G.R. No.

184528 April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,

vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision 1 dated
February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA." The Court of Appeals issuances
affirmed the Order3 dated September 27, 2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo
Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a
certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo
Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his
property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma.
Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the
court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study, interviewing the
(petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding
on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the
(respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina
Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner)
failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his
Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge
the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the
(respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. 5 (Citations omitted.)

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo
O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient
documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal
affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. 7

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now
assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly
assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2,

RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP 9

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it
allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which
purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondents incompetence.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for
another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as
well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis
as well.11

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a
minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of
the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
definite evidence."12 We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship,
petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual matters:

a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already;

b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he
purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital
bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to
cover his medical expenses;

c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;

d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister
were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former
would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another
vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;

f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughters without
the latters knowledge or consent;

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the
"orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite
protests from his children.14

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to support his
claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that
would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating
medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner
proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum16 to
illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations
and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.

xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly
perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-
constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read
the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x
x x.17

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and
personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers
and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their
co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for
himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening"
which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the
view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the
occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice."18

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners
own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own
observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does
not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors
evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional
circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings
by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court
when supported by the evidence on record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that
he is not entitled to the relief sought."24
1wphi1

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring
respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than
dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the
facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29,
2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

X------X
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984

FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.

Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.

Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and resolution of the defunct Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 27, 1981. and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172 entitled "Feliciano
Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and Pelagio Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner
Feliciano Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial
District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting execution pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner
Feliciano Francisco as guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent herein, Pelagio
Francisco, in his instead.

The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals showed that:

Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in Special
Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge.
On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San
 Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent, petitioned the court for the
removal of petitioner and for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among
other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting.

It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed to submit an inventory,
for which reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days within which to do so,
otherwise he would be removed from guardianship. Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to
which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the ground that petitioner actually received
P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale
and reported by him in his inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in
his order of April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.

On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered his finding, relying on the
deed of sale as the best evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his order dated
September 12, 1980, respondent judge acknowledged that his finding was "rather harsh and
somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the retirement of
petitioner on the ground of old age. The order states in part as follows:

"... considering the rather advanced age of the present guardian, this Court is
inclined and so decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he is hereby, retired to
take effect upon the appointment by this court and the assumption of office of his
replacement, who shall be taken from the recommendees of the parties herein. For
this purpose, the present guardian is hereby given twenty (20) days from receipt of a
copy of this order within which to submit his proposal for a replacement for himself
and to comment on petitioner's recommendee and the latter a like period within
which to comment on the present guardian's proposed substitute, after which the
matter will be deemed submitted for resolution and final action by the court.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72 years of age and still fit
to continue with the management of the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal for the past
twelve years. In an order dated November 13, 1980 the court denied his motion. Accordingly, on
December 17, 1980, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 'from the order issued by the court on
November 13, 1980' and paid the appeal bond. On February 2, 1981 he filed the record on appeal. 1

Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private respondent, required petitioner
to submit within three days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its
order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the order, the court stated that 'an indefinite
discontinuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of September 12,
1980 relieving the present guardian.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. (referring to CA-G.R. No.
SP-1217)"

On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed an "Omnibus Motion" with the court
a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain guardian from exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all
properties of the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian . 2

Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion claiming that the same was
premature. 3 The trial court, however, disregarded the opposition and required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit
within three (3) days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980,
the court holding that "an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of
September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, 5 but the trial court overruled the same on March 4, 1981.
Subsequently, on March 11, 1981, 6 the court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the
person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro. 7

On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the validity
of the order of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent
Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent portion of its decision reading as
follows:

The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case at bar, the retirement of petitioner was ordered on the
ground of old age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay of the petitioner in the
making of an accounting and the submission of an inventory, the order amounts to a finding that
petitioner, considering his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the estate of
his ward. (Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear that petitioner's continuance in office would
not be in the best interest of the ward.

It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final. Considering the time -it normally takes for
appeals to be finally determined as well as the purpose of the order under appeal, which would be
frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we cannot say that respondent acted with grave and
irreparable damage and that the order of September 12, 1980 is not yet final, petitioner has not
demonstrated that in ordering execution pending appeal, the respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion.

Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within the sound discretion of a court.
Appellate courts win not interfere to discretion, unless it modify control or inquire into the exercise of
this be shown that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 260 [1979].

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing the following arguments: that to grant
execution pending appeal would render petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of
the, grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing
respondent as guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner. 9

The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
the court finding it unnecessary to repeat the discussion of the arguments which it had already considered and only
entertained the argument regarding the competency of the respondent as the new guardian. On this point,
respondent Court ruled:

The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as guardian was never assailed in the
petition in this case. As already stated, this case concerns the validity only of the orders of January
27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required petitioner to recommend his own replacement,
otherwise the court would appoint a new guardian. It does not appear that petitioner objected to the
appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact
older than petitioner. Nor does it appear that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of March 11, 1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent Francisco is older than petitioner, In
short, the point now raised does not appear to have been urged in the lower court so that the latter
 could have rectified the error, if it was error at all, For this reason, it is not proper ground for certiorari
before this Court, much less for a motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 10

In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of Appeals has committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old
age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave misapprehension and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner did not question the
appointment of private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground that the latter is older than the former by
five (5) years.

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for
another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. 11 A guardianship is
designed to further the ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's property, as wen as
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 12

Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of the ward, the selection of a
guardian must, therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may
consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the
morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well as the
probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which
guardianship will be necessary. 13

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of
crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his
office. 14 A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging
his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to
render an account or make a return.15

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired
from the guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached
by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding
him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct
support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would,
therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's
fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration. 16

Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a guardian, We sustain the immediate
retirement of petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court.

With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as guardian to
succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent appellate court
correctly sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution
pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court will not interfere, control or
inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an abuse thereof, 18 which We find none herein.

Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection of the ward, there is more
than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first
guardian. We agree with the reason given by the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal that "an
indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving the
present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."

As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian, We likewise
agree with the respondent appellate court in denying in its resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of private respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also
find no abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court.

The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues brought before it for the first time on
appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597; Director
of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and resolution of the respondent court dated
April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.

X-----X

G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his
uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44261
annulling the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.

The Antecedents

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint 2 against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy
Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had
died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley
Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on July
7, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of the court. 3

Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following allegations in his complaint:

During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business name Benito Commercial in
Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise
promising that her college education would be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by
his promises and assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to
his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where
they cohabited and resided; he also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995, "Benedick
Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, was born, the product of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr.
acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support.
It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father. Moreover,
when he died intestate, Benito, Sr. left behind residential lands and commercial buildings worth P100,000,000.00,
more or less; as such, there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve his
(Benedick's) rights over the same before its partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint, Benedick's
mother be appointed as his guardian ad litem, that an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and
that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of Benedick, as follows:

a. declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.

b. ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late
Benito Dy Chiao.

c. ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and distributing the same in favor of the
Defendants and herein Plaintiff in a manner provided for by law.

d. granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the law.4

In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers,
denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the
illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick
as the illegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action
was for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of
their deceased parents.5

On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion,6 praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy
Chiao brothers, who were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and for the appointment
of their sister as their guardian ad litem in the case. It was, likewise, prayed that the director of the hospital be
summoned to appear before the court to inform it of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers.

On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion7 set for hearing on December 9, 1996, reiterating his plea for the
appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad litem of her brothers. That same day, however, the plaintiff, through
counsel, filed a "Compromise Agreement" dated November 24, 1996, with the following signatories to the
agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the plaintiff and assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy
Chiao-De Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty. Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf of her brothers.

Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) 8 dated September 20, 1995,
notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo L. Simando, purportedly signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then
still confined in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein appointed to be their attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:

1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with power to sign Agreements or Contracts of
Lease involving property and/or assets belonging to the estate of our late father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. while
said estate is not yet settled between (sic) all heirs; as well as to collect rentals and other money due to the
estate by reason of said agreements or contracts;

2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of our late father,
and to ask for letters of administration in her favor as a next of kin or as someone selected by us, next of kin,
to be the administrator.

On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment on the basis thereof, quoted
as follows:

Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by and between the parties in this case
which is herein below quoted, thus:

"COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly assisted by their respective counsels
hereby submit the following Compromise Agreement:

1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;

2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiff's claim from the estate of the late Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr., defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of her brothers, who
are likewise defendants in this case, hereby agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount
of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount
shall be payable under the following terms and conditions:

a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this Compromise

Agreement;

b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one year from the date
of signing of this Compromise Agreement and for which the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-
De Guzman shall issue twelve (12) checks corresponding to the said balance in the amount
of P375,000.00 per check;

3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each other;

4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be immediately
executory.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the foregoing Compromise
Agreement be approved and a decision be rendered in accordance therewith.

Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996.

(SGD.)
MARYJANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN
BENEDICK AREVALO Defendant
Plaintiff

represented by:

(SGD.)

SHIRLEY AREVALO
Natural Guardian & Guardian
Ad Litem

Assisted by:

(SGD.) (SGD.)
AMADOR L. SIMANDO ADAN MARCELO BOTOR
Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendants"
 WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the law between the parties, not being
tainted with infirmities, irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the same not being contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals and good customs, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered APPROVING the same.

Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of the foregoing Compromise
Agreement.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.9

It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy Chiao brothers to the "Benito
Commercial Building, Naga City."

On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-
3612), filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of her father and for her appointment as
administrator thereto. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of
the court; it was later transferred to Branch 19.

On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution, 10 of the Decision dated November 24, 1996, on the
allegation that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the compromise agreement. The trial
court granted the motion in an Order11 dated April 7, 1997. Conformably, it issued a Writ of Execution12 for the
enforcement of the said decision.

On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since he was Mary Jane's counsel in Special
Proceedings No. 96-684.

On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property13 over five parcels of land titled
under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., including the improvements thereon.

The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then filed with the CA a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997,
assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant
thereto. The petition alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they were of
unsound mind, which impelled their uncle Henry to file a petition for guardianship over their person and property,
now pending in the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695. They did not
authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement for and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation
with Benedick's counsel, she was able to secure a judgment based on a void compromise agreement. It was further
alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers were unaware of the complaint against them and that they did not engage the
services of the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo & Fernando Associates to represent them as counsel in said cases. As
such, the said counsel had no authority to file the answer to the complaint for and in their behalf. It was further
pointed out that less than a month before the said compromise agreement was executed by their sister, she filed
purportedly in their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a petition for the settlement of the estate of their parents in the
RTC of Naga City, with the assistance of Atty. Simando (Benedick's counsel), as well as for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC'96-684. 14 There was thus collusion between
Mary Jane and Atty. Simando.

The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the administrator of their parents'
estate.15 The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition was signed by their uncle Henry as
their representative.

On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was served on Benedick,
several lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in the name of Benito, Sr. had already been
sold at public auction: Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero for P6,400,000.00; Lot No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and
Lot No. 5, for P7,000,000.00, to Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been sold to
Consuelo Dy for P310,000.00.16 The buyers at public auction had already remitted the amounts of P15,319,364.00
and P162,836.00 to the executing sheriffs,17 who later remitted P5,711,164.00 to Benedick through his mother,
Shirley, in satisfaction of the decision,18 and the remainder given to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.

On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale 19over
the property to the buyers at public auction.

The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, informing the CA of the
recent developments in the case below. In a Resolution20 dated July 14, 1997, the appellate court granted their plea
for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows:

(a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent court to deposit before the Branch Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the proceeds of the public auction sale held on June
3, 1997 and to submit to this Court within five (5) days from notice, proof of compliance therewith;

(b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the respondent court, to refrain from issuing any
certificate of sale over the properties sold at the public auction sale conducted on the aforementioned date;

(c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the properties affected by [the] public auction
sale conducted on June 3, 1997 and cause its registration with the Register of Deeds concerned within five
(5) days from notice.

The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from issuing/effecting any further certificate of
sale over the affected properties.21 On August 15, 1997, the RTC issued an Order22 directing the Register of Deeds
of Naga City to comply with the CA resolution.

Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997. 23 His brother, Benito, Jr. then filed a Notice of Death and
Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to Admit an Amended Petition to drop Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion
of his sister Mary Jane, as party respondent, as well as those who participated in the public auction, namely, Jose
Rivero, Jessie Rivero, Amalia Rivero and Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution 24 dated January
14, 1998.

Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Jane's new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss,25 alleging, inter alia, that an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of the spouses Dy Chiao had already
been executed. Benito, Jr., represented by his uncle Henry, opposed the motion,26 alleging that a dismissal
grounded on the extrajudicial settlement alone was improper, since what was being assailed was a decision of a
court based on a compromise agreement involving one who is not a party thereto, with third-party bidders acting in
bad faith. In a Resolution27 dated February 27, 1998, the CA directed Mary Jane to submit her reply to the opposition
to the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of Benito, Jr.

In her compliance and comment/manifestation,28 Mary Jane declared that there appeared to be a sound basis for
the nullification of the assailed decision since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a
compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the
compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their
extrajudicial settlement.29

Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate court an SPA dated October 31, 1996
executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by Atty. Simando, authorizing Atty. Botor to enter into a compromise agreement in
the RTC.30

On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition and nullifying the assailed
decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the sale at public auction of the property of the
deceased. The appellate court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Benedick's action for recognition as the
illegitimate son of Benito, Sr. and for the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could not
be the subject of a compromise agreement; hence, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in rendering judgment based
thereon. It concluded that the said compromise agreement was procured through extrinsic fraud.
The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the trial court within ten days from finality of
said judgment, the amount of P15,482,200.00, together with all interests earned therefrom, and to thereafter
distribute the aggregate amount to the buyers of the said properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It
also ordered Benedick, through his mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten days from finality of
judgment, the amount of P5,711,164.00 received from Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together with all other amounts
that she might have been paid pursuant to the compromise agreement. This was, however, without prejudice to the
buyers' right of recourse against Mary Jane, who was declared subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise,
directed to return to the buyers the aggregate amount in the same proportion as above stated; thereafter, the
properties would be delivered to the intestate estate of Benito, Sr. for proper disposition by the intestate court. 31

Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, on the following
grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
IS INVALID DUE TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE;

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE
CONDUCTED ON JUNE 2, 1997 WAS VOID; AND

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOSE,
JESSIE AND AMALIA, ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY BECOME THE OWNERS
OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD AT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE.32

Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended
petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and
distribution of the latter's estate; and (3) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is
null and void for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.33

On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping contained in the
petition with the CA was executed by Henry; hence, it was he and not Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition.
Moreover, Henry had no proof of his authority to file the petition for and in behalf of the brothers. The petitioners
assert that there was no need for Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the legal
capacity to do so, as admitted by their counsel, and Henry himself. Moreover, there was no law mandating Henry to
represent his nephews in all actions which may redound to their benefit.

The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation by filing an amended petition praying
that he be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Dy Chiao brothers, the CA did not take cognizance of the
allegations in the petition. The CA was correct in so doing, since the matter of whether one is incompetent should be
threshed out in the guardianship proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695, and not in the CA via a petition
to annul the judgment of the RTC, where Benito, Jr. is also a party respondent.

On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling the decision of the RTC based on the
compromise agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud; the alleged fraud was committed by Mary Jane as an
incident to the trial. What the CA should have done was to dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of the
Dy Chiao brothers to file an action against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise agreement
and also a principal party to the case; hence, was bound by it. As a matter of fact, the petitioners aver, Mary Jane
was appointed by her brothers as their attorney-in-fact to negotiate for and execute the compromise agreement in
their behalf.
The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition filed by Benedick in the RTC, and that
the latter's recourse was based on paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code, although his putative father, Benito
Dy Chiao, Sr., was already dead when the complaint was filed.

The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff on the subject properties was valid.

In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA holding that the compromise agreement
was vitiated by extrinsic fraud is correct. She claims that she was made to sign the agreement, but was not informed
of its intricacies. She insists that she does not have any liability to Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, despite
her being a signatory to the said agreement.

For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the latter's authority to file the amended
petition before the CA in their behalf was never questioned by the petitioners. He asserts that the CA admitted the
amended petition containing the prayer that his uncle Henry be appointed as his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA
found that he and his brothers were not of sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad litem in
the person of his uncle. He further alleges that the compromise agreement was the product of connivance between
his sister and Benedick, and their respective counsels. He further points out that Atty. Simando, Benedick's counsel
in the RTC, was likewise the counsel for Mary Jane when she filed her petition for letters of administration in the
RTC of Naga City on December 17, 1996. He further insists that the ruling of the CA on the issues of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC is in accord with law, and that the decision based on the compromise agreement
was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.34

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

On the first issue, we reject the petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the amended petition
before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao,
represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover, Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and
sign the requisite certification on non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed
him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. This was in the January 14, 1998 Resolution of the CA, where the
following findings were made:

x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because there is an obvious necessity to amend the
petition; and secondly, because the representation of an incompetent need not be by a duly appointed
judicial guardian. A guardian ad litem may be appointed by the court. In the instant case, the members of
this Court who conducted the several hearings herein, are convinced from an observation of the petitioners
that they are not of a sound or disposing mind. x x x35

In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the appellate court needed only to determine
whether the individual for whom a guardian was proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial
affairs as to warrant the need for the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that,
based on clear and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that
his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian.36 A finding that the person for whom
a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his
mental illness is enough.37

Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office of such guardian is
to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor.38 Whether or not to appoint a guardian ad litem for the
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court where the petition was filed, taking into account the best
interest of the incompetent or the minor.39 The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best
promote the interest of justice.40 The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its
determination of the incompetent's best interest.41

The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and his brother, Benson Dy Chiao, before the
RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from appointing Henry as guardian ad litem for the
respondents, merely because of the pendency of his petition for appointment as guardian over their person and
property before Branch 61 of the RTC. Time was of the essence; the RTC had issued a writ of execution for the
enforcement of its decision based on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was bent
on enforcing the same, and had in fact caused the sale of five parcels of land belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr.
worth millions of pesos. Indeed, the sheriff was able to sell at public auction prime real property of the estate of the
deceased for P20,000,000.00 before the status quo order of the CA reached him.

It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the respondents is without prejudice to the
outcome of the petition in Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695.

The petitioners' claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate court's finding that the respondents were
incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion
that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be
raised before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the nature and subject matter of
an action is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and
the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of
the action. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and undertakes to
exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The
lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.42

The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in
behalf of her brothers.

The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Jane's recognition of Benedick as the illegitimate son of her father
was not a compromise, but an affirmation of the allegations in the complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had, in effect,
recognized him as the illegitimate son of their deceased father. The petitioners posit that the admissions in the
compromise agreement are likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings.

The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based
on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void.

Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As
such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for
the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. 43

A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one
already commenced.44 Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New
Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.45Any
compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no
obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.46 Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion
than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the
illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void.

Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise. Furthermore, the power of
attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by
one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the
judgment based on such compromise agreement is null and void. 47 The judgment may thus be impugned and its
execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. 48 A compromise
must be strictly construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly included therein. 49
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick
was a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father, the consideration for which was the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the
waiver of other claims from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their
counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings' unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that
Benedick was merely an impostor:

11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that they have not recognized any person or
impostor who pretends having a filial relation with their deceased father by reason of herein Defendant's
father's incapacity to bear children or to engage in any carnal act considering the age and physical state of
their father at that time alluded to by the Plaintiff .50

To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision
of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect.

It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father

1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son
of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.51

Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative. 52

It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, agreed and bound herself to
pay Benedick the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their deceased father. However, a cursory
reading of the SPA on record will show that the Dy Chiao brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize
Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father. They could not have agreed to pay P6,000,000.00 to be taken from
the estate, because they had denied that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the
complaint.

On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20, 1995, a cursory reading of the
compromise agreement will show that they did not specifically empower their sister to enter into a compromise
agreement with Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612. It bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as
September 20, 1995, while the complaint was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on August 27, 1996.

The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the compromise agreement. The records
show that at about the time when it was executed by Mary Jane, her brothers were patients at the Don Susano J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and Benedick had accused her of being a spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction
to drugs.53

On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even filed a motion for the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for them, and for the examination of Mary Jane for drug addiction, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing, an order be issued,
as follows:

1. Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao [Sr.];

2. Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants Benito, Jr. and Benson Dy-Chiao;

3. Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical examination by a medical expert on drugs to
be commissioned by the Honorable Court to determine whether or not said defendant is a drug dependent. 54

Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao siblings to appear before the RTC at 8:30
a.m. of November 18, 1996. He, likewise, prayed that the Director of the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital
be directed to bring the clinical records of the brothers, which the trial court granted per its Order dated November
12, 1996.55

Upon Mary Jane's failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to have her cited in contempt of court.
Despite his charge that Mary Jane was a drug addict and a spendthrift, he, nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated
December 5, 1996, that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad
litem of her brothers, thus:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that Maryjane Dy Chiao- De Guzman be appointed as Special Administrator over the Estate of the late
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian Ad Litem of defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao.56

Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman (whom Benedick branded as
a spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in behalf of
her brothers, who were confined in the hospital and whom Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and
needed a guardian ad litem. The trial court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the
compromise agreement without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the Dy Chiao brothers were
indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad litem for them.

What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor, did not even bother to file any
pleading in his clients' behalf, relative to the motions filed by Benedick. Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao
brothers were in the mental hospital and needed a guardian ad litem, and that Mary Jane was a spendthrift and a
drug addict, Atty. Botor still proceeded to sign the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said
counsel knew that it was he who had been empowered by the Dy Chiao brothers to compromise Civil Case No.
RTC'96-3612 (based on the SPA dated October 31, 1996); yet, he still allowed Mary Jane to execute the same
based on an SPA dated September 20, 1995 notarized by no less than Benedick's counsel, Atty. Amador Simando.

The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty. Simando, because it was he who
notarized the SPA dated September 20, 1995 purportedly executed by the Dy Chiao brothers. He later became the
counsel of Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612. He signed the compromise
agreement as Benedick's counsel, despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed
a guardian ad litem. Barely 11 days after the execution of the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition
for the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It bears stressing that
Mary Jane was the defendant in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, and that as counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in the
said civil case, Atty. Simando had accused her of being a drug addict and a spendthrift. By then of course, his client
(Benedick) had already received P6,000,000.00 from the estate of his alleged putative father.

Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and the subsequent
sale at public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void.

Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to still resolve the other issues that were
raised.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.