What is dereliction of duty

Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross
neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." It denotes a
flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases
involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to
give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference."( RE: COMPLAINT OF AERO ENGR. DARWIN A. RECI
AGAINST COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ AND DEPUTY COURT
ADMINISTRATOR THELMA C. BAHIA RELATIVE TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05236956, A.M. No. 17-01-04-
SC , February 7, 2017)

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice
of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness and candor. The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty
and condemns duplicitous behavior. Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must
not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith. (OLBES vs. . DECIEMBRE , AC-5365. April 27, 2005)

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Layao, Jr.:

[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.
 Quantum of evidence to find a member of legal profession of dereliction of duty.

In this relation, it is settled that the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
liable for the aforesaid offenses is substantial evidence, or "that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."4 Substantial
evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases,
but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs.

Requisite of judicial clemency

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case
for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
(Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency:)

Canon 9

Quesstion: Atty. Puday was charged by Mr. Dako Sili, however because of the compromise
agrement, Mr. Dako Sili withdrew his disbarment case againts Atty. Puday.

Taken into consideration that Mr. Dako Sili withdrew his case would the case still prosper?

YES. The case will still prosper.

In a long line of cases it was been held that(see the jurisprudence)

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-
in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who
called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not
terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer. (Sebastian vs. Atty. Bajar, A.C.
No. 3731, September 07, 2007)

Held: These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes.

Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a
Comment also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in
the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause. It is a conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose.[63]

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible
breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.( HADJULA vs. ATTY.
ROCELES F. MADIANDA, A.C. NO. 6711, July 03, 2007)

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a
friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the
then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end
of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment,
too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship.

Uy vs. Atty. Gonzalez, A.C. No. 5280, March 30, 2004

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence,
if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite
the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.[

held:

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits

or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that
any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in
matters pertinent to his profession. Uy case

Munar v. Flores, the Supreme Court suspended an attorney who deceitfully defrauded a
client of a sum of money allegedly representing cost of fees and other miscellaneous
expenses for a suit to be filed but which promised suit he never filed nor did he return the
amount despite demands. Failure on the part of the lawyer, upon demand, to return to his
client the funds or property held by him on the latter's behalf gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client.
Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court,
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case.

The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,[15] thus:

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this
Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar
for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this
Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney in a motion for
reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in the motion are sufficient, and such words superfluous. It is in this
 context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio thought best to
focus the attention of this Court to the issue in the case does not give him
unbridled license in language. To be sure,lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes

high esteem in courts, creates or promotesdistrust in judicial administration,
or which could have the effect of harboring and encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief. Stability of judicial institutions
suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, was the result of overenthusiasm. It is but
to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In
fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However,
it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper
place of courts in our system of government

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to
say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot
be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.(ATTY. DALLONG-
GALICINAO, A.C. NO. 6396, October 25, 2005)
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence,
if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite
the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

ILAC,
APLICATION, In the totality of the circumstances

TERMINATION OF SERVICE

It must be remembered that while the right of the client to terminate the relation is
absolute, i.e., with or without cause,[25] the right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. [26] Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination. [27] He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause.[28]

The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services are well-defined, [29] and the
abruptness of respondent's withdrawal hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may,
whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing from a case, he can not just do so
and leave the client out in the cold unprotected. [30] An attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event the lawyer should see to it that the name of the new counsel is
recorded in the case.( A.C. No. 5834, December 11, 2003

TERESITA D. SANTECO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE,

RESPONDENT.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession
(Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the case of
United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. It he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a
promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly, complainant's knowledge of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she
would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine
where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent
could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it
"worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very
rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo,
p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming
purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer,
does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such
requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the
concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
"It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
"Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
"Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of
the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (in re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896)."
In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
said:

"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him."

Disciplinary actions against lawyers cannot be abated by the complainant's withdrawal of

charges or refusal to prosecute. Likewise, the failure to answer a complaint is not
equivalent to an admission of the allegations therein. In both instances - withdrawal of
charges and failure to answer -- the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is duty-bound
to continue with the investigation, hear the evidence and submit a
recommendation/judgment as may be warranted by the established facts and the law.( AC
No. 5176 (Formerly CBD-97-492), December 14, 1999

RITA DE ERE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MANOLO RUBI, RESPONDENT. )

In this light, we cannot sustain such recommendation. There was no basis for the IBP's
ruling that respondent's failure to file an answer constituted an admission of the averments
in the Complaint. The consequence of failure to file an answer was clearly laid down in the
August 21, 1997 IBP Order, which stated that "the Commission will consider you in default
and this case shall be heard ex parte." [8] This Order is also in consonance with Section 8,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which provides that the investigation shall proceed ex
parte upon failure of the respondent to file an answer or to appear in the proceedings.
Implicit is the need for further investigation, for nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes
the IBP to treat respondent's silence as an admission of the complainant's allegations.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.

"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the
extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in
law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous
and upright man."[( A.M. No. RTJ-07-2092 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2685-RTJ),
December 08, 2008

EVA LUCIA Z. GEROY, VS. HON. DAN R. CALDERON, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
26 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,

Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:[53]

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past
and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,[56] we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in
his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not
to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Sebastian vs. Atty. Bajar, A.C. No. 3731, September 07, 2007

Held: The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the
person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct is in no sense a party,
and generally has no interest in the outcome. [66] A compromise or withdrawal of charges
does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer.

Held: These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138[58] of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders
of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. [59]
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is
not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively.[60] Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts
orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. [61]

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes.[62]

Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a
Comment also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in
the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause. It is a conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose.[63]

HADJULA vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, A.C. NO. 6711, July 03, 2007

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible
breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a
friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the
then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end
of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment,
too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship.

Uy vs. Atty. Gonzalez, A.C. No. 5280, March 30, 2004

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence,
if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite
the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.[

held:

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits

or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that
any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in
matters pertinent to his profession. Uy case

Munar v. Flores, the Supreme Court suspended an attorney who deceitfully defrauded a
client of a sum of money allegedly representing cost of fees and other miscellaneous
expenses for a suit to be filed but which promised suit he never filed nor did he return the
amount despite demands. Failure on the part of the lawyer, upon demand, to return to his
client the funds or property held by him on the latter's behalf gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client.
(OLBES vs. . DECIEMBRE , AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice
of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. [27] Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[28] No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence,
they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court,
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case.

The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,[15] thus:

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this
Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar
for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this
 Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney in a motion for
reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in the motion are sufficient, and such words superfluous. It is in this
context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio thought best to
focus the attention of this Court to the issue in the case does not give him
unbridled license in language. To be sure,lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions,
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes

high esteem in courts, creates or promotesdistrust in judicial administration,
or which could have the effect of harboring and encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief. Stability of judicial institutions
suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, was the result of overenthusiasm. It is but
to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In
fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However,
it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper
place of courts in our system of government

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to
say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot
be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.(ATTY. DALLONG-
GALICINAO, A.C. NO. 6396, October 25, 2005)

In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence,
if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite
the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

ILAC,
APLICATION, In the totality of the circumstances, ilac It is crystal clear from the
foregoing

TERMINATION OF SERVICE
It must be remembered that while the right of the client to terminate the relation is
absolute, i.e., with or without cause,[25] the right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. [26] Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination. [27] He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause.[28]

The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services are well-defined, [29] and the
abruptness of respondent's withdrawal hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may,
whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing from a case, he can not just do so
and leave the client out in the cold unprotected. [30] An attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event the lawyer should see to it that the name of the new counsel is
recorded in the case.( A.C. No. 5834, December 11, 2003

TERESITA D. SANTECO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE,

RESPONDENT.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession
(Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the case of
United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. It he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a
promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly, complainant's knowledge of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she
would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine
where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent
could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it
"worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very
rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo,
p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming
purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer,
does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such
requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the
concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
"It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
"Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
"Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of
the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (in re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896)."

In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
said:

"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him."

Disciplinary actions against lawyers cannot be abated by the complainant's withdrawal of

charges or refusal to prosecute. Likewise, the failure to answer a complaint is not
equivalent to an admission of the allegations therein. In both instances - withdrawal of
charges and failure to answer -- the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is duty-bound
to continue with the investigation, hear the evidence and submit a
recommendation/judgment as may be warranted by the established facts and the law.( AC
No. 5176 (Formerly CBD-97-492), December 14, 1999

RITA DE ERE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MANOLO RUBI, RESPONDENT. )

In this light, we cannot sustain such recommendation. There was no basis for the IBP's
ruling that respondent's failure to file an answer constituted an admission of the averments
in the Complaint. The consequence of failure to file an answer was clearly laid down in the
August 21, 1997 IBP Order, which stated that "the Commission will consider you in default
and this case shall be heard ex parte." [8] This Order is also in consonance with Section 8,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which provides that the investigation shall proceed ex
parte upon failure of the respondent to file an answer or to appear in the proceedings.
Implicit is the need for further investigation, for nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes
the IBP to treat respondent's silence as an admission of the complainant's allegations.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.

"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the
extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in
law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous
and upright man."[( A.M. No. RTJ-07-2092 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2685-RTJ),
December 08, 2008

EVA LUCIA Z. GEROY, VS. HON. DAN R. CALDERON, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
26 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Layao, Jr.:[36]

[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.[37
Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:[53]

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past
and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,[56] we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in
his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not
to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment
of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave
misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph.
This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted
place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice

Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administrative of justice. Canon 6
In Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanglag, Jr., we stated:[7]

The Court finds deserving of due consideration, the explanation of respondent Judge for
leaving ten (10) undecided cases before his retirement from the service. Serious illness may
justify the inability of a judge to perform his official duties and functions. But then, the
Court has to enforce what is required by law and to impose a reasonable punishment for a
violation thereof. The members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay. Failure to decide cases within the periods fixed by law constitutes a
neglect of duty, which warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. When he was
hindered by a grave malignancy, it was incumbent upon the respondent Judge to request
this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, for additional time to decide the
cases which he could not seasonably act upon and decide. For failing to do so, respondent
Judge has to suffer the consequences of his omission.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, it was held:[8]

While the Court is sympathetic to the plight of judges, it cannot be overemphasized that the
publics faith and confidence in the judicial system is at stake in cases involving delays in
the disposition of cases. No less than the Constitution mandates judges to decide cases with
deliberate dispatch. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
dispose of the Courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. For it
cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Procrastination among members of
the judiciary in rendering decisions and acting upon cases before them not only causes
great injustice to the parties involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the
part of the judge.

In Bagamasbad vs. Judge de Guzman, Jr.,[10] We have already admonished lawyers to be

more prudent in filing administrative charges against members of the judiciary. It is true
that "The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability' x
x x. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. x x x But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of
the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of

[10]
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand for him for any client, violation of law
or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his
client."[11] Here, complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and
frivolous administrative complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag,
with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus, exact
vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients.

Herein complainant also failed to prove malice and deliberate intent on the part of
respondent judge to perpetrate an unjustice. We hereby quote the decision of this Honorable
Court in Sta. Maria vs. Ubay,[19] stating that:

"x x x complainant failed to show any unmistakable indication that bad faith motivated the
alleged unjust actuations of the respondent judge x x x. Absent, thus, any positive evidence
on record that the respondent judge rendered judgment in question with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the x x x charge of the complainant must fall."

In Mendoza vs. Villaluz,[20] this Court has also held:

"x x x it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to
exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct x x x
the judge cannot be held administratively responsible x x x for "no one, called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment," and "to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment or
would make his position unbearable"."

This pronouncement has been reiterated by Us in the case of Miranda vs. Judge
Manalastas,[21] where We said:

[11]

[19]

[20]

[21]
"Well established is the rule that mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge
knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in administrative
proceedings against him. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice is infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is
that he follows the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the
different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis
of the conclusions he find established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to
guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly. x x x. If in the mind of the respondent, the
evidence for the defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to
account administratively for the result of his ratiocination. For that is the very essence of
judicial inquiry: otherwise the burdens of judicial office will be intolerable." (underscoring
supplied).

A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. [22] In Pabalan vs.
Guevarra,[23] the Supreme Court spoke of the rationale for this immunity. We held, thus:

"x x x "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This
concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to
preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary."

Still, complainant wants Us to apply the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine as applied by this
Court in the cases of People vs. Valenzuela;[24] Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Romillo;[25] In Re:
Wenceslao Laureta;[26] and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Capistrano.[27]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]
That doctrine, however, is not applicable to the case at bar. In similar administrative cases
separately filed against Judge Liwag[28] and Judge Dizon,[29] We have ruled that:

"In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an
inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to
bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak (sic) an injustice
against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a
character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in
short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine
does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of
evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that
when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible
explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no
further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a
respondent is necessary.

Finally, Rivera v. Corral[25] reiterates the purpose of administrative cases against lawyers in
this manner -
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from
the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may
be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which
he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as
it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person
against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent
of the former case.[5] It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then

[28]

[29]
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. [6] The relation of attorney and client is one of
confidence and trust in the highest degree.[7] A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [8] An attorney not
only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns
from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given
attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation
of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the
confidence of the people.[9]( SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 3745, October 02, 1995

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO,

RESPONDENT.

In Advincula v. Macabata,[28] the Court elucidated as to what disciplinary sanction should

be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct. Thus:

Xxx. "When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the
primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers
from similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the
administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem
proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer
strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession
and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only
on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor
erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are
of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment,
depending on the circumstances of the case. [29] In case of suspension, the period would range
from one year[30] to indefinite suspension, as in the case of Cordova v. Cordova,[31] where the
lawyer was found to have maintained an adulterous relationship for two years and refused
to support his family. On the other hand, there is a string of cases where the Court meted
out the extreme penalty of disbarment, to wit:

In Toledo v. Toledo,[32] a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned
his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[33] a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant proved that he
had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The
Court declared that the respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the Bar.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[34] the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and
misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Dantes v. Dantes,[35] disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent lawyer who
maintained illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his
marriage to the complainant. The Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established that the respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos,[36] the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he was found to
have entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. The Court
declared that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a
serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital
vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril.
Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative
penalty of disbarment.

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was
primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v.
Boncavil[17] that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of
the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded
from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.[18]

In Dantes v. Dantes,[46] the Court ordered the disbarment of a lawyer, describing as grossly
immoral his conduct of engaging in illicit relationships and abandoning his family. The
Court exhorted lawyers to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:
In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of
law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible
purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and
(iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.[47

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
[16]
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. [17] A.C.
No. 9608, November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON,

RESPONDENT.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

DECISION
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[14] the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. [15]
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or
private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

The objective of the rule against forum-shopping was cited in Municipality of Taguig, et al
vs. Court of Appeals. Said the Supreme Court -
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts
and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same
or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice.[13] Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, [14] and is
enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.[15] While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients
and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. [16] Their office does not permit violation of the law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery.[17] A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party.[18] Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[19] They advance the
honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or
give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law. [20]

Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable membership in
the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the conduct of their litigation and their relations with their clients,
the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to
speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.[21]

A.C. No. 5908, October 25, 2004

ANTONIO B. RAMOS AND MA. REGINA PAZ R. DE DIOS, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.
ALEJANDRO JOSE C. PALLUGNA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false
pretenses is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The
attorney, who violates his oath of office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client
and practises deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he
degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an
honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil 627; Manaloto vs.
Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs.
Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).

We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for
having misappropriated the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of
candor and his repeated failure to appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal
of Iligan and at the hearings scheduled by this Court, thus causing this proceeding to drag
on for a long time, demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble
profession of law. (See Capulong vs. Alino, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA
491).

Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that the proper
disciplinary action against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect
the court and the public from the misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the
assumption that a member of the bar should be competent, honorable and reliable, a person
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).

In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,[13] the Court held:

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member
of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical
fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and
unethical.

Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves with the causes of their clients before advising
the latter on the soundness of litigating. If they find that the intended suit is devoid of
merit or that the pending action is defenseless, [22] they should promptly inform and dissuade
their clients accordingly. A.C. No. 5024, February 20, 2003

ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARSENIO A. MERRERA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

Moral turpitude
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines [46] cited in Villaber v.
Commission on Elections,[47] the Court defines moral
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals."[48] The determination of whether an act involves
moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on
the circumstances attending the violation of the statute. [

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves

moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in International
Rice Research Institute v. NLRC[6] where it ruled:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of

homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal
act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not,
it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se
or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there
are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which
must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion
as the cases are reached.[7]
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President
can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.[15] In this case, the executive
clemency merely commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment the
penalty imposed on Sesbreo. Commutation is a mere
reduction of penalty.[16] Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability.[17] The penalty for Sesbreos
crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from
prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge [18]
stated that [i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted
herein shall subsist. Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbreo has been granted pardon,
there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full
and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege.[19] It is granted only to those
possessing good moral character.[20] A violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer,
including the penalty of disbarment.[21A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457, February 03, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREO

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui

generis character of disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor