SC Cases On MSJ

Admissions:
- Sugar industry is made up of 72,000 sugarcane farmers; 500,000

sugarcane farm workers; 14,000 sugar mill workers (page 2 of
Comment dated 27 March 2017)
- Main issue is: WON SO3 is canalized within the banks of SRAs
authority (p. 2 of Comment)
-
Check:
- With the said volume of HFCS importation, the demand for domestic sugar
decreased while sugar production increased or remained the same resulting
to decrease in prices. As a result, there was displacement in the sale of
domestic sugar, equivalent to PhP32.31 billion, for the five-year period (par.
9., p.5)
-
EN BANC
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 164171

HON. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC
BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF

OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE,
Petitioners,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,
INC., represented by its President JOSE
T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS,
INC., represented by its President
DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN,
INC., represented by its President
MARIANO C. SONON,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATION (DOTC),
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC
BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF
LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO
VENTURES CORP., represented
by its President YOLANDA AMBAR,
Respondent.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x

HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE CHIEF OF THE LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE
and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS
ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY
FREEPORT, INC., represented by Promulgated:
its President ALFREDO S. GALANG,
Respondent. February 20, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, in Civil
Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004; and
the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
83284, which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO
156) unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into
the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or
the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a
few exceptions.
The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo,
issued EO 156, entitled PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL
POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. The challenged provision
states:
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of

the Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles is
prohibited, except for the following:
3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a

returning resident or immigrant and covered by an authority to
import issued under the No-dollar Importation Program. Such
vehicles cannot be resold for at least three (3) years;
3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic

Corps and authorized to be imported by the Department of
Foreign Affairs;
3.1.3 Trucks excluding pickup trucks;
1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an authority

to import issued by the DTI.
2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.
3.1.4 Buses:
1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an authority to

import issued by DTI;
2. with GVW above 12 tons.
3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:
1. fire trucks
2. ambulances
3. funeral hearse/coaches
4. crane lorries
5. tractor heads and truck tractors
6. boom trucks
7. tanker trucks
8. tank lorries with high pressure spray gun
9. reefers or refrigerated trucks
10. mobile drilling derricks
11. transit/concrete mixers
12. mobile radiological units
13. wreckers or tow trucks
14. concrete pump trucks
15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks

16. street sweepers
17. vacuum trucks
18. garbage compactors
19. self loader trucks
20. man lift trucks
21. lighting trucks
22. trucks mounted with special purpose equipment
23. all other types of vehicle designed for a specific use.
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief
before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said
executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent entities, who or
whose members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and
engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used
motor vehicles.
G.R. No. 164171:
On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,

(SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS),
and Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed
as Civil Case No. 20-0-04, [1] against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant
Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport
Zone, and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport
Zone.
SOUTHWING, UNITED AUCTIONEERS and MICROVAN prayed that
judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance,
Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the
SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the Land
Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic
Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3)
in general, to allow the unimpeded entry and importation of used motor
vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.
Upon filing of petitioners answer/comment,

respondents SOUTHWING and MICROVAN filed a motion for summary
judgment which was granted by the trial court. On May 24, 2004, a summary
judgment was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the
Constitution with Congress. The trial court further held that the proviso is
contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods
and capital within the Freeport. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1
for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents
Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and
entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA
7227; directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation
Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic
Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used motor
vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and
importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only
to the payment of the required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 164171.
G.R. No. 164172:
On January 20, 2004, respondent Subic Integrated Macro Ventures

Corporation (MACRO VENTURES) filed with the same trial court, a similar
action for declaratory relief docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-04, [3] with the
same prayer and against the same parties [4] as those in Civil Case No. 20-0-
04.
In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment

on May 24, 2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant
to the constitution.[5] Elevated to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, Civil Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed as G.R. No. 164172.
G.R. No. 168741
On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers Association

of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), filed another action for
declaratory relief with essentially the same prayer as those in Civil Case No.
22-0-04 and Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Finance, Chief of the Land Transportation Office, Commissioner
of Customs, Collector of Customs at SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,[6] before the same trial court.
In a decision dated March 10, 2004, the court a quo granted
the ASSOCIATIONs prayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to
the Constitution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1
for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents
Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and
entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA
7227; directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation
Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic
Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used motor
vehicles; directing the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to allow
the entry into the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA
imported used motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded
entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines
subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition

for certiorari[8] with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284) which
denied the petition on February 14, 2005 and sustained the finding of the
trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void for being repugnant to
the constitution. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby

DENIED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 72, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 30-0-
2003, accordingly, STANDS.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this
Court and docketed as G.R. No. 168741. In a Resolution dated October 4,
2005,[10] said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No.
164172.
Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section
3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including
the Freeeport. In support of their arguments, they raise procedural and
substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of the assailed
proviso. The procedural issues are: the lack of respondents locus standi to
question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a
declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a judgment on the
pleadings in this case.
Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the

importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and tax
exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or trading
of used cars. They also aver that the actions filed by respondents do not
qualify as declaratory relief cases. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a
breach or violation of rights. Petitioners claim that there was already a
breach of respondents supposed right because the cases were filed more
than a year after the issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,
numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against imported
used motor vehicles belonging to respondent ASSOCIATIONs members.
Petitioners arguments lack merit.
The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or

administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement [11] has been satisfied in the instant
case. The broad subject of the prohibited importation is all types of used
motor vehicles. Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the
implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax
exemption authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor
vehicles and spare parts, except used cars.[12] Other types of motor
vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the
category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of
their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail
the validity of EO 156.
As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the

executive issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of
respondents will not affect the case. In Commission on Audit of the Province
of Cebu v. Province of Cebu,[13] the Court entertained a suit for declaratory
relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the
conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party
affected. We find no reason to deviate from said ruling mindful of the
significance of the present case to the national economy.
So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial court

because the issues involved in the instant case were pure questions of law. A
motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues
presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil
action in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as
to any material fact.[14]
At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners

truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside these
technicalities and taking cognizance of the action filed by respondents
considering its importance to the public and in keeping with the duty to
determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[15]
We now come to the substantive issues, which are: (1) whether

there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer is in
the affirmative, whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156,
reasonable and within the scope provided by law.
The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because

it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the
Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport
because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said
zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items
brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods
and materials without restriction.
In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section

3.1 of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President
to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used
motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and
absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an
executive issuance, is void.
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within

constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue
of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay.[16] Such delegation confers upon
the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the
authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to
adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy. [17] To be valid, an administrative issuance,
such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed

procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
and
(4) It must be reasonable.[18]
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually

satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both
constitutional and statutory bases.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section

28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to

fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfagedues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:

1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in
the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security,
to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity. Section 401 thereof,
reads:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general

welfare and/or national security, and subject to the
limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA),
is hereby empowered: x x x (2) to establish import quota
or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be
necessary; x x x Provided, That upon periodic investigations by
the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the
President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels
granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including
those subsequently granted pursuant to this section. (Emphasis
supplied)
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the

Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon
C. Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power under the Provisional Freedom
Constitution,[20] empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition
on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished
products. Pertinent provisions thereof, read:
ART. 4. Composition of the board. The Board of Investments

shall be composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade
and Industry, three (3) Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to
be chosen by the President; and three (3) representatives from
the government agencies and the private sector x x x.
ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.
xxxx
(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs for

certain industries whose operation may result in dislocation,
overcrowding or inefficient use of resources, thus impeding
economic growth. For this purpose, the Board may formulate
guidelines for progressive manufacturing programs, local content
programs, mandatory sourcing requirements and dispersal of
industries. In appropriate cases and upon approval of the
President, the Board may restrict, either totally or
partially, the importation of any equipment or raw
materials or finished products involved in the
rationalization program; (Emphasis supplied)
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the Safeguard Measures

Act (SMA), and entitled An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing
Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And
Providing Penalties For Violation Thereof, [21] designated the Secretaries[22] of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of
Agriculture, in their capacity as alter egos of the President, as the
implementing authorities of the safeguard measures, which
include, inter alia, modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction
on the importation of a product into the Philippines. The purpose of the SMA
is stated in the declaration of policy, thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote

competitiveness of domestic industries and producers based on
sound industrial and agricultural development policies, and
efficient use of human, natural and technical resources. In
pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the State shall
provide safeguard measures to protect domestic industries and
producers from increased imports which cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to those domestic industries and producers.
There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission

authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles and
commodities into the country.
Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary
that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined. As in
the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of
administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only
exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the
regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate
investigation.[23] This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative
rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; [24] and
are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. [25] A legislative rule, on the
other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a
primary legislation.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,

[26]
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc.,[27] the Court enunciated the doctrine that when an administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly
informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law.
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to
implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the
domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified
product not previously subject to such prohibition. The due process
requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in Section 401[28] of the
Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of the SMA [29] which essentially
mandate the conduct of investigation and public hearings before the
regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.
In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this Court

nor with the courts below the procedure that paved the way for the issuance
of EO 156. What they challenged in their petitions before the trial court was
the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO. [30] Their
main contention before the court a quo is that the importation ban is illogical
and unfair because it unreasonably drives them out of business to the
prejudice of the national economy.
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence

to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed
to be valid,[31] and there being no objection from the respondents as to the
procedure in the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said
executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law.
To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth
requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it was issued within
the scope of authority given by the legislature and that it is reasonable, an
examination of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial
purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.
RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and
balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic
and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the
economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the
country in general.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically defines

the territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate
customs territory consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality
of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base
and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the
1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement as amended and within the
territorial jurisdiction of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, the metes
and bounds of which shall be delineated by the President of the Philippines;
provided further that pending establishment of secure perimeters around the
entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area demarcated by the SBMA pursuant
to Section 13[32] hereof."
Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone.
xxxx
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following

policies:
xxxx
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and

limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the
Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall
be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial,
financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote
productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and

managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or
movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of
the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital
and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from
the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties
and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant
tax laws of the Philippines;
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods

and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract
investors to invest their capital in a business climate with the least
governmental intervention. The concept of this zone was explained by
Senator Guingona in this wise:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic

zone is successful in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which
is a free port. The difference between a special economic zone
and an industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense that the
commercial activities, including the establishment of banks,
services, financial institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe
agriculture to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the

least of government intervention, and the running of the
affairs of the special economic zone would be run
principally by the investors themselves, similar to a
housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect
their representatives to run the affairs of the subdivision,
to set the policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a

little Hong Kong, Mr. President, where there is a hub of
free port and free entry, free duties and activities to a
maximum spur generation of investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines,

as a rule, because of red tape and perceived delays, we envision
this special economic zone to be an area where there will be
minimum government interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government
or the Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves,
because they would be encouraged to invest not only for the
land but also for the buildings and factories. As long as they are
convinced that in such an area they can do business and reap
reasonable profits, then many from other parts, both local and
foreign, would invest, Mr. President.[33] (Emphasis, added)
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in

general, engage in any kind of business as well as import and export any
article into and out of the Freeport. These are among the rights accorded
to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7227, thus
SEC. 39. Rights and Obligations.- SBF Enterprises shall

have the following rights and obligations:
a. To freely engage in any business, trade, manufacturing,
financial or service activity, and to import and export freely
all types of goods into and out of the SBF, subject to the
provisions of the Act, these Rules and other regulations
that may be promulgated by the SBMA;
Citing, inter alia, the interpellations of Senator Enrile, petitioners claim

that the free flow or movement of goods and capital only means that goods
and material brought within the Freeport shall not be subject to customs
duties and other taxes and should not be construed as an open floodgate for
entry of all kinds of goods. They thus surmise that the importation ban on
motor vehicles is applicable within the Freeport. Pertinent interpellations of
Senator Enrile on the concept of Freeport is as follows:
Senator Enrile: Mr. President, I think we are talking here of

sovereign concepts, not territorial concepts. The concept that we
are supposed to craft here is to carve out a portion of our
terrestrial domain as well as our adjacent waters and say to the
world: Well, you can set up your factories in this area that we are
circumscribing, and bringing your equipment and bringing your
goods, you are not subject to any taxes and duties because you
are not within the customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines, whether you store the goods or only for purposes of
transshipment or whether you make them into finished products
again to be reexported to other lands.
xxxx
My understanding of a free port is, we are in effect

carving out a part of our territory and make it as if it
were foreign territory for purposes of our customs laws,
and that people can come, bring their goods, store them
there and bring them out again, as long as they do not
come into the domestic commerce of the Republic.
We do not really care whether these goods are stored
here. The only thing that we care is for our people to have an
employment because of the entry of these goods that are being
discharged, warehoused and reloaded into the ships so that they
can be exported. That will generate employment for us. For as
long as that is done, we are saying, in effect, that we have the
least contact with our tariff and customs laws and our tax
laws. Therefore, we consider these goods as outside of the
customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines as yet,
until we draw them from this territory and bring them inside our
domestic commerce. In which case, they have to pass through
our customs gate. I thought we are carving out this entire area
and convert it into this kind of concept.[34]
However, contrary to the claim of petitioners, there is nothing in the

foregoing excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport investors
only to exemption from customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the legislative
intent to attract investors, enhance investment and boost the economy, the
legislature could not have limited the enticement only to exemption from
taxes. The minimum interference policy of the government on
the Freeport extends to the kind of business that investors may embark on
and the articles which they may import or export into and out of the zone. A
contrary interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the Freeport and
drive away investors.
It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport enterprises to

import all types of goods and article is absolute. Such right is of course
subject to the limitation that articles absolutely prohibited by law cannot be
imported into the Freeport.[35] Nevertheless, in determining whether the
prohibition would apply to the Freeport, resort to the purpose of the
prohibition is necessary.
In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under
Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the importation
of used motor vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine
motor manufacturing firms to be globally competitive producers of
completely build-up units and their parts and components for the local and
export markets.[36] In justifying the issuance of EO 156, petitioners alleged
that there has been a decline in the sales of new vehicles and a remarkable
growth of the sales of imported used motor vehicles. To address the same,
the President issued the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the
already depressed market base of the local motor vehicle industry and to
curtail the harmful effects of the increase in the importation of used motor
vehicles.[37]
Taking our bearings from the foregoing discussions, we hold that the
importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative
order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or
beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify
the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the
sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government
cannot usurp. As held in United BF Homeowners Association v. BF Homes,
Inc.:[38]
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a

delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to
abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or
to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may
be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what
fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of,
or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is
the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to
the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually
the customs territory which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227, as follows:
the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay

Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are
in force and effect.[39]
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be

operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the
ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when
the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or
exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes
void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative

law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously
in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they
were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.[40]
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic
industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of the
local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor
vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by
the President. In the exercise of delegated police power, the executive can
therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles. Thus, in Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of Transportation,[41] the Court held
that a regulation phasing out taxi cabs more than six years old is a valid
exercise of police power. The regulation was sustained as reasonable holding
that the purpose thereof was to promote the convenience and comfort and
protect the safety of the passengers.
The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the

importation ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the all
encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport which is
outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not
enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or
remedied will not arise. The application of the law should be consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex,
et cessat lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not
the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. [42] To apply the
proscription to the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of
improving the general economy of the country, the application of the
importation ban in the Freeport would subvert the avowed purpose of RA
7227 which is to create a market that would draw investors and ultimately
boost the national economy.
In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative issuance or

ordinances concerned for being unreasonable. To illustrate, in De la Cruz
v. Paras,[43] the Court held as unreasonable and unconstitutional an ordinance
characterized by overbreadth. In that case,
the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, prohibited the operation of all night
clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of
public morals. As explained by the Court:
x x x It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face
is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition
in Salaveria should be heeded: The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal
in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those
night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and
salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,[44] is a case involving a resolution issued

by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from
attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like
three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity
and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being
unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure
was found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is

not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making
the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of
review or preparation on those last three precious days when
they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have
learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself would be
like uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or
personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it.
Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,[45] the

Court likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city ordinance
granting an exclusive franchise for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years,
to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus
and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City. While professedly aimed towards
alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, the ordinance
was held to be beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem in the city.
By parity of reasoning, the importation ban in this case should also be

declared void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to
the Freeport which has no bearing on the objective of the prohibition. If the
aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used motor vehicles from
the Freeport to the customs territory, the solution is not to forbid entry of
these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify governmental campaign and
measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor vehicles into the customs
territory.
At this juncture, it must be mentioned that on June 19, 1993, President

Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, Further Clarifying The Tax
And Duty-Free Privilege Within The SubicSpecial Economic And Free Port
Zone, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax

and duty-free privilege within the Secured Area of
the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone:
1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and
duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and
individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured
Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment,
and consumer items tax and dutry-free. Consumption items,
however, must be consumed within the Secured Area.Removal of
raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out
of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered
enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except
as may be provided herein.
In Tiu v. Court of Appeals[46] as reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners

Association, Inc. v. Torres,[47] this provision limiting the special privileges on
tax and duty-free importation in the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base has been declared valid and constitutional and in accordance with RA
7227. Consistent with these rulings and for easier management and
monitoring of activities and to prevent fraudulent importation of
merchandise and smuggling, the free flow and importation of used motor
vehicles shall be operative only within the secured area.
In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void
insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to
the separability clause[48] of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it
applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the
Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area
may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine
territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of
the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24,
2004 Decisions of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, in Civil
Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the February 14, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63284,
are MODIFIED insofar as they declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive
Order No. 156, void in its entirety.
Said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine

territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 81-90.
[2]
Id. at 68; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p. 65. Penned by
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas.
[3]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164172), pp. 78-86.
[4]
The Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication,
Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land
Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of
Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land
Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
[5]
The dispositive portion thereof is identically worded as the
quoted decretal portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 20-0-04.
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 139-153.
[7]
Id. at 264. Penned by Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas.
[8]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284.
[9]
Dated February 14, 2005, rollo (G.R. No. 168741), p. 125. Penned by
Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Associate Justices
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals on June 28, 2004, id.
at 126.
[10]
Id. at 354.
[11]
Miranda v. Aguirre, 373 Phil. 386, 397 (1999).
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 94-96 and rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p. 88.
[13]
422 Phil. 519, 531 (2001).
[14]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416
SCRA 133, 140.
[15]
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 47, 62.
[16]
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Torres, 350 Phil. 315, 331
(1998).
[17]
Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 2003 Edition, p. 24.
[18]
Id. at 41.
[19]
Essentially the same provision is embodied in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Constitution (1935), Art. VI, Sec 22, par. (2):
The Congress may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, to fix, within specified limits, tariff rates,
import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.
Constitution (1973), Art. VII, Sec 17, par. (2):
The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts.
[20]
Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary,
1996 Edition, p. 610.
[21]
Enacted on July 17, 2000. See Filipino Metals Corporation v. Secretary of
Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 157498, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 616, 619.
[22]
Secretary as defined under Section 4 (n) of the SMA refers to either the
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry in the case of non-
agricultural products or the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture in the
case of agricultural products.
[23]
Cruz, supra note 17 at 53.
[24]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1007
(1996).
[25]
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 108524, November 10, 1994, 238 SCRA 63, 69.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
453 Phil. 1043, 1058 (2003).
[28]
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national

security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase,
reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any
necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or
decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than
the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of
import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent
ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban imports of any
commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all
imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem whenever necessary;
Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction
of protection levels granted in Section One Hundred and Four of this Code,
including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the

NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the imposition of
an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the
Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall
hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable
opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The
Commission shall also hear the views and recommendations of any
government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission
shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty
(30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
[29]
SEC. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. The
Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the Commission that a product is being imported into the
country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to
the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the
secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard
measures will be in the public interest.
SEC. 9. Formal Investigation. Within five (5) working days from receipt of the
request from the Secretary, the Commission shall publish the notice of the
commencement of the investigation, and public hearings which shall afford
interested parties and consumers an opportunity to be present, or to present
evidence, to respond to the presentation of other parties and consumers,
and otherwise be heard. Evidence and positions with respect to the
importation of the subject article shall be submitted to the Commission
within fifteen (15) days after the initiation of the investigation by the
Commission.
The Commission shall complete its investigation and submit its report
to the Secretary within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days from receipt
of the referral by the Secretary, except when the Secretary certifies that the
same is urgent, in which case the Commission shall complete the
investigation and submit the report to the Secretary within sixty (60) days.
[30]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 144-145; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), pp. 205-
206; rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 87-86.
[31]
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, supra note 15 at 62-63.
[32]
Section 13 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227
provides: Establishment of Secure Perimeters, Points of Entry and Duty and
Tax Free Areas of the SBF. - Pending the establishment of secure perimeters
around the entire SBF, the SBMA shall have the authority to establish and
demarcate areas of the SBF with secure perimeters within which articles and
merchandise free of duties and internal revenue taxes may be limited,
without prejudice to the availment of other benefits conferred by the Act and
these Rules in the SBF outside such areas. The SBMA shall furthermore have
the authority to establish, regulate and maintain points of entry to the SBF or
to any limited duty and tax-free areas of the SBF.
[33]
RECORDS, SENATE 8TH CONGRESS, SESSION (JANUARY 14, 1992).
[34]
Id.
[35]
SEC. 45. Importation of Articles. In general, all articles may be imported
by SBF Enterprises into the SBF free of customs and import duties and
national internal revenue taxes, except those articles prohibited by the SBMA
and those absolutely prohibited by law. (Rules and Regulations Implementing
RA 7227)
[36]
Whereas clauses of EO 156.
[37]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 77-79; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p.
46; rollo (G.R. No. 164171), p. 48.
[38]
369 Phil. 568, 579-580 (1999).
[39]
Definitions, Section 3 (n).
[40]
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77372, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA
848, 858-859.
[41]
202 Phil. 925, 935-936 (1982).
[42]
Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 160328, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 495, 508.
[43]
208 Phil. 490, 499-500 (1983).
[44]
Supra note 40 at 860.
[45]
G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174.
[46]
361 Phil. 229 (1999).
[47]
Supra note 15.
[48]
Article 7, Section 3:
Sec. 3. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Executive Order are

hereby declared separable and in the event any of such provisions is
declared unconstitutional, the other provisions, which are not affected,
thereby remain in force and effect.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120040. January 29, 1996]
SPS. CAMILO Y. GO and DELIA L. GO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. MARCELINO F. BAUTISTA, JR. and MANUELA
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; DOES NOT LIE IN
DOUBTFUL CASES; CASE AT BAR. - Mandamus lies to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. The propriety of rendering summary
judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court rests on the sound exercise
of the courts discretion. Petitioners failed to establish a mandatory and
ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to render summary
judgment. Likewise, they failed to show a clear legal right to the relief
sought. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial
dispute or to which a substantial doubt exist. Litigants, like the herein
petitioners, may not be permitted to impose upon the court their notions
of how cases should be resolved. Neither may they be allowed to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion by the court in a particular way.
The court has to decide a question or issue according to its own judgment
or understanding of the law, as well as the laws applicability to the
attendant facts and circumstances.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMARY JUDGMENTS; PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF
ANY GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT THAT WOULD REQUIRE
THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE; CONTROLLING FACTOR IN
DETERMINING WHETHER A SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD ISSUE. - The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the controlling factor in a motion for
summary judgment is not the submission or non-submission of counter-
affidavits, but the presence or absence of any genuine issue as to any
material fact that would require the presentation of evidence. Where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment can not take the place of trial.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
M.R. Pamaran & Associates for private respondent.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners spouses Camilo and

Delia Go, through counsel, posed this query: May respondent court be
compelled by mandamus to grant the motion for summary judgment when
there is no genuine issue as to a material fact raised in the opposition
thereto?1 The antecedent facts are as follows:
To secure a loan of P93,200.00 with 14% interest p/a, petitioners on June
15, 1978, constituted a real estate mortgage over their house and lot
covered by TCT No. 30532 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City in favor of
herein private respondent Manuela Realty Development Corporation
(Manuela). For alleged petitioners failure to heed Manuelas repeated
demands for payment of the loan, Manuela moved for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the subject properties pursuant to a provision in the deed of
mortgage. The ex-officio sheriff of Makati City conducted a public auction
sale on September 9, 1989, where Manuela submitted the lone and winning
bid of P251,15 1.74, petitioners alleged outstanding debt at the time. After
the expiration of the redemption period, Manuela filed its affidavit of
consolidation of ownership before the Register of Deeds. Thus, ownership of
the mortgaged properties was consolidated in Manuela and a new Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT No. T-1884) was thereafter issued in its name.
Petitioners filed on August 21, 1989, and later amended on November 20,
1989, a complaint for recovery of ownership of the subject properties against
Manuela before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed
as Civil Case No. 89-4839. They alleged payment of five hundred
dollars ($500) to Manuela sometime in 1982 by money transfer order
through Security Pacific National Bank, and payment of the entire loan as all
their installment payments, if added, will amount to P95, 946.67 which sum
is more than their contracted loan. Petitioners also raised as an issue the
alleged invalidity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties
and usury on the ground that the stipulated 14% interest p/a exceeds the
12% applicable interest ceiling. In its answer, Manuela countered that
petitioners failed to pay their obligation and, in fact, argued that it was their
continued default thereof which caused their outstanding debt to increase.
Manuela maintained that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale in question was
valid and the 14% stipulated interest was not usurious. Petitioners
subsequently moved for summary judgment attaching their joint affidavit
which Manuela opposed, albeit without attaching its own counter-affidavit.
The trial court found that there are genuine issues of facts that need to be
fully ventilated, thus the motion was denied. Petitioners elevated the case
before public respondent Court of Appeals 2 by way of mandamus to compel
the trial court to render summary judgment, but to no avail. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, the instant petition posing the above
query.
The petition lacks merit. Mandamus lies to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. The propriety of rendering summary judgment under Rule
34 of the Rules of Court rests on the sound exercise of the Courts discretion.
Petitioners failed to establish a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of
the trial court to render summary judgment. Likewise, they failed to show a
clear legal right to the relief sought. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.
Litigants, like the herein petitioners, may not be permitted to impose upon
the court their notions of how cases should be resolved. Neither may they be
allowed to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion by the court in a
particular way. The court has to decide a question or issue according to its
own judgment or understanding of the law, as well as the laws applicability
to the attendant facts and circumstances.
Moreover, even if we were to gloss over petitioners erroneous recourse
we find no reversible error in both the trial courts and respondent courts
dispositions. Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a
summary judgment when on motion of the plaintiff, after the answer to the
complaint had been filed, it would appear at the hearing for such a
judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the winning party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. 3 Petitioners failed to show the absence of any
genuine issue that could necessitate summary judgment. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that the controlling factor in a motion for summary
judgment is not the submission or non-submission of counter-affidavits, but
the presence or absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact that
would require the presentation of evidence. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment can
not take the place of trial.4 We quote with approval, in this connection,
respondent courts observation:
x x x. Pleadings on hand show that private respondent duly raised

substantial and triable issues of fact, to wit: that there was no overpayment
of petitioners loan; that petitioners delinquency or breach in the settlement
of their obligation, despite demands, caused private respondent to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.
The respondent court correctly pointed out genuine triable issues of fact. Its
assailed order reads, in part:
a perusal of the pleadings will clearly show that there are genuine issues of
facts that need to be fully ventilated. Samples are: how much was actually
paid by the plaintiffs? Were the plaintiffs paying in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the promissory note? What were the months where the
plaintiffs defaulted? How much is the accumulated interests? And so on and
so forth. There, (sic) aside from the legal issues, of course, e.g. the validity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Clearly, the aforesaid factual issues can be resolved only after trial on the
merits, and not by a perfunctory resolution which, in effect, would deprive
the litigant of his day in court. It is desirable that evidence pro and con, be
presented by the parties, to show whose claim is valid, a process which is not
long to conclude.5
Summary judgment can be resorted to only where there are no questions

of fact in issue or where the material allegations of the pleadings are not
disputed.6 A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue
is resolved against the movant,7 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
1
Petition, p. 1; Rollo, p. 6.
2
Second Division, Purisima, J., Ponente; Isnani, Ibay-Somera, JJ., concurring.
3
Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 207, 210
(1991).
4
Excelsa industries Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 105455, August
23, 1995.
5
CA Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 82-83.
6
National irrigation Administration v. Gamit, 215 SCRA 436, 454 (1992).
7
Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 297, 314(1983).
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 173289
Petitioner,
Present:
-versus-
CARPIO,* J.,
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO PERALTA, and
FAJARDO, and HEIR OF MENDOZA, JJ.
TIBURCIO
MALABANAN named TERESA
MALABANAN, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 17, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision [1] dated February 28,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed
the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the Resolutions
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.
The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following:
Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, the

heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a Complaint [2] dated March 2, 1998 for
Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC, Branch XVIII,
Tagaytay City against petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. Respondents claimed
that they are the owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as
Lot 9250 Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-008367, situated
in Barangay Iruhin, Tagaytay City, containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-
Four Thousand One Hundred Twelve (244,112) square meters, by occupation
and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) [3] of the Public Land Law
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
For having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as

owners of the said lot for at least thirty years, respondents stated that they
were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest
or claim on the same lot until the time they were requesting that the lot be
declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was the subject of a
land registration proceeding that had already been decided by the same
court[4] where their complaint was filed. They also found out that Decree No.
N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, was already issued on August 20, 1997
to the petitioner pursuant to the Decision dated June 7, 1994 of the same
court. They averred that they were not notified of the said land registration
case; thus, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to
actual or extrinsic fraud. Thus, they argued that they were also entitled to a
writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its
privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to
refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were served on the

petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998, petitioner filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time,[5] which the trial court
granted[6] for a period of ten (10) days within which to file a responsive
pleading. Petitioner filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer[7] dated April 29, 1998, which the trial court likewise granted.[8]
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [9] dated May 9, 1998,

stating that the pleading asserting the claim of respondents stated no cause
of action, and that the latter were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, setting the same for hearing on May 21, 1998. On the
date of the hearing, the trial court issued an Order, [10] which granted the
respondents ten (10) days from that day to file a comment, and set the date
of the hearing on July 23, 1998. Respondents filed a Motion to Admit
Comment/Opposition to Defendant Eland,[11] together with the
correspondingComment/Opposition[12] dated June 8, 1998.
On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial court issued
an Order,[13] considering the Motion to Dismiss submitted for resolution due
to the non-appearance of the parties and their respective counsels. The said
motion was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order [14] dated
September 25, 1998, ruling that the allegations in the complaint established
a cause of action and enjoined petitioner Eland to file its answer to the
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed
two Motions for Extension to File an Answer.[15]
Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for

Reconsideration[16] of the trial court's Order dated September 25, 1998,
denying the former's Motion to Dismiss. Again, petitioner filed a Motion for
Final Extension of Time to File Answer [17] dated November 6,
1998. Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 24, 1998. Subsequently, the trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order [18] dated January
11, 1999.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in

Default[19] dated November 17, 1998. On December 4, 1998 Petitioner Eland
filed its Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in
Default)[20] dated December 2, 1998, while respondents filed a Reply to
Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default)
[21]
dated December 29, 1998. Thereafter, the trial court issued an
Order[22] dated January 11, 1999 declaring the petitioner in default and
allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 11 January 1999) [23] dated
February 5, 1999 on the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss and in
declaring it in default. The trial court in an Order[24] dated March 18, 1999,
denied the former and granted the latter. In the same Order, the trial court
admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam.
Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With Compulsory

Counterclaim)[25] dated November 12, 1998. Respondents countered by filing
a Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records [26] dated December 2,
1998. Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge Eland's
Answer from the Records)[27] dated December 21, 1998, as well as a
Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records)
[28]
dated January 26, 1999.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of

Evidence Ex Parte[29] dated January 18, 1999, which was granted in an
Order[30] dated January 22, 1999.
On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their evidence before the

Clerk of Court of the trial court which ended on February 3, 1999; and, on
February 10, 1999, respondents filed their Formal Offer of Evidence.
[31]
However, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Plaintiff's Ex
Parte Presentation of Evidence[32] dated February 8, 1999. In that regard, the
trial court issued an Order[33] dated February 11, 1999 directing the Clerk of
Court to suspend the proceedings.
On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification [34] as to

whether or not the evidence presented ex parte was nullified by the
admission of petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam.Petitioner filed its
Comment[35] dated May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the

parties submitted their pre-trial briefs.[36] However, petitioner filed a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings[37] dated May 24, 1999 on the ground that the same
petitioner had filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, asking for the
nullification of the Order dated March 18, 1999 of the trial court and for the
affirmation of its earlier Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The
petition for certiorari was subsequently denied; and a copy of the
Resolution[38] dated June 14, 1999 was received by the trial court. Hence, in
an Order[39] dated July 7, 1999, the trial court ruled that the reception of
evidence already presented by the respondents before the Clerk of Court
remained as part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the
right to cross-examine the witness and to comment on the documentary
exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[40] dated July 19, 1999, but it was denied by the trial court in
an Omnibus Order[41] dated September 14, 1999.
Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [42] dated

August 5, 1999, while petitioner filed its Opposition [43] to the Motion dated
August 31, 1999. In its Resolution[44]dated November 3, 1999, the trial court
found favor on the respondents. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for

summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby
adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful possessors

of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, subject to the rights of
occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration

Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No. N-217313, LRC
Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and void;
3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be

canceled, as well as tax declaration covering Lot 9250, Cad-355.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA, which
dismissed it in a Decision dated February 28, 2006, which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is

DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated November 3, 1999, of
the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-1784, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:
5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 05, 1999 DID
NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER SECTION 3,
RULE 35 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE ARE NO
GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-
1784.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION
DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO, BASED ON
TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT
GRANTING HEREIN PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
AND UPON DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION
DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BASED ON
FALSIFIED EVIDENCE.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE
COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A
QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET
TITLE.
According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must be

served at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing thereof, and
that a hearing must be held to hear the parties on the propriety of a
summary judgment, per Sec. 3 of Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which was not observed because the petitioner received a copy of the
respondents' motion for summary judgment only on August 20, 1999, or the
very same day that the motion was set for hearing. Petitioner further claims
that the trial court never conducted any hearing on the motion for summary
judgment.
Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to a

claimant seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief, and does not include cases for quieting of
title. Furthermore, petitioner also averred that a summary judgment has no
place in a case where genuine factual and triable issues exist, like in the
present case. It added that the genuine and triable issues were all raised in
its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to cross-examine

the witnesses for the respondents without fault on its part. It also stated that
the trial court did not issue any order admitting in evidence the documentary
exhibits presented by the respondents. Hence, according to the petitioner,
the trial court gravely erred in relying upon the testimonies of the witnesses
for the respondents, without having the latter cross-examined; and upon the
documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its Resolution
dated November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence.
Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering summary

judgment, the trial court deprived the former of its right to due process.
Respondents, in their Comment[45] dated October 16, 2006, countered
the first issue raised by the petitioner, stating that their filing of the motion
for summary judgment fourteen (14) days before the requested hearing of
the same motion was in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court.
As to the second and third issues, respondents argued that petitioner

had a constricted perception of the coverage of the Rules of Summary
Judgment, and that the latter's citation of cases decided by this Court
showed the diverse causes of action that could be the subject matters of
summary judgment. Respondents also posited that petitioner's statements in
its Answer Ad Cautelam, although denominated as Specific Denial, were
really general denials that did not comply with the provisions of Section 10,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite the
opportunity, or the right allowed in the Order dated July 17, 1999 of the trial
court, for the petitioner to cross-examine respondents' witnesses and to
comment on the documentary evidence presented ex parte after the default
order against the same petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside
respondents' evidence in order to suspend further proceedings that were
intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner
neglected to avail itself of, or to comply with, the prescription of the rules
found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by opting not to avail itself of the
hearing of its opposition to the summary judgment after receiving the Order
dated August 20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or
admission in the records; and by not objecting to the decretal portion of the
said Order dated August 20, 1999, which stated that the motion for
summary judgment has been submitted for resolution without further
argument. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the trial court
wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted that
petitioner's counsel failed to study carefully the records of the proceedings
for the presentation of the evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was
not only a single-day proceeding, and that more than one witness had been
presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on the
photographs of the houses of the occupants of the property in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated
that their complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title under
Art. 476 of the New Civil Code and for the review of the decree of
registration pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree or P.D.
No. 1529, because they are complimentary with each other.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the

propriety of the summary judgment in this particular case of quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking

to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain
a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for
a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall

be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and
admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.[46]
In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a summary
judgment.
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because
the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served only on August 20,
1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if the
petitioner received a copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there was
no hearing conducted on that date because the trial court issued an order
giving petitioner 10 days within which to file its comment or opposition.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was
correct in its observation that there was substantial compliance with due
process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule was
substantially complied with because when the respondents filed the motion
for summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a
copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the
motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of
the filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and

in all situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one's evidence in
support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of
previous notice, but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be
heard.[47]
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an

action for quieting of title. This particular argument, however, is misplaced.
This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary
judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.[48]
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of
summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if,
while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such
issues are not genuine.[49]
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine

issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment,
and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial
court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate
conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows
otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to

clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely
reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed
some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and

uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more
litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further
trial on the merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property,

the issue has already become nil because of not only the lack of
seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity of
the subject parcel of land Lot 9250 was proven by the approved
plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and offered in
evidence as Exhibit B for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is

barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing considering that the
vital documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration
Case No. TG-423 before this Honorable Court the markings and
descriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment
quoted as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit Q; x x x.

(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit R; x x x.
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit S; x x x.
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit T x x x.
are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by

the plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No.
217313 issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-
62686 pursuant to the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by
this Honorable Court penned by the acting presiding Judge
Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the

complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing
evidence as the well-nigh or almost incontrovertible evidence of
a registerable title to the subject land in the proceedings
conducted on the reception of evidence ex-parte for the plaintiffs
establishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open,
exclusive possession as aspects of acquisitive prescription as
confirmed in the affidavit herein attached as Annex A;
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial
court merely stated that:
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that

plaintiffs cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed
parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the
substitution of their landholdings of Lot 9250, Cad 355,
Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of 244,112 square
meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre, containing
only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant Eland in
its answer practically and mainly interposed the defenses of: (a)
the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel
of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b)
the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this Court
in said Land Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs' complaint is
barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case

No. TG-423 that was decided previously by this Court with the
case at bench was imperatively made by this Court. Being
minded that the Court has and can take judicial notice of the said
land registration case, this Court observed that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly, because
the supposed identity crisis of the controverted parcel of land
covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-423 with the
subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275
(Exhibit N) LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit B
of the plaintiffs) and the Technical Description of Lot 9250, Cad
355 (Exhibit B-1 of the plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior judgment
rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since not only
intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and established
by the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G. R.
No. 1184436, pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is incontrovertible
that the complaint in this case seeking to review the judgment
and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one
(1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree
No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not
attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question

of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings, the
observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to prove
by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of
possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, as hereinafter illustrated.
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court,

propounded thus:
The contention of defendant-appellant is

untenable. Summary judgment is not only limited to solving
actions involving money claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be allowed. The term genuine issue has been defined as an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived,
set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is

appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact, which call
for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if
on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, but when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are
not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules
must ensue as a matter of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered

the assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very
court that decided the LRC Case No. TG-423. Such being the
case, the court a quo was privy to all relevant facts and rulings
pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it considered and
applied to this case. Thus, where all the facts are within the
judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be
granted as a matter of right.
On the contrary, in petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine, factual
and triable issues were raised, aside from specifically denying all the
allegations in the complaint, thus:
2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint insofar as it
alleges the personal circumstances of the plaintiff and one A. F.
Development Corporation for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of said allegations.And if the property referred to in said
paragraphs is that parcel of land which was the subject matter of
Land Registration Case No. TG-423 which was previously decided
by this Honorable Court with finality, said allegations are likewise
specifically denied for the obvious reason that the said property
had already been adjudged with finality by no less than this
Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.

contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint insofar as it alleged
that (u)pon exercise of further circumspection, counsel for the
plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the 1994 request of the
plaintiffs to have the subject parcel of land be declared for
taxation purposes and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel
of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 for lack of
truth thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein
plaintiffs were never mentioned during the entire proceedings in
said land registration case and by reason of the Affirmative
Allegations contained hereunder.

contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d), 10
(e), 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason that there is no
showing that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiff is
the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. TG- 423, and in the remote possibility that
the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as
that parcel of land subject of Land Registration Case No. TG-423,
the allegations contained in said paragraphs are still specifically
denied for the reason that no less than the Honorable Court had
decided with finality that the parcel of land is absolutely owned
by herein defendant to the exclusion of all other persons
as attested to by the subsequent issuance of an Original
Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant and for
reasons stated in the Affirmative Allegations.

contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint for the obvious
reason that it was the plaintiffs who appear to have been
sleeping on their rights considering that up to the present they
still do not have any certificate of title covering the parcel of land
they are claiming in the instant case, while on the part of herein
defendant, no less than the Honorable Court had adjudged with
finality that the parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration
Case No. TG-423 is absolutely owned by herein defendant.

contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint for the reason that
defendant has never ladgrabbed any parcel of land belonging to
others, much less from the plaintiffs, and further, answering
defendant specifically denies the allegations therein that
plaintiffs engaged the services of a lawyer for a fee for lack of
knowledge r information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.

contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Complaint
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
the truth thereof.

contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the reason that, as
above-stated, if the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs
is the same as that parcel of land subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. TG-423, this Honorable Court had already
decided with finality that said parcel of land is absolutely owned
by herein answering defendant and additionally, for those
reasons stated in defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

contained in paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint for lack of
truth thereof.
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the same
Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
xxxx
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states

no cause of action as asserted in the Motion To Dismiss filed by
herein answering defendant and for the reason that there is no
evidence whatsoever showing or attesting to the fact that the
parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs in the Complaint is
the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment

rendered by this Honorable in Land Registration Case No. TG-
423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in

that OCT No. 0-660 had become incontrovertible by virtue of the
Torrens System of Registration; and to allow plaintiffs to question
the validity of answering defendant's title through the instant
complaint would be a collateral of OCT No. 0-660 which is not
permissible under the law.
4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission

from filing the present complaint under the principles of estoppel
and laches.
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as

they appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said Land
Registration Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such knowledge,
plaintiffs never bothered to present their alleged claims in the
proceedings.
4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice,

given everyone his due, and observed honesty and good faith in
his dealings.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for

summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by petitioner,
raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial.
When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. [50] In the
present case, the petitioner was able to point out the genuine issues. A
genuine issue is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[51]
It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already the

registered owner (Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the
Register of Deeds) of the parcel of land in question, pursuant to a decree of
registration (Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. 62686) based on the
ruling of the same court that granted the summary judgment for the quieting
of title.
Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in the disputed

summary judgment were obtained through judicial notice of the facts and
rulings pertaining to that earlier case (LRC Case No. TG-423) wherein the
same trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is, therefore, disorienting
that the same trial court reversed its earlier ruling, which categorically stated
that:
x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record

that the vendors listed in Exhibit HH, with submarkings, are the
previous owners of the parcel of land mentioned in the same
deed of sale and aside form the tax declarations covering the
same property (Exhibits Q to T, inclusive), the uncontroverted
testimony of Atty. Ruben Roxas establishes beyond any shadow
of doubt that applicant's (referring to herein defendant-appellant)
sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the grandchildren, great
grandchildren and great great grandchildren of the spouses Lucio
Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of the same
property, whose ownership is further bolstered by tax receipts
showing payments of realty taxes (Exhibits U to GG, inclusive,
with submarkings).
xxx
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and

considering that applicant is a domestic corporation not
otherwise disqualified from owning real properties in the
Philippines, this Court finds that applicant has satisfied all the
conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its application
pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as
amended, inspite of the opposition filed by the Heirs of the late
Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant's petition appears
to be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant

petition for land registration and, thus, places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-
04-006275 and containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters,
as supported by its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of the applicant, ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal
office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (Espaa Extension), Quezon City,
Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the

corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect

annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership of
the same land for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of
title issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession
of the same land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a
genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure of the
respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved, should
have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for summary
judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.[52]
Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to delve briefly

on the nature of the action of quieting of title as applied in this case. This
Court's ruling in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al.[53] is instructive on this
matter, thus:
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action
for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded
on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:[54]
Regarding the nature of the action filed before

the trial court, quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt
or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to
secure x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or
an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and
those claiming under him may be forever afterward
free from any danger of hostile claim. In an action
for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant
and other claimants, x x x not only to place things in
their proper place, to make the one who has no
rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the
other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards
without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best xxx.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may
be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or any
interest therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title

to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from

being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party
who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or

equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to

prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an
equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that
the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid.
So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,[55] we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to

have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on
plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)

indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the

owners in fee-simple title of the subject land by occupation and possession
under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended. Thus, it appears that the first requisite has been
satisfied. Anent the second requisite, respondents enumerated several facts
that would tend to prove the invalidity of the claim of the petitioner. All of
these claims, which would correspond to the two requisites for the quieting
of title, are factual; and, as discussed earlier, the petitioner interposed its
objections and duly disputed the said claims, thus, presenting genuine issues
that can only be resolved through a full-blown trial.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title,
the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come
into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent

purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other
disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the government
and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser
for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent
purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the

decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of
petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on
August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No.
TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying the
above provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the
issuance of the decree of registration has not elapsed for the review
thereof. However, a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly
indicate that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the
proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree
when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year
from the issuance of the decree of registration. [56] However, the basis of the
aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding light on
the matter is a discussion presented in one of the recognized textbooks on
property registration,[57] citing decisions of this Court, thus:
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained
by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration. [58] One of the
remedies available to him is a petition for review. To avail
of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the

land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the

decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent

purchaser for value.[59]
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a

certificate of title obtained under the Torrens system. An
important feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The
proceedings whereby such a title is obtained are directed against
all persons, known or unknown, whether actually served with
notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land. If
they do not appear and oppose the registration of their own
estate or interest in the property in the name of another,
judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the
absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in
the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of
registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.[60]
As further pointed out in the same book, [61] the petition for review must
be filed within one year from entry of the decree of registration. As written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land

Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed
from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to
be under the control and sound discretion of the registration
court.[62] After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes
incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the

decree of registration may be filed not later than one year
from and after the date of entry of such decree of
registration. Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may
at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be
presented until the final decree has been entered. However, it
has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time
after the rendition of the court's decision and before the
expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree
of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,[63] there can be
no possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait until
the final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a

petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to
the decree of registration described in Section 31, which decree
is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.[64]
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of

registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national
government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened
or revised by reason of absence, minority or other disability or by
any proceeding in court, save only in cases of actual fraud and
then only for one year from the entry of the decree, must be
understood as referring to final and unappealable decrees of
registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a
decree of a registration court, does not become final and
unappealable until fifteen days after the interested parties have
been notified of its entry, and during that period may be set
aside by the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the
grounds stated in the Rules of Court. [65] An appeal from the
decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from becoming
final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the
appellate court.[66]
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy

separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the
right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a
motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may
have been presented. Thus, where petitioners acquired their
interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the
litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in these
circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent
purchasers in good faith.[67]
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is

filed within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is
error for the court to deny the petition without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud
upon which the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be
afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation.[68]
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a
review of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the

petitioner are necessarily rendered inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland

Philippines, Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated February 28,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed
the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the resolutions
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the resolutions
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay
City in Civil Case No. TG-1784 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated to sit as an additional Member, in lieu of Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated February 10, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,
concurring; rollo, pp. 77-92.
[2]
Records, p. 1.
[3]
Sec. 48. The following described-citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
[4]
Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
[5]
Supra note 2 at 51.
[6]
Id. at 57.
[7]
Id. at 68.
[8]
Id. at 71.
[9]
Id. at 58.
[10]
Id. at 67.
[11]
Id. at 97.
[12]
Id. at 99.
[13]
Id. at 146.
[14]
Id. at 147.
[15]
Motion for Extension to File Answer dated October 16, 1998 and Second
Motion for Extension to File Answer dated October 28, 1998.
[16]
Supra note 2 at 165.
[17]
Id. at 168.
[18]
Id. at 214.
[19]
Id. at 173.
[20]
Id. at 209.
[21]
Id. at 204.
[22]
Id. at 214.
[23]
Id. at 224.
[24]
Id. at 305.
[25]
Id. at 177.
[26]
Id. at 197.
[27]
Id. at 200.
[28]
Id. at 221.
[29]
Id. at 218.
[30]
Id. at 220.
[31]
Id. at 239.
[32]
Id. at 235.
[33]
Id. at 248.
[34]
Id. at 376.
[35]
Id. at 379.
[36]
Id. at 370 for the respondents, p. 394 for petitioner.
[37]
Id. at 398.
[38]
Id. at 486.
[39]
Id. at 491.
[40]
Id. at 492.
[41]
Id. at 520.
[42]
Id. at 506.
[43]
Id. at 513.
[44]
Id. at 522.
[45]
Rollo, p. 469.
[46]
Now Secs.1 and 3, Rule 35, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[47]
Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48108, September 26, 1990, 190
SCRA 43.
[48]
See Carlos v. Sandoval, et al, G. R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, SCRA
574 116, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, November 18,
2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v.
Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
[49]
Mariano Nocom v. Oscar Camerino, et al., G. R. No. 182984, February 10,
2009, 578 SCRA 390, citing Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No.
172592, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 516.
[50]
National Power Corporation v. Loro, et al., G. R. No. 175176, October 17,
2008,
569 SCRA 648, citing Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 163269, April
19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 535.
[51]
Id.
[52]
Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, et al, G. R. No. 117574, January 2, 1997,
266 SCRA 88, citing Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 75282, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 207, 212, citing Auman
v. Estenzo., No. L- 40500, 27 February 1976, 69 SCRA 524; Loreno v.
Estenzo, No. L-43306, 29 October 1976, 73 SCRA 630; Viajar v. Estenzo, No.
L- 45321, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 684.
[53]
G. R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438.
[54]
382 Phil. 15, 25 (2000).
[55]
384 Phil. 635, 647 (2000).
[56]
Lopez v. Padilla, G. R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44.
[57]
Justice Agcaoili (ed.), Property Registration Decree and Related Laws
(Land Titles and Deeds), 297-298 (2006).
[58]
Serna v. CA, G. R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999, 308 SCRA 527.
[59]
Walstrom v. Mapa, G. R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Cruz
v. Navarro, G. R. No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109; Libudan v.
Palma Gil, G. R. No. L-21164, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17.
[60]
26 Phil. 581 (1914).
[61]
Supra note 57 at 302-304.
[62]
Gomez v. CA, G. R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 491.
[63]
48 Phil. 836 (1926).
[64]
Ramos v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 94033, May 29, 1995, 244 SCRA 418.
[65]
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Sunico, 36 Phil. 279 (1917).
[66]
Supra note at 60.
[67]
Rivera v. Moran, 48 Phil. 863 (1926).
[68]
Republic v. Sioson, G. R. No. L-13687, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 533.
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK, G.R. No. 178899
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
FELIPE CHUA, November 15, 2010
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Philippine

Business Bank (PBB) challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94883 dated February 8, 2007, [2] insofar as it overturned the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) order dated December 16, 2005 declaring the
finality of its Partial Summary Judgment and granting the issuance of a writ
of execution against respondent Felipe Chua (respondent Chua). PBB also
seeks to overturn the resolution of the CA dated July 18, 2007, which denied
its motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
From the records, the following facts are not in dispute.
On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of

CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of
Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys
Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee,
Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu
Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis
Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent
Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court. [3]
In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that

sometime in February 2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment,
he turned over to respondent Chua, a director and the President of CST, the
original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles
to lands owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January 2002, the
respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as
collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper
authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.[4]
From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime

Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John
Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board
meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under
the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also
authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for
these loans.[5] Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out
loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),[6] and used CST properties as collateral.
[7]
Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who
signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal
capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this
loan.[8]
When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties
after CST defaulted,[9] Tan filed the present complaint, essentially arguing
that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CSTs name are
unenforceable against it, since they were entered into by persons who were
unauthorized to bind the company.[10]
In its Amended Answer,[11] PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well
as the corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and
binding since the loan applications and documents accomplished by John
Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate,
which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition,
the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as
collaterals.
PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent

Chua, demanding payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker
with John Dennis Chua.[12]
In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB, [13] he claimed

that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing
John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST
properties as security for any loans. [14] Nevertheless, he admitted that he
signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans
obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua,
he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been
consummated, in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off
the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.[15]
PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based

on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming
that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the
promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos
(P75,000,000.00),[16] insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned,
there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to
PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the
promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to
PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.[17]
THE RTCS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on

PBBs cross-claim on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a
signatory to the promissory notes amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos
(P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he
obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes, even
if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay
PBB the amount of P75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.[18]
In its order dated December 16, 2005, the RTC resolved respondent
Chuas Notice of Appeal, as well as PBBs Motion to Disallow Appeal and to
Issue Execution. Citing Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules, the RTC ruled that
respondent Chua could not file a notice of appeal. Instead, he should have
filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. However,
since the period for filing a certiorari petition had already lapsed without
respondent filing any petition, the partial summary judgment had become
final and executory. Thus, it ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for
the satisfaction of the partial summary judgment in favor of PBB.[19]
On December 21, 2005, the RTC issued an order appointing Renato
Flora as the special sheriff to implement the writ of execution. In line with
this order, Renato Flora, on December 23, 2005, issued a Notice of Levy
and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties, addressed to respondent Chua.
He proceeded with the execution sale, and on December 28, 2005, he issued
a certificate of sale over respondent Chuas 900 shares of stock in CST in
favor of PBB. He also posted a notice of sheriffs sale on January 10,
2006 over respondent Chuas five parcels of land located in Las
Pinas, PasayCity, and Muntinlupa.[20]
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
CA to challenge: (a) the December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to
disallow his appeal; (b) the December 21, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion
to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement the writ of execution;
and (c) the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for reconsideration
and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial
summary judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly,
respondent Chua did not question the propriety of the partial summary
judgment.
On February 8, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision, partly affirming the
RTC order dated December 16, 2005 on the matter of the disallowance of
respondent Chuas appeal. The CA held that respondent Chua could not
appeal the partial summary judgment while the main case remained
pending, in keeping with Section 1(g), Rule 41 of the Rules.
However, the CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua. As found by
the CA, the RTC grievously erred when it held that the partial judgment had
become final and executory when respondent Chua failed to avail of the
proper remedy of certiorari within the 60 day reglementary period under Rule
65. Since a partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of the action,
it is merely an interlocutory, not a final, order. Thus, it could not attain
finality.
The CA further noted that certiorari is an independent action and not

part of the appeal proceedings, and failure to file a certiorari petition
would not result in the finality of the judgment or final order. The RTC, thus,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
granted the issuance of a writ of execution, and the corresponding writ of
execution issued by the court a quo, as well as the subsequent implementing
proceedings, were void.
THE PETITION
PBB submits two issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED AN ERROR IN APPLYING JURISPRUDENCE NOT ON
ALL FOURS [WITH] THE FACTUAL BACKDROP OF THE CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED AN ERROR IN RECALLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE WRONG NOTION THAT THE PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
THE RULING
We DENY the petition for being unmeritorious.
Nature of Partial Summary Judgment
PBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua

was based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to

recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural

technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on
record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. [21] When
the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be
tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.[22]
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always

result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these
instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion

under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole
case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary,
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the
facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful

reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never
intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not [put] an end to an
action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled
himself to recover the remedy he sues for. [23] The Rules provide for a partial
summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the
court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established
those facts which are not in dispute.
After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the
partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be
settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is
more akin to a record of pre-trial,[24] an interlocutory order, rather than a final
judgment.
The differences between a final judgment and an interlocutory order

are well-established. We said in Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[25] that:
[A] final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,

leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in
the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once
rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties' next move . . . and ultimately,
of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it
becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, final and executory.
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the

case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the
parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules x x x Unlike a 'final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory order
may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.[26]
Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that

the partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an
interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated separately
from the main case. As we explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals:[27]
It will be noted that the judgment in question is a partial

summary judgment. It was rendered only with respect to the
private respondents first and second causes of action alleged in
their complaint. It was not intended to cover the other prayers in
the said complaint, nor the supplementary counterclaim filed by
the petitioners against the private respondents, nor the third-
party complaint filed by the petitioners against the Security Bank
and Trust Company. A partial summary judgment is not a
final or appealable judgment. (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p.
189, citing several cases.) It is merely a pre-trial
adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed
established for the trial of the case. (Francisco, Rules of
Court, Vol. II, p. 429.)
xxxx
The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court

being merely interlocutory and not a final judgment, it is puerile
to discuss whether the same became final and executory due to
the alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed
period of appeal. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal
from the partial summary judgment shall be taken
together with the judgment that may be rendered in the
entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts
on which a substantial controversy exists. This is on the
assumption that the partial summary judgment was validly
rendered, which, as shown above, is not true in the case at bar.
[28]
We reiterated this ruling in the cases of Province of Pangasinan v. Court of

Appeals[29] and Government Service Insurance System v. Philippine Village
Hotel, Inc.[30]
Applicability of Guevarra
PBB asserts that our pronouncement in the cases

of Guevarra, Province of Pangasinan, and Government Service Insurance
System cannot be applied to the present case because these cases involve
factual circumstances that are completely different from the facts before us.
While the partial summary judgments in the cited cases decided only some
of the causes of action presented, leaving other issues unresolved, PBB
insists that as far as its cross-claim against respondent Chua is concerned,
the court a quos partial summary judgment is a full and complete
adjudication because the award is for the whole claim. [31] According to PBB,
whatever the court decides as regards the main case, this will not affect the
liability of respondent Chua as a solidary debtor in the promissory notes,
since the creditor can proceed against any of the solidary debtors. In other
words, no substantial controversy exists between PBB and respondent Chua,
and there is nothing more to be done on this particular issue.
We do not agree with PBBs submission.
In the Guevarra case, the Court held that the summary judgment rendered
by the lower court was in truth a partial summary judgment because it failed
to resolve the other causes of action in the complaint, as well as the
counterclaim and the third party complaint raised by the defendants.
Contrary to PBBs assertions, the same could be said for the case
presently before us. The partial summary judgment in question resolved
only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant, respondent
Chua, based on the latters admission that he signed promissory notes as
a co-maker in favor of PBB. This is obvious from the dispositive portion of
the partial summary judgment, quoted below for convenient reference:
WHEREFORE, a partial summary judgment is hereby

rendered on the cross-claim of cross-defendant Philippine
Business Bank against cross-defendant Felipe Chua, ordering the
latter to pay the former as follows:
1. The amount of Ten Million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos,

representing the value of the Promissory Note dated April 17,
2001, plus interest thereof at the rate of 16% from April 12,
2002, until fully paid;
2. The amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) Pesos,
representing the value of the Promissory Note dated April 5,
2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from April 1,
3. The amount of Twenty Three Million (P23,000,000.00)
Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note
dated April 25, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 16%
from April 19, 2002, until fully paid;
4. The amount of Eight Million (P8,000,000.00) Pesos,
representing the value of the Promissory Note dated June 20,
2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 20,
5. The amount of Seven Million (P7,000,000.00) Pesos,
6. The amount of Fifteen Million (P15,000,000.00) Pesos,
7. Plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. [32]
Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the

case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tans complaint, i.e.,
the validity of the secretarys certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua
to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on
behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and
mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.
Chua shares common interest with

co-defendant- debtors
Still, PBB insists that the partial summary judgment is a final judgment
as regards PBBs cross-claim against respondent Chua since respondent
Chuas liability will not be affected by the resolution of the issues of the main
case.
On its face, the promissory notes were executed by John Dennis Chua
in two capacities as the alleged representative of CST, and in his personal
capacity. Thus, while there can be no question as to respondent Chuas
liability to PBB (since he already admitted to executing these promissory
notes as a co-maker), still, the court a quos findings on: (a) whether John
Dennis Chua was properly authorized to sign these promissory notes on
behalf of CST, and (b) whether John Dennis Chua actually signed these
promissory notes in his personal capacity, would certainly have the effect of
determining whether respondent Chua has the right to go after CST and/or
John Dennis Chua for reimbursement on any payment he makes on these
promissory notes, pursuant to Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors
extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer
to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors

only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest
for the payment already made. If the payment is made before
the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be
demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his

insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the
obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each.
In other words, PBB has a common cause of action against respondent

Chua with his alleged co-debtors, John Dennis Chua and CST, it would simply
not be proper to treat respondent Chua separately from his co-debtors.
Moreover, we cannot turn a blind eye to the clear intention of the trial
court in rendering a partial summary judgment. Had the trial court truly
intended to treat PBBs cross-claim against respondent Chua separately, it
could easily have ordered a separate trial via Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules,
which states:
Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of

convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
That the trial court did not do so belies PBBs contention.
It has also not escaped our attention that PBB, in its Motion to Disallow
Appeal and to Issue Execution Against Cross-Defendant Felipe Chua,
[33]
already admitted that the partial summary judgment is not a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. In its
own words:
xxxx
3. However, the remedy availed of by [respondent Chua] is

patently erroneous because under Rule 41 Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes the case;
4. The judgment rendered by [the RTC] dated July 27,

2005 is only a partial summary judgment against
[respondent Chua], on the crossclaim of cross-claimant
Philippine Business Bank. The main case which involves
the claim of plaintiffs against the principal defendants is
still pending and has not yet been adjudged by [the RTC].[34]
Thus, PBB cannot now be allowed to deny the interlocutory nature of

the partial summary judgment.
Certiorari not the proper remedy
PBB also maintains that the partial summary judgment attained finality
when respondent Chua failed to file a certiorari petition, citing the last
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules as basis. We quote:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal maybe taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of

several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims
and third party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment, or

final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Contrary to PBBs contention, however, certiorari was not the proper

recourse for respondent Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may
be corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not a petition
for certiorari,[35] since it imputes error on the lower courts judgment. It is
well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions of law and fact. [36] As we
explained in Apostol v. Court of Appeals:[37]
As a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is a

limited form of review. The jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in
scope; it is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their
jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their
discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by
an appeal or a petition for review.[38]
In light of these findings, we affirm the CAs ruling that the partial
summary judgment is an interlocutory order which could not become a final
and executory judgment, notwithstanding respondent Chuas failure to file
a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the RTC
grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against respondent
Chua.
In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue

raised by respondent Chua on the validity of the RTCs appointment of a
special sheriff for the implementation of the execution writ.
Propriety of Summary Judgment

Reserved for Appeal
As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this
Court the issue of the propriety of the partial summary judgment issued by
the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never raised this issue in his petition
for certiorari before the CA. It is well settled that no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
[39]
Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. [40]
Furthermore, this issue would be better resolved in the proper appeal,

to be taken by the parties once the court a quo has completely resolved all
the issues involved in the present case in a final judgment. If we were to
resolve this issue now, we would be preempting the CA, which has primary
jurisdiction over this issue.
Lastly, taking jurisdiction over this issue now would only result in
multiple appeals from a single case which concerns the same, or integrated,
causes of action. As we said in Santos v. People:[41]
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal

only from a final order or judgment, and not from an
interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals
in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing
and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of
the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits
of the case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable
length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as
many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him, and
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94883 dated February 8, 2007, as well as its Resolution dated July 18, 2007.
Costs against the petitioner, Philippine Business Bank.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, rollo, pp. 12-33.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with the concurrence
of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court),
and Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle, id. at 40-53.
[3]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 02-299.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 62-65.
[5]
Id. at 65.
[6]
Id. at 78.
[7]
Id. at 80.
[8]
Id. at 76.
[9]
Id. at 95.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Id. at 105-198.
[12]
Id. at 190.
[13]
Id. at 209-214.
[14]
Id. at 209.
[15]
Id. at 210.
[16]
Summary of Promissory Notes
Date of Promissory Due Date Amount

Notes
April 17, 2001 April 12, 2002 P10,000,000.00
April 5, 2001 April 1, 2002 12,000,000.00

April 25, 2001 April 19, 2002 23,000,000.00
June 20, 2001 June 14, 2002 8,000,000.00
June 22, 2001 June 17, 2002 7,000,000.00
June 28, 2001 June 24, 2002 15,000,000.00
Id. at 224-229.
[17]
Section 29. Liability of accommodation party. An accommodation party is
one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser,
without receiving value therefore and for the purpose of lending his name
to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder
for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the
instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 254-257.
[19]
Id. at 258-260.
[20]
Id. at 285-286.
[21]
Monterey Foods Corporation v. Eserjose, G.R. No. 153126, September 11,
2003, 410 SCRA 627, 632.
[22]
Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings, G.R. No. 170483, April 19,
2010.
[23]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 756 (1979).
[24]
Defined in Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 7. Record of pre-trial. - The proceedings in the pre-trial

shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall
issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in
the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should
the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and
limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial
to prevent manifest injustice.
[25]
G.R. No. 75000, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 280.
[26]
Id. at 286-287, citing Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334
(1987); PLDT Employees' Union v. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, 97
Phil. 424 (1955), citing Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1952 ed., Vol. I, pp.
894-895, Nico v. Blanco, 81 Phil. 213 (1948) and Hodges v. Villanueva, 90
Phil. 255 (1951); Mejia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 572 (1905); Rios v. Ros, 79 Phil.
243 (1947); Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR Co. v. Yard
Crew Union, et al., 109 Phil. 1143 (1960); Antonio v. Samonte, 1 SCRA 1072
(1961); Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation v. Hon. Caluag, et
al., 2 SCRA 536 (1961); Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, et al., 18 SCRA 1235
(1966); Dela Cruz v. Hon. Paras and San Miguel, 69 SCRA 556
(1976); Valdez v. Hon. Bagaso, et al, 82 SCRA 22 (1978).
[27]
No. L-49017, August 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 297.
[28]
Id. at 315-316.
[29]
G.R. No. 104266, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 726.
[30]
G.R. No. 150922, September 21, 2004, 438 SCRA 567.
[31]
Rollo, p. 368.
[32]
Annex K, Petition; rollo, pp. 254-257.
[33]
Id. at 429-434.
[34]
Id. at 430.
[35]
See Heirs of Roxas v. Garcia, G.R. No. 146208, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA
253.
[36]
La Campana Development Corporation v. See, G.R. No. 149195, June 26,
2006, 492 SCRA 584.
[37]
G.R. No. 141854, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 80.
[38]
Id. at 92.
[39]
Besana v. Mayor, G.R. No. 153837, July 21, 2010. See Sanchez, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA
647; Chua v. Timan, G.R. No. 170452, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA
146, citing Lim v. Queensland Tokyo Commodities, Inc., 373 SCRA 31, 41
(2002).
[40]
Genesis Transport Service, Inc. v. Unyon ng Malayang Manggagawa ng
Genesis Transport, G.R. No. 182114, April 5, 2010, citing Pag-Asa Steel
Works v. Court of Appeals, 486 SCRA 475 (2006).
[41]
G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 359, citing Sitchon v.
Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397, 399 (1948).
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE G.R. No. 178925

YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON
ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and
VALENTIN YBIERNAS, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
NACHURA,
ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, PERALTA,

MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS,
ABAD, and
INC., and THE SHERIFF OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFPA MENDOZA, JJ.
SIG CITY, BRANCH 163,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 1, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions[1] dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed
Resolutions granted respondents motion for new trial of a case for quieting of
title and damages, decided in petitioners favor by the trial court in a
summary judgment.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in

Talisay, Negros Occidental, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-83976. On April 28, 1988, Estrella executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale[2] over the property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas (Dionisio) and
petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles.
On June 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City
issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Rec. No.
97, Lot 713-C-B, Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, directing the registration and
annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, on July 5, 1989,
the Deed of Absolute Sale and the said RTC Order were annotated on the
title, as follows:
Entry No. 334150; Order; Dionisio M. Ybiernas; Order issued by

the RTC of Negros Occ. to register and annotate the deed of sale
on this title without need of presenting the owners duplicate.
Date of order-June 30, 1989; Date of prescription-July 5, 1989 at
10:45 a.m.
Entry No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al; Deed of absolute

sale of this property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of
Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente M. Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and
Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in undivided equal share to each; doc.
no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988 of the not. reg. of Mr.
Indalecio P. Arriola of Iloilo City. Date of instrument-April 28,
1988; Date of inscription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m.[3]
On October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay
Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint [4] for sum of
money and damages, amounting to P6,000,000.00, against
Estrella and three other individuals. The Complaint alleged that the
defendants were guilty of fraud when they misrepresented to herein
respondents that they own a parcel of land in Quezon City, and that the title
over the said property is free from liens and encumbrances.
Upon respondents motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order [5] dated November
6, 1991, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing
of a bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied
the subject property.[6] On November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was
annotated on TCT No. T-83976 as Entry No. 346816.[7]
When Estrellas heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14,
1992, an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to
them.[8] Respondents, however, filed an indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff
refused to lift the levy.
The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of
respondents, and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus
legal interest and damages. Respondents, however, elevated the case all the
way up to this Court, questioning the interest rate. This Court eventually
denied the appeal in a Minute Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which
became final and executory on April 14, 2003.[9]
In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners
Valentin Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas.
On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a
Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages,[10] claiming that the levy was
invalid because the property is not owned by any of the defendants in the
Pasig City RTC case. They averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and
the Deed of Absolute Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice to the whole
world that the property is no longer owned by Estrella.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, [11] respondents contended that (a) the
case constituted an interference in the proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a
co-equal court; (b) petitioners should have filed their claims against the
indemnity bond filed by respondents; and (c) petitioners were guilty of
forum-shopping, considering that the case actually sought a relief similar to
the third-party claim.
During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the [e]xistence of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47, Bacolod City, in Cad. Case No.
10 concerning the same TCT No. T-83976.[12]
On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC
initially denied the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004. [13] Upon
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the motion for
summary judgment in the decision[14] dated December 27, 2005. The RTC
made the following pronouncement:
A consideration of the issues defined by the parties during the

pre-trial x x x shows quite clearly that they are issues that may
already be properly resolved now at this stage of the proceedings
in this case, as they, other than the amount of damages, are
quite apparently pure questions of law, the factual antecedents
for these issues having already been admitted by the parties.
As to issue No. 1 [whether ownership has been transferred to

petitioners], it is a fact well-established, as admitted by the
parties and shown by the annotation as Entry No. 334151 on said
TCT No. T-8[39]76, that the said Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
April 28, 1988 over the subject property by Estrella Mapa Vda. de
Ybiernas in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, Manuel
Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles, was validly annotated as
such Entry No. 334151, inscribed on July 5, 1989, on said TCT No.
T-83976 registered in the name of Estrella M. Ybiernas.
Neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the

validity of the judicial proceedings before RTC, Branch
47, Bacolod City, which issued in Cadastral Case No. 10, the said
Order dated June 30, 1989, which directed the registration and
annotation of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1988
on said TCT No. T-83976, and which led to the annotation under
said Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-83976.[15]
Thus, the dispositive portion of the December 27, 2005 RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except as to the amount of damages, a summary

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, and as prayed for by the plaintiffs in their
complaint:
1. The levy on attachment made by herein

defendant Sheriff of RTC, Branch
163, Pasig City on said TCT No. T-83976, issued by
the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Negros
Occidental, covering the Subject Property, is
hereby DECLARED INVALID; and, consequently,
2. Entry No. 346816 on the same TCT No. T-83976

is hereby CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Respondents filed a notice of appeal,[17] and it was granted by the RTC.
While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new
trial,[18] claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral
Case No. 10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated.
Attached to the motion were the affidavit[19] of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who
conducted the research in Bacolod City in behalf of the law office
representing respondents, and the following certifications:
a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso M.

Villanueva, Jr., Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City,
stating that: no cadastral case involving Lot 713-C-1-B, Psd-
220027, Talisay Cadastre, was filed with this office sometime
on 30 June 1989 and raffled to Branch 47 of this court which
was then presided by Judge Enrique T. Jocson.[20]
b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Atty. Mehafee G.

Sideno, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 47,
stating that: as per records of this court, no Cadastral Case
No. 10, LRC, GLRO Rec. 97, Lot No. 713-C-1-B, Psd 220027,
filed by Dionisio Ybiernas was filed and docketed in this office.
[21]
c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella M.

Domingo, OIC Archives Division of the National Archives
Office, stating that: no copy is on file with this Office of a
DEED OF SALE allegedly executed by and among ESTRELLA
MAPA VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO YBIERNAS, VICENTE M.
YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL YBIERNAS and MARIA CORAZON
ANGELES, ratified on April 28, 1988 before INDALECIO P.
ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo City and
acknowledged as Doc. No. 437; Page No. 89; Book No. VI;
Series of 1988.[22]
Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant
of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they
discovered the evidence after the trial court rendered its judgmenton
December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have discovered and produced the
evidence during the trial with reasonable diligence; and (3) the evidence was
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and was of
such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. On the
second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered
the evidence with reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on
the veracity of the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle
that the issuance of a court order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the
presumption of regularity. On the third requisite, respondents pointed out
that, if the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10 and the invalidity of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by the newly
discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably be
dismissed, as respondents levy would be declared superior to petitioners
claim.[23]
In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned

decision was a partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a
motion for new trial; (b) the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an
admitted fact which could not be questioned in a motion for new trial; and (c)
there was no newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial.[24]
The CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted
respondents motion for new trial, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants-appellants

having satisfied all the elements necessary to justify the filing of
a Motion for New Trial which appears to be meritorious and in the
higher interest of substantial justice, the said motion is
GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, let a
new trial of the Quieting of Title case be held and let said case be
REMANDED to the Court a quo for said purpose.
SO ORDERED.[25]
At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a
proper subject of an appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits
of the case, having completely disposed of all the issues except as to the
amount of damages. The CA concluded that respondents properly availed of
a motion for new trial because such remedy could be availed of at any time
after the appeal from the lower court had been perfected and before the CA
loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, respondents were able
to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the trial of the case
and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held that
respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral
Case No. 10; they only admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30,
1989 in Cadastral Case No. 10.
On July 16, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

[26]
Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari,

raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A
PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
B.

FAILING TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN
IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ADMITTED FACTS.
C.

FAILING TO RULE THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
ADDUCED TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.[27]
Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the trial courts decision
because it did not completely dispose of all the issues in the case; it failed to
settle the issue on damages. Petitioners categorize the decision as a partial
summary judgment, which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
[28]
reiterated in GSIS v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.,[29] the Court pronounced
as not a final and an appealable judgment, hence, interlocutory and clearly
an improper subject of an appeal. Petitioners theorize then that the appeal
could not have been perfected and the CA could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new trial. Accordingly,
they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been denied outright
for being violative of Section 1,[30]Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the motion for new trial may be filed after the appeal has been
perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court, trial should proceed instead to settle the issue on
damages. Petitioners point out that the case cited by the CA in its
Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[31]
is not applicable to the case because, unlike in the present case, the trial
courts ruling completely disposed of all the issues in that case.
In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the

existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the
Order dated June 30, 1989. They maintain that respondents cannot admit the
existence of an order and yet deny the existence of the proceedings from
which the order emanates. Respondents judicial admission that the court
Order existed necessarily carried with it the admission that the cadastral
proceedings where the Order was issued likewise existed. Petitioners aver
that respondents are bound by their judicial admission and they cannot be
allowed to present evidence to contradict the same.
Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of

evidence have no probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are
self-serving and inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did not even
indicate the period when they occupied their positions and state whether
they had the authority to issue such certifications and whether they had
personal knowledge of the documents archived during the year that the deed
of sale was executed. According to petitioners, the certifications cannot
overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Order dated
June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications would simply show that the records
of Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence,
they would have no bearing on the result of the case.
Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of
proving that the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with
the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. They contend that
respondents could have discovered and presented in court the certifications
during trial had they exercised reasonable diligence.
Petitioners arguments are untenable.
The issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment is indeed crucial.
If the judgment were not final, it would be an improper subject of an appeal.
Hence, no appeal would have been perfected before the CA, and the latter
would not have acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, including the
motion for new trial. But more importantly, only a final judgment or order, as
opposed to an interlocutory order, may be the subject of a motion for new
trial.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving

nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto, such as an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground of res judicataor prescription, for instance.[32] Just like any other
judgment, a summary judgment that satisfies the requirements of a final
judgment will be considered as such.
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion

of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the
amount of damages.[33] The RTC judgment in this case fully determined the
rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case for quieting of title
and left no other issue unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it
is a final judgment.
In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not
remove its summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact,
under Section 3,[34] Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may
not be rendered on the amount of damages, although such judgment may be
rendered on the issue of the right to damages.[35]
In Jugador v. De Vera,[36] the Court distinguished between the determination

of the amount of damages and the issue of the right to damages itself in
case of a summary judgment. The Court elucidated on this point, thus:
[A] summary judgment may be rendered except as to the

amount of damages. In other words, such judgment may be
entered on the issue relating to the existence of the right to
damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently observes that if there is
any real issue as to the amount of damages, the c[o]urt, after
rendering summary judgment, may proceed to assess the
amount recoverable.[37]
It is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v.

Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.[38] In that case, the summary judgment
specifically stated that [t]rial on the issu[e] of damages shall resume.
Evidently, there remained an unresolved issue on the right to damages.
Here, the trial court, in stating that except as to the amount of damages, a
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, had, in effect, resolved all issues, including the right to
damages in favor of the plaintiffs (petitioners). What remained undetermined

was only the amount of damages.
On the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting

evidence that would disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, we
likewise sustain the CA.
A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the
need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.[39]
During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of the

Order dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such admission to
the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the circumstances under
which the admission was made. In construing an admission, the court should
consider the purpose for which the admission is used and the surrounding
circumstances and statements.[40] Respondents have constantly insisted that,
in making the admission, they relied in good faith on the veracity of the
Order which was presented by petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the
presumption that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the
regular performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and unfair
to respondents if they would be prevented from proving that the Order is in
fact spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case No. 10 before the
RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City.
Finally, we find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is

warranted. New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice. Thus, the Rules allows the courts
to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when
there exists newly discovered evidence.[41] The grant or denial of a new trial
is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. [42]
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered
newly discovered.[43]
The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence

could have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable
diligence. In Custodio v. Sandiganbayan,[44] the Court expounded on the due
diligence requirement, thus:
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new

trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the
[proffered] evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered by due diligence. The question
of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects:
a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and
a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been
discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due
diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly
discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much
the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence
nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party
now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence,

and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends
upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it
has been observed that the phrase is often equated with
reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant. In
other words, the concept of due diligence has both
a time component and a good faith component. The movant for
a new trialmust not only act in a timely fashion in gathering
evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in
good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the
defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
facts known to him.[45]
As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of

the Order dated June 30, 1989 which petitioners presented in court. It was
only practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given
this circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence
in obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly
discovered evidence.
The question of whether the certifications presented by respondents

have any probative value is left to the judgment and discretion of the trial
court which will be hearing the case anew.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court

of Appeals Resolutions dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate Justices Isaias
P. Dicdican and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47, 61.
[2]
Id. at 65-66.
[3]
Id. at 71.
[4]
Id. at 165-176.
[5]
Id. at 231.
[6]
Id. at 232.
[7]
Id. at 70.
[8]
Id. at 279.
[9]
Id. at 260.
[10]
Id. at 270-277.
[11]
Id. at 289-294.
[12]
Id. at 73.
[13]
Id. at 295.
[14]
Id. at 295-307.
[15]
Id. at 301-302.
[16]
Id. at 307.
[17]
Id. at 308.
[18]
Id. at 315-339.
[19]
Id. at 310-311.
[20]
Id. at 312.
[21]
Id. at 313.
[22]
Id. at 314.
[23]
Id. at 321-325.
[24]
Id. at 358-365.
[25]
Id. at 47.
[26]
Supra note 1.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 452-453.
[28]
209 Phil. 241 (1983).
[29]
482 Phil. 47 (2004).
[30]
Section 1. Period for filing; ground. At any time after the appeal from the
lower court has been perfected and before the Court of Appeals loses
jurisdiction over the case, a party may file a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered
prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which
is of such character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds
therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
[31]
G.R. No. 75315, May 7, 1990, 185 SCRA 35.
[32]
Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, 395 Phil. 278,
293 (2000).
[33]
Cotabato Timberland Co., Inc. v. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., G.R. No.
145469, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 227, 233.
[34]
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at
least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse
party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three
(3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
[35]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, 368 (Eighth
Revised Edition 2002).
[36]
94 Phil. 704 (1954).
[37]
Id. at 710.
[38]
Supra note 29.
[39]
Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16,
2008, 551 SCRA 540, 549.
[40]
Harmon v. Christy Lumber, Inc., 402 NW2D 690 (1987); see Moffett v.
Arabian American Oil Co., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 174 (1949).
[41]
Brig. Gen. Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2005).
[42]
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 157264, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 329, 340.
[43]
Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 204-205.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id. at 206.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, G.R. No. 170658

WILMA CALUBAQUIB,
EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, Present:
ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB,
and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
CALUBAQUIB, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners, DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 22, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary
judgment.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the September 21, 2005 Decision, [2] as well as the November
30, 2005 Resolution,[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83073. The
two issuances of the appellate court ruled against petitioners and ordered them to
reconvey the subject properties to respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic). The CA upheld the April 26, 2004 Decision [4] of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, the dispositive portion of which
decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the
Republic of the Philippines is the owner of that certain property
denominated as Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao
with an area of three hundred ninety two thousand nine hundred
ninety six (392,996) square meters which is registered in its name as
evidenced by Original Certificate No. 13562, and as such, is entitled
to the possession of the same, and that the defendants illegally
occupied a five (5) hectare portion thereof since 1992.
Defendants are then ordered to vacate the portion so occupied by

them, and pay to the national government the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per year of occupancy, from 1992 up to
the time the property is vacated by them.
Defendants counterclaim is dismissed.
No pronouncement as to cost.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80,
[6]
which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation expressly
stated that it was being issued subject to private rights, if any there
be. Accordingly, the respondent obtained an Original Certificate of Title No.
13562[7] over the property, which is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao),
situated in the barrio of Caggay, Municipality of Tuguegarao. Bounded
on the E. by Lot No. 2594: on the SE, by the Provincial Road: on the
SW by Lot Nos. 2539, 2538, and 2535: and on NW, by Lot Nos. 2534,
2533, 2532, 2478 and 2594.
On January 16, 1995, respondent[8] filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a
complaint for recovery of possession[9] against petitioners alleging that sometime
in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy
and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property)
thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite
repeated demands to do so.[10] Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be
ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time
that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is
restored to possession.[11]
Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the subject
property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992. [12] They maintained that
they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in
open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s.
[13]
Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the area
as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children
acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document
entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonios children applied for a homestead patent but
the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. [14] Nevertheless, these
children continued cultivating the subject property.
Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17,

1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly
occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation. Petitioners cite as
their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military
reservation site private rights, if any there be.[15] Petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against them.
The pre-trial conference conducted on August 21, 1995 yielded the following
admissions of fact:
1. Lot No. 2470 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre is a parcel of land
situated in Alimanao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with an area of 392,996
square meters. On August 17, 1936, the President of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No. 80 reserving the lot for military purposes. On
the strength of this Proclamation, OCT No. 13562 covering said lot
was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The defendants are in actual possession of a 5-hectare portion of

said property.
3. The Administrator of the Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation

demanded the defendants to vacate but they refused.
4. The defendants sought presidential assistance regarding their

status on the land covered by the title in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. The Office of the President has referred the matter to
the proper administrative agencies and up to now there has been no
definite action on said request for assistance.[16]
Given the trial courts opinion that the basic facts of the case were undisputed, it
advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment. [17] Neither party filed
the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two occasions[18] its objection to a
summary judgment. It explained that summary judgment is improper given the
existence of a genuine and vital factual issue, which is the petitioners claim of
ownership over the subject property. It argued that the said issue can only be
resolved by trying the case on the merits.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus:
The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to raise any
issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in order.
Let this case be submitted for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[20]
Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004
Decision[21] dismissing petitioners claim of possession of the subject property in
the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80
recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military
reservation, petitioners position could not be sustained, as there was no right of
[petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government.[22]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[23]
Petitioners appealed[24] to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision dated
April 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4846 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA explained that, in order to segregate the subject property from the mass of
public land, it was imperative for petitioners to prove their and their predecessors-
in-interests occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30
years prior to the issuance of the proclamation. [26] There must be clear, positive
and absolute evidence that they had complied with all the requirements of the law
for confirmation of an imperfect title before the property became a military
reservation site.[27] Based on these standards, petitioners failed to establish any
vested right pertaining to them with respect to the subject property. [28] The CA
further held that petitioners did not say what evidence they had of an imperfect
title under the Public Land Act.[29]
The CA denied reconsideration of its Decision, hence petitioners appeal to this

Court.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners maintain that the subject property was alienable land when they,
through their ancestors, began occupying the same in the early 1900s. By
operation of law, they became owners of the subject parcel of land by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Thus, when Proclamation No. 80 declared
that existing private rights, if there be any are exempt from the military
reservation site, the subject property remained private property of the petitioners.
Petitioners then ask that the case be remanded to the trial court for the reception
of evidence. They maintain that the case presents several factual issues, such as
the determination of the nature of the property (whether alienable or inalienable)
prior to 1936 and of the veracity of petitioners claim of prior and adverse
occupation of the subject property.[30]
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that petitioners
were not able to prove that they had a vested right to the subject property prior to
the issuance of Proclamation No. 80. As petitioners themselves admit, their
application for homestead patent filed in 1926 was not acted upon, hence they did
not acquire any vested right to the subject property. Likewise, petitioners did not
prove their occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30
years prior to August 17, 1936, the date when Proclamation No. 80 took effect.[31]
Issue[32]
The crux of the case is the propriety of rendering a summary judgment.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the
defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender
a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[33] A deeper understanding of summary judgments is
found in Viajar v. Estenzo:[34]
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly

dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a
doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined
by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary
judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the
place of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary

judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts
in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary
judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party
who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits,
depositions, or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting
character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after
compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court
in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of
a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue
posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence
of such an issue is resolved against the movant.[35]
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[36]
The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a
genuine issue of fact,[37] as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.[38] [A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its
nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party
tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate
evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants
merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking
advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway.[39]
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under
oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they
submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is
held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary
judgment is proper so long as the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine.[40]
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter
of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action. [41] The
non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting
a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.
[42]
In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with
neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an
opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary
judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of
fact. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have
persisted in rendering summary judgment.Considering that the remedy of
summary judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case,
the trial court cannot railroad the parties rights over their objections.
More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the
trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an
assumption that petitioners defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and
that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous
possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This
assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given why
the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower
courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense
and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.
It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary
judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment based
on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners due
process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their
defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2004
summary judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 1, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, for
trial. The Presiding Judge is directed to proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 18- 37.
[2]
Id. at 45-56; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a
Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo F.
Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[3]
Id. at 57.
[4]
Id. at 39-44; penned by Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr.
[5]
RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; id. at 43-44.
[6]
Records, pp. 50-51.
[7]
Id. at 2.
[8]
The Republic was represented by Commander Abelardo Arugay, who was
appointed as Administrator of Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation
on April 15, 1994 (id. at 49).
[9]
Id. at 1-6. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4846 (95-Tug.) and
raffled to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
[10]
Id. at 3.
[11]
Id. at 4.
[12]
Answer, pp. 1-2; id. at 17-18.
[13]
Id. at 2; id. at 18.
[14]
[15]
[16]
Records, pp. 58-59.
[17]
Id. at 61.
[18]
Manifestation and Compliance dated July 28, 1999 (id. at 95) and Plaintiffs
Memorandum dated November 18, 1999 (id. at 111-112).
[19]
Id. at 124.
[20]
Id. at 125-130.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 39-44.
[22]
Id. at 42.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 45-56.
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 18-21.
[25]
CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 55.
[26]
Id. at 7-8; id. at 51-52.
[27]
Id. at 10; id. at 54.
[28]
Id.; id.
[29]
[30]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 27-31; id. at 141-145.
[31]
Respondents Memorandum, pp. 5-8; id. at 100-103.
[32]
Petition for Review, pp. 8-9; id. at 25-26.
[33]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 35.
[34]
178 Phil. 561 (1979).
[35]
Id. at 572-573. Citations omitted.
[36]
Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010, 613
SCRA 66, 81-82.
[37]
Estrada v. Consolacion, 163 Phil. 540, 549 (1976).
[38]
Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, supra at 88.
[39]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Barredo in Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at
554. Emphasis supplied.
[40]
Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, surpa at 82. Emphasis supplied.
[41]
Estrada v. Consolacion, supra note 37 at 550.
[42]
Caridao v. Hon. Estenzo, 217 Phil. 93, 101-102 (1984).

SC Cases On MSJ

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

SC Cases On MSJ

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Admissions:

- Sugar industry is made up of 72,000 sugarcane farmers; 500,000

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 164171

AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND

TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC

BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF

SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,

INC., represented by its President JOSE

T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS,

INC., represented by its President

DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN,

INC., represented by its President

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 164172

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND

TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC

BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF

LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE,

SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO

VENTURES CORP., represented

by its President YOLANDA AMBAR,

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 168741

THE CHIEF OF THE LAND

TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE

and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,

SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE,

MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS

ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY

FREEPORT, INC., represented by Promulgated:

its President ALFREDO S. GALANG,

Respondent. February 20, 2006

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President

3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of

3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a

3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic

1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an authority

2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.

1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an authority to

2. with GVW above 12 tons.

3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:

5. tractor heads and truck tractors

8. tank lorries with high pressure spray gun

9. reefers or refrigerated trucks

10. mobile drilling derricks

11. transit/concrete mixers

12. mobile radiological units

13. wreckers or tow trucks

14. concrete pump trucks

15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks

17. vacuum trucks

18. garbage compactors

19. self loader trucks

20. man lift trucks

21. lighting trucks

22. trucks mounted with special purpose equipment

23. all other types of vehicle designed for a specific use.

G.R. No. 164171:

On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,

Upon filing of petitioners answer/comment,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

G.R. No. 164172: