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DE LIMA VS GATDULA

Facts: Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed and raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation (DE LIMA, et al) Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to cease and desist from framing up
Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident. RTC rendered a Decision
granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for,
namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of an answer is appropriate.
2. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and
the filing of a RETURN is proper.
3. Whether or not the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is the same as the Writ of Amparo. Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is
the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be
violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing
summons and requiring an Answer.

On the second issue, the Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. Without a Return, the
issues could not have been properly joined.

Memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. It is a


synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the
case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.

On the third issue, the Court pointed out that the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be
distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of
the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants
the privilege of the writ cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as
tragically symbolic or ritualistic as granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

CARAM VS SEGUI
FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete
the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun
and Moon Home for Children in Paraaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On
August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as
Legally Available for Adoption. On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was matched with Spouses
Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter
to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally
available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina
signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively
made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before
the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there
was no enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico


enumerated the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily
defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;


That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
That it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWDs Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses
when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the
respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no enforced disappearance as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.

Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has
been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MANALO


FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of
detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos
and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos custody,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all
medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set
aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of
the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities.
xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection
by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of
respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there
is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo, the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,
October 7, 2008)

RUBRICO VS ARROYO
Facts
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was
abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS)
based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and
detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation,
but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary
detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has
happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the
Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from
their investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated
that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes.
Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court
on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to
any of them on the case of Lourdes.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparo petition.

Ruling: No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings
Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law,
has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippine law that provides for
criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility While there are several pending
bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability
under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats,
may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine
now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with
the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there
be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings
on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural
end.

SO VS TACLA
Facts: Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on
behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the
criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before
the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical
Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla,
stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready
for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Acting on the
prosecutions Urgent Motion to Refer Accuseds Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla
ordered Guisandes referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisandes
mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for
Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be
physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of
the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of
Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial.
During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to
the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case for Qualified Theft was dismissed.

Issue:
1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy based on the facts at hand?
2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants the dismissal of the petition
for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?

Ruling: On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus
and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of -
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life,
liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
In this case , the confinement and custody of Accused Guisande is proper.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking
such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.
On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG, that with the dismissal of
the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a
jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person, and treatment of any
medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful
processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and
academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value."

Title: Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906
Facts: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court
of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a
petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a
another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the
settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

Issue: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

Ruling: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover,
aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will.

CASTILLO VS CRUZ
Facts:
Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan
which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn decided against the spouses.
RTC affirmed the decision.
The spouses didnt vacate and continued to file cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended the
demolition against the property, a determination of the property bounds, and a remanding of the
case by means of a writ of injunction.
The respondents filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another
demolition order.
In order to stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property.
Superintendent Castillo was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession.
Respondents refused. The y filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC
The same people claimed that the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy
equipment and arrested them. RTC ruled in their favor.

Issue: Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.
As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on
Oct. 24, 2007 and the Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power was inherent in the Constitutional
grant to the courts to promulgate rules for human rights.
Definitions of the Writs:
a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity
b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person.
The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Sec of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There must be a connection
between the acts and effects of the aforementioned rights.
Tapuz v Del Rosario- What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The same case states that the court will only issue the writ after determining the facts existence
from the supporting affidavits of thNotably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show
that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.
There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners use of force. They were only protecting
property rights. Their affidavit said: Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa
lupa na 45 years naming IN POSSESSION.
Regarding habeas data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement.
The writs cant be used to stall the execution of a property dispute decision.
The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was due to the institution of criminal
proceedings running first. They may avail of the reliefs as a motion

NAVIA VS PARDICO
FACTS: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita
M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she
saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita
where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him
that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was
lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in
Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of
amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that
in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on
its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of
the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that
petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook
which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the
writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an
expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity."

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings
inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and
security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command
against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our
fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined
enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a
private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in
an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at
Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed
above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person.

DISMISSED

PADOR VS ARCAYAN
The Facts:
The spouses Nerio and Soledad filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo against Barangay
Captain Bernabe Arcayan, Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Tanods Alberto, Carmelo, Roberto, Winelo,
Christopher and Bienvenido, all of Bgy. Tabunan, Cebu City. They allege that rumours circulated
about them cultivating a marijuana plantation, and because of this, the respondents raided their
ampalaya farm, but found none. After the raid, they received invitation letters for a conference
from Bernabe. They referred the letter to their counsel, who advised them to instead send a letter-
reply. When Bernabe read the letter, he took a copy but refused to receive it. The conduct of the
raid, the invitation letter, the refusal of the barangay captain to receive their reply, and the
possibility of more harassment cases threatened their life, liberty and security, thus a writ of
amparo is necessitated. After the RTC issued the Writ, the respondents filed their Verified
Return/Comment. In it, they alleged that Winelo received a report of an alleged existence of a
marijuana plantation in Bgy. Gining; the matter was referred to Bernabe and Romeo who organised
a patrol; while Carmelo was taking his breakfast, Nerio chanced upon him and accused him of
uprooting the marijuana plants, which Carmelo denied. Nerio then threatened to kill him;they
proceeded to conduct the patrol, and upon passing by Nerios house, the latter threatened them
again. They patrolled the area owned by David Quitana but it yielded negative results. In the
evening, it was Albertos turn to be threatened by Nerio. Because of these threats, Bernabe
instructed his secretary to send invitation letters to Nerio since the threats were serious. Bernabe
did not anymore sign the letter-reply sent by Nerio as he already had a copy.
After hearing, the RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondents had sufficiently
explained the reason for the issuance of the invitation letters, and the spouses claims were based
on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures. Hence, the spouses filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court, to assail what they think is a serious and grave error on the
part of the RTC.
The Courts ruling:
We uphold the RTCs Resolution and deny the instant Petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo[1] provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in
a petition therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence[2]
that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first, that
respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the latter
were cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them invitation
letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay captain
refused to receive petitioners letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the possibility of
more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.
On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners ampalaya farm was
sufficiently controverted by respondents.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on the
ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot
possessed by David Quintana[3].
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador
himself admitted that they had done so with his permission, as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning.
He told me that there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya farm and that
there is already a raid.
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for
marijuana plants[4].
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners permission, we cannot grant
the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that
the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners property rights. In Tapuz v. Del
Rosario,[5] we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are
purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:
[T]he writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds[6].
x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners ampalaya farm is an insufficient
ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captains act of sending
invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not
violate or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show that
Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the
records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference through
the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the
conference, as they have in fact done in this case.
The fourth allegation of petitioner that, following these events, they can anticipate more
harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents is baseless,
unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation
does not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations[7].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The 3 July 2008
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB is
AFFIRMED.