundary of Kurd-
istan to include Kurdish possession of Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala.6 Under Article 140,
ethnic Kurdish communities like Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanaqin, Nineveh, and Diyala would fall
under Kurdish rule.7

Northern Iraq is also home to a large percentage of Iraq’s oil fields. Some estimates
claim that Kurdistan could produce 450,000 barrels per day; it currently produces only
20,000.8 Kirkuk’s oil field, currently the center of Iraqi oil producation, can generate
approximately 500,000 barrels per day.9 This natural conflict of economic interests
makes full Kurdish indepedence problematic for Iraq, but Article 140 provides a solu-
tion that would help satisfy both Kurdish and Iraqi interests. Iraq will retain lucrative
oil fields, while the KRG remains semi-autonomous and is given an outlet to express its
ethnic unity.

Support of this Article will allow for Kurdish gains within the scope of Iraqi rule of law.
The Kurdish territory gained is that promised to the KRG within the Iraqi Constitution.

24
The United States’ support would help to ensure that the Iraqi government continues
to follow the legal provisions set forth in its own constitution, upholding a critical princi-
ple in the rule of law and establishing an important precedent for this ethnically divided
nation. One other factor to consider is Turkey’s response to any change in Kurdistan’s
staus quo. Turkey has recently opened economic activity with the KRG but, it has yet
to “[allow] the KRG to export oil and gas through its territory until Iraq has adopted
a federal hydrocarbons law.”10 Negotiating this balance of interests successfully may
prove critical to regional stability, and it is essential that Iraq, the KRG, and Turkey come
to a stable arrangement that promotes economic prosperity without instigating further
violence.
Talking Points
Next Steps • Prior to 2003, Saddam Hussein’s army ex-
While Iraq has become more ac- pelled Kurdish people living in Kirkuk; human
cepting of the KRG in recent years, rights experts have determined that this was
they have still not meaningfully ad- an ethnic cleansing effort.
dressed the egregious wrongs com- • Territory gains for the Kurdish people in Iraq
mitted by Saddam Hussein’s gov- will be difficult as Kurds in Turkey, Syria and
ernment. In the 2005 Constitution, Iran remain in persecution. Territory gains
Article 140 explicitly states that a also undoubtedly complicate the oil trade
between Iraq and Turkey.
census and referendum will be done
• The disputed Kurdish territories are histori-
and “de-Arabization” procedures of cally Kurdish.
ethnically Kurdish communities will
begin. Five years later, these pro-
cesses have yet to start. It is imperative that the United States pressure Iraq to uphold
the rule of law, as tensions in northern Iraq could be significantly improved with these
small, but significant gestures.

Endnotes
1. Iraq. Iraqi National Assembly. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Web. 8 Apr.
2010. <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf>.
2. “Inside the 2010 Iraqi Elections.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 12 Nov. 2009. Web. 09
Apr. 2010. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24168>.
3. “Kirkuk: 1.25 Million Population, Room Only for 450 Patients in Hospitals | Misc | AKNEWS.com.”
AK News. Kurdistan News Agency, 19 Mar. 2010. Web. 08 Apr. 2010. <http://www.aknews.com/en/
aknews/3/127041/>.
4. Londoño, Ernesto. “Kurds, Arabs Maneuver Ahead of U.N. Report on N. Iraq.” The Washington
Post. 17 Feb 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2010. < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/
AR2009041604007.html>
5. Iraq. Iraqi National Assembly. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Web. 8 Apr.
2010. <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf>.
6. Myers, Stephen L. “Rivalries in Iraq Keep G.I’s in the Field.” New York Times, 26 Jan. 2010. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/world/middleeast/27mosul.html?scp=2&sq=kurds&st=cse>
7. “Iraq: Kurdish Official Says Kirkuk Normalization To Proceed - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.” Radio
Free Europe / Radio Liberty - Free Media in Unfree Societies. 21 June 2007. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. <http://
www.rferl.org/content/Article/1072472.html>
8. Holland, Ben. “Kurds’ Boom in North Iraq Imperiled by Oil Dispute With Baghdad.” Business Week. 10
Jan. 2010. Web. 31 Jan. 2010. < http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-14/kurds-boom-in-north-
iraq-imperiled-by-oil-dispute-with-baghdad.html>
9. “Iraq: The KRG’s Bold Moves on Oil.” Stratfor Global Intelligence. Strategic Forecasting Inc., 30 Nov.
2007. Web. 1 Feb. 2010.
10. “International Crisis Group - 81 Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation.” International Crisis
Group - Conflict prevention and resolution. Web. 01 Feb. 2010. < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/
index.cfm?id=5777>

25
A Comprehensive Approach to Child Labor
Eradication in the Bolivian Mines
Marcelo A. Ostria, University of North Texas

A multidimensional approach to reducing child labor in Bolivian mines should fo-

cus on empowering the child through education, empowering the community with
alternative sources of income, and changing social norms that define child labor as
normal and acceptable.

Bolivian children working in mines face hazardous conditions and miss school to pro-
vide for their families. Social and economic structures condoning child labor render this
exploitation perpetual. Bolivia also ignores the United Nation’s pressure to eliminate
extreme forms of child labor.1 This cycle of exploitation makes parents complicit in the
abuse of children who are robbed simultaneously of their childhood and of the educa-
tion they need to break out of the doom-loop of poverty.

Analysis
The solution must address the attitude in
Bolivia about the propriety of child labor. Key Facts
There should also be a more constructive • Child labor in mines is one of the most
channeling of U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia to exploitative and hazardous forms of
educate the Bolivian public about such child labor in the world.5
matters. The current Bolivian incentive • Children are attracted to working in
the mines in Bolivia because of the
program, “Bono Juancito Pinto,” grants
payoff can be significant.
a stipend the equivalent of $15 U.S.2 to • Certain mining towns in Bolivia do not
children in grades one through six. U.S. regard child labor as a problem, but
foreign aid could be geared toward sub- rather as a societal role.
sidizing grant stipends of higher amounts
to families of older children (grades four
through six), the age at which children usually leave school to enter the mines. More-
over, encouraging regulated microfinance institutions in the mining towns would gener-
ate income-producing alternatives for the parents, and especially for women.

Grassroots organizations should likewise assist in building schools and providing other
educational and employment opportunities in Bolvian mining towns. One useful model
is provided by the Bolivian Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (IPTK), which has devel-
oped educational workshops for child laborers in the Potosi-Oruro region.3 The role
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. is essential to achieving this
reform. Consider, with respect to Bolivian gold mining, an endeavor already funded by
the U.S. Department of Labor (USDO) to the tune of $4,480,000, which works to elimi-
nate child labor in Bolivian gold mines.4 Similar investment is essential for the 120,000
Bolivian children involved in small-scale mining of other resources.

Next Steps
Too often, Bolivians resist the notion that child labor comprises either abuse or a human
rights offense. That fundamental rejection presents a formidable deterrent to reform.
As long as this popular attitude remains, administrative and legislative measures will

26
 Talking Points
• Empower the families of child laborers by providing alternative-income opportunities
(such as U.S. regulated-microfinance institutes). By decreasing the need for child labor,
more families may be able to keep their children in school.
• Grassroots organizations should work in partnership with the Bolivian government, U.S.
Department of Labor, and USAID to supply better schools and more financial incentives
for at-risk youth in Bolivia.

falter and fail. The U.S. Department of Labor and USAID must work in tandem with the
government of Bolivia and grassroots organizations to not only to supply better schools,
education incentives, and job opportunities, but also to undermine and attack this per-
vasive idea that it is right and acceptable for children to work in Bolivia’s mines.

Endnotes
1. Personal e-mail correspondence with Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze, former President of Bolivia and current
Professor of Law and Politics at the Catholic University in La Paz, Bolivia. Correspondence ranged
from June 2009-present.
2. United States Department of Labor, 2007 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor- Bolivia, 27 Au-
gust 2008. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48caa460c.
html [accessed December 14, 2008]
3. Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (IPTK). Iván Ramiro Arancibia Araoz, Executive Director. Sucre, Bo-
livia. E-mail correspondence, December 2008 – January 2009.
4. United States Department of Labor, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking, Proj-
ect Status – Americas. Online available at: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/project-americas.
htm [accessed December 12, 2008]
5. Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI). (October, 2008) Child Labour in
the Mining Sector in Bolivia: the Children’s Perspective Final Report.

27
Roosevelt Review Preview:
Elevating Development as the Third Pillar
in American Foreign Policy
Erika K. Solanki and Shah-Ruhk Paracha, University of California Los Angeles

Abstract
The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) policies, programs,
and field representatives serve as the faces of America throughout the world in civil so-
ciety. In recent years, support for foreign aid programs has increased markedly. Howev-
er, the incoherent organizational structure of U.S. aid programs has led to a fragmented,
ineffective, and chaotic foreign aid system in urgent need of institutional reform. Under
President George W. Bush’s administration, official development assistance increased
from $10 billion in 2000 to $22 billion in 2003. However, American foreign aid organi-
zations lack the structural and organizational capacity to allocate and utilize these re-
sources effectively. Additionally, many aid packages are lined with earmarks, diverting
money to political or military purposes.

President Bush elevated development as the third pillar of national security policy,
alongside defense and diplomacy. But this vision has not yet been realized — insti-
tutional reform is critical to ensure that every foreign assistance dollar is effectively
spent.

To read more, visit www.rooseveltinstitute.org for the full white paper,

part of the forthcoming Roosevelt Review.

29
www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org