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The Electronic Newsletter of The Industrial Refrigeration Consortium


Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

ENGINEERING RELIEF SYSTEMS RELIEF


VALVE SIZING CONSIDERATIONS
We continue to receive frequent inquiries and questions on safety relief systems as they apply to industrial
refrigeration systems. In past issues of The Cold Front, we have covered the basics of engineering
safety relief systems (Vol. 6 No. 1, 2006 and Vol. 11 No. 1, 2011). In this edition, we extend our discussion to
include considerations for pressure relief valve sizing in non-routine circumstances as a preface to the next
edition of The Cold Front where we will cover relief scenarios that form the basis for sizing of relief
vent piping systems. The linkage between relief valve sizing basis and relief scenarios is both an important
and inseparable aspect of ensuring that the safety relief system being engineered will perform as-expected.

Background
The requirements for overpressure protection of pressure vessels originate from the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code. Related industry safety and design standards such as ASHRAE 15 and IIAR 2 require
pressure vessels used in industrial refrigeration systems be built to ASME Section VIII Division 1 (referred to

IRC Staff In This Issue


Director Relief Systems Valve Sizing 1-9
Doug Reindl 608/265-3010
Considerations
or 608/262-6381
dreindl@wisc.edu Upcoming Ammonia Classes 2
Assistant Director Noteworthy 2
Todd Jekel 608/265-3008
tbjekel@wisc.edu

Research Staff
Dan Dettmers 608/262-8221
djdettme@wisc.edu

IRC Contact Information Mailing Address


Toll-free 1-866-635-4721 1513 University Avenue
Phone 608/262-8220 Suite 3184
FAX 608/262-6209 Madison, WI 53706
e-mail info@irc.wisc.edu Web Address www.irc.wisc.edu
Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

here as the B&PV Code). Section UG-125 of the B&PV


Code specifies that all pressure vessels within its scope
must be provided with overpressure protection in Upcoming Ammonia
accordance with the requirements prescribed in UG-125 Courses
through UG-138 and/or with an overpressure protection
system as outlined in section UG-140. In part, UG-125 Design of NH3 Refrigeration Systems
states: for Peak Performance and Efficiency
September 17-21, 2012 Madison, WI
(1) It is the users or his/her designated agents
responsibility to identify all potential overpressure
scenarios and the method of overpressure protection Introduction to Ammonia Refrigeration
used to mitigate each scenario. Systems
October 8-10, 2012 Madison, WI
(2) It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the
required overpressure protection system is properly
installed prior to initial operation. Process Hazard Analysis (Emphasizing
Ammonia Refrigeration Systems)
(3) If a pressure relief device(s) is to be installed, it is October 19-21, 2012 Madison, WI
the responsibility of the user or his/her designated
agent to size and select the pressure relief device(s)
based on its intended service. Intermediate Ammonia Refrigeration
Systems
Part (1) above clearly states that the user of a vessel (the December 5-7, 2012 Madison, WI
owner) is responsible for identifying ALL potential
overpressure scenarios and assuring the proper sizing of Process Safety Management Audits for
relief device(s) in accordance with the identified Compliance and Continuous Safety
overpressure scenarios. Industry standards such as Improvement
ASHRAE 15 and IIAR 2 provide basic sizing methods for January 16-18, 2013 Madison, WI
pressure vessels built upon an assumed external heat
load that drives the overpressure condition. In this Introduction to Ammonia Refrigeration
edition, we will not only review the basic sizing of
Systems
pressure relief valves for vessels but extend the
March 6-8, 2013 Madison, WI
discussion to consider other situations that could lead to
overpressure and discuss how the sizing basis differs.
Ammonia Refrigeration System Safety
April 17-19, 2013 Madison, WI
Relief Sizing Basis for
Pressure Vessels Achieving Energy Cost Savings for
The basis for sizing relief valves for pressure vessels
Ammonia Refrigeration Systems
seems pretty straightforward. For the pressure vessels
May 22-24, 2013 Madison, WI
used in refrigeration systems, the most frequently
applied basis for relief capacity determination is due to
overpressure caused by external heat addition
originating from a fire radiating heat to the vessel. The
sizing basis included in ASHRAE 15 is given by:

Noteworthy
Noteworthy
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presentations
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at the 2011and
IRCTechnology
Research
Forum May 2-3, 2012 at the Pyle Center in Madison, WI.
and Technology Forum.
Mark
Send your
itemscalendars now
of note for fornewsletter
next the 2012 Jekel, tbjekel@wisc.edu.
IRC Research
to Todd and Technology
Forum May 2-3, 2012 at the Pyle Center in Madison, WI.
Send items of note for next newsletter to Todd Jekel, tbjekel@wisc.edu.

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Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

= (1)

where

= minimum required discharge capacity of the relief device expressed in lbm/min of air

f = relief device capacity factor that depends on the refrigerant type and whether combustible materials
are within 20 ft of the pressure vessel. If combustible materials are within 20 ft of the vessel, f is
multiplied by 2.5.

D = outside diameter of the vessel (ft)

L = overall length of the vessel (ft)

A similar sizing basis is included in IIAR 2 but the capacity factor is prescribed as a constant specifically for one
refrigerant ammonia. In a general case, the capacity factor f is derived by determining the rate of evaporation
from liquid to vapor due to a heat load applied to the vessel from an external fire radiating thermal energy to
the vessels projected area ( ) as described by Fenton and Richards (2003) and illustrated in Figure 1. The
capacity factor is, predominately, a function of the refrigerant type.

Figure 1: Pressure vessel showing the projected area (shaded in blue) assumed to absorb radiative energy
from a fire emanating from combustible materials located more than 20 ft from the vessel.

Some confusion begins to arise when combustible materials are located within 20 ft of the pressure vessel
because ASHRAE 15 and IIAR 2 require the relief capacity factor to be increased by 2.5 times. Fenton and
Richards (2002) note that the increased capacity factor is intended to account for a greater proportion of the
vessels exterior surface experiencing the radiative heat gain from the assumed fire condition. Neither ASHRAE
15 nor IIAR 2 is explicit with details on what constitutes the types and uses of combustible materials that would
trigger the increased capacity factor. In addition both standards are silent with respect to the availability of fire
protection systems that could actively mitigate a fire. These situations require design professionals to exercise
good engineering judgment as they consider the siting of a vessel (facility siting) as well as the availability of
mitigation systems such as sprinklers or other fire protection devices and whether or not to increase the
capacity factor.

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Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

In the background of Figure 1 there are barrels of oil visible. Would those barrels of oil be considered
combustible materials that necessitate increasing the capacity factor for pressure relief sizing? Maybe. In
September 1997, ASHRAE issued an interpretation to its 1994 edition of ASHRAE 15 (Interpretation IC 15-1994-4)
that relates to the increase in the relief capacity factor with combustibles present. Question 4 of that
interpretation asks:

Does the requirement that an additional factor of 2.5 be multiplied times the "f" factor apply to the
sizing of relief valves for pressure vessels when flammable fuels are stored within 20 feet of the pressure
vessel?

The Standard 15 committee at that time responded no. If flammable fuels within 20 ft do not require
increased capacity on the nearby vessel, then it would seem logical that barrels of refrigerant oil would not
either.

Next, consider the high pressure receiver (HPR) shown in Figure 2. In this installation, the HPR is located
inside a machinery room constructed of concrete block walls with a combustible material roof. In the ASHRAE-
issued interpretation IC 15-1994-4, the committee included a closing comment that stated, in part, The 2.5
multiplier applies when combustible material is stored within 20 feet of the pressure vessel, or to combustible
material underneath the pressure vessel, such as a tar roof under a receiver. The Standard 15 committee did
not address the specific situation shown in Figure 2and in this case, the vessel is located below not above
the combustible roof. The presence of a fire protection system would further mitigate the need to increase the
capacity factor; although, neither ASHRAE 15 nor IIAR 2 cover this situation. What should you do? Apply sound
engineering judgment and document the relief valve selection/design basis. The other step you could take is to
request a formal interpretation from ASHRAE or IIAR on your specific situation. Keep in mind that individual
interpretations issued by ASHRAE are only applicable for the specific version of the standard published (i.e. the IC
15-1994-4 interpretation, technically, only applies to the 1994 edition of Std. 15).

Figure 2: HPR located in a machinery room with brick wall construction with a wood-deck roof.

The previous two (2) examples cover the potential increase in heat load on the vessels due to the proximity of

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Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

combustibles with respect to the protected component outlined within ASHRAE 15 & IIAR 2. But recall that the
B&PV code (the code from which requirements for pressure relief protection originate from) necessitates that
we identify and consider all potential overpressure scenarios. Are there other overpressure scenarios to
consider? Undoubtedly there are, and a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the component or area may be the
source for identifying other alternative overpressure scenarios.

PRESSURE RELIEF SIZING ALTERNATIVES


Lets consider a couple of possible situations with a focus on possible alternative relief valve capacity sizing
scenarios. There is justification for the extensions used in these examples within ASHRAE 15. Consider that
Section 9.7.8.1 of ASHRAE 15 (2010) identifies the requirements when engineering relief devices that relieve
from a higher pressure portion of a system to a lower pressure part of a system. Section 9.7.8.1(b) states:

The capacity of the pressure-relief valve protecting the part of the system receiving a discharge from a pressure relief
valve protecting a higher-pressure vessel shall be at least the sum of the capacity required in Section 9.7.5 plus the
mass flow capacity of the pressure-relief valve discharging into that part of the system.

While this is narrowly read to be about relief internal to the system, ultimately it is about additional heat or
vapor generation that must be handled by the relief valve to prevent the protected component from
overpressure. Said more clearly, the pressure relief device for a particular vessel may need to be larger than the
minimum required for accommodating its own overpressure based on the relief capacity determined using
Equation (1). Please note that the specifics of the following examples are critical.

THERMOSIPHON PILOT RECEIVER


Consider the schematic in Figure 3 which shows the high-side of an industrial refrigeration system equipped
with shell-and-tube thermosiphon oil coolers where the refrigerant-side of the oil cooling heat exchangers are
integrated into the high-pressure side of the system. Consider the relief valve connected to protect the
thermosiphon pilot receiver (). Normally, this relief valve would be sized based on the projected area of the
thermosiphon pilot receiver alone; however, there is an alternative sizing basis for this relief valve. The
alternative sizing basis relates to a relief scenario for a fire condition in the machinery room. The assumptions in
this alternative sizing scenario include:

1. Design pressure of the refrigerant-side of the oil coolers is 300 psig and the design pressure of the
thermosiphon pilot receiver is 250 psig and the relief valves installed match the individual equipments
MAWP.
2. Compressors and pilot receiver are located in the same machinery room.
3. At the time of the overpressure situation (fire), compressors are shut down.
4. The stop valves on the refrigerant-side of the oil cooling heat exchangers are open.
5. The radiant heat gain occurring on each of the oil cooling heat exchangers causes refrigerant in the tube-
side of the oil coolers to evaporate; thereby, building pressure in that circuit.
6. The pilot receiver pressure relief valve sized to to accommodate the over pressure for itself and the
radiant heat gain from all the oil coolers.
In this situation, the relief valve on the thermosiphon pilot receiver would be sized for fDL on the pilot reciever
itself as well as the sum of the fDL capacities for each of the oil cooling heat exchangers. Why? Because the
relief valves on the oil coolers will not open until the pressure rises to 300 psig; therefore, to keep the
thermosiphon pilot receiver from exceeding its MAWP or 250 psig the relief valve must be capable of relieving
the additional heat gain from the oil coolers as well. This scenario also assumes that the pilot receiver would be
affected before the pressure relief on the HPR by virtue of the pilot receivers location in proximity to the oil
cooling heat exchangers generating refrigerant vapor that leads to the overpressure and its lower relief device

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set pressure.

The individual pressure relief valves protecting oil coolers (PRVs labeled , , and ) would only lift if the
refrigerant-side of one or more oil coolers were valved out for service during the fire scenario. We have chosen
to neglect that simulatenous scenario due by assuming that the probability of coincedence of both the fire in the
machinery room and service is small. If you feel that it is more probable, then your sizing and ultimately your
simulaneous relief scenario would reflect that judgement.

Figure 3: Refrigeration system schematic showing key high-side components for the refrigerant-side of
thermosiphon oil cooling system.

When sizing of the individual pressure relief valves protecting the oil coolers (PRVs labeled , , and ) the
designer must consider the greatest anticipated heat load as discussed previously by Reindl & Jekel (2009).
Usually, the dictating heat load on the oil coolers is the maximum heat rejection to the oil at an oil temperature
equal to the saturation temperature corresponding to the oil cooler relief device set pressure. This scenario is
based on a compressor being started with the refrigerant-side of the oil cooling heat exchanger valved out. In
this case, the respective relief valve (, , or ) would lift to relieve the overpressure created by heat gain the
refrigerant-side of the oil cooling heat exchanger until the oil temperature in the compressor rose to a level high
enough to trigger the automatic shutdown of the compressor package on high oil temperature. It is important to
note that the overpressure of the refrigerant-side of the oil cooling heat exchanger in this scenario will likely
happen long before the oil reaches a temperature high enough to shut the compressor shutdown.

INTERCOOLER
Figure 4 shows a portion of the low-side of an intercooled two-stage compression refrigeration system

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including the safety reliefs protecting the low-stage booster compressors and the intercooler. IIAR 2-2008
(including Addendum A) requires the minimum design pressure for low-side components, including vessels, to be
150 psig. In older plants, the intercooler may be designed for an MAWP of 150 psig while the design pressure on
the discharge side of the booster compressor packages might be 250 psig or 300 psig.

Figure 4: Refrigeration system schematic showing key low-side components and related reliefs for a two-stage
system.

Analogous to our discussion on the thermosiphon pilot receiver above, relief protection for the intercooler is
commonly sized based on fDL of the intercooler alone. This sizing basis neglects at least two other sources of
potential overpressure that could occur on this vessel including (1) the continued operation of booster
compressors when their high pressure cut-outs either fail to shut-down or cut-out set points above the MAWP of
the intercooler and (2) the vapor load from heat gain to the booster oil separators from a fire condition.

It is not realistic to size the the intercooler pressure relief valve to accommodate the overpressure attributable to
the added vapor capacity from the operation of one or more booster compressors at discharge pressures
approaching or exceeding the intercooler MAWP. The following approaches should be taken to prevent this
potentially unsafe operating condition:

1. Initial and on-going periodic inspection and tests of the high pressure cut-outs on the booster
compressors to ensure they are set and functional at discharge pressures no higher (preferably lower)
than 90% of the MAWP of the intercooler (i.e. the lowest pressure rated component downstream of the
compressors) .
2. System-level controls that initiate a complete refrigeration system shutdown at an intermediate pressure
no higher (preferably lower) than 90% of the MAWP of the intercooler.
3. Clear operating instructions that require re-setting and functional testing of the discharge pressure cut-
out on compressors designed to swing operation from high-stage to booster (i.e. when both the suction
and discharge of the compressor is swung) prior to placing it into operation.
4. Designing/specifying a MAWP of 250 psig for the intercooler and the booster discharge piping system
(note that this is current design practice, but NOT required by codes).

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Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

Approach #4 is a design consideration. Approaches #1-3 are procedures that are focused on maintaining the
ongoing mechanical integrity of the critical safety system that is the compressors high discharge pressure
cutout. Note that simply doing #4 does not absolve one of doing #1-3, it just changes the sizing basis of the relief
valve on the intercooler.

It is realistic to consider an alternate sizing basis for the relief valve connected to protect the intercooler ().
The alternative sizing basis relates to a fire condition in the machinery room and assumes that the intercooler
would be sized to accommodate fDL for the intercooler itself as well as the sum of the equivalent fDL capacities
for each of the booster compressor oil separators. Reindl & Jekel (2009) discuss the basis of using fDL for oil
separator vessels even though they do not generally contain liquid-phase refrigerant. The assumptions in this
sizing scenario include:

1. Design pressure of the oil separators on the booster compressors are at least 250 psig and the design
pressure of the intercooler is 150 psig.
2. The intercooler and booster compressors are co-located in the same machinery room.
3. At the time of the overpressure situation (fire), all booster and high-stage compressors are shut down.
4. The discharge stop valves on the booster compressors are open.
5. The radiant heat gain occurring on each of the booster compressor oil separators causes the refrigerant
specific volume within the oil separator to increase; thereby, building pressure in the intercooler.
6. The intercoolers pressure relief valve is sized to to accommodate the over pressure for itself and the
radiant heat gain on booster oil seaprators.

In this situation, the individual pressure relief valves attached to the booster oil separators (PRVs labeled , ,
and ) would only lift if the boosters discharge stop valve was closed and the machine energized to start.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
In both of these examples, the relief valve sizing scenario was effected by the presence of equipment with
different MAWPs (and different relief valve set pressures). Since the installed capacity of relief devices is only
available when the component exceeds the relief valves set pressure, a fire scenario would pass on the heat
load absorbed by the higher MAWP components to the connected components with a lower set pressure relief
valve. Had the MAWPs been the same, then all of the installed relief valve capacity would be available to
prevent overpressure and sizing the relief valves based on each of the individual components requirements
would be sufficient.

Conclusions
At a first glance, the basis for sizing pressure relief valves for pressure vessels in built-up industrial refrigeration
systems appears simple and straightforward. Upon more careful consideration of all potential scenarios that
could lead to vessel overpressure, it is clear that the relief sizing based solely on fDL for some vessels may not be
adequate. Consideration of all potential overpressure scenarios is a requirement that originates from the ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (Section VIII Div. 1).

In this article, we present two examples where the integration of a pressure vessel as part of a sub-system that is
part of a larger system would necessitate consideration of an increased pressure relief valve capacity. In the next
edition of the Cold Front, we will extend our discussion to include relief scenarios that form the basis for
sizing relief vent piping systems. Clear scenarios are a necessary foundation for sizing the manifolded or
headered relief vent systems commonly found in industrial refrigeration systems. From a design perspective, it is
essential to document the sizing basis for each pressure relief device applied in a system. It is also important that
the sizing basis of individual pressure relief devices align with relief scenarios that form the basis for sizing of the
vent piping system.
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Vol. 12 No. 1, 2012

References
ANSI/ASHRAE 15, Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and
Air Conditioning Engineers, Atlanta, GA (2010).
ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15, Interpretation IC 15-1994-4 for the Safety Code for Mechanical Refrigeration,
ASHRAE, Atlanta, GA (1997).
ANSI/IIAR 2, Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems,
including Addendum A, International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration, (2010).
ASME Section VIII Div. 1, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, (2010).
Fenton, D. and Richards, W., ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard 15-2001 User's Manual: Safety Standard for Refrigeration
Systems, ASHRAE, (2002).
IRC, Pressure Relief Capacity Determination for Equipment, Cold Front newsletter, Industrial Refrigeration
Consortium, Madison, WI, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2011).
IRC, Relief Valves 101, Cold Front newsletter, Industrial Refrigeration Consortium, Madison, WI, Vol. 6, No. 1
(2006).
Reindl, D. T. and Jekel, T. B., Pressure Relief Device Capacity Determination, ASHRAE Transactions, pp. 603-612,
ASHRAE, Atlanta, GA (2009).
Reindl & Jekel, Engineering Safety Relief Systems Guidebook, Industrial Refrigeration Consortium, (2007).

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