Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept .

, CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

British Standard

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Technical Information Services Dept .
13 January 2004

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current version of this document by searching British
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 PUBLISHED DOCUMENT |
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Queries and interpretations on |
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BS 5839 : Parts 1 and 4 |
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(as amended) |
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ICS 13.220.20; 13.320 |
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NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW
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 PD 6531 : 1997

Committees responsible for this

Published Document
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

The preparation of this Published Document was entrusted to Technical Committee

FSM/12, Fire detection and alarm systems, upon which the following bodies were
represented:

AEA Technology
British Cable Makers Confederation
British Fire Protection Systems' Association
British Telecommunications plc
Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers
Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers' Association
Consumer Policy Committee of BSI
Department of Health
Department of the Environment (Building Research Establishment)
Department of the Environment (Construction Sponsorship Directorate)
Electrical Contractors' Association
Home Office
Institute of Fire Safety
Institution of Electrical Engineers
Institution of Fire Engineers
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
Loss Prevention Council
Ministry of Defence
National Association of Fire Officers
National Caravan Council Limited
National Inspection Council for Electrical Installation Contracting
National Quality Assurance
Professional Lighting and Sound Association
Trades Union Congress

The following bodies were also represented in the drafting of the standard, through
subcommittees and panels:

Engineering Industries' Association

This Published Document, having Institute of Petroleum
been prepared under the
direction of the Fire Standards Institute of Sound and Communications Engineers
Policy Committee, was published
under the authority of the
Standards Board and comes into
effect on
15 July 1997

BSI 1997
Amendments issued since publication
Amd. No. Date Text affected

The following BSI reference

relates to the work on this
Published Document:
Committee reference FSM/12

ISBN 0 580 27348 2

 PD 6531 : 1997

Contents
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

Page
Foreword iii
1 Scope 1
2 Interpretations of BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 1
2.1 Manual and automatic systems 1
2.2 Short circuit monitoring 1
2.3 Monitoring of alarm sounder circuits 1
2.4 The use of isolators between zones 2
2.5 Addressable detector/sounder units 2
2.6 Isolation of staircase zones 3
2.7 Sounder and detector cabling 3
2.8 Cabling of multiple sounder circuits 3
2.9 Disk memories 4
2.10 `Search distance' in addressable systems 4
2.11 Zoning of multi-storey buildings 4
2.12 Starting or restarting fire alarm sounders 4
2.13 Loudness of alarms in residential care homes 5
2.14 Loudness measurement for voice alarm signals 5
2.15 Travel distance to manual call points 5
2.16 Positioning of detectors in a roof apex 6
2.17 Detectors in ventilated ceiling voids 6
2.18 Optical beam detectors in congested roof spaces 6
2.19 Siting of detectors near ceiling obstructions 7
2.20 Detectors in lift shafts 7
2.21 Detectors in ventilation ducts 7
2.22 Use of L2 and L3 systems 8
2.23 Smoke detector standards for type L systems 8
2.24 Smoke detectors used to operate door-holding devices 9
2.25 Door smoke seals 9
2.26 Sprinkler protection 9
2.27 Time delays 9
2.28 Reduced sensitivity 10
2.29 Remote isolation facilities 10
2.30 Diagrammatic representation of the building 11
2.31 Connection to mains supplies 11
2.3 Fire protection of mains wiring to fire alarm systems 11
2.33 Use of standby generators 11
2.34 Conditions to be satisfied for absence of mechanical protection to cables 12
2.35 Rodent attack on cables 12
2.36 `Low smoke' cables 12
2.37 Fire resistant armoured cables 12
2.38 Cabling of ring-connected data-transmission systems 13
2.39 Radio-linked sounders 13
2.40 Ancillary services 13
2.41 Testing of manual call points 13
2.42 Zone testing 14
2.43 Testing voltages 14
2.44 Insulation testing at the 5-year test 14
2.45 Cable fixings 14

BSI 1997 i
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

3 Interpretations of BS 5839 : Part 4 : 1988 15

3.1 Silencing facilities 15
3.2 Short circuit warnings 15
3.3 Fire alarm response to manual call point 15
3.4 Earth faults 15
3.5 Fault location displays 16
3.6 Memory check sums 16
3.7 Disk memories: see 2.9 of this Published Document 16
3.8 Memory check routines 16
3.9 Total loss of power 16
3.10 Battery monitoring current 16
Subject index 17
List of references Inside back cover

ii BSI 1997
 PD 6531 : 1997

Foreword
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

This Published Document has been prepared under the direction of the Fire Standards
Policy Committee. It supersedes PD 6531 : 1992, which is withdrawn. It is intended that
this Published Document will be updated every two to three years.
This Published Document contains queries dealt with in the previous edition, some of
which have been amended, together with the inclusion of further queries. A
background to this, and the previous edition, is as follows.
Since the publication of the various Parts of BS 5839, a number of queries on
interpretation have been submitted to BSI. In some cases these queries have shown the
standards to be in need of amendment, and amendments have now been published. In
other cases, however, the queries have shown that although the standards are correct,
they are so expressed that misunderstandings have arisen over both their
interpretation and the philosophies behind their recommendations.
The subcommittees responsible for the standards have, of course, answered the
queries individually, but believe that many of them (and their answers) deserve a wider
audience. This document, therefore, gives not merely the queries and answers, but
seeks to give the intentions of the standards in the hope that these may help in future
interpretations.
Queries that have subsequently been clarified by the issue of amendments have not
been included in this Published Document (see Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 to BS 5839 :
Part 1 (AMD 6317 and AMD 6874, respectively) and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 to
BS 5839: Part 4 (AMD 6654 and AMD 6875, respectively). It is essential that readers
refer to the amended text when reading this Published Document.
Points already covered in the amendments include the following.
a) In BS 5839 : Part 1.
1) In 6.6.2, an ambiguity concerning the removal of detectors from the circuit has
been resolved by Amendment No. 1.
2) In 6.6.3, confusion over whether `sounder' refers to the whole of the sounder or
just to the sound generating part has been resolved by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2.
b) In BS 5839 : Part 4.
1) There was no requirement forbidding the use of a single cable entry point for
the mains power lead into the equipment and for cables to detectors and
sounders, although there was such a recommendation in BS 5839 : Part 1.
Amendment No. 1 to BS 5839 : Part 4 brings the two standards into line.
2) The case of signal cables, such as those to door release units, using voltages
other than extra low voltage has been inserted.

Summary of pages
This document comprises a front cover, an inside front cover, pages i to iv, pages 1
to 18, an inside back cover and a back cover.

BSI 1997 iii

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

iv
blank

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
1 Scope
This Published Document gives queries concerning
the interpretation of BS 5839 : Part 1 (as amended by
Amendment Nos. 1 and 2) and BS 5839 : Part 4 (as
amended by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2) together with
the relevant answers.
NOTE. The titles of the publications referred to in this Published
Document are listed on the inside back cover.
2 Interpretations of BS 5839:
Part 1: 1988
2.1 Manual and automatic systems
Query
BS 5839 : Part 1 seems to be ambiguous about the
provision of manual call points and sounders. For
instance, 10.3 says `... If manual and automatic
devices are to be installed ...' and `Where manual call
points are incorporated ...', but 3.2 says `... manual
call points should always be provided'. Similarly, a
type L system is stated in 3.1 to be an `automatic'
system, but appendix J.1 says that the
recommendations for manual call points are
applicable to all types of system. If I am installing a
type P system, do I have to include manual call
points and the sounders required for a type M
system? If I am installing a type L system, do I have
to include manual call points in the system?
Answer
BS 5839 : Part 1 has been written to cover fire alarm
systems for a very wide range of premises. Some will
be new, while others will be older premises, with
existing fire alarm systems.
In most cases there will be legislative requirements
for the premises to have provision for sounding the
alarm, and often in older premises these will already
have been satisfied by a manual alarm system. If the
occupier now wishes to protect his property by
installing a type P system, then the code makes no
recommendations on whether or not the new system
should incorporate or replace the old system. The
code discriminates between `the system' and `the
building'. Thus, in 10.3, it permits, but does not
require, manual and automatic devices to be
incorporated into a single system.
If a single system is to perform the functions of both
type M and type P systems, then it should perform all
the recommended functions. In such a case the
type P system would need to have the sounders
recommended for life protection by 9.3. If the
functions were performed by separate systems, then
the type M system would need to have the sounders
called up by 9.3, while the type P system would need
those called up by 9.2. Frequently in such cases the
integration into a single system will make economic
sense, since there will be a reduction in the total
amount of wiring and maintenance will be easier.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
Clause 3.6 recommends that `the type of system to
be installed should always be included in the
specification'. Where necessary, the contract
specification should call up multiple types; L/M, P/M,
L/P or even L/P/M.
2.2 Short circuit monitoring
Query
My system senses a fire alarm by monitoring for an
increase in the current taken by one or more
detectors, and monitors the wiring by looking for the
current taken by an end-of-line resistor. The result is
that a fault warning is given if the line is broken, but
a fire warning if the line is short circuited. Since this
method is fail-safe, is it acceptable?
Answer (see also 3.2 of this Published
Document)
The code is quite specific about this, both in the
definition of monitored wiring (2.10) and in the
recommendations for circuit design (6.6.1, fourth
paragraph). A fault warning, and not a fire alarm,
should be given in response to either a short or open
circuit of cable such that it would disable one or
more detectors or call points.
The purpose behind the recommendation is to avoid
unnecessary false alarms. The committee takes the
view that any false alarm will reduce people's
confidence in the system. Thus the system proposed
in the question is not fail-safe, since it may lead to
an increase in the danger of a real fire alarm being
ignored.
2.3 Monitoring of alarm sounder circuits
Query
9.1 says that `advice on the connection of sounder
circuits is given in 6.6.3'. 6.6.3 recommends that
disconnection of a sounder should generate a fault
warning, but does not recommend monitoring of
sounder cables. Does this mean that unmonitored
cables can be used?
Answer
No. Monitoring of sounder circuits (and other
circuits) is covered in 6.6.1, which recommends that
`... an indication is given at the control and indicating
equipment within 100 s of the occurrence of any
disconnection,.... or of a failure of any other
interconnection...'. This applies even where the
interconnection is a short spur running from the
main sounder circuit to feed a single sounder.
Furthermore, the committee believes that in this
context the recommendations for sounder circuits
also cover other devices for giving the alarm,
including loudspeakers in voice alarm systems.
1
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.4 The use of isolators between zones
Query
Clause 6.6.2 sets limitations as to the effect of a fault
or faults in the wiring. What is the philosophy behind
these limitations?
Answer
Clause 6.6.2, as amended by AMD 6874 (May 1992),
contains the following four recommendations
relating to wiring faults:
a) `if separate circuits are used for each zone, then
a fault or faults on one circuit cannot affect any
other circuit;
b) if any circuit is used for more than one zone,
then a single fault on that circuit cannot remove
protection from an area greater than that allowed
under 7.2(a) to (d) for a single zone;
c) if a circuit is used for more than one zone and
multiple faults within one fire compartment could
remove protection from an area greater than that
allowed under 7.2(a) to (d) for a single zone, then
the circuit within that compartment is suitably
protected (see 17.15);
d) two simultaneous faults should not remove
protection from an area greater than 10 000 m2'.
These recommendations were put into the standard
because of the introduction of addressable systems,
in which signals from individual detectors could be
separately identified even though sharing common
cables with other detectors.
The objective of the committee was that the new
systems should be allowed to introduce advantages,
but that any disadvantages should be excluded or at
least limited.
In non-addressable systems each zone has a separate
circuit (remember that a zone is defined as an area
of the building, not as part of the fire alarm system).
Damage to that circuit (whether at one place or at
several) can affect only one zone. 6.6.2(1) maintains
this property irrespective of system.
In addressable systems one circuit can feed many
zones. The committee could have maintained
comparability with non-addressable systems by a
recommendation that a single fault should affect only
one zone. Such a recommendation could have been
conformed to by the use of fault isolators between
zones, together with an alternative return path such
as might be supplied by a loop circuit.
However, one of the advantages of the addressable
system is its ability to give a more accurate location
of the fire by allowing the use of smaller zones,
specified only in software and without expensive
wiring or additional zone modules in the control
equipment. The committee decided that a
recommendation for isolation between all zones
would penalize this advantage, and therefore
expressed its recommendation as in 6.6.2(2), needing
isolation only at the same zone limits as for
conventional systems. Isolation of the smaller zones
is, of course, allowable but is optional.
2 BSI 1997
Of course, the ability to use isolators in this way
depends on the use of loops or similar circuits, so
that in the event of failure at one point of the loop
the signal from unaffected parts can still be returned
to the control equipment. But if both sides of the
loop return through the same fire compartment, then
a large fire within that compartment could break
both sides of the loop, leaving the intermediate
detectors isolated and leaving unprotected any area
covered by the isolated part. To prevent this,
6.6.2(3) and 17.15 recommend the use of wiring able
to withstand prolonged exposure to fire in such
cases.
The recommendation of 6.6.2(4) is concerned with
the limitation of damage to the system due to two
unrelated faults. In theory (given the necessary zone
isolation) it would be possible to have an
addressable system in which many thousands of
detectors were connected to one loop circuit. Two
unrelated faults could then remove protection from a
very large area. Although such a circumstance was
considered unlikely, the committee felt that the
extent of the resultant loss of protection should be
limited. 6.6.2(4) limits the area of the building that
might be affected to 10 000 m2. In most cases this
will limit the maximum area that can be served by a
single loop circuit.
2.5 Addressable detector/sounder units
Query
Clause 6.6.3 recommends that `If alarm sounders use
the same wiring as detectors, then no alarm sounder
should be affected by the removal of any detector'.
Does this imply that combined detector/sounder
units cannot be used in BS 5839 : Part 1 systems?
Answer
In 1988, when the standard was written, this type of
unit did not exist, and hence was not catered for in
the standard. Its use, therefore, should be considered
against the background philosophy of the
recommendations of 6.6.3.
In non-addressable systems, detectors (particularly
smoke-sensitive detectors) are frequently mounted in
plug-in sockets for ease of maintenance. In many
such systems removal of a detector will break the
circuit, isolating any detectors beyond the break.
Alarm sounders are generally considered to be more
robust, and are therefore usually wired directly into
the circuit, with a much reduced risk of the circuit
being broken by removal of a sounder. However, if
detectors and sounders are mounted on a common
circuit a risk arises that the easy removal of a
detector by unplugging will isolate both detectors
and alarm sounders beyond the break.
Under 6.6.2a the removal of a detector should raise
a fault warning. In general, it would be expected that
the fire routine for the building would include
arrangements to deal with the loss of detection
ability in the now unprotected area, usually by a
wakeful watch system. However, although this may
be adequate for the detection of the fire, it is less

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
likely to be of use in giving a general alarm. Removal
of a single detector should not prevent the correct
operation of alarm sounders throughout the building,
even though the alarm may have to be initiated
manually. This is the reason for the first sentence
of 6.6.3. The same reasoning applies to the removal
of alarm sounders in the recommendations of the
second and third sentences.
The committee considers that the combined
detector/sounder unit should be considered as a new
type of device. Such a device would conform to the
general recommendations of 6.6.2 and 6.6.3 provided
that:
a) removal of a detector/sounder unit requires the
use of a special tool;
b) removal of one detector/sounder unit does not
affect the operation of other detectors, sounders
or detector/sounder units on the circuit;
c) removal of any detector/sounder unit causes a
fault signal to be given at the control and
indicating equipment.
The effects of the removal would then be localized
to the immediate area of the removal, and thus be
more restricted than the separate removal of a
detector and an alarm sounder.
Changes to incorporate such devices into the
standard are likely to be considered at the next
revision.
2.6 Isolation of staircase zones
Query
We are installing a new addressable fire alarm
system in a building with eight stairwells, each
forming a fire compartment. Under 7.2d(2), each of
these stairwells is a separate zone.
Running a separate circuit to each stairwell will be
expensive. Extending one of the storey circuits (via
isolators) to cover the stairwell causes problems by
exceeding the maximum number of points the
system allows for a single loop. However, it is
technically feasible to arrange that at each level the
detector in the stairwell is joined via an isolator and
a tee to the main detection loop for that storey. This
would mean that the various detectors within one
stairwell are all connected to different circuits, but
are then zoned via software in the control and
indicating equipment to give a common zone
indication. Is this permissible?
Answer
6.6 has been carefully written to give the conditions
that should be satisfied while putting as few
limitations as possible on the methods by which
satisfaction is achieved. Conditions covering the
system you describe are given in 6.6.2(2) to 6.6.2(4).
6.6.2(2) covers the effects of a single fault. In your
system the isolator is fed from both sides of the
storey circuit, and hence a single fault on that circuit
will have no effect. A fault on the tee itself will
isolate the detector, but will have no effect on the
main storey circuit. This recommendation is
therefore satisfied.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
6.6.2(3) is more difficult. Multiple faults on the
storey circuit could result in isolation of the detector
at that level on the stairwell, although it would leave
the detectors at other levels of the stairwell
unaffected. It could therefore be said that the area of
the landing at the fault level was left unprotected.
Since there is no recommendation that a zone can
only be fed from a single circuit, or that individual
detectors on several different circuits cannot be
combined into a single zone by software in the
control and indicating equipment, both of these
conditions are acceptable.
2.7 Sounder and detector cabling
Query
Is it permissible to include wires to both detectors
and sounders in the same cable?
Answer
There is no recommendation in the standard which
would prevent this practice. In some ways, such a
system may be advantageous, since alarm wires
usually need better fire protection than do detector
cables, and in this case both would need the
protection recommended for alarm wires. As against
this, the designer should be aware of possible
interference between the two sets of wires.
2.8 Cabling of multiple sounder circuits
Query
Clause 6.6.3 recommends that two sounder circuits
are used. Is it permissible to run the two circuits in a
4-core cable?
Answer
The objective behind the recommendations of the
second and third paragraphs of 6.6.3 is that damage
caused by a fire at one point should not silence all
the alarm sounders. 6.6.3 does not recommend that
two circuits are used. Instead, it says that if a short
circuit develops in any part of the sounder wiring
during a fire, at least one sounder should continue to
sound. The use of two circuits may be one way of
achieving the recommendations, but others (such as
the use of a loop circuit with short-circuit isolators)
are possible.
If 4-core cable is used, then clearly damage to the
cable at one point could affect both circuits, and the
committee believes that this would not be
acceptable. Clause 6.6.5 points out that, even with
isolators, the occurrence of two faults on a loop can
put devices out of action between the two faults. If
the out and return parts of the loop were carried in a
4-core cable which were to be cut between the
control equipment and the first sounder, then this
would prevent all sounder operation. The committee
believes that little improvement in safety is achieved
by the use of multiple signal paths within a common
section of cable, and that this sort of cabling should
be avoided.
3
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.9 Disk memories
Query
Clause 6.9b of the standard says that (for program-
controlled systems) those functions that are
recommended by the standard should not depend on
programs stored on moving disks. Our building
management system uses two computers, one of
which runs the system while the other monitors the
first and is ready to take over the running should a
fault occur. Each computer has two disk drives, each
carrying all the programs and data necessary to
operate the system. There is thus a triply redundant
system, requiring four disk failures before the system
fails to operate. Can this system be considered as
having adequate reliability?
Answer
6.9b is not the only recommendation relevant to disk
memories. 15.2.1 recommends that `control and
indicating equipment for automatic fire alarm
systems should comply with BS 5839 : Part 4'.
Clause 3.8.4.1 of BS 5839 : Part 4 : 1988 requires that
`in particular software shall not be held on storage
media requiring mechanical moving parts such as
magnetic tape or disks'.
The committee considered that the system you
describe, whilst apparently having good redundancy,
could fail if a common mode failure caused
simultaneous corruption of all the memories. If, for
instance, a software `bug' caused disk corruption,
then it would be quite likely that both disks on one
machine would fail, and equally that the same `bug'
could appear on both machines. The committee
therefore felt that the use of redundant disks did not
offer the same degree of reliability as that given by
read-only memories.
2.10 `Search distance' in addressable systems
Query
I am installing an addressable fire detection system
in my premises. In the event of a fire, the display
will show both the zone of origin and the
identification number of the initiating detector. Do I
still have to comply with the search distance
recommendation of 7.2b?
Answer
As BS 5839 : Part 1 is written, no distinction is drawn
between addressable and non-addressable systems,
and the recommendation on search distance applies
to both. If the search distance exceeds the
recommended limit then a deviation should be
agreed (see 4.3 and 6.11) and listed in the
installation and commissioning certificate.
2.11 Zoning of multi-storey buildings
Query
The standard allows a zone to cover more than one
storey if the building is very small (less than 300 m2).
Can this be applied to part of a building? We have a
building of more than 300 m2, but all the individual
floors are smaller than 100 m2. Can we lump two or
three floors into one zone, covering the building with
three zones?
4 BSI 1997
Answer
The relaxations you refer to come in 7.2c
and 7.2d(1).
7.2c allows the complete building to be a single
zone, even though there may be more than one
storey, provided that the total floor area does not
exceed 300 m2. It does not apply to parts of a
building.
7.2d(1) was intended to allow for the case of two or
more multi-storied fire compartments joined together
by doors at the lowest level. Such a case might arise
where two or three houses in a terrace (each
forming a separate fire compartment) are joined
together. Each of the compartments can then be
considered as a single zone. But notice that the
relaxation cannot be applied to compartments
formed from groups of floors in a single building,
since communication between the compartments can
only be at the lowest level.
The example given in the question does not appear
to fall under either 7.2c or 7.2d(1), and therefore
does not conform to the standard's
recommendations.
2.12 Starting or restarting fire alarm sounders
Query
In 9.1 the standard recommends that `a clearly
labelled facility should be available for starting or
restarting the fire alarm sounders'. Does the use of
`or' imply that only one of these facilities needs to be
provided, or do I have to be able to both start and
restart the alarm?
Answer
The clause is intended to mean that whenever the
alarm sounders are silent it should be possible, by
operating a facility at or near the control and
indicating equipment, to cause them to sound.
Whether this operation is starting or restarting will
depend on the state of the system at the time. If the
sounders have been previously silent, so that this is
the first alarm of fire, then the operation will be
`starting'. If the sounders have been sounding, but
have then been silenced with the control equipment
remaining in the `fire' condition, then the operation
will be `restarting'. Whatever the prior condition, it
should be possible by the correct operation to cause
the sounders to sound.
Although the standard refers to `A clearly labelled
facility ...', it is permissible for different controls to
be used for starting and restarting, provided that
these controls are clearly labelled. For instance, the
system could be put into the `fire' condition by the
operation of a break-glass manual call point
(starting); a switch on the control equipment could
then silence or restart the sounders.

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.13 Loudness of alarms in residential care
homes
Query
In a residential care home, we note that most, if not
all, of the patients will be under the influence of
sleeping pills at night. It is unlikely that these
patients will be rousable by sound, and they will
certainly require the assistance of staff if they are to
leave the building. The presence of a loud (75 dB(A))
fire alarm sound will make the evacuation of the
building even more difficult. Is such a loud noise
really necessary?
Answer
Clause 9.4.1 recommends that a sound level of
`75 dB(A) at the bedhead' is achieved if `the fire
routine for the premises requires the audible alarm
to arouse sleeping persons'. If the fire routine
requires the residents to be woken by staff,
then 75 dB(A) may not be necessary in the residents'
quarters (although it may be necessary in the staff
quarters).
Furthermore, 9.10 allows the use in the first instance
of alarms restricted to staff. These could take the
form of personal bleepers, quieter audible alarms or
visual signals. A facility for giving a general alarm (at
the 65 dB(A) level) should be retained.
It is important to remember that if the fire routine
requires residents to be woken (or helped to escape)
by staff, then the general routine for the building
should ensure that sufficient staff will be available in
the event of fire.
2.14 Loudness measurement for voice alarm
signals
Query
In our building the fire alarm is given by voice
messages over a loudspeaker system. The note
to 9.4.1 suggests that loudness measurement should
be by an instrument conforming to BS 5969 and set
to slow response. Slow response averages the signal
over one second, and thus gives low readings on
discontinuous voice signals. Is there an approved
method for measuring the loudness of voice signals?
NOTE. BS 5969 has been withdrawn and is replaced by
BS EN 60651 : 1994. Sound level meters conforming to
BS EN 60651, type 2 are suitable for measuring sound levels from
fire alarm sounders.
Answer
The measurement of sound levels in relation to voice
signals is more difficult than that in relation to more
common sounders. Frequently the problem is not
simply one of sound level, but also of the
intelligibility of the message.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
Clause 9.4.6 recommends that where the level of
sound of a speech message falls below the level
recommended in 9.4.1 then `the message should be
preceded for at least 6 s by an attention-drawing
signal, having at least the loudness recommended
by 9.4.1'. We suggest that you adopt this procedure,
giving the attention-drawing signal over your
loudspeaker system, and measure the level of this
signal.
BS 7443 : 1991 Specification for sound systems for
emergency purposes, gives details about the
measurement of speech intelligibilities.
2.15 Travel distance to manual call points
Query
In large open-plan areas such as offices or shops,
BS 5588 : Parts 2 and 3 recommend that the travel
distance from any point to the nearest storey exit
(normally the doorway to a protected stairway)
should not exceed 45 m. In places of assembly (to be
covered in BS 5588 : Part 6) some open areas (such
as arenas) may have travel distances exceeding 45 m.
However, 10.2 of BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 recommends
that the travel distance to a manual call point should
not exceed 30 m. In some cases it may be possible to
mount call points on supporting pillars or columns,
but frequently there will be no such support. Is there
any way by which the two recommendations can be
brought into line?
Answer
The 30 m recommendation is based on the travel
time of a normally active occupant, as against the
escape time needed by other normally active
occupants. The standard makes the point that should
the occupants be slow in movement then it may be
necessary to reduce the maximum travel distance. It
should be recognized that a normal person, at
walking speed, will take about 30 s to cover an
unobstructed distance of 45 m.
However, deviations from the recommendations of
the code are permissible. The committee believes
that this is a case where such a deviation might be
considered. The consideration should include:
a) the abilities of the probable occupants;
b) the probable rate of spread of fire and the
effect of that rate on the escape time allowable;
c) the degree of obstruction to movement that
might be found in the area, and that might
effectively increase the actual travel distance.
Any deviation should be recorded on the completion
certificate.
5
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.16 Positioning of detectors in a roof apex
Query
12.2.3 recommends that under a pitched roof a
detector should be sited within the apex of the roof,
but gives that detector additional coverage
(depending on the angle of the roof). In a shallowly
sloped roof, the recommendation for a detector
within the apex could mean that more detectors
were needed than under a flat roof, but the
shallowness of the slope could prevent
compensation by the increase of allowable coverage.
Was this intended?
Answer
The recommendation for detectors to be placed in
the apex stems from the fact that the hot gases from
the fire will tend to rise to the roof, then move along
the upwards slope until they reach the apex. If the
apex fell between two rows of detectors, then there
would be a possibility of the hot gases remaining in
the apex and not moving down towards the
detectors. The increased coverage allowed for the
apex detectors stems similarly from the more rapid
flow of the smoke towards the apex detector
because of the slope.
Under a shallowly sloped roof the major problem is
usually the determination of the allowable range of
positions of the `apex' detector. Clause 12.2.3
recommends that the sensitive elements are not
more than 150 mm (for heat detectors) or 600 mm
(for smoke detectors) below the roof. The committee
believes that the detector can be considered as an
`apex' detector provided that it is within this depth
below the apex, even though it may not be vertically
below the apex. Under shallowly sloped ceilings this
allows a significant tolerance on the detector's
position. For a slope of 5, for instance, the `apex'
detector could be more than 5 m horizontally from
the apex.
2.17 Detectors in ventilated ceiling voids
Query
Under 12.2.3 and 12.2.11, voids greater than 800 mm
high should have detectors installed in them. We
have such a void forming a return air plenum above
a false ceiling, with air being pulled up through vents
in the ceiling. We are proposing to put a normal
smoke detection system underneath the false ceiling,
but to rely on smoke detection in the extract duct
for fire detection in the ceiling void. Does this
conform to the standard?
6 BSI 1997
Answer
As you have described it, the installation does not
conform to the code. Reasons for non-conformity
include:
a) the effect of the ceiling ventilation in drawing
smoke away from the under-ceiling detectors, with
the associated possible need for a spacing between
under-ceiling detectors of less than the present
maximum allowed by the standard (i.e. a need for
a greater number of detectors);
b) the possible existence of combustible material
above the false ceiling with the associated
possibility of fire above the ceiling;
c) the inability to detect a fire in the ceiling void
when the ventilation is turned off.
2.18 Optical beam detectors in congested roof
spaces
Query
We have a large warehouse with a series of bays,
each having a shallow pitched roof. The warehouse
is protected by optical beam smoke detectors, the
beams passing close above the trusses supporting
the roof. There is a high rate of false alarms
(possibly due to birds perching in the beams), and
our installers have recommended mounting the
detectors so that the beams pass below the trusses.
The beams will then be 1.8 m below the underside of
the roof, although 12.2.3 says that this distance
should not exceed 600 mm. What should we do? The
apex of the roof is 15 m above the ground, the eaves
are 13 m above the ground and the bays are 25 m
wide.
Answer
The revised system would not conform to the
standard, but this might be a case in which a
deviation from the standard should be considered. In
a building of this type the smoke will usually rise
into the apex of the roof, then gradually build
downwards until it can pass under the valley of the
roof into the next bay. It may be that detection
beams at valley level would be satisfactory, since
detection will occur while the smoke is restricted to
one bay.
However, these beams would not be able to detect
fires starting within the roof apex. If the apex
contains fuel and ignition sources (such as electrical
or mechanical equipment), then it is important that
detection facilities are placed higher than any
potential fire.

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.19 Siting of detectors near ceiling obstructions
Query
The first paragraph of 12.2.10 talks about
obstructions to the `.... passage of smoke or hot gas
from a point to a detector ....'. The second paragraph
says that `isolated attachments to the ceiling such as
lighting fittings and luminaires do not normally act
as obstructions to the general flow of smoke. They
may, however, cause a local disturbance, and
detectors should not be mounted closer to such
attachments than twice the depth of the attachment'.
Since the first paragraph refers to both smoke and
hot gas, while the second refers only to smoke,
should we assume that the isolated attachments act
as obstructions to hot gas but not to smoke, and that
therefore the decrease in distances given in the first
paragraph should be applied to both heat and smoke
detectors, while the restriction on mounting in the
second paragraph applies only to smoke detectors?
Answer
Both heat-sensitive and smoke-sensitive detectors
rely on the effects of convection for the transfer of
fire products from the fire to the detector. In the
first case the product detected is hot gas, in the
second it is smoke particulates, but in both cases the
transfer processes are those of gas convection, with
the gas acting as a carrier for the particulates.
Most of the recommendations in 12.2 assume that
this transfer takes place under a flat, open ceiling,
but 12.2.8 to 12.2.10 deal with the effects of walls
(including corridor walls), beams and other
obstructions.
12.2.10 deals with the effects of obstructions other
than walls. The most significant of these obstructions
will be ceiling downstands such as beams.
When the expanding layer of hot gas under the
ceiling hits a shallow downstand it will build
downwards until it passes under the downstand to
continue its flow on the far side. This can slow the
movement of the smoke (and may also introduce
some additional dilution). To allow for this slowing,
the effective radius of the detector is reduced by
twice the depth of the obstruction.
If, however, the depth of the downstand is too great
then the smoke may not pass under it until the
whole of the area bounded by the downstand is
filled with smoke, with the downstand acting as a
containing wall. As a rule of thumb, the change in
behaviour starts to occur when the downstand is
about as deep as the undisturbed thickness of the
layer, i.e. about 10 % of the distance from fire to
ceiling. Thus the standard recommends that
obstructions deeper than 10 % of the ceiling height
should be treated as walls.
Isolated attachments such as lighting fittings may act
as local obstructions, but the general flow is able to
pass round the obstructions as well as under them.
The standard thus recommends that detectors avoid
the local disturbance by not being mounted closer to
the attachment than twice the depth of the
attachment.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
Since the laws of convective flow apply equally to
hot gas and to the smoke contained in it, the rules
of 12.2.10 apply equally to heat-sensitive and
smoke-sensitive detectors. Both types of detector
should be spaced away from isolated ceiling
attachments by at least twice the depth of the
attachment.
2.20 Detectors in lift shafts
Query
12.2.12 recommends that a detector be mounted at
the top of any lift shaft. Has any thought been given
to how this detector is to be maintained? BS 5655,
Lifts and service lifts, recommends that other
services are not run in lift shafts. How are the two
standards reconciled?
Answer
It is not unknown for fires to start in lift shafts,
either accidentally or by arson. The committee
therefore thought it necessary to provide a means by
which such fires can be detected more quickly than
by waiting for the smoke to penetrate lift doors to
operate external detectors.
However, if the siting of a detector in the lift shaft is
inconvenient, then a possible alternative is the use of
an aspirating detector. In this case the detector and
its aspirator can be outside the shaft, with just a
tube leading into the shaft. 11.3 states that the entry
hole into the system can be considered as a point
smoke detector, even though the actual detector is
mounted outside the shaft. Movement of the lift
within the shaft can cause pressure surges, and this
should be taken into account in the design of the
system.
2.21 Detectors in ventilation ducts
Query
Our building is continuously air-conditioned. This
causes air movement which will draw any smoke
away from room-mounted detectors. Can we mount
the detectors inside the extract duct?
Answer
The effectiveness of smoke detectors in ducts is
questionable. Smoke drawn into a duct will often
form a stream, without mixing with air from other
extract points. For this smoke stream to be detected,
the detector would have to be placed very precisely
within the duct. More usually, precautions are taken
to ensure that air in the duct is mixed, so that a
detector will see a mixture of air from several
extract points, making positioning less critical.
However, this dilutes the smoke, so that the detector
sees much lower density smoke than might be found
in the fire room. While adequate to prevent
recirculation of unacceptably dense smoke, this is
unlikely to give early warning of fire. Additionally,
air conditioning will sometimes be turned off (if only
for maintenance).
It is for these reasons that 12.4.2 says that duct
mounted smoke detectors `should not normally be
considered as constituting on their own a
satisfactory fire detection system'.
7
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.22 Use of L2 and L3 systems
Query
In protecting residential premises such as hotels and
boarding houses, how does BS 5839 : Part 1
recommend that choices be made between L2 and L3
systems, and between the use of smoke and heat
detectors in bedrooms?
Answer
The function of BS 5839 : Part 1 is to define the
various types of system and to give some guidance
on their choice. The standard is not intended to
usurp the function of regulatory authorities in
specifying the degree of protection required for
particular risks. If the standard gave more specific
recommendations then it would run the risk of
conflicting with legal requirements.
However, the background to the definition of types
for life safety may be helpful.
The original impetus to the provision of
recommendations for detectors for life safety came
with the passing of the Fire Precautions Act (1971).
This required the installation of suitable alarm
systems in certificated premises. During research
leading up to the Act it had been found that by
spending a night in a hotel a person had about ten
times as much risk of losing his or her life from fire
compared with spending the same night at home.
Since the risk of loss of life in the home was
generally at an acceptable level, the first intention of
the standard was to bring the two levels of risk to
comparable levels.
In the normal British home you may be at risk of
loss of life from fires started by yourself or your
immediate family, but generally there is little risk
from fires started by your neighbours. In hotels,
however, a fire started by a neighbour may spread to
kill you if no warning is given. The lowest level of
protection (L3) was therefore intended to give the
risk level of normal homes, by providing warning
while there was still time to use the escape routes.
In 1980, when this concept was first introduced to
BS 5839 : Part 1, it was expected that a suitable
warning would be obtained from detectors mounted
on escape routes, but research then showed that in
certain circumstances smoke logging could occur
before these detectors operated (see also 2.25 of this
Published Document). Where these circumstances
might occur the standard recommended that fire
detectors be installed in rooms adjoining escape
routes. Since this type of smoke logging could only
occur after the gas temperature in the rooms
exceeded 200 C, and then only proceeded slowly,
the detectors could be either heat-sensitive or
smoke-sensitive.
8 BSI 1997
A lower level of risk may be obtained by installing a
type L2 system. This will normally start with a
type L3 system, with additional detectors installed
either where they are likely to cause special damage
to life or where fires are likely to start. These are
defined in 13.6.2 as:
a) `those areas in which the normal occupants are
especially vulnerable to fire starting in their
vicinity;
b) those areas having a particularly high
probability of ignition and from which fire or fire
products could spread to affect the building
occupants'.
Notice that in 13.6.2a `normal occupants' was
intended to mean `those occupants who are normally
in the areas', not `those occupants of the areas who
are normal in their abilities'.
The code is not specific in saying which rooms
should be included under (a) and (b) above. In
particular, there is no specific recommendation in
the code for detectors to be installed in bedrooms in
an L2 system (other than those which might be
needed in achieving the L3 standard). The areas to
be protected in an L2 system should be part of the
specification for each individual installation. As
recommended in 3.6, `the specification of a type P2,
L2 or L3 system should always include details of
those areas of the building which are to be
protected'.
If the additional detectors are installed in areas
where there is an immediate risk to life, such as
those defined in 13.6.2a, then they would be
expected to be smoke-sensitive. If they are installed
in areas where fire might start with risk to life only
if the fire or its products spread, then they could be
of either heat-sensitive or smoke- sensitive types.
Decisions on types of system or types of detector
will often depend on a knowledge of the particular
building being protected and of the occupants and
risks it might contain. Without such knowledge only
general guidance can be given.
2.23 Smoke detector standards for type L
systems
Query
BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 covers the choice of fire
detectors for life safety under 13.3. It says that point
smoke detectors `should comply with .... BS 5445 :
Part 7 or, for residential premises only, BS 5446 :
Part 1 (other than self contained smoke alarms)'.
Does this mean that detectors conforming to
BS 5445 : Part 7 cannot be used in residential
premises?
Answer
No. 13.3.2 was intended to mean that detectors
conforming to BS 5445 : Part 7 can be used for life
safety in any premises. Detectors conforming to
BS 5446 : Part 1 (other than self-contained smoke
alarms) can be used in residential premises, but not
elsewhere.

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
The differentiation between the two standards is
based on the differing requirements for resistance to
environmental conditions.
The differentiation in 13.3.2 is likely to be overtaken
by events. The latest edition of BS 5446 : Part 1 will
have a changed scope. It will be restricted to self
contained smoke alarms, and will no longer be
applicable to installations under BS 5839 : Part 1.
However, detectors conforming to the earlier edition
can still be used.
2.24 Smoke detectors used to operate
door-holding devices
Query
We have a type L3 fire detection system in our
building, comprising a mixture of smoke detectors
and heat detectors. Smoke control doors in the
corridors have hold-open devices operated from the
fire detection system. Do we have to have additional
smoke detectors close to each of the smoke control
doors?
Answer
A type L3 fire detection system is designed to give a
warning before unacceptable amounts of smoke
spread on to the escape routes. In general, the
smoke control doors are intended to prevent
unacceptable amounts of smoke spreading along the
escape routes. The warning from the system should
therefore always be given before the doors need to
close. This subject will be given greater attention in
the next revision.
2.25 Door smoke seals
Query
We are installing a type L3 system. 13.5.3
recommends that detectors be fitted in rooms
adjoining escape routes to give warning before
smoke passes through the door crack to smoke-log
the escape route. All our room doors are fitted with
brush-type seals to prevent this from happening. Do
we still need detectors in the rooms?
Answer
One of the main reasons for this recommendation is
a phenomenon seen in experimental fires. In passing
through a door crack, the hot oxygen-reduced gases
from a flaming fire in a room can pyrolize the wood
of the door and door-frame to produce a dense,
tar-laden smoke. This smoke, cooled in its passage
through the crack, can be so heavy that it fails to
rise to the corridor ceiling, and spreads at lower
levels to smoke-log the corridor without operating
the detector. At a later stage in the fire, heat
conducted through the door will cause an upcurrent
to carry the smoke to the detector, but this may be
after the corridor is already impassable.
Use of a brush-type seal will slow the initial
movement through the door crack, but at the gas
temperatures achieved in the fire (600 C or more)
brush seals will quickly melt and become ineffective.
Intumescent seals, however, can be effective in
preventing the effect, holding the smoke back until
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
heat conducted through the door will carry the
smoke up to the ceiling. The problem with
intumescent seals is that they can easily be lost or
removed from doors. Sometimes this is because the
door has been adjusted in height to fit a frame by
planing off the top of the door, together with the
intumescent strip. The provision of intumescent seals
on all doors would certainly give the necessary
protection to escape routes, but would require
detailed examination of the doors.
In the end the committee came to the conclusion
that the most reliable method of protection was the
installation of detectors in rooms leading on to
escape routes. However, if the purpose is solely to
protect the escape route, then these detectors need
not be smoke detectors. Heat detectors will give
adequate warning and have a lower false alarm rate.
2.26 Sprinkler protection
Query
In an L3 system, 13.5.1 recommends detectors to be
installed in both escape routes and adjoining rooms,
although in adjoining rooms the detectors may be of
the heat-sensitive type. If the adjoining rooms are
protected by sprinklers, is it still necessary to
provide detectors in them?
Answer
The detectors in the adjoining rooms are intended to
give warning of fire before the fire becomes so large
that excessive quantities of smoke move through (or
are generated in) the doorcrack. Even relatively
insensitive detectors can give a warning adequately
early for this purpose, and the committee accepts
that a sprinkler element would give adequate
warning. It would, of course, be necessary for the
sprinkler to be linked to the fire alarm system so
that when the sprinkler operates an audible alarm is
given.
2.27 Time delays
Query
I would like to install a type L3 system, using smoke
detectors in rooms adjoining the escape routes.
Because of the possibility of false alarms from
smoke detectors, the detectors in adjoining rooms
would operate initially only staff alarms, turning to a
general alarm if no action were taken in 3 min
to 4 min. In view of the higher sensitivity of the
smoke detectors compared with heat detectors,
could such a system be accepted as meeting the
L3 recommendations?
Answer
The system as described appears to raise two
problems:
a) No early warning is given to the occupant of the
fire room. However, the L3 system (see 3.3) is not
intended to protect the occupant of the room of
fire origin, but only the occupants of the
remainder of the building. The committee
therefore accepts that from this point of view the
system outlined would satisfy the general
principles of a type L3 system.
9
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
b) No mention is made of the method of calling
the fire brigade. Normally it would be expected
that the fire brigade would be called at the first
(staff) alarm, either automatically or via
the 999 system. If the call to the fire brigade is to
be delayed pending the investigation by staff, then
the system effectively has a transmission delay, as
covered under 14.7. Bearing in mind the greater
sensitivity of smoke detectors compared with that
of heat detectors, the committee believes that the
system proposed would still satisfy the principles
of the type L3 system. The committee would point
out that the use of transmission delay units is
subject to approval by the fire brigade, and that
this system, although not a `transmission delay
unit' in the full sense, would have the same effect
and should therefore be discussed with the fire
brigade. It would be expected that approval of the
system would depend on the provision of a
suitable staffing level while it is in operation.
2.28 Reduced sensitivity
Query
We have a fire detection system in our theatre. When
the genie comes up in a puff of smoke in our
pantomime, everyone leaves the theatre because the
fire bells start ringing. What should we do?
Answer
14.6 allows the use of time related systems in such
applications, and gives several examples of their use.
The examples are not exclusive, however, and other
possibilities exist.
In the case of your theatre, you will need to
desensitize (or turn off) the smoke detectors which
might be subjected to smoke. This should only be
done during the times at which smoke is expected;
at other times the full sensitivity should be restored.
14.6 places no precise limits on the period for which
the low sensitivity condition may be held, but says
that the recovery to full sensitivity should be
automatic.
If it is found that the low sensitivity needs to be
maintained after the nominal recovery time, then a
manually operated switch may be provided to extend
the time by not more than 45 min after each
operation of the switch.
The standard recommends that no automatic
switching device should be readily accessible to the
user. However, in the case of a theatre, the times at
which smoke might appear may be predetermined
for each production, but need to be changed for a
new production. It might be possible for the times to
be programmed in for each production, subject only
to an overall limit on the time at which full
sensitivity is restored.
10
2.29 Remote isolation facilities
Query
We have a large complex in which each unit has its
own local fire detection system, but in which all the
systems report back to a remote central security
room. The individual local systems all have provision
for isolation of individual circuits (including alarm
sounder circuits) for maintenance, etc., using a
software code at access level 3.
However, we are worried that, if the access code
becomes known, this provision might be used by
unauthorized persons to disable the system as a
means of preventing false alarms. To prevent this,
we are making the system such that circuits can only
be isolated if the isolation is previously enabled by
staff at the remote security room. Requests for
isolation are sent to the security room, where the
requested period is entered on to a data base.
Outside the requested period operation of the local
disablement control will have no effect. During the
period the isolation control is automatically enabled,
but actual isolation will still require a manual action
in the individual unit. Isolation will be indicated both
in the individual shop and in the security room.
Our understanding (from definition 2.1 of BS 5839 :
Part 4 : 1988) is that access level 1 is intended for
open access, access level 2 for authorized staff, and
access level 3 for trained engineers. Table 1 of
BS 5839 : Part 4 : 1988 requires that disablement of
fire alarm devices (if provided) is at access level 3,
and is prohibited at access level 2. In our system the
enabling of the isolation will be by security staff,
who are not trained engineers. 15.2.1 of BS 5839 :
Part 1 : 1988 recommends that control and indicating
equipment should conform to BS 5839 : Part 4. Does
our system conform to the two standards?
Answer
There is nothing in the system you describe which
would directly conflict with either the
recommendations of BS 5839 : Part 1 or the
requirements of BS 5839 : Part 4. Although enabling
of the disablement control is by the security staff,
actual operation of the control is still locally at
access level 3. There is no objection to the system
you describe being used for temporary disablement
for specific purposes such as maintenance or to
cover fault situations.
However, care should be taken if it is possible for
the system to carry times such as `0700 to 0900 on
every weekday', intended to allow regular
maintenance periods. If the local disablement switch
were to be left in the `disable' position, then this
could give the effect of the system being regularly
disabled without local staff realising it. Such a
system could conform to BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 as a
time related system under 14.6 but would then
require prior agreement under the procedures of
clause 4.
BSI 1997

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
2.30 Diagrammatic representation of the
building
Query
15.4.3a states that the location of the fire may be
shown by `a display of letters and/or numbers,
together with a suitable key (which may be a plan of
the building)'.
Our system has a liquid crystal display (LCD) which
names the room in which the fire starts. Is this
sufficient for the `suitable key'.
Answer
The purpose of this recommendation is to provide a
means by which firefighters, possibly unfamiliar with
the building, can find their way to the fire. This
cannot be achieved by just identifying the name or
number of the room containing the fire, since this
will not show the route to the fire. It is essential that
the location is shown together with a diagrammatic
representation of the building (which could be that
recommended by the final paragraph of 15.4.3).
2.31 Connection to mains supplies
Query
In 16.2 of BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 it is recommended
that connection to the mains should be via an
isolating protective device, e.g. a switch fuse.
Normally connection from this protective device to
the power supply unit is via a fused connection unit
(fused spur unit). We would like to make this a
switched unit, since this will make maintenance
easier and safer. In accordance with the final
paragraph of 16.2, it will be coloured red and
marked `FIRE ALARM: DO NOT SWITCH OFF'. Will
this satisfy the recommendations of the standard?
Answer
The security recommended for the power supplies is
expressed in the third paragraph of 16.1 `... to ensure
continuity of supply to the fire alarm system ...', and
the fifth paragraph of 16.2 which states `it is
important that the electricity supply to the fire alarm
system should be so arranged that continuity of
supply is ensured'. The security recommended for
the system controls is given in 15.5 where it says
that `the operation of all ... isolating devices should
be limited to authorized personnel', reinforced by the
second paragraph of 16.2 which says that `the
isolating protective device should be secure from
unauthorized operation'. The `unauthorized
operation' is usually taken as switching off, reflecting
the need for continuity of supply, but where
maintenance is in progress unauthorized switching
on may also cause a risk to life.
A local switched fused connection unit will therefore
only be acceptable if it is provided with a method of
securing it from unauthorized operation, such as by
placing it in a lockable box.
The committee believes that connection via a spur
from a general-purpose circuit does not meet the
recommendations of the standard.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
2.32 Fire protection of mains wiring to fire
alarm systems
Query
My fire alarm system has control equipment which is
integrated with the power supply unit and battery.
Under 17.2a of BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988, cables
required to operate after a fire include power
supplies. Does this mean that the mains wiring to my
system must be protected against fire?
Answer
The recommendations of 17.2a should be considered
as depending on the effects of any cable failure in a
fire. In a system such as you describe, failure of the
mains wiring would not cause failure of the system
because the system would continue to operate on its
internal battery supply. The mains wiring in your
system would therefore not need protection against
fire. However, in a system with a separate power
unit (particularly where the power unit is remote
from the control and indicating equipment), integrity
of the entire system could depend on a single cable.
Such a cable should be well protected from fire.
2.33 Use of standby generators
Query
We are planning to use our public address system as
part of our fire alarm system, but cannot find
sufficient accommodation for the necessary 24 h
standby capacity. Is it permissible to use a standby
generator instead?
Answer
Under 16.3, standby generators are permissible at
least as a partial replacement for standby batteries.
However, it is recognized that when a fire occurs
standby generators may not be running, and may not
start on demand. The standard therefore
recommends in 16.5.1.4 that sufficient battery
capacity be provided to run the system until another
source of power can be obtained.
The standard gives no details of this `other source of
power', or of the time required to obtain it. If, for
instance, the premises have two generators, one of
which is automatically started on failure of the mains
while the other needs manual starting, then the
standby capacity recommended is that needed to
cover the time taken to recognize failure of the first
generator and then to start the second. If the
premises were continuously manned (or for type L
systems, were manned by competent staff at all
times when people were present) then a 30 min
standby capacity might be deemed sufficient.
It might be possible for the alternative supply to
come from another source. To reduce the probability
of common failure, two separate main supplies
coming by differing routes might be used, or two
factories might have a mutual agreement to share
two generators. The basic recommendations are:
a) sufficient standby should be provided to allow
for the probable time taken in detecting and
repairing the faulty supply; and
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Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
b) if the standby supply is provided by local
generators (or by other generators having a lower
reliability than the normal supply) then sufficient
battery capacity should be provided to carry the
system over until a further temporary supply can
be obtained.
2.34 Conditions to be satisfied for absence of
mechanical protection to cables
Query
Under 17.5.2c, certain cables should be given
mechanical protection if:
1) `they are not monitored; or
2) they are less than 2.25 m above the floor; or
3) physical damage or rodent attack is likely'.
Does this mean that if the cables are monitored then
they do not need to be protected?
Answer
No, it is not enough to simply monitor the cables.
17.5.2c should be read as meaning the following:
Cables should be given mechanical protection if
any one or more of the following conditions
occurs:
1) they are not monitored;
2) they are less than 2.25 m above the floor;
3) physical damage or rodent attack is likely.
2.35 Rodent attack on cables
Query
Under 17.5.2c mechanical protection is
recommended for cables that are liable to rodent
attack. How does one discover this liability?
Answer
Rodent attack tends to be more of a problem in old
buildings than in new ones. The best indication as to
whether rodent attack is likely comes from other
cables of similar type. If there has been a previous
attack, then it is probable that it will happen again. If
there are any other signs of rodent infestation, then
the cables should be considered as vulnerable. Bear
in mind that rodent attack on power cables increases
the probability of ignition, and that rodents include
squirrels as well as rats and mice. A cat may give
useful protection, but in old buildings the presence
of a cat may be a warning that there are rodent
problems. In the end, as with much else in the fire
field, the problem becomes one of common sense,
laced with experience!
2.36 `Low smoke' cables
Query
Our client is asking us to use `low smoke' cable
types conforming to BS 6724 and BS 7211. These
types are not in the list of recommended cables
given in 17.3. Are they allowed?
12
Answer
Cables conforming to BS 6724 are designed to be
enhanced alternatives to the equivalent constructions
in BS 5467 and BS 6346, and cables conforming to
BS 7211 are designed to be enhanced alternatives to
the equivalent constructions in BS 6004. These `low
smoke' cables therefore form acceptable alternatives
under 17.6.
2.37 Fire resistant armoured cables
Query
In 17.5.2 the standard recommends that `where it is
appropriate to use armoured cable ..... the cables
described in 17.3(h) or 17.3(i) should be used' which
means that the cables used should be either PVC
insulated, and sheathed steel wire armoured cable
conforming to BS 6346 or sheathed
steel-wire-armoured cables with cross-linked
polyethylene or hard ethylene propylene rubber
insulation conforming to BS 5467. Neither of these
cables meets the recommendations for prolonged
operation in a fire.
Armoured cables are now available, which would
appear to have both the necessary mechanical
strength and the ability to withstand fire. The
manufacturers tell us that although these cables can
withstand the fire tests of BS 6387, they cannot be
given the W and X ratings because of dimensional
limitations of the test apparatus. Would it be
permissible to use such cables?
Answer
Clause 17.6 says:
`Types of cable or cable system other than those
described in 17.3 may be used only if it can be
shown that, in the application in which they are to
be used, all the following apply:
a) their resistance to heat and fire is not less than
that of the types described in 17.3 and
recommended by 17.4 as suitable for the
application;
b) their resistance to ambient conditions including
resistance to mechanical impact and abrasion is
not less than that of the types described in 17.3
and recommended by 17.5 as suitable for the
application;
c) they are not prone to faulty assembly or
installation;
d) their electrical properties under both normal
and fault conditions are suitable for the
application;
e) they are operated within their manufacturer's
ratings.
We assume from the description of the cables that
conditions c), d) and e) are satisfied. The
manufacturer states that the resistance to heat and
fire is at least that required by BS 6387 AWX or SWX,
so condition a) would be at least partly satisfied. The
BSI 1997

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
manufacturer also states that the cables conform to
BS 6724 in respect of construction and dimensions,
and so the general strength (which will depend on
the armouring) will be equivalent to the armoured
cables already recommended by the standard, and
the resistance to ambient conditions will be
sufficient to satisfy b).
The only difficulty remaining is the ability to test
such cables. The tests for water and impact in
BS 6387 are limited to cable diameters not greater
than 20 mm, and hence it would appear impossible to
carry out these tests on the full range of cable sizes.
The standard's recommendations are then best met
by some sort of ad-hoc test similar to that in
BS 6387.
If the manufacturers of the cable are willing to
demonstrate that the cable has been subjected to
such tests and has performed satisfactorily, then the
cable can be accepted as an alternative under 17.6.
To cover the matter fully, the use of the alternative
cable could be included on the commissioning
certificate.
2.38 Cabling of ring-connected
data-transmission systems
Query
We have a system in which a number of remote
sector panels are connected together via a ring
network, such that a single failure will always leave
an alternative signal path. Our understanding is that
we do not need to fire protect this cable. Are we
correct?
Answer
In general you are correct. However, if two portions
of the cable pass through the same fire compartment
so that multiple failures within that compartment
could prevent the correct operation of devices in
another compartment, then fire protection will be
necessary. Such a case might arise where the two
sides of a loop enter a building to connect to one of
the sector panels. If the two cables run together then
one fire could attack both cables and inhibit the
correct operation of the sector panel. Under the final
paragraph of 17.15, fire protection for the portion of
the cables within a common fire compartment could
then be necessary.
2.39 Radio-linked sounders
Query
We have a fire alarm system using radio-linked alarm
sounders. We believe that the system conforms to
BS 5839 : Part 1, except that the power supply for the
sounder is derived from a primary battery (with a
second primary battery in reserve as specified
by 18.2.3b for detectors). However, clause 16
recommends that the normal supply is derived from
the mains. Is our system acceptable?
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
Answer
The use of radio-linked sounders with primary
battery power supplies is one of the technical
developments that arise from time to time and that
are not covered by the relevant standards because
the particular technologies or practices did not exist
and were not anticipated when the standard was
written. Under such circumstances it is primarily for
the user, purchaser, manufacturer and other
interested parties such as enforcing authorities
(see 4.3) to decide whether the practice is
acceptable. In general the decision will depend on
whether the level of reliability, integrity, etc. is
equivalent to the practices or technologies
recognized by the standard.
In this particular case, the fire alarm system does not
conform fully to BS 5839 : Part 1. However, if, for a
particular installation, the use of these sounders
were agreed as a deviation, and that deviation were
recorded on the installation certificate, then the
system as installed would conform. In effect, the act
of obtaining agreement from the interested parties
and recording the deviation precludes the installed
system from not conforming.
2.40 Ancillary services
Query
The first paragraph of clause 19 states that the fire
alarm system `may' be used to operate ancillary
services. Does this mean that the system is allowed
to be used to operate ancillary services (which may
alternatively be operated in other ways), or that the
fire alarm system is the only method by which the
system may be operated?
Answer
The use of a fire alarm system to switch ancillary
services on or off is entirely optional. Data or
control signals may be passed between the fire alarm
system and the system controlling the ancillary
services using a suitable communications protocol.
However, the combined system should be such that
the ancillary system (even if faulty) cannot affect the
operation of the fire alarm system.
2.41 Testing of manual call points
Query
We have a large analogue addressable fire detection
and alarm system, with two stage alarms. Operation
of a detector or manual call point in a zone will
cause sounders in that zone to give a continuous `fire
alarm' sound, while sounders in other zones give an
intermittent `alert' warning. To test the alarm mode
of sounders in one zone, it is necessary to put all the
other sounders in the building into the `alert' mode.
Although 29.2.4 only recommends us to test the
ability to sound the `alarm', to do this in each
individual zone requires us to sound the `alert' signal
in the other zones, causing considerable disturbance.
Is there a way out of this problem?
13
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
Answer
The primary purpose of the testing of 29.2.4a is to
test the ability of the control equipment to receive an
alarm signal from a manual call point or detector.
The second paragraph of 29.2.4a implicitly allows
the sounders to be isolated or disconnected for this
test, provided that a final test is carried out to prove
proper reconnection.
Clause 29.2.4 only recommends one zone to be
tested each week, although if there are more
than 13 zones then more zones may need to be tested
so that the cycle is completed within the period
between quarterly tests. The interval between tests
on an individual zone should not exceed 13 weeks.
2.42 Zone testing
Query
Clause 29.2.4 recommends that one or more zones is
tested each week in such a way that the interval
between tests on one circuit does not
exceed 13 weeks. Clause 29.2.6 recommends that at
the quarterly test all zones should be tested. If I
ensure that in the course of the weekly tests all the
zones are tested, do I need to carry out the quarterly
test?
Answer
The question raises two points of interpretation.
Firstly, in the note to 7.1, we are warned to
distinguish between `zone' and `circuit'. In 29.2.4 the
intention is primarily to check that the circuit is
properly connected. The recommendation is that the
interval between tests on one circuit should not
exceed 13 weeks. In an addressable system that
circuit may carry more than one zone, but still only
needs to be tested once in the 13 week cycle.
In 29.2.6, however, the intention is to check not just
continuity but also correct indication. The clause
therefore recommends that each zone is checked at
the quarterly inspection, and in an addressable
system this may need an individual circuit to be
operated several times.
Secondly, 29.2.6 recommends that the check be
carried out by a `competent person'. No such
recommendation appears in 29.2.4. The weekly test
may be carried out by local (unqualified) staff, while
the quarterly check is carried out by trained and
competent staff.
Taking these two points together, the committee is
of the opinion that the recommendations of the code
would be met if:
a) the weekly tests are carried out by competent
persons; and
b) during the 13 week period all zones and circuits
are tested.
14
2.43 Testing voltages
Query
Under 26.3 the standard recommends extra-low
voltage cables to be tested at 500 V. Why is the
voltage so high?
Answer
There are two reasons. The first is purely practical.
Most of the people installing fire alarm systems in
the UK are electrical installers, and they are
equipped with 500 V testers. 500 V was therefore
called up in the standard.
The second is one of experience. We have found that
any reasonable wiring installation (and this is a test
of the wiring only) will pass at 500 V. The ones that
fail are systems having incipient faults such as
hairline insulation faults, hairs caught in the
insulation and wires which are almost touching. We
have found that the 500 V test will often reveal such
incipient faults, while a test at, say, 24 V may show
nothing. 500 V testing makes the faults show up
during the test, rather than later on in service, and
hence gives greater assurance of reliability.
2.44 Insulation testing at the 5-year test
Query
Clause 29.2.8 recommends that the wiring should be
checked in accordance with the testing and
inspection requirements of the IEE Wiring
Regulations, at not more than 5 year intervals.
Should the test voltage be 500 V (as in 26.3) or can
the voltage be reduced to prevent damage to
equipment?
Answer
The committee accepts that this test can be carried
out `at a voltage recommended by the manufacturer',
as recommended in the final sentence of 26.3.
2.45 Cable fixings
Query
Clause 24.4.4 recommends that surface-laid cables
be `neatly run and securely fixed at suitable
intervals', but says nothing about how this fixing is
to be achieved. Can I secure my cables with plastic
cable ties?
Answer
The committee considers that the security of the
fixing should be commensurate with the security
required for the cable's application. In particular,
under 17.2a cables used in applications requiring
prolonged operation during a fire are expected to
resist fire for 0.5 h, and hence for these cables the
committee considers that the fixings should maintain
their integrity for a similar period. Plastic cable ties
should only be used where early failure of the ties,
due to a fire, could not lead to loss of support for
the cables.
BSI 1997

Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
3 Interpretations of BS 5839 : Part 4 :
1988
3.1 Silencing facilities
Query
In inspecting a recently installed system we found
that operation of the `Alarm Silence' switch also
returned all the ancillary systems to their normal
condition, thus closing the smoke vents and turning
off the smoke extraction system. Does this conform
to BS 5839 : Part 4?
Answer
The control of ancillary systems in the event of fire
is covered under 3.1.1e as follows.
`The transition of the decision element from a
non-fire state to the fire state shall result in the
following.
(e) Operation of such other functions as specified
in the manufacturer's data, for example
transmission of signals to fire protection
equipment'.
The function of the silencing switch is covered
under 3.1.3. The final paragraph of 3.1.3 states that
`operation of either or both of the silencing switches
shall not cancel the alarm condition responses
specified in items (b), (d) and (e) of 3.1.1'. The two
silencing switches referred to here are those for the
fire alarm devices and for the control sounder.
The standard is therefore quite specific in saying that
the operation of the silencing switch for the fire
alarm devices `shall not cancel' the transmission of
signals to fire protection equipment, and hence the
system described in the question cannot conform to
the requirements of the standard.
3.2 Short circuit warnings
Query
My system senses a fire alarm by monitoring for an
increase in the current taken by one or more
detectors, and monitors the wiring by looking for the
current taken by an end-of-line resistor. The result is
that a fault warning is given if the line is broken, but
a fire warning if the line is short circuited. Since this
method is fail-safe, is it acceptable?
Answer (see also 2.2 of this Published
Document)
3.2.2 is specific in requiring that a fault warning is
given in response to a short-circuit of the leads to
one or more detectors.
BS 5839 : Part 4 does not say that a fire alarm shall
not be given in response to such a fault. However,
6.6.1 of BS 5839 : Part 1 : 1988 says that `circuits
should be so arranged that an indication is given ...
of any ...short circuit in a cable which would disable
one or more detectors ... , and this should be done
without giving a false alarm'. Thus control equipment
which responded to a short-circuit fault by giving a
fire alarm could only be used in an installation
conforming to BS 5839 : Part 1 if a deviation were
declared and agreed under 6.11 and 4.3 of that
standard.
BSI 1997
PD 6531 : 1997
3.3 Fire alarm response to manual call point
Query
We have had a new fire alarm system installed on
our site. On operation of a manual call point the
indicator panel initially gives a fault indication.
After 3 s to 4 s this changes to a fire indication and
the alarm sounds. Does this conform to the
standard?
Answer
Clause 3.1.1 requires that `the transition of the
decision element from a non-fire state to the fire
state shall result in the following.
a) Outputs to external circuits for the energization
of fire alarm devices......
b) A visible indication of the fire alarm'.
Clause 3.1.2 (as amended by AMD No. 6875) requires
that `Any delay in the giving of the responses listed
in 3.1.1 shall be limited as follows.
b) Where the response is to the operation of a
manual call point, the delay shall not exceed 3 s'.
The standard does not define the state of the system
during the delay time, and thus your system will
conform to the requirements of the standard
provided that the delay in giving the indications
of 3.1.1 is not greater than 3 s. If, as you state, the
delay is between 3 s and 4 s, then the system does
not conform.
3.4 Earth faults
Query
Clause 3.2.2 requires a fault warning to be given in
response to short-circuit or disconnection of various
cables, but makes no mention of earth faults. Does
this mean that there is no need to monitor for earth
faults?
Answer
Firstly, it should be appreciated that the
requirements of this clause are aimed at maintaining
the function of the system, and are not concerned
with protection from electric shock.
Many fire alarm systems are operated earth-free. In
such systems a single earth fault will not prevent
correct operation. However, should a second earth
fault then occur from a point having a different
potential, there will, in effect, be a short-circuit
between the two fault points and a warning should
be given.
A single earth fault on a nominally unearthed system
therefore jeopardises, but does not of itself prevent,
correct operation. No immediate warning is required,
but it would be expected that the fault would be
discovered in the course of routine servicing. This
should be covered in the instructions provided
under 6.2i.
15
 PD 6531 : 1997
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
Where the system is intended to be earthed, one of
the lines within the system will be at earth potential.
If this line is subjected to a further earth connection
via an earth fault, then the system may continue to
operate normally. If, however, one of the other lines
is subjected to an earth fault, then the effect will be
of a short circuit between the earthed line and the
fault point, and a warning should be given.
3.5 Fault location displays
Query
Is it permissible to use a liquid crystal alpha-numeric
display, rather than individual zone lights, to give the
location of a fault?
Answer
Separate indication for each zone is required only for
fire alarms (see 3.1.1d).
Although indication of the fault zone is required
(see 3.2.1c), the standard only requires the first fault
to be indicated. However, if there are multiple faults
then, after repair of the first fault, the warning shall
return for a further fault within 100 s of resetting in
accordance with 3.2.5. This process will recur until
all the faults have been repaired. Clearly it may be
desirable for indications of multiple faults to be
given, but although this would be permissible under
the standard, it is not required.
A liquid crystal display is therefore sufficient to
conform to the requirements for fault location.
3.6 Memory check sums
Query
3.8.1c requires a check-sum to be performed on the
program memory contents. We are proposing a
system which checks the functions carried out,
rather than the memory itself. Is this acceptable, and
how can we comply with 3.8.1c?
Answer
The purpose behind 3.8.1 is that if the program is
improperly executed then the processor is
reinitialized and the memory is checked. The
standard does not require this to be done by check-
sums, but if the checking method is by check-sum,
then as part of the reinitialization all (rather than
some) memory check-sums should be checked. If, as
in your case, the checking is by some other method
then we would expect the reinitialization to perform
an equivalent check, or to ensure by some other
means that any stored data is uncorrupted.
3.7 Disk memories: see 2.9 of this Published
Document
16
3.8 Memory check routines
Query
Clause 3.8.4.1 requires provision to be made for the
regular checking of memory contents. I am using a
fuse-blown, one time programmable micro-controller,
in which it is impossible to alter any program
memory once the device has been programmed.
Does this eliminate the need for checking program
memory?
Answer
Clause 3.8.4.1 is specific in requiring provision for
the regular checking of memory contents. Equipment
without this provision cannot be said to conform to
the standard.
Although the note to 3.8.4.1 quotes a `check-sum'
procedure as a checking routine, this is only as an
example. Any method capable of checking that the
memory content has not changed is acceptable.
3.9 Total loss of power
Query
Test 3 of clause 16 requires the battery to be fully
discharged, while the subsequent functional test,
given in appendix A(e), requires a test to be carried
out with the normal power disconnected. Is the
equipment expected to respond without normal or
standby power?
Answer
The requirement in response to test 3, given
in 16.3.1, is that `the specimen shall respond
correctly during each functional test'. The committee
accepts that, since equipment without power cannot
respond, the `correct' response in this case may be
no response at all. The equipment is thus not
expected to respond when it is unpowered.
3.10 Battery monitoring current
Query
Clause 16.3.2 requires that `no discharge current
shall flow from the battery in tests 1, 3 and 4 of
table 3'. Our battery monitoring circuit draws 200 mA
during these tests. Is this acceptable?
Answer
In the past, systems have been produced in which
the maximum alarm load could be met only by the
combination of normal and standby power supplies.
Clause 5.2.1 now requires that each supply on its
own shall be capable of supplying the maximum
alarm load and this test is intended to ensure that
the requirement is met. The committee believes that
this small discharge current should be allowed,
provided that complete failure of the battery will not
affect the alarm function under normal supply
conditions.
BSI 1997

Subject index
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
Alarm sounders: see Sounders
Ancillary services:
alternative methods of operation 2.40
interaction with silencing facility 3.1
Armoured cables: see Cabling
Batteries: see Power supply
Cabling:
armoured cables 2.37
fire protection of mains wiring 2.32
`low smoke' cables 2.36
mechanical protection 2.34
multicore cables for sounder circuits 2.8
multicore cables to detectors and
sounders 2.7
ring-connected data-transmission
systems 2.38
rodent attack 2.35
short circuit monitoring 2.2, 3.2
Combined detector/sounder units 2.5
Control equipment:
battery monitoring current 3.10
diagrammatic representation of the
building 2.30
earth-fault monitoring 3.4
fire indications 3.3
disk memories 2.9
display of fault location 3.5
indication of multiple faults 3.5
interaction of silencing with ancillary
equipment 3.1
isolation facilities at remote centres 2.29
memory check routines 3.8
memory check-sums 3.6
response times 3.3
short-circuit monitoring 3.2
total loss of power 3.9
BSI 1997
Delayed alarms: see False alarms
Detectors: see also False alarms
combined with sounders 2.5
in congested roof spaces 2.18
in lift shafts 2.20
in ventilated ceiling voids 2.17
in ventilation ducts 2.21
near ceiling obstructions 2.19
positioning in a roof apex 2.16
standards in type L systems 2.23
used to operate door-holding devices 2.24
use with sprinklers in L3 systems 2.26
Disk memory: see Control equipment
Doors:
detector operation of holding devices
2.24
smoke seals 2.25
False alarms:
use of delayed alarms 2.27
time related systems 2.28
Fire alarm sounders: see Sounders
Generators, standby: see Power supply
Isolators: see Zones
Isolation: see Control equipment
Loudness: see Sounders
Manual call points:
travel distance 2.15
testing 2.41
time to respond 3.3
Memory: see Control equipment
Multicore cables: see Cabling
Power supply:
battery monitoring current 3.10
connection to mains supplies 2.31
fire protection: see Cabling
radio-linked sounders: see Radio systems
standby generators 2.33
total loss of power: see Control
equipment
PD 6531 : 1997
Radio systems:
power supplies for sounders 2.39
Rodent attack on cables: see Cabling
Search distance: see Zones
Silencing facilities: see Control equipment
Sounders:
circuits to 2.3
combined with detectors 2.5
loudness in residential care homes 2.13
loudness measurement for voice alarms
2.14
multicore cables to 2.8
radio-linked: see Radio systems
starting or restarting 2.12
Short circuit: see Cabling
Siting of detectors: see Detectors
Sprinklers: use in L3 systems 2.26
Staff alarms 2.27
Standby generators: see Power supply
Starting or restarting fire alarm sounders:
see Sounders
Testing:
manual call points 2.41
voltages 2.43
weekly and quarterly zone testing 2.42
insulation testing at the 5-year test 2.44
Time related systems: see False alarms
Travel distance: see Manual call points
Types of system:
general 2.1
use of L2 and L3 systems 2.22
Voice alarms: see Sounders
Wiring: see Cabling
Zones:
isolators between 2.4
multi-storey buildings 2.11
search distance 2.10
staircases 2.6
17
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 PD 6531 : 1997

List of references
Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

BSI publications
BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION, London

BS 5445 Components of automatic fire detection systems

BS 5445 : Part 7 : 1984 Specification for point-type smoke detectors using scattered light,
transmitted light or ionization
BS 5446 Components automatic fire alarm systems for residential
premises
BS 5446 : Part 1 : 1990 Specification for self-contained smoke alarms and point-type
smoke detectors
BS 5467 : 1989 Specification for cables with thermosetting insulation for
electricity supply for rated voltages of up to and including
600/1000 V and up to and including 1900/3300 V
BS 5588 Fire precautions in the design, construction and use of buildings
BS 5588 : Part 2 : 1985 Code of practice for shops
BS 5588 : Part 3 : 1983 Code of practice for office buildings
BS 5588 : Part 6 : 1991 Code of practice for places of assembly
BS 5655 Lifts and service lifts
BS 6004 : 1995 Specification for PVC-insulated cables (non-armoured) for electric
power and lighting
BS 6346 : 1989 Specification for PVC-insulated cables for electricity supply
BS 6387 : 1994 Specification for performance requirements for cables required to
maintain circuit integrity under fire conditions
BS 6724 : 1990 Specification for armoured cables for electricity supply having
thermosetting insultation with low emission of smoke and
corrosive gases when affected by fire
BS 7211 : 1994 Specification for thermosetting insulated cables (non-armoured)
for electric power and lighting with low emission of smoke and
corrosive gases when affected by fire
BS 7443 : 1991 Specification for sound systems for emergency purposes
BS EN 60651 : 1994 Specification for sound level meters

BSI 1997
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BSI British Standards Institution
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Licensed Copy: Technical Information Services Dept ., CNL Technical Information Services, 13 January 2004, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI

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