Sie sind auf Seite 1von 16

GUY VS CA This Court is not a trier of facts.

Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial


Court after a full-blown trial.
FACTS:
Karen and Kamille OANES WEI represented by their mother Remedios OANES WEI filed a
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION before the RTC alleging that they are
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima WEI. Sima WEIs legitimate heirs are all
TEDDY MOLINA, JULIET PASCUAL, ISAGANI YAMBOT, and LETTY JIMENEZ-
surnamed GUY. Michael GUY prayed to be appointed administrator of the estate. The heirs of
MAGSANOC, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RAYMUNDO A.
Sima WEI filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that certification was signed by their counsel
ARMOVIT, respondents.
and not by the respondent as well as alleging a waiver of claim signed by Remedios. This was
denied by the RTC. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was filed by GUY but was
denied. GUY then files a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the CA disregarded
existing rules on certification against forum shopping; ignoring the release and waiver of claim FACTS:
executed by Remedios; and that respondents do not have legal personality to institute an action,
failing to prove filiation. On May 2 and May 3, 1996, Petitioners published news items in Philippine Daily Inquirer
ISSUE:
stating that NBI agents reportedly raided a vacation house in San Fernando, La Union, owned
1) Whether or not respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules
by Rolito Gos lawyer, Raymundo Armovit, where the convicted killer was hiding at the time.
on certification of non-forum shopping;
2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their They missed Go, who left the house hours before the agents came.
successional rights; and
3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation. Private respondent then filed a complaint for libel against petitioners, alleging that they caused
to be published reports that maliciously accused him of harboring and/or concealing a
HELD: Petition lacks merit. While a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of convicted murderer.
non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse
may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. So it is in the present controversy Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur: found probable cause and thereafter two Informations
where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with for libel were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
rules. Petitioners sought a review of the resolution by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents Office of the Regional State Prosecutor: reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor
from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and directed the latter to withdraw the Informations filed.
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur: denied the motion to withdraw the indictments on the ground that
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. there was probable cause for the filing of the Informations.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a special civil action for
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public certiorari.
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is CA: dismissed the petition. It found that:
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the 1. The copies of the assailed orders of the trial court were purportedly certified,
alleged parent. but there was no showing whatsoever of the authority of the person who
certified the same.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of
evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be 2. The seal of the trial court could not be identified on the copies of said orders.
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet.
3.That the petition was not accompanied by all the pleadings and documents 3.
It is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that the trial judge
pertinent thereto. himself be impleaded in a petition for certiorari. The rule clearly states that a
MR: denied. Hence, the instant petition. petition for certiorari may be filed against the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi- judicial functions. The inclusion of the tribunal, which issued the
Petitioner contended: decision, as nominal party, was substantially complied with. When petitioners
mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, they also
1. that they should not be faulted for such technical defects as the failure to indicate referred necessarily to the judge who issued the assailed resolutions.
the authority of the certifying officer or the inscrutable imprint of the trial court's DOCTRINE:
seal because they did not have a hand in the preparation of the documents.
lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked when they
2. that their failure to attach the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition is
do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen
immaterial as the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has given due course to
accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party, nor deprived the court of
similarly faulty petitions in the interests of equity and justice and merely directed
its authority.
that the lacking pleadings and documents be attached. It is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that the trial judge
himself be impleaded in a petition for certiorari.

3. that they did not err if they only mentioned in the caption of the petition the trial NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES and/or CATHY
court and not the trial court judge. It is clear from the enumeration of parties against NG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and VIRGINIA
whom or against which a petition for certiorari may be filed in Rule 65, Section 1 of M. PUBLICO, respondents.
the Rules of Court that they need not implead the officer or the trial court judge
who committed the grave abuse of discretion, amounting to want or excess of [G.R. No. 146267. February 17, 2003]
jurisdiction. QUISUMBING, J.:
ISSUE:
DOCTRINE:
WON Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in dismissing the petition. Section 1 of Rule 65,[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order, together with copies of all
HELD: pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.

Yes. A Xerox copy even if stamped as CERTIFIED TRUE COPY, is not an authenticated
original of such certified true copy.
1. Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court mandates that rules of procedure shall be
liberally interpreted. In the instant case, we agree w that the Court of Appeals erred
in stressing too much petitioners' failure to comply with technicalities. We cannot FACTS:
attribute to petitioners the perceived defects on the attached copies of the trial 1. Petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Publico requested that she
court's orders because petitioners did not have control over their preparation. be allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of
influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless, Publico went home.
2. We have held that lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest 2. The following day, Publico called her employer and notified management that she was
mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party, still recovering from her ailment.
nor deprived the court of its authority. In the instant case, petitioners' failure to
append: (1) respondent's Answer to the Petition for Review; (2) petitioners' 3. Publico reported for work. The security guard prevented her from entering the NYK
Memorandum; and (3) respondent's Memorandum, do not touch on public policy, premises. Publico requested to see the owner, Stephen Ng. Her request was declined. She
nor do they deprive the appellate court of its authority. No right of respondent is was instead asked to come back the following day.
prejudiced or adversely affected.
4. Publico returned to NYK as instructed. When she inquired why she was barred from W/N CA commit a reversible error in dismissing the case on purely technical grounds, i.e., that
reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to render the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere photocopy of the original decision.
overtime service.
HELD:
5. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL NO. Petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
against petitioner corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng.
Petitioners contend that they have substantially complied with the requirements of Section
6. Before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners allegedly verify why Publico did not report for work 1, Rule 65, hence, in the interests of justice and equity, the Court of Appeals should have
and found out that her husband did not allow her to work at night. As night work is a given due course to their special civil action for certiorari.
must in their line of business, particularly when there are rush orders, petitioners claimed
that given Publicos failure to render overtime work, they were left with no other recourse Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners wanton disregard of the
but to fire her. Rule warrant the outright dismissal of their petition. She adds that the present petition
raises factual issues that the Court cannot pass upon at the first instance.
7. LABOR ARBITER
Publicos dismissal was illegal. Section 1 of Rule 65,[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment
8. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto.
9. Petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI filed before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of Administrative Circular No. 3-96
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for The "certified true copy" thereof shall be such other copy furnished to a party at his
affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or representatives
of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified.
10. COURT OF APPEALS
Dismissed the petition. Petitioners failed to attach the other pleadings and The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the
documents pertinent and material to their petition, such as the parties position issuing entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not a
papers, their evidence and the motion for reconsideration in contravention of the mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or other
said rule. initiatory pleading.

11. Petitioners duly moved for reconsideration, explaining that they had requested for a Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the disputed document although
certified true copy of the NLRCs decision but since the original NLRC decision was stamped as certified true copy is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy,
printed on onionskin was not legible, the NLRC itself photocopied the resolution and but only a xerox copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted
certified it afterwards. guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
petition for certiorari.
12. As proof of payment of petitioners request for a certified true copy of the NLRC decision,
petitioners attached a copy of the official receipts issued by the NLRC, which described The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for
the nature of the entry as CERTIFIED TRUE COPY. Petitioners appended in their motion compelling reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to
copies of pertinent pleadings and documents not previously attached in their petition. correct a patent injustice made. However, petitioners here have not shown any
compelling reason for us to relax the rule.
13. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition for
review. Petitioners are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
ISSUE:
A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never ground that the orders of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion
issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari for reconsideration were issued in excess of jurisdiction. CA dismissed the petition stating that
must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the the verification and certification in the petition, under the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was
law and the Rules. made without authority. the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on
the grounds that: a complaint filed on behalf of a corporation can be made only if authorized
by its Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the petition cannot prosper and be granted
due course
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special
Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando Issue: (1) whether or not an authorization from petitioners Board of Directors is still required
City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. in order for its resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the
corporation;
Facts:
Ruling: The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a
Rafael Galvez owns 4 parcels of land in La Union. He conveyed 2 lots to Mamaril, Llana, pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such
Bustos and Balatbat in a deed of sale. TCT transferred in favor of buyers requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended
Mamaril et al then sold said lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company transferring TCT to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
to the latter. Soon unknown to Lepanto, the CFI of La Union ordered the cancellation of the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
OCT of said lot in the name of Galvez in the Registry of deeds for being null and void and faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the
granting the title in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby
Eventually Lepanto sold said lots to petitioner also transferring the TCT in its favor. be served.

In the meantime, Galvez filed a motion for reconsideration against the order declaring OCT On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by
null and void. the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that
RTC denied said motion. CA affirmed. CA then issued an entry of Judgement, certifying its should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be
decision to be final and executory. A writ of execution was then issued. sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by
24 years later, the OSG received a letter from Mr. Florseca, VP of John Hay Poro Point proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
Development Corp. stating that the decision of the CA has not been executed. the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
RTC. certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court
considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as
The evidence showed that petitioner is the impleaded defendant being the successor in interest substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et.
of Galvez and registered owner of said Lot. Solicitor General argued that since the trial court al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the
ruled and declared the OCT to be null and void, which ruling was subsequently affirmed by the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for
Court of Appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently
over the property, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum
consequently cancelled. shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the action is barred by prescription. The trial forum shopping.
court dismissed the motion. Petitioners motion for reconsideration is likewise dismissed.
petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, on the
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special circumstances or LOWER COURT
compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-
forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance - Plaintiff demanded from the Vanguard Assurance Corporation, as surety, the
with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we balance of P21,000.00 (unheeded)
allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum - Plaintiff filed a motion with the lower court for an order to recover the unpaid
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner balance from the counterbond, pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an - the lower court granted the motion and ordered the surety company to pay plaintiff
action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight. the amount of P21,000.00.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum CA
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and
thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. - Vanguard Assurance Corporation elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
- Jalwindor Manufacturers, Inc. moved to dismiss the appeal, to which appellant
NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote,
surety filed an opposition claiming that the motion to dismiss could not be
not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the
determined without resolving the entire case on the merits.
granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. - Court of Appeals granted motion to dismiss

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari

5. VANGUARD ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner contends that a surety in a counterbond should be considered as a special intervenor
in the principal case, joining issue with the principal defendant, wherein its rights and liabilities
ESGUERRA, J. should be ascertained, fixed and adjudicated at the same time with the principal defendant
before final judgment; or in a supplemental pleading for that purpose, otherwise the surety's
FACTS: liability under the bond would be barred.

- (RESPONDENT) Jalwindor Manufacturers, Inc. sued Felipe Hernandez to recover


the sum of P30,000.00.
- Upon plaintiff's filing a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 the lower court issued
ISSUES
the order of attachment against defendant Felipe Hernandez.
- Felipe Hernandez moved to dissolve or to lift the order of attachment and put up a
Whether or not private respondent's claim on the counter-bond was barred by its failure to file
counterbond in the amount of P30,000.00, with petitioner Vanguard Assurance
a supplemental pleading before finality of the judgment to fix the liability of the counter-surety.
Corporation acting as surety.
- The lower court approved the counterbond and lifted the writ of attachment.
- After the issues had been joined the parties, duly assisted by their respective HELD:
counsel, entered into a compromise agreement whereby Felipe Hernandez
Petitioners contention untenable.
undertook and agreed to pay the plaintiff P26,000.00 in three (3) monthly
instalments. It was also provided in the compromise agreement that the counterbond
The contention does not find support from the rules applicable to the instant case. Petitioner
executed by the defendant would remain in full force and effect in favor of the
might have in mind Section 20 of Rule 57 which outlines the procedure to be followed in a
plaintiff and that in case of breach by the defendant of any provision of the
claim for damages by the party against whom attachment was issued. This rule provides that
compromise agreement, especially that which relates to the satisfaction of the
such damages may be awarded only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be
principal obligation, he would be amenable to the execution of the judgment and
included in the judgment; and that the application must be filed before the trial or before appeal
other relief available to the plaintiff as circumstances may warrant.
- On motion of the plaintiff due to defendant's failure to pay accordingly, the lower is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching
court issued a writ of execution creditor or his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the
- However, no sufficient property of the defendant was located and the writ of amount thereof.
execution was only partially satisfied to the extent of P5,000.00.
By its very terms, Section 20 of Rule 57 obviously refers to the recovery of damages by a
party against whom attachment was issued. This remedy is available only to the
defendant not the plaintiff (Dizon vs. Valdez, G.R. No. L-23920, April 25, 1968). Rule 57 of FACTS:
the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 12 and 17 thereof, is the rule applicable to the case at
bar. Section 12 provides that a counter-bond in an attachment is executed "to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action". This legal On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification
precept should be read together with Section 17 of the same Rule, which we quote: of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with
damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before
When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the execution be returned the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No.
unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the 095-84 therein.3
provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such
counter-bond, and bound to pay to the judgment creditor upon demand, the amount due under
the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de
summary hearing in the same action. Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626,
Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters,
The above-quoted provision of the pertinent Rule contemplates of proceedings on execution more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or
after judgment when liability upon the surety's bond may be determined. The key term in sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the
Section 17 is the phrase "if the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part." deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and
(Dizon vs. Valdez, supra). Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
and the execution is returned unsatisfied, as in the instant case, the liability of the bond
automatically attaches and, in case of failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the
defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive
the obligation of the bond (Tijam, et al. vs. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc., et al., G.R. period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose
No. L-21450, April 15, 1968). administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila
was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
It is also contended that where the case is tried and disposed of either on the basis of a consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of
compromise entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, or the evidence duly presented by Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the
the parties, where the surety has never consented to the compromise nor notified of the trial, name of said petitioner spouses.
the judgment rendered against the principal based thereon cannot bind the surety unless he is
given an opportunity to ascertain the correctness of said judgment before it becomes final,
otherwise any subsequent claim against the surety on the counterbond should be barred. It is
claimed that unless this is the rule the plaintiff and the defendant can easily connive by means
of a compromise to prejudice the surety.
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion
to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein,
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.
IGNAO, petitioners, On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to
vs. dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the
CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and cause of action has prescribed.
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to NO.
dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint
does not state a cause of action against him. We do not agree.

After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of
petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
respondents, conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of
donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated
RTC DECISION: in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is
not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the cause of action has prescribed.5 By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a) are of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the
whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of
prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and
of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation
main action for reconveyance of real property.6 to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the
condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and
void" would not appear in the deed of donation.9
CA DECISION:

In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, with the following dispositive cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.10 It called attention to the holding
portion: that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and rescission of the contract.11 It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when
REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.7 there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation. 12

Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we
motions for reconsideration which were denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article
resolution dated February 6, 1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari. 732 of the Civil Code provides that donationsinter vivos shall be governed by the general
provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III
ISSUE: on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a
donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that the
same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition
Whether or not the action has already prescribed? imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The
suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is
Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action against the petitioners? consequently justified.

HELD:
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be
of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that
recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held therein that said stipulation is in private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of
breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of
condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be
revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of
case was an onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights
rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
of its provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from
parity of reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals,
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction
rescission was proper.14 on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered
the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not applicable by analogy.1wphi1Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its
at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable
donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of for more than twenty (20) years are void.
the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the
court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of
the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that Article 764 was statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for
revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of
is not the situation in the case at bar. cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.

PEOPLE VS JABINAL
2. NO. FACTS:

Jose JABINAL was found in possession of a revolver and ammunition. He was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. JABINAL admitted to the
possession of the revolver without a license or permit, but contends that he was a
SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor as well as a CONFIDENTIAL
AGENT which grants him authority to possess firearms in the performance of his
official duties as a peace officer. He was found guilty and he appealed the MTC President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act
judgment to the RTC. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). After the plebiscite and with the approval of the
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal. people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands
(Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials and later, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials.

The RTC affirmed the MTC decision citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political
ISSUE: Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang
prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also
HELD: The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, denied.
hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he
was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte,
but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the unconstitutional. On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. declaring R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on
population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared
the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, petitioners,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision and in its Resolution dated May 12,
of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE 2010, the Court denied the said motions.
S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR
GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene
Islands, respondents, and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. They alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del
Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event
that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. and would be directly affected. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately
ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May
MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
BAGUNDOL, intervenors.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May
12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011. addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said
motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

FACTS:
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
of judgment. They alleged that: the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised
requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)
1. Prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The second exception attends this case.
existent.

2. Prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this
case. Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of
attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of
procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
3. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-
pointed out it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this
Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of
First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units.
legal interest in this controversy.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision DOCTRINE:
in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the Movant-Intervenors
filed on October 29, 2010 an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgement.

ISSUE: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
WON judgment rendered can still be disturbed albeit being moot and academic. and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet
HELD:
evading review.

The Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in
light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even
Yes. If the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even
remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions.
that which this Court itself had already declared final.
Thus, to the Court's mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.
G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
before this Court simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case
had already been decided. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of P100 million. Rationale for the amendment was to restrain "the mad rush" of
Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Revenue Allotment. Joint Resolution No. 29, 8 which sought to exempt from the
Respondents. P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
13th Congress - the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
G.R. No. 177499
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. The 16 cityhood bills contained
a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National
income requirement in RA 9009.
President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, House of Representative approved the cityhood bills except for a few
municipalities. The cityhood bills lapsed into law.
vs.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of municipality into a city
Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, November 18, 2008 Ruling: The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the
Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires
Oriental, Respondents. that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The
criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of
local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.
G.R. No. 178056
March 31, 2009 Ruling - The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. With
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National a 7-5 vote.
President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. April 28, 2009 Ruling - SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion
Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, for reconsideration.

vs. December 21, 2009 Ruling - The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008
decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress
Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills
of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million
Management, Respondents. that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive
effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.
August 24, 2010 Ruling = The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for
reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood
11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities, Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.The
but it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution..
12th Congress Enacted into law RA 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2011. RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual February 15, 2011 Ruling - the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011
resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a determination
in 2008. of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid

precedent,
CURRENT CASE:
June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified the April 28, 2009 Resolution:
The present petition is an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
petitioners against the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011. The
Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
Reconsideration of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision
Cityhood Laws constitutional. becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of
the first motion for reconsideration.
Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration was based on the ground that the Court
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws
reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the
unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory.
filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second
ISSUES: motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to promulgate the resolution because there In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
is no longer any actual case or controversy (No) reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the
2. Whether or not the Resolution contravenes the 1997 Rules of Procedure and filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion
Relevant Supreme Court Issuances (No) for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for
3. Whether or not resolution undermines the judicial system in its disregard of the lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008
principles of res judicata and the doctrine of immutability of final judgments (No) Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second
motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution
4. Whether or not the resolution violates Article X, Section 6 and 10 of the
Constitution (no) As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the
records several pleadings and documents, including respondents Motion To Amend
5. Whether or not the resolution violates the equal protection Clause of the
Resolution Of April 28, 2009
Constitution and the right of Local Governments to a just share in the national
Taxes (no) The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
June 2, 2009, asseverating that their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28,
HELD:
2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008
1-3 : Petitioner posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-
Resolution denying the respondents second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the November vote on the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration.
18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution, the Court required the petitioners to
judgment on May 21, 2009. - Court disagreed
comment on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009
In the April 28, 2009 Resolution The court ruled that by a vote of 6-6, the Motion
petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of
merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to
Resolution of 31 March 2009. Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge", together with the
Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed Reply.
a Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners Comment Ad
Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" Cautelam With Motion to Expunge, to grant the respondents Motion for Leave to
And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached Second Motion For File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to
Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved
Expunge, and to note the respondents Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,
with Motion to Expunge. 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April
28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the
December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April
April 28, 2009 Resolution), the Court opted to act on the Motion for
28, 2009 etc. and voting anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse
to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its Decision granting the motion
parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same
and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional, disposing thus respondent
permitting effect occurred when the Court, by its November 17, 2009
LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution, granted the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for
Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to
noted the attached Reply.
File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further The actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance
Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of with the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. The Court has also frequently
the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of
March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.
The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED
herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events recounted herein
On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been
Reconsideration against the December 21, 2009 Decision. On the same date, the resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of
petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009. judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to
the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the
On January 12, 2010, the Court Directed the respondents to comment on the
precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty
motions of the petitioners
and finality.
On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors filed their separate Manifestations with
ISSUE:
Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration to which the adverse
parties comment on the motions 4-5:

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the
2008 Decision. Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The
apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable
On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local
of the "Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010. They followed this by filing on Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million under
September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in
Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. On November 19, 2010, the his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill
petitioners sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were
Resolution dated August 24, 2010"]. On November 30, 2010, the Court noted, municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th Congress
among others, the petitioners Opposition. prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the
On January 18, 2011, the Court denied the respondents Motion to Set "Motion for municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws.
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
On February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged. ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations
of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity,
clarified, the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration was not a the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions
prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting and acting on it having the being embodied in the exemption clauses.
effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the
The 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills their right over the property. the CA dismissed the petition, holding that respondents
pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the were bound by the said decision. The CA ratiocinated that respondents were aware
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. of the pendency of the case, yet they did not intervene, and that the case is barred by
Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and res judicata.
fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its Respondents elevated the case to the SC by petition for review on certiorari but was
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly also denied. Said resolution became final and executory.
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. Respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against petitioner with
the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Respondents posited therein that, since they did not
The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just
sell their shares in the property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have
share in the national taxes is not acceptable. share of local government units is
the right to redeem the shares sold by the other heirs. They prayed that they be
a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount.
allowed to exercise their right to redeem their co-heirs shares and that petitioner
Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population
execute all papers, documents and deeds to effectuate the right of legal redemption.
(50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on
RTC granted the petition.
the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then
Acting jointly on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and respondents
more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that
Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a
the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase
Resolution, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and granting
or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the
respondents motion for execution.
allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement
Petitioner filed for annulment of judgement but was denied by the CA, holding that
of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than
the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available since
that received in the preceding year.
petitioner Maura So had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing
Heirs of Mauro So Vs. Obliosca the same orders of the trial court.
Facts: Petitioners then filed this petition for review.
Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land in Cagayan De Oro. The property was
inherited by his family upon his death(including respondents). Issue:
The Jomoc heirs sold the lot to Maura So for P300k. However, the 3 petitioners whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the right of
and maura so failed to affix their signature on the deed of sale and it was not legal redemption by respondent.
notarized. However, they gave a down payment of P49k.
Soon, petitioners demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the
Ruling:
Jomoc Heirs refused. Petitioner then filed a complaint for specific performance
Yes,
against the Jomoc heirs, except for the respondents.
The Jomoc Heirs again sold the same land to the spouses Lim for P200k. The
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and executory
spouses lim intervened in the civil case.
judgments. The first is this Courts Decision which upheld the sale of the whole
Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners and was affirmed by the CA on appeal. The
property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura
defendant heirs and sps lim filed a petition for review. The court rendered a decision
So. The second is the Courts Resolution which sustained the order of execution of
in favor of petitioner which became final and executory,
the said decision against the herein respondents despite the fact that they were not
Petitioner filed a motion for execution, however respondents opposed the motion
party-defendants in the first case. And the third is the Courts Minute Resolution
on the ground that they did not participate in the sale of the land and were not
which denied Maura Sos petition for review of the RTC Decision granting
parties to the case. Despite the opposition, the trial court granted the motion.
respondents right to redeem the property.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was also denied. the trial court issued an It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous
Order granting the motion for execution and divesting all the Jomoc heirs of their
judgments. It rendered final and executory the Resolution of the RTC which
titles over the property.
recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from
All the Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the said
Maura So. To recall, the RTC premised its decision on its finding that respondents
order of the RTC. They alleged that herein respondents were not parties to the
did not actually sell their shares in the property to Maura So because they did not
case, therefore, they should not be bound by the decision therein and be deprived of
sign the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in Appellants would argue before this Court that defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to
favor of So; hence, they remained co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous show that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver in question.
because this Court had already pronounced in the first two final and executory
judgments that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court of Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
was barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment. (IMPORTANT)

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment precludes the re-litigation of a


particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in a The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant
former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the
claim or cause of action. bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we
had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical
RAMOS vs. PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In
BENGZON, J.P., J view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'.
FACTS: In the case of Campo vs. CamaroteNo. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in
appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In
- Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. and order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere
a collision, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the
PEPESI-COLA. applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of
- Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co- service." Defendant Company has taken all these steps.2
plaintiff of Placido.
- PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision under review by
Bonifacio.
taking issue with the testimony of Anasco upon which the findings of due diligence
aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now contended that Aasco being PEPSI-COLA's
RTC:
employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony is not believable.
- Rendered a judgment in favor of Ramos thereby finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due ISSUE:
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
- Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants appellee to the Court of Appeals. Whether or not PEPSI-COLA's evidence failed to show that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection of its driver in question
CA:

- Affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio HELD:
negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability
- PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Stated differently, Aascos credibility is not for this Court now to re-examine. And said witness
Bonifacio. having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testimony, as accepted by said Court,
cannot at this stage be assailed. As We said in Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, L-9194, April 25,
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this petition for review of the Court of Appeals' 1957, assignments of error involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect
decision. dispute the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these
proceedings. For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well- diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G.
known: There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of
what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.5 driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service."
From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must be taken as established that,
as testified to by Aasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Appellant's other assignment of errors are likewise outside the purview of this Court's
Bonifacio as to his qualifications, experiences and record of service, taking all steps mentioned reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether PEPSI-COLA violated the Revised Motor
by the Court of Appeals in its decision already quoted.1wph1.t Vehicles Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not having been raised and argued in
the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the first time.
The uncontradicted testimony of (the) personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production
department: that when he was hired as a driver, defendant company had size him by looking
into his background, asking him to submit clearances, and later on, he was sent to the pool
house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of, first, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense
that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of defendant driver.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen