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lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
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ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20,
1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they
were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from
the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio
Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz.
Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a
two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00.
Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion.
Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for
damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to
pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorneys fee and the
cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the
unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages
from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called
presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that
birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury
or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue
to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission
to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
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personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a
conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because
that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should
be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child
was dead when separated from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child.