HOW ITS DONE

A good friend, a man of 86 years and a faithful servant of the people, as a New
Hampshire State Representative, brings this common law claim against; the
wrongdoers/lebellees; the fraudsters; the negligent; the derelicts; in breach of their
fiduciary duty.

Common Law is above the foreign, bankrupt, private de factos STATUTORY

COMMERCIAL CODE, written by those who are not lawfully allowed to hold offices of
trust. The Crown Temple B.A.R. Attorners are purveyors of fraud and piracy, and
whatever they do is null and void on its face.

US Supreme Court held that state officials acting by color of law may be held
personally liable for the injuries or torts they cause and that official or sovereign
immunity may not be asserted.; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232 (1974), 94 S. Ct.
1683, 1687 (1974), When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner
violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.; Warnock v Pecos
County, Texas, 116 F. 3d 776 No.96-50869 Summary Calendar. July 3, 1997.

The de facto is foreclosed from parity with the tangible. Their STATUTES and CODES
are colour of law, not law. They can control only that which they create. They are a
CORPORATION, not a government. They, as TRUSTEES are all in breach of their
fiduciary duty and many are guilty of HIGH TREASON.

These public servants have taken over so that we are their servants. This is what
happens when the general population is hoodwinked into thinking theyre supposed
to be acting as U.S. citizens. Its the exact opposite of the truth! Its imperative to
correct that tragic, mortal error mentally and in your political status. Many years
ago, when Dick Marple was a young man, he and many others quit and resigned
from the State Police because they learned they werent law enforcement at all, in
that they were CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS acting as RE-VENUE generators for
the Bankruptcy by fleecing living people as if they were DEAD
entities/PERSONS/JOHN H. DOEs under Colour of Law. That is a serious crime and
hangable/punishable by death.

Dick figured this out 60 years ago, yet still to this day, the general population
doesnt know that theyre supposed to be free and unencumbered by their servants.
Their STATUTES and CODES are to govern them, not us. Today, the Police are
trained chimpanzees who go about kidnapping people for the foreign B.A.R.
maggots in black robes who have no jurisdiction over us. Read Jordan vs. New
London. That man couldnt get a job as a Policeman because he scored too highly
on the test. The last thing the B.A.R. wants is a Cop with a brain capable of critical
thinking, because if the Cops could think, theyd figure out that its the B.A.R.
Attorneys who need to be arrested, especially the scum at the Bank/Bench. Today,
the Police dont know the difference between :john-henry: doe and JOHN H. DOE.
When its explained to them, they get that stupid deer in the headlights look on
their faces, then they swear theyre hearing nonsense.

There are NO Judicial Courts in America and have not been since 1789. Judges do
NOT enforce Statutes and Codes. Executive Administrators enforce Statutes and
Codes. FRC v. GE, 281 U.S. 464 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 1 Stat. 138-
178

There have NOT been any Judges in America since 1789. There have only been
Administrators. FRC v. GE, 281 U.S. 464 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 1
Stat. 138-178

The Supreme Court has warned, Because of what appears

to be Lawful commands [Statutory Rules, Regulations and -codesordinances- and
Restrictions] on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what
appears to be law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to
ignorance [deceptive practices, constructive fraud, barratry, legal plunder,
conversion, and malicious prosecution in inferior administrative State courts].
(United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187, 76 S.Ct. 281, 100 L.Ed. 185 (1956);

The Common Law is the real law, the Supreme Law of the land. The codes, rules,
regulations, policy and statutes are not the law. (Self v. Rhay, 61 Wn 2d 261),
They are the law of government for internal regulation, not the law of man, in his
separate but equal station and natural state, a sovereign foreign with respect to
government generally.

A concurrent or joint resolutionof legislature is not Law, (Koenig v. Flynn, 258

N.Y. 292, 179 N. E. 705, 707; Ward v State, 176 Okl. 368, 56 P.2d 136, 137; State ex
rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162, 165).
All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not
human/Creators in accord with Gods Laws. All codes, rules, and regulations are
unconstitutional and lacking due process of Law..(Rodriques v. Ray Donavan, U.S.
Department of Labor, 769 F.2d 1344, 1348 (1985)); lacking due process of law, in
that they are void for ambiguity in their failure to specify the statutes applicability
to natural persons, otherwise depriving the same of fair notice, as their
construction by definition of terms aptly identifies the applicability of such statutes
to artificial or fictional corporate entities or persons, creatures of statute, or those
by contract employed as agents or representatives, departmental subdivisions,
offices, officers, and property of the government, but not the Natural Person or
American citizen Immune from such jurisdiction of legalism.

A Statute is not a Law, (Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La. 1067, 3
So.2d 244, 248),
A Code or Statute is not a Law, (Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La.
1067, 3 So.2d 244, 248),

A Code is not a Law, (In Re Self v Rhay Wn 2d 261), in point of fact in Law).

Below is what Dick is doing to enforce law upon the outlaw public servants:
Affidavit of Truth in Commerce and Claim for Damages

Addressed to all herein named Libellees in their official and individual personal
capacities as Trustees of the people, to whom a Fiduciary relationship is contracted
by OATH and for whom they must promptly act.

Margaret Wood Hassan, Governor of New Hampshire; having her obligations and
authority pursuant to Article 41 and 51 Part II, constitution for the State of New
Hampshire, Further; District 1 Councilor Joseph D. Kenney; District 2, Councilor Colin
Van Ostern, District 3 Councilor Christopher T. Sununu, District 4 Councilor
Christopher C. Pappas, Councilor, District 5 Councilor David K. Wheeler, all in their
official and individual capacities.

Now comes the Affiant, A. Richard: Marple, Sui Juris, an Article 30 Part TWO
Inhabitant who is a Life Member of the VFW and is in his 86th year and who has
firsthand knowledge of all of the facts enumerated within this Affidavit. Affiant
makes his common law claim for damages, compounding now in excess of one
million silver dollars that he has suffered as a result of corporate public servant
employees maintaining silence to written Affidavits and other communication. The
courts have found such SILENCE to be FRAUD, when there is a duty to speak, and be
accountable, as required by Article Eight of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights. Other
unlawful acts perpetrated by corporate employees acting under color of law are
all enumerated in the ignored Affidavits. Affiant makes demand for prosecution and
enforcement of law upon all the public servants named and un named co-
conspirators in this Affidavit and those Affidavits filed with the Secretary of State
and in the exhibits attached.

INTRODUCTION

This Affidavit is filed pursuant 18 USC 4 and by the authority of Article 14, New
Hampshire Bill of Rights, and U.S. v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, (7th Cir. 1981) Indeed, no
more than that, [Affidavit] is necessary to make the prima facie case. Id at 536.
Article 32 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights is the authority for the instructions
and Information demanded by this Affidavit which is in the nature of Claim, 42 USC
1983, 42 USC 1985(3) , 42 USC 1988 (a) (b). and nature of Quo Warranto; Ames v.
Kansas, 111 U.S. 449; All Libellees are encouraged to study this AFFIDAVIT
thoroughly and carefully before making any counter Affidavit This is a lawful
NOTICE. It informs you. It means what it says, and says what it means. Note,
vicarious liability imposes liability on one person for a tortious act committed by
another for which all libellees are at risk. There are a number of contexts expressed
in this instrument in which this joint and several liabilities arise and SILENCE to such
revelations is FRAUD.

This Affidavit is an offer and agreement with instructions for the libellees to perform
their duty, obey their Oaths of Office and enforce the laws of this state. The wrong
doers must be prosecuted. Specifically, corporate employee Joyce Phinney, a public
servant and her fellow co-conspirators who have committed the criminal Tort of
CONVERSION; See Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 413 Pa. 442 (Pa. 1964)
upon all elected members of the legislature by withholding, Medicare, Social
Security and IRS demands from their Article 15 Part II Compensation. Title 29 of
the U.S. Code, Section 630 (f) clearly exempts all elected officials (and that
includes the elected reader) from such burden as does RSA 282-A:9, IV, (O)(1)(2) All
this being confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991) Ms. Phinney is, by her silence, guilty of FRAUD. She is guilty of violating 18
USC 241 & 242 among other statutes. The breached fiduciary duty arises from and
is in consequence of the silence and bad faith of all subordinate municipal public
servants ignoring their fiduciary duty, which includes, non-performance,
nonfeasance, and refusal to be accountable to Article 8, New Hampshire Bill of
Rights and by their deliberate and collective silence to Affidavits filed, by this Affiant
and recorded with the Secretary of State. These facts remove all controversy from
the matter at hand, thus meaning there is no longer any recourse to a court of law
since this Affidavit is a PRIMA FACIE CASE. This Affidavit addresses the crimes and
violation of OATHS of all subordinate public servants acting under your supervision
and includes specifically, all identified in the Affidavits by their ignoring their moral
and fiduciary duty. The following stare decisis apply; Hafer v. Melo, 502 US 21
(1991): US Supreme Court held that state officials acting by color of law may be
held personally liable for the injuries or torts they cause and that official or
sovereign immunity may not be asserted.; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232 (1974),
94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974), When a state officer acts under a state law in a
manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.; Warnock v Pecos
County, Texas, 116 F. 3d 776 No.96-50869 Summary Calendar. July 3, 1997. It is
stipulated that all exhibits attached are to be understood as being incorporated
herein as if written within this affidavit verbatim. The following facts are itemized
point for point.In the pure Maxims of Laws of Commerce, the eternal and
unchanging principles are;

1-A WORKMAN IS WORTHY OF HIS HIRE. Exodus 20:15; Lev. 19:13; Mat. 10:10; Luke
107; II Tim. 2:6. Legal maxim: It is against equity for freemen not to have the free
disposal of their own property.
2.-ALL ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW. Equality before the law Exodus 21:23-25; Lev.
24: 17-21; Deut. 1;17, 19:21; Mat. 22:36-40; Luke 10:17; Col. 3:25. No one is above
The Law.
3- IN COMMERCE TRUTH IS SOVEREIGN. (Exodus 20:16; Ps. 117:2; John 8:32; II Cor.
13:8 ). Truth Rules, Your Word is your Bond.
4- TRUTH IS EXPRESSED BY FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT. (Lev. 5:4- 5; Lev. 6:3-5; Lev.
19:11-13: Num. 30:2; Mat. 5:33; James 5: 12)
5- AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN COMMERCE. (12 Pet. 1:25; Heb.
6:13-15;) Affidavit is the highest form of truth. Legal Maxim: He who does not deny,
admits.
6- AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGMENT IN COMMERCE. (Heb. 6:16
17 wink emoticon. Nihil Dicit
7- IN COMMERCE FOR ANY MATTER TO BE RESOLVED MUST BE EXPRESSED. (Heb.
4:16; Phil. 4:6; Eph. 6:19-21). Legal Maxim: He who fails to assert his rights has
none.)
8- HE WHO LEAVES THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST LOSES BY DEFAULT. Mat. 10:22; Legal
Maxim: He who does not repel a wrong when he can, occasions it.
9- SACRIFICE IS THE MEASURE OF CREDIBILITY (NO WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE =
NO LIABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY OR MEASURE OF CONVICTION). (Acts 7,
life/death of Stephen), Legal Maxim: He who bears the burden ought also to derive
the benefit.
10- SATISFACTION OF A LIEN (Gen. 2-3; Mat. 4;.). In commerce a lien or claim can be
satisfied by rebutting the affidavit, with a counter affidavit, point by point. It is
stipulated that In case of non-resolution, doctrine of estoppel will automatically
prevail. If non-payment is encountered, the Sheriff will convene a common law jury,
based on the Seventh Amendment, concerning a dispute involving a claim of more
than $20.00. The only other way to satisfy a lien is to pay it.

INSTRUCTIONS, pursuant to Article 32, Part II

Point #1-The Governor and Council shall conduct an immediate investigation to

verify all the facts enumerated in this Affidavit and all Affidavits filed with the
Secretary of State by this Affiant. Convene a Grand Jury to present the verified facts
and upon receipt of a True Bill prosecute all co-conspirators and wrong doers.
Point #2 Silence, fraud, and judicial fraud Silence can only be equated with fraud
where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered
would be intentionally misleading. . . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani 265 F.2d
408(2d Cir.), cert. den.,360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f.,
Avery v. Clearly, 132U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United
States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Natl Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383
F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967). United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).
Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit and this is one of the
meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163,
168 (7th Cir.1985) includes the deliberate concealment of material information in
a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public,
including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he
deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .
Justice Stevens (dissenting) in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987),
quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987). Ongoing
silence of all the corporate municipal employees all named as corporate public
servants in the several Affidavits recorded by Secretary of State, are guilty of FRAUD
and demand is made for prosecution.

This affidavit complies with all known rules of evidence (Rule 301 FRCP & Rule 36
FRCP). It is stipulated to be accurate and unconditionally proved if not countered by
Affidavit with documented proof, point for point by each Libellee within 30 days
from the date Filed stamped by the Secretary of State office. Any rebuttal must be
addressed to the Secretary of States office for acceptance and recording. Silence
will be Nihil Dicit judgment by acquiescence, and refusal to perform. Such Silence
will prove the acceptance, admission and confession of the facts and truth herein
expressed. Estoppels will automatically toll and prevail. This Affidavit consists of 2
pages plus exhibits and is made in Good faith, without ill will, vexation or frivolity. All
rights Reserved. None waived

A.Richard: Marple, Sui Juris

Any Street
Somewhere, New Hampshire

.
Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to
speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24
. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S.
918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10
S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir.
1969); American Natl Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967). United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).
Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit and this is one of the
meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163,
168 (7th Cir.1985) includes the deliberate concealment of material information in
a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public,
including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he
deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .
Justice Stevens (dissenting) in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987),
quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).

Memorandum on Silence is Fraud Attachment 4 Page 1 of 5

Silence is Fraud When There is a Duty to Speak

Table of Authorities.
Cases
American Family Service Corp. v. Michelfelder, 968 F.2d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 1992)
3
Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 721 (9th Cir. 1961)
3
Arizona v. Coddington, 662 P.2d. 155, 156 (Ct.App. Az. 1983)
. 2
Bishop v. E.A. Strout realty Agency, 182 F.2d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 1950)
.. 3
Borzillo v. Thompson, 57 A.2d 195, 197 (D.C.Mun.App.1948)
.. 4
Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 260 F.2d 521, 522 (3rd Cir. 1958)
3
Casso v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 219 F.2d 303, 305 (3rd Cir. 1955)
.. 3
Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 638 (5th Cir. 2002)
. 3
Commercial Property Investments, Inc. v. Quality Inns Intern., Inc., 938 F.2d 870,
877 (8th Cir. 1991)
3
Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23, 28 (Alaska 2007)
. 3
Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410, 425, 426
(1941)

2
Hill v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 428 F.2d 112, 119 (11th Cir. 1970)
. 3
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976)
. 3
Jensen v. Snow, 163 A. 784, 786 Sup.Jud.Ct.Maine 1933)
5
Kershaw v. Julien, 72 F2d 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1934)
. 4
Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 931 F.2d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 1991)
. 4
Nasaba Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp., 39 N.E.2d 243, 295 (Ct.App.N.Y. 1942).
5
Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2nd Cir. 1981)
. 3
Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th, Cir. 1989)
3 Memorandum on Silence is Fraud Attachment 4 Page
2 of 5

Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co., Ltd., 78 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1996)
3
Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 935, 939 (4th Cir. 1951)
3
Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Boykin, 181 So. 741, 742 (Sup.Ct.Miss. 1938).
5
Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888)
. 4
Sweeden v. Sweeden, 270 Minn. 491, 500, 134 N.W.2d 871, 877 (1965)
.. 3
Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 98 (1892)
.. 4
United States of America v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 14,15 (9th Cir. 1973)
. 2
United States v. Prudden, 424 F2d. 1021, 1032 (1970); cert. denied 400 U.S. 831
.. 2
Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to
speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. United
States v. Prudden, 424 F2d. 1021, 1032 (1970); cert. denied 400 U.S. 831. See also
United States of America v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 14,15 (9th Cir. 1973). In Arizona v.
Coddington, 662 P.2d. 155, 156 (Ct.App. Az. 1983) When one conveys a false
impression by the disclosure of some facts and the concealment of others, such
concealment is in effect a false representation that what is disclosed is the whole
truth.
In Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410, 425,
426 (1941) To tell less than the whole truth may constitute a false and fraudulent
representation. willful concealment of material facts which change the effect of
the facts actually stated, is as much a fraud as an actual positive misrepresentation
* * * A statement in a business transaction which, while stating the truth so far as it
goes, the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure
to state Memorandum on Silence is Fraud Attachment 4 Page 3 of 5
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation. Such a statement of a half
truth is as much a misrepresentation as if the facts stated were untrue.
In Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23, 28 (Alaska 2007) FN15 See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS 538(1) (1938) (Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact in a
business transaction is justifiable if, but only if, the fact misrepresented is
material.)
In Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 638 (5th Cir. 2002) RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 549(2) (1997) ([T]he recipient of a fraudulent
misrepresentation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover additional
damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these
damages are proved with reasonable certainty.) See also Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato
Kagaku Co., Ltd., 78 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1996); American Family Service Corp. v.
Michelfelder, 968 F.2d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 1992); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc.,
863 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th, Cir. 1989); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2nd Cir.
1981); See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976); Hill v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 428 F.2d 112, 119 (11th Cir. 1970); Anderson v. Knox, 297
F.2d 702, 721 (9th Cir. 1961); Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 260 F.2d
521, 522 (3rd Cir. 1958); Casso v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 219 F.2d 303, 305 (3rd Cir.
1955); Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 935, 939 (4th Cir. 1951);
Bishop v. E.A. Strout realty Agency, 182 F.2d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 1950).
In Commercial Property Investments, Inc. v. Quality Inns Intern., Inc., 938 F.2d 870,
877 (8th Cir. 1991) See Sweeden v. Sweeden, 270 Minn. 491, 500, 134 N.W.2d 871,
877 (1965) (It is settled law, however, that a statement in a business transaction,
which, while stating the truth as far as it goes, the maker knows or believes to be
materially misleading because of his failure to state qualifying matter is a fraudulent
Memorandum on Silence is Fraud Attachment 4 Page 4 of 5

misrepresentation; a statement which contains only those matters which are

favorable and omits all reference to those which are unfavorable is as much a false
representation as if all the facts stated were untrue. (quoting Borzillo v. Thompson,
57 A.2d 195, 197 (D.C.Mun.App.1948))).
In Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 931 F.2d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 1991) The basis for
damages resulting from negligent misrepresentation is the lack of care; the basis for
damages resulting from fraud is the want of honesty. The lack of care in
misrepresentation and the want of honesty in fraudulent misrepresentation in
business transactions give rise to distinct causes of action, the one in tort, the other
in fraud.
In Kershaw v. Julien, 72 F2d 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1934) Where there is a duty to
speak, the suppression of the truth is as reprehensible and as actionable as the
utterance of the false.
In Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 98 (1892) This suppression of a material fact, which
Tyler was bound in good faith to disclose, was equivalent to a false representation
Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888).
In Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888), to wit:
Aliud est tacere, aliud celare,a suppression of the truth may amount to a
suggestion of falsehood. And if, with intent to deceive, either party to a contract of
sale conceals or suppresses a material fact, which he is in good faith bound to
disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to a false representation, because the
concealment or suppression is, in effect, a representation that what is disclosed is
the whole truth. The gist of the action is fraudulently producing a false impression
upon the mind of the other party; and, if this result is accomplished, it is
unimportant whether the means of accomplishing it are words or acts of the
defendant, or his concealment or suppression of material facts not equally within
the knowledge or reach of the plaintiff. Memorandum on Silence is Fraud
Attachment 4 Page 5 of 5

In Jensen v. Snow, 163 A. 784, 786 Sup.Jud.Ct.Maine 1933), to wit:

No principle of law is better settled than that which requires the agent in all
dealings concerning the subject-matter of his agency to act with utmost good faith
and loyalty and disclose all facts within his knowledge which bear materially upon
his principals interests. The rule that withholding information, when good faith and
honest dealing require that it shall be given, is as culpable as misrepresentation as
to facts concerning which good faith and honest dealing require the truth to be
spoken is fully applicable to the relation of principal and agent. As has been said, it
is fraud to deal with a party in ignorance and leave him so. It is not necessary that
the party sought to be charged should have created the false impression nor
intended it. It is sufficient that he knows it and takes advantage of it. Cummings
Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 113 Me. 347, 351, 93 A. 968; Barrett v. St. Ry. Co., 110
Me. 24, 29, 85 A. 306; Prentiss v. Russ, 16 Me. 30; Lapish v. Wells, 6 Me. (6 Greenl.)
175.
Concealment with intent to defraud of facts which one is duty-bound in honesty to
disclose is of the same legal effect and significance as affirmative misrepresentation
of fact. Nasaba Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp., 39 N.E.2d 243, 295 (Ct.App.N.Y.
1942).
Where a party is entitled to inquire of another, who is required to respond,
respondent is guilty of fraud if he conceals any material fact to the inquirers hurt
and respondents advantage. Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Boykin, 181 So. 741, 742
(Sup.Ct.Miss. 1938)

The views expressed here belong to the author and do not neces