G.R.$No.

$78059$ August$31,$1987$ That$I$am$the$OIC$Governor$of$Rizal$having$been$appointed$as$such$on$March$20,$

$ 1986;$
ALFREDO$ M.$ DE$ LEON,$ ANGEL$ S.$ SALAMAT,$ MARIO$ C.$ STA.$ ANA,$ JOSE$ C.$ $
TOLENTINO,$ROGELIO$J.$DE$LA$ROSA$and$JOSE$M.$RESURRECCION,$petitioners,$$ That$as$being$OIC$Governor$of$the$Province$of$Rizal$and$in$the$performance$of$
vs.$ my$ duties$ thereof,$ I$ among$ others,$ have$ signed$ as$ I$ did$ sign$ the$ unnumbered$
HON.$BENJAMIN$B.$ESGUERRA,$in$his$capacity$as$OIC$Governor$of$the$Province$ memorandum$ ordering$ the$ replacement$ of$ all$ the$ barangay$ officials$ of$ all$ the$
of$ Rizal,$ HON.$ ROMEO$ C.$ DE$ LEON,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ OIC$ Mayor$ of$ the$ barangay(s)$in$the$Municipality$of$Taytay,$Rizal;$
Municipality$ of$ Taytay,$ Rizal,$ FLORENTINO$ G.$ MAGNO,$ REMIGIO$ M.$ TIGAS,$ $
RICARDO$ Z.$ LACANIENTA,$ TEODORO$ V.$ MEDINA,$ ROSENDO$ S.$ PAZ,$ and$ That$the$above$cited$memorandum$dated$December$1,$1986$was$signed$by$me$
TERESITA$L.$TOLENTINO,$respondents.$ personally$on$February$8,1987;$
$ $
$$ That$ said$ memorandum$ was$ further$ deciminated$ (sic)$ to$ all$ concerned$ the$
$ following$day,$February$9.$1987.$
MELENCIOSHERRERA,$J.:$ $
$ FURTHER$AFFIANT$SAYETH$NONE.$
An$ original$ action$ for$ Prohibition$ instituted$ by$ petitioners$ seeking$ to$ enjoin$ $
respondents$ from$ replacing$ them$ from$ their$ respective$ positions$ as$ Barangay$ Pasig,$Metro$Manila,$March$23,$1987.$
Captain$and$Barangay$Councilmen$of$Barangay$Dolores,$Municipality$of$Taytay,$ $
Province$of$Rizal.$ Before$ us$ now,$ petitioners$ pray$ that$ the$ subject$ Memoranda$ of$ February$ 8,$
$ 1987$be$declared$null$and$void$and$that$respondents$be$prohibited$from$taking$
As$required$by$the$Court,$respondents$submitted$their$Comment$on$the$Petition,$ over$ their$ positions$ of$ Barangay$ Captain$ and$ Barangay$ Councilmen,$
and$petitioner's$their$Reply$to$respondents'$Comment.$ respectively.$ Petitioners$ maintain$ that$ pursuant$ to$ Section$ 3$ of$ the$ Barangay$
$ Election$ Act$ of$ 1982$ (BP$ Blg.$ 222),$ their$ terms$ of$ office$ "shall$ be$ six$ (6)$ years$
In$the$Barangay$elections$held$on$May$17,$1982,$petitioner$Alfredo$M.$De$Leon$ which$shall$commence$on$June$7,$1982$and$shall$continue$until$their$successors$
was$elected$Barangay$Captain$and$the$other$petitioners$Angel$S.$Salamat,$Mario$ shall$have$elected$and$shall$have$qualified,"$or$up$to$June$7,$1988.$It$is$also$their$
C.$Sta.$Ana,$Jose$C.$Tolentino,$Rogelio$J.$de$la$Rosa$and$Jose$M.$Resurreccion,$as$ position$ that$ with$ the$ ratification$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution,$ respondent$ OIC$
Barangay$Councilmen$of$Barangay$Dolores,$Taytay,$Rizal$under$Batas$Pambansa$ Governor$ no$ longer$ has$ the$ authority$ to$ replace$ them$ and$ to$ designate$ their$
Blg.$222,$otherwise$known$as$the$Barangay$Election$Act$of$1982.$ successors.$
$ $
On$ February$ 9,$ 1987,$ petitioner$ Alfredo$ M,$ de$ Leon$ received$ a$ Memorandum$ On$the$other$hand,$respondents$rely$on$Section$2,$Article$III$of$the$Provisional$
antedated$December$1,$1986$but$signed$by$respondent$OIC$Governor$Benjamin$ Constitution,$promulgated$on$March$25,$1986,$which$provided:$
Esguerra$ on$ February$ 8,$ 1987$ designating$ respondent$ Florentino$ G.$ Magno$ as$ $
Barangay$Captain$of$Barangay$Dolores,$Taytay,$Rizal.$The$designation$made$by$ SECTION$2.$ All$ elective$ and$ appointive$ officials$ and$ employees$ under$ the$
the$OIC$Governor$was$"by$authority$of$the$Minister$of$Local$Government."$ 1973$ Constitution$ shall$ continue$ in$ office$ until$ otherwise$ provided$ by$
$ proclamation$ or$ executive$ order$ or$ upon$ the$ designation$ or$ appointment$ and$
Also$ on$ February$ 8,$ 1987,$ respondent$ OIC$ Governor$ signed$ a$ Memorandum,$ qualification$of$their$successors,$if$such$appointment$is$made$within$a$period$of$
antedated$ December$ 1,$ 1986$ designating$ respondents$ Remigio$ M.$ Tigas,$ one$year$from$February$25,1986.$
Ricardo$ Z.$ Lacanienta$ Teodoro$ V.$ Medina,$ Roberto$ S.$ Paz$ and$ Teresita$ L.$ $
Tolentino$ as$ members$ of$ the$ Barangay$ Council$ of$ the$ same$ Barangay$ and$ By$ reason$ of$ the$ foregoing$ provision,$ respondents$ contend$ that$ the$ terms$ of$
Municipality.$ office$ of$ elective$ and$ appointive$ officials$ were$ abolished$ and$ that$ petitioners$
$ continued$in$office$by$virtue$of$the$aforequoted$provision$and$not$because$their$
That$ the$ Memoranda$ had$ been$ antedated$ is$ evidenced$ by$ the$ Affidavit$ of$ term$ of$ six$ years$ had$ not$ yet$ expired;$ and$ that$ the$ provision$ in$ the$ Barangay$
respondent$OIC$Governor,$the$pertinent$portions$of$which$read:$ Election$Act$fixing$the$term$of$office$of$Barangay$officials$to$six$(6)$years$must$
$ be$ deemed$ to$ have$ been$ repealed$ for$ being$ inconsistent$ with$ the$ aforequoted$
xxx$ xxx$ xxx$ provision$of$the$Provisional$Constitution.$
$ $
Examining$ the$ said$ provision,$ there$ should$ be$ no$ question$ that$ petitioners,$ as$ Contrary$to$the$stand$of$respondents,$we$find$nothing$inconsistent$between$the$
elective$officials$under$the$1973$Constitution,$may$continue$in$office$but$should$ term$ of$ six$ (6)$ years$ for$ elective$ Barangay$ officials$ and$ the$ 1987$ Constitution,$
vacate$their$positions$upon$the$occurrence$of$any$of$the$events$mentioned.$1$ and$ the$ same$ should,$ therefore,$ be$ considered$ as$ still$ operative,$ pursuant$ to$
$ Section$3,$Article$XVIII$of$the$1987$Constitution,$reading:$
Since$ the$ promulgation$ of$ the$ Provisional$ Constitution,$ there$ has$ been$ no$ $
proclamation$ or$ executive$ order$ terminating$ the$ term$ of$ elective$ Barangay$ Sec.$3.$ All$ existing$ laws,$ decrees,$ executive$ orders,$ proclamations$ letters$ of$
officials.$ Thus,$ the$ issue$ for$ resolution$ is$ whether$ or$ not$ the$ designation$ of$ instructions,$ and$ other$ executive$ issuances$ not$ inconsistent,$ with$ this$
respondents$to$replace$petitioners$was$validly$made$during$the$oneSyear$period$ Constitution$shall$remain$operative$until$amended,$repealed$or$revoked.$
which$ended$on$February$25,$1987.$ $
$ WHEREFORE,$ (1)$ The$ Memoranda$ issued$ by$ respondent$ OIC$ Governor$ on$
Considering$ the$ candid$ Affidavit$ of$ respondent$ OIC$ Governor,$ we$ hold$ that$ February$ 8,$ 1987$ designating$ respondents$ as$ the$ Barangay$ Captain$ and$
February$8,$1977,$should$be$considered$as$the$effective$date$of$replacement$and$ Barangay$Councilmen,$respectively,$of$Barangay$Dolores,$Taytay,$Rizal,$are$both$
not$December$1,1986$to$which$it$was$ante$dated,$in$keeping$with$the$dictates$of$ declared$ to$ be$ of$ no$ legal$ force$ and$ effect;$ and$ (2)$ the$ Writ$ of$ Prohibition$ is$
justice.$ granted$ enjoining$ respondents$ perpetually$ from$ proceeding$ with$ the$
$ ouster/takeSover$of$petitioners'$positions$subject$of$this$Petition.$Without$costs.$
But$while$February$8,$1987$is$ostensibly$still$within$the$oneSyear$deadline,$the$ $
aforequoted$provision$in$the$Provisional$Constitution$must$be$deemed$to$have$ SO$ORDERED.$
been$overtaken$by$Section$27,$Article$XVIII$of$the$1987$Constitution$reading.$ $
$ Yap,$ Fernan,$ Narvasa,$ Gutierrez,$ Jr.,$ Paras,$ Feliciano,$ Gancayco,$ Padilla,$ Bidin$
SECTION$27.$ This$ Constitution$ shall$ take$ effect$ immediately$ upon$ its$ and$Cortes,$JJ.,$concur.$
ratification$ by$ a$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ in$ a$ plebiscite$ held$ for$ the$ purpose$ $ $
and$shall$supersede$all$previous$Constitutions.$
$
The$1987$Constitution$was$ratified$in$a$plebiscite$on$February$2,$1987.$By$that$
date,$ therefore,$ the$ Provisional$ Constitution$ must$ be$ deemed$ to$ have$ been$
superseded.$ Having$ become$ inoperative,$ respondent$ OIC$ Governor$ could$ no$
longer$ rely$ on$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ III,$ thereof$ to$ designate$ respondents$ to$ the$
elective$positions$occupied$by$petitioners.$
$
Petitioners$ must$ now$ be$ held$ to$ have$ acquired$ security$ of$ tenure$ specially$
considering$ that$ the$ Barangay$ Election$ Act$ of$ 1982$ declares$ it$ "a$ policy$ of$ the$
State$to$guarantee$and$promote$the$autonomy$of$the$barangays$to$ensure$their$
fullest$ development$ as$ selfSreliant$ communities.$ 2$ Similarly,$ the$ 1987$
Constitution$ ensures$ the$ autonomy$ of$ local$ governments$ and$ of$ political$
subdivisions$ of$ which$ the$ barangays$ form$ a$ part,$ 3$ and$ limits$ the$ President's$
power$to$"general$supervision"$over$local$governments.$4$Relevantly,$Section$8,$
Article$X$of$the$same$1987$Constitution$further$provides$in$part:$
$
Sec.$8.$ The$ term$ of$ office$ of$ elective$ local$ officials,$ except$ barangay$ officials,$
which$shall$be$determined$by$law,$shall$be$three$years$...$
$
Until$ the$ term$ of$ office$ of$ barangay$ officials$ has$ been$ determined$ by$ law,$
therefore,$ the$ term$ of$ office$ of$ six$ (6)$ years$ provided$ for$ in$ the$ Barangay$
Election$Act$of$1982$5$should$still$govern.$
$
[G.R.$No.$122156.$February$3,$1997]$ b.$ The$ Highest$ Bidder$ must$ execute$ the$ Stock$ Purchase$ and$ Sale$ Agreement$
$ with$GSIS$x$x$x$x$
MANILA$ PRINCE$ HOTEL,$ petitioner,$ vs.$ GOVERNMENT$ SERVICE$ INSURANCE$ $
SYSTEM,$MANILA$HOTEL$CORPORATION,$COMMITTEE$ON$PRIVATIZATION$and$ K.$DECLARATION$OF$THE$WINNING$BIDDER/STRATEGIC$PARTNER!"!
OFFICE$OF$THE$GOVERNMENT$CORPORATE$COUNSEL,$respondents.$ !
D$E$C$I$S$I$O$N$ The! Highest! Bidder! will! be! declared! the! Winning$Bidder/Strategic$Partner$
BELLOSILLO,$J.:$ after$the$following$conditions$are$met:$
$ $
The$Filipino$First$Policy$enshrined$in$the$1987$Constitution,$i.e.,$in$the$grant$of$ a.$ Execution$ of$ the$ necessary$ contracts$ with$ GSIS/MHC$ not$ later$ than$ October$
rights,$ privileges,$ and$ concessions$ covering$ the$ national$ economy$ and$ 23,$1995$(reset$to$November$3,$1995);$and$
patrimony,$the$State$shall$give$preference$to$qualified$Filipinos,[1]$is$invoked$by$ $
petitioner$ in$ its$ bid$ to$ acquire$ 51%$ of$ the$ shares$ of$ the$ Manila$ Hotel$ b.$ Requisite$ approvals$ from$ the$ GSIS/MHC$ and$ COP$ (Committee$ on$
Corporation$ (MHC)$ which$ owns$ the$ historic$ Manila$ Hotel.$ Opposing,$ Privatization)/$ OGCC$ (Office$ of$ the$ Government$ Corporate$ Counsel)$ are$
respondents$ maintain$ that$ the$ provision$ is$ not$ selfSexecuting$ but$ requires$ an$ obtained.[3]$
implementing$ legislation$ for$ its$ enforcement.$ Corollarily,$ they$ ask$ whether$ the$ $
51%$ shares$ form$ part$ of$ the$ national$ economy$ and$ patrimony$ covered$ by$ the$ Pending$ the$ declaration$ of$ Renong$ Berhard$ as$ the$ winning$ bidder/strategic$
protective$mantle$of$the$Constitution.$ partner$ and$ the$ execution$ of$ the$ necessary$ contracts,$ petitioner$ in$ a$ letter$ to$
$ respondent$GSIS$dated$28$September$1995$matched$the$bid$price$of$P44.00$per$
The$controversy$arose$when$respondent$Government$Service$Insurance$System$ share$ tendered$ by$ Renong$ Berhad.[4]$ In$ a$ subsequent$ letter$ dated$ 10$ October$
(GSIS),$ pursuant$ to$ the$ privatization$ program$ of$ the$ Philippine$ Government$ 1995$petitioner$sent$a$managers$check$issued$by$Philtrust$Bank$for$ThirtySthree$
under$ Proclamation$ No.$ 50$ dated$ 8$ December$ 1986,$ decided$ to$ sell$ through$ Million$ Pesos$ (P33,000,000.00)$ as$ Bid$ Security$ to$ match$ the$ bid$ of$ the$
public$bidding$30%$to$51%$of$the$issued$and$outstanding$shares$of$respondent$ Malaysian$ Group,$ Messrs.$ Renong$ Berhad$ x$ x$ x$ x[5]$ which$ respondent$ GSIS$
MHC.$ The$ winning$ bidder,$ or$ the$ eventual$ strategic$ partner,$ is$ to$ provide$ refused$to$accept.$
management$ expertise$ and/or$ an$ international$ marketing/reservation$ system,$ $
and$ financial$ support$ to$ strengthen$ the$ profitability$ and$ performance$ of$ the$ On$ 17$ October$ 1995,$ perhaps$ apprehensive$ that$ respondent$ GSIS$ has$
Manila$ Hotel.[2]$ In$ a$ close$ bidding$ held$ on$ 18$ September$ 1995$ only$ two$ (2)$ disregarded$the$tender$of$the$matching$bid$and$that$the$sale$of$51%$of$the$MHC$
bidders$ participated:$ petitioner$ Manila$ Prince$ Hotel$ Corporation,$ a$ Filipino$ may$ be$ hastened$ by$ respondent$ GSIS$ and$ consummated$ with$ Renong$ Berhad,$
corporation,$ which$ offered$ to$ buy$ 51%$ of$ the$ MHC$ or$ 15,300,000$ shares$ at$ petitioner$ came$ to$ this$ Court$ on$ prohibition$ and$ mandamus.$ On$ 18$ October$
P41.58$ per$ share,$ and$ Renong$ Berhad,$ a$ Malaysian$ firm,$ with$ ITTSSheraton$ as$ 1995$ the$ Court$ issued$ a$ temporary$ restraining$ order$ enjoining$ respondents$
its$hotel$operator,$which$bid$for$the$same$number$of$shares$at$P44.00$per$share,$ from$perfecting$and$consummating$the$sale$to$the$Malaysian$firm.$
or$P2.42$more$than$the$bid$of$petitioner.$ $
$ On$10$September$1996$the$instant$case$was$accepted$by$the$Court$En$Banc$after$
Pertinent$provisions$of$the$bidding$rules$prepared$by$respondent$GSIS$state$S$ it$ was$ referred$ to$ it$ by$ the$ First$ Division.$ The$ case$ was$ then$ set$ for$ oral$
$ arguments$ with$ former$ Chief$ Justice$ Enrique$ M.$ Fernando$ and$ Fr.$ Joaquin$ G.$
I.$EXECUTION$OF$THE$NECESSARY$CONTRACTS$WITH$GSIS/MHC!"! Bernas,$S.J.,$as$amici$curiae.$
! $
1.! The! Highest! Bidder! must! comply! with! the! conditions$set$forth$below$by$ In$ the$ main,$ petitioner$ invokes$ Sec.$ 10,$ second$ par.,$ Art.$ XII,$ of$ the$ 1987$
October$ 23,$ 1995$ (reset$ to$ November$ 3,$ 1995)$ or$ the$ Highest$ Bidder$ will$ lose$ Constitution$ and$ submits$ that$ the$ Manila$ Hotel$ has$ been$ identified$ with$ the$
the$right$to$purchase$the$Block$of$Shares$and$GSIS$will$instead$offer$the$Block$of$ Filipino$nation$and$has$practically$become$a$historical$monument$which$reflects$
Shares$to$the$other$Qualified$Bidders:$ the$vibrancy$of$Philippine$heritage$and$culture.$It$is$a$proud$legacy$of$an$earlier$
$ generation$ of$ Filipinos$ who$ believed$ in$ the$ nobility$ and$ sacredness$ of$
a.$ The$ Highest$ Bidder$ must$ negotiate$ and$ execute$ with$ the$ GSIS/MHC$ the$ independence$ and$ its$ power$ and$ capacity$ to$ release$ the$ full$ potential$ of$ the$
Management$Contract,$International$Marketing/Reservation$System$Contract$or$ Filipino$people.$To$all$intents$and$purposes,$it$has$become$a$part$of$the$national$
other$type$of$contract$specified$by$the$Highest$Bidder$in$its$strategic$plan$for$the$ patrimony.[6]$ Petitioner$ also$ argues$ that$ since$ 51%$ of$ the$ shares$ of$ the$ MHC$
Manila$Hotel$x$x$x$x$ carries$ with$ it$ the$ ownership$ of$ the$ business$ of$ the$ hotel$ which$ is$ owned$ by$
$ respondent$ GSIS,$ a$ governmentSowned$ and$ controlled$ corporation,$ the$ hotel$
business$ of$ respondent$ GSIS$ being$ a$ part$ of$ the$ tourism$ industry$ is$ postulate$that$the$privilege$of$submitting$a$matching$bid$has$not$yet$arisen$since$
unquestionably$a$part$of$the$national$economy.$Thus,$any$transaction$involving$ it$only$takes$place$if$for$any$reason,$the$Highest$Bidder$cannot$be$awarded$the$
51%$ of$ the$ shares$ of$ stock$ of$ the$ MHC$ is$ clearly$ covered$ by$ the$ term$ national$ Block$ of$ Shares.$ Thus$ the$ submission$ by$ petitioner$ of$ a$ matching$ bid$ is$
economy,$to$which$Sec.$10,$second$par.,$Art.$XII,$1987$Constitution,$applies.[7]$ premature$ since$ Renong$ Berhad$ could$ still$ very$ well$ be$ awarded$ the$ block$ of$
$ shares$and$the$condition$giving$rise$to$the$exercise$of$the$privilege$to$submit$a$
It$ is$ also$ the$ thesis$ of$ petitioner$ that$ since$ Manila$ Hotel$ is$ part$ of$ the$ national$ matching$bid$had$not$yet$taken$place.$
patrimony$ and$ its$ business$ also$ unquestionably$ part$ of$ the$ national$ economy$ $
petitioner$ should$ be$ preferred$ after$ it$ has$ matched$ the$ bid$ offer$ of$ the$ Finally,$the$prayer$for$prohibition$grounded$on$grave$abuse$of$discretion$should$
Malaysian$firm.$For$the$bidding$rules$mandate$that$if$for$any$reason,$the$Highest$ fail$ since$ respondent$ GSIS$ did$ not$ exercise$ its$ discretion$ in$ a$ capricious,$
Bidder$cannot$be$awarded$the$Block$of$Shares,$GSIS$may$offer$this$to$the$other$ whimsical$manner,$and$if$ever$it$did$abuse$its$discretion$it$was$not$so$patent$and$
Qualified$Bidders$that$have$validly$submitted$bids$provided$that$these$Qualified$ gross$ as$ to$ amount$ to$ an$ evasion$ of$ a$ positive$ duty$ or$ a$ virtual$ refusal$ to$
Bidders$are$willing$to$match$the$highest$bid$in$terms$of$price$per$share.[8]$ perform$a$duty$enjoined$by$law.$Similarly,$the$petition$for$mandamus$should$fail$
$ as$petitioner$has$no$clear$legal$right$to$what$it$demands$and$respondents$do$not$
Respondents$ except.$ They$ maintain$ that:$ First,$ Sec.$ 10,$ second$ par.,$ Art.$ XII,$ of$ have$an$imperative$duty$to$perform$the$act$required$of$them$by$petitioner.$
the$ 1987$ Constitution$ is$ merely$ a$ statement$ of$ principle$ and$ policy$ since$ it$ is$ $
not$ a$ selfSexecuting$ provision$ and$ requires$ implementing$ legislation(s)$ x$ x$ x$ x$ We$ now$ resolve.$ A$ constitution$ is$ a$ system$ of$ fundamental$ laws$ for$ the$
Thus,$for$the$said$provision$to$operate,$there$must$be$existing$laws$to$lay$down$ governance$ and$ administration$ of$ a$ nation.$ It$ is$ supreme,$ imperious,$ absolute$
conditions$under$which$business$may$be$done.[9]$ and$ unalterable$ except$ by$ the$ authority$ from$ which$ it$ emanates.$ It$ has$ been$
$ defined$as$the$fundamental$and$paramount$law$of$the$nation.[10]$It$prescribes$
Second,$granting$that$this$provision$is$selfSexecuting,$Manila$Hotel$does$not$fall$ the$ permanent$ framework$ of$ a$ system$ of$ government,$ assigns$ to$ the$ different$
under$ the$ term$ national$ patrimony$ which$ only$ refers$ to$ lands$ of$ the$ public$ departments$ their$ respective$ powers$ and$ duties,$ and$ establishes$ certain$ fixed$
domain,$ waters,$ minerals,$ coal,$ petroleum$ and$ other$ mineral$ oils,$ all$ forces$ of$ principles$ on$ which$ government$ is$ founded.$ The$ fundamental$ conception$ in$
potential$ energy,$ fisheries,$ forests$ or$ timber,$ wildlife,$ flora$ and$ fauna$ and$ all$ other$words$is$that$it$is$a$supreme$law$to$which$all$other$laws$must$conform$and$
marine$ wealth$ in$ its$ territorial$ sea,$ and$ exclusive$ marine$ zone$ as$ cited$ in$ the$ in$ accordance$ with$ which$ all$ private$ rights$ must$ be$ determined$ and$ all$ public$
first$ and$ second$ paragraphs$ of$ Sec.$ 2,$ Art.$ XII,$ 1987$ Constitution.$ According$ to$ authority$administered.[11]$Under$the$doctrine$of$constitutional$supremacy,$if$a$
respondents,$ while$ petitioner$ speaks$ of$ the$ guests$ who$ have$ slept$ in$ the$ hotel$ law$ or$ contract$ violates$ any$ norm$ of$ the$ constitution$ that$ law$ or$ contract$
and$the$events$that$have$transpired$therein$which$make$the$hotel$historic,$these$ whether$ promulgated$ by$ the$ legislative$ or$ by$ the$ executive$ branch$ or$ entered$
alone$ do$ not$ make$ the$ hotel$ fall$ under$ the$ patrimony$ of$ the$ nation.$ What$ is$ into$ by$ private$ persons$ for$ private$ purposes$ is$ null$ and$ void$ and$ without$ any$
more,$ the$ mandate$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$ addressed$ to$ the$ State,$ not$ to$ force$and$effect.$Thus,$since$the$Constitution$is$the$fundamental,$paramount$and$
respondent$GSIS$which$possesses$a$personality$of$its$own$separate$and$distinct$ supreme$law$of$the$nation,$it$is$deemed$written$in$every$statute$and$contract.$
from$the$Philippines$as$a$State.$ $
$ Admittedly,$ some$ constitutions$ are$ merely$ declarations$ of$ policies$ and$
Third,$granting$that$the$Manila$Hotel$forms$part$of$the$national$patrimony,$the$ principles.$ Their$ provisions$ command$ the$ legislature$ to$ enact$ laws$ and$ carry$
constitutional$provision$invoked$is$still$inapplicable$since$what$is$being$sold$is$ out$the$purposes$of$the$framers$who$merely$establish$an$outline$of$government$
only$ 51%$ of$ the$ outstanding$ shares$ of$ the$ corporation,$ not$ the$ hotel$ building$ providing$ for$ the$ different$ departments$ of$ the$ governmental$ machinery$ and$
nor$the$land$upon$which$the$building$stands.$Certainly,$51%$of$the$equity$of$the$ securing$certain$fundamental$and$inalienable$rights$of$citizens.[12]$A$provision$
MHC$ cannot$ be$ considered$ part$ of$ the$ national$ patrimony.$ Moreover,$ if$ the$ which$lays$down$a$general$principle,$such$as$those$found$in$Art.$II$of$the$1987$
disposition$ of$ the$ shares$ of$ the$ MHC$ is$ really$ contrary$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ Constitution,$is$usually$not$selfSexecuting.$But$a$provision$which$is$complete$in$
petitioner$ should$ have$ questioned$ it$ right$ from$ the$ beginning$ and$ not$ after$ it$ itself$ and$ becomes$ operative$ without$ the$ aid$ of$ supplementary$ or$ enabling$
had$lost$in$the$bidding.$ legislation,$or$that$which$supplies$sufficient$rule$by$means$of$which$the$right$it$
$ grants$ may$ be$ enjoyed$ or$ protected,$ is$ selfSexecuting.$ Thus$ a$ constitutional$
Fourth,$ the$ reliance$ by$ petitioner$ on$ par.$ V.,$ subpar.$ J.$ 1.,$ of$ the$ bidding$ rules$ provision$is$selfSexecuting$if$the$nature$and$extent$of$the$right$conferred$and$the$
which$provides$that$if$for$any$reason,$the$Highest$Bidder$cannot$be$awarded$the$ liability$ imposed$ are$ fixed$ by$ the$ constitution$ itself,$ so$ that$ they$ can$ be$
Block$ of$ Shares,$ GSIS$ may$ offer$ this$ to$ the$ other$ Qualified$ Bidders$ that$ have$ determined$ by$ an$ examination$ and$ construction$ of$ its$ terms,$ and$ there$ is$ no$
validly$ submitted$ bids$ provided$ that$ these$ Qualified$ Bidders$ are$ willing$ to$ language$indicating$that$the$subject$is$referred$to$the$legislature$for$action.[13]$
match$ the$ highest$ bid$ in$ terms$ of$ price$ per$ share,$ is$ misplaced.$ Respondents$ $
As$ against$ constitutions$ of$ the$ past,$ modern$ constitutions$ have$ been$ generally$ Quite$apparently,$Sec.$10,$second$par.,$of$Art$XII$is$couched$in$such$a$way$as$not$
drafted$ upon$ a$ different$ principle$ and$ have$ often$ become$ in$ effect$ extensive$ to$make$it$appear$that$it$is$nonSselfSexecuting$but$simply$for$purposes$of$style.$
codes$of$laws$intended$to$operate$directly$upon$the$people$in$a$manner$similar$ But,$ certainly,$ the$ legislature$ is$ not$ precluded$ from$ enacting$ further$ laws$ to$
to$ that$ of$ statutory$ enactments,$ and$ the$ function$ of$ constitutional$ conventions$ enforce$the$constitutional$provision$so$long$as$the$contemplated$statute$squares$
has$ evolved$ into$ one$ more$ like$ that$ of$ a$ legislative$ body.$ Hence,$ unless$ it$ is$ with$ the$ Constitution.$ Minor$ details$ may$ be$ left$ to$ the$ legislature$ without$
expressly$provided$that$a$legislative$act$is$necessary$to$enforce$a$constitutional$ impairing$the$selfSexecuting$nature$of$constitutional$provisions.$
mandate,$the$presumption$now$is$that$all$provisions$of$the$constitution$are$selfS $
executing.$ If$ the$ constitutional$ provisions$ are$ treated$ as$ requiring$ legislation$ In$ selfSexecuting$ constitutional$ provisions,$ the$ legislature$ may$ still$ enact$
instead$ of$ selfSexecuting,$ the$ legislature$ would$ have$ the$ power$ to$ ignore$ and$ legislation$ to$ facilitate$ the$ exercise$ of$ powers$ directly$ granted$ by$ the$
practically$ nullify$ the$ mandate$ of$ the$ fundamental$ law.[14]$ This$ can$ be$ constitution,$further$the$operation$of$such$a$provision,$prescribe$a$practice$to$be$
cataclysmic.$That$is$why$the$prevailing$view$is,$as$it$has$always$been,$that$S$ used$for$its$enforcement,$provide$a$convenient$remedy$for$the$protection$of$the$
$ rights$ secured$ or$ the$ determination$ thereof,$ or$ place$ reasonable$ safeguards$
x$ x$ x$ x$ in$ case$ of$ doubt,$ the$ Constitution$ should$ be$ considered$ selfSexecuting$ around$the$exercise$of$the$right.$The$mere$fact$that$legislation$may$supplement$
rather$than$nonSselfSexecuting$x$x$x$x$Unless$the$contrary$is$clearly$intended,$the$ and$ add$ to$ or$ prescribe$ a$ penalty$ for$ the$ violation$ of$ a$ selfSexecuting$
provisions$of$the$Constitution$should$be$considered$selfSexecuting,$as$a$contrary$ constitutional$ provision$ does$ not$ render$ such$ a$ provision$ ineffective$ in$ the$
rule$would$give$the$legislature$discretion$to$determine$when,$or$whether,$they$ absence$ of$ such$ legislation.$ The$ omission$ from$ a$ constitution$ of$ any$ express$
shall$ be$ effective.$ These$ provisions$ would$ be$ subordinated$ to$ the$ will$ of$ the$ provision$ for$ a$ remedy$ for$ enforcing$ a$ right$ or$ liability$ is$ not$ necessarily$ an$
lawmaking$ body,$ which$ could$ make$ them$ entirely$ meaningless$ by$ simply$ indication$ that$ it$ was$ not$ intended$ to$ be$ selfSexecuting.$ The$ rule$ is$ that$ a$ selfS
refusing$to$pass$the$needed$implementing$statute.[15]$ executing$provision$of$the$constitution$does$not$necessarily$exhaust$legislative$
$ power$ on$ the$ subject,$ but$ any$ legislation$ must$ be$ in$ harmony$ with$ the$
Respondents$argue$that$Sec.$10,$second$par.,$Art.$XII,$of$the$1987$Constitution$is$ constitution,$ further$ the$ exercise$ of$ constitutional$ right$ and$ make$ it$ more$
clearly$ not$ selfSexecuting,$ as$ they$ quote$ from$ discussions$ on$ the$ floor$ of$ the$ available.[17]$ Subsequent$ legislation$ however$ does$ not$ necessarily$ mean$ that$
1986$Constitutional$Commission$S$ the$subject$constitutional$provision$is$not,$by$itself,$fully$enforceable.$
$ $
MR.$RODRIGO.$Madam$President,$I$am$asking$this$question$as$the$Chairman$of$ Respondents$ also$ argue$ that$ the$ nonSselfSexecuting$ nature$ of$ Sec.$ 10,$ second$
the$Committee$on$Style.$If$the$wording$of$PREFERENCE$is$given$to$QUALIFIED$ par.,$of$Art.$XII$is$implied$from$the$tenor$of$the$first$and$third$paragraphs$of$the$
FILIPINOS,$ can$ it$ be$ understood$ as$ a$ preference$ to$ qualified$ Filipinos$ visSaSvis$ same$ section$ which$ undoubtedly$ are$ not$ selfSexecuting.[18]$ The$ argument$ is$
Filipinos$ who$ are$ not$ qualified.$ So,$ why$ do$ we$ not$ make$ it$ clear?$ To$ qualified$ flawed.$If$the$first$and$third$paragraphs$are$not$selfSexecuting$because$Congress$
Filipinos$as$against$aliens?$ is$ still$ to$ enact$ measures$ to$ encourage$ the$ formation$ and$ operation$ of$
$ enterprises$fully$owned$by$Filipinos,$as$in$the$first$paragraph,$and$the$State$still$
THE$ PRESIDENT.$ What$ is$ the$ question$ of$ Commissioner$ Rodrigo?$ Is$ it$ to$ needs$ legislation$ to$ regulate$ and$ exercise$ authority$ over$ foreign$ investments$
remove$the$word$QUALIFIED?$ within$its$national$jurisdiction,$as$in$the$third$paragraph,$then$a$fortiori,$by$the$
$ same$logic,$the$second$paragraph$can$only$be$selfSexecuting$as$it$does$not$by$its$
MR.$ RODRIGO.$ No,$ no,$ but$ say$ definitely$ TO$ QUALIFIED$ FILIPINOS$ as$ against$ language$ require$ any$ legislation$ in$ order$ to$ give$ preference$ to$ qualified$
whom?$As$against$aliens$or$over$aliens$?$ Filipinos$in$the$grant$of$rights,$privileges$and$concessions$covering$the$national$
$ economy$ and$ patrimony.$ A$ constitutional$ provision$ may$ be$ selfSexecuting$ in$
MR.$ NOLLEDO.$ Madam$ President,$ I$ think$ that$ is$ understood.$ We$ use$ the$ word$ one$part$and$nonSselfSexecuting$in$another.[19]$
QUALIFIED$because$the$existing$laws$or$prospective$laws$will$always$lay$down$ $
conditions$ under$ which$ business$ may$ be$ done.$ For$ example,$ qualifications$ on$ Even$ the$ cases$ cited$ by$ respondents$ holding$ that$ certain$ constitutional$
capital,$ qualifications$ on$ the$ setting$ up$ of$ other$ financial$ structures,$ et$ cetera$ provisions$are$merely$statements$of$principles$and$policies,$which$are$basically$
(underscoring$supplied$by$respondents).$ not$ selfSexecuting$ and$ only$ placed$ in$ the$ Constitution$ as$ moral$ incentives$ to$
$ legislation,$not$as$judicially$enforceable$rights$S$are$simply$not$in$point.$Basco$v.$
MR.$RODRIGO.$It$is$just$a$matter$of$style.$ Philippine$ Amusements$ and$ Gaming$ Corporation[20]$ speaks$ of$ constitutional$
$ provisions$on$personal$dignity,[21]$the$sanctity$of$family$life,[22]$the$vital$role$
MR.$NOLLEDO.$Yes.[16]$ of$the$youth$in$nationSbuilding,[23]$the$promotion$of$social$justice,[24]$and$the$
$ values$ of$ education.[25]$ Tolentino$ v.$ Secretary$ of$ Finance[26]$ refers$ to$
constitutional$ provisions$ on$ social$ justice$ and$ human$ rights[27]$ and$ on$ Government$ it$ plays$ host$ to$ dignitaries$ and$ official$ visitors$ who$ are$ accorded$
education.[28]$ Lastly,$ Kilosbayan,$ Inc.$ v.$ Morato[29]$ cites$ provisions$ on$ the$ the$traditional$Philippine$hospitality.[36]$
promotion$of$general$welfare,[30]$the$sanctity$of$family$life,[31]$the$vital$role$of$ $
the$ youth$ in$ nationSbuilding[32]$ and$ the$ promotion$ of$ total$ human$ liberation$ The$history$of$the$hotel$has$been$chronicled$in$the$book$The$Manila$Hotel:$The$
and$ development.[33]$ A$ reading$ of$ these$ provisions$ indeed$ clearly$ shows$ that$ Heart$and$Memory$of$a$City.[37]$During$World$War$II$the$hotel$was$converted$
they$ are$ not$ judicially$ enforceable$ constitutional$ rights$ but$ merely$ guidelines$ by$the$Japanese$Military$Administration$into$a$military$headquarters.$When$the$
for$ legislation.$ The$ very$ terms$ of$ the$ provisions$ manifest$ that$ they$ are$ only$ American$ forces$ returned$ to$ recapture$ Manila$ the$ hotel$ was$ selected$ by$ the$
principles$upon$which$legislations$must$be$based.$Res$ipsa$loquitur.$ Japanese$ together$ with$ Intramuros$ as$ the$ two$ (2)$ places$ for$ their$ final$ stand.$
$ Thereafter,$ in$ the$ 1950s$ and$ 1960s,$ the$ hotel$ became$ the$ center$ of$ political$
On$ the$ other$ hand,$ Sec.$ 10,$ second$ par.,$ Art.$ XII$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ is$ a$ activities,$ playing$ host$ to$ almost$ every$ political$ convention.$ In$ 1970$ the$ hotel$
mandatory,$ positive$ command$ which$ is$ complete$ in$ itself$ and$ which$ needs$ no$ reopened$ after$ a$ renovation$ and$ reaped$ numerous$ international$ recognitions,$
further$ guidelines$ or$ implementing$ laws$ or$ rules$ for$ its$ enforcement.$ From$ its$ an$acknowledgment$of$the$Filipino$talent$and$ingenuity.$In$1986$the$hotel$was$
very$words$the$provision$does$not$require$any$legislation$to$put$it$in$operation.$ the$ site$ of$ a$ failed$ coup$ d$ etat$ where$ an$ aspirant$ for$ viceSpresident$ was$
It$is$per$se$judicially$enforceable.$When$our$Constitution$mandates$that$[i]n$the$ proclaimed$President$of$the$Philippine$Republic.$
grant$ of$ rights,$ privileges,$ and$ concessions$ covering$ national$ economy$ and$ $
patrimony,$ the$ State$ shall$ give$ preference$ to$ qualified$ Filipinos,$ it$ means$ just$ For$ more$ than$ eight$ (8)$ decades$ Manila$ Hotel$ has$ bore$ mute$ witness$ to$ the$
that$S$qualified$Filipinos$shall$be$preferred.$And$when$our$Constitution$declares$ triumphs$ and$ failures,$ loves$ and$ frustrations$ of$ the$ Filipinos;$ its$ existence$ is$
that$ a$ right$ exists$ in$ certain$ specified$ circumstances$ an$ action$ may$ be$ impressed$with$public$interest;$its$own$historicity$associated$with$our$struggle$
maintained$to$enforce$such$right$notwithstanding$the$absence$of$any$legislation$ for$sovereignty,$independence$and$nationhood.$Verily,$Manila$Hotel$has$become$
on$the$subject;$consequently,$if$there$is$no$statute$especially$enacted$to$enforce$ part$of$our$national$economy$and$patrimony.$For$sure,$51%$of$the$equity$of$the$
such$constitutional$right,$such$right$enforces$itself$by$its$own$inherent$potency$ MHC$comes$within$the$purview$of$the$constitutional$shelter$for$it$comprises$the$
and$puissance,$and$from$which$all$legislations$must$take$their$bearings.$Where$ majority$ and$ controlling$ stock,$ so$ that$ anyone$ who$ acquires$ or$ owns$ the$ 51%$
there$is$a$right$there$is$a$remedy.$Ubi$jus$ibi$remedium.$ will$have$actual$control$and$management$of$the$hotel.$In$this$instance,$51%$of$
$ the$MHC$cannot$be$disassociated$from$the$hotel$and$the$land$on$which$the$hotel$
As$ regards$ our$ national$ patrimony,$ a$ member$ of$ the$ 1986$ Constitutional$ edifice$ stands.$ Consequently,$ we$ cannot$ sustain$ respondents$ claim$ that$ the$
Commission[34]$explains$S$ Filipino$First$Policy$provision$is$not$applicable$since$what$is$being$sold$is$only$
$ 51%$of$the$outstanding$shares$of$the$corporation,$not$the$Hotel$building$nor$the$
The$patrimony$of$the$Nation$that$should$be$conserved$and$developed$refers$not$ land$upon$which$the$building$stands.[38]$
only$to$our$rich$natural$resources$but$also$to$the$cultural$heritage$of$our$race.$It$ $
also$refers$to$our$intelligence$in$arts,$sciences$and$letters.$Therefore,$we$should$ The$ argument$ is$ pure$ sophistry.$ The$ term$ qualified$ Filipinos$ as$ used$ in$ our$
develop$not$only$our$lands,$forests,$mines$and$other$natural$resources$but$also$ Constitution$ also$ includes$ corporations$ at$ least$ 60%$ of$ which$ is$ owned$ by$
the$mental$ability$or$faculty$of$our$people.$ Filipinos.$ This$ is$ very$ clear$ from$ the$ proceedings$ of$ the$ 1986$ Constitutional$
$ Commission$S$
We$ agree.$ In$ its$ plain$ and$ ordinary$ meaning,$ the$ term$ patrimony$ pertains$ to$ $
heritage.[35]$When$the$Constitution$speaks$of$national$patrimony,$it$refers$not$ THE$PRESIDENT.$Commissioner$Davide$is$recognized.$
only$to$the$natural$resources$of$the$Philippines,$as$the$Constitution$could$have$ $
very$ well$ used$ the$ term$ natural$ resources,$ but$ also$ to$ the$ cultural$ heritage$ of$ MR.$ DAVIDE.$ I$ would$ like$ to$ introduce$ an$ amendment$ to$ the$ Nolledo$
the$Filipinos.$ amendment.$ And$ the$ amendment$ would$ consist$ in$ substituting$ the$ words$
$ QUALIFIED$ FILIPINOS$ with$ the$ following:$ CITIZENS$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ OR$
Manila$ Hotel$ has$ become$ a$ landmark$ S$ a$ living$ testimonial$ of$ Philippine$ CORPORATIONS$OR$ASSOCIATIONS$WHOSE$CAPITAL$OR$CONTROLLING$STOCK$
heritage.$ While$ it$ was$ restrictively$ an$ American$ hotel$ when$ it$ first$ opened$ in$ IS$WHOLLY$OWNED$BY$SUCH$CITIZENS.$
1912,$it$immediately$evolved$to$be$truly$Filipino.$Formerly$a$concourse$for$the$ $
elite,$ it$ has$ since$ then$ become$ the$ venue$ of$ various$ significant$ events$ which$ x$x$x$x$
have$shaped$Philippine$history.$It$was$called$the$Cultural$Center$of$the$1930s.$It$ $
was$ the$ site$ of$ the$ festivities$ during$ the$ inauguration$ of$ the$ Philippine$
Commonwealth.$ Dubbed$ as$ the$ Official$ Guest$ House$ of$ the$ Philippine$
MR.$MONSOD.$Madam$President,$apparently$the$proponent$is$agreeable,$but$we$ MR.$ FOZ.$ If$ the$ foreigner$ is$ more$ qualified$ in$ some$ aspects$ than$ the$ Filipino$
have$to$raise$a$question.$Suppose$it$is$a$corporation$that$is$80Spercent$Filipino,$ enterprise,$will$the$Filipino$still$be$preferred?$
do$we$not$give$it$preference?$ $
$ MR.$NOLLEDO.$The$answer$is$yes.$
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ The$ Nolledo$ amendment$ would$ refer$ to$ an$ individual$ Filipino.$ $
What$about$a$corporation$wholly$owned$by$Filipino$citizens?$ MR.$FOZ.$Thank$you.[41]$
$ $
MR.$MONSOD.$At$least$60$percent,$Madam$President.$ Expounding$further$on$the$Filipino$First$Policy$provision$Commissioner$Nolledo$
$ continues$
MR.$DAVIDE.$Is$that$the$intention?$ $
$ MR.$NOLLEDO.$Yes,$Madam$President.$Instead$of$MUST,$it$will$be$SHALL$S$THE$
MR.$ MONSOD.$ Yes,$ because,$ in$ fact,$ we$ would$ be$ limiting$ it$ if$ we$ say$ that$ the$ STATE$SHALL$GIVE$PREFERENCE$TO$QUALIFIED$FILIPINOS.$This$embodies$the$
preference$should$only$be$100Spercent$Filipino.$ soScalled$ Filipino$ First$ policy.$ That$ means$ that$ Filipinos$ should$ be$ given$
$ preference$ in$ the$ grant$ of$ concessions,$ privileges$ and$ rights$ covering$ the$
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ I$ want$ to$ get$ that$ meaning$ clear$ because$ QUALIFIED$ FILIPINOS$ national$patrimony.[42]$
may$refer$only$to$individuals$and$not$to$juridical$personalities$or$entities.$ $
$ The$ exchange$ of$ views$ in$ the$ sessions$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Commission$
MR.$MONSOD.$We$agree,$Madam$President.[39]$ regarding$ the$ subject$ provision$ was$ still$ further$ clarified$ by$ Commissioner$
$ Nolledo[43]$S$
x$x$x$x$ $
$ Paragraph$ 2$ of$ Section$ 10$ explicitly$ mandates$ the$ ProSFilipino$ bias$ in$ all$
MR.$RODRIGO.$Before$we$vote,$may$I$request$that$the$amendment$be$read$again.$ economic$concerns.$It$is$better$known$as$the$FILIPINO$FIRST$Policy$x$x$x$x$This$
$ provision$was$never$found$in$previous$Constitutions$x$x$x$x$
MR.$ NOLLEDO.$ The$ amendment$ will$ read:$ IN$ THE$ GRANT$ OF$ RIGHTS,$ $
PRIVILEGES$ AND$ CONCESSIONS$ COVERING$ THE$ NATIONAL$ ECONOMY$ AND$ The$ term$ qualified$ Filipinos$ simply$ means$ that$ preference$ shall$ be$ given$ to$
PATRIMONY,$THE$STATE$SHALL$GIVE$PREFERENCE$TO$QUALIFIED$FILIPINOS.$ those$citizens$who$can$make$a$viable$contribution$to$the$common$good,$because$
And$ the$ word$ Filipinos$ here,$ as$ intended$ by$ the$ proponents,$ will$ include$ not$ of$ credible$ competence$ and$ efficiency.$ It$ certainly$ does$ NOT$ mandate$ the$
only$ individual$ Filipinos$ but$ also$ FilipinoScontrolled$ entities$ or$ entities$ fullyS pampering$and$preferential$treatment$to$Filipino$citizens$or$organizations$that$
controlled$by$Filipinos.[40]$ are$ incompetent$ or$ inefficient,$ since$ such$ an$ indiscriminate$ preference$ would$
$ be$counterproductive$and$inimical$to$the$common$good.$
The$phrase$preference$to$qualified$Filipinos$was$explained$thus$S$ $
$ In$ the$ granting$ of$ economic$ rights,$ privileges,$ and$ concessions,$ when$ a$ choice$
MR.$ FOZ.$ Madam$ President,$ I$ would$ like$ to$ request$ Commissioner$ Nolledo$ to$ has$to$be$made$between$a$qualified$foreigner$and$a$qualified$Filipino,$the$latter$
please$restate$his$amendment$so$that$I$can$ask$a$question.$ shall$be$chosen$over$the$former.$
$ $
MR.$ NOLLEDO.$ IN$ THE$ GRANT$ OF$ RIGHTS,$ PRIVILEGES$ AND$ CONCESSIONS$ Lastly,$the$word$qualified$is$also$determinable.$Petitioner$was$so$considered$by$
COVERING$ THE$ NATIONAL$ ECONOMY$ AND$ PATRIMONY,$ THE$ STATE$ SHALL$ respondent$ GSIS$ and$ selected$ as$ one$ of$ the$ qualified$ bidders.$ It$ was$ preS
GIVE$PREFERENCE$TO$QUALIFIED$FILIPINOS.$ qualified$by$respondent$GSIS$in$accordance$with$its$own$guidelines$so$that$the$
$ sole$inference$here$is$that$petitioner$has$been$found$to$be$possessed$of$proven$
MR.$FOZ.$In$connection$with$that$amendment,$if$a$foreign$enterprise$is$qualified$ management$ expertise$ in$ the$ hotel$ industry,$ or$ it$ has$ significant$ equity$
and$ a$ Filipino$ enterprise$ is$ also$ qualified,$ will$ the$ Filipino$ enterprise$ still$ be$ ownership$ in$ another$ hotel$ company,$ or$ it$ has$ an$ overall$ management$ and$
given$a$preference?$ marketing$proficiency$to$successfully$operate$the$Manila$Hotel.[44]$
$ $
MR.$NOLLEDO.$Obviously.$ The$penchant$to$try$to$whittle$away$the$mandate$of$the$Constitution$by$arguing$
$ that$ the$ subject$ provision$ is$ not$ selfSexecutory$ and$ requires$ implementing$
legislation$ is$ quite$ disturbing.$ The$ attempt$ to$ violate$ a$ clear$ constitutional$
provision$ S$ by$ the$ government$ itself$ S$ is$ only$ too$ distressing.$ To$ adopt$ such$ a$
line$ of$ reasoning$ is$ to$ renounce$ the$ duty$ to$ ensure$ faithfulness$ to$ the$
Constitution.$ For,$ even$ some$ of$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution$ which$
evidently$need$implementing$legislation$have$juridical$life$of$their$own$and$can$
be$ the$ source$ of$ a$ judicial$ remedy.$ We$ cannot$ simply$ afford$ the$ government$ a$
defense$that$arises$out$of$the$failure$to$enact$further$enabling,$implementing$or$
guiding$ legislation.$ In$ fine,$ the$ discourse$ of$ Fr.$ Joaquin$ G.$ Bernas,$ S.J.,$ on$
constitutional$government$is$apt$S$
$ one$ with$ the$ highest$ bidder.$ For$ in$ choosing$ the$ awardee$ respondents$ are$
The$ executive$ department$ has$ a$ constitutional$ duty$ to$ implement$ laws,$
including$the$Constitution,$even$before$Congress$acts$S$provided$that$there$are$
discoverable$ legal$ standards$ for$ executive$ action.$ When$ the$ executive$ acts,$ it$
must$be$guided$by$its$own$understanding$of$the$constitutional$command$and$of$
applicable$ laws.$ The$ responsibility$ for$ reading$ and$ understanding$ the$
Constitution$and$the$laws$is$not$the$sole$prerogative$of$Congress.$If$it$were,$the$
executive$ would$ have$ to$ ask$ Congress,$ or$ perhaps$ the$ Court,$ for$ an$
interpretation$ every$ time$ the$ executive$ is$ confronted$ by$ a$ constitutional$
command.$That$is$not$how$constitutional$government$operates.[45]$
$ $
Respondents$further$argue$that$the$constitutional$provision$is$addressed$to$the$
State,$ not$ to$ respondent$ GSIS$ which$ by$ itself$ possesses$ a$ separate$ and$ distinct$
personality.$ This$ argument$ again$ is$ at$ best$ specious.$ It$ is$ undisputed$ that$ the$
sale$of$51%$of$the$MHC$could$only$be$carried$out$with$the$prior$approval$of$the$
State$ acting$ through$ respondent$ Committee$ on$ Privatization.$ As$ correctly$
pointed$ out$ by$ Fr.$ Joaquin$ G.$ Bernas,$ S.J.,$ this$ fact$ alone$ makes$ the$ sale$ of$ the$
assets$ of$ respondents$ GSIS$ and$ MHC$ a$ state$ action.$ In$ constitutional$
jurisprudence,$the$acts$of$persons$distinct$from$the$government$are$considered$
state$action$covered$by$the$Constitution$(1)$when$the$activity$it$engages$in$is$a$
public$ function;$ (2)$ when$ the$ government$ is$ so$ significantly$ involved$ with$ the$
private$ actor$ as$ to$ make$ the$ government$ responsible$ for$ his$ action;$ and,$ (3)$
when$the$government$has$approved$or$authorized$the$action.$It$is$evident$that$
the$act$of$respondent$GSIS$in$selling$51%$of$its$share$in$respondent$MHC$comes$
under$the$second$and$third$categories$of$state$action.$Without$doubt$therefore$
the$ transaction,$ although$ entered$ into$ by$ respondent$ GSIS,$ is$ in$ fact$ a$
transaction$ of$ the$ State$ and$ therefore$ subject$ to$ the$ constitutional$
command.[46]$
$ constitutional$fiat$is$omnipresent$to$be$simply$disregarded.$To$ignore$it$would$
When$ the$ Constitution$ addresses$ the$ State$ it$ refers$ not$ only$ to$ the$ people$ but$
also$ to$ the$ government$ as$ elements$ of$ the$ State.$ After$ all,$ government$ is$
composed$ of$ three$ (3)$ divisions$ of$ power$ S$ legislative,$ executive$ and$ judicial.$
Accordingly,$ a$ constitutional$ mandate$ directed$ to$ the$ State$ is$ correspondingly$
directed$ to$ the$ three$ (3)$ branches$ of$ government.$ It$ is$ undeniable$ that$ in$ this$
case$ the$ subject$ constitutional$ injunction$ is$ addressed$ among$ others$ to$ the$
Executive$ Department$ and$ respondent$ GSIS,$ a$ government$ instrumentality$
deriving$its$authority$from$the$State.$
$ under$the$Constitution$and$the$laws$of$the$forum.$
It$ should$ be$ stressed$ that$ while$ the$ Malaysian$ firm$ offered$ the$ higher$ bid$ it$ is$
not$yet$the$winning$bidder.$The$bidding$rules$expressly$provide$that$the$highest$
bidder$ shall$ only$ be$ declared$ the$ winning$ bidder$ after$ it$ has$ negotiated$ and$
executed$the$necessary$contracts,$and$secured$the$requisite$approvals.$Since$the$
Filipino$ First$ Policy$ provision$ of$ the$ Constitution$ bestows$ preference$ on$
qualified$Filipinos$the$mere$tending$of$the$highest$bid$is$not$an$assurance$that$
the$highest$bidder$will$be$declared$the$winning$bidder.$Resultantly,$respondents$
are$not$bound$to$make$the$award$yet,$nor$are$they$under$obligation$to$enter$into$
mandated$ to$ abide$ by$ the$ dictates$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ the$ provisions$ of$
which$are$presumed$to$be$known$to$all$the$bidders$and$other$interested$parties.$
$
Adhering$to$the$doctrine$of$constitutional$supremacy,$the$subject$constitutional$
provision$ is,$ as$ it$ should$ be,$ impliedly$ written$ in$ the$ bidding$ rules$ issued$ by$
respondent$ GSIS,$ lest$ the$ bidding$ rules$ be$ nullified$ for$ being$ violative$ of$ the$
Constitution.$ It$ is$ a$ basic$ principle$ in$ constitutional$ law$ that$ all$ laws$ and$
contracts$ must$ conform$ with$ the$ fundamental$ law$ of$ the$ land.$ Those$ which$
violate$the$Constitution$lose$their$reason$for$being.$
Paragraph$ V.$ J.$ 1$ of$ the$ bidding$ rules$ provides$ that$ [i]f$ for$ any$ reason$ the$
Highest$ Bidder$ cannot$ be$ awarded$ the$ Block$ of$ Shares,$ GSIS$ may$ offer$ this$ to$
other$ Qualified$ Bidders$ that$ have$ validly$ submitted$ bids$ provided$ that$ these$
Qualified$ Bidders$ are$ willing$ to$ match$ the$ highest$ bid$ in$ terms$ of$ price$ per$
share.[47]$ Certainly,$ the$ constitutional$ mandate$ itself$ is$ reason$ enough$ not$ to$
award$the$block$of$shares$immediately$to$the$foreign$bidder$notwithstanding$its$
submission$of$a$higher,$or$even$the$highest,$bid.$In$fact,$we$cannot$conceive$of$a$
stronger$reason$than$the$constitutional$injunction$itself.$
$
In$ the$ instant$ case,$ where$ a$ foreign$ firm$ submits$ the$ highest$ bid$ in$ a$ public$
bidding$concerning$the$grant$of$rights,$privileges$and$concessions$covering$the$
national$economy$and$patrimony,$thereby$exceeding$the$bid$of$a$Filipino,$there$
is$no$question$that$the$Filipino$will$have$to$be$allowed$to$match$the$bid$of$the$
foreign$ entity.$ And$ if$ the$ Filipino$ matches$ the$ bid$ of$ a$ foreign$ firm$ the$ award$
should$go$to$the$Filipino.$It$must$be$so$if$we$are$to$give$life$and$meaning$to$the$
Filipino$ First$ Policy$ provision$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution.$ For,$ while$ this$ may$
neither$ be$ expressly$ stated$ nor$ contemplated$ in$ the$ bidding$ rules,$ the$
be$to$sanction$a$perilous$skirting$of$the$basic$law.$
$
This$Court$does$not$discount$the$apprehension$that$this$policy$may$discourage$
foreign$ investors.$ But$ the$ Constitution$ and$ laws$ of$ the$ Philippines$ are$
understood$to$be$always$open$to$public$scrutiny.$These$are$given$factors$which$
investors$must$consider$when$venturing$into$business$in$a$foreign$jurisdiction.$
Any$ person$ therefore$ desiring$ to$ do$ business$ in$ the$ Philippines$ or$ with$ any$ of$
its$agencies$or$instrumentalities$is$presumed$to$know$his$rights$and$obligations$
$ As$scrupulously$as$it$has$tried$to$observe$that$it$is$not$its$function$to$substitute$
The$argument$of$respondents$that$petitioner$is$now$estopped$from$questioning$
the$sale$to$Renong$Berhad$since$petitioner$was$well$aware$from$the$beginning$
that$ a$ foreigner$ could$ participate$ in$ the$ bidding$ is$ meritless.$ Undoubtedly,$
Filipinos$and$foreigners$alike$were$invited$to$the$bidding.$But$foreigners$may$be$
awarded$the$sale$only$if$no$Filipino$qualifies,$or$if$the$qualified$Filipino$fails$to$
match$the$highest$bid$tendered$by$the$foreign$entity.$In$the$case$before$us,$while$
petitioner$was$already$preferred$at$the$inception$of$the$bidding$because$of$the$
constitutional$ mandate,$ petitioner$ had$ not$ yet$ matched$ the$ bid$ offered$ by$
Renong$ Berhad.$ Thus$ it$ did$ not$ have$ the$ right$ or$ personality$ then$ to$ compel$
respondent$GSIS$to$accept$its$earlier$bid.$Rightly,$only$after$it$had$matched$the$
bid$ of$ the$ foreign$ firm$ and$ the$ apparent$ disregard$ by$ respondent$ GSIS$ of$
petitioners$matching$bid$did$the$latter$have$a$cause$of$action.$
$ they$ do$ not$ violate$ the$ Constitution$ or$ the$ laws,$ or$ are$ not$ adopted$ or$
Besides,$there$is$no$time$frame$for$invoking$the$constitutional$safeguard$unless$
perhaps$the$award$has$been$finally$made.$To$insist$on$selling$the$Manila$Hotel$
to$ foreigners$ when$ there$ is$ a$ Filipino$ group$ willing$ to$ match$ the$ bid$ of$ the$
foreign$ group$ is$ to$ insist$ that$ government$ be$ treated$ as$ any$ other$ ordinary$
market$ player,$ and$ bound$ by$ its$ mistakes$ or$ gross$ errors$ of$ judgment,$
regardless$of$the$consequences$to$the$Filipino$people.$The$miscomprehension$of$
the$ Constitution$ is$ regrettable.$ Thus$ we$ would$ rather$ remedy$ the$ indiscretion$
while$there$is$still$an$opportunity$to$do$so$than$let$the$government$develop$the$
habit$ of$ forgetting$ that$ the$ Constitution$ lays$ down$ the$ basic$ conditions$ and$
parameters$for$its$actions.$
$ of$a$free$society;$after$all,$there$is$nothing$so$sacrosanct$in$any$economic$policy$
Since$petitioner$has$already$matched$the$bid$price$tendered$by$Renong$Berhad$
pursuant$to$the$bidding$rules,$respondent$GSIS$is$left$with$no$alternative$but$to$
award$ to$ petitioner$ the$ block$ of$ shares$ of$ MHC$ and$ to$ execute$ the$ necessary$
agreements$ and$ documents$ to$ effect$ the$ sale$ in$ accordance$ not$ only$ with$ the$
bidding$guidelines$and$procedures$but$with$the$Constitution$as$well.$The$refusal$
of$respondent$GSIS$to$execute$the$corresponding$documents$with$petitioner$as$
provided$ in$ the$ bidding$ rules$ after$ the$ latter$ has$ matched$ the$ bid$ of$ the$
Malaysian$firm$clearly$constitutes$grave$abuse$of$discretion.$
$ is$merely$a$policy.$It$cannot$override$the$demands$of$nationalism.[50]$
The$Filipino$First$Policy$is$a$product$of$Philippine$nationalism.$It$is$embodied$in$
the$1987$Constitution$not$merely$to$be$used$as$a$guideline$for$future$legislation$
but$primarily$to$be$enforced;$so$must$it$be$enforced.$This$Court$as$the$ultimate$
guardian$ of$ the$ Constitution$ will$ never$ shun,$ under$ any$ reasonable$
circumstance,$the$duty$of$upholding$the$majesty$of$the$Constitution$which$it$is$
tasked$to$defend.$It$is$worth$emphasizing$that$it$is$not$the$intention$of$this$Court$
to$impede$and$diminish,$much$less$undermine,$the$influx$of$foreign$investments.$
Far$ from$ it,$ the$ Court$ encourages$ and$ welcomes$ more$ business$ opportunities$
but$avowedly$sanctions$the$preference$for$Filipinos$whenever$such$preference$
is$ordained$by$the$Constitution.$The$position$of$the$Court$on$this$matter$could$
have$not$been$more$appropriately$articulated$by$Chief$Justice$Narvasa$S$
$
its$ judgment$ for$ that$ of$ the$ legislature$ or$ the$ executive$ about$ the$ wisdom$ and$
feasibility$ of$ legislation$ economic$ in$ nature,$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ has$ not$ been$
spared$criticism$for$decisions$perceived$as$obstacles$to$economic$progress$and$
development$ x$ x$ x$ x$ in$ connection$ with$ a$ temporary$ injunction$ issued$ by$ the$
Courts$ First$ Division$ against$ the$ sale$ of$ the$ Manila$ Hotel$ to$ a$ Malaysian$ Firm$
and$its$partner,$certain$statements$were$published$in$a$major$daily$to$the$effect$
that$that$injunction$again$demonstrates$that$the$Philippine$legal$system$can$be$a$
major$obstacle$to$doing$business$here.$
$
Let$it$be$stated$for$the$record$once$again$that$while$it$is$no$business$of$the$Court$
to$intervene$in$contracts$of$the$kind$referred$to$or$set$itself$up$as$the$judge$of$
whether$ they$ are$ viable$ or$ attainable,$ it$ is$ its$ bounden$ duty$ to$ make$ sure$ that$
implemented$ with$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$
jurisdiction.$ It$ will$ never$ shirk$ that$ duty,$ no$ matter$ how$ buffeted$ by$ winds$ of$
unfair$and$illSinformed$criticism.[48]$
$
Privatization$of$a$business$asset$for$purposes$of$enhancing$its$business$viability$
and$ preventing$ further$ losses,$ regardless$ of$ the$ character$ of$ the$ asset,$ should$
not$ take$ precedence$ over$ nonSmaterial$ values.$ A$ commercial,$ nay$ even$ a$
budgetary,$objective$should$not$be$pursued$at$the$expense$of$national$pride$and$
dignity.$ For$ the$ Constitution$ enshrines$ higher$ and$ nobler$ nonSmaterial$ values.$
Indeed,$the$Court$will$always$defer$to$the$Constitution$in$the$proper$governance$
as$to$draw$itself$beyond$judicial$review$when$the$Constitution$is$involved.[49]$
$
Nationalism$ is$ inherent$ in$ the$ very$ concept$ of$ the$ Philippines$ being$ a$
democratic$ and$ republican$ state,$ with$ sovereignty$ residing$ in$ the$ Filipino$
people$and$from$whom$all$government$authority$emanates.$In$nationalism,$the$
happiness$and$welfare$of$the$people$must$be$the$goal.$The$nationSstate$can$have$
no$ higher$ purpose.$ Any$ interpretation$ of$ any$ constitutional$ provision$ must$
adhere$to$such$basic$concept.$Protection$of$foreign$investments,$while$laudible,$
$
The$Manila$Hotel$or,$for$that$matter,$51%$of$the$MHC,$is$not$just$any$commodity$
to$be$sold$to$the$highest$bidder$solely$for$the$sake$of$privatization.$We$are$not$
talking$ about$ an$ ordinary$ piece$ of$ property$ in$ a$ commercial$ district.$ We$ are$
talking$about$a$historic$relic$that$has$hosted$many$of$the$most$important$events$
in$the$short$history$of$the$Philippines$as$a$nation.$We$are$talking$about$a$hotel$
where$ heads$ of$ states$ would$ prefer$ to$ be$ housed$ as$ a$ strong$ manifestation$ of$
their$ desire$ to$ cloak$ the$ dignity$ of$ the$ highest$ state$ function$ to$ their$ official$
visits$to$the$Philippines.$Thus$the$Manila$Hotel$has$played$and$continues$to$play$
a$ significant$ role$ as$ an$ authentic$ repository$ of$ twentieth$ century$ Philippine$
history$and$culture.$In$this$sense,$it$has$become$truly$a$reflection$of$the$Filipino$
soul$ S$ a$ place$ with$ a$ history$ of$ grandeur;$ a$ most$ historical$ setting$ that$ has$
played$a$part$in$the$shaping$of$a$country.[51]$
$
This$ Court$ cannot$ extract$ rhyme$ nor$ reason$ from$ the$ determined$ efforts$ of$
respondents$ to$ sell$ the$ historical$ landmark$ S$ this$ Grand$ Old$ Dame$ of$ hotels$ in$
Asia$S$to$a$total$stranger.$For,$indeed,$the$conveyance$of$this$epic$exponent$of$the$
Filipino$ psyche$ to$ alien$ hands$ cannot$ be$ less$ than$ mephistophelian$ for$ it$ is,$ in$
whatever$ manner$ viewed,$ a$ veritable$ alienation$ of$ a$ nations$ soul$ for$ some$
pieces$ of$ foreign$ silver.$ And$ so$ we$ ask:$ What$ advantage,$ which$ cannot$ be$
equally$drawn$from$a$qualified$Filipino,$can$be$gained$by$the$Filipinos$if$Manila$
Hotel$S$and$all$that$it$stands$for$S$is$sold$to$a$nonSFilipino?$How$much$of$national$
pride$will$vanish$if$the$nations$cultural$heritage$is$entrusted$to$a$foreign$entity?$
On$ the$ other$ hand,$ how$ much$ dignity$ will$ be$ preserved$ and$ realized$ if$ the$
national$ patrimony$ is$ safekept$ in$ the$ hands$ of$ a$ qualified,$ zealous$ and$ wellS
meaning$ Filipino?$ This$ is$ the$ plain$ and$ simple$ meaning$ of$ the$ Filipino$ First$
Policy$ provision$ of$ the$ Philippine$ Constitution.$ And$ this$ Court,$ heeding$ the$
clarion$ call$ of$ the$ Constitution$ and$ accepting$ the$ duty$ of$ being$ the$ elderly$
watchman$of$the$nation,$will$continue$to$respect$and$protect$the$sanctity$of$the$
Constitution.$
$
WHEREFORE,$ respondents$ GOVERNMENT$ SERVICE$ INSURANCE$ SYSTEM,$
MANILA$HOTEL$CORPORATION,$COMMITTEE$ON$PRIVATIZATION$and$OFFICE$
OF$ THE$ GOVERNMENT$ CORPORATE$ COUNSEL$ are$ directed$ to$ CEASE$ and$
DESIST$ from$ selling$ 51%$ of$ the$ shares$ of$ the$ Manila$ Hotel$ Corporation$ to$
RENONG$ BERHAD,$ and$ to$ ACCEPT$ the$ matching$ bid$ of$ petitioner$ MANILA$
PRINCE$HOTEL$CORPORATION$to$purchase$the$subject$51%$of$the$shares$of$the$
Manila$ Hotel$ Corporation$ at$ P44.00$ per$ share$ and$ thereafter$ to$ execute$ the$
necessary$ agreements$ and$ documents$ to$ effect$ the$ sale,$ to$ issue$ the$ necessary$
clearances$ and$ to$ do$ such$ other$ acts$ and$ deeds$ as$ may$ be$ necessary$ for$ the$
purpose.$
$
SO$ORDERED.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$160261$$$$$$$$$$$$$November$10,$2003$ SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$
$ $
ERNESTO$B.$FRANCISCO,$JR.,$petitioner,$$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
NAGMAMALASAKIT$ NA$ MGA$ MANANANGGOL$ NG$ MGA$ MANGGAGAWANG$ $
PILIPINO,$INC.,$ITS$OFFICERS$AND$MEMBERS,$petitionerSinSintervention,$ G.R.$No.$160277$November$10,$2003$
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ $
petitionerSinSintervention,$$ FRANCISCO$I.$CHAVEZ,$petitioner,$
vs.$ WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ petitionerSinSintervention,$$
VENECIA,$THE$SENATE,$REPRESENTED$BY$SENATE$PRESIDENT$FRANKLIN$M.$ vs.$
DRILON,$ REPRESENTATIVE$ GILBERTO$ C.$ TEODORO,$ JR.$ AND$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ IN$ HIS$ CAPACITY$ AS$ SPEAKER$ OF$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$
REPRESENTATIVE$FELIX$WILLIAM$B.$FUENTEBELLA,$respondents.$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ FRANKLIN$ M.$ DRILON,$ IN$ HIS$ CAPACITY$ AS$ PRESIDENT$
JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSIntervention,$ OF$THE$SENATE$OF$THE$REPUBLIC$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$GILBERT$TEODORO,$
SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$ JR.,$ FELIX$ WILLIAM$ FUENTEBELLA,$ JULIO$ LEDESMA$ IV,$ HENRY$ LANOT,$ KIM$
$ BERNARDOSLOKIN,$ MARCELINO$ LIBANAN,$ EMMYLOU$ TALIOSSANTOS,$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ DOUGLAS$ CAGAS,$ SHERWIN$ GATCHALIAN,$ LUIS$ BERSAMIN,$ JR.,$ NERISSA$
$ SOONSRUIZ,$ ERNESTO$ NIEVA,$ EDGAR$ ERICE,$ ISMAEL$ MATHAY,$ SAMUEL$
G.R.$No.$160262$November$10,$2003$ DANGWA,$ ALFREDO$ MARAON,$ JR.,$ CECILIA$ CARREONSJALOSJOS,$ AGAPITO$
$ AQUINO,$ FAUSTO$ SEACHON,$ JR.,$ GEORGILU$ YUMULSHERMIDA,$ JOSE$ CARLOS$
SEDFREY$ M.$ CANDELARIA,$ CARLOS$ P.$ MEDINA,$ JR.$ AND$ HENEDINA$ RAZONS LACSON,$MANUEL$ORTEGA,$ULIRAN$JUAQUIN,$SORAYA$JAAFAR,$WILHELMINO$
ABAD,$petitioners,$ SYSALVARADO,$CLAUDE$BAUTISTA,$DEL$DE$GUZMAN,$ZENAIDA$CRUZSDUCUT,$
ATTYS.$ROMULO$B.$MACALINTAL$AND$PETE$QUIRINO$QUADRA,$petitionersSinS AUGUSTO$ BACULIO,$ FAUSTINO$ DY$ III,$ AUGUSTO$ SYJUCO,$ ROZZANO$ RUFINO$
intervention,$ BIAZON,$ LEOVIGILDO$ BANAAG,$ ERIC$ SINGSON,$ JACINTO$ PARAS,$ JOSE$ SOLIS,$
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ RENATO$ MATUBO,$ HERMINO$ TEVES,$ AMADO$ ESPINO,$ JR.,$ EMILIO$ MACIAS,$
petitionerSinSintervention,$$ ARTHUR$PINGOY,$JR.,$FRANCIS$NEPOMUCENO,$CONRADO$ESTRELLA$III,$ELIAS$
vs.$ BULUT,$JR.,$JURDIN$ROMUALDO,$JUAN$PABLO$BONDOC,$GENEROSO$TULAGAN,$
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ THROUGH$ THE$ SPEAKER$ OR$ ACTING$ PERPETUO$ YLAGAN,$ MICHAEL$ DUAVIT,$ JOSEPH$ DURANO,$ JESLI$ LAPUS,$
SPEAKER$ OR$ PRESIDING$ OFFICER,$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ CARLOS$ COJUANGCO,$ GIORGIDI$ AGGABAO,$ FRANCIS$ ESCUDERRO,$ RENE$
REPRESENTATIVE$ GILBERTO$ G.$ TEODORO,$ JR.,$ REPRESENTASTIVE$ FELIX$ VELARDE,$ CELSO$ LOBREGAT,$ ALIPIO$ BADELLES,$ DIDAGEN$ DILANGALEN,$
WILLIAM$B.$FUENTEBELLA,$THE$SENATE$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$THROUGH$ITS$ ABRAHAM$MITRA,$JOSEPH$SANTIAGO,$DARLENE$ANTONIOSCUSTODIO,$ALETA$
PRESIDENT,$SENATE$PRESIDENT$FRANKLIN$M.$DRILON,$respondents,$ SUAREZ,$RODOLF$PLAZA,$JV$BAUTISTA,$GREGORIO$IPONG,$GILBERT$REMULLA,$
JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSintervention,$ ROLEX$ SUPLICO,$ CELIA$ LAYUS,$ JUAN$ MIGUEL$ ZUBIRI,$ BENASING$
SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$ MACARAMBON,$ JR.,$ JOSEFINA$ JOSON,$ MARK$ COJUANGCO,$ MAURICIO$
$ DOMOGAN,$ RONALDO$ ZAMORA,$ ANGELO$ MONTILLA,$ ROSELLER$ BARINAGA,$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ JESNAR$ FALCON,$ REYLINA$ NICOLAS,$ RODOLFO$ ALBANO,$ JOAQUIN$ CHIPECO,$
$ JR.,$AND$RUY$ELIAS$LOPEZ,$respondents,$
G.R.$No.$160263$November$10,$2003$ JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSintervention,$
$ SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$
ARTURO$M.$DE$CASTRO$AND$SOLEDAD$M.$CAGAMPANG,$petitioners,$ $
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
petitionersSinSintervention,$$ $
vs.$ G.R.$No.$160292$November$10,$2003$
FRANKLIN$M.$DRILON,$IN$HIS$CAPACITY$AS$SENATE$PRESIDENT,$AND$JOSE$G.$ $
DE$ VENECIA,$ JR.,$ IN$ HIS$ CAPACITY$ AS$ SPEAKER$ OF$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ HERMINIO$ HARRY$ L.$ ROQUE,$ JR.,$ JOEL$ RUIZ$ BUTUYAN,$ MA.$ CECILIA$ PAPA,$
REPRESENTATIVES,$respondents,$ NAPOLEON$ C.$ REYES,$ ANTONIO$ H.$ ABAD,$ JR.,$ ALFREDO$ C.$ LIGON,$ JOAN$ P.$
JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSintervention,$ SERRANO$AND$GARY$S.$MALLARI,$petitioners,$
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ vs.$
petitionerSinSintervention,$$ THE$HOUSE$OF$REPRESENTATIVES,$REPRESENTED$BY$HON.$SPEAKER$JOSE$C.$
vs.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ JR.,$ THE$ SENATE,$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ HON.$ SENATE$ PRESIDENT$
HON.$SPEAKER$JOSE$G.$DE$VENECIA,$JR.$AND$ROBERTO$P.$NAZARENO,$IN$HIS$ FRANKLIN$DRILON,$HON.$FELIX$FUENTEBELLA,$ET$AL.,$respondents.$
CAPACITY$ AS$ SECRETARY$ GENERAL$ OF$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ $
AND$THE$HOUSE$OF$REPRESENTATIVES,$respondents,$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSintervention,$ $
SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$ G.R.$No.$160318$November$10,$2003$
$ $
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ PUBLIC$INTEREST$CENTER,$INC.,$CRISPIN$T.$REYES,$petitioners,$$
$ vs.$
G.R.$No.$160295$November$10,$2003$ HON.$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ ALL$ MEMBERS,$ HOUSE$ OF$
$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ HON.$ SENATE$ PRESIDENT$ FRANKLIN$ M.$ DRILON,$ AND$
SALACNIB$ F.$ BATERINA$ AND$ DEPUTY$ SPEAKER$ RAUL$ M.$ GONZALES,$ ALL$MEMBERS,$PHILIPPINE$SENATE,$respondents.$
petitioners,$ $
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
petitionerSinSintervention,$ $
$ G.R.$No.$160342$November$10,$2003$
vs.$ $
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENSTATIVES,$ THROUGH$ THE$ SPEAKER$ OR$ ACTING$ ATTY.$ FERNANDO$ P.R.$ PERITO,$ IN$ HIS$ CAPACITY$ AS$ A$ MEMBER$ OF$ THE$
SPEAKER$ OR$ PRESIDING$ OFFICER,$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ INTEGRATED$ BAR$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ MANILA$ III,$ AND$ ENGR.$ MAXIMO$ N.$
REPRESENTATIVE$ GILBERTO$ G.$ TEODORO,$ JR.,$ REPRESENTATIVE$ FELIX$ MENEZ$ JR.,$ IN$ HIS$ CAPACITY$ AS$ A$ TAXPAYER$ AND$ MEMBER$ OF$ THE$
WILLIAM$B.$FUENTEBELLA,$THE$SENATE$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$THROUGH$ITS$ ENGINEERING$PROFESSION,$petitioners,$$
PRESIDENT,$SENATE$PRESIDENT$FRANKLIN$M.$DRILON,$respondents,$ vs.$
JAIME$N.$SORIANO,$respondentSinSintervention,$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTASTIVES$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ THE$ 83$ HONORABLE$
SENATOR$AQUILINO$Q.$PIMENTEL,$respondentSinSintervention.$ MEMBERS$ OF$ THE$ HOUSE$ LED$ BY$ HON.$ REPRESENTATIVE$ WILLIAM$
$ FUENTEBELLA,$respondents.$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $
$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
G.R.$No.$160310$November$10,$2003$ $
$ G.R.$No.$160343$November$10,$2003$
LEONILO$R.$ALFONSO,$PETER$ALVAREZ,$SAMUEL$DOCTOR,$MELVIN$MATIBAG,$ $
RAMON$ MIQUIBAS,$ RODOLFO$ MAGSINO,$ EDUARDO$ MALASAGA,$ EDUARDO$ INTEGRATED$BAR$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$petitioner,$$
SARMIENTO,$ EDGARDO$ NAOE,$ LEONARDO$ GARCIA,$ EDGARD$ SMITH,$ vs.$
EMETERIO$ MENDIOLA,$ MARIO$ TOREJA,$ GUILLERMO$ CASTASUS,$ NELSON$ A.$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTASTIVES,$ THROUGH$ THE$ SPEAKER$ OR$ ACTING$
LOYOLA,$ WILFREDO$ BELLO,$ JR.,$ RONNIE$ TOQUILLO,$ KATE$ ANN$ VITAL,$ SPEAKER$ OR$ PRESIDING$ OFFICER,$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$
ANGELITA$ Q.$ GUZMAN,$ MONICO$ PABLES,$ JR.,$ JAIME$ BOAQUINA,$ LITA$ A.$ REPRESENTATIVE$ GILBERTO$ G.$ TEODORO,$ JR.,$ REPRESENTATIVE$ FELIX$
AQUINO,$ MILA$ P.$ GABITO,$ JANETTE$ ARROYO,$ RIZALDY$ EMPIG,$ ERNA$ LAHUZ,$ WILLIAM$B.$FUENTEBELLA,$THE$SENATE$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES$THROUGH$ITS$
HOMER$CALIBAG,$DR.$BING$ARCE,$SIMEON$ARCE,$JR.,$EL$DELLE$ARCE,$WILLIE$ PRESIDENT,$SENATE$PRESIDENT$FRANKLIN$M.$DRILON,$respondents.$
RIVERO,$ DANTE$ DIAZ,$ ALBERTO$ BUENAVISTA,$ FAUSTO$ BUENAVISTA,$ EMILY$ $
SENERIS,$ ANNA$ CLARISSA$ LOYOLA,$ SALVACION$ LOYOLA,$ RAINIER$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
QUIROLGICO,$JOSEPH$LEANDRO$LOYOLA,$ANTONIO$LIBREA,$FILEMON$SIBULO,$ $
MANUEL$ D.$ COMIA,$ JULITO$ U.$ SOON,$ VIRGILIO$ LUSTRE,$ AND$ NOEL$ ISORENA,$ G.R.$No.$160360$November$10,$2003$
MAU$RESTRIVERA,$MAX$VILLAESTER,$AND$EDILBERTO$GALLOR,$petitioners,$ $
WORLD$ WAR$ II$ VETERANS$ LEGIONARIES$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.,$ CLARO$B.$FLORES,$petitioner,$$
petitionerSinSintervention,$$ vs.$
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES$ THROUGH$ THE$ SPEAKER,$ AND$ THE$ G.R.$No.$160392$November$10,$2003$
SENATE$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ THROUGH$ THE$ SENATE$ PRESIDENT,$ $
respondents.$ VENICIO$S.$FLORES$AND$HECTOR$L.$HOFILEA,$petitioners,$$
$ vs.$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ THE$HOUSE$OF$REPRESENTATIVES,$THROUGH$SPEAKER$JOSE$G.$DE$VENECIA,$
$ AND$ THE$ SENATE$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ THROUGH$ SENATE$ PRESIDENT$
G.R.$No.$160365$November$10,$2003$ FRANKLIN$DRILON,$respondents.$
$ $
U.P.$ LAW$ ALUMNI$ CEBU$ FOUNDATION,$ INC.,$ GOERING$ G.C.$ PADERANGA,$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
DANILO$V.$ORTIZ,$GLORIA$C.$ESTENZOSRAMOS,$LIZA$D.$CORRO,$LUIS$V.$DIORES,$ $
SR.,$ BENJAMIN$ S.$ RALLON,$ ROLANDO$ P.$ NONATO,$ DANTE$ T.$ RAMOS,$ ELSA$ R.$ G.R.$No.$160397$November$10,$2003$
DIVINAGRACIA,$ KAREN$ B.$ CAPARROSSARQUILLANO,$ SYLVA$ G.$ AGUIRRES $
PADERANGA,$FOR$THEMSELVES$AND$IN$BEHALF$OF$OTHER$CITIZENS$OF$THE$ IN$THE$MATTER$OF$THE$IMPEACHMENT$COMPLAINT$AGAINST$CHIEF$JUSTICE$
REPUBLIC$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$petitioners,$$ HILARIO$G.$DAVIDE,$JR.,$ATTY.$DIOSCORO$U.$VALLEJOS,$JR.,$petitioner.$
vs.$ $
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTASTIVES,$ SPEAKER$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ THE$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
SENATE$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$SENATE$PRESIDENT$FRANKLIN$DRILON,$HOUSE$ $
REPRESENTATIVES$ FELIX$ FUENTEBELLA$ AND$ GILBERTO$ TEODORO,$ BY$ G.R.$No.$160403$November$10,$2003$
THEMSELVES$AND$AS$REPRESENTATIVES$OF$THE$GROUP$OF$MORE$THAN$80$ $
HOUSE$ REPRESENTATIVES$ WHO$ SIGNED$ AND$ FILED$ THE$ IMPEACHMENT$ PHILIPPINE$BAR$ASSOCIATION,$petitioner,$$
COMPLAINT$AGAINST$SUPREME$COURT$CHIEF$JUSTICE$HILARIO$G.$DAVIDE,$JR.$ vs.$
respondents.$ THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ THROUGH$ THE$ SPEAKER$ OR$ PRESIDING$
$ OFFICER,$ HON.$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ VENECIA,$ REPRESENTATIVE$ GILBERTO$ G.$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ TEODORO,$ JR.,$ REPRESENTATIVE$ FELIX$ WILLIAM$ B.$ FUENTEBELA,$ THE$
$ SENATE$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ THROUGH$ SENATE$ PRESIDENT,$ HON.$
G.R.$No.$160370$November$10,$2003$ FRANKLIN$DRILON,$respondents.$
$ $
FR.$RANHILIO$CALLANGAN$AQUINO,$petitioner,$$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
vs.$ $
THE$HONORABLE$PRESIDENT$OF$THE$SENATE,$THE$HONORABLE$SPEAKER$OF$ G.R.$No.$160405$November$10,$2003$
THE$HOUSE$OF$REPRESENTATIVES,$respondents.$ $
$ DEMOCRITO$C.$BARCENAS,$PRESIDENT$OF$IBP,$CEBU$CITY$CHAPTER,$MANUEL$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ M.$ MONZON,$ PRESIDING$ OF$ IBP,$ CEBU$ PROVINCE,$ VICTOR$ A.$ MAAMBONG,$
$ PROVINCIAL$BOARD$MEMBER,$ADELINO$B.$SITOY,$DEAN$OF$THE$COLLEG$EOF$
G.R.$No.$160376$November$10,$2003$ LAW,$ UNIVERSITY$ OF$ CEBU,$ YOUNG$ LAWYERS$ ASSOCAITION$ OF$ CEBU,$ INC.$
$ [YLAC],$ REPRSEENTED$ BY$ ATTY.$ MANUEL$ LEGASPI,$ CONFEDERATION$ OF$
NILO$A.$MALANYAON,$petitioner,$$ ACCREDITED$ MEDIATORS$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INC.$ [CAMP,$ INC],$
vs.$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ RODERIC$ R.$ POCA,$ MANDAUE$ LAWYERS$ ASSOCIATION,$
HON.$ FELIX$ WILLIAM$ FUENTEBELLA$ AND$ GILBERT$ TEODORO,$ IN$ [MANLAW],$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ FELIPE$ VELASQUEZ,$ FEDERACION$
REPRESENTATION$ OF$ THE$ 86$ SIGNATORIES$ OF$ THE$ ARTICLES$ OF$ INTERNACIONAL$ DE$ ABOGADAS$ [FIDA],$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ THELMA$ L.$
IMPEACHMENT$ AGAINST$ CHIEF$ JUSTICE$ HILARIO$ G.$ DAVIDE,$ JR.$ AND$ THE$ JORDAN,$ CARLOS$ G.$ CO,$ PRESIENT$ OF$ CEBU$ CHAMBER$ OF$ COMMERCE$ AND$
HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTATIVES,$ CONGRESS$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ INDUSTRY$ AND$ CEBU$ LADY$ LAWYERS$ ASSOCIATION,$ INC.$ [CELLA,$ INC.],$
REPRESENTED$BY$ITS$SPEAKER,$HON.$JOSE$G.$DE$VENECIA,$respondents.$ MARIBELLE$ NAVARRO$ AND$ BERNARDITO$ FLORIDO,$ PAST$ PRESIDENT$ CEBU$
$ CHAMBER$OF$COMMERCE$AND$INTEGRATED$BAR$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$CEBU$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ CHAPTER,$petitioners,$$
$ vs.$
THE$ HOUSE$ OF$ REPRESENTASTIVES,$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ REP.$ JOSE$ G.$ DE$ good$of$the$people,$mandate$a$relationship$of$interdependence$and$coordination$
VENECIA,$AS$HOUSE$SPEAKER$AND$THE$SENATE,$REPRESENTED$BY$SENATOR$ among$ these$ branches$ where$ the$ delicate$ functions$ of$ enacting,$ interpreting$
FRANKLIN$DRILON,$AS$SENATE$PRESIDENT,$respondents.$ and$ enforcing$ laws$ are$ harmonized$ to$ achieve$ a$ unity$ of$ governance,$ guided$
$ only$by$what$is$in$the$greater$interest$and$wellSbeing$of$the$people.$Verily,$salus$
CARPIO$MORALES,$J.:$ populi$est$suprema$lex.$
$ $
There$ can$ be$ no$ constitutional$ crisis$ arising$ from$ a$ conflict,$ no$ matter$ how$ Article$XI$of$our$present$1987$Constitution$provides:$
passionate$ and$ seemingly$ irreconcilable$ it$ may$ appear$ to$ be,$ over$ the$ $
determination$by$the$independent$branches$of$government$of$the$nature,$scope$ ARTICLE$XI$
and$ extent$ of$ their$ respective$ constitutional$ powers$ where$ the$ Constitution$ $
itself$provides$for$the$means$and$bases$for$its$resolution.$ Accountability$of$Public$Officers$
$ $
Our$ nation's$ history$ is$ replete$ with$ vivid$ illustrations$ of$ the$ often$ frictional,$ at$ SECTION$1.$Public$office$is$a$public$trust.$Public$officers$and$employees$must$at$
times$ turbulent,$ dynamics$ of$ the$ relationship$ among$ these$ coSequal$ branches.$ all$ times$ be$ accountable$ to$ the$ people,$ serve$ them$ with$ utmost$ responsibility,$
This$ Court$ is$ confronted$ with$ one$ such$ today$ involving$ the$ legislature$ and$ the$ integrity,$loyalty,$and$efficiency,$act$with$patriotism$and$justice,$and$lead$modest$
judiciary$which$has$drawn$legal$luminaries$to$chart$antipodal$courses$and$not$a$ lives.$
few$of$our$countrymen$to$vent$cacophonous$sentiments$thereon.$ $
$ SECTION$ 2.$ The$ President,$ the$ ViceSPresident,$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ Supreme$
There$ may$ indeed$ be$ some$ legitimacy$ to$ the$ characterization$ that$ the$ present$ Court,$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Commissions,$ and$ the$ Ombudsman$
controversy$ subject$ of$ the$ instant$ petitions$ $ whether$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ second$ may$ be$ removed$ from$ office,$ on$ impeachment$ for,$ and$ conviction$ of,$ culpable$
impeachment$ complaint$ against$ Chief$ Justice$ Hilario$ G.$ Davide,$ Jr.$ with$ the$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ treason,$ bribery,$ graft$ and$ corruption,$ other$ high$
House$ of$ Representatives$ falls$ within$ the$ one$ year$ bar$ provided$ in$ the$ crimes,$or$betrayal$of$public$trust.$All$other$public$officers$and$employees$may$
Constitution,$ and$ whether$ the$ resolution$ thereof$ is$ a$ political$ question$ $ has$ be$removed$from$office$as$provided$by$law,$but$not$by$impeachment.$
resulted$ in$ a$ political$ crisis.$ Perhaps$ even$ more$ truth$ to$ the$ view$ that$ it$ was$ $
brought$upon$by$a$political$crisis$of$conscience.$ SECTION$3.$(1)$The$House$of$Representatives$shall$have$the$exclusive$power$to$
$ initiate$all$cases$of$impeachment.$
In$any$event,$it$is$with$the$absolute$certainty$that$our$Constitution$is$sufficient$ $
to$ address$ all$ the$ issues$ which$ this$ controversy$ spawns$ that$ this$ Court$ (2)$ A$ verified$ complaint$ for$ impeachment$ may$ be$ filed$ by$ any$ Member$ of$ the$
unequivocally$pronounces,$at$the$first$instance,$that$the$feared$resort$to$extraS House$of$Representatives$or$by$any$citizen$upon$a$resolution$of$endorsement$by$
constitutional$ methods$ of$ resolving$ it$ is$ neither$ necessary$ nor$ legally$ any$Member$thereof,$which$shall$be$included$in$the$Order$of$Business$within$ten$
permissible.$ Both$ its$ resolution$ and$ protection$ of$ the$ public$ interest$ lie$ in$ session$ days,$ and$ referred$ to$ the$ proper$ Committee$ within$ three$ session$ days$
adherence$to,$not$departure$from,$the$Constitution.$ thereafter.$ The$ Committee,$ after$ hearing,$ and$ by$ a$ majority$ vote$ of$ all$ its$
$ Members,$ shall$ submit$ its$ report$ to$ the$ House$ within$ sixty$ session$ days$ from$
In$ passing$ over$ the$ complex$ issues$ arising$ from$ the$ controversy,$ this$ Court$ is$ such$ referral,$ together$ with$ the$ corresponding$ resolution.$ The$ resolution$ shall$
ever$ mindful$ of$ the$ essential$ truth$ that$ the$ inviolate$ doctrine$ of$ separation$ of$ be$ calendared$ for$ consideration$ by$ the$ House$ within$ ten$ session$ days$ from$
powers$among$the$legislative,$executive$or$judicial$branches$of$government$by$ receipt$thereof.$
no$means$prescribes$for$absolute$autonomy$in$the$discharge$by$each$of$that$part$ $
of$the$governmental$power$assigned$to$it$by$the$sovereign$people.$ (3)$ A$ vote$ of$ at$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ House$ shall$ be$
$ necessary$ either$ to$ affirm$ a$ favorable$ resolution$ with$ the$ Articles$ of$
At$the$same$time,$the$corollary$doctrine$of$checks$and$balances$which$has$been$ Impeachment$of$the$Committee,$or$override$its$contrary$resolution.$The$vote$of$
carefully$ calibrated$ by$ the$ Constitution$ to$ temper$ the$ official$ acts$ of$ each$ of$ each$Member$shall$be$recorded.$
these$ three$ branches$ must$ be$ given$ effect$ without$ destroying$ their$ $
indispensable$coSequality.$ (4)$ In$ case$ the$ verified$ complaint$ or$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ is$ filed$ by$ at$
$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ House,$ the$ same$ shall$ constitute$ the$
Taken$ together,$ these$ two$ fundamental$ doctrines$ of$ republican$ government,$ Articles$of$Impeachment,$and$trial$by$the$Senate$shall$forthwith$proceed.$
intended$as$they$are$to$insure$that$governmental$power$is$wielded$only$for$the$ $
(5)$ No$ impeachment$ proceedings$ shall$ be$ initiated$ against$ the$ same$ official$ resolution$ of$ endorsement$ against$ an$ impeachable$ officer,$ impeachment$
more$than$once$within$a$period$of$one$year.$ proceedings$against$such$official$are$deemed$initiated$on$the$day$the$Committee$
$ on$ Justice$ finds$ that$ the$ verified$ complaint$ and/or$ resolution$ against$ such$
(6)$ The$ Senate$ shall$ have$ the$ sole$ power$ to$ try$ and$ decide$ all$ cases$ of$ official,$as$the$case$may$be,$is$sufficient$in$substance,$or$on$the$date$the$House$
impeachment.$ When$ sitting$ for$ that$ purpose,$ the$ Senators$ shall$ be$ on$ oath$ or$ votes$ to$ overturn$ or$ affirm$ the$ finding$ of$ the$ said$ Committee$ that$ the$ verified$
affirmation.$When$the$President$of$the$Philippines$is$on$trial,$the$Chief$Justice$of$ complaint$and/or$resolution,$as$the$case$may$be,$is$not$sufficient$in$substance.$
the$Supreme$Court$shall$preside,$but$shall$not$vote.$No$person$shall$be$convicted$ $
without$the$concurrence$of$twoSthirds$of$all$the$Members$of$the$Senate.$ In$ cases$ where$ a$ verified$ complaint$ or$ a$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ is$ filed$ or$
$ endorsed,$as$the$case$may$be,$by$at$least$oneSthird$(1/3)$of$the$Members$of$the$
(7)$ Judgment$ in$ cases$ of$ impeachment$ shall$ not$ extend$ further$ than$ removal$ House,$impeachment$proceedings$are$deemed$initiated$at$the$time$of$the$filing$
from$ office$ and$ disqualification$ to$ hold$ any$ office$ under$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ of$ such$ verified$ complaint$ or$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ with$ the$ Secretary$
Philippines,$ but$ the$ party$ convicted$ shall$ nevertheless$ be$ liable$ and$ subject$ to$ General.$
prosecution,$trial,$and$punishment$according$to$law.$ $
$ $$
(8)$The$Congress$shall$promulgate$its$rules$on$impeachment$to$effectively$carry$ $
out$the$purpose$of$this$section.$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$ RULE$V$
$ $
Following$the$aboveSquoted$Section$8$of$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution,$the$12th$ BAR$AGAINST$IMPEACHMENT$
Congress$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ adopted$ and$ approved$ the$ Rules$ of$ $
Procedure$ in$ Impeachment$ Proceedings$ (House$ Impeachment$ Rules)$ on$ Section$ 14.$ Scope$ of$ Bar.$ $ No$ impeachment$ proceedings$ shall$ be$ initiated$
November$ 28,$ 2001,$ superseding$ the$ previous$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules1$ against$the$same$official$more$than$once$within$the$period$of$one$(1)$year.$
approved$ by$ the$ 11th$ Congress.$ The$ relevant$ distinctions$ between$ these$ two$ $
Congresses'$House$Impeachment$Rules$are$shown$in$the$following$tabulation:$ Section$ 17.$ Bar$ Against$ Initiation$ Of$ Impeachment$ Proceedings.$ $ Within$ a$
$ period$ of$ one$ (1)$ year$ from$ the$ date$ impeachment$ proceedings$ are$ deemed$
11TH$CONGRESS$RULES$ initiated$ as$ provided$ in$ Section$ 16$ hereof,$ no$ impeachment$ proceedings,$ as$
$ such,$can$be$initiated$against$the$same$official.$(Italics$in$the$original;$emphasis$
12TH$CONGRESS$NEW$RULES$ and$underscoring$supplied)$
$ $
RULE$II$ On$ July$ 22,$ 2002,$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ adopted$ a$ Resolution,2$
$ sponsored$ by$ Representative$ Felix$ William$ D.$ Fuentebella,$ which$ directed$ the$
INITIATING$IMPEACHMENT$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ "to$ conduct$ an$ investigation,$ in$ aid$ of$ legislation,$ on$ the$
$ manner$of$disbursements$and$expenditures$by$the$Chief$Justice$of$the$Supreme$
Section$ 2.$ Mode$ of$ Initiating$ Impeachment.$ $ Impeachment$ shall$ be$ initiated$ Court$of$the$Judiciary$Development$Fund$(JDF)."3$
only$by$a$verified$complaint$for$impeachment$filed$by$any$Member$of$the$House$ $
of$ Representatives$ or$ by$ any$ citizen$ upon$ a$ resolution$ of$ endorsement$ by$ any$ On$ June$ 2,$ 2003,$ former$ President$ Joseph$ E.$ Estrada$ filed$ an$ impeachment$
Member$ thereof$ or$ by$ a$ verified$ complaint$ or$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ filed$ complaint4$ (first$ impeachment$ complaint)$ against$ Chief$ Justice$ Hilario$ G.$
by$at$least$oneSthird$(1/3)$of$all$the$Members$of$the$House.$ Davide$Jr.$and$seven$Associate$Justices5$of$this$Court$for$"culpable$violation$of$
$ the$ Constitution,$ betrayal$ of$ the$ public$ trust$ and$ other$ high$ crimes."6$ The$
RULE$V$ complaint$ was$ endorsed$ by$ Representatives$ Rolex$ T.$ Suplico,$ Ronaldo$ B.$
$ Zamora$ and$ Didagen$ Piang$ Dilangalen,7$ and$ was$ referred$ to$ the$ House$
BAR$ AGAINST$ INITIATION$ OF$ IMPEACHMENT$ PROCEEDINGS$ AGAINST$ THE$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ on$ August$ 5,$ 20038$ in$ accordance$ with$ Section$ 3(2)$ of$
SAME$OFFICIAL$ Article$XI$of$the$Constitution$which$reads:$
$ $
Section$ 16.$ $ Impeachment$ Proceedings$ Deemed$ Initiated.$ $ In$ cases$ where$ a$ Section$3(2)$A$verified$complaint$for$impeachment$may$be$filed$by$any$Member$
Member$of$the$House$files$a$verified$complaint$of$impeachment$or$a$citizen$files$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ or$ by$ any$ citizen$ upon$ a$ resolution$ of$
a$ verified$ complaint$ that$ is$ endorsed$ by$ a$ Member$ of$ the$ House$ through$ a$ endorsement$ by$ any$ Member$ thereof,$ which$ shall$ be$ included$ in$ the$ Order$ of$
Business$within$ten$session$days,$and$referred$to$the$proper$Committee$within$
three$ session$ days$ thereafter.$ The$ Committee,$ after$ hearing,$ and$ by$ a$ majority$
vote$of$all$its$Members,$shall$submit$its$report$to$the$House$within$sixty$session$
days$ from$ such$ referral,$ together$ with$ the$ corresponding$ resolution.$ The$
resolution$shall$be$calendared$for$consideration$by$the$House$within$ten$session$
days$from$receipt$thereof.$
$ "perpetually"$ prohibiting$ respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ from$ filing$ any$
The$ House$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ ruled$ on$ October$ 13,$ 2003$ that$ the$ first$
impeachment$ complaint$ was$ "sufficient$ in$ form,"9$ but$ voted$ to$ dismiss$ the$
same$ on$ October$ 22,$ 2003$ for$ being$ insufficient$ in$ substance.10$ To$ date,$ the$
Committee$Report$to$this$effect$has$not$yet$been$sent$to$the$House$in$plenary$in$
accordance$with$the$said$Section$3(2)$of$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution.$
$ $
Four$ months$ and$ three$ weeks$ since$ the$ filing$ on$ June$ 2,$ 2003$ of$ the$ first$
complaint$or$on$October$23,$2003,$a$day$after$the$House$Committee$on$Justice$
voted$ to$ dismiss$ it,$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint11$ was$ filed$ with$ the$
Secretary$ General$ of$ the$ House12$ by$ Representatives$ Gilberto$ C.$ Teodoro,$ Jr.$
(First$ District,$ Tarlac)$ and$ Felix$ William$ B.$ Fuentebella$ (Third$ District,$
Camarines$ Sur)$ against$ Chief$ Justice$ Hilario$ G.$ Davide,$ Jr.,$ founded$ on$ the$
alleged$ results$ of$ the$ legislative$ inquiry$ initiated$ by$ aboveSmentioned$ House$
Resolution.$ This$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ was$ accompanied$ by$ a$
"Resolution$ of$ Endorsement/Impeachment"$ signed$ by$ at$ least$ oneSthird$ (1/3)$
of$all$the$Members$of$the$House$of$Representatives.13$
$ of$ Chavez$ v.$ PCGG15$ and$ Chavez$ v.$ PEASAmari$ Coastal$ Bay$ Development$
Thus$ arose$ the$ instant$ petitions$ against$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives,$ et.$ al.,$
most$ of$ which$ petitions$ contend$ that$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ second$ impeachment$
complaint$is$unconstitutional$as$it$violates$the$provision$of$Section$5$of$Article$
XI$ of$ the$ Constitution$ that$ "[n]o$ impeachment$ proceedings$ shall$ be$ initiated$
against$the$same$official$more$than$once$within$a$period$of$one$year."$
$ order$prohibiting$respondent$House$of$Representatives$from$drafting,$adopting,$
In$G.R.$No.$160261,$petitioner$Atty.$Ernesto$B.$Francisco,$Jr.,$alleging$that$he$has$
a$duty$as$a$member$of$the$Integrated$Bar$of$the$Philippines$to$use$all$available$
legal$remedies$to$stop$an$unconstitutional$impeachment,$that$the$issues$raised$
in$ his$ petition$ for$ Certiorari,$ Prohibition$ and$ Mandamus$ are$ of$ transcendental$
importance,$ and$ that$ he$ "himself$ was$ a$ victim$ of$ the$ capricious$ and$ arbitrary$
changes$ in$ the$ Rules$ of$ Procedure$ in$ Impeachment$ Proceedings$ introduced$ by$
the$12th$Congress,"14$posits$that$his$right$to$bring$an$impeachment$complaint$
against$ then$ Ombudsman$ Aniano$ Desierto$ had$ been$ violated$ due$ to$ the$
capricious$and$arbitrary$changes$in$the$House$Impeachment$Rules$adopted$and$
approved$ on$ November$ 28,$ 2001$ by$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ and$ prays$
that$(1)$Rule$V,$Sections$16$and$17$and$Rule$III,$Sections$5,$6,$7,$8,$and$9$thereof$
be$declared$unconstitutional;$(2)$this$Court$issue$a$writ$of$mandamus$directing$
respondents$House$of$Representatives$et.$al.$to$comply$with$Article$IX,$Section$3$
(2),$ (3)$ and$ (5)$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ to$ return$ the$ second$ impeachment$
complaint$and/or$strike$it$off$the$records$of$the$House$of$Representatives,$and$
to$ promulgate$ rules$ which$ are$ consistent$ with$ the$ Constitution;$ and$ (3)$ this$
Court$ permanently$ enjoin$ respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ from$
proceeding$with$the$second$impeachment$complaint.$
$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160262,$ petitioners$ Sedfrey$ M.$ Candelaria,$ et.$ al.,$ as$ citizens$ and$
taxpayers,$alleging$that$the$issues$of$the$case$are$of$transcendental$importance,$
pray,$ in$ their$ petition$ for$ Certiorari/Prohibition,$ the$ issuance$ of$ a$ writ$
Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ against$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ with$ the$ Senate;$ and$ for$ the$
issuance$ of$ a$ writ$ "perpetually"$ prohibiting$ respondents$ Senate$ and$ Senate$
President$ Franklin$ Drilon$ from$ accepting$ any$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ against$
the$ Chief$ Justice$ or,$ in$ the$ event$ that$ the$ Senate$ has$ accepted$ the$ same,$ from$
proceeding$with$the$impeachment$trial.$
In$G.R.$No.$160263,$petitioners$Arturo$M.$de$Castro$and$Soledad$Cagampang,$as$
citizens,$ taxpayers,$ lawyers$ and$ members$ of$ the$ Integrated$ Bar$ of$ the$
Philippines,$ alleging$ that$ their$ petition$ for$ Prohibition$ involves$ public$ interest$
as$it$involves$the$use$of$public$funds$necessary$to$conduct$the$impeachment$trial$
on$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint,$ pray$ for$ the$ issuance$ of$ a$ writ$ of$
prohibition$ enjoining$ Congress$ from$ conducting$ further$ proceedings$ on$ said$
second$impeachment$complaint.$
$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160277,$ petitioner$ Francisco$ I.$ Chavez,$ alleging$ that$ this$ Court$ has$
recognized$that$he$has$locus$standi$to$bring$petitions$of$this$nature$in$the$cases$
Corporation,16$prays$in$his$petition$for$Injunction$that$the$second$impeachment$
complaint$be$declared$unconstitutional.$
$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160292,$ petitioners$ Atty.$ Harry$ L.$ Roque,$ et.$ al.,$ as$ taxpayers$ and$
members$ of$ the$ legal$ profession,$ pray$ in$ their$ petition$ for$ Prohibition$ for$ an$
approving$ and$ transmitting$ to$ the$ Senate$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint,$
and$ respondents$ De$ Venecia$ and$ Nazareno$ from$ transmitting$ the$ Articles$ of$
Impeachment$to$the$Senate.$
$
In$G.R.$No.$160295,$petitioners$Representatives$Salacnib$F.$Baterina$and$Deputy$
Speaker$ Raul$ M.$ Gonzalez,$ alleging$ that,$ as$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives,$ they$ have$ a$ legal$ interest$ in$ ensuring$ that$ only$ constitutional$
impeachment$ proceedings$ are$ initiated,$ pray$ in$ their$ petition$ for$
Certiorari/Prohibition$ that$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ and$ any$ act$
proceeding$therefrom$be$declared$null$and$void.$
$
In$G.R.$No.$160310,$petitioners$Leonilo$R.$Alfonso$et$al.,$claiming$that$they$have$
a$ right$ to$ be$ protected$ against$ all$ forms$ of$ senseless$ spending$ of$ taxpayers'$
money$and$that$they$have$an$obligation$to$protect$the$Supreme$Court,$the$Chief$
Justice,$ and$ the$ integrity$ of$ the$ Judiciary,$ allege$ in$ their$ petition$ for$ Certiorari$
and$Prohibition$that$it$is$instituted$as$"a$class$suit"$and$pray$that$(1)$the$House$
Resolution$ endorsing$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ as$ well$ as$ all$ transcendental$ significance$ and$ that$ as$ an$ official$ of$ the$ Philippine$ Judicial$
issuances$ emanating$ therefrom$ be$ declared$ null$ and$ void;$ and$ (2)$ this$ Court$ Academy,$he$has$a$direct$and$substantial$interest$in$the$unhampered$operation$
enjoin$the$Senate$and$the$Senate$President$from$taking$cognizance$of,$hearing,$ of$the$Supreme$Court$and$its$officials$in$discharging$their$duties$in$accordance$
trying$ and$ deciding$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint,$ and$ issue$ a$ writ$ of$ with$the$Constitution,$prays$for$the$issuance$of$a$writ$prohibiting$the$House$of$
prohibition$ commanding$ the$ Senate,$ its$ prosecutors$ and$ agents$ to$ desist$ from$ Representatives$ from$ transmitting$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ to$ the$ Senate$
conducting$any$proceedings$or$to$act$on$the$impeachment$complaint.$ and$ the$ Senate$ from$ receiving$ the$ same$ or$ giving$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$
$ due$course.$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160318,$ petitioner$ Public$ Interest$ Center,$ Inc.,$ whose$ members$ are$ $
citizens$and$taxpayers,$and$its$coSpetitioner$Crispin$T.$Reyes,$a$citizen,$taxpayer$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160376,$ petitioner$ Nilo$ A.$ Malanyaon,$ as$ a$ taxpayer,$ alleges$ in$ his$
and$a$member$of$the$Philippine$Bar,$both$allege$in$their$petition,$which$does$not$ petition$ for$ Prohibition$ that$ respondents$ Fuentebella$ and$ Teodoro$ at$ the$ time$
state$ what$ its$ nature$ is,$ that$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ they$ filed$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint,$ were$ "absolutely$ without$ any$
involves$ paramount$ public$ interest$ and$ pray$ that$ Sections$ 16$ and$ 17$ of$ the$ legal$power$to$do$so,$as$they$acted$without$jurisdiction$as$far$as$the$Articles$of$
House$ Impeachment$ Rules$ and$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint/Articles$ of$ Impeachment$assail$the$alleged$abuse$of$powers$of$the$Chief$Justice$to$disburse$
Impeachment$be$declared$null$and$void.$ the$(JDF)."$
$ $
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160342,$ petitioner$ Atty.$ Fernando$ P.$ R.$ Perito,$ as$ a$ citizen$ and$ a$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160392,$ petitioners$ Attorneys$ Venicio$ S.$ Flores$ and$ Hector$ L.$
member$ of$ the$ Philippine$ Bar$ Association$ and$ of$ the$ Integrated$ Bar$ of$ the$ Hofilea,$alleging$that$as$professors$of$law$they$have$an$abiding$interest$in$the$
Philippines,$ and$ petitioner$ Engr.$ Maximo$ N.$ Menez,$ Jr.,$ as$ a$ taxpayer,$ pray$ in$ subject$matter$of$their$petition$for$Certiorari$and$Prohibition$as$it$pertains$to$a$
their$petition$for$the$issuance$of$a$Temporary$Restraining$Order$and$Permanent$ constitutional$ issue$ "which$ they$ are$ trying$ to$ inculcate$ in$ the$ minds$ of$ their$
Injunction$ to$ enjoin$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ from$ proceeding$ with$ the$ students,"$ pray$ that$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ be$ enjoined$ from$ endorsing$
second$impeachment$complaint.$ and$ the$ Senate$ from$ trying$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ and$ that$ the$ second$
$ impeachment$complaint$be$declared$null$and$void.$
In$G.R.$No.$160343,$petitioner$Integrated$Bar$of$the$Philippines,$alleging$that$it$is$ $
mandated$by$the$Code$of$Professional$Responsibility$to$uphold$the$Constitution,$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160397,$ petitioner$ Atty.$ Dioscoro$ Vallejos,$ Jr.,$ without$ alleging$ his$
prays$ in$ its$ petition$ for$ Certiorari$ and$ Prohibition$ that$ Sections$ 16$ and$ 17$ of$ locus$standi,$but$alleging$that$the$second$impeachment$complaint$is$founded$on$
Rule$V$and$Sections$5,$6,$7,$8,$9$of$Rule$III$of$the$House$Impeachment$Rules$be$ the$ issue$ of$ whether$ or$ not$ the$ Judicial$ Development$ Fund$ (JDF)$ was$ spent$ in$
declared$ unconstitutional$ and$ that$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ be$ accordance$ with$ law$ and$ that$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ does$ not$ have$
permanently$ enjoined$ from$ proceeding$ with$ the$ second$ impeachment$ exclusive$jurisdiction$in$the$examination$and$audit$thereof,$prays$in$his$petition$
complaint.$ "To$ Declare$ Complaint$ Null$ and$ Void$ for$ Lack$ of$ Cause$ of$ Action$ and$
$ Jurisdiction"$that$the$second$impeachment$complaint$be$declared$null$and$void.$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160360,$ petitionerStaxpayer$ Atty.$ Claro$ Flores$ prays$ in$ his$ petition$ $
for$ Certiorari$ and$ Prohibition$ that$ the$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules$ be$ declared$ In$G.R.$No.$160403,$petitioner$Philippine$Bar$Association,$alleging$that$the$issues$
unconstitutional.$ raised$ in$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ involve$ matters$ of$
$ transcendental$importance,$prays$in$its$petition$for$Certiorari/Prohibition$that$
In$G.R.$No.$160365,$petitioners$U.P.$Law$Alumni$Cebu$Foundation$Inc.,$et.$al.,$in$ (1)$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ and$ all$ proceedings$ arising$ therefrom$
their$petition$for$Prohibition$and$Injunction$which$they$claim$is$a$class$suit$filed$ be$ declared$ null$ and$ void;$ (2)$ respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ be$
in$behalf$of$all$citizens,$citing$Oposa$v.$Factoran17$which$was$filed$in$behalf$of$ prohibited$from$transmitting$the$Articles$of$Impeachment$to$the$Senate;$and$(3)$
succeeding$ generations$ of$ Filipinos,$ pray$ for$the$ issuance$ of$ a$ writ$ prohibiting$ respondent$ Senate$ be$ prohibited$ from$ accepting$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$
respondents$House$of$Representatives$and$the$Senate$from$conducting$further$ and$from$conducting$any$proceedings$thereon.$
proceedings$on$the$second$impeachment$complaint$and$that$this$Court$declare$ $
as$ unconstitutional$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ and$ the$ acts$ of$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160405,$ petitioners$ Democrit$ C.$ Barcenas$ et.$ al.,$ as$ citizens$ and$
respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ in$ interfering$ with$ the$ fiscal$ matters$ of$ taxpayers,$ pray$ in$ their$ petition$ for$ Certiorari/Prohibition$ that$ (1)$ the$ second$
the$Judiciary.$ impeachment$ complaint$ as$ well$ as$ the$ resolution$ of$ endorsement$ and$
$ impeachment$by$the$respondent$House$of$Representatives$be$declared$null$and$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 160370,$ petitionerStaxpayer$ Father$ Ranhilio$ Callangan$ Aquino,$ void$ and$ (2)$ respondents$ Senate$ and$ Senate$ President$ Franklin$ Drilon$ be$
alleging$ that$ the$ issues$ in$ his$ petition$ for$ Prohibition$ are$ of$ national$ and$ prohibited$from$accepting$any$Articles$of$Impeachment$against$the$Chief$Justice$
or,$in$the$event$that$they$have$accepted$the$same,$that$they$be$prohibited$from$ jurisdiction$to$hear,$much$less$prohibit$or$enjoin$the$House$of$Representatives,$
proceeding$with$the$impeachment$trial.$ which$ is$ an$ independent$ and$ coSequal$ branch$ of$ government$ under$ the$
$ Constitution,$ from$ the$ performance$ of$ its$ constitutionally$ mandated$ duty$ to$
Petitions$ bearing$ docket$ numbers$ G.R.$ Nos.$ 160261,$ 160262$ and$ 160263,$ the$ initiate$ impeachment$ cases.$ On$ even$ date,$ Senator$ Aquilino$ Q.$ Pimentel,$ Jr.,$ in$
first$three$of$the$eighteen$which$were$filed$before$this$Court,18$prayed$for$the$ his$ own$ behalf,$ filed$ a$ Motion$ to$ Intervene$ (Ex$ Abudante$ Cautela)21$ and$
issuance$ of$ a$ Temporary$ Restraining$ Order$ and/or$ preliminary$ injunction$ to$ Comment,$ praying$ that$ "the$ consolidated$ petitions$ be$ dismissed$ for$ lack$ of$
prevent$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ from$ transmitting$ the$ Articles$ of$ jurisdiction$of$the$Court$over$the$issues$affecting$the$impeachment$proceedings$
Impeachment$ arising$ from$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ to$ the$ Senate.$ and$ that$ the$ sole$ power,$ authority$ and$ jurisdiction$ of$ the$ Senate$ as$ the$
Petition$ bearing$ docket$ number$ G.R.$ No.$ 160261$ likewise$ prayed$ for$ the$ impeachment$ court$ to$ try$ and$ decide$ impeachment$ cases,$ including$ the$ one$
declaration$ of$ the$ November$ 28,$ 2001$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules$ as$ null$ and$ where$the$Chief$Justice$is$the$respondent,$be$recognized$and$upheld$pursuant$to$
void$for$being$unconstitutional.$ the$provisions$of$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution."22$
$ $
Petitions$bearing$docket$numbers$G.R.$Nos.$160277,$160292$and$160295,$which$ Acting$on$the$other$petitions$which$were$subsequently$filed,$this$Court$resolved$
were$ filed$ on$ October$ 28,$ 2003,$ sought$ similar$ relief.$ In$ addition,$ petition$ to$ (a)$ consolidate$ them$ with$ the$ earlier$ consolidated$ petitions;$ (b)$ require$
bearing$docket$number$G.R.$No.$160292$alleged$that$House$Resolution$No.$260$ respondents$to$file$their$comment$not$later$than$4:30$p.m.$of$November$3,$2003;$
(calling$ for$ a$ legislative$ inquiry$ into$ the$ administration$ by$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ of$ and$(c)$include$them$for$oral$arguments$on$November$5,$2003.$
the$JDF)$infringes$on$the$constitutional$doctrine$of$separation$of$powers$and$is$a$ $
direct$ violation$ of$ the$ constitutional$ principle$ of$ fiscal$ autonomy$ of$ the$ On$ October$ 29,$ 2003,$ the$ Senate$ of$ the$ Philippines,$ through$ Senate$ President$
judiciary.$ Franklin$ M.$ Drilon,$ filed$ a$ Manifestation$ stating$ that$ insofar$ as$ it$ is$ concerned,$
$ the$ petitions$ are$ plainly$ premature$ and$ have$ no$ basis$ in$ law$ or$ in$ fact,$ adding$
On$ October$ 28,$ 2003,$ during$ the$ plenary$ session$ of$ the$ House$ of$ that$ as$ of$ the$ time$ of$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ petitions,$ no$ justiciable$ issue$ was$
Representatives,$ a$ motion$ was$ put$ forth$ that$ the$ second$ impeachment$ presented$ before$ it$ since$ (1)$ its$ constitutional$ duty$ to$ constitute$ itself$ as$ an$
complaint$be$formally$transmitted$to$the$Senate,$but$it$was$not$carried$because$ impeachment$ court$ commences$ only$ upon$ its$ receipt$ of$ the$ Articles$ of$
the$House$of$Representatives$adjourned$for$lack$of$quorum,19$and$as$reflected$ Impeachment,$ which$ it$ had$ not,$ and$ (2)$ the$ principal$ issues$ raised$ by$ the$
above,$ to$ date,$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ have$ yet$ to$ be$ forwarded$ to$ the$ petitions$pertain$exclusively$to$the$proceedings$in$the$House$of$Representatives.$
Senate.$ $
$ On$ October$ 30,$ 2003,$ Atty.$ Jaime$ Soriano$ filed$ a$ "Petition$ for$ Leave$ to$
Before$ acting$ on$ the$ petitions$ with$ prayers$ for$ temporary$ restraining$ order$ Intervene"$in$G.R.$Nos.$160261,$160262,$160263,$160277,$160292,$and$160295,$
and/or$writ$of$preliminary$injunction$which$were$filed$on$or$before$October$28,$ questioning$the$status$quo$Resolution$issued$by$this$Court$on$October$28,$2003$
2003,$ Justices$ Puno$ and$ Vitug$ offered$ to$ recuse$ themselves,$ but$ the$ Court$ on$ the$ ground$ that$ it$ would$ unnecessarily$ put$ Congress$ and$ this$ Court$ in$ a$
rejected$their$offer.$Justice$Panganiban$inhibited$himself,$but$the$Court$directed$ "constitutional$deadlock"$and$praying$for$the$dismissal$of$all$the$petitions$as$the$
him$to$participate.$ matter$in$question$is$not$yet$ripe$for$judicial$determination.$
$ $
Without$necessarily$giving$the$petitions$due$course,$this$Court$in$its$Resolution$ On$November$3,$2003,$Attorneys$Romulo$B.$Macalintal$and$Pete$Quirino$Quadra$
of$ October$ 28,$ 2003,$ resolved$ to$ (a)$ consolidate$ the$ petitions;$ (b)$ require$ filed$in$G.R.$No.$160262$a$"Motion$for$Leave$of$Court$to$Intervene$and$to$Admit$
respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ and$ the$ Senate,$ as$ well$ as$ the$ Solicitor$ the$Herein$Incorporated$Petition$in$Intervention."$
General,$ to$ comment$ on$ the$ petitions$ not$ later$ than$ 4:30$ p.m.$ of$ November$ 3,$ $
2003;$ (c)$ set$ the$ petitions$ for$ oral$ arguments$ on$ November$ 5,$ 2003,$ at$ 10:00$ On$ November$ 4,$ 2003,$ Nagmamalasakit$ na$ mga$ Manananggol$ ng$ mga$
a.m.;$ and$ (d)$ appointed$ distinguished$ legal$ experts$ as$ amici$ curiae.20$ In$ Manggagawang$Pilipino,$Inc.$filed$a$Motion$for$Intervention$in$G.R.$No.$160261.$
addition,$this$Court$called$on$petitioners$and$respondents$to$maintain$the$status$ On$ November$ 5,$ 2003,$ World$ War$ II$ Veterans$ Legionnaires$ of$ the$ Philippines,$
quo,$enjoining$all$the$parties$and$others$acting$for$and$in$their$behalf$to$refrain$ Inc.$ also$ filed$ a$ "PetitionSinSIntervention$ with$ Leave$ to$ Intervene"$ in$ G.R.$ Nos.$
from$committing$acts$that$would$render$the$petitions$moot.$ 160261,$160262,$160263,$160277,$160292,$160295,$and$160310.$
$ $
Also$on$October$28,$2003,$when$respondent$House$of$Representatives$through$ The$ motions$ for$ intervention$ were$ granted$ and$ both$ Senator$ Pimentel's$
Speaker$ Jose$ C.$ De$ Venecia,$ Jr.$ and/or$ its$ coSrespondents,$ by$ way$ of$ special$ Comment$and$Attorneys$Macalintal$and$Quadra's$Petition$in$Intervention$were$
appearance,$ submitted$ a$ Manifestation$ asserting$ that$ this$ Court$ has$ no$ admitted.$
$ SECTION$1.$The$judicial$power$shall$be$vested$in$one$Supreme$Court$and$in$such$
On$November$5S6,$2003,$this$Court$heard$the$views$of$the$amici$curiae$and$the$ lower$courts$as$may$be$established$by$law.$
arguments$ of$ petitioners,$ intervenors$ Senator$ Pimentel$ and$ Attorney$ $
Makalintal,$ and$ Solicitor$ General$ Alfredo$ Benipayo$ on$ the$ principal$ issues$ Judicial$ power$ includes$ the$ duty$ of$ the$ courts$ of$ justice$ to$ settle$ actual$
outlined$in$an$Advisory$issued$by$this$Court$on$November$3,$2003,$to$wit:$ controversies$ involving$ rights$ which$ are$ legally$ demandable$ and$ enforceable,$
$ and$ to$ determine$ whether$ or$ not$ there$ has$ been$ a$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$
Whether$the$certiorari$jurisdiction$of$the$Supreme$Court$may$be$invoked;$who$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$ jurisdiction$ on$ the$ part$ of$ any$ branch$ or$
can$ invoke$ it;$ on$ what$ issues$ and$ at$ what$ time;$ and$ whether$ it$ should$ be$ instrumentality$of$the$government.$(Emphasis$supplied)$
exercised$by$this$Court$at$this$time.$ $
$ Such$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ was$ early$ on$ exhaustively$ expounded$ upon$ by$
In$discussing$these$issues,$the$following$may$be$taken$up:$ Justice$ Jose$ P.$ Laurel$ in$ the$ definitive$ 1936$ case$ of$ Angara$ v.$ Electoral$
$ Commission23$ after$ the$ effectivity$ of$ the$ 1935$ Constitution$ whose$ provisions,$
a)$locus$standi$of$petitioners;$ unlike$the$present$Constitution,$did$not$contain$the$present$provision$in$Article$
$ VIII,$ Section$ 1,$ par.$ 2$ on$ what$ judicial$ power$ includes.$ Thus,$ Justice$ Laurel$
b)$ripeness(prematurity;$mootness);$ discoursed:$
$ $
c)$political$question/justiciability;$ x$x$x$In$times$of$social$disquietude$or$political$excitement,$the$great$landmarks$
$ of$the$Constitution$are$apt$to$be$forgotten$or$marred,$if$not$entirely$obliterated.$
d)$House's$"exclusive"$power$to$initiate$all$cases$of$impeachment;$ In$ cases$ of$ conflict,$ the$ judicial$ department$ is$ the$ only$ constitutional$ organ$
$ which$can$be$called$upon$to$determine$the$proper$allocation$of$powers$between$
e)$Senate's$"sole"$power$to$try$and$decide$all$cases$of$impeachment;$ the$several$departments$and$among$the$integral$or$constituent$units$thereof.$
$ $
f)$constitutionality$of$the$House$Rules$on$Impeachment$visSaSvis$Section$3(5)$of$ As$any$human$production,$our$Constitution$is$of$course$lacking$perfection$and$
Article$XI$of$the$Constitution;$and$ perfectibility,$ but$ as$ much$ as$ it$ was$ within$ the$ power$ of$ our$ people,$ acting$
$ through$their$delegates$to$so$provide,$that$instrument$which$is$the$expression$of$
g)$judicial$restraint$(Italics$in$the$original)$ their$ sovereignty$ however$ limited,$ has$ established$ a$ republican$ government$
$ intended$ to$ operate$ and$ function$ as$ a$ harmonious$ whole,$ under$ a$ system$ of$
In$ resolving$ the$ intricate$ conflux$ of$ preliminary$ and$ substantive$ issues$ arising$ checks$ and$ balances,$ and$ subject$ to$ specific$ limitations$ and$ restrictions$
from$ the$ instant$ petitions$ as$ well$ as$ the$ myriad$ arguments$ and$ opinions$ provided$ in$ the$ said$ instrument.$ The$ Constitution$ sets$ forth$ in$ no$ uncertain$
presented$for$and$against$the$grant$of$the$reliefs$prayed$for,$this$Court$has$sifted$ language$ the$ restrictions$ and$ limitations$ upon$ governmental$ powers$ and$
and$ determined$ them$ to$ be$ as$ follows:$ (1)$ the$ threshold$ and$ novel$ issue$ of$ agencies.$ If$ these$ restrictions$ and$ limitations$ are$ transcended$ it$ would$ be$
whether$ or$ not$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ extends$ to$ those$ arising$ from$ inconceivable$if$the$Constitution$had$not$provided$for$a$mechanism$by$which$to$
impeachment$ proceedings;$ (2)$ whether$ or$ not$ the$ essential$ preSrequisites$ for$ direct$ the$ course$ of$ government$ along$ constitutional$ channels,$ for$ then$ the$
the$ exercise$ of$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ have$ been$ fulfilled;$ and$ (3)$ the$ distribution$ of$ powers$ would$ be$ mere$ verbiage,$ the$ bill$ of$ rights$ mere$
substantive$ issues$ yet$ remaining.$ These$ matters$ shall$ now$ be$ discussed$ in$ expressions$of$sentiment,$and$the$principles$of$good$government$mere$political$
seriatim.$ apothegms.$ Certainly,$ the$ limitations$ and$ restrictions$ embodied$ in$ our$
$ Constitution$are$real$as$they$should$be$in$any$living$constitution.$In$the$United$
Judicial$Review$ States$ where$ no$ express$ constitutional$ grant$ is$ found$ in$ their$ constitution,$ the$
$ possession$of$this$moderating$power$of$the$courts,$not$to$speak$of$its$historical$
As$ reflected$ above,$ petitioners$ plead$ for$ this$ Court$ to$ exercise$ the$ power$ of$ origin$and$development$there,$has$been$set$at$rest$by$popular$acquiescence$for$a$
judicial$review$to$determine$the$validity$of$the$second$impeachment$complaint.$ period$of$more$than$one$and$a$half$centuries.$In$our$case,$this$moderating$power$
$ is$granted,$if$not$expressly,$by$clear$implication$from$section$2$of$article$VIII$of$
This$Court's$power$of$judicial$review$is$conferred$on$the$judicial$branch$of$the$ our$Constitution.$
government$in$Section$1,$Article$VIII$of$our$present$1987$Constitution:$ $
$ The$ Constitution$ is$ a$ definition$ of$ the$ powers$ of$ government.$ Who$ is$ to$
determine$the$nature,$scope$and$extent$of$such$powers?$The$Constitution$itself$
has$ provided$ for$ the$ instrumentality$ of$ the$ judiciary$ as$ the$ rational$ way.$ And$
when$ the$ judiciary$ mediates$ to$ allocate$ constitutional$ boundaries,$ it$ does$ not$
assert$any$superiority$over$the$other$departments;$it$does$not$in$reality$nullify$
or$ invalidate$ an$ act$ of$ the$ legislature,$ but$ only$ asserts$ the$ solemn$ and$ sacred$
obligation$ assigned$ to$ it$ by$ the$ Constitution$ to$ determine$ conflicting$ claims$ of$
authority$ under$ the$ Constitution$ and$ to$ establish$ for$ the$ parties$ in$ an$ actual$
controversy$ the$ rights$ which$ that$ instrument$ secures$ and$ guarantees$ to$ them.$
This$is$in$truth$all$that$is$involved$in$what$is$termed$"judicial$supremacy"$which$
properly$is$the$power$of$judicial$review$under$the$Constitution.$Even$then,$this$
power$ of$ judicial$ review$ is$ limited$ to$ actual$ cases$ and$ controversies$ to$ be$
exercised$after$full$opportunity$of$argument$by$the$parties,$and$limited$further$
to$the$constitutional$question$raised$or$the$very$lis$mota$presented.$Any$attempt$
at$ abstraction$ could$ only$ lead$ to$ dialectics$ and$ barren$ legal$ questions$ and$ to$
sterile$ conclusions$ unrelated$ to$ actualities.$ Narrowed$ as$ its$ function$ is$ in$ this$
manner,$ the$ judiciary$ does$ not$ pass$ upon$ questions$ of$ wisdom,$ justice$ or$
expediency$ of$ legislation.$ More$ than$ that,$ courts$ accord$ the$ presumption$ of$
constitutionality$ to$ legislative$ enactments,$ not$ only$ because$ the$ legislature$ is$
presumed$ to$ abide$ by$ the$ Constitution$ but$ also$ because$ the$ judiciary$ in$ the$
determination$ of$ actual$ cases$ and$ controversies$ must$ reflect$ the$ wisdom$ and$
justice$of$the$people$as$expressed$through$their$representatives$in$the$executive$
and$ legislative$ departments$ of$ the$ government.24$ (Italics$ in$ the$ original;$
emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$ together$with$the$corollary$principle$of$separation$of$powers,$forms$the$bedrock$
As$ pointed$ out$ by$ Justice$ Laurel,$ this$ "moderating$ power"$ to$ "determine$ the$
proper$ allocation$ of$ powers"$ of$ the$ different$ branches$ of$ government$ and$ "to$
direct$the$course$of$government$along$constitutional$channels"$is$inherent$in$all$
courts25$as$a$necessary$consequence$of$the$judicial$power$itself,$which$is$"the$
power$ of$ the$ court$ to$ settle$ actual$ controversies$ involving$ rights$ which$ are$
legally$demandable$and$enforceable."26$
$ of$ matters$ within$ its$ jurisdiction,$ and$ is$ supreme$ within$ its$ own$ sphere.$ But$ it$
Thus,$ even$ in$ the$ United$ States$ where$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ is$ not$
explicitly$ conferred$ upon$ the$ courts$ by$ its$ Constitution,$ such$ power$ has$ "been$
set$ at$ rest$ by$ popular$ acquiescence$ for$ a$ period$ of$ more$ than$ one$ and$ a$ half$
centuries."$To$be$sure,$it$was$in$the$1803$leading$case$of$Marbury$v.$Madison27$
that$the$power$of$judicial$review$was$first$articulated$by$Chief$Justice$Marshall,$
to$wit:$
$ the$exercise$of$its$power$to$determine$the$law,$and$hence$to$declare$executive$
It$ is$ also$ not$ entirely$ unworthy$ of$ observation,$ that$ in$ declaring$ what$ shall$ be$
the$ supreme$ law$ of$ the$ land,$ the$ constitution$ itself$ is$ first$ mentioned;$ and$ not$
the$ laws$ of$ the$ United$ States$ generally,$ but$ those$ only$ which$ shall$ be$ made$ in$
pursuance$of$the$constitution,$have$that$rank.$
$ Feliciano,$ "x$ x$ x$ judicial$ review$ is$ essential$ for$ the$ maintenance$ and$
Thus,$ the$ particular$ phraseology$ of$ the$ constitution$ of$ the$ United$ States$
confirms$ and$ strengthens$ the$ principle,$ supposed$ to$ be$ essential$ to$ all$ written$
constitutions,$that$a$law$repugnant$to$the$constitution$is$void;$and$that$courts,$
as$ well$ as$ other$ departments,$ are$ bound$ by$ that$ instrument.28$ (Italics$ in$ the$
original;$emphasis$supplied)$
$
In$our$own$jurisdiction,$as$early$as$1902,$decades$before$its$express$grant$in$the$
1935$Constitution,$the$power$of$judicial$review$was$exercised$by$our$courts$to$
invalidate$ constitutionally$ infirm$ acts.29$ And$ as$ pointed$ out$ by$ noted$ political$
law$ professor$ and$ former$ Supreme$ Court$ Justice$ Vicente$ V.$ Mendoza,30$ the$
executive$ and$ legislative$ branches$ of$ our$ government$ in$ fact$ effectively$
acknowledged$this$power$of$judicial$review$in$Article$7$of$the$Civil$Code,$to$wit:$
$
Article$ 7.$ Laws$ are$ repealed$ only$ by$ subsequent$ ones,$ and$ their$ violation$ or$
nonSobservance$ shall$ not$ be$ excused$ by$ disuse,$ or$ custom$ or$ practice$ to$ the$
contrary.$
$
When$ the$ courts$ declare$ a$ law$ to$ be$ inconsistent$ with$ the$ Constitution,$ the$
former$shall$be$void$and$the$latter$shall$govern.$
$
Administrative$ or$ executive$ acts,$ orders$ and$ regulations$ shall$ be$ valid$ only$
when$they$are$not$contrary$to$the$laws$or$the$Constitution.$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$
As$indicated$in$Angara$v.$Electoral$Commission,31$judicial$review$is$indeed$an$
integral$ component$ of$ the$ delicate$ system$ of$ checks$ and$ balances$ which,$
of$ our$ republican$ form$ of$ government$ and$ insures$ that$ its$ vast$ powers$ are$
utilized$only$for$the$benefit$of$the$people$for$which$it$serves.$
$
The$ separation$ of$ powers$ is$ a$ fundamental$ principle$ in$ our$ system$ of$
government.$It$obtains$not$through$express$provision$but$by$actual$division$in$
our$Constitution.$Each$department$of$the$government$has$exclusive$cognizance$
does$not$follow$from$the$fact$that$the$three$powers$are$to$be$kept$separate$and$
distinct$that$the$Constitution$intended$them$to$be$absolutely$unrestrained$and$
independent$ of$ each$ other.$ The$ Constitution$ has$ provided$ for$ an$ elaborate$
system$ of$ checks$ and$ balances$ to$ secure$ coordination$ in$ the$ workings$ of$ the$
various$departments$of$the$government.$x$x$x$And$the$judiciary$in$turn,$with$the$
Supreme$Court$as$the$final$arbiter,$effectively$checks$the$other$departments$in$
and$ legislative$ acts$ void$ if$ violative$ of$ the$ Constitution.32$ (Emphasis$ and$
underscoring$supplied)$
$
In$ the$ scholarly$ estimation$ of$ former$ Supreme$ Court$ Justice$ Florentino$
enforcement$ of$ the$ separation$ of$ powers$ and$ the$ balancing$ of$ powers$ among$
the$ three$ great$ departments$ of$ government$ through$ the$ definition$ and$
maintenance$ of$ the$ boundaries$ of$ authority$ and$ control$ between$ them."33$ To$
him,$"[j]udicial$review$is$the$chief,$indeed$the$only,$medium$of$participation$$or$ $
instrument$of$intervention$$of$the$judiciary$in$that$balancing$operation."34$ Briefly$stated,$courts$of$justice$determine$the$limits$of$power$of$the$agencies$and$
$ offices$ of$ the$ government$ as$ well$ as$ those$ of$ its$ officers.$ In$ other$ words,$ the$
To$ ensure$ the$ potency$ of$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ to$ curb$ grave$ abuse$ of$ judiciary$ is$ the$ final$ arbiter$ on$ the$ question$ whether$ or$ not$ a$ branch$ of$
discretion$by$"any$branch$or$instrumentalities$of$government,"$the$aforeSquoted$ government$or$any$of$its$officials$has$acted$without$jurisdiction$or$in$excess$of$
Section$ 1,$ Article$ VIII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ engraves,$ for$ the$ first$ time$ into$ its$ jurisdiction,$or$so$capriciously$as$to$constitute$an$abuse$of$discretion$amounting$
history,$into$block$letter$law$the$soScalled$"expanded$certiorari$jurisdiction"$of$ to$excess$of$jurisdiction$or$lack$of$jurisdiction.$This$is$not$only$a$judicial$power$
this$ Court,$ the$ nature$ of$ and$ rationale$ for$ which$ are$ mirrored$ in$ the$ following$ but$a$duty$to$pass$judgment$on$matters$of$this$nature.$
excerpt$ from$ the$ sponsorship$ speech$ of$ its$ proponent,$ former$ Chief$ Justice$ $
Constitutional$Commissioner$Roberto$Concepcion:$ This$is$the$background$of$paragraph$2$of$Section$1,$which$means$that$the$courts$
$ cannot$hereafter$evade$the$duty$to$settle$matters$of$this$nature,$by$claiming$that$
x$x$x$ such$matters$constitute$a$political$question.35$(Italics$in$the$original;$emphasis$
$ and$underscoring$supplied)$
The$ first$ section$ starts$ with$ a$ sentence$ copied$ from$ former$ Constitutions.$ It$ $
says:$ To$determine$the$merits$of$the$issues$raised$in$the$instant$petitions,$this$Court$
$ must$necessarily$turn$to$the$Constitution$itself$which$employs$ the$ wellSsettled$
The$ judicial$ power$ shall$ be$ vested$ in$ one$ Supreme$ Court$ and$ in$ such$ lower$ principles$of$constitutional$construction.$
courts$as$may$be$established$by$law.$ $
$ First,$verba$legis,$that$is,$wherever$possible,$the$words$used$in$the$Constitution$
I$suppose$nobody$can$question$it.$ must$ be$ given$ their$ ordinary$ meaning$ except$ where$ technical$ terms$ are$
$ employed.$Thus,$in$J.M.$Tuason$&$Co.,$Inc.$v.$Land$Tenure$Administration,36$this$
The$ next$ provision$ is$ new$ in$ our$ constitutional$ law.$ I$ will$ read$ it$ first$ and$ Court,$speaking$through$Chief$Justice$Enrique$Fernando,$declared:$
explain.$ $
$ We$look$to$the$language$of$the$document$itself$in$our$search$for$its$meaning.$We$
Judicial$ power$ includes$ the$ duty$ of$ courts$ of$ justice$ to$ settle$ actual$ do$not$of$course$stop$there,$but$that$is$where$we$begin.$It$is$to$be$assumed$that$
controversies$ involving$ rights$ which$ are$ legally$ demandable$ and$ enforceable$ the$words$in$which$constitutional$provisions$are$couched$express$the$objective$
and$ to$ determine$ whether$ or$ not$ there$ has$ been$ a$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ sought$to$be$attained.$They$are$to$be$given$their$ordinary$meaning$except$where$
amounting$to$lack$or$excess$of$jurisdiction$on$the$part$or$instrumentality$of$the$ technical$ terms$ are$ employed$ in$ which$ case$ the$ significance$ thus$ attached$ to$
government.$ them$prevails.$As$the$Constitution$is$not$primarily$a$lawyer's$document,$it$being$
$ essential$ for$ the$ rule$ of$ law$ to$ obtain$ that$ it$ should$ ever$ be$ present$ in$ the$
Fellow$Members$of$this$Commission,$this$is$actually$a$product$of$our$experience$ people's$consciousness,$its$language$as$much$as$possible$should$be$understood$
during$martial$law.$As$a$matter$of$fact,$it$has$some$antecedents$in$the$past,$but$ in$the$sense$they$have$in$common$use.$What$it$says$according$to$the$text$of$the$
the$role$of$the$judiciary$during$the$deposed$regime$was$marred$considerably$by$ provision$ to$ be$ construed$ compels$ acceptance$ and$ negates$ the$ power$ of$ the$
the$circumstance$that$in$a$number$of$cases$against$the$government,$which$then$ courts$to$alter$it,$based$on$the$postulate$that$the$framers$and$the$people$mean$
had$ no$ legal$ defense$ at$ all,$ the$ solicitor$ general$ set$ up$ the$ defense$ of$ political$ what$ they$ say.$ Thus$ these$ are$ the$ cases$ where$ the$ need$ for$ construction$ is$
questions$and$got$away$with$it.$As$a$consequence,$certain$principles$concerning$ reduced$to$a$minimum.37$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
particularly$ the$ writ$ of$ habeas$ corpus,$ that$ is,$ the$ authority$ of$ courts$ to$ order$ $
the$release$of$political$detainees,$and$other$matters$related$to$the$operation$and$ Second,$ where$ there$ is$ ambiguity,$ ratio$ legis$ est$ anima.$ The$ words$ of$ the$
effect$ of$ martial$ law$ failed$ because$ the$ government$ set$ up$ the$ defense$ of$ Constitution$should$be$interpreted$in$accordance$with$the$intent$of$its$framers.$
political$ question.$ And$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ said:$ "Well,$ since$ it$ is$ political,$ we$ And$ so$ did$ this$ Court$ apply$ this$ principle$ in$ Civil$ Liberties$ Union$ v.$ Executive$
have$ no$ authority$ to$ pass$ upon$ it."$ The$ Committee$ on$ the$ Judiciary$ feels$ that$ Secretary38$in$this$wise:$
this$ was$ not$ a$ proper$ solution$ of$ the$ questions$ involved.$ It$ did$ not$ merely$ $
request$ an$ encroachment$ upon$ the$ rights$ of$ the$ people,$ but$ it,$ in$ effect,$ A$foolproof$yardstick$in$constitutional$construction$is$the$intention$underlying$
encouraged$further$violations$thereof$during$the$martial$law$regime.$x$x$x$ the$ provision$ under$ consideration.$ Thus,$ it$ has$ been$ held$ that$ the$ Court$ in$
$ construing$ a$ Constitution$ should$ bear$ in$ mind$ the$ object$ sought$ to$ be$
x$x$x$ accomplished$ by$ its$ adoption,$ and$ the$ evils,$ if$ any,$ sought$ to$ be$ prevented$ or$
remedied.$A$doubtful$provision$will$be$examined$in$the$light$of$the$history$of$the$ In$other$words,$the$court$must$harmonize$them,$if$practicable,$and$must$lean$in$
times,$ and$ the$ condition$ and$ circumstances$ under$ which$ the$ Constitution$ was$ favor$of$a$construction$which$will$render$every$word$operative,$rather$than$one$
framed.$The$object$is$to$ascertain$the$reason$which$induced$the$framers$of$the$ which$may$make$the$words$idle$and$nugatory.45$(Emphasis$supplied)$
Constitution$ to$ enact$ the$ particular$ provision$ and$ the$ purpose$ sought$ to$ be$ $
accomplished$ thereby,$ in$ order$ to$ construe$ the$ whole$ as$ to$ make$ the$ words$ If,$ however,$ the$ plain$ meaning$ of$ the$ word$ is$ not$ found$ to$ be$ clear,$ resort$ to$
consonant$to$that$reason$and$calculated$to$effect$that$purpose.39$(Emphasis$and$ other$aids$is$available.$In$still$the$same$case$of$Civil$Liberties$Union$v.$Executive$
underscoring$supplied)$ Secretary,$this$Court$expounded:$
$ $
As$ it$ did$ in$ Nitafan$ v.$ Commissioner$ on$ Internal$ Revenue40$ where,$ speaking$ While$ it$ is$ permissible$ in$ this$ jurisdiction$ to$ consult$ the$ debates$ and$
through$Madame$Justice$Amuerfina$A.$MelencioSHerrera,$it$declared:$ proceedings$of$the$constitutional$convention$in$order$to$arrive$at$the$reason$and$
$ purpose$ of$ the$ resulting$ Constitution,$ resort$ thereto$ may$ be$ had$ only$ when$
x$ x$ x$ The$ ascertainment$ of$ that$ intent$ is$ but$ in$ keeping$ with$ the$ fundamental$ other$ guides$ fail$ as$ said$ proceedings$ are$ powerless$ to$ vary$ the$ terms$ of$ the$
principle$ of$ constitutional$ construction$ that$ the$ intent$ of$ the$ framers$ of$ the$ Constitution$ when$ the$ meaning$ is$ clear.$ Debates$ in$ the$ constitutional$
organic$ law$ and$ of$ the$ people$ adopting$ it$ should$ be$ given$ effect.$ The$ primary$ convention$ "are$ of$ value$ as$ showing$ the$ views$ of$ the$ individual$members,$and$
task$ in$ constitutional$ construction$ is$ to$ ascertain$ and$ thereafter$ assure$ the$ as$indicating$the$reasons$for$their$votes,$but$they$give$us$no$light$as$to$the$views$
realization$of$the$purpose$of$the$framers$and$of$the$people$in$the$adoption$of$the$ of$ the$ large$ majority$ who$ did$ not$ talk,$ much$ less$ of$ the$ mass$ of$ our$ fellow$
Constitution.$ It$ may$ also$ be$ safely$ assumed$ that$ the$ people$ in$ ratifying$ the$ citizens$whose$votes$at$the$polls$gave$that$instrument$the$force$of$fundamental$
Constitution$ were$ guided$ mainly$ by$ the$ explanation$ offered$ by$ the$ framers.41$ law.$We$think$it$safer$to$construe$the$constitution$from$what$appears$upon$its$
(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$ face."$ The$ proper$ interpretation$ therefore$ depends$ more$ on$ how$ it$ was$
$ understood$ by$ the$ people$ adopting$ it$ than$ in$ the$ framers's$ understanding$
Finally,$ut$magis$valeat$quam$pereat.$The$Constitution$is$to$be$interpreted$as$a$ thereof.46$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
whole.$ Thus,$ in$ Chiongbian$ v.$ De$ Leon,42$ this$ Court,$ through$ Chief$ Justice$ $
Manuel$Moran$declared:$ It$ is$ in$ the$ context$ of$ the$ foregoing$ backdrop$ of$ constitutional$ refinement$ and$
$ jurisprudential$ application$ of$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ that$ respondents$
x$x$x$[T]he$members$of$the$Constitutional$Convention$could$not$have$dedicated$ Speaker$ De$ Venecia,$ et.$ al.$ and$ intervenor$ Senator$ Pimentel$ raise$ the$ novel$
a$ provision$ of$ our$ Constitution$ merely$ for$ the$ benefit$ of$ one$ person$ without$ argument$ that$ the$ Constitution$ has$ excluded$ impeachment$ proceedings$ from$
considering$ that$ it$ could$ also$ affect$ others.$ When$ they$ adopted$ subsection$ 2,$ the$coverage$of$judicial$review.$
they$ permitted,$ if$ not$ willed,$ that$ said$ provision$ should$ function$ to$ the$ full$ $
extent$of$its$substance$and$its$terms,$not$by$itself$alone,$but$in$conjunction$with$ Briefly$ stated,$ it$ is$ the$ position$ of$ respondents$ Speaker$ De$ Venecia$ et.$ al.$ that$
all$ other$ provisions$ of$ that$ great$ document.43$ (Emphasis$ and$ underscoring$ impeachment$ is$ a$ political$ action$ which$ cannot$ assume$ a$ judicial$ character.$
supplied)$ Hence,$any$question,$issue$or$incident$arising$at$any$stage$of$the$impeachment$
$ proceeding$is$beyond$the$reach$of$judicial$review.47$
Likewise,$ still$ in$ Civil$ Liberties$ Union$ v.$ Executive$ Secretary,44$ this$ Court$ $
affirmed$that:$ For$ his$ part,$ intervenor$ Senator$ Pimentel$ contends$ that$ the$ Senate's$ "sole$
$ power$ to$ try"$ impeachment$ cases48$ (1)$ entirely$ excludes$ the$ application$ of$
It$is$a$wellSestablished$rule$in$constitutional$construction$that$no$one$provision$ judicial$ review$ over$ it;$ and$ (2)$ necessarily$ includes$ the$ Senate's$ power$ to$
of$the$Constitution$is$to$be$separated$from$all$the$others,$to$be$considered$alone,$ determine$constitutional$questions$relative$to$impeachment$proceedings.49$
but$ that$ all$ the$ provisions$ bearing$ upon$ a$ particular$ subject$ are$ to$ be$ brought$ $
into$ view$ and$ to$ be$ so$ interpreted$ as$ to$ effectuate$ the$ great$ purposes$ of$ the$ In$furthering$their$arguments$on$the$proposition$that$impeachment$proceedings$
instrument.$ Sections$ bearing$ on$ a$ particular$ subject$ should$ be$ considered$ and$ are$outside$the$scope$of$judicial$review,$respondents$Speaker$De$Venecia,$et.$al.$
interpreted$together$as$to$effectuate$the$whole$purpose$of$the$Constitution$and$ and$ intervenor$ Senator$ Pimentel$ rely$ heavily$ on$ American$ authorities,$
one$ section$ is$ not$ to$ be$ allowed$ to$ defeat$ another,$ if$ by$ any$ reasonable$ principally$ the$ majority$ opinion$ in$ the$ case$ of$ Nixon$ v.$ United$ States.50$ Thus,$
construction,$the$two$can$be$made$to$stand$together.$ they$contend$that$the$exercise$of$judicial$review$over$impeachment$proceedings$
$ is$ inappropriate$ since$ it$ runs$ counter$ to$ the$ framers'$ decision$ to$ allocate$ to$
different$fora$the$powers$to$try$impeachments$and$to$try$crimes;$it$disturbs$the$
system$of$checks$and$balances,$under$which$impeachment$is$the$only$legislative$
check$ on$ the$ judiciary;$ and$ it$ would$ create$ a$ lack$ of$ finality$ and$ difficulty$ in$
fashioning$ relief.51$ Respondents$ likewise$ point$ to$ deliberations$ on$ the$ US$
Constitution$ to$ show$ the$ intent$ to$ isolate$ judicial$ power$ of$ review$ in$ cases$ of$
impeachment.$
$ on$ the$ principle$ that$ "whenever$ possible,$ the$ Court$ should$ defer$ to$ the$
Respondents'$ and$ intervenors'$ reliance$ upon$ American$ jurisprudence,$ the$
American$Constitution$and$American$authorities$cannot$be$credited$to$support$
the$ proposition$ that$ the$ Senate's$ "sole$ power$ to$ try$ and$ decide$ impeachment$
cases,"$as$provided$for$under$Art.$XI,$Sec.$3(6)$of$the$Constitution,$is$a$textually$
demonstrable$ constitutional$ commitment$ of$ all$ issues$ pertaining$ to$
impeachment$ to$ the$ legislature,$ to$ the$ total$ exclusion$ of$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$
review$to$check$and$restrain$any$grave$abuse$of$the$impeachment$process.$Nor$
can$it$reasonably$support$the$interpretation$that$it$necessarily$confers$upon$the$
Senate$ the$ inherently$ judicial$ power$ to$ determine$ constitutional$ questions$
incident$to$impeachment$proceedings.$
$ The$ cases$ of$ Romulo$ v.$ Yniguez58$ and$ Alejandrino$ v.$ Quezon,59$ cited$ by$
Said$ American$ jurisprudence$ and$ authorities,$ much$ less$ the$ American$
Constitution,$ are$ of$ dubious$ application$ for$ these$ are$ no$ longer$ controlling$
within$ our$ jurisdiction$ and$ have$ only$ limited$ persuasive$ merit$ insofar$ as$
Philippine$ constitutional$ law$ is$ concerned.$ As$ held$ in$ the$ case$ of$ Garcia$ vs.$
COMELEC,52$ "[i]n$ resolving$ constitutional$ disputes,$ [this$ Court]$ should$ not$ be$
beguiled$by$foreign$jurisprudence$some$of$which$are$hardly$applicable$because$
they$ have$ been$ dictated$ by$ different$ constitutional$ settings$ and$ needs."53$
Indeed,$although$the$Philippine$Constitution$can$trace$its$origins$to$that$of$the$
United$ States,$ their$ paths$ of$ development$ have$ long$ since$ diverged.$ In$ the$
colorful$words$of$Father$Bernas,$"[w]e$have$cut$the$umbilical$cord."$
$ prerogatives.$ In$ Tanada$ v.$ Angara,61$ in$ seeking$ to$ nullify$ an$ act$ of$ the$
The$ major$ difference$ between$ the$ judicial$ power$ of$ the$ Philippine$ Supreme$
Court$ and$ that$ of$ the$ U.S.$ Supreme$ Court$ is$ that$ while$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$
review$is$only$impliedly$granted$to$the$U.S.$Supreme$Court$and$is$discretionary$
in$ nature,$ that$ granted$ to$ the$ Philippine$ Supreme$ Court$ and$ lower$ courts,$ as$
expressly$ provided$ for$ in$ the$ Constitution,$ is$ not$ just$ a$ power$ but$ also$ a$ duty,$
and$ it$ was$ given$ an$ expanded$ definition$ to$ include$ the$ power$ to$ correct$ any$
grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ on$ the$ part$ of$ any$ government$ branch$ or$
instrumentality.$
$ Mitra,63$it$held$that$the$resolution$of$whether$the$House$representation$in$the$
There$ are$ also$ glaring$ distinctions$ between$ the$ U.S.$ Constitution$ and$ the$
Philippine$ Constitution$ with$ respect$ to$ the$ power$ of$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives$ over$ impeachment$ proceedings.$ While$ the$ U.S.$ Constitution$
bestows$ sole$ power$ of$ impeachment$ to$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ without$
limitation,54$ our$ Constitution,$ though$ vesting$ in$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$
the$ exclusive$ power$ to$ initiate$ impeachment$ cases,55$ provides$ for$ several$
limitations$ to$ the$ exercise$ of$ such$ power$ as$ embodied$ in$ Section$ 3(2),$ (3),$ (4)$
and$ (5),$ Article$ XI$ thereof.$ These$ limitations$ include$ the$ manner$ of$ filing,$
required$vote$to$impeach,$and$the$one$year$bar$on$the$impeachment$of$one$and$
the$same$official.$
$
Respondents$ are$ also$ of$ the$ view$ that$ judicial$ review$ of$ impeachments$
undermines$their$finality$and$may$also$lead$to$conflicts$between$Congress$and$
the$judiciary.$Thus,$they$call$upon$this$Court$to$exercise$judicial$statesmanship$
judgment$of$the$people$expressed$legislatively,$recognizing$full$well$the$perils$of$
judicial$willfulness$and$pride."56$
$
But$ did$ not$ the$ people$ also$ express$ their$ will$ when$ they$ instituted$ the$ aboveS
mentioned$safeguards$in$the$Constitution?$This$shows$that$the$Constitution$did$
not$ intend$ to$ leave$ the$ matter$ of$ impeachment$ to$ the$ sole$ discretion$ of$
Congress.$Instead,$it$provided$for$certain$wellSdefined$limits,$or$in$the$language$
of$ Baker$ v.$ Carr,57$ "judicially$ discoverable$ standards"$ for$ determining$ the$
validity$of$the$exercise$of$such$discretion,$through$the$power$of$judicial$review.$
$
respondents$in$support$of$the$argument$that$the$impeachment$power$is$beyond$
the$scope$of$judicial$review,$are$not$in$point.$These$cases$concern$the$denial$of$
petitions$ for$ writs$ of$ mandamus$ to$ compel$ the$ legislature$ to$ perform$ nonS
ministerial$acts,$and$do$not$concern$the$exercise$of$the$power$of$judicial$review.$
$
There$is$indeed$a$plethora$of$cases$in$which$this$Court$exercised$the$power$of$
judicial$ review$ over$ congressional$ action.$ Thus,$ in$ Santiago$ v.$ Guingona,$ Jr.,60$
this$Court$ruled$that$it$is$well$within$the$power$and$jurisdiction$of$the$Court$to$
inquire$ whether$ the$ Senate$ or$ its$ officials$ committed$ a$ violation$ of$ the$
Constitution$or$grave$abuse$of$discretion$in$the$exercise$of$their$functions$and$
Philippine$Senate$on$the$ground$that$it$contravened$the$Constitution,$it$held$that$
the$ petition$ raises$ a$ justiciable$ controversy$ and$ that$ when$ an$ action$ of$ the$
legislative$ branch$ is$ seriously$ alleged$ to$ have$ infringed$ the$ Constitution,$ it$
becomes$ not$ only$ the$ right$ but$ in$ fact$ the$ duty$ of$ the$ judiciary$ to$ settle$ the$
dispute.$In$Bondoc$v.$Pineda,62$this$Court$declared$null$and$void$a$resolution$of$
the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ withdrawing$ the$ nomination,$ and$ rescinding$ the$
election,$ of$ a$ congressman$ as$ a$ member$ of$ the$ House$ Electoral$ Tribunal$ for$
being$ violative$ of$ Section$ 17,$ Article$ VI$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ In$ Coseteng$ v.$
Commission$on$Appointments$was$based$on$proportional$representation$of$the$
political$ parties$ as$ provided$ in$ Section$ 18,$ Article$ VI$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$
subject$to$judicial$review.$In$Daza$v.$Singson,64$it$held$that$the$act$of$the$House$
of$ Representatives$ in$ removing$ the$ petitioner$ from$ the$ Commission$ on$
Appointments$ is$ subject$ to$ judicial$ review.$ In$ Tanada$ v.$ Cuenco,65$ it$ held$ that$
although$ under$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ legislative$ power$ is$ vested$ exclusively$ in$
Congress,$ this$ does$ not$ detract$ from$ the$ power$ of$ the$ courts$ to$ pass$ upon$ the$
constitutionality$ of$ acts$ of$ Congress.$ In$ Angara$ v.$ Electoral$ Commission,66$ it$
ruled$that$confirmation$by$the$National$Assembly$of$the$election$of$any$member,$
irrespective$ of$ whether$ his$ election$ is$ contested,$ is$ not$ essential$ before$ such$
memberSelect$may$discharge$the$duties$and$enjoy$the$privileges$of$a$member$of$ $
the$National$Assembly.$ Intervenor$ Soriano,$ in$ praying$ for$ the$ dismissal$ of$ the$ petitions,$ contends$ that$
$ petitioners$do$not$have$standing$since$only$the$Chief$Justice$has$sustained$and$
Finally,$there$exists$no$constitutional$basis$for$the$contention$that$the$exercise$ will$ sustain$ direct$ personal$ injury.$ Amicus$ curiae$ former$ Justice$ Minister$ and$
of$ judicial$ review$ over$ impeachment$ proceedings$ would$ upset$ the$ system$ of$ Solicitor$General$Estelito$Mendoza$similarly$contends.$
checks$and$balances.$Verily,$the$Constitution$is$to$be$interpreted$as$a$whole$and$ $
"one$ section$ is$ not$ to$ be$ allowed$ to$ defeat$ another."67$ Both$ are$ integral$ Upon$the$other$hand,$the$Solicitor$General$asserts$that$petitioners$have$standing$
components$of$the$calibrated$system$of$independence$and$interdependence$that$ since$ this$ Court$ had,$ in$ the$ past,$ accorded$ standing$ to$ taxpayers,$ voters,$
insures$that$no$branch$of$government$act$beyond$the$powers$assigned$to$it$by$ concerned$ citizens,$ legislators$ in$ cases$ involving$ paramount$ public$ interest70$
the$Constitution.$ and$transcendental$importance,71$and$that$procedural$matters$are$subordinate$
$ to$the$need$to$determine$whether$or$not$the$other$branches$of$the$government$
Essential$Requisites$for$Judicial$Review$ have$kept$themselves$within$the$limits$of$the$Constitution$and$the$laws$and$that$
$ they$have$not$abused$the$discretion$given$to$them.72$Amicus$curiae$Dean$Raul$
As$clearly$stated$in$Angara$v.$Electoral$Commission,$the$courts'$power$of$judicial$ Pangalangan$ of$ the$ U.P.$ College$ of$ Law$ is$ of$ the$ same$ opinion,$ citing$
review,$ like$ almost$ all$ powers$ conferred$ by$ the$ Constitution,$ is$ subject$ to$ transcendental$ importance$ and$ the$ wellSentrenched$ rule$ exception$ that,$ when$
several$ limitations,$ namely:$ (1)$ an$ actual$ case$ or$ controversy$ calling$ for$ the$ the$ real$ party$ in$ interest$ is$ unable$ to$ vindicate$ his$ rights$ by$ seeking$ the$ same$
exercise$ of$ judicial$ power;$ (2)$ the$ person$ challenging$ the$ act$ must$ have$ remedies,$ as$ in$ the$ case$ of$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ who,$ for$ ethical$ reasons,$ cannot$
"standing"$to$challenge;$he$must$have$a$personal$and$substantial$interest$in$the$ himself$ invoke$ the$ jurisdiction$ of$ this$ Court,$ the$ courts$ will$ grant$ petitioners$
case$ such$ that$ he$ has$ sustained,$ or$ will$ sustain,$ direct$ injury$ as$ a$ result$ of$ its$ standing.$
enforcement;$(3)$the$question$of$constitutionality$must$be$raised$at$the$earliest$ $
possible$opportunity;$and$(4)$the$issue$of$constitutionality$must$be$the$very$lis$ There$ is,$ however,$ a$ difference$ between$ the$ rule$ on$ realSpartySinSinterest$ and$
mota$of$the$case.$ the$rule$on$standing,$for$the$former$is$a$concept$of$civil$procedure73$while$the$
$ latter$ has$ constitutional$ underpinnings.74$ In$ view$ of$ the$ arguments$ set$ forth$
x$ x$ x$ Even$ then,$ this$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ is$ limited$ to$ actual$ cases$ and$ regarding$standing,$it$behooves$the$Court$to$reiterate$the$ruling$in$Kilosbayan,$
controversies$to$be$exercised$after$full$opportunity$of$argument$by$the$parties,$ Inc.$ v.$ Morato75$ to$ clarify$ what$ is$ meant$ by$ locus$ standi$ and$ to$ distinguish$ it$
and$ limited$ further$ to$ the$ constitutional$ question$ raised$ or$ the$ very$ lis$ mota$ from$real$partySinSinterest.$
presented.$ Any$ attempt$ at$ abstraction$ could$ only$ lead$ to$ dialectics$ and$ barren$ $
legal$questions$and$to$sterile$conclusions$unrelated$to$actualities.$Narrowed$as$ The$difference$between$the$rule$on$standing$and$real$party$in$interest$has$been$
its$ function$ is$ in$ this$ manner,$ the$ judiciary$ does$ not$ pass$ upon$ questions$ of$ noted$by$authorities$thus:$"It$is$important$to$note$.$.$.$that$standing$because$of$its$
wisdom,$ justice$ or$ expediency$ of$ legislation.$ More$ than$ that,$ courts$ accord$ the$ constitutional$and$public$policy$underpinnings,$is$very$different$from$questions$
presumption$of$constitutionality$to$legislative$enactments,$not$only$because$the$ relating$ to$ whether$ a$ particular$ plaintiff$ is$ the$ real$ party$ in$ interest$ or$ has$
legislature$ is$ presumed$ to$ abide$ by$ the$ Constitution$ but$ also$ because$ the$ capacity$to$sue.$Although$all$three$requirements$are$directed$towards$ensuring$
judiciary$in$the$determination$of$actual$cases$and$controversies$must$reflect$the$ that$only$certain$parties$can$maintain$an$action,$standing$restrictions$require$a$
wisdom$and$justice$of$the$people$as$expressed$through$their$representatives$in$ partial$ consideration$ of$ the$ merits,$ as$ well$ as$ broader$ policy$ concerns$ relating$
the$ executive$ and$ legislative$ departments$ of$ the$ government.68$ (Italics$ in$ the$ to$the$proper$role$of$the$judiciary$in$certain$areas.$
original)$ $
$ Standing$is$a$special$concern$in$constitutional$law$because$in$some$cases$suits$
Standing$ are$brought$not$by$parties$who$have$been$personally$injured$by$the$operation$of$
$ a$law$or$by$official$action$taken,$but$by$concerned$citizens,$taxpayers$or$voters$
Locus$standi$or$legal$standing$or$has$been$defined$as$a$personal$and$substantial$ who$ actually$ sue$ in$ the$ public$ interest.$ Hence$ the$ question$ in$ standing$ is$
interest$in$the$case$such$that$the$party$has$sustained$or$will$sustain$direct$injury$ whether$such$parties$have$"alleged$such$a$personal$stake$in$the$outcome$of$the$
as$ a$ result$ of$ the$ governmental$ act$ that$ is$ being$ challenged.$ The$ gist$ of$ the$ controversy$ as$ to$ assure$ that$ concrete$ adverseness$ which$ sharpens$ the$
question$ of$ standing$ is$ whether$ a$ party$ alleges$ such$ personal$ stake$ in$ the$ presentation$of$issues$upon$which$the$court$so$largely$depends$for$illumination$
outcome$ of$ the$ controversy$ as$ to$ assure$ that$ concrete$ adverseness$ which$ of$difficult$constitutional$questions."$
sharpens$ the$ presentation$ of$ issues$ upon$ which$ the$ court$ depends$ for$ $
illumination$of$difficult$constitutional$questions.69$ x$x$x$
$ As$ for$ a$ legislator,$ he$ is$ allowed$ to$ sue$ to$ question$ the$ validity$ of$ any$ official$
On$ the$ other$ hand,$ the$ question$ as$ to$ "real$ party$ in$ interest"$ is$ whether$ he$ is$ action$ which$ he$ claims$ infringes$ his$ prerogatives$ as$ a$ legislator.82$ Indeed,$ a$
"the$ party$ who$ would$ be$ benefited$ or$ injured$ by$ the$ judgment,$ or$ the$ 'party$ member$of$the$House$of$Representatives$has$standing$to$maintain$inviolate$the$
entitled$to$the$avails$of$the$suit.'"76$(Citations$omitted)$ prerogatives,$powers$and$privileges$vested$by$the$Constitution$in$his$office.83$
$ $
While$rights$personal$to$the$Chief$Justice$may$have$been$injured$by$the$alleged$ While$ an$ association$ has$ legal$ personality$ to$ represent$ its$ members,84$
unconstitutional$ acts$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives,$ none$ of$ the$ petitioners$ especially$ when$ it$ is$ composed$ of$ substantial$ taxpayers$ and$ the$ outcome$ will$
before$ us$ asserts$ a$ violation$ of$ the$ personal$ rights$ of$ the$ Chief$ Justice.$ On$ the$ affect$ their$ vital$ interests,85$ the$ mere$ invocation$ by$ the$ Integrated$ Bar$ of$ the$
contrary,$ they$ invariably$ invoke$ the$ vindication$ of$ their$ own$ rights$ $ as$ Philippines$ or$ any$ member$ of$ the$ legal$ profession$ of$ the$ duty$ to$ preserve$ the$
taxpayers;$ members$ of$ Congress;$ citizens,$ individually$ or$ in$ a$ class$ suit;$ and$ rule$ of$ law$ and$ nothing$ more,$ although$ undoubtedly$ true,$ does$ not$ suffice$ to$
members$ of$ the$ bar$ and$ of$ the$ legal$ profession$ $ which$ were$ supposedly$ clothe$ it$ with$ standing.$ Its$ interest$ is$ too$ general.$ It$ is$ shared$ by$ other$ groups$
violated$by$the$alleged$unconstitutional$acts$of$the$House$of$Representatives.$ and$ the$ whole$ citizenry.$ However,$ a$ reading$ of$ the$ petitions$ shows$ that$ it$ has$
$ advanced$constitutional$issues$which$deserve$the$attention$of$this$Court$in$view$
In$ a$ long$ line$ of$ cases,$ however,$ concerned$ citizens,$ taxpayers$ and$ legislators$ of$their$seriousness,$novelty$and$weight$as$precedents.86$It,$therefore,$behooves$
when$ specific$ requirements$ have$ been$ met$ have$ been$ given$ standing$ by$ this$ this$Court$to$relax$the$rules$on$standing$and$to$resolve$the$issues$presented$by$
Court.$ it.$
$ $
When$ suing$ as$ a$ citizen,$ the$ interest$ of$ the$ petitioner$ assailing$ the$ In$ the$ same$ vein,$ when$ dealing$ with$ class$ suits$ filed$ in$ behalf$ of$ all$ citizens,$
constitutionality$ of$ a$ statute$ must$ be$ direct$ and$ personal.$ He$ must$ be$ able$ to$ persons$intervening$must$be$sufficiently$numerous$to$fully$protect$the$interests$
show,$ not$ only$ that$ the$ law$ or$ any$ government$ act$ is$ invalid,$ but$ also$ that$ he$ of$ all$ concerned87$ to$ enable$ the$ court$ to$ deal$ properly$ with$ all$ interests$
sustained$or$is$in$imminent$danger$of$sustaining$some$direct$injury$as$a$result$of$ involved$ in$ the$ suit,88$ for$ a$ judgment$ in$ a$ class$ suit,$ whether$ favorable$ or$
its$enforcement,$and$not$merely$that$he$suffers$thereby$in$some$indefinite$way.$ unfavorable$ to$ the$ class,$ is,$ under$ the$ res$ judicata$ principle,$ binding$ on$ all$
It$ must$ appear$ that$ the$ person$ complaining$ has$ been$ or$ is$ about$ to$ be$ denied$ members$ of$ the$ class$ whether$ or$ not$ they$ were$ before$ the$ court.89$ Where$ it$
some$right$or$privilege$to$which$he$is$lawfully$entitled$or$that$he$is$about$to$be$ clearly$appears$that$not$all$interests$can$be$sufficiently$represented$as$shown$by$
subjected$ to$ some$ burdens$ or$ penalties$ by$ reason$ of$ the$ statute$ or$ act$ the$divergent$issues$raised$in$the$numerous$petitions$before$this$Court,$G.R.$No.$
complained$of.77$In$fine,$when$the$proceeding$involves$the$assertion$of$a$public$ 160365$as$a$class$suit$ought$to$fail.$Since$petitioners$additionally$allege$standing$
right,78$the$mere$fact$that$he$is$a$citizen$satisfies$the$requirement$of$personal$ as$citizens$and$taxpayers,$however,$their$petition$will$stand.$
interest.$ $
$ The$ Philippine$ Bar$ Association,$ in$ G.R.$ No.$ 160403,$ invokes$ the$ sole$ ground$ of$
In$the$case$of$a$taxpayer,$he$is$allowed$to$sue$where$there$is$a$claim$that$public$ transcendental$importance,$while$Atty.$Dioscoro$U.$Vallejos,$in$G.R.$No.$160397,$
funds$ are$ illegally$ disbursed,$ or$ that$ public$ money$ is$ being$ deflected$ to$ any$ is$mum$on$his$standing.$
improper$ purpose,$ or$ that$ there$ is$ a$ wastage$ of$ public$ funds$ through$ the$ $
enforcement$ of$ an$ invalid$ or$ unconstitutional$ law.79$ Before$ he$ can$ invoke$ the$ There$being$no$doctrinal$definition$of$transcendental$importance,$the$following$
power$ of$ judicial$ review,$ however,$ he$ must$ specifically$ prove$ that$ he$ has$ instructive$ determinants$ formulated$ by$ former$ Supreme$ Court$ Justice$
sufficient$ interest$ in$ preventing$ the$ illegal$ expenditure$ of$ money$ raised$ by$ Florentino$ P.$ Feliciano$ are$ instructive:$ (1)$ the$ character$ of$ the$ funds$ or$ other$
taxation$and$that$he$would$sustain$a$direct$injury$as$a$result$of$the$enforcement$ assets$ involved$ in$ the$ case;$ (2)$ the$ presence$ of$ a$ clear$ case$ of$ disregard$ of$ a$
of$ the$ questioned$ statute$ or$ contract.$ It$ is$ not$ sufficient$ that$ he$ has$ merely$ a$ constitutional$ or$ statutory$ prohibition$ by$ the$ public$ respondent$ agency$ or$
general$interest$common$to$all$members$of$the$public.80$ instrumentality$ of$ the$ government;$ and$ (3)$ the$ lack$ of$ any$ other$ party$ with$ a$
$ more$ direct$ and$ specific$ interest$ in$ raising$ the$ questions$ being$ raised.90$
At$all$events,$courts$are$vested$with$discretion$as$to$whether$or$not$a$taxpayer's$ Applying$these$determinants,$this$Court$is$satisfied$that$the$issues$raised$herein$
suit$ should$ be$ entertained.81$ This$ Court$ opts$ to$ grant$ standing$ to$ most$ of$ the$ are$indeed$of$transcendental$importance.$
petitioners,$given$their$allegation$that$any$impending$transmittal$to$the$Senate$ $
of$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ and$ the$ ensuing$ trial$ of$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ will$ In$not$a$few$cases,$this$Court$has$in$fact$adopted$a$liberal$attitude$on$the$locus$
necessarily$involve$the$expenditure$of$public$funds.$ standi$ of$ a$ petitioner$ where$ the$ petitioner$ is$ able$ to$ craft$ an$ issue$ of$
$ transcendental$ significance$ to$ the$ people,$ as$ when$ the$ issues$ raised$ are$ of$
paramount$importance$to$the$public.91$Such$liberality$does$not,$however,$mean$
that$the$requirement$that$a$party$should$have$an$interest$in$the$matter$is$totally$ Senator$Pimentel$possesses$a$legal$interest$in$the$matter$in$litigation,$he$being$a$
eliminated.$ A$ party$ must,$ at$ the$ very$ least,$ still$ plead$ the$ existence$ of$ such$ member$ of$ Congress$ against$ which$ the$ herein$ petitions$ are$ directed.$ For$ this$
interest,$ it$ not$ being$ one$ of$ which$ courts$ can$ take$ judicial$ notice.$ In$ petitioner$ reason,$and$to$fully$ventilate$all$substantial$issues$relating$to$the$matter$at$hand,$
Vallejos'$case,$he$failed$to$allege$any$interest$in$the$case.$He$does$not$thus$have$ his$ Motion$ to$ Intervene$ was$ granted$ and$ he$ was,$ as$ earlier$ stated,$ allowed$ to$
standing.$ argue.$
$ $
With$respect$to$the$motions$for$intervention,$Rule$19,$Section$2$of$the$Rules$of$ Lastly,$ as$ to$ Jaime$ N.$ Soriano's$ motion$ to$ intervene,$ the$ same$ must$ be$ denied$
Court$ requires$ an$ intervenor$ to$ possess$ a$ legal$ interest$ in$ the$ matter$ in$ for,$ while$ he$ asserts$ an$ interest$ as$ a$ taxpayer,$ he$ failed$ to$ meet$ the$ standing$
litigation,$or$in$the$success$of$either$of$the$parties,$or$an$interest$against$both,$or$ requirement$for$bringing$taxpayer's$suits$as$set$forth$in$Dumlao$v.$Comelec,93$
is$so$situated$as$to$be$adversely$affected$by$a$distribution$or$other$disposition$of$ to$wit:$
property$in$the$custody$of$the$court$or$of$an$officer$thereof.$While$intervention$ $
is$ not$ a$ matter$ of$ right,$ it$ may$ be$ permitted$ by$ the$ courts$ when$ the$ applicant$ x$ x$ x$ While,$ concededly,$ the$ elections$ to$ be$ held$ involve$ the$ expenditure$ of$
shows$ facts$ which$ satisfy$ the$ requirements$ of$ the$ law$ authorizing$ public$moneys,$nowhere$in$their$Petition$do$said$petitioners$allege$that$their$tax$
intervention.92$ money$ is$ "being$ extracted$ and$ spent$ in$ violation$ of$ specific$ constitutional$
$ protection$against$abuses$of$legislative$power,"$or$that$there$is$a$misapplication$
In$ Intervenors$ Attorneys$ Romulo$ Macalintal$ and$ Pete$ Quirino$ Quadra's$ case,$ of$such$funds$by$respondent$COMELEC,$or$that$public$money$is$being$deflected$
they$seek$to$join$petitioners$Candelaria,$et.$al.$in$G.R.$No.$160262.$Since,$save$for$ to$ any$ improper$ purpose.$ Neither$ do$ petitioners$ seek$ to$ restrain$ respondent$
one$additional$issue,$they$raise$the$same$issues$and$the$same$standing,$and$no$ from$ wasting$ public$ funds$ through$ the$ enforcement$ of$ an$ invalid$ or$
objection$on$the$part$of$petitioners$Candelaria,$et.$al.$has$been$interposed,$this$ unconstitutional$law.94$(Citations$omitted)$
Court$as$earlier$stated,$granted$the$Motion$for$Leave$of$Court$to$Intervene$and$ $
PetitionSinSIntervention.$ In$ praying$ for$ the$ dismissal$ of$ the$ petitions,$ Soriano$ failed$ even$ to$ allege$ that$
$ the$ act$ of$ petitioners$ will$ result$ in$ illegal$ disbursement$ of$ public$ funds$ or$ in$
Nagmamalasakit$na$mga$Manananggol$ng$mga$Manggagawang$Pilipino,$Inc.,$et.$ public$ money$ being$ deflected$ to$ any$ improper$ purpose.$ Additionally,$ his$ mere$
al.$sought$to$join$petitioner$Francisco$in$G.R.$No.$160261.$Invoking$their$right$as$ interest$as$a$member$of$the$Bar$does$not$suffice$to$clothe$him$with$standing.$
citizens$ to$ intervene,$ alleging$ that$ "they$ will$ suffer$ if$ this$ insidious$ scheme$ of$ $
the$minority$members$of$the$House$of$Representatives$is$successful,"$this$Court$ Ripeness$and$Prematurity$
found$the$requisites$for$intervention$had$been$complied$with.$ $
$ In$Tan$v.$Macapagal,95$this$Court,$through$Chief$Justice$Fernando,$held$that$for$
Alleging$ that$ the$ issues$ raised$ in$ the$ petitions$ in$ G.R.$ Nos.$ 160261,$ 160262,$ a$case$to$be$considered$ripe$for$adjudication,$"it$is$a$prerequisite$that$something$
160263,$ 160277,$ 160292,$ 160295,$ and$ 160310$ were$ of$ transcendental$ had$ by$ then$ been$ accomplished$ or$ performed$ by$ either$ branch$ before$ a$ court$
importance,$World$War$II$Veterans$Legionnaires$of$the$Philippines,$Inc.$filed$a$ may$come$into$the$picture."96$Only$then$may$the$courts$pass$on$the$validity$of$
"PetitionSinSIntervention$ with$ Leave$ to$ Intervene"$ to$ raise$ the$ additional$ issue$ what$ was$ done,$ if$ and$ when$ the$ latter$ is$ challenged$ in$ an$ appropriate$ legal$
of$whether$or$not$the$second$impeachment$complaint$against$the$Chief$Justice$is$ proceeding.$
valid$and$based$on$any$of$the$grounds$prescribed$by$the$Constitution.$ $
$ The$instant$petitions$raise$in$the$main$the$issue$of$the$validity$of$the$filing$of$the$
Finding$ that$ Nagmamalasakit$ na$ mga$ Manananggol$ ng$ mga$ Manggagawang$ second$impeachment$complaint$against$the$Chief$Justice$in$accordance$with$the$
Pilipino,$ Inc.,$ et$ al.$ and$ World$ War$ II$ Veterans$ Legionnaires$ of$ the$ Philippines,$ House$Impeachment$Rules$adopted$by$the$12th$Congress,$the$constitutionality$
Inc.$possess$a$legal$interest$in$the$matter$in$litigation$the$respective$motions$to$ of$ which$ is$ questioned.$ The$ questioned$ acts$ having$ been$ carried$ out,$ i.e.,$ the$
intervene$were$hereby$granted.$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ had$ been$ filed$ with$ the$ House$ of$
$ Representatives$ and$ the$ 2001$ Rules$ have$ already$ been$ already$ promulgated$
Senator$ Aquilino$ Pimentel,$ on$ the$ other$ hand,$ sought$ to$ intervene$ for$ the$ and$ enforced,$ the$ prerequisite$ that$ the$ alleged$ unconstitutional$ act$ should$ be$
limited$ purpose$ of$ making$ of$ record$ and$ arguing$ a$ point$ of$ view$ that$ differs$ accomplished$ and$ performed$ before$ suit,$ as$ Tan$ v.$ Macapagal$ holds,$ has$ been$
with$ Senate$ President$ Drilon's.$ He$ alleges$ that$ submitting$ to$ this$ Court's$ complied$with.$
jurisdiction$ as$ the$ Senate$ President$ does$ will$ undermine$ the$ independence$ of$ $
the$ Senate$ which$ will$ sit$ as$ an$ impeachment$ court$ once$ the$ Articles$ of$ Related$to$the$issue$of$ripeness$is$the$question$of$whether$the$instant$petitions$
Impeachment$are$transmitted$to$it$from$the$House$of$Representatives.$Clearly,$ are$premature.$Amicus$curiae$former$Senate$President$Jovito$R.$Salonga$opines$
that$there$may$be$no$urgent$need$for$this$Court$to$render$a$decision$at$this$time,$ Prior$to$the$1973$Constitution,$without$consistency$and$seemingly$without$any$
it$ being$ the$ final$ arbiter$ on$ questions$ of$ constitutionality$ anyway.$ He$ thus$ rhyme$or$reason,$this$Court$vacillated$on$its$stance$of$taking$cognizance$of$cases$
recommends$ that$ all$ remedies$ in$ the$ House$ and$ Senate$ should$ first$ be$ which$ involved$ political$ questions.$ In$ some$ cases,$ this$ Court$ hid$ behind$ the$
exhausted.$ cover$ of$ the$ political$ question$ doctrine$ and$ refused$ to$ exercise$ its$ power$ of$
$ judicial$review.100$In$other$cases,$however,$despite$the$seeming$political$nature$
Taking$a$similar$stand$is$Dean$Raul$Pangalangan$of$the$U.P.$College$of$Law$who$ of$ the$ therein$ issues$ involved,$ this$ Court$ assumed$ jurisdiction$ whenever$ it$
suggests$to$this$Court$to$take$judicial$notice$of$onSgoing$attempts$to$encourage$ found$ constitutionally$ imposed$ limits$ on$ powers$ or$ functions$ conferred$ upon$
signatories$to$the$second$impeachment$complaint$to$withdraw$their$signatures$ political$ bodies.101$ Even$ in$ the$ landmark$ 1988$ case$ of$ Javellana$ v.$ Executive$
and$ opines$ that$ the$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules$ provide$ for$ an$ opportunity$ for$ Secretary102$ which$ raised$ the$ issue$ of$ whether$ the$ 1973$ Constitution$ was$
members$ to$ raise$ constitutional$ questions$ themselves$ when$ the$ Articles$ of$ ratified,$ hence,$ in$ force,$ this$ Court$ shunted$ the$ political$ question$ doctrine$ and$
Impeachment$are$presented$on$a$motion$to$transmit$to$the$same$to$the$Senate.$ took$cognizance$thereof.$Ratification$by$the$people$of$a$Constitution$is$a$political$
The$dean$maintains$that$even$assuming$that$the$Articles$are$transmitted$to$the$ question,$it$being$a$question$decided$by$the$people$in$their$sovereign$capacity.$
Senate,$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ can$ raise$ the$ issue$ of$ their$ constitutional$ infirmity$ by$ $
way$of$a$motion$to$dismiss.$ The$frequency$with$which$this$Court$invoked$the$political$question$doctrine$to$
$ refuse$ to$ take$ jurisdiction$ over$ certain$ cases$ during$ the$ Marcos$ regime$
The$ dean's$ position$ does$ not$ persuade.$ First,$ the$ withdrawal$ by$ the$ motivated$ Chief$ Justice$ Concepcion,$ when$ he$ became$ a$ Constitutional$
Representatives$ of$ their$ signatures$ would$ not,$ by$ itself,$ cure$ the$ House$ Commissioner,$to$clarify$this$Court's$power$of$judicial$review$and$its$application$
Impeachment$ Rules$ of$ their$ constitutional$ infirmity.$ Neither$ would$ such$ a$ on$issues$involving$political$questions,$viz:$
withdrawal,$by$itself,$obliterate$the$questioned$second$impeachment$complaint$ $
since$it$would$only$place$it$under$the$ambit$of$Sections$3(2)$and$(3)$of$Article$XI$ MR.$CONCEPCION.$Thank$you,$Mr.$Presiding$Officer.$
of$the$Constitution97$and,$therefore,$petitioners$would$continue$to$suffer$their$ $
injuries.$ I$ will$ speak$ on$ the$ judiciary.$ Practically,$ everybody$ has$ made,$ I$ suppose,$ the$
$ usual$ comment$ that$ the$ judiciary$ is$ the$ weakest$ among$ the$ three$ major$
Second$ and$ most$ importantly,$ the$ futility$ of$ seeking$ remedies$ from$ either$ or$ branches$of$the$service.$Since$the$legislature$holds$the$purse$and$the$executive$
both$Houses$of$Congress$before$coming$to$this$Court$is$shown$by$the$fact$that,$ the$ sword,$ the$ judiciary$ has$ nothing$ with$ which$ to$ enforce$ its$ decisions$ or$
as$previously$discussed,$neither$the$House$of$Representatives$nor$the$Senate$is$ commands$except$the$power$of$reason$and$appeal$to$conscience$which,$after$all,$
clothed$ with$ the$ power$ to$ rule$ with$ definitiveness$ on$ the$ issue$ of$ reflects$ the$ will$ of$ God,$ and$ is$ the$ most$ powerful$ of$ all$ other$ powers$ without$
constitutionality,$ whether$ concerning$ impeachment$ proceedings$ or$ otherwise,$ exception.$ x$ x$ x$ And$ so,$ with$ the$ body's$ indulgence,$ I$ will$ proceed$ to$ read$ the$
as$said$power$is$exclusively$vested$in$the$judiciary$by$the$earlier$quoted$Section$ provisions$drafted$by$the$Committee$on$the$Judiciary.$
I,$Article$VIII$of$the$Constitution.$Remedy$cannot$be$sought$from$a$body$which$is$ $
bereft$of$power$to$grant$it.$ The$ first$ section$ starts$ with$ a$ sentence$ copied$ from$ former$ Constitutions.$ It$
$ says:$
Justiciability$ $
$ The$ judicial$ power$ shall$ be$ vested$ in$ one$ Supreme$ Court$ and$ in$ such$ lower$
In$ the$ leading$ case$ of$ Tanada$ v.$ Cuenco,98$ Chief$ Justice$ Roberto$ Concepcion$ courts$as$may$be$established$by$law.$
defined$the$term$"political$question,"$viz:$ $
$ I$suppose$nobody$can$question$it.$
[T]he$ term$ "political$ question"$ connotes,$ in$ legal$ parlance,$ what$ it$ means$ in$ $
ordinary$parlance,$namely,$a$question$of$policy.$In$other$words,$in$the$language$ The$ next$ provision$ is$ new$ in$ our$ constitutional$ law.$ I$ will$ read$ it$ first$ and$
of$ Corpus$ Juris$ Secundum,$ it$ refers$ to$ "those$ questions$ which,$ under$ the$ explain.$
Constitution,$ are$ to$ be$ decided$ by$ the$ people$ in$ their$ sovereign$ capacity,$ or$ in$ $
regard$ to$ which$ full$ discretionary$ authority$ has$ been$ delegated$ to$ the$ Judicial$ power$ includes$ the$ duty$ of$ courts$ of$ justice$ to$ settle$ actual$
Legislature$or$executive$branch$of$the$Government."$It$is$concerned$with$issues$ controversies$ involving$ rights$ which$ are$ legally$ demandable$ and$ enforceable$
dependent$upon$the$wisdom,$not$legality,$of$a$particular$measure.99$(Italics$in$ and$ to$ determine$ whether$ or$ not$ there$ has$ been$ a$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$
the$original)$ amounting$to$lack$or$excess$of$jurisdiction$on$the$part$or$instrumentality$of$the$
$ government.$
$ 15.$ But$ the$ questions$ to$ be$ submitted$ in$ the$ referendum$ were$ not$ announced$
Fellow$Members$of$this$Commission,$this$is$actually$a$product$of$our$experience$
during$martial$law.$As$a$matter$of$fact,$it$has$some$antecedents$in$the$past,$but$
the$role$of$the$judiciary$during$the$deposed$regime$was$marred$considerably$by$
the$circumstance$that$in$a$number$of$cases$against$the$government,$which$then$
had$ no$ legal$ defense$ at$ all,$ the$ solicitor$ general$ set$ up$ the$ defense$ of$ political$
questions$and$got$away$with$it.$As$a$consequence,$certain$principles$concerning$
particularly$ the$ writ$ of$ habeas$ corpus,$ that$ is,$ the$ authority$ of$ courts$ to$ order$
the$release$of$political$detainees,$and$other$matters$related$to$the$operation$and$
effect$ of$ martial$ law$ failed$ because$ the$ government$ set$ up$ the$ defense$ of$
political$ question.$ And$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ said:$ "Well,$ since$ it$ is$ political,$ we$
have$ no$ authority$ to$ pass$ upon$ it."$ The$ Committee$ on$ the$ Judiciary$ feels$ that$
this$ was$ not$ a$ proper$ solution$ of$ the$ questions$ involved.$ It$ did$ not$ merely$
request$ an$ encroachment$ upon$ the$ rights$ of$ the$ people,$ but$ it,$ in$ effect,$
encouraged$further$violations$thereof$during$the$martial$law$regime.$I$am$sure$
the$members$of$the$Bar$are$familiar$with$this$situation.$But$for$the$benefit$of$the$
Members$ of$ the$ Commission$ who$ are$ not$ lawyers,$ allow$ me$ to$ explain.$ I$ will$
start$with$a$decision$of$the$Supreme$Court$in$1973$on$the$case$of$Javellana$vs.$
the$ Secretary$ of$ Justice,$ if$ I$ am$ not$ mistaken.$ Martial$ law$ was$ announced$ on$
September$22,$although$the$proclamation$was$dated$September$21.$The$obvious$
reason$ for$ the$ delay$ in$ its$ publication$ was$ that$ the$ administration$ had$
apprehended$and$detained$prominent$newsmen$on$September$21.$So$that$when$
martial$ law$ was$ announced$ on$ September$ 22,$ the$ media$ hardly$ published$
anything$ about$ it.$ In$ fact,$ the$ media$ could$ not$ publish$ any$ story$ not$ only$
because$ our$ main$ writers$ were$ already$ incarcerated,$ but$ also$ because$ those$
who$succeeded$them$in$their$jobs$were$under$mortal$threat$of$being$the$object$
of$wrath$of$the$ruling$party.$The$1971$Constitutional$Convention$had$begun$on$
June$ 1,$ 1971$ and$ by$ September$ 21$ or$ 22$ had$ not$ finished$ the$ Constitution;$ it$
had$ barely$ agreed$ in$ the$ fundamentals$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ I$ forgot$ to$ say$ that$
upon$ the$ proclamation$ of$ martial$ law,$ some$ delegates$ to$ that$ 1971$
Constitutional$ Convention,$ dozens$ of$ them,$ were$ picked$ up.$ One$ of$ them$ was$
our$very$own$colleague,$Commissioner$Calderon.$So,$the$unfinished$draft$of$the$
Constitution$was$taken$over$by$representatives$of$Malacaang.$In$17$days,$they$
finished$ what$ the$ delegates$ to$ the$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Convention$ had$ been$
unable$ to$ accomplish$ for$ about$ 14$ months.$ The$ draft$ of$ the$ 1973$ Constitution$
was$ presented$ to$ the$ President$ around$ December$ 1,$ 1972,$ whereupon$ the$
President$issued$a$decree$calling$a$plebiscite$which$suspended$the$operation$of$
some$provisions$in$the$martial$law$decree$which$prohibited$discussions,$much$
less$ public$ discussions$ of$ certain$ matters$ of$ public$ concern.$ The$ purpose$ was$
presumably$to$allow$a$free$discussion$on$the$draft$of$the$Constitution$on$which$
a$ plebiscite$ was$ to$ be$ held$ sometime$ in$ January$ 1973.$ If$ I$ may$ use$ a$ word$
famous$by$our$colleague,$Commissioner$Ople,$during$the$interregnum,$however,$
the$ draft$ of$ the$ Constitution$ was$ analyzed$ and$ criticized$ with$ such$ a$ telling$
effect$ that$ Malacaang$ felt$ the$ danger$ of$ its$ approval.$ So,$ the$ President$
suspended$ indefinitely$ the$ holding$ of$ the$ plebiscite$ and$ announced$ that$ he$
would$consult$the$people$in$a$referendum$to$be$held$from$January$10$to$January$
until$the$eve$of$its$scheduled$beginning,$under$the$supposed$supervision$not$of$
the$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ but$ of$ what$ was$ then$ designated$ as$ "citizens$
assemblies$ or$ barangays."$ Thus$ the$ barangays$ came$ into$ existence.$ The$
questions$ to$ be$ propounded$ were$ released$ with$ proposed$ answers$ thereto,$
suggesting$ that$ it$ was$ unnecessary$ to$ hold$ a$ plebiscite$ because$ the$ answers$
given$in$the$referendum$should$be$regarded$as$the$votes$cast$in$the$plebiscite.$
Thereupon,$a$motion$was$filed$with$the$Supreme$Court$praying$that$the$holding$
of$the$referendum$be$suspended.$When$the$motion$was$being$heard$before$the$
Supreme$Court,$the$Minister$of$Justice$delivered$to$the$Court$a$proclamation$of$
the$President$declaring$that$the$new$Constitution$was$already$in$force$because$
the$ overwhelming$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ in$ the$ referendum$ favored$ the$
Constitution.$ Immediately$ after$ the$ departure$ of$ the$ Minister$ of$ Justice,$ I$
proceeded$to$the$session$room$where$the$case$was$being$heard.$I$then$informed$
the$Court$and$the$parties$the$presidential$proclamation$declaring$that$the$1973$
Constitution$had$been$ratified$by$the$people$and$is$now$in$force.$
$
A$number$of$other$cases$were$filed$to$declare$the$presidential$proclamation$null$
and$void.$The$main$defense$put$up$by$the$government$was$that$the$issue$was$a$
political$question$and$that$the$court$had$no$jurisdiction$to$entertain$the$case.$
$
x$x$x$
$
The$government$said$that$in$a$referendum$held$from$January$10$to$January$15,$
the$vast$majority$ratified$the$draft$of$the$Constitution.$Note$that$all$members$of$
the$Supreme$Court$were$residents$of$Manila,$but$none$of$them$had$been$notified$
of$ any$ referendum$ in$ their$ respective$ places$ of$ residence,$ much$ less$ did$ they$
participate$ in$ the$ alleged$ referendum.$ None$ of$ them$ saw$ any$ referendum$
proceeding.$
$
In$the$Philippines,$even$local$gossips$spread$like$wild$fire.$So,$a$majority$of$the$
members$of$the$Court$felt$that$there$had$been$no$referendum.$
$
Second,$a$referendum$cannot$substitute$for$a$plebiscite.$There$is$a$big$difference$
between$a$referendum$and$a$plebiscite.$But$another$group$of$justices$upheld$the$
defense$that$the$issue$was$a$political$question.$Whereupon,$they$dismissed$the$
case.$This$is$not$the$only$major$case$in$which$the$plea$of$"political$question"$was$
set$up.$There$have$been$a$number$of$other$cases$in$the$past.$
$
x$ x$ x$ The$ defense$ of$ the$ political$ question$ was$ rejected$ because$ the$ issue$ was$
clearly$justiciable.$
$
x$x$x$
$
x$ x$ x$ When$ your$ Committee$ on$ the$ Judiciary$ began$ to$ perform$ its$ functions,$ it$ $
faced$ the$ following$ questions:$ What$ is$ judicial$ power?$ What$ is$ a$ political$ MR.$ NOLLEDO.$ The$ Gentleman$ used$ the$ term$ "judicial$ power"$ but$ judicial$
question?$ power$is$not$vested$in$the$Supreme$Court$alone$but$also$in$other$lower$courts$as$
$ may$be$created$by$law.$
The$Supreme$Court,$like$all$other$courts,$has$one$main$function:$to$settle$actual$ $
controversies$ involving$ conflicts$ of$ rights$ which$ are$ demandable$ and$ MR.$CONCEPCION.$Yes.$
enforceable.$ There$ are$ rights$ which$ are$ guaranteed$ by$ law$ but$ cannot$ be$ $
enforced$by$a$judiciary$party.$In$a$decided$case,$a$husband$complained$that$his$ MR.$NOLLEDO.$And$so,$is$this$only$an$example?$
wife$was$unwilling$to$perform$her$duties$as$a$wife.$The$Court$said:$"We$can$tell$ $
your$ wife$ what$ her$ duties$ as$ such$ are$ and$ that$ she$ is$ bound$ to$ comply$ with$ MR.$ CONCEPCION.$ No,$ I$ know$ this$ is$ not.$ The$ Gentleman$ seems$ to$ identify$
them,$but$we$cannot$force$her$physically$to$discharge$her$main$marital$duty$to$ political$questions$with$jurisdictional$questions.$But$there$is$a$difference.$
her$husband.$There$are$some$rights$guaranteed$by$law,$but$they$are$so$personal$ $
that$ to$ enforce$ them$ by$ actual$ compulsion$ would$ be$ highly$ derogatory$ to$ MR.$NOLLEDO.$Because$of$the$expression$"judicial$power"?$
human$dignity."$ $
$ MR.$ CONCEPCION.$ No.$ Judicial$ power,$ as$ I$ said,$ refers$ to$ ordinary$ cases$ but$
This$is$why$the$first$part$of$the$second$paragraph$of$Section$I$provides$that:$ where$ there$ is$ a$ question$ as$ to$ whether$ the$ government$ had$ authority$ or$ had$
$ abused$its$authority$to$the$extent$of$lacking$jurisdiction$or$excess$of$jurisdiction,$
Judicial$ power$ includes$ the$ duty$ of$ courts$ to$ settle$ actual$ controversies$ that$is$not$a$political$question.$Therefore,$the$court$has$the$duty$to$decide.$
involving$rights$which$are$legally$demandable$or$enforceable$.$.$.$ $
$ x$x$x$
The$ courts,$ therefore,$ cannot$ entertain,$ much$ less$ decide,$ hypothetical$ $
questions.$In$a$presidential$system$of$government,$the$Supreme$Court$has,$also$ FR.$ BERNAS.$ Ultimately,$ therefore,$ it$ will$ always$ have$ to$ be$ decided$ by$ the$
another$ important$ function.$ The$ powers$ of$ government$ are$ generally$ Supreme$Court$according$to$the$new$numerical$need$for$votes.$
considered$ divided$ into$ three$ branches:$ the$ Legislative,$ the$ Executive$ and$ the$ $
Judiciary.$ Each$ one$ is$ supreme$ within$ its$ own$ sphere$ and$ independent$ of$ the$ On$ another$ point,$ is$ it$ the$ intention$ of$ Section$ 1$ to$ do$ away$ with$ the$ political$
others.$ Because$ of$ that$ supremacy$ power$ to$ determine$ whether$ a$ given$ law$ is$ question$doctrine?$
valid$or$not$is$vested$in$courts$of$justice.$ $
$ MR.$CONCEPCION.$No.$
Briefly$stated,$courts$of$justice$determine$the$limits$of$power$of$the$agencies$and$ $
offices$ of$ the$ government$ as$ well$ as$ those$ of$ its$ officers.$ In$ other$ words,$ the$ FR.$BERNAS.$It$is$not.$
judiciary$ is$ the$ final$ arbiter$ on$ the$ question$ whether$ or$ not$ a$ branch$ of$ $
government$or$any$of$its$officials$has$acted$without$jurisdiction$or$in$excess$of$ MR.$ CONCEPCION.$ No,$ because$ whenever$ there$ is$ an$ abuse$ of$ discretion,$
jurisdiction,$or$so$capriciously$as$to$constitute$an$abuse$of$discretion$amounting$ amounting$to$a$lack$of$jurisdiction.$.$.$
to$excess$of$jurisdiction$or$lack$of$jurisdiction.$This$is$not$only$a$judicial$power$ $
but$a$duty$to$pass$judgment$on$matters$of$this$nature.$ FR.$BERNAS.$So,$I$am$satisfied$with$the$answer$that$it$is$not$intended$to$do$away$
$ with$the$political$question$doctrine.$
This$is$the$background$of$paragraph$2$of$Section$1,$which$means$that$the$courts$ $
cannot$hereafter$evade$the$duty$to$settle$matters$of$this$nature,$by$claiming$that$ MR.$CONCEPCION.$No,$certainly$not.$
such$matters$constitute$a$political$question.$ $
$ When$ this$ provision$ was$ originally$ drafted,$ it$ sought$ to$ define$ what$ is$ judicial$
I$ have$ made$ these$ extended$ remarks$ to$ the$ end$ that$ the$ Commissioners$ may$ power.$But$the$Gentleman$will$notice$it$says,$"judicial$power$includes"$and$the$
have$an$initial$food$for$thought$on$the$subject$of$the$judiciary.103$(Italics$in$the$ reason$being$that$the$definition$that$we$might$make$may$not$cover$all$possible$
original;$emphasis$supplied)$ areas.$
$ $
During$ the$ deliberations$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Commission,$ Chief$ Justice$ FR.$ BERNAS.$ So,$ this$ is$ not$ an$ attempt$ to$ solve$ the$ problems$ arising$ from$ the$
Concepcion$further$clarified$the$concept$of$judicial$power,$thus:$ political$question$doctrine.$
$ In$the$case$now$before$us,$the$jurisdictional$objection$becomes$even$less$tenable$
MR.$ CONCEPCION.$ It$ definitely$ does$ not$ eliminate$ the$ fact$ that$ truly$ political$ and$ decisive.$ The$ reason$ is$ that,$ even$ if$ we$ were$ to$ assume$ that$ the$ issue$
questions$are$beyond$the$pale$of$judicial$power.104$(Emphasis$supplied)$ presented$ before$ us$ was$ political$ in$ nature,$ we$ would$ still$ not$ be$ precluded$
$ from$ resolving$ it$ under$ the$ expanded$ jurisdiction$ conferred$ upon$ us$ that$ now$
From$ the$ foregoing$ record$ of$ the$ proceedings$ of$ the$ 1986$ Constitutional$ covers,$ in$ proper$ cases,$ even$ the$ political$ question.110$ x$ x$ x$ (Emphasis$ and$
Commission,$it$is$clear$that$judicial$power$is$not$only$a$power;$it$is$also$a$duty,$a$ underscoring$supplied.)$
duty$which$cannot$be$abdicated$by$the$mere$specter$of$this$creature$called$the$ $
political$ question$ doctrine.$ Chief$ Justice$ Concepcion$ hastened$ to$ clarify,$ Section$1,$Article$VIII,$of$the$Court$does$not$define$what$are$justiciable$political$
however,$ that$ Section$ 1,$ Article$ VIII$ was$ not$ intended$ to$ do$ away$ with$ "truly$ questions$ and$ nonSjusticiable$ political$ questions,$ however.$ Identification$ of$
political$ questions."$ From$ this$ clarification$ it$ is$ gathered$ that$ there$ are$ two$ these$two$species$of$political$questions$may$be$problematic.$There$has$been$no$
species$of$political$questions:$(1)$"truly$political$questions"$and$(2)$those$which$ clear$ standard.$ The$ American$ case$ of$ Baker$ v.$ Carr111$ attempts$ to$ provide$
"are$not$truly$political$questions."$ some:$
$ $
Truly$political$questions$are$thus$beyond$judicial$review,$the$reason$for$respect$ x$x$x$Prominent$on$the$surface$of$any$case$held$to$involve$a$political$question$is$
of$the$doctrine$of$separation$of$powers$to$be$maintained.$On$the$other$hand,$by$ found$ a$ textually$ demonstrable$ constitutional$ commitment$ of$ the$ issue$ to$ a$
virtue$of$Section$1,$Article$VIII$of$the$Constitution,$courts$can$review$questions$ coordinate$ political$ department;$ or$ a$ lack$ of$ judicially$ discoverable$ and$
which$are$not$truly$political$in$nature.$ manageable$standards$for$resolving$it;$or$the$impossibility$of$deciding$without$
$ an$ initial$ policy$ determination$ of$ a$ kind$ clearly$ for$ nonSjudicial$ discretion;$ or$
As$pointed$out$by$amicus$curiae$former$dean$Pacifico$Agabin$of$the$UP$College$ the$ impossibility$ of$ a$ court's$ undertaking$ independent$ resolution$ without$
of$ Law,$ this$ Court$ has$ in$ fact$ in$ a$ number$ of$ cases$ taken$ jurisdiction$ over$ expressing$ lack$ of$ the$ respect$ due$ coordinate$ branches$ of$ government;$ or$ an$
questions$ which$ are$ not$ truly$ political$ following$ the$ effectivity$ of$ the$ present$ unusual$need$for$questioning$adherence$to$a$political$decision$already$made;$or$
Constitution.$ the$ potentiality$ of$ embarrassment$ from$ multifarious$ pronouncements$ by$
$ various$departments$on$one$question.112$(Underscoring$supplied)$
In$Marcos$v.$Manglapus,105$this$Court,$speaking$through$Madame$Justice$Irene$ $
Cortes,$held:$ Of$ these$ standards,$ the$ more$ reliable$ have$ been$ the$ first$ three:$ (1)$ a$ textually$
$ demonstrable$ constitutional$ commitment$ of$ the$ issue$ to$ a$ coordinate$ political$
The$ present$ Constitution$ limits$ resort$ to$ the$ political$ question$ doctrine$ and$ department;$ (2)$ the$ lack$ of$ judicially$ discoverable$ and$ manageable$ standards$
broadens$ the$ scope$ of$ judicial$ inquiry$ into$ areas$ which$ the$ Court,$ under$ for$ resolving$ it;$ and$ (3)$ the$ impossibility$ of$ deciding$ without$ an$ initial$ policy$
previous$constitutions,$would$have$normally$left$to$the$political$departments$to$ determination$of$a$kind$clearly$for$nonSjudicial$discretion.$These$standards$are$
decide.106$x$x$x$ not$ separate$ and$ distinct$ concepts$ but$ are$ interrelated$ to$ each$ in$ that$ the$
$ presence$of$one$strengthens$the$conclusion$that$the$others$are$also$present.$
In$ Bengzon$ v.$ Senate$ Blue$ Ribbon$ Committee,107$ through$ Justice$ Teodoro$ $
Padilla,$this$Court$declared:$ The$problem$in$applying$the$foregoing$standards$is$that$the$American$concept$
$ of$judicial$review$is$radically$different$from$our$current$concept,$for$Section$1,$
The$ "allocation$ of$ constitutional$ boundaries"$ is$ a$ task$ that$ this$ Court$ must$ Article$ VIII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ provides$ our$ courts$ with$ far$ less$ discretion$ in$
perform$ under$ the$ Constitution.$ Moreover,$ as$ held$ in$ a$ recent$ case,$ "(t)he$ determining$whether$they$should$pass$upon$a$constitutional$issue.$
political$ question$ doctrine$ neither$ interposes$ an$ obstacle$ to$ judicial$ $
determination$ of$ the$ rival$ claims.$ The$ jurisdiction$ to$ delimit$ constitutional$ In$ our$ jurisdiction,$ the$ determination$ of$ a$ truly$ political$ question$ from$ a$ nonS
boundaries$ has$ been$ given$ to$ this$ Court.$ It$ cannot$ abdicate$ that$ obligation$ justiciable$political$question$lies$in$the$answer$to$the$question$of$whether$there$
mandated$by$the$1987$Constitution,$although$said$provision$by$no$means$does$ are$ constitutionally$ imposed$ limits$ on$ powers$ or$ functions$ conferred$ upon$
away$with$the$applicability$of$the$principle$in$appropriate$cases."108$(Emphasis$ political$ bodies.$ If$ there$ are,$ then$ our$ courts$ are$ dutySbound$ to$ examine$
and$underscoring$supplied)$ whether$the$branch$or$instrumentality$of$the$government$properly$acted$within$
$ such$ limits.$ This$ Court$ shall$ thus$ now$ apply$ this$ standard$ to$ the$ present$
And$ in$ Daza$ v.$ Singson,109$ speaking$ through$ Justice$ Isagani$ Cruz,$ this$ Court$ controversy.$
ruled:$ $
$ These$petitions$raise$five$substantial$issues:$
$ left$for$consideration$until$a$case$arises$in$which$a$decision$upon$such$question$
I.$Whether$the$offenses$alleged$in$the$Second$impeachment$complaint$constitute$ will$be$unavoidable.116$[Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied]$
valid$impeachable$offenses$under$the$Constitution.$ $
$ The$ same$ principle$ was$ applied$ in$ Luz$ Farms$ v.$ Secretary$ of$ Agrarian$
II.$ Whether$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ was$ filed$ in$ accordance$ with$ Reform,117$where$this$Court$invalidated$Sections$13$and$32$of$Republic$Act$No.$
Section$3(4),$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution.$ 6657$for$being$confiscatory$and$violative$of$due$process,$to$wit:$
$ $
III.$Whether$the$legislative$inquiry$by$the$House$Committee$on$Justice$into$the$ It$ has$ been$ established$ that$ this$ Court$ will$ assume$ jurisdiction$ over$ a$
Judicial$ Development$ Fund$ is$ an$ unconstitutional$ infringement$ of$ the$ constitutional$ question$ only$ if$ it$ is$ shown$ that$ the$ essential$ requisites$ of$ a$
constitutionally$mandated$fiscal$autonomy$of$the$judiciary.$ judicial$ inquiry$ into$ such$ a$ question$ are$ first$ satisfied.$ Thus,$ there$ must$ be$ an$
$ actual$ case$ or$ controversy$ involving$ a$ conflict$ of$ legal$ rights$ susceptible$ of$
IV.$Whether$Sections$15$and$16$of$Rule$V$of$the$Rules$on$Impeachment$adopted$ judicial$determination,$the$constitutional$question$must$have$been$opportunely$
by$the$12th$Congress$are$unconstitutional$for$violating$the$provisions$of$Section$ raised$ by$ the$ proper$ party,$ and$ the$ resolution$ of$ the$ question$ is$ unavoidably$
3,$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution.$ necessary$to$the$decision$of$the$case$itself.118$[Emphasis$supplied]$
$ $
V.$Whether$the$second$impeachment$complaint$is$barred$under$Section$3(5)$of$ Succinctly$ put,$ courts$ will$ not$ touch$ the$ issue$ of$ constitutionality$ unless$ it$ is$
Article$XI$of$the$Constitution.$ truly$unavoidable$and$is$the$very$lis$mota$or$crux$of$the$controversy.$
$ $
The$first$issue$goes$into$the$merits$of$the$second$impeachment$complaint$over$ As$ noted$ earlier,$ the$ instant$ consolidated$ petitions,$ while$ all$ seeking$ the$
which$ this$ Court$ has$ no$ jurisdiction.$ More$ importantly,$ any$ discussion$ of$ this$ invalidity$ of$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint,$ collectively$ raise$ several$
issue$would$require$this$Court$to$make$a$determination$of$what$constitutes$an$ constitutional$issues$upon$which$the$outcome$of$this$controversy$could$possibly$
impeachable$offense.$Such$a$determination$is$a$purely$political$question$which$ be$ made$ to$ rest.$ In$ determining$ whether$ one,$ some$ or$ all$ of$ the$ remaining$
the$Constitution$has$left$to$the$sound$discretion$of$the$legislation.$Such$an$intent$ substantial$ issues$ should$ be$ passed$ upon,$ this$ Court$ is$ guided$ by$ the$ related$
is$clear$from$the$deliberations$of$the$Constitutional$Commission.113$ cannon$ of$ adjudication$ that$ "the$ court$ should$ not$ form$ a$ rule$ of$ constitutional$
$ law$broader$than$is$required$by$the$precise$facts$to$which$it$is$applied."119$
Although$Section$2$of$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution$enumerates$six$grounds$for$ $
impeachment,$ two$ of$ these,$ namely,$ other$ high$ crimes$ and$ betrayal$ of$ public$ In$G.R.$No.$160310,$petitioners$Leonilo$R.$Alfonso,$et$al.$argue$that,$among$other$
trust,$ elude$ a$ precise$ definition.$ In$ fact,$ an$ examination$ of$ the$ records$ of$ the$ reasons,$the$second$impeachment$complaint$is$invalid$since$it$directly$resulted$
1986$ Constitutional$ Commission$ shows$ that$ the$ framers$ could$ find$ no$ better$ from$ a$ Resolution120$ calling$ for$ a$ legislative$ inquiry$ into$ the$ JDF,$ which$
way$ to$ approximate$ the$ boundaries$ of$ betrayal$ of$ public$ trust$ and$ other$ high$ Resolution$ and$ legislative$ inquiry$ petitioners$ claim$ to$ likewise$ be$
crimes$than$by$alluding$to$both$positive$and$negative$examples$of$both,$without$ unconstitutional$ for$ being:$ (a)$ a$ violation$ of$ the$ rules$ and$ jurisprudence$ on$
arriving$at$their$clear$cut$definition$or$even$a$standard$therefor.114$Clearly,$the$ investigations$ in$ aid$ of$ legislation;$ (b)$ an$ open$ breach$ of$ the$ doctrine$ of$
issue$calls$upon$this$court$to$decide$a$nonSjusticiable$political$question$which$is$ separation$ of$ powers;$ (c)$ a$ violation$ of$ the$ constitutionally$ mandated$ fiscal$
beyond$the$scope$of$its$judicial$power$under$Section$1,$Article$VIII.$ autonomy$ of$ the$ judiciary;$ and$ (d)$ an$ assault$ on$ the$ independence$ of$ the$
$ judiciary.121$
Lis$Mota$ $
$ Without$ going$ into$ the$ merits$ of$ petitioners$ Alfonso,$ et.$ al.'s$ claims,$ it$ is$ the$
It$ is$ a$ wellSsettled$ maxim$ of$ adjudication$ that$ an$ issue$ assailing$ the$ studied$ opinion$ of$ this$ Court$ that$ the$ issue$ of$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ the$ said$
constitutionality$ of$ a$ governmental$ act$ should$ be$ avoided$ whenever$ possible.$ Resolution$and$resulting$legislative$inquiry$is$too$far$removed$from$the$issue$of$
Thus,$in$the$case$of$Sotto$v.$Commission$on$Elections,115$this$Court$held:$ the$validity$of$the$second$impeachment$complaint.$Moreover,$the$resolution$of$
$ said$ issue$ would,$ in$ the$ Court's$ opinion,$ require$ it$ to$ form$ a$ rule$ of$
x$ x$ x$ It$ is$ a$ wellSestablished$ rule$ that$ a$ court$ should$ not$ pass$ upon$ a$ constitutional$ law$ touching$ on$ the$ separate$ and$ distinct$ matter$ of$ legislative$
constitutional$ question$ and$ decide$ a$ law$ to$ be$ unconstitutional$ or$ invalid,$ inquiries$in$general,$which$would$thus$be$broader$than$is$required$by$the$facts$
unless$ such$ question$ is$ raised$ by$ the$ parties$ and$ that$ when$ it$ is$ raised,$ if$ the$ of$these$consolidated$cases.$This$opinion$is$further$strengthened$by$the$fact$that$
record$ also$ presents$ some$ other$ ground$ upon$ which$ the$ court$ may$ rest$ its$ said$ petitioners$ have$ raised$ other$ grounds$ in$ support$ of$ their$ petition$ which$
judgment,$ that$ course$ will$ be$ adopted$ and$ the$ constitutional$ question$ will$ be$ would$not$be$adversely$affected$by$the$Court's$ruling.$
$ $
En$ passant,$ this$ Court$ notes$ that$ a$ standard$ for$ the$ conduct$ of$ legislative$ Intervenors$ Macalintal$ and$ Quadra$ further$ claim$ that$ what$ the$ Constitution$
inquiries$ has$ already$ been$ enunciated$ by$ this$ Court$ in$ Bengzon,$ Jr.$ v.$ Senate$ requires$ in$ order$ for$ said$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ to$ automatically$
Blue$Ribbon$Commttee,122$viz:$ become$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ and$ for$ trial$ in$ the$ Senate$ to$ begin$
$ "forthwith,"$is$that$the$verified$complaint$be$"filed,"$not$merely$endorsed,$by$at$
The$ 1987$ Constitution$ expressly$ recognizes$ the$ power$ of$ both$ houses$ of$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives.$ Not$ having$
Congress$ to$ conduct$ inquiries$ in$ aid$ of$ legislation.$ Thus,$ Section$ 21,$ Article$ VI$ complied$ with$ this$ requirement,$ they$ concede$ that$ the$ second$ impeachment$
thereof$provides:$ complaint$ should$ have$ been$ calendared$ and$ referred$ to$ the$ House$ Committee$
$ on$Justice$under$Section$3(2),$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution,$viz:$
The$Senate$or$the$House$of$Representatives$or$any$of$its$respective$committees$ $
may$conduct$inquiries$in$aid$of$legislation$in$accordance$with$its$duly$published$ Section$3(2)$A$verified$complaint$for$impeachment$may$be$filed$by$any$Member$
rules$ of$ procedure.$ The$ rights$ of$ persons$ appearing$ in$ or$ affected$ by$ such$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ or$ by$ any$ citizen$ upon$ a$ resolution$ of$
inquiries$shall$be$respected.$ endorsement$ by$ any$ Member$ thereof,$ which$ shall$ be$ included$ in$ the$ Order$ of$
$ Business$within$ten$session$days,$and$referred$to$the$proper$Committee$within$
The$power$of$both$houses$of$Congress$to$conduct$inquiries$in$aid$of$legislation$ three$ session$ days$ thereafter.$ The$ Committee,$ after$ hearing,$ and$ by$ a$ majority$
is$ not,$ therefore$ absolute$ or$ unlimited.$ Its$ exercise$ is$ circumscribed$ by$ the$ vote$of$all$its$Members,$shall$submit$its$report$to$the$House$within$sixty$session$
aforeSquoted$ provision$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ Thus,$ as$ provided$ therein,$ the$ days$ from$ such$ referral,$ together$ with$ the$ corresponding$ resolution.$ The$
investigation$must$be$"in$aid$of$legislation$in$accordance$with$its$duly$published$ resolution$shall$be$calendared$for$consideration$by$the$House$within$ten$session$
rules$of$procedure"$and$that$"the$rights$of$persons$appearing$in$or$affected$by$ days$from$receipt$thereof.$
such$inquiries$shall$be$respected."$It$follows$then$that$the$right$rights$of$persons$ $
under$ the$ Bill$ of$ Rights$ must$ be$ respected,$ including$ the$ right$ to$ due$ process$ Intervenors'$foregoing$position$is$echoed$by$Justice$Maambong$who$opined$that$
and$the$right$not$be$compelled$to$testify$against$one's$self.123$ for$ Section$ 3$ (4),$ Article$ XI$ of$ the$ Constitution$ to$ apply,$ there$ should$ be$ 76$ or$
$ more$ representatives$ who$ signed$ and$ verified$ the$ second$ impeachment$
In$G.R.$No.$160262,$intervenors$Romulo$B.$Macalintal$and$Pete$Quirino$Quadra,$ complaint$as$complainants,$signed$and$verified$the$signatories$to$a$resolution$of$
while$joining$the$original$petition$of$petitioners$Candelaria,$et.$al.,$introduce$the$ impeachment.$ Justice$ Maambong$ likewise$ asserted$ that$ the$ Resolution$ of$
new$ argument$ that$ since$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ was$ verified$ and$ Endorsement/Impeachment$signed$by$at$least$oneSthird$of$the$members$of$the$
filed$ only$ by$ Representatives$ Gilberto$ Teodoro,$ Jr.$ and$ Felix$ William$ House$ of$ Representatives$ as$ endorsers$ is$ not$ the$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$
Fuentebella,$the$same$does$not$fall$under$the$provisions$of$Section$3$(4),$Article$ contemplated$ by$ the$ Constitution,$ such$ resolution$ of$ endorsement$ being$
XI$of$the$Constitution$which$reads:$ necessary$ only$ from$ at$ least$ one$ Member$ whenever$ a$ citizen$ files$ a$ verified$
$ impeachment$complaint.$
Section$3(4)$In$case$the$verified$complaint$or$resolution$of$impeachment$is$filed$ $
by$at$least$oneSthird$of$all$the$Members$of$the$House,$the$same$shall$constitute$ While$the$foregoing$issue,$as$argued$by$intervenors$Macalintal$and$Quadra,$does$
the$Articles$of$Impeachment,$and$trial$by$the$Senate$shall$forthwith$proceed.$ indeed$ limit$ the$ scope$ of$ the$ constitutional$ issues$ to$ the$ provisions$ on$
$ impeachment,$ more$ compelling$ considerations$ militate$ against$ its$ adoption$ as$
They$ assert$ that$ while$ at$ least$ 81$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ the$lis$mota$or$crux$of$the$present$controversy.$Chief$among$this$is$the$fact$that$
signed$a$Resolution$of$Endorsement/Impeachment,$the$same$did$not$satisfy$the$ only$ Attorneys$ Macalintal$ and$ Quadra,$ intervenors$ in$ G.R.$ No.$ 160262,$ have$
requisites$for$the$application$of$the$aforeSmentioned$section$in$that$the$"verified$ raised$ this$ issue$ as$ a$ ground$ for$ invalidating$ the$ second$ impeachment$
complaint$or$resolution$of$impeachment"$was$not$filed$"by$at$least$oneSthird$of$ complaint.$ Thus,$ to$ adopt$ this$ additional$ ground$ as$ the$ basis$ for$ deciding$ the$
all$the$Members$of$the$House."$With$the$exception$of$Representatives$Teodoro$ instant$ consolidated$ petitions$ would$ not$ only$ render$ for$ naught$ the$ efforts$ of$
and$Fuentebella,$the$signatories$to$said$Resolution$are$alleged$to$have$verified$ the$ original$ petitioners$ in$ G.R.$ No.$ 160262,$ but$ the$ efforts$ presented$ by$ the$
the$ same$ merely$ as$ a$ "Resolution$ of$ Endorsement."$ Intervenors$ point$ to$ the$ other$petitioners$as$well.$
"Verification"$of$the$Resolution$of$Endorsement$which$states$that:$ $
$ Again,$the$decision$to$discard$the$resolution$of$this$issue$as$unnecessary$for$the$
"We$ are$ the$ proponents/sponsors$ of$ the$ Resolution$ of$ Endorsement$ of$ the$ determination$ of$ the$ instant$ cases$ is$ made$ easier$ by$ the$ fact$ that$ said$
abovementioned$ Complaint$ of$ Representatives$ Gilberto$ Teodoro$ and$ Felix$ intervenors$Macalintal$and$Quadra$have$joined$in$the$petition$of$Candelaria,$et.$
William$B.$Fuentebella$x$x$x"124$
al.,$adopting$the$latter's$arguments$and$issues$as$their$own.$Consequently,$they$ render$justice,$to$be$unafraid$to$displease$any$person,$interest$or$power$and$to$
are$not$unduly$prejudiced$by$this$Court's$decision.$ be$equipped$with$a$moral$fiber$strong$enough$to$resist$the$temptations$lurking$
$ in$[his]$office."130$
In$ sum,$ this$ Court$ holds$ that$ the$ two$ remaining$ issues,$ inextricably$ linked$ as$ $
they$ are,$ constitute$ the$ very$ lis$ mota$ of$ the$ instant$ controversy:$ (1)$ whether$ The$ duty$ to$ exercise$ the$ power$ of$ adjudication$ regardless$ of$ interest$ had$
Sections$15$and$16$of$Rule$V$of$the$House$Impeachment$Rules$adopted$by$the$ already$been$settled$in$the$case$of$Abbas$v.$Senate$Electoral$Tribunal.131$In$that$
12th$ Congress$ are$ unconstitutional$ for$ violating$ the$ provisions$ of$ Section$ 3,$ case,$ the$ petitioners$ filed$ with$ the$ respondent$ Senate$ Electoral$ Tribunal$ a$
Article$ XI$ of$ the$ Constitution;$ and$ (2)$ whether,$ as$ a$ result$ thereof,$ the$ second$ Motion$for$Disqualification$or$Inhibition$of$the$SenatorsSMembers$thereof$from$
impeachment$ complaint$ is$ barred$ under$ Section$ 3(5)$ of$ Article$ XI$ of$ the$ the$ hearing$ and$ resolution$ of$ SET$ Case$ No.$ 002S87$ on$ the$ ground$ that$ all$ of$
Constitution.$ them$ were$ interested$ parties$ to$ said$ case$ as$ respondents$ therein.$ This$ would$
$ have$ reduced$ the$ Tribunal's$ membership$ to$ only$ its$ three$ JusticesSMembers$
Judicial$Restraint$ whose$disqualification$was$not$sought,$leaving$them$to$decide$the$matter.$This$
$ Court$held:$
Senator$ Pimentel$ urges$ this$ Court$ to$ exercise$ judicial$ restraint$ on$ the$ ground$ $
that$the$Senate,$sitting$as$an$impeachment$court,$has$the$sole$power$to$try$and$ Where,$ as$ here,$ a$ situation$ is$ created$ which$ precludes$ the$ substitution$ of$ any$
decide$all$cases$of$impeachment.$Again,$this$Court$reiterates$that$the$power$of$ Senator$ sitting$ in$ the$ Tribunal$ by$ any$ of$ his$ other$ colleagues$ in$ the$ Senate$
judicial$ review$ includes$ the$ power$ of$ review$ over$ justiciable$ issues$ in$ without$ inviting$ the$ same$ objections$ to$ the$ substitute's$ competence,$ the$
impeachment$proceedings.$ proposed$ mass$ disqualification,$ if$ sanctioned$ and$ ordered,$ would$ leave$ the$
$ Tribunal$no$alternative$but$to$abandon$a$duty$that$no$other$court$or$body$can$
On$the$other$hand,$respondents$Speaker$De$Venecia$et.$al.$argue$that$"[t]here$is$ perform,$but$which$it$cannot$lawfully$discharge$if$shorn$of$the$participation$of$
a$ moral$ compulsion$ for$ the$ Court$ to$ not$ assume$ jurisdiction$ over$ the$ its$entire$membership$of$Senators.$
impeachment$ because$ all$ the$ Members$ thereof$ are$ subject$ to$ $
impeachment."125$ But$ this$ argument$ is$ very$ much$ like$ saying$ the$ Legislature$ To$ our$ mind,$ this$ is$ the$ overriding$ consideration$ $ that$ the$ Tribunal$ be$ not$
has$a$moral$compulsion$not$to$pass$laws$with$penalty$clauses$because$Members$ prevented$from$discharging$a$duty$which$it$alone$has$the$power$to$perform,$the$
of$the$House$of$Representatives$are$subject$to$them.$ performance$of$which$is$in$the$highest$public$interest$as$evidenced$by$its$being$
$ expressly$imposed$by$no$less$than$the$fundamental$law.$
The$exercise$of$judicial$restraint$over$justiciable$issues$is$not$an$option$before$ $
this$ Court.$ Adjudication$ may$ not$ be$ declined,$ because$ this$ Court$ is$ not$ legally$ It$is$aptly$noted$in$the$first$of$the$questioned$Resolutions$that$the$framers$of$the$
disqualified.$Nor$can$jurisdiction$be$renounced$as$there$is$no$other$tribunal$to$ Constitution$ could$ not$ have$ been$ unaware$ of$ the$ possibility$ of$ an$ election$
which$ the$ controversy$ may$ be$ referred."126$ Otherwise,$ this$ Court$ would$ be$ contest$ that$ would$ involve$ all$ Senatorselect,$ six$ of$ whom$ would$ inevitably$
shirking$from$its$duty$vested$under$Art.$VIII,$Sec.$1(2)$of$the$Constitution.$More$ have$to$sit$in$judgment$thereon.$Indeed,$such$possibility$might$surface$again$in$
than$ being$ clothed$ with$ authority$ thus,$ this$ Court$ is$ dutySbound$ to$ take$ the$ wake$ of$ the$ 1992$ elections$ when$ once$ more,$ but$ for$ the$ last$ time,$ all$ 24$
cognizance$ of$ the$ instant$ petitions.127$ In$ the$ august$ words$ of$ amicus$ curiae$ seats$in$the$Senate$will$be$at$stake.$Yet$the$Constitution$provides$no$scheme$or$
Father$Bernas,$"jurisdiction$is$not$just$a$power;$it$is$a$solemn$duty$which$may$ mode$ for$ settling$ such$ unusual$ situations$ or$ for$ the$ substitution$ of$ Senators$
not$be$renounced.$To$renounce$it,$even$if$it$is$vexatious,$would$be$a$dereliction$ designated$ to$ the$ Tribunal$ whose$ disqualification$ may$ be$ sought.$ Litigants$ in$
of$duty."$ such$ situations$ must$ simply$ place$ their$ trust$ and$ hopes$ of$ vindication$ in$ the$
$ fairness$ and$ sense$ of$ justice$ of$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ Tribunal.$ Justices$ and$
Even$ in$ cases$ where$ it$ is$ an$ interested$ party,$ the$ Court$ under$ our$ system$ of$ Senators,$singly$and$collectively.$
government$ cannot$ inhibit$ itself$ and$ must$ rule$ upon$ the$ challenge$ because$ no$ $
other$office$has$the$authority$to$do$so.128$On$the$occasion$that$this$Court$had$ Let$ us$ not$ be$ misunderstood$ as$ saying$ that$ no$ SenatorSMember$ of$ the$ Senate$
been$ an$ interested$ party$ to$ the$ controversy$ before$ it,$ it$ has$ acted$ upon$ the$ Electoral$Tribunal$may$inhibit$or$disqualify$himself$from$sitting$in$judgment$on$
matter$"not$with$officiousness$but$in$the$discharge$of$an$unavoidable$duty$and,$ any$ case$ before$ said$ Tribunal.$ Every$ Member$ of$ the$ Tribunal$ may,$ as$ his$
as$always,$with$detachment$and$fairness."129$After$all,$"by$[his]$appointment$to$ conscience$dictates,$refrain$from$participating$in$the$resolution$of$a$case$where$
the$ office,$ the$ public$ has$ laid$ on$ [a$ member$ of$ the$ judiciary]$ their$ confidence$ he$sincerely$feels$that$his$personal$interests$or$biases$would$stand$in$the$way$of$
that$ [he]$ is$ mentally$ and$ morally$ fit$ to$ pass$ upon$ the$ merits$ of$ their$ varied$ an$ objective$ and$ impartial$ judgment.$ What$ we$ are$ merely$ saying$ is$ that$ in$ the$
contentions.$For$this$reason,$they$expect$[him]$to$be$fearless$in$[his]$pursuit$to$ light$of$the$Constitution,$the$Senate$Electoral$Tribunal$cannot$legally$function$as$
such,$ absent$ its$ entire$ membership$ of$ Senators$ and$ that$ no$ amendment$ of$ its$ challenging$ its$ decision$ of$ a$ question$ under$ the$ Federal$ Constitution$ are$
Rules$ can$ confer$ on$ the$ three$ JusticesSMembers$ alone$ the$ power$ of$ valid$ frequently$dismissed$because$the$judgment$can$be$sustained$on$an$independent$
adjudication$of$a$senatorial$election$contest.$ state$ground.$
$ $
More$recently$in$the$case$of$Estrada$v.$Desierto,132$it$was$held$that:$ 5.$The$Court$will$not$pass$upon$the$validity$of$a$statute$upon$complaint$of$one$
$ who$ fails$ to$ show$ that$ he$ is$ injured$ by$ its$ operation.$ Among$ the$ many$
Moreover,$to$disqualify$any$of$the$members$of$the$Court,$particularly$a$majority$ applications$ of$ this$ rule,$ none$ is$ more$ striking$ than$ the$ denial$ of$ the$ right$ of$
of$them,$is$nothing$short$of$pro$tanto$depriving$the$Court$itself$of$its$jurisdiction$ challenge$to$one$who$lacks$a$personal$or$property$right.$Thus,$the$challenge$by$a$
as$ established$ by$ the$ fundamental$ law.$ Disqualification$ of$ a$ judge$ is$ a$ public$official$interested$only$in$the$performance$of$his$official$duty$will$not$be$
deprivation$of$his$judicial$power.$And$if$that$judge$is$the$one$designated$by$the$ entertained$.$.$.$In$Fairchild$v.$Hughes,$the$Court$affirmed$the$dismissal$of$a$suit$
Constitution$ to$ exercise$ the$ jurisdiction$ of$ his$ court,$ as$ is$ the$ case$ with$ the$ brought$ by$ a$ citizen$ who$ sought$ to$ have$ the$ Nineteenth$ Amendment$ declared$
Justices$of$this$Court,$the$deprivation$of$his$or$their$judicial$power$is$equivalent$ unconstitutional.$ In$ Massachusetts$ v.$ Mellon,$ the$ challenge$ of$ the$ federal$
to$ the$ deprivation$ of$ the$ judicial$ power$ of$ the$ court$ itself.$ It$ affects$ the$ very$ Maternity$ Act$ was$ not$ entertained$ although$ made$ by$ the$ Commonwealth$ on$
heart$ of$ judicial$ independence.$ The$ proposed$ mass$ disqualification,$ if$ behalf$of$all$its$citizens.$
sanctioned$and$ordered,$would$leave$the$Court$no$alternative$but$to$abandon$a$ $
duty$which$it$cannot$lawfully$discharge$if$shorn$of$the$participation$of$its$entire$ 6.$The$Court$will$not$pass$upon$the$constitutionality$of$a$statute$at$the$instance$
membership$of$Justices.133$(Italics$in$the$original)$ of$one$who$has$availed$himself$of$its$benefits.$
$ $
Besides,$ there$ are$ specific$ safeguards$ already$ laid$ down$ by$ the$ Court$ when$ it$ 7.$When$the$validity$of$an$act$of$the$Congress$is$drawn$in$question,$and$even$if$a$
exercises$its$power$of$judicial$review.$ serious$ doubt$ of$ constitutionality$ is$ raised,$ it$ is$ a$ cardinal$ principle$ that$ this$
$ Court$will$first$ascertain$whether$a$construction$of$the$statute$is$fairly$possible$
In$ Demetria$ v.$ Alba,134$ this$ Court,$ through$ Justice$ Marcelo$ Fernan$ cited$ the$ by$which$the$question$may$be$avoided$(citations$omitted).$
"seven$ pillars"$ of$ limitations$ of$ the$ power$ of$ judicial$ review,$ enunciated$ by$ US$ $
Supreme$Court$Justice$Brandeis$in$Ashwander$v.$TVA135$as$follows:$ The$ foregoing$ "pillars"$ of$ limitation$ of$ judicial$ review,$ summarized$ in$
$ Ashwander$v.$TVA$from$different$decisions$of$the$United$States$Supreme$Court,$
1.$The$Court$will$not$pass$upon$the$constitutionality$of$legislation$in$a$friendly,$ can$be$encapsulated$into$the$following$categories:$
nonSadversary$ proceeding,$ declining$ because$ to$ decide$ such$ questions$ 'is$ $
legitimate$only$in$the$last$resort,$and$as$a$necessity$in$the$determination$of$real,$ 1.$that$there$be$absolute$necessity$of$deciding$a$case$
earnest$ and$ vital$ controversy$ between$ individuals.$ It$ never$ was$ the$ thought$ $
that,$by$means$of$a$friendly$suit,$a$party$beaten$in$the$legislature$could$transfer$ 2.$ that$ rules$ of$ constitutional$ law$ shall$ be$ formulated$ only$ as$ required$ by$ the$
to$the$courts$an$inquiry$as$to$the$constitutionality$of$the$legislative$act.'$ facts$of$the$case$
$ $
2.$ The$ Court$ will$ not$ 'anticipate$ a$ question$ of$ constitutional$ law$ in$ advance$ of$ 3.$that$judgment$may$not$be$sustained$on$some$other$ground$
the$ necessity$ of$ deciding$ it.'$ .$ .$ .$ 'It$ is$ not$ the$ habit$ of$ the$ Court$ to$ decide$ $
questions$of$a$constitutional$nature$unless$absolutely$necessary$to$a$decision$of$ 4.$that$there$be$actual$injury$sustained$by$the$party$by$reason$of$the$operation$
the$case.'$ of$the$statute$
$ $
3.$ The$ Court$ will$ not$ 'formulate$ a$ rule$ of$ constitutional$ law$ broader$ than$ is$ 5.$that$the$parties$are$not$in$estoppel$
required$by$the$precise$facts$to$which$it$is$to$be$applied.'$ $
$ 6.$that$the$Court$upholds$the$presumption$of$constitutionality.$
4.$ The$ Court$ will$ not$ pass$ upon$ a$ constitutional$ question$ although$ properly$ $
presented$by$the$record,$if$there$is$also$present$some$other$ground$upon$which$ As$stated$previously,$parallel$guidelines$have$been$adopted$by$this$Court$in$the$
the$case$may$be$disposed$of.$This$rule$has$found$most$varied$application.$Thus,$ exercise$of$judicial$review:$
if$a$case$can$be$decided$on$either$of$two$grounds,$one$involving$a$constitutional$ $
question,$ the$ other$ a$ question$ of$ statutory$ construction$ or$ general$ law,$ the$ 1.$actual$case$or$controversy$calling$for$the$exercise$of$judicial$power$
Court$ will$ decide$ only$ the$ latter.$ Appeals$ from$ the$ highest$ court$ of$ a$ state$ $
2.$ the$ person$ challenging$ the$ act$ must$ have$ "standing"$ to$ challenge;$ he$ must$ government$ will$ behave$ in$ a$ precipitate$ manner$ and$ risk$ social$ upheaval,$
have$a$personal$and$substantial$interest$in$the$case$such$that$he$has$sustained,$ violence,$chaos$and$anarchy$by$encouraging$disrespect$for$the$fundamental$law$
or$will$sustain,$direct$injury$as$a$result$of$its$enforcement$ of$the$land.$
$ $
3.$ the$ question$ of$ constitutionality$ must$ be$ raised$ at$ the$ earliest$ possible$ Substituting$the$word$public$officers$for$judges,$this$Court$is$well$guided$by$the$
opportunity$ doctrine$in$People$v.$Veneracion,$to$wit:141$
$ $
4.$the$issue$of$constitutionality$must$be$the$very$lis$mota$of$the$case.136$ Obedience$ to$ the$ rule$ of$ law$ forms$ the$ bedrock$ of$ our$ system$ of$ justice.$ If$
$ [public$officers],$under$the$guise$of$religious$or$political$beliefs$were$allowed$to$
Respondents$ Speaker$ de$ Venecia,$ et.$ al.$ raise$ another$ argument$ for$ judicial$ roam$unrestricted$beyond$boundaries$within$which$they$are$required$by$law$to$
restraint$the$possibility$that$"judicial$review$of$impeachments$might$also$lead$to$ exercise$the$duties$of$their$office,$then$law$becomes$meaningless.$A$government$
embarrassing$ conflicts$ between$ the$ Congress$ and$ the$ [J]udiciary."$ They$ stress$ of$ laws,$ not$ of$ men$ excludes$ the$ exercise$ of$ broad$ discretionary$ powers$ by$
the$ need$ to$ avoid$ the$ appearance$ of$ impropriety$ or$ conflicts$ of$ interest$ in$ those$acting$under$its$authority.$Under$this$system,$[public$officers]$are$guided$
judicial$ hearings,$ and$ the$ scenario$ that$ it$ would$ be$ confusing$ and$ humiliating$ by$the$Rule$of$Law,$and$ought$"to$protect$and$enforce$it$without$fear$or$favor,"$
and$ risk$ serious$ political$ instability$ at$ home$ and$ abroad$ if$ the$ judiciary$ resist$encroachments$by$governments,$political$parties,$or$even$the$interference$
countermanded$ the$ vote$ of$ Congress$ to$ remove$ an$ impeachable$ official.137$ of$their$own$personal$beliefs.142$
Intervenor$Soriano$echoes$this$argument$by$alleging$that$failure$of$this$Court$to$ $
enforce$ its$ Resolution$ against$ Congress$ would$ result$ in$ the$ diminution$ of$ its$ Constitutionality$of$the$Rules$of$Procedure$
judicial$authority$and$erode$public$confidence$and$faith$in$the$judiciary.$ for$Impeachment$Proceedings$
$ adopted$by$the$12th$Congress$
Such$an$argument,$however,$is$specious,$to$say$the$least.$As$correctly$stated$by$ $
the$Solicitor$General,$the$possibility$of$the$occurrence$of$a$constitutional$crisis$is$ Respondent$House$of$Representatives,$through$Speaker$De$Venecia,$argues$that$
not$ a$ reason$ for$ this$ Court$ to$ refrain$ from$ upholding$ the$ Constitution$ in$ all$ Sections$ 16$ and$ 17$ of$ Rule$ V$ of$ the$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules$ do$ not$ violate$
impeachment$ cases.$ Justices$ cannot$ abandon$ their$ constitutional$ duties$ just$ Section$3$(5)$of$Article$XI$of$our$present$Constitution,$contending$that$the$term$
because$their$action$may$start,$if$not$precipitate,$a$crisis.$ "initiate"$does$not$mean$"to$file;"$that$Section$3$(1)$is$clear$in$that$it$is$the$House$
$ of$ Representatives,$ as$ a$ collective$ body,$ which$ has$ the$ exclusive$ power$ to$
Justice$Feliciano$warned$against$the$dangers$when$this$Court$refuses$to$act.$ initiate$all$cases$of$impeachment;$that$initiate$could$not$possibly$mean$"to$file"$
$ because$filing$can,$as$Section$3$(2),$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution$provides,$only$
x$x$x$Frequently,$the$fight$over$a$controversial$legislative$or$executive$act$is$not$ be$accomplished$in$3$ways,$to$wit:$(1)$by$a$verified$complaint$for$impeachment$
regarded$ as$ settled$ until$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ has$ passed$ upon$ the$ by$ any$ member$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives;$ or$ (2)$ by$ any$ citizen$ upon$ a$
constitutionality$of$the$act$involved,$the$judgment$has$not$only$juridical$effects$ resolution$ of$ endorsement$ by$ any$ member;$ or$ (3)$ by$ at$ least$ 1/3$ of$ all$ the$
but$ also$ political$ consequences.$ Those$ political$ consequences$ may$ follow$ even$ members$ of$ the$ House.$ Respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ concludes$ that$
where$the$Court$fails$to$grant$the$petitioner's$prayer$to$nullify$an$act$for$lack$of$ the$one$year$bar$prohibiting$the$initiation$of$impeachment$proceedings$against$
the$necessary$number$of$votes.$Frequently,$failure$to$act$explicitly,$one$way$or$ the$ same$ officials$ could$ not$ have$ been$ violated$ as$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$
the$ other,$ itself$ constitutes$ a$ decision$ for$ the$ respondent$ and$ validation,$ or$ at$ against$Chief$Justice$Davide$and$seven$Associate$Justices$had$not$been$initiated$
least$quasiSvalidation,$follows."$138$ as$the$House$of$Representatives,$acting$as$the$collective$body,$has$yet$to$act$on$
$ it.$
Thus,$in$Javellana$v.$Executive$Secretary139$where$this$Court$was$split$and$"in$ $
the$end$there$were$not$enough$votes$either$to$grant$the$petitions,$or$to$sustain$ The$ resolution$ of$ this$ issue$ thus$ hinges$ on$ the$ interpretation$ of$ the$ term$
respondent's$ claims,"140$ the$ preSexisting$ constitutional$ order$ was$ disrupted$ "initiate."$Resort$to$statutory$construction$is,$therefore,$in$order.$
which$paved$the$way$for$the$establishment$of$the$martial$law$regime.$ $
$ That$ the$ sponsor$ of$ the$ provision$ of$ Section$ 3(5)$ of$ the$ Constitution,$
Such$ an$ argument$ by$ respondents$ and$ intervenor$ also$ presumes$ that$ the$ Commissioner$Florenz$Regalado,$who$eventually$became$an$Associate$Justice$of$
coordinate$branches$of$the$government$would$behave$in$a$lawless$manner$and$ this$ Court,$ agreed$ on$ the$ meaning$ of$ "initiate"$ as$ "to$ file,"$ as$ proffered$ and$
not$do$their$duty$under$the$law$to$uphold$the$Constitution$and$obey$the$laws$of$ explained$by$Constitutional$Commissioner$Maambong$during$the$Constitutional$
the$ land.$ Yet$ there$ is$ no$ reason$ to$ believe$ that$ any$ of$ the$ branches$ of$ Commission$proceedings,$which$he$(Commissioner$Regalado)$as$amicus$curiae$
affirmed$during$the$oral$arguments$on$the$instant$petitions$held$on$November$ $
5,$2003$at$which$he$added$that$the$act$of$"initiating"$included$the$act$of$taking$ x$x$x$
initial$ action$ on$ the$ complaint,$ dissipates$ any$ doubt$ that$ indeed$ the$ word$ $
"initiate"$as$it$twice$appears$in$Article$XI$(3)$and$(5)$of$the$Constitution$means$ MR.$MAAMBONG.$Mr.$Presiding$Officer,$I$am$not$moving$for$a$reconsideration$of$
to$file$the$complaint$and$take$initial$action$on$it.$ the$approval$of$the$amendment$submitted$by$Commissioner$Regalado,$but$I$will$
$ just$ make$ of$ record$ my$ thinking$ that$ we$ do$ not$ really$ initiate$ the$ filing$ of$ the$
"Initiate"$of$course$is$understood$by$ordinary$men$to$mean,$as$dictionaries$do,$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ on$ the$ floor.$ The$ procedure,$ as$ I$ have$ pointed$ out$
to$ begin,$ to$ commence,$ or$ set$ going.$ As$ Webster's$ Third$ New$ International$ earlier,$was$that$the$initiation$starts$with$the$filing$of$the$complaint.$And$what$is$
Dictionary$ of$ the$ English$ Language$ concisely$ puts$ it,$ it$ means$ "to$ perform$ or$ actually$ done$ on$ the$ floor$ is$ that$ the$ committee$ resolution$ containing$ the$
facilitate$the$first$action,"$which$jibes$with$Justice$Regalado's$position,$and$that$ Articles$of$Impeachment$is$the$one$approved$by$the$body.$
of$ Father$ Bernas,$ who$ elucidated$ during$ the$ oral$ arguments$ of$ the$ instant$ $
petitions$on$November$5,$2003$in$this$wise:$ As$ the$ phraseology$ now$ runs,$ which$ may$ be$ corrected$ by$ the$ Committee$ on$
$ Style,$ it$ appears$ that$ the$ initiation$ starts$ on$ the$ floor.$ If$ we$ only$ have$ time,$ I$
Briefly$then,$an$impeachment$proceeding$is$not$a$single$act.$It$is$a$comlexus$of$ could$ cite$ examples$ in$ the$ case$ of$ the$ impeachment$ proceedings$ of$ President$
acts$consisting$of$a$beginning,$a$middle$and$an$end.$The$end$is$the$transmittal$of$ Richard$ Nixon$ wherein$ the$ Committee$ on$ the$ Judiciary$ submitted$ the$
the$ articles$ of$ impeachment$ to$ the$ Senate.$ The$ middle$ consists$ of$ those$ recommendation,$the$resolution,$and$the$Articles$of$Impeachment$to$the$body,$
deliberative$moments$leading$to$the$formulation$of$the$articles$of$impeachment.$ and$ it$ was$ the$ body$ who$ approved$ the$ resolution.$ It$ is$ not$ the$ body$ which$
The$ beginning$ or$ the$ initiation$ is$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ complaint$ and$ its$ referral$ to$ initiates$ it.$ It$ only$ approves$ or$ disapproves$ the$ resolution.$ So,$ on$ that$ score,$
the$Committee$on$Justice.$ probably$the$Committee$on$Style$could$help$in$rearranging$these$words$because$
$ we$have$to$be$very$technical$about$this.$I$have$been$bringing$with$me$The$Rules$
Finally,$it$should$be$noted$that$the$House$Rule$relied$upon$by$Representatives$ of$the$House$of$Representatives$of$the$U.S.$Congress.$The$Senate$Rules$are$with$
Cojuangco$ and$ Fuentebella$ says$ that$ impeachment$ is$ "deemed$ initiated"$ when$ me.$The$proceedings$on$the$case$of$Richard$Nixon$are$with$me.$I$have$submitted$
the$ Justice$ Committee$ votes$ in$ favor$ of$ impeachment$ or$ when$ the$ House$ my$proposal,$but$the$Committee$has$already$decided.$Nevertheless,$I$just$want$
reverses$ a$ contrary$ vote$ of$ the$ Committee.$ Note$ that$ the$ Rule$ does$ not$ say$ to$indicate$this$on$record.$
"impeachment$proceedings"$are$initiated$but$rather$are$"deemed$initiated."$The$ $
language$ is$ recognition$ that$ initiation$ happened$ earlier,$ but$ by$ legal$ fiction$ x$x$x$
there$is$an$attempt$to$postpone$it$to$a$time$after$actual$initiation.$(Emphasis$and$ $
underscoring$supplied)$ MR.$MAAMBONG.$I$would$just$like$to$move$for$a$reconsideration$of$the$approval$
$ of$Section$3$(3).$My$reconsideration$will$not$at$all$affect$the$substance,$but$it$is$
As$ stated$ earlier,$ one$ of$ the$ means$ of$ interpreting$ the$ Constitution$ is$ looking$ only$ in$ keeping$ with$ the$ exact$ formulation$ of$ the$ Rules$ of$ the$ House$ of$
into$ the$ intent$ of$ the$ law.$ Fortunately,$ the$ intent$ of$ the$ framers$ of$ the$ 1987$ Representatives$of$the$United$States$regarding$impeachment.$
Constitution$can$be$pried$from$its$records:$ $
$ I$ am$ proposing,$ Madam$ President,$ without$ doing$ damage$ to$ any$ of$ this$
MR.$MAAMBONG.$With$reference$to$Section$3,$regarding$the$procedure$and$the$ provision,$that$on$page$2,$Section$3$(3),$from$lines$17$to$18,$we$delete$the$words$
substantive$ provisions$ on$ impeachment,$ I$ understand$ there$ have$ been$ many$ which$read:$"to$initiate$impeachment$proceedings"$and$the$comma$(,)$and$insert$
proposals$and,$I$think,$these$would$need$some$time$for$Committee$action.$ on$ line$ 19$ after$ the$ word$ "resolution"$ the$ phrase$ WITH$ THE$ ARTICLES,$ and$
$ then$capitalize$the$letter$"i"$in$"impeachment"$ and$ replace$ the$ word$ "by"$ with$
However,$ I$ would$ just$ like$ to$ indicate$ that$ I$ submitted$ to$ the$ Committee$ a$ OF,$so$that$the$whole$section$will$now$read:$"A$vote$of$at$least$oneSthird$of$all$
resolution$ on$ impeachment$ proceedings,$ copies$ of$ which$ have$ been$ furnished$ the$Members$of$the$House$shall$be$necessary$either$to$affirm$a$resolution$WITH$
the$ Members$ of$ this$ body.$ This$ is$ borne$ out$ of$ my$ experience$ as$ a$ member$ of$ THE$ ARTICLES$ of$ Impeachment$ OF$ the$ Committee$ or$ to$ override$ its$ contrary$
the$ Committee$ on$ Justice,$ Human$ Rights$ and$ Good$ Government$ which$ took$ resolution.$The$vote$of$each$Member$shall$be$recorded."$
charge$ of$ the$ last$ impeachment$ resolution$ filed$ before$ the$ First$ Batasang$ $
Pambansa.$For$the$information$of$the$Committee,$the$resolution$covers$several$ I$already$mentioned$earlier$yesterday$that$the$initiation,$as$far$as$the$House$of$
steps$ in$ the$ impeachment$ proceedings$ starting$ with$ initiation,$ action$ of$ the$ Representatives$of$the$United$States$is$concerned,$really$starts$from$the$filing$of$
Speaker$ committee$ action,$ calendaring$ of$ report,$ voting$ on$ the$ report,$ the$ verified$ complaint$ and$ every$ resolution$ to$ impeach$ always$ carries$ with$ it$
transmittal$referral$to$the$Senate,$trial$and$judgment$by$the$Senate.$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment.$ As$ a$ matter$ of$ fact,$ the$ words$ "Articles$ of$
Impeachment"$ are$ mentioned$ on$ line$ 25$ in$ the$ case$ of$ the$ direct$ filing$ of$ a$ sense$that$the$House$has$"exclusive$power"$to$initiate$all$cases$of$impeachment.$
verified$compliant$of$oneSthird$of$all$the$Members$of$the$House.$I$will$mention$ No$other$body$can$do$it.$However,$before$a$decision$is$made$to$initiate$a$case$in$
again,$Madam$President,$that$my$amendment$will$not$vary$the$substance$in$any$ the$ Senate,$ a$ "proceeding"$ must$ be$ followed$ to$ arrive$ at$ a$ conclusion.$ A$
way.$ It$ is$ only$ in$ keeping$ with$ the$ uniform$ procedure$ of$ the$ House$ of$ proceeding$ must$ be$ "initiated."$ To$ initiate,$ which$ comes$ from$ the$ Latin$ word$
Representatives$ of$ the$ United$ States$ Congress.$ Thank$ you,$ Madam$ initium,$means$to$begin.$On$the$other$hand,$proceeding$is$a$progressive$noun.$It$
President.143$(Italics$in$the$original;$emphasis$and$udnerscoring$supplied)$ has$a$beginning,$a$middle,$and$an$end.$It$takes$place$not$in$the$Senate$but$in$the$
$ House$and$consists$of$several$steps:$(1)$there$is$the$filing$of$a$verified$complaint$
This$ amendment$ proposed$ by$ Commissioner$ Maambong$ was$ clarified$ and$ either$ by$ a$ Member$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ or$ by$ a$ private$ citizen$
accepted$by$the$Committee$on$the$Accountability$of$Public$Officers.144$ endorsed$ by$ a$ Member$ of$ the$ House$ of$ the$ Representatives;$ (2)$ there$ is$ the$
$ processing$of$this$complaint$by$the$proper$Committee$which$may$either$reject$
It$is$thus$clear$that$the$framers$intended$"initiation"$to$start$with$the$filing$of$the$ the$complaint$or$uphold$it;$(3)$whether$the$resolution$of$the$Committee$rejects$
complaint.$ In$ his$ amicus$ curiae$ brief,$ Commissioner$ Maambong$ explained$ that$ or$ upholds$ the$ complaint,$ the$ resolution$ must$ be$ forwarded$ to$ the$ House$ for$
"the$ obvious$ reason$ in$ deleting$ the$ phrase$ "to$ initiate$ impeachment$ further$processing;$and$(4)$there$is$the$processing$of$the$same$complaint$by$the$
proceedings"$ as$ contained$ in$ the$ text$ of$ the$ provision$ of$ Section$ 3$ (3)$ was$ to$ House$ of$ Representatives$ which$ either$ affirms$ a$ favorable$ resolution$ of$ the$
settle$ and$ make$ it$ understood$ once$ and$ for$ all$ that$ the$ initiation$ of$ Committee$ or$ overrides$ a$ contrary$ resolution$ by$ a$ vote$ of$ oneSthird$ of$ all$ the$
impeachment$proceedings$starts$with$the$filing$of$the$complaint,$and$the$vote$of$ members.$If$at$least$one$third$of$all$the$Members$upholds$the$complaint,$Articles$
oneSthird$ of$ the$ House$ in$ a$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ does$ not$ initiate$ the$ of$ Impeachment$ are$ prepared$ and$ transmitted$ to$ the$ Senate.$ It$ is$ at$ this$ point$
impeachment$proceedings$which$was$already$initiated$by$the$filing$of$a$verified$ that$ the$ House$ "initiates$ an$ impeachment$ case."$ It$ is$ at$ this$ point$ that$ an$
complaint$under$Section$3,$paragraph$(2),$Article$XI$of$the$Constitution."145$ impeachable$ public$ official$ is$ successfully$ impeached.$ That$ is,$ he$ or$ she$ is$
$ successfully$ charged$ with$ an$ impeachment$ "case"$ before$ the$ Senate$ as$
Amicus$curiae$Constitutional$Commissioner$Regalado$is$of$the$same$view$as$is$ impeachment$court.$
Father$Bernas,$who$was$also$a$member$of$the$1986$Constitutional$Commission,$ $
that$ the$ word$ "initiate"$ as$ used$ in$ Article$ XI,$ Section$ 3(5)$ means$ to$ file,$ both$ Father$Bernas$further$explains:$The$"impeachment$proceeding"$is$not$initiated$
adding,$ however,$ that$ the$ filing$ must$ be$ accompanied$ by$ an$ action$ to$ set$ the$ when$the$complaint$is$transmitted$to$the$Senate$for$trial$because$that$is$the$end$
complaint$moving.$ of$ the$ House$ proceeding$ and$ the$ beginning$ of$ another$ proceeding,$ namely$ the$
$ trial.$ Neither$ is$ the$ "impeachment$ proceeding"$ initiated$ when$ the$ House$
During$ the$ oral$ arguments$ before$ this$ Court,$ Father$ Bernas$ clarified$ that$ the$ deliberates$ on$ the$ resolution$ passed$ on$ to$ it$ by$ the$ Committee,$ because$
word$"initiate,"$appearing$in$the$constitutional$provision$on$impeachment,$viz:$ something$ prior$ to$ that$ has$ already$ been$ done.$ The$ action$ of$ the$ House$ is$
$ already$a$further$step$in$the$proceeding,$not$its$initiation$or$beginning.$Rather,$
Section$ 3$ (1)$ The$ House$ of$ Representatives$ shall$ have$ the$ exclusive$ power$ to$ the$ proceeding$ is$ initiated$ or$ begins,$ when$ a$ verified$ complaint$ is$ filed$ and$
initiate$all$cases$of$impeachment.$ referred$to$the$Committee$on$Justice$for$action.$This$is$the$initiating$step$which$
$ triggers$the$series$of$steps$that$follow.$
x$x$x$ $
$ The$ framers$ of$ the$ Constitution$ also$ understood$ initiation$ in$ its$ ordinary$
(5)$ No$ impeachment$ proceedings$ shall$ be$ initiated$ against$ the$ same$ official$ meaning.$ Thus$ when$ a$ proposal$ reached$ the$ floor$ proposing$ that$ "A$ vote$ of$ at$
more$than$once$within$a$period$of$one$year,$(Emphasis$supplied)$ least$oneSthird$of$all$the$Members$of$the$House$shall$be$necessary$to$initiate$
$ impeachment$proceedings,"$this$was$met$by$a$proposal$to$delete$the$line$on$the$
refers$to$two$objects,$"impeachment$case"$and$"impeachment$proceeding."$ ground$that$the$vote$of$the$House$does$not$initiate$impeachment$proceeding$but$
$ rather$ the$ filing$ of$ a$ complaint$ does.146$ Thus$ the$ line$ was$ deleted$ and$ is$ not$
Father$ Bernas$ explains$ that$ in$ these$ two$ provisions,$ the$ common$ verb$ is$ "to$ found$in$the$present$Constitution.$
initiate."$ The$ object$ in$ the$ first$ sentence$ is$ "impeachment$ case."$ The$ object$ in$ $
the$ second$ sentence$ is$ "impeachment$ proceeding."$ Following$ the$ principle$ of$ Father$ Bernas$ concludes$ that$ when$ Section$ 3$ (5)$ says,$ "No$ impeachment$
reddendo$ singuala$ sinuilis,$ the$ term$ "cases"$ must$ be$ distinguished$ from$ the$ proceeding$shall$be$initiated$against$the$same$official$more$than$once$within$a$
term$"proceedings."$An$impeachment$case$is$the$legal$controversy$that$must$be$ period$of$one$year,"$it$means$that$no$second$verified$complaint$may$be$accepted$
decided$by$the$Senate.$AboveSquoted$first$provision$provides$that$the$House,$by$ and$ referred$ to$ the$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ for$ action.$ By$ his$ explanation,$ this$
a$vote$of$oneSthird$of$all$its$members,$can$bring$a$case$to$the$Senate.$It$is$in$that$ interpretation$is$founded$on$the$common$understanding$of$the$meaning$of$"to$
initiate"$ which$ means$ to$ begin.$ He$ reminds$ that$ the$ Constitution$ is$ ratified$ by$ about$ the$ real$ meaning$ because$ of$ the$ latter's$ balanced$ perspectives$ and$
the$ people,$ both$ ordinary$ and$ sophisticated,$ as$ they$ understand$ it;$ and$ that$ disinterestedness.148$
ordinary$ people$ read$ ordinary$ meaning$ into$ ordinary$ words$ and$ not$ abstruse$ $
meaning,$ they$ ratify$ words$ as$ they$ understand$ it$ and$ not$ as$ sophisticated$ Justice$ Gutierrez's$ statements$ have$ no$ application$ in$ the$ present$ petitions.$
lawyers$confuse$it.$ There$ are$ at$ present$ only$ two$ members$ of$ this$ Court$ who$ participated$ in$ the$
$ 1986$ Constitutional$ Commission$ $ Chief$ Justice$ Davide$ and$ Justice$ Adolf$
To$ the$ argument$ that$ only$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ as$ a$ body$ can$ initiate$ Azcuna.$Chief$Justice$Davide$has$not$taken$part$in$these$proceedings$for$obvious$
impeachment$ proceedings$ because$ Section$ 3$ (1)$ says$ "The$ House$ of$ reasons.$ Moreover,$ this$ Court$ has$ not$ simply$ relied$ on$ the$ personal$ opinions$
Representatives$ shall$ have$ the$ exclusive$ power$ to$ initiate$ all$ cases$ of$ now$given$by$members$of$the$Constitutional$Commission,$but$has$examined$the$
impeachment,"$ This$ is$ a$ misreading$ of$ said$ provision$ and$ is$ contrary$ to$ the$ records$of$the$deliberations$and$proceedings$thereof.$
principle$ of$ reddendo$ singula$ singulis$ by$ equating$ "impeachment$ cases"$ with$ $
"impeachment$proceeding."$ Respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives$ counters$ that$ under$ Section$ 3$ (8)$ of$
$ Article$XI,$it$is$clear$and$unequivocal$that$it$and$only$it$has$the$power$to$make$
From$the$records$of$the$Constitutional$Commission,$to$the$amicus$curiae$briefs$ and$interpret$its$rules$governing$impeachment.$Its$argument$is$premised$on$the$
of$two$former$Constitutional$Commissioners,$it$is$without$a$doubt$that$the$term$ assumption$ that$ Congress$ has$ absolute$ power$ to$ promulgate$ its$ rules.$ This$
"to$ initiate"$ refers$ to$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$ coupled$ with$ assumption,$however,$is$misplaced.$
Congress'$taking$initial$action$of$said$complaint.$ $
$ Section$3$(8)$of$Article$XI$provides$that$"The$Congress$shall$promulgate$its$rules$
Having$concluded$that$the$initiation$takes$place$by$the$act$of$filing$and$referral$ on$impeachment$to$effectively$carry$out$the$purpose$of$this$section."$Clearly,$its$
or$ endorsement$ of$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$ to$ the$ House$ Committee$ on$ power$ to$ promulgate$ its$ rules$ on$ impeachment$ is$ limited$ by$ the$ phrase$ "to$
Justice$ or,$ by$ the$ filing$ by$ at$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ the$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ effectively$ carry$ out$ the$ purpose$ of$ this$ section."$ Hence,$ these$ rules$ cannot$
Representatives$with$the$Secretary$General$of$the$House,$the$meaning$of$Section$ contravene$the$very$purpose$of$the$Constitution$which$said$rules$were$intended$
3$ (5)$ of$ Article$ XI$ becomes$ clear.$ Once$ an$ impeachment$ complaint$ has$ been$ to$ effectively$ carry$ out.$ Moreover,$ Section$ 3$ of$ Article$ XI$ clearly$ provides$ for$
initiated,$ another$ impeachment$ complaint$ may$ not$ be$ filed$ against$ the$ same$ other$specific$limitations$on$its$power$to$make$rules,$viz:$
official$within$a$one$year$period.$ $
$ Section$3.$(1)$x$x$x$
Under$ Sections$ 16$ and$ 17$ of$ Rule$ V$ of$ the$ House$ Impeachment$ Rules,$ $
impeachment$ proceedings$ are$ deemed$ initiated$ (1)$ if$ there$ is$ a$ finding$ by$ the$ (2)$ A$ verified$ complaint$ for$ impeachment$ may$ be$ filed$ by$ any$ Member$ of$ the$
House$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ that$ the$ verified$ complaint$ and/or$ resolution$ is$ House$of$Representatives$or$by$any$citizen$upon$a$resolution$of$endorsement$by$
sufficient$ in$ substance,$ or$ (2)$ once$ the$ House$ itself$ affirms$ or$ overturns$ the$ any$Member$thereof,$which$shall$be$included$in$the$Order$of$Business$within$ten$
finding$ of$ the$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ that$ the$ verified$ complaint$ and/or$ session$ days,$ and$ referred$ to$ the$ proper$ Committee$ within$ three$ session$ days$
resolution$ is$ not$ sufficient$ in$ substance$ or$ (3)$ by$ the$ filing$ or$ endorsement$ thereafter.$ The$ Committee,$ after$ hearing,$ and$ by$ a$ majority$ vote$ of$ all$ its$
before$ the$ SecretarySGeneral$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ of$ a$ verified$ Members,$ shall$ submit$ its$ report$ to$ the$ House$ within$ sixty$ session$ days$ from$
complaint$or$a$resolution$of$impeachment$by$at$least$1/3$of$the$members$of$the$ such$ referral,$ together$ with$ the$ corresponding$ resolution.$ The$ resolution$ shall$
House.$These$rules$clearly$contravene$Section$3$(5)$of$Article$XI$since$the$rules$ be$ calendared$ for$ consideration$ by$ the$ House$ within$ ten$ session$ days$ from$
give$the$term$"initiate"$a$meaning$different$meaning$from$filing$and$referral.$ receipt$thereof.$
$ $
In$his$amicus$curiae$brief,$Justice$Hugo$Gutierrez$posits$that$this$Court$could$not$ (3)$ A$ vote$ of$ at$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ House$ shall$ be$
use$contemporaneous$construction$as$an$aid$in$the$interpretation$of$Sec.3$(5)$of$ necessary$ to$ either$ affirm$ a$ favorable$ resolution$ with$ the$ Articles$ of$
Article$ XI,$ citing$ Vera$ v.$ Avelino147$ wherein$ this$ Court$ stated$ that$ "their$ Impeachment$of$the$Committee,$or$override$its$contrary$resolution.$The$vote$of$
personal$opinions$(referring$to$Justices$who$were$delegates$to$the$Constitution$ each$Member$shall$be$recorded.$
Convention)$ on$ the$ matter$ at$ issue$ expressed$ during$ this$ Court's$ our$ $
deliberations$stand$on$a$different$footing$from$the$properly$recorded$utterances$ (4)$ In$ case$ the$ verified$ complaint$ or$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ is$ filed$ by$ at$
of$ debates$ and$ proceedings."$ Further$ citing$ said$ case,$ he$ states$ that$ this$ Court$ least$ oneSthird$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ House,$ the$ same$ shall$ constitute$ the$
likened$the$former$members$of$the$Constitutional$Convention$to$actors$who$are$ Articles$of$Impeachment,$and$trial$by$the$Senate$shall$forthwith$proceed.$
so$absorbed$in$their$emotional$roles$that$intelligent$spectators$may$know$more$ $
(5)$ No$ impeachment$ proceedings$ shall$ be$ initiated$ against$ the$ same$ official$ Rule$XV$
more$than$once$within$a$period$of$one$year.$ $
$ 3.$On$the$demand$of$any$member,$or$at$the$suggestion$of$the$Speaker,$the$names$
It$ is$ basic$ that$ all$ rules$ must$ not$ contravene$ the$ Constitution$ which$ is$ the$ of$ members$ sufficient$ to$ make$ a$ quorum$ in$ the$ hall$ of$ the$ House$ who$ do$ not$
fundamental$law.$If$as$alleged$Congress$had$absolute$rule$making$power,$then$it$ vote$shall$be$noted$by$the$clerk$and$recorded$in$the$journal,$and$reported$to$the$
would$by$necessary$implication$have$the$power$to$alter$or$amend$the$meaning$ Speaker$with$the$names$of$the$members$voting,$and$be$counted$and$announced$
of$the$Constitution$without$need$of$referendum.$ in$ determining$ the$ presence$ of$ a$ quorum$ to$ do$ business.$ (House$ Journal,$ 230,$
$ Feb.$14,$1890)$
In$ Osmea$ v.$ Pendatun,149$ this$ Court$ held$ that$ it$ is$ within$ the$ province$ of$ $
either$House$of$Congress$to$interpret$its$rules$and$that$it$was$the$best$judge$of$ The$ action$ taken$ was$ in$ direct$ compliance$ with$ this$ rule.$ The$ question,$
what$ constituted$ "disorderly$ behavior"$ of$ its$ members.$ However,$ in$ Paceta$ v.$ therefore,$ is$ as$ to$ the$ validity$ of$ this$ rule,$ and$ not$ what$ methods$ the$ Speaker$
Secretary$ of$ the$ Commission$ on$ Appointments,150$ Justice$ (later$ Chief$ Justice)$ may$of$his$own$motion$resort$to$for$determining$the$presence$of$a$quorum,$nor$
Enrique$ Fernando,$ speaking$ for$ this$ Court$ and$ quoting$ Justice$ Brandeis$ in$ what$ matters$ the$ Speaker$ or$ clerk$ may$ of$ their$ own$ volition$ place$ upon$ the$
United$States$v.$Smith,151$declared$that$where$the$construction$to$be$given$to$a$ journal.$ Neither$ do$ the$ advantages$ or$ disadvantages,$ the$ wisdom$ or$ folly,$ of$
rule$ affects$ persons$ other$ than$ members$ of$ the$ Legislature,$ the$ question$ such$ a$ rule$ present$ any$ matters$ for$ judicial$ consideration.$ With$ the$ courts$ the$
becomes$judicial$in$nature.$In$Arroyo$v.$De$Venecia,152$quoting$United$States$v.$ question$ is$ only$ one$ of$ power.$ The$ Constitution$ empowers$ each$ house$ to$
Ballin,$ Joseph$ &$ Co.,153$ Justice$ Vicente$ Mendoza,$ speaking$ for$ this$ Court,$ held$ determine$its$rules$of$proceedings.$It$may$not$by$its$rules$ignore$constitutional$
that$ while$ the$ Constitution$ empowers$ each$ house$ to$ determine$ its$ rules$ of$ restraints$ or$ violate$ fundamental$ rights,$ and$ there$ should$ be$ a$ reasonable$
proceedings,$ it$ may$ not$ by$ its$ rules$ ignore$ constitutional$ restraints$ or$ violate$ relation$ between$ the$ mode$ or$ method$ of$ proceedings$ established$ by$ the$ rule$
fundamental$ rights,$ and$ further$ that$ there$ should$ be$ a$ reasonable$ relation$ and$ the$ result$ which$ is$ sought$ to$ be$ attained.$ But$ within$ these$ limitations$ all$
between$ the$ mode$ or$ method$ of$ proceeding$ established$ by$ the$ rule$ and$ the$ matters$ of$ method$ are$ open$ to$ the$ determination$ of$ the$ House,$ and$ it$ is$ no$
result$which$is$sought$to$be$attained.$It$is$only$within$these$limitations$that$all$ impeachment$ of$ the$ rule$ to$ say$ that$ some$ other$ way$ would$ be$ better,$ more$
matters$of$method$are$open$to$the$determination$of$the$Legislature.$In$the$same$ accurate,$ or$ even$ more$ just.$ It$ is$ no$ objection$ to$ the$ validity$ of$ a$ rule$ that$ a$
case$ of$ Arroyo$ v.$ De$ Venecia,$ Justice$ Reynato$ S.$ Puno,$ in$ his$ Concurring$ and$ different$one$has$been$prescribed$and$in$force$for$a$length$of$time.$The$power$to$
Dissenting$ Opinion,$ was$ even$ more$ emphatic$ as$ he$ stressed$ that$ in$ the$ make$ rules$ is$ not$ one$ which$ once$ exercised$ is$ exhausted.$ It$ is$ a$ continuous$
Philippine$ setting$ there$ is$ even$ more$ reason$ for$ courts$ to$ inquire$ into$ the$ power,$always$subject$to$be$exercised$by$the$House,$and$within$the$limitations$
validity$of$the$Rules$of$Congress,$viz:$ suggested,$absolute$and$beyond$the$challenge$of$any$other$body$or$tribunal."$
$ $
With$due$respect,$I$do$not$agree$that$the$issues$posed$by$the$petitioner$are$nonS Ballin,$ clearly$ confirmed$ the$ jurisdiction$ of$ courts$ to$ pass$ upon$ the$ validity$ of$
justiciable.$ Nor$ do$ I$ agree$ that$ we$ will$ trivialize$ the$ principle$ of$ separation$ of$ congressional$rules,$i.e,$whether$they$are$constitutional.$Rule$XV$was$examined$
power$if$we$assume$jurisdiction$over$he$case$at$bar.$Even$in$the$United$States,$ by$the$Court$and$it$was$found$to$satisfy$the$test:$(1)$that$it$did$not$ignore$any$
the$ principle$ of$ separation$ of$ power$ is$ no$ longer$ an$ impregnable$ impediment$ constitutional$restraint;$(2)$it$did$not$violate$any$fundamental$right;$and$(3)$its$
against$the$interposition$of$judicial$power$on$cases$involving$breach$of$rules$of$ method$had$a$reasonable$relationship$with$the$result$sought$to$be$attained.$By$
procedure$by$legislators.$ examining$Rule$XV,$the$Court$did$not$allow$its$jurisdiction$to$be$defeated$by$the$
$ mere$invocation$of$the$principle$of$separation$of$powers.154$
Rightly,$the$ponencia$uses$the$1891$case$of$US$v$Ballin$(144$US$1)$as$a$window$ $
to$view$the$issues$before$the$Court.$It$is$in$Ballin$where$the$US$Supreme$Court$ x$x$x$
first$ defined$ the$ boundaries$ of$ the$ power$ of$ the$ judiciary$ to$ review$ $
congressional$rules.$It$held:$ In$ the$ Philippine$ setting,$ there$ is$ a$ more$ compelling$ reason$ for$ courts$ to$
$ categorically$ reject$ the$ political$ question$ defense$ when$ its$ interposition$ will$
"x$x$x$ cover$ up$ abuse$ of$ power.$ For$ section$ 1,$ Article$ VIII$ of$ our$ Constitution$ was$
$ intentionally$ cobbled$ to$ empower$ courts$ "x$ x$ x$ to$ determine$ whether$ or$ not$
"The$Constitution,$in$the$same$section,$provides,$that$each$house$may$determine$ there$ has$ been$ a$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$
the$rules$of$its$proceedings."$It$appears$that$in$pursuance$of$this$authority$the$ jurisdiction$ on$ the$ part$ of$ any$ branch$ or$ instrumentality$ of$ the$ government."$
House$had,$prior$to$that$day,$passed$this$as$one$of$its$rules:$ This$ power$ is$ new$ and$ was$ not$ granted$ to$ our$ courts$ in$ the$ 1935$ and$ 1972$
$ Constitutions.$ It$ was$ not$ also$ xeroxed$ from$ the$ US$ Constitution$ or$ any$ foreign$
state$constitution.$The$CONCOM$granted$this$enormous$power$to$our$courts$in$ refuse$to$exercise$this$new$power$or$if$we$wield$it$with$timidity.$To$be$sure,$it$is$
view$ of$ our$ experience$ under$ martial$ law$ where$ abusive$ exercises$ of$ state$ this$ exceeding$ timidity$ to$ unsheathe$ the$ judicial$ sword$ that$ has$ increasingly$
power$ were$ shielded$ from$ judicial$ scrutiny$ by$ the$ misuse$ of$ the$ political$ emboldened$ other$ branches$ of$ government$ to$ denigrate,$ if$ not$ defy,$ orders$ of$
question$doctrine.$Led$by$the$eminent$former$Chief$Justice$Roberto$Concepcion,$ our$courts.$In$Tolentino,$I$endorsed$the$view$of$former$Senator$Salonga$that$this$
the$CONCOM$expanded$and$sharpened$the$checking$powers$of$the$judiciary$visS novel$provision$stretching$the$latitude$of$judicial$power$is$distinctly$Filipino$and$
Svis$the$Executive$and$the$Legislative$departments$of$government.155$ its$ interpretation$ should$ not$ be$ depreciated$ by$ undue$ reliance$ on$ inapplicable$
$ foreign$ jurisprudence.$ In$ resolving$ the$ case$ at$ bar,$ the$ lessons$ of$ our$ own$
x$x$x$ history$ should$ provide$ us$ the$ light$ and$ not$ the$ experience$ of$ foreigners.157$
$ (Italics$in$the$original$emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
The$ Constitution$ cannot$ be$ any$ clearer.$ What$ it$ granted$ to$ this$ Court$ is$ not$ a$ $
mere$ power$ which$ it$ can$ decline$ to$ exercise.$ Precisely$ to$ deter$ this$ Thus,$the$ruling$in$Osmena$v.$Pendatun$is$not$applicable$to$the$instant$petitions.$
disinclination,$the$Constitution$imposed$it$as$a$duty$of$this$Court$to$strike$down$ Here,$ the$ third$ parties$ alleging$ the$ violation$ of$ private$ rights$ and$ the$
any$act$of$a$branch$or$instrumentality$of$government$or$any$of$its$officials$done$ Constitution$are$involved.$
with$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$ jurisdiction.$ $
Rightly$or$wrongly,$the$Constitution$has$elongated$the$checking$powers$of$this$ Neither$ may$ respondent$ House$ of$ Representatives'$ rely$ on$ Nixon$ v.$ US158$ as$
Court$against$the$other$branches$of$government$despite$their$more$democratic$ basis$ for$ arguing$ that$ this$ Court$ may$ not$ decide$ on$ the$ constitutionality$ of$
character,$the$President$and$the$legislators$being$elected$by$the$people.156$ Sections$16$and$17$of$the$House$Impeachment$Rules.$As$already$observed,$the$
$ U.S.$ Federal$ Constitution$ simply$ provides$ that$ "the$ House$ of$ Representatives$
x$x$x$ shall$ have$ the$ sole$ power$ of$ impeachment."$ It$ adds$ nothing$ more.$ It$ gives$ no$
$ clue$ whatsoever$ as$ to$ how$ this$ "sole$ power"$ is$ to$ be$ exercised.$ No$ limitation$
The$ provision$ defining$ judicial$ power$ as$ including$ the$ 'duty$ of$ the$ courts$ of$ whatsoever$ is$ given.$ Thus,$ the$ US$ Supreme$ Court$ concluded$ that$ there$ was$ a$
justice.$ .$ .$ to$ determine$ whether$ or$ not$ there$ has$ been$ a$ grave$ abuse$ of$ textually$demonstrable$constitutional$commitment$of$a$constitutional$power$to$
discretion$amounting$to$lack$or$excess$of$jurisdiction$on$the$part$of$any$branch$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives.$ This$ reasoning$ does$ not$ hold$ with$ regard$ to$
or$instrumentality$of$the$Government'$constitutes$the$capstone$of$the$efforts$of$ impeachment$ power$ of$ the$ Philippine$ House$ of$ Representatives$ since$ our$
the$Constitutional$Commission$to$upgrade$the$powers$of$this$court$visSSvis$the$ Constitution,$ as$ earlier$ enumerated,$ furnishes$ several$ provisions$ articulating$
other$ branches$ of$ government.$ This$ provision$ was$ dictated$ by$ our$ experience$ how$that$"exclusive$power"$is$to$be$exercised.$
under$ martial$ law$ which$ taught$ us$ that$ a$ stronger$ and$ more$ independent$ $
judiciary$is$needed$to$abort$abuses$in$government.$x$x$x$ The$provisions$of$Sections$16$and$17$of$Rule$V$of$the$House$Impeachment$Rules$
$ which$state$that$impeachment$proceedings$are$deemed$initiated$(1)$if$there$is$a$
x$x$x$ finding$ by$ the$ House$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ that$ the$ verified$ complaint$ and/or$
$ resolution$ is$ sufficient$ in$ substance,$ or$ (2)$ once$ the$ House$ itself$ affirms$ or$
In$ sum,$ I$ submit$ that$ in$ imposing$ to$ this$ Court$ the$ duty$ to$ annul$ acts$ of$ overturns$ the$ finding$ of$ the$ Committee$ on$ Justice$ that$ the$ verified$ complaint$
government$ committed$ with$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion,$ the$ new$ Constitution$ and/or$ resolution$ is$ not$ sufficient$ in$ substance$ or$ (3)$ by$ the$ filing$ or$
transformed$this$Court$from$passivity$to$activism.$This$transformation,$dictated$ endorsement$before$the$SecretarySGeneral$of$the$House$of$Representatives$of$a$
by$ our$ distinct$ experience$ as$ nation,$ is$ not$ merely$ evolutionary$ but$ verified$ complaint$ or$ a$ resolution$ of$ impeachment$ by$ at$ least$ 1/3$ of$ the$
revolutionary.$ Under$ the$ 1935$ and$ the$ 1973$ Constitutions,$ this$ Court$ members$of$the$House$thus$clearly$contravene$Section$3$(5)$of$Article$XI$as$they$
approached$constitutional$violations$by$initially$determining$what$it$cannot$do;$ give$the$term$"initiate"$a$meaning$different$from$"filing."$
under$the$1987$Constitution,$there$is$a$shift$in$stress$$this$Court$is$mandated$to$ $
approach$constitutional$violations$not$by$finding$out$what$it$should$not$do$but$ Validity$of$the$Second$Impeachment$Complaint$
what$it$must$do.$The$Court$must$discharge$this$solemn$duty$by$not$resuscitating$ $
a$past$that$petrifies$the$present.$ Having$ concluded$ that$ the$ initiation$ takes$ place$ by$ the$ act$ of$ filing$ of$ the$
$ impeachment$ complaint$ and$ referral$ to$ the$ House$ Committee$ on$ Justice,$ the$
I$ urge$ my$ brethren$ in$ the$ Court$ to$ give$ due$ and$ serious$ consideration$ to$ this$ initial$action$taken$thereon,$the$meaning$of$Section$3$(5)$of$Article$XI$becomes$
new$constitutional$provision$as$the$case$at$bar$once$more$calls$us$to$define$the$ clear.$ Once$ an$ impeachment$ complaint$ has$ been$ initiated$ in$ the$ foregoing$
parameters$of$our$power$to$review$violations$of$the$rules$of$the$House.$We$will$ manner,$ another$ may$ not$ be$ filed$ against$ the$ same$ official$ within$ a$ one$ year$
not$ be$ true$ to$ our$ trust$ as$ the$ last$ bulwark$ against$ government$ abuses$ if$ we$ period$following$Article$XI,$Section$3(5)$of$the$Constitution.$
$ competently$address$and$adjudicate$in$accordance$with$the$clearScut$allocation$
In$ fine,$ considering$ that$ the$ first$ impeachment$ complaint,$ was$ filed$ by$ former$ of$powers$under$our$system$of$government.$FaceStoSface$thus$with$a$matter$or$
President$ Estrada$ against$ Chief$ Justice$ Hilario$ G.$ Davide,$ Jr.,$ along$ with$ seven$ problem$ that$ squarely$ falls$ under$ the$ Court's$ jurisdiction,$ no$ other$ course$ of$
associate$ justices$ of$ this$ Court,$ on$ June$ 2,$ 2003$ and$ referred$ to$ the$ House$ action$can$be$had$but$for$it$to$pass$upon$that$problem$head$on.$
Committee$ on$ Justice$ on$ August$ 5,$ 2003,$ the$ second$ impeachment$ complaint$ $
filed$ by$ Representatives$ Gilberto$ C.$ Teodoro,$ Jr.$ and$ Felix$ William$ Fuentebella$ The$ claim,$ therefore,$ that$ this$ Court$ by$ judicially$ entangling$ itself$ with$ the$
against$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ on$ October$ 23,$ 2003$ violates$ the$ constitutional$ process$of$impeachment$has$effectively$set$up$a$regime$of$judicial$supremacy,$is$
prohibition$against$the$initiation$of$impeachment$proceedings$against$the$same$ patently$without$basis$in$fact$and$in$law.$
impeachable$officer$within$a$oneSyear$period.$ $
$ This$Court$in$the$present$petitions$subjected$to$judicial$scrutiny$and$resolved$on$
Conclusion$ the$ merits$ only$ the$ main$ issue$ of$ whether$ the$ impeachment$ proceedings$
$ initiated$ against$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ transgressed$ the$ constitutionally$ imposed$
If$ there$ is$ anything$ constant$ about$ this$ country,$ it$ is$ that$ there$ is$ always$ a$ oneSyear$ time$ bar$ rule.$ Beyond$ this,$ it$ did$ not$ go$ about$ assuming$ jurisdiction$
phenomenon$ that$ takes$ the$ center$ stage$ of$ our$ individual$ and$ collective$ where$it$had$none,$nor$indiscriminately$turn$justiciable$issues$out$of$decidedly$
consciousness$as$a$people$with$our$characteristic$flair$for$human$drama,$conflict$ political$ questions.$ Because$ it$ is$ not$ at$ all$ the$ business$ of$ this$ Court$ to$ assert$
or$ tragedy.$ Of$ course$ this$ is$ not$ to$ demean$ the$ seriousness$ of$ the$ controversy$ judicial$ dominance$ over$ the$ other$ two$ great$ branches$ of$ the$ government.$
over$the$Davide$impeachment.$For$many$of$us,$the$past$two$weeks$have$proven$ Rather,$the$raison$d'etre$of$the$judiciary$is$to$complement$the$discharge$by$the$
to$ be$ an$ exasperating,$ mentally$ and$ emotionally$ exhausting$ experience.$ Both$ executive$ and$ legislative$ of$ their$ own$ powers$ to$ bring$ about$ ultimately$ the$
sides$ have$ fought$ bitterly$ a$ dialectical$ struggle$ to$ articulate$ what$ they$ beneficent$ effects$ of$ having$ founded$ and$ ordered$ our$ society$ upon$ the$ rule$ of$
respectively$ believe$ to$ be$ the$ correct$ position$ or$ view$ on$ the$ issues$ involved.$ law.$
Passions$ had$ ran$ high$ as$ demonstrators,$ whether$ for$ or$ against$ the$ $
impeachment$of$the$Chief$Justice,$took$to$the$streets$armed$with$their$familiar$ It$is$suggested$that$by$our$taking$cognizance$of$the$issue$of$constitutionality$of$
slogans$and$chants$to$air$their$voice$on$the$matter.$Various$sectors$of$society$S$ the$ impeachment$ proceedings$ against$ the$ Chief$ Justice,$ the$ members$ of$ this$
from$the$business,$retired$military,$to$the$academe$and$denominations$of$faith$$ Court$ have$ actually$ closed$ ranks$ to$ protect$ a$ brethren.$ That$ the$ members'$
offered$suggestions$for$a$return$to$a$state$of$normalcy$in$the$official$relations$of$ interests$in$ruling$on$said$issue$is$as$much$at$stake$as$is$that$of$the$Chief$Justice.$
the$ governmental$ branches$ affected$ to$ obviate$ any$ perceived$ resulting$ Nothing$could$be$farther$from$the$truth.$
instability$upon$areas$of$national$life.$ $
$ The$institution$that$is$the$Supreme$Court$together$with$all$other$courts$has$long$
Through$ all$ these$ and$ as$ early$ as$ the$ time$ when$ the$ Articles$ of$ Impeachment$ held$ and$ been$ entrusted$ with$ the$ judicial$ power$ to$ resolve$ conflicting$ legal$
had$been$constituted,$this$Court$was$specifically$asked,$told,$urged$and$argued$ rights$regardless$of$the$personalities$involved$in$the$suits$or$actions.$This$Court$
to$ take$ no$ action$ of$ any$ kind$ and$ form$ with$ respect$ to$ the$ prosecution$ by$ the$ has$dispensed$justice$over$the$course$of$time,$unaffected$by$whomsoever$stood$
House$ of$ Representatives$ of$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$ against$ the$ subject$ to$benefit$or$suffer$therefrom,$unfraid$by$whatever$imputations$or$speculations$
respondent$ public$ official.$ When$ the$ present$ petitions$ were$ knocking$ so$ to$ could$ be$ made$ to$ it,$ so$ long$ as$ it$ rendered$ judgment$ according$ to$ the$ law$ and$
speak$at$the$doorsteps$of$this$Court,$the$same$clamor$for$nonSinterference$was$ the$ facts.$ Why$ can$ it$ not$ now$ be$ trusted$ to$ wield$ judicial$ power$ in$ these$
made$ through$ what$ are$ now$ the$ arguments$ of$ "lack$ of$ jurisdiction,"$ "nonS petitions$just$because$it$is$the$highest$ranking$magistrate$who$is$involved$when$
justiciability,"$ and$ "judicial$ selfSrestraint"$ aimed$ at$ halting$ the$ Court$ from$ any$ it$ is$ an$ incontrovertible$ fact$ that$ the$ fundamental$ issue$ is$ not$ him$ but$ the$
move$that$may$have$a$bearing$on$the$impeachment$proceedings.$ validity$ of$ a$ government$ branch's$ official$ act$ as$ tested$ by$ the$ limits$ set$ by$ the$
$ Constitution?$Of$course,$there$are$rules$on$the$inhibition$of$any$member$of$the$
This$ Court$ did$ not$ heed$ the$ call$ to$ adopt$ a$ handsSoff$ stance$ as$ far$ as$ the$ judiciary$from$taking$part$in$a$case$in$specified$instances.$But$to$disqualify$this$
question$ of$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ initiating$ the$ impeachment$ complaint$ entire$ institution$ now$ from$ the$ suit$ at$ bar$ is$ to$ regard$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ as$
against$ Chief$ Justice$ Davide$ is$ concerned.$ To$ reiterate$ what$ has$ been$ already$ likely$ incapable$ of$ impartiality$ when$ one$ of$ its$ members$ is$ a$ party$ to$ a$ case,$
explained,$the$Court$found$the$existence$in$full$of$all$the$requisite$conditions$for$ which$is$simply$a$non$sequitur.$
its$exercise$of$its$constitutionally$vested$power$and$duty$of$judicial$review$over$ $
an$issue$whose$resolution$precisely$called$for$the$construction$or$interpretation$ No$one$is$above$the$law$or$the$Constitution.$This$is$a$basic$precept$in$any$legal$
of$a$provision$of$the$fundamental$law$of$the$land.$What$lies$in$here$is$an$issue$of$ system$ which$ recognizes$ equality$ of$ all$ men$ before$ the$ law$ as$ essential$ to$ the$
a$ genuine$ constitutional$ material$ which$ only$ this$ Court$ can$ properly$ and$ law's$moral$authority$and$that$of$its$agents$to$secure$respect$for$and$obedience$
to$ its$ commands.$ Perhaps,$ there$ is$ no$ other$ government$ branch$ or$
instrumentality$that$is$most$zealous$in$protecting$that$principle$of$legal$equality$
other$ than$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ which$ has$ discerned$ its$ real$ meaning$ and$
ramifications$ through$ its$ application$ to$ numerous$ cases$ especially$ of$ the$ highS
profile$kind$in$the$annals$of$jurisprudence.$The$Chief$Justice$is$not$above$the$law$
and$neither$is$any$other$member$of$this$Court.$But$just$because$he$is$the$Chief$
Justice$ does$ not$ imply$ that$ he$ gets$ to$ have$ less$ in$ law$ than$ anybody$ else.$ The$
law$is$solicitous$of$every$individual's$rights$irrespective$of$his$station$in$life.$
$
The$ Filipino$ nation$ and$ its$ democratic$ institutions$ have$ no$ doubt$ been$ put$ to$
test$ once$ again$ by$ this$ impeachment$ case$ against$ Chief$ Justice$ Hilario$ Davide.$
Accordingly,$this$Court$has$resorted$to$no$other$than$the$Constitution$in$search$
for$ a$ solution$ to$ what$ many$ feared$ would$ ripen$ to$ a$ crisis$ in$ government.$ But$
though$it$is$indeed$immensely$a$blessing$for$this$Court$to$have$found$answers$in$
our$bedrock$of$legal$principles,$it$is$equally$important$that$it$went$through$this$
crucible$ of$ a$ democratic$ process,$ if$ only$ to$ discover$ that$ it$ can$ resolve$
differences$without$the$use$of$force$and$aggression$upon$each$other.$
$
WHEREFORE,$ Sections$ 16$ and$ 17$ of$ Rule$ V$ of$ the$ Rules$ of$ Procedure$ in$
Impeachment$ Proceedings$ which$ were$ approved$ by$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives$on$November$28,$2001$are$unconstitutional.$Consequently,$the$
second$impeachment$complaint$against$Chief$Justice$Hilario$G.$Davide,$Jr.$which$
was$ filed$ by$ Representatives$ Gilberto$ C.$ Teodoro,$ Jr.$ and$ Felix$ William$ B.$
Fuentebella$ with$ the$ Office$ of$ the$ Secretary$ General$ of$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives$on$October$23,$2003$is$barred$under$paragraph$5,$section$3$of$
Article$XI$of$the$Constitution.$
$
SO$ORDERED.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$LS28196$$$$$$November$9,$1967$ provided$ in$ the$ present$ Constitution,$ to$ a$ maximum$ of$ 180,$ to$ be$ apportioned$
$ among$ the$ several$ provinces$ as$ nearly$ as$ may$ be$ according$ to$ the$ number$ of$
RAMON$A.$GONZALES,$petitioner,$$ their$respective$inhabitants,$although$each$province$shall$have,$at$least,$one$(1)$
vs.$ member;$
COMMISSION$ ON$ ELECTIONS,$ DIRECTOR$ OF$ PRINTING$ and$ AUDITOR$ $
GENERAL,$respondents.$ 2.$ R.$ B.$ H.$ No.$ 2,$ calling$ a$ convention$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ said$
$ Constitution,$the$convention$to$be$composed$of$two$(2)$elective$delegates$from$
G.R.$No.$LS28224$$$$$$November$9,$1967$ each$representative$district,$to$be$"elected$in$the$general$elections$to$be$held$on$
$ the$second$Tuesday$of$November,$1971;"$and$
PHILIPPINE$CONSTITUTION$ASSOCIATION$(PHILCONSA),$petitioner,$$ $
vs.$ 3.$ R.$ B.$ H.$ No.$ 3,$ proposing$ that$ Section$ 16,$ Article$ VI,$ of$ the$ same$
COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS,$respondent.$ Constitution,$ be$ amended$ so$ as$ to$ authorize$ Senators$ and$ members$ of$ the$
$ House$ of$ Representatives$ to$ become$ delegates$ to$ the$ aforementioned$
No.$28196:$ constitutional$convention,$without$forfeiting$their$respective$seats$in$Congress.$
Ramon$A.$Gonzales$for$and$in$his$own$behalf$as$petitioner.$$ $
Juan$T.$David$as$amicus$curiae$ Subsequently,$Congress$passed$a$bill,$which,$upon$approval$by$the$President,$on$
Office$of$the$Solicitor$General$for$respondents.$ June$ 17,$ 1967,$ became$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 4913,$ providing$ that$ the$ amendments$
$ to$the$Constitution$proposed$in$the$aforementioned$Resolutions$No.$1$and$3$be$
No.$28224:$ submitted,$ for$ approval$ by$ the$ people,$ at$ the$ general$ elections$ which$ shall$ be$
Salvador$Araneta$for$petitioner.$$ held$on$November$14,$1967.$
Office$of$the$Solicitor$General$for$respondent.$ $
$ The$petition$in$LS28196$was$filed$on$October$21,$1967.$At$the$hearing$thereof,$
CONCEPCION,$C.J.:$ on$ October$ 28,$ 1967,$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ appeared$ on$ behalf$ of$ respondents.$
$ Moreover,$ Atty.$ Juan$ T.$ David$ and$ counsel$ for$ the$ Philippine$ Constitution$
G.$ R.$ No.$ LS28196$ is$ an$ original$ action$ for$ prohibition,$ with$ preliminary$ Association$ $ hereinafter$ referred$ to$ as$ the$ PHILCONSA$ $ were$ allowed$ to$
injunction.$ argue$ as$ amici$ curiae.$ Said$ counsel$ for$ the$ PHILCONSA,$ Dr.$ Salvador$ Araneta,$
$ likewise$ prayed$ that$ the$ decision$ in$ this$ case$ be$ deferred$ until$ after$ a$
Petitioner$therein$prays$for$judgment:$ substantially$identical$case$brought$by$said$organization$before$the$Commission$
$ on$ Elections,1$ which$ was$ expected$ to$ decide$ it$ any$ time,$ and$ whose$ decision$
1)$ Restraining:$ (a)$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ from$ enforcing$ Republic$ would,$ in$ all$ probability,$ be$ appealed$ to$ this$ Court$ $ had$ been$ submitted$
Act$ No.$ 4913,$ or$ from$ performing$ any$ act$ that$ will$ result$ in$ the$ holding$ of$ the$ thereto$for$final$determination,$for$a$joint$decision$on$the$identical$issues$raised$
plebiscite$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ the$ constitutional$ amendments$ proposed$ in$ in$both$cases.$In$fact,$on$October$31,$1967,$the$PHILCONSA$filed$with$this$Court$
Joint$Resolutions$Nos.$1$and$3$of$the$two$Houses$of$Congress$of$the$Philippines,$ the$petition$in$G.$R.$No.$LS28224,$for$review$by$certiorari$of$the$resolution$of$the$
approved$on$March$16,$1967;$(b)$the$Director$of$Printing$from$printing$ballots,$ Commission$ on$ Elections2$ dismissing$ the$ petition$ therein.$ The$ two$ (2)$ cases$
pursuant$to$said$Act$and$Resolutions;$and$(c)$the$Auditor$General$from$passing$ were$ deemed$ submitted$ for$ decision$ on$ November$ 8,$ 1967,$ upon$ the$ filing$ of$
in$ audit$ any$ disbursement$ from$ the$ appropriation$ of$ funds$ made$ in$ said$ the$ answer$ of$ respondent,$ the$ memorandum$ of$ the$ petitioner$ and$ the$ reply$
Republic$Act$No.$4913;$and$ memorandum$of$respondent$in$LS28224.$
$ $
2)$ declaring$said$Act$unconstitutional$and$void.$ Ramon$A.$Gonzales,$the$petitioner$in$LS28196,$is$admittedly$a$Filipino$citizen,$a$
$ taxpayer,$and$a$voter.$He$claims$to$have$instituted$case$LS28196$as$a$class$unit,$
The$main$facts$are$not$disputed.$On$March$16,$1967,$the$Senate$and$the$House$ for$ and$ in$ behalf$ of$ all$ citizens,$ taxpayers,$ and$ voters$ similarly$ situated.$
of$Representatives$passed$the$following$resolutions:$ Although$ respondents$ and$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ have$ filed$ an$ answer$ denying$
$ the$ truth$ of$ this$ allegation,$ upon$ the$ ground$ that$ they$ have$ no$ knowledge$ or$
1.$ R.$ B.$ H.$ (Resolution$ of$ Both$ Houses)$ No.$ 1,$ proposing$ that$ Section$ 5,$ information$to$form$a$belief$as$to$the$truth$thereof,$such$denial$would$appear$to$
Article$ VI,$ of$ the$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines,$ be$ amended$ so$ as$ to$ increase$ be$ a$ perfunctory$ one.$ In$ fact,$ at$ the$ hearing$ of$ case$ LS28196,$ the$ Solicitor$
the$ membership$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ from$ a$ maximum$ of$ 120,$ as$
General$ expressed$ himself$ in$ favor$ of$ a$ judicial$ determination$ of$ the$ merits$ of$
the$issued$raised$in$said$case.$
$ may$be$possible$according$to$the$number$of$inhabitants$of$each$province.$Thus$
The$ PHILCONSA,$ petitioner$ in$ LS28224,$ is$ admittedly$ a$ corporation$ duly$
organized$and$existing$under$the$laws$of$the$Philippines,$and$a$civic,$nonSprofit$
and$nonSpartisan$organization$the$objective$of$which$is$to$uphold$the$rule$of$law$
in$the$Philippines$and$to$defend$its$Constitution$against$erosions$or$onslaughts$
from$whatever$source.$Despite$his$aforementioned$statement$in$LS28196,$in$his$
answer$ in$ LS28224$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ maintains$ that$ this$ Court$ has$ no$
jurisdiction$over$the$subjectSmatter$of$LS28224,$upon$the$ground$that$the$same$
is$ "merely$ political"$ as$ held$ in$ Mabanag$ vs.$ Lopez$ Vito.3$ Senator$ Arturo$ M.$
Tolentino,$ who$ appeared$ before$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ and$ filed$ an$
opposition$ to$ the$ PHILCONSA$ petition$ therein,$ was$ allowed$ to$ appear$ before$
this$Court$and$objected$to$said$petition$upon$the$ground:$a)$that$the$Court$has$
no$jurisdiction$either$to$grant$the$relief$sought$in$the$petition,$or$to$pass$upon$
the$ legality$ of$ the$ composition$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives;$ b)$ that$ the$
petition,$ if$ granted,$ would,$ in$ effect,$ render$ in$ operational$ the$ legislative$
department;$ and$ c)$ that$ "the$ failure$ of$ Congress$ to$ enact$ a$ valid$
reapportionment$ law$ .$ .$ .$ does$ not$ have$ the$ legal$ effect$ of$ rendering$ illegal$ the$
House$ of$ Representatives$ elected$ thereafter,$ nor$ of$ rendering$ its$ acts$ null$ and$
void."$
$ Since,$ when$ proposing,$ as$ a$ constituent$ assembly,$ amendments$ to$ the$
JURISDICTION$
$ Fundamental$Law,$it$follows,$necessarily,$that$they$do$not$have$the$final$say$on$
As$ early$ as$ Angara$ vs.$ Electoral$ Commission,4$ this$ Court$ $ speaking$ through$
one$ of$ the$ leading$ members$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ and$ a$ respected$
professor$of$Constitutional$Law,$Dr.$Jose$P.$Laurel$$declared$that$"the$judicial$
department$ is$ the$ only$ constitutional$ organ$ which$ can$ be$ called$ upon$ to$
determine$ the$ proper$ allocation$ of$ powers$ between$ the$ several$ departments$
and$among$the$integral$or$constituent$units$thereof."$It$is$true$that$in$Mabanag$
vs.$ Lopez$ Vito,5$ this$ Court$ characterizing$ the$ issue$ submitted$ thereto$ as$ a$
political$one,$declined$to$pass$upon$the$question$whether$or$not$a$given$number$
of$votes$cast$in$Congress$in$favor$of$a$proposed$amendment$to$the$Constitution$
$ which$ was$ being$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ ratification$ $ satisfied$ the$
threeSfourths$ vote$ requirement$ of$ the$ fundamental$ law.$ The$ force$ of$ this$
precedent$has$been$weakened,$however,$by$Suanes$vs.$Chief$Accountant$of$the$
Senate,6$ Avelino$ vs.$ Cuenco,7$ Taada$ vs.$ Cuenco,8$ and$ Macias$ vs.$ Commission$
on$Elections.9$In$the$first,$we$held$that$the$officers$and$employees$of$the$Senate$
Electoral$ Tribunal$ are$ under$ its$ supervision$ and$ control,$ not$ of$ that$ of$ the$
Senate$President,$as$claimed$by$the$latter;$in$the$second,$this$Court$proceeded$to$
determine$the$number$of$Senators$necessary$for$a$quorum$in$the$Senate;$in$the$
third,$ we$ nullified$ the$ election,$ by$ Senators$ belonging$ to$ the$ party$ having$ the$
largest$number$of$votes$in$said$chamber,$purporting$to$act$on$behalf$of$the$party$
having$ the$ second$ largest$ number$ of$ votes$ therein,$ of$ two$ (2)$ Senators$
belonging$ to$ the$ first$ party,$ as$ members,$ for$ the$ second$ party,$ of$ the,$ Senate$
Electoral$ Tribunal;$ and$ in$ the$ fourth,$ we$ declared$ unconstitutional$ an$ act$ of$
Congress$ purporting$ to$ apportion$ the$ representative$ districts$ for$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives,$upon$the$ground$that$the$apportionment$had$not$been$made$as$
we$rejected$the$theory,$advanced$in$these$four$(4)$cases,$that$the$issues$therein$
raised$ were$ political$ questions$ the$ determination$ of$ which$ is$ beyond$ judicial$
review.$
$
Indeed,$the$power$to$amend$the$Constitution$or$to$propose$amendments$thereto$
is$ not$ included$ in$ the$ general$ grant$ of$ legislative$ powers$ to$ Congress.10$ It$ is$
part$of$the$inherent$powers$of$the$people$$as$the$repository$of$sovereignty$in$
a$republican$state,$such$as$ours11$$to$make,$and,$hence,$to$amend$their$own$
Fundamental$ Law.$ Congress$ may$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$
merely$ because$ the$ same$ explicitly$ grants$ such$ power.12$ Hence,$ when$
exercising$ the$ same,$ it$ is$ said$ that$ Senators$ and$ Members$ of$ the$ House$ of$
Representatives$act,$not$as$members$of$Congress,$but$as$component$elements$of$
a$ constituent$ assembly.$ When$ acting$ as$ such,$ the$ members$ of$ Congress$ derive$
their$ authority$ from$ the$ Constitution,$ unlike$ the$ people,$ when$ performing$ the$
same$function,13$for$their$authority$does$not$emanate$from$the$Constitution$$
they$are$the$very$source$of$all$powers$of$government,$including$the$Constitution$
itself$.$
$
Constitution,$ the$ members$ of$ Congress$ derive$ their$ authority$ from$ the$
whether$or$not$their$acts$are$within$or$beyond$constitutional$limits.$Otherwise,$
they$ could$ brush$ aside$ and$ set$ the$ same$ at$ naught,$ contrary$ to$ the$ basic$ tenet$
that$ ours$ is$ a$ government$ of$ laws,$ not$ of$ men,$ and$ to$ the$ rigid$ nature$ of$ our$
Constitution.$Such$rigidity$is$stressed$by$the$fact$that,$the$Constitution$expressly$
confers$ upon$ the$ Supreme$ Court,14$ the$ power$ to$ declare$ a$ treaty$
unconstitutional,15$ despite$ the$ eminently$ political$ character$ of$ treatySmaking$
power.$
$
In$ short,$ the$ issue$ whether$ or$ not$ a$ Resolution$ of$ Congress$ $ acting$ as$ a$
constituent$ assembly$ $ violates$ the$ Constitution$ essentially$ justiciable,$ not$
political,$and,$hence,$subject$to$judicial$review,$and,$to$the$extent$that$this$view$
may$ be$ inconsistent$ with$ the$ stand$ taken$ in$ Mabanag$ vs.$ Lopez$ Vito,16$ the$
latter$ should$ be$ deemed$ modified$ accordingly.$ The$ Members$ of$ the$ Court$ are$
unanimous$on$this$point.$
$
THE$MERITS$
$
Section$1$of$Article$XV$of$the$Constitution,$as$amended,$reads:$
$
The$ Congress$ in$ joint$ session$ assembled$ by$ a$ vote$ of$ threeSfourths$ of$ all$ the$
Members$ of$ the$ Senate$ and$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ voting$ separately,$
may$ propose$ amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution$ or$ call$ a$ convention$ for$ that$
purpose.$ Such$ amendments$ shall$ be$ valid$ as$ part$ of$ this$ Constitution$ when$ not$ otherwise.$ Until$ such$ apportionment$ shall$ have$ been$ made,$ the$ House$ of$
approved$by$a$majority$of$the$votes$cast$at$an$election$at$which$the$amendments$ Representatives$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ number$ of$ Members$ as$ that$ fixed$ by$ law$
are$submitted$to$the$people$for$their$ratification.$ for$ the$ National$ Assembly,$ who$ shall$ be$ elected$ by$ the$ qualified$ electors$ from$
$ the$ present$ Assembly$ districts.$ Each$ representative$ district$ shall$ comprise,$ as$
Pursuant$ to$ this$ provision,$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ may$ be$ proposed,$ far$as$practicable,$contiguous$and$compact$territory.$
either$ by$ Congress,$ or$ by$ a$ convention$ called$ by$ Congress$ for$ that$ purpose.$ In$ $
either$ case,$ the$ vote$ of$ "threeSfourths$ of$ all$ the$ members$ of$ the$ Senate$ and$ of$ It$ is$ urged$ that$ the$ last$ enumeration$ or$ census$ took$ place$ in$ 1960;$ that,$ no$
the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ voting$ separately"$ is$ necessary.$ And,$ "such$ apportionment$ having$ been$ made$ within$ three$ (3)$ years$ thereafter,$ the$
amendments$ shall$ be$ valid$ as$ part$ of"$ the$ "Constitution$ when$ approved$ by$ a$ Congress$ of$ the$ Philippines$ and/or$ the$ election$ of$ its$ Members$ became$ illegal;$
majority$of$the$votes$cast$at$an$election$at$which$the$amendments$are$submitted$ that$Congress$and$its$Members,$likewise,$became$a$de$facto$Congress$and/or$de$
to$the$people$for$their$ratification."$ facto$ congressmen,$ respectively;$ and$ that,$ consequently,$ the$ disputed$
$ Resolutions,$proposing$amendments$to$the$Constitution,$as$well$as$Republic$Act$
In$ the$ cases$ at$ bar,$ it$ is$ conceded$ that$ the$ R.$ B.$ H.$ Nos.$ 1$ and$ 3$ have$ been$ No.$4913,$are$null$and$void.$
approved$by$a$vote$of$threeSfourths$of$all$the$members$of$the$Senate$and$of$the$ $
House$ of$ Representatives$ voting$ separately.$ This,$ notwithstanding,$ it$ is$ urged$ It$ is$ not$ true,$ however,$ that$ Congress$ has$ not$ made$ an$ apportionment$ within$
that$said$resolutions$are$null$and$void$because:$ three$years$after$the$enumeration$or$census$made$in$1960.$It$did$actually$pass$a$
$ bill,$ which$ became$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 3040,17$ purporting$ to$ make$ said$
1.$ The$Members$of$Congress,$which$approved$the$proposed$amendments,$ apportionment.$ This$ Act$ was,$ however,$ declared$ unconstitutional,$ upon$ the$
as$ well$ as$ the$ resolution$ calling$ a$ convention$ to$ propose$ amendments,$ are,$ at$ ground$ that$ the$ apportionment$ therein$ undertaken$ had$ not$ been$ made$
best,$de$facto$Congressmen;$ according$ to$ the$ number$ of$ inhabitants$ of$ the$ different$ provinces$ of$ the$
$ Philippines.18$
2.$ Congress$ may$ adopt$ either$ one$ of$ two$ alternatives$ propose$ $ $
amendments$or$call$a$convention$therefore$but$may$not$avail$of$both$$that$is$ Moreover,$we$are$unable$to$agree$with$the$theory$that,$in$view$of$the$failure$of$
to$say,$propose$amendment$and$call$a$convention$$at$the$same$time;$ Congress$ to$ make$ a$ valid$ apportionment$ within$ the$ period$ stated$ in$ the$
$ Constitution,$ Congress$ became$ an$ "unconstitutional$ Congress"$ and$ that,$ in$
3.$ The$ election,$ in$ which$ proposals$ for$ amendment$ to$ the$ Constitution$ consequence$thereof,$the$Members$of$its$House$of$Representatives$are$de$facto$
shall$ be$ submitted$ for$ ratification,$ must$ be$ a$ special$ election,$ not$ a$ general$ officers.$The$major$premise$of$this$process$of$reasoning$is$that$the$constitutional$
election,$in$which$officers$of$the$national$and$local$governments$$such$as$the$ provision$ on$ "apportionment$ within$ three$ years$ after$ the$ return$ of$ every$
elections$scheduled$to$be$held$on$November$14,$1967$$will$be$chosen;$and$ enumeration,$and$not$otherwise,"$is$mandatory.$The$fact$that$Congress$is$under$
$ legal$ obligation$ to$ make$ said$ apportionment$ does$ not$ justify,$ however,$ the$
4.$ The$ spirit$ of$ the$ Constitution$ demands$ that$ the$ election,$ in$ which$ conclusion$that$failure$to$comply$with$such$obligation$rendered$Congress$illegal$
proposals$for$amendment$shall$be$submitted$to$the$people$for$ratification,$must$ or$unconstitutional,$or$that$its$Members$have$become$de$facto$officers.$
be$held$under$such$conditions$$which,$allegedly,$do$not$exist$$as$to$give$the$ $
people$ a$ reasonable$ opportunity$ to$ have$ a$ fair$ grasp$ of$ the$ nature$ and$ It$is$conceded$that,$since$the$adoption$of$the$Constitution$in$1935,$Congress$has$
implications$of$said$amendments.$ not$made$a$valid$apportionment$as$required$in$said$fundamental$law.$The$effect$
$ of$this$omission$has$been$envisioned$in$the$Constitution,$pursuant$to$which:$
Legality$of$Congress$and$Legal$Status$of$the$Congressmen$ $
$ .$ .$ .$ Until$ such$ apportionment$ shall$ have$ been$ made,$ the$ House$ of$
The$first$objection$is$based$upon$Section$5,$Article$VI,$of$the$Constitution,$which$ Representatives$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ number$ of$ Members$ as$ that$ fixed$ by$ law$
provides:$ for$ the$ National$ Assembly,$ who$ shall$ be$ elected$ by$ the$ qualified$ electors$ from$
$ the$present$Assembly$districts.$.$.$.$.$
The$House$of$Representatives$shall$be$composed$of$not$more$than$one$hundred$ $
and$twenty$Members$who$shall$be$apportioned$among$the$several$provinces$as$ The$provision$does$not$support$the$view$that,$upon$the$expiration$of$the$period$
nearly$ as$ may$ be$ according$ to$ the$ number$ of$ their$ respective$ inhabitants,$ but$ to$ make$ the$ apportionment,$ a$ Congress$ which$ fails$ to$ make$ it$ is$ dissolved$ or$
each$province$shall$have$at$least$one$Member.$The$Congress$shall$by$law$make$ becomes$ illegal.$ On$ the$ contrary,$ it$ implies$ necessarily$ that$ Congress$ shall$
an$apportionment$within$three$years$after$the$return$of$every$enumeration,$and$
continue$to$function$with$the$representative$districts$existing$at$the$time$of$the$ mandatory$ duty,$ whatever$ it$ may$ be,$ would$ automatically$ result$ in$ the$
expiration$of$said$period.$ forfeiture$of$an$office,$in$the$absence$of$a$statute$to$this$effect.$
$ $
It$is$argued$that$the$aboveSquoted$provision$refers$only$to$the$elections$held$in$ Similarly,$it$would$seem$obvious$that$the$provision$of$our$Election$Law$relative$
1935.$ This$ theory$ assumes$ that$ an$ apportionment$ had$ to$ be$ made$ necessarily$ to$ the$ election$ of$ Members$ of$ Congress$ in$ 1965$ were$ not$ repealed$ in$
before$the$first$elections$to$be$held$after$the$inauguration$of$the$Commonwealth$ consequence$of$the$failure$of$said$body$to$make$an$apportionment$within$three$
of$the$Philippines,$or$in$1938.19$The$assumption,$is,$however,$unwarranted,$for$ (3)$ years$ after$ the$ census$ of$ 1960.$ Inasmuch$ as$ the$ general$ elections$ in$ 1965$
there$ had$ been$ no$ enumeration$ in$ 1935,$ and$ nobody$ could$ foretell$ when$ it$ were$ presumably$ held$ in$ conformity$ with$ said$ Election$ Law,$ and$ the$ legal$
would$be$made.$Those$who$drafted$and$adopted$the$Constitution$in$1935$could$ provisions$ creating$ Congress$ $ with$ a$ House$ of$ Representatives$ composed$ of$
be$ certain,$ therefore,$ that$ the$ threeSyear$ period,$ after$ the$ earliest$ possible$ members$ elected$ by$ qualified$ voters$ of$ representative$ districts$ as$ they$ existed$
enumeration,$would$expire$after$the$elections$in$1938.$ at$ the$ time$ of$ said$ elections$ $ remained$ in$ force,$ we$ can$ not$ see$ how$ said$
$ Members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ can$ be$ regarded$ as$ de$ facto$ officers$
What$ is$ more,$ considering$ that$ several$ provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ owing$to$the$failure$of$their$predecessors$in$office$to$make$a$reapportionment$
particularly$ those$ on$ the$ legislative$ department,$ were$ amended$ in$ 1940,$ by$ within$the$period$aforementioned.$
establishing$ a$ bicameral$ Congress,$ those$ who$ drafted$ and$ adopted$ said$ $
amendment,$ incorporating$ therein$ the$ provision$ of$ the$ original$ Constitution$ Upon$ the$ other$ hand,$ the$ Constitution$ authorizes$ the$ impeachment$ of$ the$
regarding$ the$ apportionment$ of$ the$ districts$ for$ representatives,$ must$ have$ President,$the$ViceSPresident,$the$Justices$of$the$Supreme$Court$and$the$Auditor$
known$ that$ the$ threeSyear$ period$ therefor$ would$ expire$ after$ the$ elections$ General$for,$inter$alia,$culpable$violation$of$the$Constitution,20$the$enforcement$
scheduled$to$be$held$and$actually$held$in$1941.$ of$ which$ is,$ not$ only$ their$ mandatory$ duty,$ but$ also,$ their$ main$ function.$ This$
$ provision$indicates$that,$despite$the$violation$of$such$mandatory$duty,$the$title$
Thus,$ the$ events$ contemporaneous$ with$ the$ framing$ and$ ratification$ of$ the$ to$ their$ respective$ offices$ remains$ unimpaired,$ until$ dismissal$ or$ ouster$
original$ Constitution$ in$ 1935$ and$ of$ the$ amendment$ thereof$ in$ 1940$ strongly$ pursuant$to$a$judgment$of$conviction$rendered$in$accordance$with$Article$IX$of$
indicate$that$the$provision$concerning$said$apportionment$and$the$effect$of$the$ the$Constitution.$In$short,$the$loss$of$office$or$the$extinction$of$title$thereto$is$not$
failure$to$make$it$were$expected$to$be$applied$to$conditions$obtaining$after$the$ automatic.$
elections$in$1935$and$1938,$and$even$after$subsequent$elections.$ $
$ Even$if$we$assumed,$however,$that$the$present$Members$of$Congress$are$merely$
Then$ again,$ since$ the$ report$ of$ the$ Director$ of$ the$ Census$ on$ the$ last$ de$facto$officers,$it$would$not$follow$that$the$contested$resolutions$and$Republic$
enumeration$was$submitted$to$the$President$on$November$30,$1960,$it$follows$ Act$No.$4913$are$null$and$void.$In$fact,$the$main$reasons$for$the$existence$of$the$
that$the$threeSyear$period$to$make$the$apportionment$did$not$expire$until$1963,$ de$ facto$ doctrine$ is$ that$ public$ interest$ demands$ that$ acts$ of$ persons$ holding,$
or$after$the$Presidential$elections$in$1961.$There$can$be$no$question,$therefore,$ under$ color$ of$ title,$ an$ office$ created$ by$ a$ valid$ statute$ be,$ likewise,$ deemed$
that$ the$ Senate$ and$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ organized$ or$ constituted$ on$ valid$insofar$as$the$public$$as$distinguished$from$the$officer$in$question$$is$
December$30,$1961,$were$de$jure$bodies,$and$that$the$Members$thereof$were$de$ concerned.21$ Indeed,$ otherwise,$ those$ dealing$ with$ officers$ and$ employees$ of$
jure$ officers.$ Pursuant$ to$ the$ theory$ of$ petitioners$ herein,$ upon$ expiration$ of$ the$ Government$ would$ be$ entitled$ to$ demand$ from$ them$ satisfactory$ proof$ of$
said$ period$ of$ three$ years,$ or$ late$ in$ 1963,$ Congress$ became$ illegal$ and$ its$ their$ title$ to$ the$ positions$ they$ hold,$ before$ dealing$ with$ them,$ or$ before$
Members,$ or$ at$ least,$ those$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives,$ became$ illegal$ recognizing$their$authority$or$obeying$their$commands,$even$if$they$should$act$
holder$of$their$respective$offices,$and$were$de$facto$officers.$ within$the$limits$of$the$authority$vested$in$their$respective$offices,$positions$or$
$ employments.22$One$can$imagine$this$great$inconvenience,$hardships$and$evils$
Petitioners$do$not$allege$that$the$expiration$of$said$threeSyear$period$without$a$ that$would$result$in$the$absence$of$the$de$facto$doctrine.$
reapportionment,$ had$ the$ effect$ of$ abrogating$ or$ repealing$ the$ legal$ provision$ $
creating$Congress,$or,$at$least,$the$House$of$Representatives,$and$are$not$aware$ As$a$consequence,$the$title$of$a$de$facto$officer$cannot$be$assailed$collaterally.23$
of$any$rule$or$principle$of$law$that$would$warrant$such$conclusion.$Neither$do$ It$ may$not$ be$ contested$ except$ directly,$ by$ quo$ warranto$ proceedings.$Neither$
they$ allege$ that$ the$ term$ of$ office$ of$ the$ members$ of$ said$ House$ automatically$ may$the$validity$of$his$acts$be$questioned$upon$the$ground$that$he$is$merely$a$de$
expired$or$that$they$ipso$facto$forfeited$their$seats$in$Congress,$upon$the$lapse$ facto$officer.24$And$the$reasons$are$obvious:$(1)$it$would$be$an$indirect$inquiry$
of$said$period$for$reapportionment.$In$fact,$neither$our$political$law,$nor$our$law$ into$ the$ title$ to$ the$ office;$ and$ (2)$ the$ acts$ of$ a$ de$ facto$ officer,$ if$ within$ the$
on$ public$ officers,$ in$ particular,$ supports$ the$ view$ that$ failure$ to$ discharge$ a$ competence$of$his$office,$are$valid,$insofar$as$the$public$is$concerned.$
$
It$is$argued$that$the$foregoing$rules$do$not$apply$to$the$cases$at$bar$because$the$ sessions$ or$ different$ days$ of$ the$ same$ congressional$ session.$ And,$ neither$ has$
acts$ therein$ involved$ have$ not$ been$ completed$ and$ petitioners$ herein$ are$ not$ any$ plausible$ reason$ been$ advanced$ to$ justify$ the$ denial$ of$ authority$ to$ adopt$
third$ parties.$ This$ pretense$ is$ untenable.$ It$ is$ inconsistent$ with$ Tayko$ vs.$ said$resolutions$on$the$same$day.$
Capistrano.25$In$that$case,$one$of$the$parties$to$a$suit$being$heard$before$Judge$ $
Capistrano$ objected$ to$ his$ continuing$ to$ hear$ the$ case,$ for$ the$ reason$ that,$ Counsel$ ask:$ Since$ Congress$ has$ decided$ to$ call$ a$ constitutional$ convention$ to$
meanwhile,$ he$ had$ reached$ the$ age$ of$ retirement.$ This$ Court$ held$ that$ the$ propose$ amendments,$ why$ not$ let$ the$ whole$ thing$ be$ submitted$ to$ said$
objection$ could$ not$ be$ entertained,$ because$ the$ Judge$ was$ at$ least,$ a$ de$ facto$ convention,$ instead$ of,$ likewise,$ proposing$ some$ specific$ amendments,$ to$ be$
Judge,$whose$title$can$not$be$assailed$collaterally.$It$should$be$noted$that$Tayko$ submitted$ for$ ratification$ before$ said$ convention$ is$ held?$ The$ force$ of$ this$
was$not$a$third$party$insofar$as$the$Judge$was$concerned.$Tayko$was$one$of$the$ argument$ must$ be$ conceded.$ but$ the$ same$ impugns$ the$ wisdom$ of$ the$ action$
parties$in$the$aforementioned$suit.$Moreover,$Judge$Capistrano$had$not,$as$yet,$ taken$by$Congress,$not$its$authority$to$take$it.$One$seeming$purpose$thereof$to$
finished$ hearing$ the$ case,$ much$ less$ rendered$ decision$ therein.$ No$ rights$ had$ permit$ Members$ of$ Congress$ to$ run$ for$ election$ as$ delegates$ to$ the$
vested$ in$ favor$ of$ the$ parties,$ in$ consequence$ of$ the$ acts$ of$ said$ Judge.$ Yet,$ constitutional$ convention$ and$ participate$ in$ the$ proceedings$ therein,$ without$
Tayko's$ objection$ was$ overruled.$ Needless$ to$ say,$ insofar$ as$ Congress$ is$ forfeiting$ their$ seats$ in$ Congress.$ Whether$ or$ not$ this$ should$ be$ done$ is$ a$
concerned,$ its$ acts,$ as$ regards$ the$ Resolutions$ herein$ contested$ and$ Republic$ political$question,$not$subject$to$review$by$the$courts$of$justice.$
Act$ No.$ 4913,$ are$ complete.$ Congress$ has$ nothing$ else$ to$ do$ in$ connection$ $
therewith.$ On$this$question$there$is$no$disagreement$among$the$members$of$the$Court.$
$ $
The$Court$is,$also,$unanimous$in$holding$that$the$objection$under$consideration$ May$ Constitutional$ Amendments$ Be$ Submitted$ for$ Ratification$ in$ a$ General$
is$untenable.$ Election?$
$ $
Available$Alternatives$to$Congress$ Article$XV$of$the$Constitution$provides:$
$ $
Atty.$ Juan$ T.$ David,$ as$ amicus$ curiae,$ maintains$ that$ Congress$ may$ either$ .$.$.$The$Congress$in$joint$session$assembled,$by$a$vote$of$threeSfourths$of$all$the$
propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution$or$call$a$convention$for$that$purpose,$ Members$ of$ the$ Senate$ and$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ voting$ separately,$
but$it$can$not$do$both,$at$the$same$time.$This$theory$is$based$upon$the$fact$that$ may$ propose$ amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution$ or$ call$ a$ contention$ for$ that$
the$ two$ (2)$ alternatives$ are$ connected$ in$ the$ Constitution$ by$ the$ disjunctive$ purpose.$ Such$ amendments$ shall$ be$ valid$ as$ part$ of$ this$ Constitution$ when$
"or."$Such$basis$is,$however,$a$weak$one,$in$the$absence$of$other$circumstances$ approved$by$a$majority$of$the$votes$cast$at$an$election$at$which$the$amendments$
$ and$ none$ has$ brought$ to$ our$ attention$ $ supporting$ the$ conclusion$ drawn$ are$submitted$to$the$people$for$their$ratification.$
by$ the$ amicus$ curiae.$ In$ fact,$ the$ term$ "or"$ has,$ oftentimes,$ been$ held$ to$ mean$ $
"and,"$or$viceSversa,$when$the$spirit$or$context$of$the$law$warrants$it.26$ There$is$in$this$provision$nothing$to$indicate$that$the$"election"$therein$referred$
$ to$ is$ a$ "special,"$ not$ a$ general,$ election.$ The$ circumstance$ that$ three$ previous$
It$ is,$ also,$ noteworthy$ that$ R.$ B.$ H.$ Nos.$ 1$ and$ 3$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ had$ been$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$
constitutional$ provision$ on$ Congress,$ to$ be$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ ratification$in$special$elections$merely$shows$that$Congress$deemed$it$best$to$do$
ratification$on$November$14,$1967,$whereas$R.$B.$H.$No.$2$calls$for$a$convention$ so$ under$ the$ circumstances$ then$ obtaining.$ It$ does$ not$ negate$ its$ authority$ to$
in$1971,$to$consider$proposals$for$amendment$to$the$Constitution,$in$general.$In$ submit$proposed$amendments$for$ratification$in$general$elections.$
other$words,$the$subjectSmatter$of$R.$B.$H.$No.$2$is$different$from$that$of$R$B.$H.$ $
Nos.$1$and$3.$Moreover,$the$amendments$proposed$under$R.$B.$H.$Nos.$1$and$3,$ It$would$be$better,$from$the$viewpoint$of$a$thorough$discussion$of$the$proposed$
will$ be$ submitted$ for$ ratification$ several$ years$ before$ those$ that$ may$ be$ amendments,$ that$ the$ same$ be$ submitted$ to$ the$ people's$ approval$
proposed$ by$ the$ constitutional$ convention$ called$ in$ R.$ B.$ H.$ No.$ 2.$ Again,$ independently$of$the$election$of$public$officials.$And$there$is$no$denying$the$fact$
although$ the$ three$ (3)$ resolutions$ were$ passed$ on$ the$ same$ date,$ they$ were$ that$an$adequate$appraisal$of$the$merits$and$demerits$proposed$amendments$is$
taken$ up$ and$ put$ to$ a$ vote$ separately,$ or$ one$ after$ the$ other.$ In$ other$ words,$ likely$ to$ be$ overshadowed$ by$ the$ great$ attention$ usually$ commanded$ by$ the$
they$were$not$passed$at$the$same$time.$ choice$ of$ personalities$ involved$ in$ general$ elections,$ particularly$ when$
$ provincial$ and$ municipal$ officials$ are$ to$ be$ chosen.$ But,$ then,$ these$
In$any$event,$we$do$not$find,$either$in$the$Constitution,$or$in$the$history$thereof$ considerations$ are$ addressed$ to$ the$ wisdom$ of$ holding$ a$ plebiscite$
anything$that$would$negate$the$authority$of$different$Congresses$to$approve$the$ simultaneously$ with$ the$ election$ of$ public$ officer.$ They$ do$ not$ deny$ the$
contested$ Resolutions,$ or$ of$ the$ same$ Congress$ to$ pass$ the$ same$ in,$ different$ authority$ of$ Congress$ to$ choose$ either$ alternative,$ as$ implied$ in$ the$ term$
"election"$ used,$ without$ qualification,$ in$ the$ abovequoted$ provision$ of$ the$ in$every$polling$place$not$later$than$October$14,$1967,"$and$that$said$copy$"shall$
Constitution.$Such$authority$becomes$even$more$patent$when$we$consider:$(1)$ remain$posted$therein$until$after$the$election;"$
that$the$term$"election,"$normally$refers$to$the$choice$or$selection$of$candidates$ $
to$public$office$by$popular$vote;$and$(2)$that$the$word$used$in$Article$V$of$the$ (3)$ that$"at$least$five$copies$of$said$amendment$shall$be$kept$in$each$polling$
Constitution,$ concerning$ the$ grant$ of$ suffrage$ to$ women$ is,$ not$ "election,"$ but$ place,$ to$ be$ made$ available$ for$ examination$ by$ the$ qualified$ electors$ during$
"plebiscite."$ election$day;"$
$ $
Petitioners$maintain$that$the$term$"election,"$as$used$in$Section$1$of$Art.$XV$of$ (4)$ that$"when$practicable,$copies$in$the$principal$native$languages,$as$may$
the$ Constitution,$ should$ be$ construed$ as$ meaning$ a$ special$ election.$ Some$ be$ determined$ by$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ shall$ be$ kept$ in$ each$ polling$
members$ of$ the$ Court$ even$ feel$ that$ said$ term$ ("election")$ refers$ to$ a$ place;"$
"plebiscite,"$ without$ any$ "election,"$ general$ or$ special,$ of$ public$ officers.$ They$ $
opine$ that$ constitutional$ amendments$ are,$ in$ general,$ if$ not$ always,$ of$ such$ (5)$ that$ "the$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ shall$ make$ available$ copies$ of$ said$
important,$if$not$transcendental$and$vital$nature$as$to$demand$that$the$attention$ amendments$ in$ English,$ Spanish$ and,$ whenever$ practicable,$ in$ the$ principal$
of$the$people$be$focused$exclusively$on$the$subjectSmatter$thereof,$so$that$their$ native$languages,$for$free$distributing:"$and$
votes$ thereon$ may$ reflect$ no$ more$ than$ their$ intelligent,$ impartial$ and$ $
considered$view$on$the$merits$of$the$proposed$amendments,$unimpaired,$or,$at$ (6)$ that$ the$ contested$ Resolutions$ "shall$ be$ printed$ in$ full"$ on$ the$ back$ of$
least,$ undiluted$ by$ extraneous,$ if$ not$ insidious$ factors,$ let$ alone$ the$ partisan$ the$ballots$which$shall$be$used$on$November$14,$1967.$
political$considerations$that$are$likely$to$affect$the$selection$of$elective$officials.$ $
$ We$ are$ not$ prepared$ to$ say$ that$ the$ foregoing$ measures$ are$ palpably$
This,$certainly,$is$a$situation$to$be$hoped$for.$It$is$a$goal$the$attainment$of$which$ inadequate$ to$ comply$ with$ the$ constitutional$ requirement$ that$ proposals$ for$
should$be$promoted.$The$ideal$conditions$are,$however,$one$thing.$The$question$ amendment$ be$ "submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ their$ ratification,"$ and$ that$ said$
whether$the$Constitution$forbids$the$submission$of$proposals$for$amendment$to$ measures$are$manifestly$insufficient,$from$a$constitutional$viewpoint,$to$inform$
the$ people$ except$ under$ such$ conditions,$ is$ another$ thing.$ Much$ as$ the$ writer$ the$people$of$the$amendment$sought$to$be$made.$
and$ those$ who$ concur$ in$ this$ opinion$ admire$ the$ contrary$ view,$ they$ find$ $
themselves$ unable$ to$ subscribe$ thereto$ without,$ in$ effect,$ reading$ into$ the$ These$were$substantially$the$same$means$availed$of$to$inform$the$people$of$the$
Constitution$ what$ they$ believe$ is$ not$ written$ thereon$ and$ can$ not$ fairly$ be$ subject$submitted$to$them$for$ratification,$from$the$original$Constitution$down$
deduced$ from$ the$ letter$ thereof,$ since$ the$ spirit$ of$ the$ law$ should$ not$ be$ a$ to$the$Parity$Amendment.$Thus,$referring$to$the$original$Constitution,$Section$1$
matter$of$sheer$speculation.$ of$Act$No.$4200,$provides:$
$ $
The$ majority$ view$ $ although$ the$ votes$ in$ favor$ thereof$ are$ insufficient$ to$ Said$ Constitution,$ with$ the$ Ordinance$ appended$ thereto,$ shall$ be$ published$ in$
declare$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 4913$ unconstitutional$ $ as$ ably$ set$ forth$ in$ the$ the$ Official$ Gazette,$ in$ English$ and$ in$ Spanish,$ for$ three$ consecutive$ issues$ at$
opinion$penned$by$Mr.$Justice$Sanchez,$is,$however,$otherwise.$ least$fifteen$days$prior$to$said$election,$and$a$printed$copy$of$said$Constitution,$
$ with$the$Ordinance$appended$thereto,$shall$be$posted$in$a$conspicuous$place$in$
Would$the$Submission$now$of$the$Contested$Amendments$to$the$People$Violate$ each$ municipal$ and$ provincial$ government$ office$ building$ and$ in$ each$ polling$
the$Spirit$of$the$Constitution?$ place$ not$ later$ than$ the$ twentySsecond$ day$ of$ April,$ nineteen$ hundred$ and$
$ thirtySfive,$ and$ shall$ remain$ posted$ therein$ continually$ until$ after$ the$
It$should$be$noted$that$the$contested$Resolutions$were$approved$on$March$16,$ termination$ of$ the$ election.$ At$ least$ ten$ copies$ of$ the$ Constitution$ with$ the$
1967,$ so$ that,$ by$ November$ 14,$ 1967,$ our$ citizenry$ shall$ have$ had$ practically$ Ordinance$ appended$ thereto,$ in$ English$ and$ in$ Spanish,$ shall$ be$ kept$ at$ each$
eight$ (8)$ months$ to$ be$ informed$ on$ the$ amendments$ in$ question.$ Then$ again,$ polling$place$available$for$examination$by$the$qualified$electors$during$election$
Section$2$of$Republic$Act$No.$4913$provides:$ day.$ Whenever$ practicable,$ copies$ in$ the$ principal$ local$ dialects$ as$ may$ be$
$ determined$ by$ the$ Secretary$ of$ the$ Interior$ shall$ also$ be$ kept$ in$ each$ polling$
(1)$ that$"the$amendments$shall$be$published$in$three$consecutive$issues$of$ place.$
the$Official$Gazette,$at$least$twenty$days$prior$to$the$election;"$ $
$ The$provision$concerning$woman's$suffrage$is$Section$1$of$Commonwealth$Act$
(2)$ that$"a$printed$copy$of$the$proposed$amendments$shall$be$posted$in$a$ No.$34,$reading:$
conspicuous$place$in$every$municipality,$city$and$provincial$office$building$and$ $
Said$ Article$ V$ of$ the$ Constitution$ shall$ be$ published$ in$ the$ Official$ Gazette,$ in$ parties$ have$ not$ seemingly$ made$ an$ issue$ on$ the$ amendments$ now$ being$
English$and$in$Spanish,$for$three$consecutive$issues$at$least$fifteen$days$prior$to$ contested$ and$ have,$ accordingly,$ refrained$ from$ discussing$ the$ same$ in$ the$
said$ election,$ and$ the$ said$ Article$ V$ shall$ be$ posted$ in$ a$ conspicuous$ place$ in$ current$political$campaign.$Such$debates$or$polemics$as$may$have$taken$place$$
each$municipal$and$provincial$office$building$and$in$each$polling$place$not$later$ on$a$rather$limited$scale$$on$the$latest$proposals$for$amendment,$have$been$
than$ the$ twentySsecond$ day$ of$ April,$ nineteen$ and$ thirtySseven,$ and$ shall$ due$ principally$ to$ the$ initiative$ of$ a$ few$ civic$ organizations$ and$ some$ militant$
remain$ posted$ therein$ continually$ until$ after$ the$ termination$ of$ the$ plebiscite.$ members$of$our$citizenry$who$have$voiced$their$opinion$thereon.$A$legislation$
At$least$ten$copies$of$said$Article$V$of$the$Constitution,$in$English$and$in$Spanish,$ cannot,$ however,$ be$ nullified$ by$ reason$ of$ the$ failure$ of$ certain$ sectors$ of$ the$
shall$ be$ kept$ at$ each$ polling$ place$ available$ for$ examination$ by$ the$ qualified$ community$ to$ discuss$ it$ sufficiently.$ Its$ constitutionality$ or$ unconstitutionality$
electors$ during$ the$ plebiscite.$ Whenever$ practicable,$ copies$ in$ the$ principal$ depends$upon$no$other$factors$than$those$existing$at$the$time$of$the$enactment$
native$ languages,$ as$ may$ be$ determined$ by$ the$ Secretary$ of$ the$ Interior,$ shall$ thereof,$ unaffected$ by$ the$ acts$ or$ omissions$ of$ law$ enforcing$ agencies,$
also$be$kept$in$each$polling$place.$ particularly$those$that$take$place$subsequently$to$the$passage$or$approval$of$the$
$ law.$
Similarly,$ Section$ 2,$ Commonwealth$ Act$ No.$ 517,$ referring$ to$ the$ 1940$ $
amendments,$is$of$the$following$tenor:$ Referring$particularly$to$the$contested$proposals$for$amendment,$the$sufficiency$
$ or$ insufficiency,$ from$ a$ constitutional$ angle,$ of$ the$ submission$ thereof$ for$
The$ said$ amendments$ shall$ be$ published$ in$ English$ and$ Spanish$ in$ three$ ratification$ to$ the$ people$ on$ November$ 14,$ 1967,$ depends$ $ in$ the$ view$ of$
consecutive$ issues$ of$ the$ Official$ Gazette$ at$ least$ twenty$ days$ prior$ to$ the$ those$ who$ concur$ in$ this$ opinion,$ and$ who,$ insofar$ as$ this$ phase$ of$ the$ case,$
election.$A$printed$copy$thereof$shall$be$posted$in$a$conspicuous$place$in$every$ constitute$ the$ minority$ $ upon$ whether$ the$ provisions$ of$ Republic$ Act$ No.$
municipal,$ city,$ and$ provincial$ government$ office$ building$ and$ in$ every$ polling$ 4913$ are$ such$ as$ to$ fairly$ apprise$ the$ people$ of$ the$ gist,$ the$ main$ idea$ or$ the$
place$not$later$than$May$eighteen,$nineteen$hundred$and$forty,$and$shall$remain$ substance$of$said$proposals,$which$is$$under$R.$B.$H.$No.$1$$the$increase$of$
posted$ therein$ until$ after$ the$ election.$ At$ least$ ten$ copies$ of$ said$ amendments$ the$ maximum$ number$ of$ seats$ in$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives,$ from$ 120$ to$
shall$be$kept$in$each$polling$place$to$be$made$available$for$examination$by$the$ 180,$ and$ $ under$ R.$ B.$ H.$ No.$ 3$ $ the$ authority$ given$ to$ the$ members$ of$
qualified$electors$during$election$day.$When$practicable,$copies$in$the$principal$ Congress$ to$ run$ for$ delegates$ to$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ and,$ if$ elected$
native$ languages,$ as$ may$ be$ determined$ by$ the$ Secretary$ of$ the$ Interior,$ shall$ thereto,$to$discharge$the$duties$of$such$delegates,$without$forfeiting$their$seats$
also$be$kept$therein.$ in$Congress.$We$$who$constitute$the$minority$$believe$that$Republic$Act$No.$
$ 4913$satisfies$such$requirement$and$that$said$Act$is,$accordingly,$constitutional.$
As$ regards$ the$ Parity$ Amendment,$ Section$ 2$ of$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 73$ is$ to$ the$ $
effect$that:$ A$ considerable$ portion$ of$ the$ people$ may$ not$ know$ how$ over$ 160$ of$ the$
$ proposed$maximum$of$representative$districts$are$actually$apportioned$by$R.$B.$
The$ said$ amendment$ shall$ be$ published$ in$ English$ and$ Spanish$ in$ three$ H.$No.$1$among$the$provinces$in$the$Philippines.$It$is$not$improbable,$however,$
consecutive$ issues$ of$ the$ Official$ Gazette$ at$ least$ twenty$ days$ prior$ to$ the$ that$they$are$not$interested$in$the$details$of$the$apportionment,$or$that$a$careful$
election.$A$printed$copy$thereof$shall$be$posted$in$a$conspicuous$place$in$every$ reading$thereof$may$tend$in$their$simple$minds,$to$impair$a$clear$vision$thereof.$
municipal,$ city,$ and$ provincial$ government$ office$ building$ and$ in$ every$ polling$ Upon$ the$ other$ hand,$ those$ who$ are$ more$ sophisticated,$ may$ enlighten$
place$ not$ later$ than$ February$ eleven,$ nineteen$ hundred$ and$ fortySseven,$ and$ themselves$ sufficiently$ by$ reading$ the$ copies$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendments$
shall$ remain$ posted$ therein$ until$ after$ the$ election.$ At$ least,$ ten$ copies$ of$ the$ posted$ in$ public$ places,$ the$ copies$ kept$ in$ the$ polling$ places$ and$ the$ text$ of$
said$ amendment$ shall$ be$ kept$ in$ each$ polling$ place$ to$ be$ made$ available$ for$ contested$resolutions,$as$printed$in$full$on$the$back$of$the$ballots$they$will$use.$
examination$ by$ the$ qualified$ electors$ during$ election$ day.$ When$ practicable,$ $
copies$ in$ the$ principal$ native$ languages,$ as$ may$ be$ determined$ by$ the$ It$is,$likewise,$conceivable$that$as$many$people,$if$not$more,$may$fail$to$realize$or$
Commission$on$Elections,$shall$also$be$kept$in$each$polling$place.$ envisage$ the$ effect$ of$ R.$ B.$ H.$ No.$ 3$ upon$ the$ work$ of$ the$ Constitutional$
$ Convention$ or$ upon$ the$ future$ of$ our$ Republic.$ But,$ then,$ nobody$ can$ foretell$
The$ main$ difference$ between$ the$ present$ situation$ and$ that$ obtaining$ in$ such$ effect$ with$ certainty.$ From$ our$ viewpoint,$ the$ provisions$ of$ Article$ XV$ of$
connection$ with$ the$ former$ proposals$ does$ not$ arise$ from$ the$ law$ enacted$ the$Constitution$are$satisfied$so$long$as$the$electorate$knows$that$R.$B.$H.$No.$3$
therefor.$ The$ difference$ springs$ from$ the$ circumstance$ that$ the$ major$ political$ permits$Congressmen$to$retain$their$seats$as$legislators,$even$if$they$should$run$
parties$had$taken$sides$on$previous$amendments$to$the$Constitution$$except,$ for$and$assume$the$functions$of$delegates$to$the$Convention.$
perhaps,$ the$ woman's$ suffrage$ $ and,$ consequently,$ debated$ thereon$ at$ some$ $
length$ before$ the$ plebiscite$ took$ place.$ Upon$ the$ other$ hand,$ said$ political$
We$are$impressed$by$the$factors$considered$by$our$distinguished$and$esteemed$
brethren,$who$opine$otherwise,$but,$we$feel$that$such$factors$affect$the$wisdom$
of$Republic$Act$No.$4913$and$that$of$R.$B.$H.$Nos.$1$and$3,$not$the$authority$of$
Congress$to$approve$the$same.$
$
The$system$of$checks$and$balances$underlying$the$judicial$power$to$strike$down$
acts$ of$ the$ Executive$ or$ of$ Congress$ transcending$ the$ confines$ set$ forth$ in$ the$
fundamental$laws$is$not$in$derogation$of$the$principle$of$separation$of$powers,$
pursuant$ to$ which$ each$ department$ is$ supreme$ within$ its$ own$ sphere.$ The$
determination$ of$ the$ conditions$ under$ which$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ shall$
be$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ is$ concededly$ a$ matter$ which$ falls$ within$ the$
legislative$ sphere.$ We$ do$ not$ believe$ it$ has$ been$ satisfactorily$ shown$ that$
Congress$ has$ exceeded$ the$ limits$ thereof$ in$ enacting$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 4913.$
Presumably,$it$could$have$done$something$better$to$enlighten$the$people$on$the$
subjectSmatter$ thereof.$ But,$ then,$ no$ law$ is$ perfect.$ No$ product$ of$ human$
endeavor$ is$ beyond$ improvement.$ Otherwise,$ no$ legislation$ would$ be$
constitutional$ and$ valid.$ Six$ (6)$ Members$ of$ this$ Court$ believe,$ however,$ said$
Act$and$R.$B.$H.$Nos.$1$and$3$violate$the$spirit$of$the$Constitution.$
$
Inasmuch$as$there$are$less$than$eight$(8)$votes$in$favor$of$declaring$Republic$Act$
4913$ and$ R.$ B.$ H.$ Nos.$ 1$ and$ 3$ unconstitutional$ and$ invalid,$ the$ petitions$ in$
these$two$(2)$cases$must$be,$as$they$are$hereby,$dismiss$and$the$writs$therein$
prayed$for$denied,$without$special$pronouncement$as$to$costs.$It$is$so$ordered.$
$
Makalintal$and$Bengzon,$J.P.,$JJ.,$concur.$
Fernando,$ J.,$ concurs$ fully$ with$ the$ above$ opinion,$ adding$ a$ few$ words$ on$ the$
question$of$jurisdiction.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$LS32432$September$11,$1970$ on$ the$ second$ Tuesday$ of$ November,$ 1970$ in$ accordance$ with$ the$ Revised$
$ Election$Code.$
MANUEL$B.$IMBONG,$petitioner,$$ $
vs.$ After$the$adoption$of$said$Res.$No.$2$in$1967$but$before$the$November$elections$
JAIME$ FERRER,$ as$ Chairman$ of$ the$ Comelec,$ LINO$ M.$ PATAJO$ and$ CESAR$ of$ that$ year,$ Congress,$ acting$ as$ a$ legislative$ body,$ enacted$ Republic$ Act$ No.$
MILAFLOR,$as$members$thereof,$respondents.$ 4914$ implementing$ the$ aforesaid$ Resolution$ No.$ 2$ and$ practically$ restating$ in$
$ toto$the$provisions$of$said$Resolution$No.$2.$
G.R.$No.$LS32443$September$11,$1970$ $
$ On$ June$ 17,$ 1969,$ Congress,$ also$ acting$ as$ a$ Constituent$ Assembly,$ passed$
IN$THE$MATTER$OF$A$PETITION$FOR$DECLARATORY$JUDGMENT$REGARDING$ Resolution$No.$4$amending$the$aforesaid$Resolution$No.$2$of$March$16,$1967$by$
THE$ VALIDITY$ OF$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ OTHERWISE$ KNOWN$ AS$ THE$ providing$that$the$convention$"shall$be$composed$of$320$delegates$apportioned$
CONSTITUTIONAL$CONVENTION$ACT$OF$1970.$RAUL$M.$GONZALES,$petitioner,$$ among$ the$ existing$ representative$ districts$ according$ to$ the$ number$ of$ their$
vs.$ respective$inhabitants:$Provided,$that$a$representative$district$shall$be$entitled$
COMELEC,$respondent.$ to$ at$ least$ two$ delegates,$ who$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ qualifications$ as$ those$
$ required$ of$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives,"$ 1$ "and$ that$ any$ other$
Manuel$B.$Imbong$in$his$own$behalf.$ details$relating$to$the$specific$apportionment$of$delegates,$election$of$delegates$
$ to,$ and$ the$ holding$ of,$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ shall$ be$ embodied$ in$ an$
Raul$M.$Gonzales$in$his$own$behalf.$ implementing$ legislation:$ Provided,$ that$ it$ shall$ not$ be$ inconsistent$ with$ the$
$ provisions$of$this$Resolution."$2$
Office$of$the$Solicitor$General$Felix$Q.$Antonio,$Acting$Assistant$Solicitor$General$ $
Ricardo$L.$Pronove,$Jr.,$and$Solicitors$Raul$I.$Goco,$Bernardo$P.$Pardo,$Rosalio$A.$ On$August$24,$1970,$Congress,$acting$as$a$legislative$body,$enacted$Republic$Act$
de$Leon,$Vicente$A.$Torres$and$Guillermo$C.$Nakar$for$respondents.$ No.$6132,$implementing$Resolutions$Nos.$2$and$4,$and$expressly$repealing$R.A.$
$ No.$$
Lorenzo$ Taada,$ Arturo$ Tolentino,$ Jovito$ Salonga$ and$ Emmanuel$ Pelaez$ as$ 4914.$3$
amici$curiae.$ $
$ Petitioner$ Raul$ M.$ Gonzales$ assails$ the$ validity$ of$ the$ entire$ law$ as$ well$ as$ the$
$$ particular$provisions$embodied$in$Sections$2,$4,$5,$and$par.$1$of$8(a).$Petitioner$
$ Manuel$B.$Imbong$impugns$the$constitutionality$of$only$par.$I$of$Sec.$8(a)$of$said$
MAKASIAR,$J.:$ R.A.$No.$6132$practically$on$the$same$grounds$advanced$by$petitioner$Gonzales.$
$ $
These$ two$ separate$ but$ related$ petitions$ for$ declaratory$ relief$ were$ filed$ I$
pursuant$to$Sec.$19$of$R.A.$No.$6132$by$petitioners$Manuel$B.$Imbong$and$Raul$ $
M.$ Gonzales,$ both$ members$ of$ the$ Bar,$ taxpayers$ and$ interested$ in$ running$ as$ The$ validity$ of$ Sec.$ 4$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ which$ considers,$ all$ public$ officers$ and$
candidates$ for$ delegates$ to$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention.$ Both$ impugn$ the$ employees,$ whether$ elective$ or$ appointive,$ including$ members$ of$ the$ Armed$
constitutionality$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ claiming$ during$ the$ oral$ argument$ that$ it$ Forces$ of$ the$ Philippines,$ as$ well$ as$ officers$ and$ employees$ of$ corporations$ or$
prejudices$ their$ rights$ as$ such$ candidates.$ After$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ had$ filed$ enterprises$ of$ the$ government,$ as$ resigned$ from$ the$ date$ of$ the$ filing$ of$ their$
answers$in$behalf$the$respondents,$hearings$were$held$at$which$the$petitioners$ certificates$of$candidacy,$was$recently$sustained$by$this$Court,$on$the$grounds,$
and$ the$ amici$ curiae,$ namely$ Senator$ Lorenzo$ Taada,$ Senator$ Arturo$ inter$alia,$that$the$same$is$merely$an$application$of$and$in$consonance$with$the$
Tolentino,$Senator$Jovito$Salonga,$and$Senator$Emmanuel$Pelaez$argued$orally.$ prohibition$in$Sec.$2$of$Art.$XII$of$the$Constitution$and$that$it$does$not$constitute$
$ a$ denial$ of$ due$ process$ or$ of$ the$ equal$ protection$ of$ the$ law.$ Likewise,$ the$
It$ will$ be$ recalled$ that$ on$ March$ 16,$ 1967,$ Congress,$ acting$ as$ a$ Constituent$ constitutionality$of$paragraph$2$of$Sec.$8(a)$of$R.A.$No.$6132$was$upheld.$4$
Assembly$pursuant$to$Art.$XV$of$the$Constitution,$passed$Resolution$No.$2$which$ $
among$ others$ called$ for$ a$ Constitutional$ Convention$ to$ propose$ constitutional$ II$
amendments$to$be$composed$of$two$delegates$from$each$representative$district$ $
who$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ qualifications$ as$ those$ of$ Congressmen,$ to$ be$ elected$ Without$ first$ considering$ the$ validity$ of$ its$ specific$ provisions,$ we$ sustain$ the$
constitutionality$ of$ the$ enactment$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132$ by$ Congress$ acting$ as$ a$
legislative$body$in$the$exercise$of$its$broad$lawSmaking$authority,$and$not$as$a$ $
Constituent$Assembly,$because$$ Petitioner$ Raul$ M.$ Gonzales$ asserts$ that$ Sec.$ 2$ on$ the$ apportionment$ of$
$ delegates$ is$ not$ in$ accordance$ with$ proportional$ representation$ and$ therefore$
1.$ Congress,$when$acting$as$a$Constituent$Assembly$pursuant$to$Art.$XV$of$ violates$the$Constitution$and$the$intent$of$the$law$itself,$without$pinpointing$any$
the$ Constitution,$ has$ full$ and$ plenary$ authority$ to$ propose$ Constitutional$ specific$provision$of$the$Constitution$with$which$it$collides.$
amendments$or$to$call$a$convention$for$the$purpose,$by$a$threeSfourths$vote$of$ $
each$House$in$joint$session$assembled$but$voting$separately.$Resolutions$Nos.$2$ Unlike$ in$ the$ apportionment$ of$ representative$ districts,$ the$ Constitution$ does$
and$4$calling$for$a$constitutional$convention$were$passed$by$the$required$threeS not$ expressly$ or$ impliedly$ require$ such$ apportionment$ of$ delegates$ to$ the$
fourths$vote.$ convention$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ population$ in$ each$ congressional$ district.$ Congress,$
$ sitting$as$a$Constituent$Assembly,$may$constitutionally$allocate$one$delegate$for,$
2.$ The$ grant$ to$ Congress$ as$ a$ Constituent$ Assembly$ of$ such$ plenary$ each$congressional$district$or$for$each$province,$for$reasons$of$economy$and$to$
authority$ to$ call$ a$ constitutional$ convention$ includes,$ by$ virtue$ of$ the$ doctrine$ avoid$having$an$unwieldy$convention.$If$the$framers$of$the$present$Constitution$
of$ necessary$ implication,$ all$ other$ powers$ essential$ to$ the$ effective$ exercise$ of$ wanted$ the$ apportionment$ of$ delegates$ to$ the$ convention$ to$ be$ based$ on$ the$
the$principal$power$granted,$such$as$the$power$to$fix$the$qualifications,$number,$ number$of$inhabitants$in$each$representative$district,$they$would$have$done$so$
apportionment,$ and$ compensation$ of$ the$ delegates$ as$ well$ as$ appropriation$ of$ in$ so$ many$ words$ as$ they$ did$ in$ relation$ to$ the$ apportionment$ of$ the$
funds$to$meet$the$expenses$for$the$election$of$delegates$and$for$the$operation$of$ representative$districts.$5$
the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ itself,$ as$ well$ as$ all$ other$ implementing$ details$ $
indispensable$to$a$fruitful$convention.$Resolutions$Nos.$2$and$4$already$embody$ The$ apportionment$ provided$ for$ in$ Sec.$ 2$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132$ cannot$ possibly$
the$aboveSmentioned$details,$except$the$appropriation$of$funds.$ conflict$ with$ its$ own$ intent$ expressed$ therein;$ for$ it$ merely$ obeyed$ and$
$ implemented$the$intent$of$Congress$acting$as$a$Constituent$Assembly$expressed$
3.$ While$the$authority$to$call$a$constitutional$convention$is$vested$by$the$ in$ Sec.$ 1$ of$ Res.$ No.$ 4,$ which$ provides$ that$ the$ 320$ delegates$ should$ be$
present$Constitution$solely$and$exclusively$in$Congress$acting$ as$a$Constituent$ apportioned$ among$ the$ existing$ representative$ districts$ according$ to$ the$
Assembly,$ the$ power$ to$ enact$ the$ implementing$ details,$ which$ are$ now$ number$ of$ their$ respective$ inhabitants,$ but$ fixing$ a$ minimum$ of$ at$ least$ two$
contained$ in$ Resolutions$ Nos.$ 2$ and$ 4$ as$ well$ as$ in$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ does$ not$ delegates$ for$ a$ representative$ district.$ The$ presumption$ is$ that$ the$ factual$
exclusively$ pertain$ to$ Congress$ acting$ as$ a$ Constituent$ Assembly.$ Such$ predicate,$the$latest$available$official$population$census,$for$such$apportionment$
implementing$ details$ are$ matters$ within$ the$ competence$ of$ Congress$ in$ the$ was$ presented$ to$ Congress,$ which,$ accordingly$ employed$ a$ formula$ for$ the$
exercise$ of$ its$ comprehensive$ legislative$ power,$ which$ power$ encompasses$ all$ necessary$computation$to$effect$the$desired$proportional$representation.$
matters$ not$ expressly$ or$ by$ necessary$ implication$ withdrawn$ or$ removed$ by$ $
the$ Constitution$ from$ the$ ambit$ of$ legislative$ action.$ And$ as$ lone$ as$ such$ The$ records$ of$ the$ proceedings$ on$ Senate$ Bill$ No.$ 77$ sponsored$ by$ Senator$
statutory$ details$ do$ not$ clash$ with$ any$ specific$ provision$ of$ the$ constitution,$ Pelaez$ which$ is$ now$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ submitted$ to$ this$ Tribunal$ by$ the$ amici$
they$are$valid.$ curiae,$show$that$it$based$its$apportionment$of$the$delegates$on$the$1970$official$
$ preliminary$ population$ census$ taken$ by$ the$ Bureau$ of$ Census$ and$ Statistics$
4.$ Consequently,$when$Congress,$acting$as$a$Constituent$Assembly,$omits$ from$May$6$to$June$30,$1976;$and$that$Congress$adopted$the$formula$to$effect$a$
to$ provide$ for$ such$ implementing$ details$ after$ calling$ a$ constitutional$ reasonable$ apportionment$ of$ delegates.$ The$ Director$ of$ the$ Bureau$ of$ Census$
convention,$ Congress,$ acting$ as$ a$ legislative$ body,$ can$ enact$ the$ necessary$ and$ Statistics$ himself,$ in$ a$ letter$ to$ Senator$ Pelaez$ dated$ July$ 30,$ 1970,$ stated$
implementing$ legislation$ to$ fill$ in$ the$ gaps,$ which$ authority$ is$ expressly$ that$"on$the$basis$of$the$preliminary$count$of$the$population,$we$have$computed$
recognized$in$Sec.$8$of$Res$No.$2$as$amended$by$Res.$No.$4.$ the$ distribution$ of$ delegates$ to$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ based$ on$ Senate$
$ Bill$ 77$ (p.$ 2$ lines$ 5$ to$ 32$ and$ p.$ 3$ line$ 12)$ which$ is$ a$ fair$ and$ an$ equitable$
5.$ The$ fact$ that$ a$ bill$ providing$ for$ such$ implementing$ details$ may$ be$ method$ of$ distributing$ the$ delegates$ pursuant$ to$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ joint$
vetoed$ by$ the$ President$ is$ no$ argument$ against$ conceding$ such$ power$ in$ Resolution$of$both$Houses$No.$2,$as$amended.$Upon$your$request$at$the$session$
Congress$ as$ a$ legislative$ body$ nor$ present$ any$ difficulty;$ for$ it$ is$ not$ of$ the$ SenateSHouse$ Conference$ Committee$ meeting$ last$ night,$ we$ are$
irremediable$ as$ Congress$ can$ override$ the$ Presidential$ veto$ or$ Congress$ can$ submitting$ herewith$ the$ results$ of$ the$ computation$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ the$ aboveS
reconvene$ as$ a$ Constituent$ Assembly$ and$ adopt$ a$ resolution$ prescribing$ the$ stated$method."$
required$implementing$details.$ $
$ Even$if$such$latest$census$were$a$preliminary$census,$the$same$could$still$be$a$
III$ valid$ basis$ for$ such$ apportionment.$ 6$ The$ fact$ that$ the$ lone$ and$ small$
congressional$district$of$Batanes,$may$be$overSrepresented,$because$it$is$allotted$ branch$ of$ the$ government$ government$ until$ after$ the$ final$ adjournment$ of$ the$
two$ delegates$ by$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132$ despite$ the$ fact$ that$ it$ has$ a$ population$ very$ Constitutional$Convention."$
much$ less$ than$ several$ other$ congressional$ districts,$ each$ of$ which$ is$ also$ $
allotted$only$two$delegates,$and$therefore$underSrepresented,$visSaSvis$Batanes$ That$the$citizen$does$not$have$any$inherent$nor$natural$right$to$a$public$office,$is$
alone,$ does$ not$ vitiate$ the$ apportionment$ as$ not$ effecting$ proportional$ axiomatic$under$our$constitutional$system.$The$State$through$its$Constitution$or$
representation.$Absolute$proportional$apportionment$is$not$required$and$is$not$ legislative$ body,$ can$ create$ an$ office$ and$ define$ the$ qualifications$ and$
possible$ when$ based$ on$ the$ number$ of$ inhabitants,$ for$ the$ population$ census$ disqualifications$ therefor$ as$ well$ as$ impose$ inhibitions$ on$ a$ public$ officer.$
cannot$ be$ accurate$ nor$ complete,$ dependent$ as$ it$ is$ on$ the$ diligence$ of$ the$ Consequently,$ only$ those$ with$ qualifications$ and$ who$ do$ not$ fall$ under$ any$
census$ takers,$ aggravated$ by$ the$ constant$ movement$ of$ population,$ as$ well$ as$ constitutional$ or$ statutory$ inhibition$ can$ be$ validly$ elected$ or$ appointed$ to$ a$
daily$death$and$birth.$It$is$enough$that$the$basis$employed$is$reasonable$and$the$ public$ office.$ The$ obvious$ reason$ for$ the$ questioned$ inhibition,$ is$ to$ immunize$
resulting$ apportionment$ is$ substantially$ proportional.$ Resolution$ No.$ 4$ fixed$ a$ the$ delegates$ from$ the$ perverting$ influence$ of$ selfSinterest,$ party$ interest$ or$
minimum$of$two$delegates$for$a$congressional$district.$ vested$interest$and$to$insure$that$he$dedicates$all$his$time$to$performing$solely$
$ in$ the$ interest$ of$ the$ nation$ his$ high$ and$ well$ nigh$ sacred$ function$ of$
While$there$may$be$other$formulas$for$a$reasonable$apportionment$considering$ formulating$the$supreme$law$of$the$land,$which$may$endure$for$generations$and$
the$evidence$submitted$to$Congress$by$the$Bureau$of$Census$and$Statistics,$we$ which$ cannot$ easily$ be$ changed$ like$ an$ ordinary$ statute.$ With$ the$
are$not$prepared$to$rule$that$the$computation$formula$adopted$by,$Congress$for$ disqualification$embodied$in$Sec.$5,$the$delegate$will$not$utilize$his$position$as$a$
proportional$representation$as,$directed$in$Res.$No.$4$is$unreasonable$and$that$ bargaining$ leverage$ for$ concessions$ in$ the$ form$ of$ an$ elective$ or$ appointive$
the$apportionment$provided$in$R.A.$No.$6132$does$not$constitute$a$substantially$ office$ as$ long$ as$ the$ convention$ has$ not$ finally$ adjourned.$ The$ appointing$
proportional$representation.$ authority$may,$by$his$appointing$power,$entice$votes$for$his$own$proposals.$Not$
$ love$ for$ self,$ but$ love$ for$ country$ must$ always$ motivate$ his$ actuations$ as$
In$ the$ Macias$ case,$ relied$ on$ by$ petitioner$ Gonzales,$ the$ apportionment$ law,$ delegate;$ otherwise$ the$ several$ provisions$ of$ the$ new$ Constitution$ may$ only$
which$ was$ nullified$ as$ unconstitutional,$ granted$ more$ representatives$ to$ a$ satisfy$ individual$ or$ special$ interests,$ subversive$ of$ the$ welfare$ of$ the$ general$
province$with$less$population$than$the$provinces$with$more$inhabitants.$Such$is$ citizenry.$ It$ should$ be$ stressed$ that$ the$ disqualification$ is$ not$ permanent$ but$
not$the$case$here,$where$under$Sec.$2$of$R.A.$No.$6132$Batanes$is$allotted$only$ only$ temporary$ only$ to$ continue$ until$ the$ final$ adjournment$ of$ the$ convention$
two$ delegates,$ which$ number$ is$ equal$ to$ the$ number$ of$ delegates$ accorded$ which$may$not$extend$beyond$one$year.$The$convention$that$framed$the$present$
other$ provinces$ with$ more$ population.$ The$ present$ petitions$ therefore$ do$ not$ Constitution$ finished$ its$ task$ in$ approximately$ seven$ months$ $ from$ July$ 30,$
present$facts$which$fit$the$mould$of$the$doctrine$in$the$case$of$Macias$et$al.$vs.$ 1934$to$February$8,$1935.$
Comelec,$supra.$ $
$ As$ admitted$ by$ petitioner$ Gonzales,$ this$ inhibition$ finds$ analogy$ in$ the$
The$ impossibility$ of$ absolute$ proportional$ representation$ is$ recognized$ by$ the$ constitutional$provision$prohibiting$a$member$of$Congress,$during$the$time$for$
Constitution$ itself$ when$ it$ directs$ that$ the$ apportionment$ of$ congressional$ which$he$was$elected,$from$being$appointed$to$any$civil$office$which$may$have$
districts$among$the$various$provinces$shall$be$"as$nearly$as$may$be$according$to$ been$created$or$the$emolument$whereof$shall$have$been$increased$while$he$was$
their$respective$inhabitants,$but$each$province$shall$have$at$least$one$member"$ a$member$of$the$Congress.$(Sec.$16,$Art.$VI,$Phil.$Constitution.)$
(Sec.$5,$Art.$VI,$Phil.$Const.,$emphasis$supplied).$The$employment$of$the$phrase$ $
"as$nearly$as$may$be$according$to$their$respective$inhabitants"$emphasizes$the$ As$observed$by$the$Solicitor$General$in$his$Answer,$the$overriding$objective$of$
fact$that$the$human$mind$can$only$approximate$a$reasonable$apportionment$but$ the$ challenged$ disqualification,$ temporary$ in$ nature,$ is$ to$ compel$ the$ elected$
cannot$ effect$ an$ absolutely$ proportional$ representation$ with$ mathematical$ delegates$ to$ serve$ in$ full$ their$ term$ as$ such$ and$ to$ devote$ all$ their$ time$ to$ the$
precision$or$exactitude.$ convention,$ pursuant$ to$ their$ representation$ and$ commitment$ to$ the$ people;$
$ otherwise,$his$seat$in$the$convention$will$be$vacant$and$his$constituents$will$be$
IV$ deprived$ of$ a$ voice$ in$ the$ convention.$ The$ inhibition$ is$ likewise$ "designed$ to$
$ prevent$popular$political$figures$from$controlling$elections$or$positions.$Also$it$
Sec.$5$of$R.A.$6132$is$attacked$on$the$ground$that$it$is$an$undue$deprivation$of$ is$ a$ brake$ on$ the$ appointing$ power,$ to$ curtail$ the$ latter's$ desire$ to$ 'raid'$ the$
liberty$without$due$process$of$law$and$denies$the$equal$protection$of$the$laws.$ convention$of$"talents"$or$attempt$to$control$the$convention."$(p.$10,$Answer$in$
Said$Sec.$5$disqualifies$any$elected$delegate$from$running$"for$any$public$office$ LS32443.)$
in$ any$ election"$ or$ from$ assuming$ "any$ appointive$ office$ or$ position$ in$ any$ $
Thus$ the$ challenged$ disqualification$ prescribed$ in$ Sec.$ 5$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132$ is$ a$ $
valid$limitation$on$the$right$to$public$office$pursuant$to$state$police$power$as$it$ (a)$ from$representing,$or$
is$reasonable$and$not$arbitrary.$ $
$ (b)$ allowing$himself$to$be$represented$as$being$a$candidate$of$any$political$
The$ discrimination$ under$ Sec.$ 5$ against$ delegates$ to$ the$ Constitutional$ party$or$any$other$organization;$and$
Convention$is$likewise$constitutional;$for$it$is$based$on$a$substantial$distinction$ $
which$ makes$ for$ real$ differences,$ is$ germane$ to$ the$ purposes$ of$ the$ law,$ and$ 2.$ any$ political$ party,$ political$ group,$ political$ committee,$ civic,$ religious,$
applies$ to$ all$ members$ of$ the$ same$ class.$ 7$ The$ function$ of$ a$ delegate$ is$ more$ professional$or$other$organizations$or$organized$group$of$whatever$nature$from$
farSreaching$and$its$effect$more$enduring$than$that$of$any$ordinary$legislator$or$ $
any$ other$ public$ officer.$ A$ delegate$ shapes$ the$ fundamental$ law$ of$ the$ land$ (a)$ intervening$ in$ the$ nomination$ of$ any$ such$ candidate$ or$ in$ the$ filing$ of$
which$delineates$the$essential$nature$of$the$government,$its$basic$organization$ his$certificate,$or$
and$ powers,$ defines$ the$ liberties$ of$ the$ people,$ and$ controls$ all$ other$ laws.$ $
Unlike$ordinary$statutes,$constitutional$amendments$cannot$be$changed$in$one$ (b)$ from$giving$aid$or$support$directly$or$indirectly,$material$or$otherwise,$
or$ two$ years.$ No$ other$ public$ officer$ possesses$ such$ a$ power,$ not$ even$ the$ favorable$to$or$against$his$campaign$for$election.$
members$ of$ Congress$ unless$ they$ themselves,$ propose$ constitutional$ $
amendments$when$acting$as$a$Constituent$Assembly$pursuant$to$Art.$XV$of$the$ The$ ban$ against$ all$ political$ parties$ or$ organized$ groups$ of$ whatever$ nature$
Constitution.$The$classification,$therefore,$is$neither$whimsical$nor$repugnant$to$ contained$in$par.$1$of$Sec.$8(a),$is$confined$to$party$or$organization$support$or$
the$sense$of$justice$of$the$community.$ assistance,$whether$material,$moral,$emotional$or$otherwise.$The$very$Sec.$8(a)$
$ in$ its$ provisos$ permits$ the$ candidate$ to$ utilize$ in$ his$ campaign$ the$ help$ of$ the$
As$heretofore$intimated,$the$inhibition$is$relevant$to$the$object$of$the$law,$which$ members$of$his$family$within$the$fourth$civil$degree$of$consanguinity$or$affinity,$
is$to$insure$that$the$proposed$amendments$are$meaningful$to$the$masses$of$our$ and$a$campaign$staff$composed$of$not$more$than$one$for$every$ten$precincts$in$
people$and$not$designed$for$the$enhancement$of$selfishness,$greed,$corruption,$ his$district.$It$allows$the$full$exercise$of$his$freedom$of$expression$and$his$right$
or$injustice.$ to$peaceful$assembly,$because$he$cannot$be$denied$any$permit$to$hold$a$public$
$ meeting$on$the$pretext$that$the$provision$of$said$section$may$or$will$be$violated.$
Lastly,$ the$ disqualification$ applies$ to$ all$ the$ delegates$ to$ the$ convention$ who$ The$ right$ of$ a$ member$ of$ any$ political$ party$ or$ association$ to$ support$ him$ or$
will$be$elected$on$the$second$Tuesday$of$November,$1970.$ oppose$his$opponent$is$preserved$as$long$as$such$member$acts$individually.$The$
$ very$ party$ or$ organization$ to$ which$ he$ may$ belong$ or$ which$ may$ be$ in$
V$ sympathy$ with$ his$ cause$ or$ program$ of$ reforms,$ is$ guaranteed$ the$ right$ to$
$ disseminate$information$about,$or$to$arouse$public$interest$in,$or$to$advocate$for$
Paragraph$ 1,$ Sec.$ 8(a)$ of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132$ is$ impugned$ by$ both$ petitioners$ as$ constitutional$ reforms,$ programs,$ policies$ or$ constitutional$ proposals$ for$
violative$of$the$constitutional$guarantees$of$due$process,$equal$protection$of$the$ amendments.$
laws,$freedom$of$expressions,$freedom$of$assembly$and$freedom$of$association.$ $
$ It$is$therefore$patent$that$the$restriction$contained$in$Sec.$8(a)$is$so$narrow$that$
This$Court$ruled$last$year$that$the$guarantees$of$due$process,$equal$protection$of$ the$ basic$ constitutional$ rights$ themselves$ remain$ substantially$ intact$ and$
the$ laws,$ peaceful$ assembly,$ free$ expression,$ and$ the$ right$ of$ association$ are$ inviolate.$And$it$is$therefore$a$valid$infringement$of$the$aforesaid$constitutional$
neither$absolute$nor$illimitable$rights;$they$are$always$subject$to$the$pervasive$ guarantees$invoked$by$petitioners.$
and$ dormant$ police$ power$ of$ the$ State$ and$ may$ be$ lawfully$ abridged$ to$ serve$ $
appropriate$and$important$public$interests.$8$ In$ the$ aforesaid$ case$ of$ Gonzales$ vs.$ Comelec,$ supra,$ this$ Court$ unanimously$
$ sustained$ the$ validity$ of$ the$ limitation$ on$ the$ period$ for$ nomination$ of$
In$ said$ Gonzalez$ vs.$ Comelec$ case$ the$ Court$ applied$ the$ clear$ and$ present$ candidates$in$Sec.$50SA$of$R.A.$No.$4880,$thus:$
danger$test$to$determine$whether$a$statute$which$trenches$upon$the$aforesaid$ $
Constitutional$guarantees,$is$a$legitimate$exercise$of$police$power.$9$ The$prohibition$of$too$early$nomination$of$candidates$presents$a$question$that$
$ is$not$too$formidable$in$character.$According$to$the$act:$"It$shall$be$unlawful$for$
Paragraph$1$of$Sec.$8(a),$R.A.$No.$6132$prohibits:$ any$ political$ party,$ political$ committee,$ or$ political$ group$ to$ nominate$
$ candidates$ for$ any$ elective$ public$ office$ voted$ for$ at$ large$ earlier$ than$ one$
1.$ any$candidate$for$delegate$to$the$convention$ hundred$ and$ fifty$ days$ immediately$ preceding$ an$ election,$ and$ for$ any$ other$
elective$ public$ office$ earlier$ than$ ninety$ days$ immediately$ preceding$ an$ No.$ 4880,$ Sen.$ Lorenzo$ Taada,$ who$ appeared$ as$ amicus$ curiae,$ "that$ such$
election.$ provisions$ were$ deemed$ by$ the$ legislative$ body$ to$ be$ part$ and$ parcel$ of$ the$
$ necessary$ and$ appropriate$ response$ not$ merely$ to$ a$ clear$ and$ present$ danger$
The$right$of$association$is$affected.$Political$parties$have$less$freedom$as$to$the$ but$ to$ the$ actual$ existence$ of$ a$ grave$ and$ substantive$ evil$ of$ excessive$
time$ during$ which$ they$ may$ nominate$ candidates;$ the$ curtailment$ is$ not$ such,$ partisanship,$ dishonesty$ and$ corruption$ as$ well$ as$ violence$ that$ of$ late$ has$
however,$as$to$render$meaningless$such$a$basic$right.$Their$scope$of$legitimate$ marred$ election$ campaigns$ and$ partisan$ political$ activities$ in$ this$ country.$ He$
activities,$save$this$one,$is$not$unduly$narrowed.$Neither$is$there$infringement$of$ did$invite$our$attention$likewise$to$the$wellSsettled$doctrine$that$in$the$choice$of$
their$ freedom$ to$ assemble.$ They$ can$ do$ so,$ but$ not$ for$ such$ a$ purpose.$ We$ remedies$ for$ an$ admitted$ malady$ requiring$ governmental$ action,$ on$ the$
sustain$its$validity.$We$do$so$unanimously.$10$ legislature$primarily$rests$the$responsibility.$Nor$should$the$cure$prescribed$by$
$ it,$ unless$ clearly$ repugnant$ to$ fundamental$ rights,$ be$ ignored$ or$ disregarded."$
In$ said$ Gonzales$ vs.$ Comelec$ case,$ this$ Court$ likewise$ held$ that$ the$ period$ for$ 15$
the$conduct$of$an$election$campaign$or$partisan$political$activity$may$be$limited$ $
without$offending$the$aforementioned$constitutional$guarantees$as$the$same$is$ But$ aside$ from$ the$ clear$ and$ imminent$ danger$ of$ the$ debasement$ of$ the$
designed$ also$ to$ prevent$ a$ "clear$ and$ present$ danger$ of$ a$ substantive$ evil,$ the$ electoral$ process,$ as$ conceded$ by$ Senator$ Pelaez,$ the$ basic$ motivation,$
debasement$of$the$electoral$process."$11$ according$ to$ Senate$ Majority$ Floor$ Leader$ Senator$ Arturo$ Tolentino,$ the$
$ sponsor$ of$ the$ PuyatSTolentino$ amendment$ embodied$ in$ par.$ 1$ of$ Sec.$ 8(a)$ of$
Even$if$the$partisan$activity$consists$of$(a)$forming$organizations,$associations,$ R.A.$ No.$ 6132,$ is$ to$ assure$ the$ candidates$ equal$ protection$ of$ the$ laws$ by$
clubs,$committees$or$other$group$of$persons$for$the$purpose$of$soliciting$votes$ according$them$equality$of$chances.$16$The$primary$purpose$of$the$prohibition$
and/or$ undertaking$ any$ campaign$ or$ propaganda$ for$ or$ against$ a$ party$ or$ then$is$also$to$avert$the$clear$and$present$danger$of$another$substantive$evil,$the$
candidate;$ (b)$ holding$ political$ conventions,$ caucuses,$ conferences,$ meetings,$ denial$of$the$equal$protection$of$the$laws.$The$candidates$must$depend$on$their$
rallies,$ parades$ or$ other$ similar$ assemblies$ for$ the$ purpose$ of$ soliciting$ votes$ individual$ merits$ and$ not$ on$ the$ support$ of$ political$ parties$ or$ organizations.$
and/or$ undertaking$ any$ campaign$ or$ propaganda$ for$ or$ against$ any$ candidate$ Senator$ Tolentino$ and$ Senator$ Salonga$ emphasized$ that$ under$ this$ provision,$
or$ party;$ and$ (c)$ giving,$ soliciting,$ or$ receiving$ contributions$ for$ election$ the$poor$candidate$has$an$even$chance$as$against$the$rich$candidate.$We$are$not$
campaign$ either$ directly$ or$ indirectly,$ (Sec.$ 50SB,$ pars.$ (a),$ (b),$ and$ (c),$ R.A.$ prepared$ to$ disagree$ with$ them,$ because$ such$ a$ conclusion,$ predicated$ as$ it$ is$
4880),$ the$ abridgment$ was$ still$ affirmed$ as$ constitutional$ by$ six$ members$ of$ on$empirical$logic,$finds$support$in$our$recent$political$history$and$experience.$
this$ Court,$ which$ could$ not$ "ignore$ ...$ the$ legislative$ declaration$ that$ its$ Both$Senators$stressed$that$the$independent$candidate$who$wins$in$the$election$
enactment$ was$ in$ response$ to$ a$ serious$ substantive$ evil$ affecting$ the$ electoral$ against$a$candidate$of$the$major$political$parties,$is$a$rare$phenomenon$in$this$
process,$not$merely$in$danger$of$happening,$but$actually$in$existence,$and$likely$ country$and$the$victory$of$an$independent$candidate$mainly$rests$on$his$ability$
to$ continue$ unless$ curbed$ or$ remedied.$ To$ assert$ otherwise$ would$ be$ to$ close$ to$ match$ the$ resources,$ financial$ and$ otherwise,$ of$ the$ political$ parties$ or$
one's$eyes$to$the$reality$of$the$situation."$12;$ organizations$supporting$his$opponent.$This$position$is$further$strengthened$by$
$ the$ principle$ that$ the$ guarantee$ of$ social$ justice$ under$ Sec.$ V,$ Art.$ II$ of$ the$
Likewise,$ because$ four$ members$ dissented,$ this$ Court$ in$ said$ case$ of$ Gonzales$ Constitution,$ includes$ the$ guarantee$ of$ equal$ opportunity,$ equality$ of$ political$
vs.$ Comelec,$ supra,$ failed$ to$ muster$ the$ required$ eight$ votes$ to$ declare$ as$ rights,$and$equality$before$the$law$enunciated$by$Mr.$Justice$Tuazon$in$the$case$
unconstitutional$ the$ limitation$ on$ the$ period$ for$ (a)$ making$ speeches,$ Guido$vs.$Rural$Progress$Administration.$17$
announcements$ or$ commentaries$ or$ holding$ interviews$ for$ or$ against$ the$ $
election$of$any$party$or$candidate$for$public$office;$(b)$publishing$or$distributing$ While$it$may$be$true$that$a$party's$support$of$a$candidate$is$not$wrong$per$se$it$
campaign$ literature$ or$ materials;$ and$ (e)$ directly$ or$ indirectly$ soliciting$ votes$ is$ equally$ true$ that$ Congress$ in$ the$ exercise$ of$ its$ broad$ lawSmaking$ authority$
and/or$ undertaking$ any$ campaign$ or$ propaganda$ for$ or$ against$ any$ candidate$ can$declare$certain$acts$as$mala$prohibita$when$justified$by$the$exigencies$of$the$
or$party$specified$in$Sec.$50SB,$pars.$(c),$(d)$&$(e)$of$R.A.$4880.$13$ times.$ One$ such$ act$ is$ the$ party$ or$ organization$ support$ proscribed$ in$ Sec.$
$ 8(a),which$ ban$ is$ a$ valid$ limitation$ on$ the$ freedom$ of$ association$ as$ well$ as$
The$debasement$of$the$electoral$process$as$a$substantive$evil$exists$today$and$is$ expression,$for$the$reasons$aforestated.$
one$of$the$major$compelling$interests$that$moved$Congress$into$prescribing$the$ $
total$ban$contained$in$par.$1$of$Sec.$8(a)$of$R.A.$No.$6132,$to$justify$such$ban.$In$ Senator$Tolentino$emphasized$that$"equality$of$chances$may$be$better$attained$
the$ said$ Gonzales$ vs.$ Comelec$ case,$ this$ Court$ gave$ "due$ recognition$ to$ the$ by$banning$all$organization$support."$18$
legislative$ concern$ to$ cleanse,$ and$ if$ possible,$ render$ spotless,$ the$ electoral$ $
process,"$14$impressed$as$it$was$by$the$explanation$made$by$the$author$of$R.A.$
The$ questioned$ par.$ 1$ of$ Sec.$ 8$ (a)$ likewise$ can$ easily$ pass$ the$ balancingSofS The$ political$ parties$ and$ the$ other$ organized$ groups$ have$ builtSin$ advantages$
interest$test.$19$ because$of$their$machinery$and$other$facilities,$which,$the$individual$candidate$
$ who$is$without$any$organization$support,$does$not$have.$The$fact$that$the$other$
In$the$apt$words$of$the$Solicitor$General:$ civic$of$religious$organizations$cannot$have$a$campaign$machinery$as$efficient$as$
$ that$ of$ a$ political$ party,$ does$ not$ vary$ the$ situation;$ because$ it$ still$ has$ that$
It$ is$ to$ be$ noted$ that$ right$ now$ the$ nation$ is$ on$ the$ threshold$ of$ rewriting$ its$ much$ builtSin$ advantage$ as$ against$ the$ individual$ candidate$ without$ similar$
Constitution$ in$ a$ hopeful$ endeavor$ to$ find$ a$ solution$ to$ the$ grave$ economic,$ support.$Moreover,$these$civic$religious$and$professional$organization$may$band$
social$ and$ political$ problems$ besetting$ the$ country.$ Instead$ of$ directly$ together$to$support$common$candidates,$who$advocates$the$reforms$that$these$
proposing$ the$ amendments$ Congress$ has$ chosen$ to$ call$ a$ Constitutional$ organizations$ champion$ and$ believe$ are$ imperative.$ This$ is$ admitted$ by$
Convention$ which$ shall$ have$ the$ task$ of$ fashioning$ a$ document$ that$ shall$ petitioner$ Gonzales$ thru$ the$ letter$ of$ Senator$ Ganzon$ dated$ August$ 17,$ 1970$
embody$the$aspirations$and$ideals$of$the$people.$Because$what$is$to$be$amended$ attached$to$his$petition$as$Annex$"D",$wherein$the$Senator$stated$that$his$own$
is$ the$ fundamental$ law$ of$ the$ land,$ it$ is$ indispensable$ that$ the$ Constitutional$ "Timawa"$group$had$agreed$with$the$Liberal$Party$in$Iloilo$to$support$petitioner$
Convention$be$composed$of$delegates$truly$representative$of$the$people's$will.$ Gonzales$ and$ two$ others$ as$ their$ candidates$ for$ the$ convention,$ which$
Public$ welfare$ demands$ that$ the$ delegates$ should$ speak$ for$ the$ entire$ nation,$ organized$ support$ is$ nullified$ by$ the$ questioned$ ban,$ Senator$ Ganzon$ stressed$
and$ their$ voices$ be$ not$ those$ of$ a$ particular$ segment$ of$ the$ citizenry,$ or$ of$ a$ that$ "without$ the$ group$ moving$ and$ working$ in$ joint$ collective$ effort"$ they$
particular$ class$ or$ group$ of$ people,$ be$ they$ religious,$ political,$ civic$ or$ cannot$"exercise$effective$control$and$supervision$over$our$$
professional$in$character.$Senator$Pelaez,$Chairman$of$the$Senate$Committee$on$ leaders$ $ the$ Women's$ League,$ the$ area$ commanders,$ etc.";$ but$ with$ their$
Codes$and$Constitutional$Amendments,$eloquently$stated$that$"the$function$of$a$ joining$with$the$LP's$they$"could$have$presented$a$solid$front$with$very$bright$
constitution$ is$ not$ to$ represent$ anyone$ in$ interest$ or$ set$ of$ interests,$ not$ to$ chances$of$capturing$all$seats."$
favor$ one$ group$ at$ the$ expense$ or$ disadvantage$ of$ the$ candidates$ $ but$ to$ $
encompass$all$the$interests$that$exist$within$our$society$and$to$blend$them$into$ The$civic$associations$other$than$political$parties$cannot$with$reason$insist$that$
one$harmonious$and$balanced$whole.$For$the$constitutional$system$means,$not$ they$ should$ be$ exempted$ from$ the$ ban;$ because$ then$ by$ such$ exemption$ they$
the$predominance$of$interests,$but$the$harmonious$balancing$thereof."$ would$ be$ free$ to$ utilize$ the$ facilities$ of$ the$ campaign$ machineries$ which$ they$
$ are$ denying$ to$ the$ political$ parties.$ Whenever$ all$ organization$ engages$ in$ a$
So$that$the$purpose$for$calling$the$Constitutional$Convention$will$not$be$deflated$ political$ activity,$ as$ in$ this$ campaign$ for$ election$ of$ delegates$ to$ the$
or$ frustrated,$ it$ is$ necessary$ that$ the$ delegatee$ thereto$ be$ independent,$ Constitutional$Convention,$to$that$extent$it$partakes$of$the$nature$of$a$political$
beholden$to$no$one$but$to$God,$country$and$conscience.$ organization.$ This,$ despite$ the$ fact$ that$ the$ Constitution$ and$ by$ laws$ of$ such$
$ civic,$ religious,$ or$ professional$ associations$ usually$ prohibit$ the$ association$
xxx$ xxx$ xxx$ from$ engaging$ in$ partisan$ political$ activity$ or$ supporting$ any$ candidate$ for$ an$
$ elective$office.$Hence,$they$must$likewise$respect$the$ban.$
The$ evil$ therefore,$ which$ the$ law$ seeks$ to$ prevent$ lies$ in$ the$ election$ of$ $
delegates$ who,$ because$ they$ have$ been$ chosen$ with$ the$ aid$ and$ resources$ of$ The$freedom$of$association$also$implies$the$liberty$not$to$associate$or$join$with$
organizations,$ cannot$ be$ expected$ to$ be$ sufficiently$ representative$ of$ the$ others$or$join$any$existing$organization.$A$person$may$run$independently$on$his$
people.$ Such$ delegates$ could$ very$ well$ be$ the$ spokesmen$ of$ narrow$ political,$ own$merits$without$need$of$catering$to$a$political$party$or$any$other$association$
religious$or$economic$interest$and$not$of$the$great$majority$of$the$people.$20$ for$support.$And$he,$as$much$as$the$candidate$whose$candidacy$does$not$evoke$
$ sympathy$ from$ any$ political$ party$ or$ organized$ group,$ must$ be$ afforded$ equal$
We$ likewise$ concur$ with$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ that$ the$ equal$ protection$ of$ the$ chances.$As$emphasized$by$Senators$Tolentino$and$Salonga,$this$ban$is$to$assure$
laws$is$not$unduly$subverted$in$par.$I$of$Sec.$8(a);$because$it$does$not$create$any$ equal$chances$to$a$candidate$with$talent$and$imbued$with$patriotism$as$well$as$
hostile$discrimination$against$any$party$or$group$nor$does$it$confer$undue$favor$ nobility$of$purpose,$so$that$the$country$can$utilize$their$services$if$elected.$
or$privilege$on$an$individual$as$heretofore$stated.$The$discrimination$applies$to$ $
all$ organizations,$ whether$ political$ parties$ or$ social,$ civic,$ religious,$ or$ Impressed$ as$ We$ are$ by$ the$ eloquent$ and$ masterly$ exposition$ of$ Senator$
professional$associations.$The$ban$is$germane$to$the$objectives$of$the$law,$which$ Taada$for$the$invalidation$of$par.$1$of$Sec.$8(a)$of$R.A.$No.$6132,$demonstrating$
are$to$avert$the$debasement$of$the$electoral$process,$and$to$attain$real$equality$ once$again$his$deep$concern$for$the$preservation$of$our$civil$liberties$enshrined$
of$chances$among$individual$candidates$and$thereby$make$real$the$guarantee$of$ in$ the$ Bill$ of$ Rights,$ We$ are$ not$ persuaded$ to$ entertain$ the$ belief$ that$ the$
equal$protection$of$the$laws.$ challenged$ ban$ transcends$ the$ limits$ of$ constitutional$ invasion$ of$ such$
$ cherished$immunities.$
$
WHEREFORE,$the$prayers$in$both$petitions$are$hereby$denied$and$R.A.$No.$6132$
including$ Secs.$ 2,$ 4,$ 5,$ and$ 8(a),$ paragraph$ 1,$ thereof,$ cannot$ be$ declared$
unconstitutional.$Without$costs.$
$
Reyes,$J.B.L.,$Dizon$and$Castro,$JJ.,$concur.$
$
Makalintal,$J.,$concurs$in$the$result.$
$
Teehankee,$J.,$is$on$leave.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$LS56350$April$2,$1981$ It$is$the$ruling$of$the$Court,$as$set$forth$at$the$outset,$that$the$petitions$must$be$
$ dismissed.$
SAMUEL$C.$OCCENA,$petitioner,$$ $
vs.$ 1.$ It$is$much$too$late$in$the$day$to$deny$the$force$and$applicability$of$the$
THE$ COMMISSION$ ON$ ELECTIONS,$ THE$ COMMISSION$ ON$ AUDIT,$ THE$ 1973$ Constitution.$ In$ the$ dispositive$ portion$ of$ Javellana$ v.$ The$ Executive$
NATIONAL$TREASURER,$THE$DIRECTOR$OF$PRINTING,$respondents.$ Secretary,$ 6$ dismissing$ petitions$ for$ prohibition$ and$ mandamus$ to$ declare$
$ invalid$its$ratification,$this$Court$stated$that$it$did$so$by$a$vote$of$six$7$to$four.$8$
$$ It$ then$ concluded:$ "This$ being$ the$ vote$ of$ the$ majority,$ there$ is$ no$ further$
$ judicial$obstacle$to$the$new$Constitution$being$considered$in$force$and$effect."$9$
G.R.$No.$LS56404$April$2,$1981$ Such$a$statement$served$a$useful$purpose.$It$could$even$be$said$that$there$was$a$
$ need$ for$ it.$ It$ served$ to$ clear$ the$ atmosphere.$ It$ made$ manifest$ that,$ as$ of$
RAMON$A.$GONZALES,$MANUEL$B.$IMBONG,$JO$AUREA$MARCOSSIMBONG,$RAY$ January$17,$1973,$the$present$Constitution$came$into$force$and$effect.$With$such$
ALLAN$T.$DRILON,$NELSON$B.$MALANA$and$GIL$M.$TABIOS,$petitioners,$$ a$pronouncement$by$the$Supreme$Court$and$with$the$recognition$of$the$cardinal$
vs.$ postulate$ that$ what$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ says$ is$ not$ only$ entitled$ to$ respect$ but$
THE$ NATIONAL$ TREASURER$ and$ the$ COMMISSION$ ON$ ELECTIONS,$ must$ also$ be$ obeyed,$ a$ factor$ for$ instability$ was$ removed.$ Thereafter,$ as$ a$
respondents.$ matter$ of$ law,$ all$ doubts$ were$ resolved.$ The$ 1973$ Constitution$ is$ the$
$ fundamental$law.$It$is$as$simple$as$that.$What$cannot$be$too$strongly$stressed$is$
$$ that$the$function$of$judicial$review$has$both$a$positive$and$a$negative$aspect.$As$
$ was$so$convincingly$demonstrated$by$Professors$Black$10$and$Murphy,$11$the$
FERNANDO,$C.J.:$ Supreme$ Court$ can$ check$ as$ well$ as$ legitimate.$ In$ declaring$ what$ the$ law$ is,$ it$
$ may$not$only$nullify$the$acts$of$coordinate$branches$but$may$also$sustain$their$
The$challenge$in$these$two$prohibition$proceedings$against$the$validity$of$three$ validity.$In$the$latter$case,$there$is$an$affirmation$that$what$was$done$cannot$be$
Batasang$ Pambansa$ Resolutions$ 1$ proposing$ constitutional$ amendments,$ goes$ stigmatized$ as$ constitutionally$ deficient.$ The$ mere$ dismissal$ of$ a$ suit$ of$ this$
further$ than$ merely$ assailing$ their$ alleged$ constitutional$ infirmity.$ Petitioners$ character$suffices.$That$is$the$meaning$of$the$concluding$statement$in$Javellana.$
Samuel$Occena$and$Ramon$A.$Gonzales,$both$members$of$the$Philippine$Bar$and$ Since$then,$this$Court$has$invariably$applied$the$present$Constitution.$The$latest$
former$delegates$to$the$1971$Constitutional$Convention$that$framed$the$present$ case$in$point$is$People$v.$Sola,$12$promulgated$barely$two$weeks$ago.$During$the$
Constitution,$ are$ suing$ as$ taxpayers.$ The$ rather$ unorthodox$ aspect$ of$ these$ first$ year$ alone$ of$ the$ effectivity$ of$ the$ present$ Constitution,$ at$ least$ ten$ cases$
petitions$is$the$assertion$that$the$1973$Constitution$is$not$the$fundamental$law,$ may$be$cited.$13$
the$ Javellana$ 2$ ruling$ to$ the$ contrary$ notwithstanding.$ To$ put$ it$ at$ its$ mildest,$ $
such$an$approach$has$the$arresting$charm$of$novelty$$but$nothing$else.$It$is$in$ 2.$ We$ come$ to$ the$ crucial$ issue,$ the$ power$ of$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$
fact$self$defeating,$for$if$such$were$indeed$the$case,$petitioners$have$come$to$the$ Pambansa$ to$ propose$ amendments$ and$ how$ it$ may$ be$ exercised.$ More$
wrong$ forum.$ We$ sit$ as$ a$ Court$ dutySbound$ to$ uphold$ and$ apply$ that$ specifically$as$to$the$latter,$the$extent$of$the$changes$that$may$be$introduced,$the$
Constitution.$To$contend$otherwise$as$was$done$here$would$be,$quite$clearly,$an$ number$ of$ votes$ necessary$ for$ the$ validity$ of$ a$ proposal,$ and$ the$ standard$
exercise$ in$ futility.$ Nor$ are$ the$ arguments$ of$ petitioners$ cast$ in$ the$ traditional$ required$for$a$proper$submission.$As$was$stated$earlier,$petitioners$were$unable$
form$ of$ constitutional$ litigation$ any$ more$ persuasive.$ For$ reasons$ to$ be$ set$ to$ demonstrate$ that$ the$ challenged$ resolutions$ are$ tainted$ by$
forth,$we$dismiss$the$petitions.$ unconstitutionality.$
$ $
The$ suits$ for$ prohibition$ were$ filed$ respectively$ on$ March$ 6$ 3$ and$ March$ 12,$ (1)$ The$ existence$ of$ the$ power$ of$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ is$
1981.$4$On$March$10$and$13$respectively,$respondents$were$required$to$answer$ indubitable.$The$applicable$provision$in$the$1976$Amendments$is$quite$explicit.$
each$ within$ ten$ days$ from$ notice.$ 5$ There$ was$ a$ comment$ on$ the$ part$ of$ the$ Insofar$ as$ pertinent$ it$ reads$ thus:$ "The$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ shall$ have$
respondents.$Thereafter,$both$cases$were$set$for$hearing$and$were$duly$argued$ the$ same$ powers$ and$ its$ Members$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ functions,$
on$ March$ 26$ by$ petitioners$ and$ Solicitor$ General$ Estelito$ P.$ Mendoza$ for$ responsibilities,$ rights,$ privileges,$ and$ disqualifications$ as$ the$ interim$ National$
respondents.$With$the$submission$of$pertinent$data$in$amplification$of$the$oral$ Assembly$and$the$regular$National$Assembly$and$the$Members$thereof."$14$One$
argument,$the$cases$were$deemed$submitted$for$decision.$ of$ such$ powers$ is$ precisely$ that$ of$ proposing$ amendments.$ The$ 1973$
$ Constitution$in$its$Transitory$Provisions$vested$the$Interim$National$Assembly$
with$the$power$to$propose$amendments$upon$special$call$by$the$Prime$Minister$
by$ a$ vote$ of$ the$ majority$ of$ its$ members$ to$ be$ ratified$ in$ accordance$ with$ the$
Article$ on$ Amendments.$ 15$ When,$ therefore,$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa,$
upon$the$call$of$the$President$and$Prime$Minister$Ferdinand$E.$Marcos,$met$as$a$
constituent$ body$ it$ acted$ by$ virtue$ Of$ such$ impotence$ Its$ authority$ to$ do$ so$ is$
clearly$ beyond$ doubt.$ It$ could$ and$ did$ propose$ the$ amendments$ embodied$ in$
the$ resolutions$ now$ being$ assailed.$ It$ may$ be$ observed$ parenthetically$ that$ as$
far$ as$ petitioner$ Occena$ is$ Concerned,$ the$ question$ of$ the$ authority$ of$ the$
Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ to$ propose$ amendments$ is$ not$ new.$ In$ Occena$ v.$
Commission$ on$ Elections,$ 16$ filed$ by$ the$ same$ petitioner,$ decided$ on$ January$
28,$ 1980,$ such$ a$ question$ was$ involved$ although$ not$ directly$ passed$ upon.$ To$
quote$ from$ the$ opinion$ of$ the$ Court$ penned$ by$ Justice$ Antonio$ in$ that$ case:$
"Considering$ that$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ of$ Section$ 7$ of$ Article$ X$ of$ the$
Constitution$ extending$ the$ retirement$ of$ members$ of$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ and$
judges$ of$ inferior$ courts$ from$ sixtySfive$ (65)$ to$ seventy$ (70)$ years$ is$ but$ a$
restoration$of$the$age$of$retirement$provided$in$the$1935$Constitution$and$has$
been$ intensively$ and$ extensively$ discussed$ at$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa,$
as$well$as$through$the$mass$media,$it$cannot,$therefore,$be$said$that$our$people$
are$unaware$of$the$advantages$and$disadvantages$of$the$proposed$amendment."$
17$
$ amendments$ having$ been$ called$ to$ the$ attention$ of$ the$ people$ so$ that$ it$ could$
(2)$ Petitioners$ would$ urge$ upon$ us$ the$ proposition$ that$ the$ amendments$
proposed$are$so$extensive$in$character$that$they$go$far$beyond$the$limits$of$the$
authority$ conferred$ on$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ as$ Successor$ of$ the$
Interim$ National$ Assembly.$ For$ them,$ what$ was$ done$ was$ to$ revise$ and$ not$ to$
amend.$It$suffices$to$quote$from$the$opinion$of$Justice$Makasiar,$speaking$for$the$
Court,$ in$ Del$ Rosario$ v.$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ 18$ to$ dispose$ of$ this$
contention.$ Thus:$ "3.$ And$ whether$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ will$ only$
propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ or$ entirely$ overhaul$ the$ present$
Constitution$ and$ propose$ an$ entirely$ new$ Constitution$ based$ on$ an$ Ideology$
foreign$ to$ the$ democratic$ system,$ is$ of$ no$ moment;$ because$ the$ same$ will$ be$
submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ ratification.$ Once$ ratified$ by$ the$ sovereign$ people,$
there$ can$ be$ no$ debate$ about$ the$ validity$ of$ the$ new$ Constitution.$ 4.$ The$ fact$
that$the$present$Constitution$may$be$revised$and$replaced$with$a$new$one$...$is$
no$ argument$ against$ the$ validity$ of$ the$ law$ because$ 'amendment'$ includes$ the$
'revision'$ or$ total$ overhaul$ of$ the$ entire$ Constitution.$ At$ any$ rate,$ whether$ the$
Constitution$ is$ merely$ amended$ in$ part$ or$ revised$ or$ totally$ changed$ would$
become$ immaterial$ the$ moment$ the$ same$ is$ ratified$ by$ the$ sovereign$ people."$
19$ There$ is$ here$ the$ adoption$ of$ the$ principle$ so$ wellSknown$ in$ American$
decisions$as$well$as$legal$texts$that$a$constituent$body$can$propose$anything$but$
conclude$nothing.$20$We$are$not$disposed$to$deviate$from$such$a$principle$not$
only$sound$in$theory$but$also$advantageous$in$practice.$
$ MelencioSHerrera,$JJ.,$concur.$
(3)$ That$ leaves$ only$ the$ questions$ of$ the$ vote$ necessary$ to$ propose$
amendments$ as$ well$ as$ the$ standard$ for$ proper$ submission.$ Again,$ petitioners$
have$not$made$out$a$case$that$calls$for$a$judgment$in$their$favor.$The$language$of$
the$ Constitution$ supplies$ the$ answer$ to$ the$ above$ questions.$ The$ Interim$
Batasang$Pambansa,$sitting$as$a$constituent$body,$can$propose$amendments.$In$
that$ capacity,$ only$ a$ majority$ vote$ is$ needed.$ It$ would$ be$ an$ indefensible$
proposition$ to$ assert$ that$ the$ threeSfourth$ votes$ required$ when$ it$ sits$ as$ a$
legislative$ body$ applies$ as$ well$ when$ it$ has$ been$ convened$ as$ the$ agency$
through$which$amendments$could$be$proposed.$That$is$not$a$requirement$as$far$
as$a$constitutional$convention$is$concerned.$It$is$not$a$requirement$either$when,$
as$in$this$case,$the$Interim$Batasang$Pambansa$exercises$its$constituent$power$
to$ propose$ amendments.$ Moreover,$ even$ on$ the$ assumption$ that$ the$
requirement$ of$ threeS$ fourth$ votes$ applies,$ such$ extraordinary$ majority$ was$
obtained.$ It$ is$ not$ disputed$ that$ Resolution$ No.$ 1$ proposing$ an$ amendment$
allowing$ a$ naturalSborn$ citizen$ of$ the$ Philippines$ naturalized$ in$ a$ foreign$
country$to$own$a$limited$area$of$land$for$residential$purposes$was$approved$by$
the$ vote$ of$ 122$ to$ 5;$ Resolution$ No.$ 2$ dealing$ with$ the$ Presidency,$ the$ Prime$
Minister$and$the$Cabinet,$and$the$National$Assembly$by$a$vote$of$147$to$5$with$1$
abstention;$ and$ Resolution$ No.$ 3$ on$ the$ amendment$ to$ the$ Article$ on$ the$
Commission$on$Elections$by$a$vote$of$148$to$2$with$1$abstention.$Where$then$is$
the$alleged$infirmity?$As$to$the$requisite$standard$for$a$proper$submission,$the$
question$ may$ be$ viewed$ not$ only$ from$ the$ standpoint$ of$ the$ period$ that$ must$
elapse$before$the$holding$of$the$plebiscite$but$also$from$the$standpoint$of$such$
not$ plausibly$ be$ maintained$ that$ they$ were$ properly$ informed$ as$ to$ the$
proposed$ changes.$ As$ to$ the$ period,$ the$ Constitution$ indicates$ the$ way$ the$
matter$ should$ be$ resolved.$ There$ is$ no$ ambiguity$ to$ the$ applicable$ provision:$
"Any$amendment$to,$or$revision$of,$this$Constitution$shall$be$valid$when$ratified$
by$a$majority$of$the$votes$cast$in$a$plebiscite$which$shall$be$held$not$later$than$
three$months$after$the$approval$of$such$amendment$or$revision."$21$The$three$
resolutions$ were$ approved$ by$ the$ Interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ sitting$ as$ a$
constituent$ assembly$ on$ February$ 5$ and$ 27,$ 1981.$ In$ the$ Batasang$ Pambansa$
Blg.$22,$the$date$of$the$plebiscite$is$set$for$April$7,$1981.$It$is$thus$within$the$90S
day$period$provided$by$the$Constitution.$Thus$any$argument$to$the$contrary$is$
unavailing.$ As$ for$ the$ people$ being$ adequately$ informed,$ it$ cannot$ be$ denied$
that$this$time,$as$in$the$cited$1980$Occena$opinion$of$Justice$Antonio,$where$the$
amendment$restored$to$seventy$the$retirement$age$of$members$of$the$judiciary,$
the$proposed$amendments$have$"been$intensively$and$extensively$discussed$at$
the$Interim$Batasang$Pambansa,$as$well$as$through$the$mass$media,$[$so$that$]$it$
cannot,$ therefore,$ be$ said$ that$ our$ people$ are$ unaware$ of$ the$ advantages$ and$
disadvantages$of$the$proposed$amendment$[$s$]."$22$
$
WHEREFORE,$the$petitions$are$dismissed$for$lack$of$merit.$No$costs.$
$
Barredo,$Makasiar,$Aquino$Concepcion,$Jr.,$Fernandez,$Guerrero,$De$Castro$and$
$
Abad$Santos,$J.,$is$on$leave.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$LS34150$October$16,$1971$ first$ appeared$ thru$ Senator$ Emmanuel$ Pelaez$ and$ the$ last$ two$ thru$ Delegate$
$ Ramon$Gonzales.$All$said$respondents,$thru$counsel,$resist$petitioner's$action.$
ARTURO$M.$TOLENTINO,$petitioner,$$ $
vs.$ For$ reasons$ of$ orderliness$ and$ to$ avoid$ unnecessary$ duplication$ of$ arguments$
COMMISSION$ ON$ ELECTIONS,$ and$ THE$ CHIEF$ ACCOUNTANT,$ THE$ AUDITOR,$ and$ even$ possible$ confusion,$ and$ considering$ that$ with$ the$ principal$ parties$
and$THE$DISBURSING$OFFICER$OF$THE$1971$CONSTITUTIONAL$CONVENTION,$ being$ duly$ represented$ by$ able$ counsel,$ their$ interests$ would$ be$ adequately$
respondents,$RAUL$S.$MANGLAPUS,$JESUS$G.$BARRERA,$PABLO$S.$TRILLANA$III,$ protected$ already,$ the$ Court$ had$ to$ limit$ the$ number$ of$ intervenors$ from$ the$
VICTOR$ DE$ LA$ SERNA,$ MARCELO$ B.$ FERNAN,$ JOSE$ Y.$ FERIA,$ LEONARDO$ ranks$of$the$delegates$to$the$Convention$who,$more$or$less,$have$legal$interest$in$
SIGUION$REYNA,$VICTOR$F.$ORTEGA,$and$JUAN$V.$BORRA,$Intervenors.$ the$success$of$the$respondents,$and$so,$only$Delegates$Raul$S.$Manglapus,$Jesus$
$ G.$ Barrera,$ Pablo$ S.$ Trillana$ III,$ Victor$ de$ la$ Serna,$ Marcelo$ B.$ Fernan,$ Jose$ Y.$
Arturo$M.$Tolentino$in$his$own$behalf.$ Feria,$ Leonardo$ Siguion$ Reyna,$ Victor$ Ortega$ and$ Juan$ B.$ Borra,$ all$
$ distinguished$lawyers$in$their$own$right,$have$been$allowed$to$intervene$jointly.$
Ramon$ A.$ Gonzales$ for$ respondents$ Chief$ Accountant$ and$ Auditor$ of$ the$ 1971$ The$ Court$ feels$ that$ with$ such$ an$ array$ of$ brilliant$ and$ dedicated$ counsel,$ all$
Constitutional$Convention.$ interests$involved$should$be$duly$and$amply$represented$and$protected.$At$any$
$ rate,$notwithstanding$that$their$corresponding$motions$for$leave$to$intervene$or$
Emmanuel$ Pelaez,$ Jorge$ M.$ Juco$ and$ Tomas$ L.$ Echivarre$ for$ respondent$ to$appear$as$amicus$curiae$1$have$been$denied,$the$pleadings$filed$by$the$other$
Disbursing$Officer$of$the$1971$Constitutional$Convention.$ delegates$ and$ some$ private$ parties,$ the$ latter$ in$ representation$ of$ their$ minor$
$ children$allegedly$to$be$affected$by$the$result$of$this$case$with$the$records$and$
Intervenors$in$their$own$behalf.$ the$ Court$ acknowledges$ that$ they$ have$ not$ been$ without$ value$ as$ materials$ in$
$ the$extensive$study$that$has$been$undertaken$in$this$case.$
$$ $
$ The$ background$ facts$ are$ beyond$ dispute.$ The$ Constitutional$ Convention$ of$
BARREDO,$J.:$ 1971$ came$ into$ being$ by$ virtue$ of$ two$ resolutions$ of$ the$ Congress$ of$ the$
$ Philippines$approved$in$its$capacity$as$a$constituent$assembly$convened$for$the$
Petition$ for$ prohibition$ principally$ to$ restrain$ the$ respondent$ Commission$ on$ purpose$ of$ calling$ a$ convention$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$
Elections$"from$undertaking$to$hold$a$plebiscite$on$November$8,$1971,"$at$which$ namely,$Resolutions$2$and$4$of$the$joint$sessions$of$Congress$held$on$March$16,$
the$proposed$constitutional$amendment$"reducing$the$voting$age"$in$Section$1$ 1967$and$June$17,$1969$respectively.$The$delegates$to$the$said$Convention$were$
of$ Article$ V$ of$ the$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines$ to$ eighteen$ years$ "shall$ be,$ all$ elected$ under$ and$ by$ virtue$ of$ said$ resolutions$ and$ the$ implementing$
submitted"$for$ratification$by$the$people$pursuant$to$Organic$Resolution$No.$1$of$ legislation$thereof,$Republic$Act$6132.$The$pertinent$portions$of$Resolution$No$2$
the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ of$ 1971,$ and$ the$ subsequent$ implementing$ read$as$follows:$
resolutions,$ by$ declaring$ said$ resolutions$ to$ be$ without$ the$ force$ and$ effect$ of$ $
law$in$so$far$as$they$direct$the$holding$of$such$plebiscite$and$by$also$declaring$ SECTION$1.$There$is$hereby$called$a$convention$to$propose$amendments$to$the$
the$ acts$ of$ the$ respondent$ Commission$ (COMELEC)$ performed$ and$ to$ be$ done$ Constitution$of$the$Philippines,$to$be$composed$of$two$elective$Delegates$from$
by$ it$ in$ obedience$ to$ the$ aforesaid$ Convention$ resolutions$ to$ be$ null$ and$ void,$ each$ representative$ district$ who$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ qualifications$ as$ those$
for$being$violative$of$the$Constitution$of$the$Philippines.$ required$of$Members$of$the$House$of$Representatives.$
$ $
As$ a$ preliminary$ step,$ since$ the$ petition$ named$ as$ respondent$ only$ the$ xxx$ xxx$ xxx$
COMELEC,$ the$ Count$ required$ that$ copies$ thereof$ be$ served$ on$ the$ Solicitor$ $
General$ and$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention,$ through$ its$ President,$ for$ such$ SECTION$ 7.$ The$ amendments$ proposed$ by$ the$ Convention$ shall$ be$ valid$ and$
action$as$they$may$deem$proper$to$take.$In$due$time,$respondent$COMELEC$filed$ considered$ part$ of$ the$ Constitution$ when$ approved$ by$ a$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$
its$answer$joining$issues$with$petitioner.$To$further$put$things$in$proper$order,$ cast$ in$ an$ election$ at$ which$ they$ are$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ their$
and$ considering$ that$ the$ fiscal$ officers$ of$ the$ Convention$ are$ indispensable$ ratification$pursuant$to$Article$XV$of$the$Constitution.$
parties$ in$ a$ proceeding$ of$ this$ nature,$ since$ the$ acts$ sought$ to$ be$ enjoined$ $
involve$ the$ expenditure$ of$ funds$ appropriated$ by$ law$ for$ the$ Convention,$ the$ Resolution$ No.$ 4$ merely$ modified$ the$ number$ of$ delegates$ to$ represent$ the$
Court$also$ordered$that$the$Disbursing$Officer,$Chief$Accountant$and$Auditor$of$ different$cities$and$provinces$fixed$originally$in$Resolution$No$2.$
the$ Convention$ be$ made$ respondents.$ After$ the$ petition$ was$ so$ amended,$ the$ $
After$the$election$of$the$delegates$held$on$November$10,$1970,$the$Convention$ $
held$its$inaugural$session$on$June$1,$1971.$Its$preliminary$labors$of$election$of$ The$Commission$on$Elections$Manila$
officers,$ organization$ of$ committees$ and$ other$ preparatory$ works$ over,$ as$ its$ $
first$ formal$ proposal$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution,$ its$ session$ which$ began$ on$ Thru$the$Chairman$
September$ 27,$ 1971,$ or$ more$ accurately,$ at$ about$ 3:30$ in$ the$ morning$ of$ $
September$28,$1971,$the$Convention$approved$Organic$Resolution$No.$1$reading$ Gentlemen:$
thus:$.$ $
$ Last$ night$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ passed$ Resolution$ No.$ 1$ quoted$ as$
CC$ORGANIC$RESOLUTION$NO.$1$ follows:$
$ $
A$ RESOLUTION$ AMENDING$ SECTION$ ONE$ OF$ ARTICLE$ V$ OF$ THE$ xxx$ xxx$ xxx$
CONSTITUTION$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ SO$ AS$ TO$ LOWER$ THE$ VOTING$ AGE$ TO$ $
18$ (see$above)$
$ $
BE$ IT$ RESOLVED$ as$ it$ is$ hereby$ resolved$ by$ the$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Pursuant$to$the$provision$of$Section$14,$Republic$Act$No.$6132$otherwise$known$
Convention:$ as$the$Constitutional$Convention$Act$of$1971,$may$we$call$upon$you$to$help$the$
$ Convention$implement$this$resolution:$
Section$ 1.$ Section$ One$ of$ Article$ V$ of$ the$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines$ is$ $
amended$to$as$follows:$ Sincerely,$
$ $
Section$ 1.$ Suffrage$ may$ be$ exercised$ by$ (male)$ citizens$ of$ the$ Philippines$ not$ (Sgd.)$DIOSDADO$P.$MACAPAGAL$
otherwise$ disqualified$ by$ law,$ who$ are$ (twentySone)$ EIGHTEEN$ years$ or$ over$ DIOSDADO$P.$MACAPAGAL$
and$are$able$to$read$and$write,$and$who$shall$have$resided$in$the$Philippines$for$ President$
one$ year$ and$ in$ the$ municipality$ wherein$ they$ propose$ to$ vote$ for$ at$ least$ six$ $
months$preceding$the$election.$ On$ September$ 30,$ 1971,$ COMELEC$ "RESOLVED$ to$ inform$ the$ Constitutional$
$ Convention$that$it$will$hold$the$plebiscite$on$condition$that:$
Section$ 2.$ This$ amendment$ shall$ be$ valid$ as$ part$ of$ the$ Constitution$ of$ the$ $
Philippines$ when$ approved$ by$ a$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ in$ a$ plebiscite$ to$ (a)$ The$ Constitutional$ Convention$ will$ undertake$ the$ printing$ of$ separate$
coincide$with$the$local$elections$in$November$1971.$ official$ballots,$election$returns$and$tally$sheets$for$the$use$of$said$plebiscite$at$
$ its$expense;$
Section$3.$This$partial$amendment,$which$refers$only$to$the$age$qualification$for$ $
the$ exercise$ of$ suffrage$ shall$ be$ without$ prejudice$ to$ other$ amendments$ that$ (b)$ The$Constitutional$Convention$will$adopt$its$own$security$measures$for$
will$be$proposed$in$the$future$by$the$1971$Constitutional$Convention$on$other$ the$printing$and$shipment$of$said$ballots$and$election$forms;$and$
portions$of$the$amended$Section$or$on$other$portions$of$the$entire$Constitution.$ $
$ (c)$ Said$ official$ ballots$ and$ election$ forms$ will$ be$ delivered$ to$ the$
Section$4.$The$Convention$hereby$authorizes$the$use$of$the$sum$of$P75,000.00$ Commission$in$time$so$that$they$could$be$distributed$at$the$same$time$that$the$
from$its$savings$or$from$its$unexpended$funds$for$the$expense$of$the$advanced$ Commission$ will$ distribute$ its$ official$ and$ sample$ ballots$ to$ be$ used$ in$ the$
plebiscite;$ provided,$ however$ that$ should$ there$ be$ no$ savings$ or$ unexpended$ elections$on$November$8,$1971.$
sums,$ the$ Delegates$ waive$ P250.00$ each$ or$ the$ equivalent$ of$ 2S1/2$ days$ per$ $
diem.$ What$ happened$ afterwards$ may$ best$ be$ stated$ by$ quoting$ from$ intervenors'$
$ Governors'$statement$of$the$genesis$of$the$above$proposal:$
By$ a$ letter$ dated$ September$ 28,$ 1971,$ President$ Diosdado$ Macapagal,$ called$ $
upon$ respondent$ Comelec$ "to$ help$ the$ Convention$ implement$ (the$ above)$ The$ President$ of$ the$ Convention$ also$ issued$ an$ order$ forming$ an$ Ad$ Hoc$
resolution."$The$said$letter$reads:$ Committee$to$implement$the$Resolution.$
$ $
September$28,$1971$
This$ Committee$ issued$ implementing$ guidelines$ which$ were$ approved$ by$ the$ $
President$who$then$transmitted$them$to$the$Commission$on$Elections.$ As$ a$ preliminary$ and$ prejudicial$ matter,$ the$ intervenors$ raise$ the$ question$ of$
$ jurisdiction.$ They$ contend$ that$ the$ issue$ before$ Us$ is$ a$ political$ question$ and$
The$ Committee$ on$ Plebiscite$ and$ Ratification$ filed$ a$ report$ on$ the$ progress$ of$ that$the$Convention$being$legislative$body$of$the$highest$order$is$sovereign,$and$
the$ implementation$ of$ the$ plebiscite$ in$ the$ afternoon$ of$ October$ 7,1971,$ as$such,$its$acts$impugned$by$petitioner$are$beyond$the$control$of$the$Congress$
enclosing$ copies$ of$ the$ order,$ resolution$ and$ letters$ of$ transmittal$ above$ and$the$courts.$In$this$connection,$it$is$to$be$noted$that$none$of$the$respondent$
referred$to$(Copy$of$the$report$is$hereto$attached$as$Annex$8SMemorandum).$ has$joined$intervenors$in$this$posture.$In$fact,$respondents$Chief$Accountant$and$
$ Auditor$ of$ the$ convention$ expressly$ concede$ the$ jurisdiction$ of$ this$ Court$ in$
RECESS$RESOLUTION$ their$answer$acknowledging$that$the$issue$herein$is$a$justifiable$one.$
$ $
In$ its$ plenary$ session$ in$ the$ evening$ of$ October$ 7,$ 1971,$ the$ Convention$ Strangely,$intervenors$cite$in$support$of$this$contention$portions$of$the$decision$
approved$a$resolution$authored$by$Delegate$Antonio$Olmedo$of$Davao$Oriental,$ of$ this$ Court$ in$ the$ case$ of$ Gonzales$ v.$ Comelec,$ 21$ SCRA$ 774,$ wherein$ the$
calling$ for$ a$ recess$ of$ the$ Convention$ from$ November$ 1,$ 1971$ to$ November$ 9,$ members$ of$ the$ Court,$ despite$ their$ being$ divided$ in$ their$ opinions$ as$ to$ the$
1971$ to$ permit$ the$ delegates$ to$ campaign$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ Organic$ other$ matters$ therein$ involved,$ were$ precisely$ unanimous$ in$ upholding$ its$
Resolution$No.$1.$(Copies$of$the$resolution$and$the$transcript$of$debate$thereon$ jurisdiction.$Obviously,$distinguished$counsel$have$either$failed$to$grasp$the$full$
are$hereto$attached$as$Annexes$9$and$9SA$Memorandum,$respectively).$ impact$ of$ the$ portions$ of$ Our$ decision$ they$ have$ quoted$ or$ would$ misapply$
$ them$by$taking$them$out$of$context.$
RESOLUTION$CONFIRMING$IMPLEMENTATION$ $
$ There$ should$ be$ no$ more$ doubt$ as$ to$ the$ position$ of$ this$ Court$ regarding$ its$
On$ October$ 12,$ 1971,$ the$ Convention$ passed$ Resolution$ No.$ 24$ submitted$ by$ jurisdiction$visSaSvis$the$constitutionality$of$the$acts$of$the$Congress,$acting$as$a$
Delegate$ Jose$ Ozamiz$ confirming$ the$ authority$ of$ the$ President$ of$ the$ constituent$assembly,$and,$for$that$matter,$those$of$a$constitutional$convention$
Convention$to$implement$Organic$Resolution$No.$1,$including$the$creation$of$the$ called$ for$ the$ purpose$ of$ proposing$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ which$
Ad$ Hoc$ Committee$ ratifying$ all$ acts$ performed$ in$ connection$ with$ said$ concededly$is$at$par$with$the$former.$A$simple$reading$of$Our$ruling$in$that$very$
implementation.$ case$ of$ Gonzales$ relied$ upon$ by$ intervenors$ should$ dispel$ any$ lingering$
$ misgivings$ as$ regards$ that$ point.$ Succinctly$ but$ comprehensively,$ Chief$ Justice$
Upon$these$facts,$the$main$thrust$of$the$petition$is$that$Organic$Resolution$No.$1$ Concepcion$held$for$the$Court$thus:$.$
and$the$other$implementing$resolutions$thereof$subsequently$approved$by$the$ $
Convention$ have$ no$ force$ and$ effect$ as$ laws$ in$ so$ far$ as$ they$ provide$ for$ the$ As$ early$ as$ Angara$ vs.$ Electoral$ Commission$ (63$ Phil.$ 139,$ 157),$ this$ Court$ $
holding$ of$ a$ plebiscite$ coSincident$ with$ the$ elections$ of$ eight$ senators$ and$ all$ speaking$through$one$of$the$leading$members$of$the$Constitutional$Convention$
city,$provincial$and$municipal$officials$to$be$held$on$November$8,$1971,$hence$all$ and$a$respected$professor$of$Constitutional$Law,$Dr.$Jose$P.$Laurel$ $declared$
of$ Comelec's$ acts$ in$ obedience$ thereof$ and$ tending$ to$ carry$ out$ the$ holding$ of$ that$ "the$ judicial$ department$ is$ the$ only$ constitutional$ organ$ which$ can$ be$
the$plebiscite$directed$by$said$resolutions$are$null$and$void,$on$the$ground$that$ called$ upon$ to$ determine$ the$ proper$ allocation$ of$ powers$ between$ the$ several$
the$ calling$ and$ holding$ of$ such$ a$ plebiscite$ is,$ by$ the$ Constitution,$ a$ power$ departments$and$among$the$integral$or$constituent$units$thereof."$
lodged$exclusively$in$Congress,$as$a$legislative$body,$and$may$not$be$exercised$ $
by$the$Convention,$and$that,$under$Section$1,$Article$XV$of$the$Constitution,$the$ It$ is$ true$ that$ in$ Mabanag$ v.$ Lopez$ Vito$ (supra),$ this$ Court$ characterizing$ the$
proposed$ amendment$ in$ question$ cannot$ be$ presented$ to$ the$ people$ for$ issue$ submitted$ thereto$ as$ a$ political$ one$ declined$ to$ pass$ upon$ the$ question$
ratification$separately$from$each$and$all$of$the$other$amendments$to$be$drafted$ whether$or$not$a$given$number$of$votes$cast$in$Congress$in$favor$of$a$proposed$
and$ proposed$ by$ the$ Convention.$ On$ the$ other$ hand,$ respondents$ and$ amendment$to$the$Constitution$$which$was$being$submitted$to$the$people$for$
intervenors$ posit$ that$ the$ power$ to$ provide$ for,$ fix$ the$ date$ and$ lay$ down$ the$ ratification$ $ satisfied$ the$ threeSfourths$ vote$ requirement$ of$ the$ fundamental$
details$ of$ the$ plebiscite$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ any$ amendment$ the$ Convention$ law.$The$force$of$this$precedent$has$been$weakened,$however,$by$Suanes$v.$Chief$
may$ deem$ proper$ to$ propose$ is$ within$ the$ authority$ of$ the$ Convention$ as$ a$ Accountant$of$the$Senate$(81$Phil.$818),$Avelino$v.$Cuenco,$(LS2851,$March$4$&$
necessary$consequence$and$part$of$its$power$to$propose$amendments$and$that$ 14,$ 1949),$ Taada$ v.$ Cuenco,$ (LS10520,$ Feb.$ 28,$ 1957)$ and$ Macias$ v.$
this$power$includes$that$of$submitting$such$amendments$either$individually$or$ Commission$on$Elections,$(LS18684,$Sept.$14,$1961).$In$the$first$we$held$that$the$
jointly$at$such$time$and$manner$as$the$Convention$may$direct$in$discretion.$The$ officers$ and$ employees$ of$ the$ Senate$ Electoral$ Tribunal$ are$ under$ its$
Court's$ delicate$ task$ now$ is$ to$ decide$ which$ of$ these$ two$ poses$ is$ really$ in$ supervision$ and$ control,$ not$ of$ that$ of$ the$ Senate$ President,$ as$ claimed$ by$ the$
accord$with$the$letter$and$spirit$of$the$Constitution.$ latter;$in$the$second,$this$Court$proceeded$to$determine$the$number$of$Senators$
necessary$ for$ quorum$ in$ the$ Senate;$ in$ the$ third,$ we$ nullified$ the$ election,$ by$
Senators$ belonging$ to$ the$ party$ having$ the$ largest$ number$ of$ votes$ in$ said$
chamber,$ purporting$ to$ act,$ on$ behalf$ of$ the$ party$ having$ the$ second$ largest$
number$ of$ votes$ therein$ of$ two$ (2)$ Senators$ belonging$ to$ the$ first$ party,$ as$
members,$ for$ the$ second$ party,$ of$ the$ Senate$ Electoral$ Tribunal;$ and$ in$ the$
fourth,$we$declared$unconstitutional$an$act$of$Congress$purporting$to$apportion$
the$representatives$districts$for$the$House$of$Representatives,$upon$the$ground$
that$the$apportionment$had$not$been$made$as$may$be$possible$according$to$the$
number$of$inhabitants$of$each$province.$Thus$we$rejected$the$theory,$advanced$
in$these$four$(4)$cases$that$the$issues$therein$raised$were$political$questions$the$
determination$of$which$is$beyond$judicial$review.$
$ true$that$the$convention$is$completely$without$restrain$and$omnipotent$all$wise,$
Indeed,$the$power$to$amend$the$Constitution$or$to$propose$amendments$thereto$
is$not$included$in$the$general$grant$of$legislative$powers$to$Congress$(Section$1,$
Art.$VI,$Constitution$of$the$Philippines).$It$is$part$of$the$inherent$powers$of$the$
people$ $ as$ the$ repository$ sovereignty$ in$ a$ republican$ state,$ such$ as$ ours$
(Section$ 1,$ Art.$ 11,$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines)$ $ to$ make,$ and,$ hence,$ to$
amend$their$own$Fundamental$Law.$Congress$may$propose$amendments$to$the$
Constitution$merely$because$the$same$explicitly$grants$such$power.$(Section$1,$
Art.$ XV,$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines)$ Hence,$ when$ exercising$ the$ same,$ it$ is$
said$ that$ Senators$ and$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ act,$ not$ as$
members$ of$ Congress,$ but$ as$ component$ elements$ of$ a$ constituent$ assembly.$
When$acting$as$such,$the$members$of$Congress$derive$their$authority$from$the$
Constitution,$ unlike$ the$ people,$ when$ performing$ the$ same$ function,$ (Of$
amending$ the$ Constitution)$ for$ their$ authority$ does$ not$ emanate$ from$ the$
Constitution$$they$are$the$very$source$of$all$powers$of$government$including$
the$Constitution$itself.$
$ $
Since,$ when$ proposing,$ as$ a$ constituent$ assembly,$ amendments$ to$ the$
Constitution,$ the$ members$ of$ Congress$ derive$ their$ authority$ from$ the$
Fundamental$Law,$it$follows,$necessarily,$that$they$do$not$have$the$final$say$on$
whether$or$not$their$acts$are$within$or$beyond$constitutional$limits.$Otherwise,$
they$ could$ brush$ aside$ and$ set$ the$ same$ at$ naught,$ contrary$ to$ the$ basic$ tenet$
that$ ours$ is$ a$ government$ of$ laws,$ not$ of$ men,$ and$ to$ the$ rigid$ nature$ of$ our$
Constitution.$Such$rigidity$is$stressed$by$the$fact$that$the$Constitution$expressly$
confers$upon$the$Supreme$Court,$(And,$inferentially,$to$lower$courts.)$the$power$
to$ declare$ a$ treaty$ unconstitutional.$ (Sec.$ 2(1),$ Art.$ VIII$ of$ the$ Constitution),$
despite$the$eminently$political$character$of$treatySmaking$power.$
$ the$performance$of$its$task$to$propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution$it$is$not$
In$ short,$ the$ issue$ whether$ or$ not$ a$ Resolution$ of$ Congress$ $ acting$ as$ a$
constituent$ assembly$ $ violates$ the$ Constitution$ is$ essentially$ justiciable$ not$
political,$and,$hence,$subject$to$judicial$review,$and,$to$the$extent$that$this$view$
may$be$inconsistent$with$the$stand$taken$in$Mabanag$v.$Lopez$Vito,$(supra)$the$
latter$ should$ be$ deemed$ modified$ accordingly.$ The$ Members$ of$ the$ Court$ are$
unanimous$on$this$point.$
$ pass$ any$ resolution$ providing$ for$ the$ taking$ of$ private$ property$ without$ just$
No$one$can$rightly$claim$that$within$the$domain$of$its$legitimate$authority,$the$
Convention$ is$ not$ supreme.$ Nowhere$ in$ his$ petition$ and$ in$ his$ oral$ argument$
and$ memoranda$ does$ petitioner$ point$ otherwise.$ Actually,$ what$ respondents$
and$ intervenors$ are$ seemingly$ reluctant$ to$ admit$ is$ that$ the$ Constitutional$
Convention$ of$ 1971,$ as$ any$ other$ convention$ of$ the$ same$ nature,$ owes$ its$
existence$and$derives$all$its$authority$and$power$from$the$existing$Constitution$
of$the$Philippines.$This$Convention$has$not$been$called$by$the$people$directly$as$
in$ the$ case$ of$ a$ revolutionary$ convention$ which$ drafts$ the$ first$ Constitution$ of$
an$ entirely$ new$ government$ born$ of$ either$ a$ war$ of$ liberation$ from$ a$ mother$
country$ or$ of$ a$ revolution$ against$ an$ existing$ government$ or$ of$ a$ bloodless$
seizure$of$power$a$la$coup$d'etat.$As$to$such$kind$of$conventions,$it$is$absolutely$
and$ it$ is$ as$ to$ such$ conventions$ that$ the$ remarks$ of$ Delegate$ Manuel$ Roxas$ of$
the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ of$ 1934$ quoted$ by$ Senator$ Pelaez$ refer.$ No$
amount$ of$ rationalization$ can$ belie$ the$ fact$ that$ the$ current$ convention$ came$
into$ being$ only$ because$ it$ was$ called$ by$ a$ resolution$ of$ a$ joint$ session$ of$
Congress$acting$as$a$constituent$assembly$by$authority$of$Section$1,$Article$XV$
of$the$present$Constitution$which$provides:$
$
ARTICLE$XV$$AMENDMENTS$
$
SECTION$1.$The$Congress$in$joint$session$assembled,$by$a$vote$of$threeSfourths$
of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ Senate$ and$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ voting$
separately,$ may$ propose$ amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution$ or$ call$ a$ convention$
for$ the$ purpose.$ Such$ amendments$ shall$ be$ valid$ as$ part$ of$ this$ Constitution$
when$ approved$ by$ a$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ at$ an$ election$ at$ which$ the$
amendments$are$submitted$to$the$people$for$their$ratification.$
True$ it$ is$ that$ once$ convened,$ this$ Convention$ became$ endowed$ with$ extra$
ordinary$powers$generally$beyond$the$control$of$any$department$of$the$existing$
government,$but$the$compass$of$such$powers$can$be$coSextensive$only$with$the$
purpose$for$which$the$convention$was$called$and$as$it$may$propose$cannot$have$
any$ effect$ as$ part$ of$ the$ Constitution$ until$ the$ same$ are$ duly$ ratified$ by$ the$
people,$ it$ necessarily$ follows$ that$ the$ acts$ of$ convention,$ its$ officers$ and$
members$ are$ not$ immune$ from$ attack$ on$ constitutional$ grounds.$ The$ present$
Constitution$is$in$full$force$and$effect$in$its$entirety$and$in$everyone$of$its$parts$
the$existence$of$the$Convention$notwithstanding,$and$operates$even$within$the$
walls$of$that$assembly.$While$it$is$indubitable$that$in$its$internal$operation$and$
subject$to$any$degree$of$restraint$or$control$by$any$other$authority$than$itself,$it$
is$ equally$ beyond$ cavil$ that$ neither$ the$ Convention$ nor$ any$ of$ its$ officers$ or$
members$ can$ rightfully$ deprive$ any$ person$ of$ life,$ liberty$ or$ property$ without$
due$ process$ of$ law,$ deny$ to$ anyone$ in$ this$ country$ the$ equal$ protection$ of$ the$
laws$or$the$freedom$of$speech$and$of$the$press$in$disregard$of$the$Bill$of$Rights$
of$ the$ existing$ Constitution.$ Nor,$ for$ that$ matter,$ can$ such$ Convention$ validly$
compensation$ or$ for$ the$ imposition$ or$ exacting$ of$ any$ tax,$ impost$ or$
assessment,$or$declare$war$or$call$the$Congress$to$a$special$session,$suspend$the$
privilege$of$the$writ$of$habeas$corpus,$pardon$a$convict$or$render$judgment$in$a$
controversy$ between$ private$ individuals$ or$ between$ such$ individuals$ and$ the$
state,$in$violation$of$the$distribution$of$powers$in$the$Constitution.$
$ moderating$ power$ of$ the$ courts,$ not$ to$ speak$ of$ its$ historical$ origin$ and$
It$ being$ manifest$ that$ there$ are$ powers$ which$ the$ Convention$ may$ not$ and$
cannot$validly$assert,$much$less$exercise,$in$the$light$of$the$existing$Constitution,$
the$ simple$ question$ arises,$ should$ an$ act$ of$ the$ Convention$ be$ assailed$ by$ a$
citizen$ as$ being$ among$ those$ not$ granted$ to$ or$ inherent$ in$ it,$ according$ to$ the$
existing$ Constitution,$ who$ can$ decide$ whether$ such$ a$ contention$ is$ correct$ or$
not?$ It$ is$ of$ the$ very$ essence$ of$ the$ rule$ of$ law$ that$ somehow$ somewhere$ the$
Power$and$duty$to$resolve$such$a$grave$constitutional$question$must$be$lodged$
on$ some$ authority,$ or$ we$ would$ have$ to$ confess$ that$ the$ integrated$ system$ of$
government$ established$ by$ our$ founding$ fathers$ contains$ a$ wide$ vacuum$ no$
intelligent$ man$ could$ ignore,$ which$ is$ naturally$ unworthy$ of$ their$ learning,$
experience$and$craftsmanship$in$constitutionSmaking.$
$ obligation$ assigned$ to$ it$ by$ the$ Constitution$ to$ determine$ conflicting$ claims$ of$
We$ need$ not$ go$ far$ in$ search$ for$ the$ answer$ to$ the$ query$ We$ have$ posed.$ The$
very$ decision$ of$ Chief$ Justice$ Concepcion$ in$ Gonzales,$ so$ much$ invoked$ by$
intervenors,$ reiterates$ and$ reinforces$ the$ irrefutable$ logic$ and$ wealth$ of$
principle$ in$ the$ opinion$ written$ for$ a$ unanimous$ Court$ by$ Justice$ Laurel$ in$
Angara$vs.$Electoral$Commission,$63$Phil.,$134,$reading:$
$ exercised$after$full$opportunity$of$argument$by$the$parties,$and$limited$further$
...$(I)n$the$main,$the$Constitution$has$blocked$out$with$deft$strokes$and$in$bold$
lines,$ allotment$ of$ power$ to$ the$ executive,$ the$ legislative$ and$ the$ judicial$
departments$ of$ the$ government.$ The$ overlapping$ and$ interlacing$ of$ functions$
and$ duties$ between$ the$ several$ departments,$ however,$ sometimes$ makes$ it$
hard$ to$ say$ where$ the$ one$ leaves$ off$ and$ the$ other$ begins.$ In$ times$ of$ social$
disquietude$ or$ political$ excitement,$ the$ great$ landmark$ of$ the$ Constitution$ are$
apt$to$be$forgotten$or$marred,$if$not$entirely$obliterated.$In$cases$of$conflict,$the$
judicial$department$is$the$only$constitutional$organ$which$can$be$called$upon$to$
determine$ the$ proper$ allocation$ of$ powers$ between$ the$ several$ departments$
and$among$the$integral$or$constituent$units$thereof.$
$ $
As$ any$ human$ production$ our$ Constitution$ is$ of$ course$ lacking$ perfection$ and$
perfectibility,$ but$ as$ much$ as$ it$ was$ within$ the$ power$ of$ our$ people,$ acting$
through$their$delegates$to$so$provide,$that$instrument$which$is$the$expression$of$
their$ sovereignty$ however$ limited,$ has$ established$ a$ republican$ government$
intended$ to$ operate$ and$ function$ as$ a$ harmonious$ whole,$ under$ a$ system$ of$
check$and$balances$and$subject$to$specific$limitations$and$restrictions$provided$
in$the$said$instrument.$The$Constitution$sets$forth$in$no$uncertain$language$the$
restrictions$ and$ limitations$ upon$ governmental$ powers$ and$ agencies.$ If$ these$
restrictions$ and$ limitations$ are$ transcended$ it$ would$ be$ inconceivable$ if$ the$
Constitution$had$not$provided$for$a$mechanism$by$which$to$direct$the$course$of$
government$ along$ constitutional$ channels,$ for$ then$ the$ distribution$ of$ powers$
would$be$mere$verbiage,$the$bill$of$rights$mere$expressions$of$sentiment$and$the$
principles$ of$ good$ government$ mere$ political$ apothegms.$ Certainly$ the$
limitations$and$restrictions$embodied$in$our$Constitution$are$real$as$they$should$
be$ in$ any$ living$ Constitution.$ In$ the$ United$ States$ where$ no$ express$
constitutional$ grant$ is$ found$ in$ their$ constitution,$ the$ possession$ of$ this$
development$there,$has$been$set$at$rest$by$popular$acquiescence$for$a$period$of$
more$than$one$and$half$centuries.$In$our$case,$this$moderating$power$is$granted,$
if$ not$ expressly,$ by$ clear$ implication$ from$ section$ 2$ of$ Article$ VIII$ of$ our$
Constitution.$
$
The$ Constitution$ is$ a$ definition$ of$ the$ powers$ or$ government.$ Who$ is$ to$
determine$the$nature,$scope$and$extent$of$such$powers?$The$Constitution$itself$
has$ provided$ for$ the$ instrumentality$ of$ the$ judiciary$ as$ the$ rational$ way.$ And$
when$ the$ judiciary$ mediates$ to$ allocate$ constitutional$ boundaries,$ it$ does$ not$
assert$any$superiority$over$the$other$departments;$it$does$not$in$reality$nullify$
or$ invalidate$ an$ act$ of$ the$ legislature,$ but$ only$ asserts$ the$ solemn$ and$ sacred$
authority$ under$ the$ Constitution$ and$ to$ establish$ for$ the$ parties$ in$ an$ actual$
controversy$ the$ rights$ which$ that$ instrument$ secures$ and$ guarantees$ to$ them.$
This$is$in$truth$all$that$is$involved$in$what$is$termed$"judicial$supremacy"$which$
properly$is$the$power$of$judicial$review$under$the$Constitution.$Even$then,$this$
power$ of$ judicial$ review$ is$ limited$ to$ actual$ cases$ and$ controversies$ to$ be$
to$the$constitutional$question$raised$or$the$very$lis$mota$presented.$Any$attempt$
at$ abstraction$ could$ only$ lead$ to$ dialectics$ and$ barren$ legal$ questions$ and$ to$
strike$ conclusions$ unrelated$ to$ actualities.$ Narrowed$ as$ its$ functions$ is$ in$ this$
manner$ the$ judiciary$ does$ not$ pass$ upon$ questions$ of$ wisdom,$ justice$ or$
expediency$ of$ legislation.$ More$ than$ that,$ courts$ accord$ the$ presumption$ of$
constitutionality$ to$ legislative$ enactments,$ not$ only$ because$ the$ legislature$ is$
presumed$ to$ abide$ by$ the$ Constitution$ but$ also$ because$ the$ judiciary$ in$ the$
determination$ of$ actual$ cases$ and$ controversies$ must$ reflect$ the$ wisdom$ and$
justice$of$the$people$as$expressed$through$their$representatives$in$the$executive$
and$legislative$departments$of$the$government.$
But$much$as$we$might$postulate$on$the$internal$checks$of$power$provided$in$our$
Constitution,$ it$ ought$ not$ the$ less$ to$ be$ remembered$ that,$ in$ the$ language$ of$
James$ Madison,$ the$ system$ itself$ is$ not$ "the$ chief$ palladium$ of$ constitutional$
liberty$...$the$people$who$are$authors$of$this$blessing$must$also$be$its$guardians$
...$their$eyes$must$be$ever$ready$to$mark,$their$voices$to$pronounce$...$aggression$
on$ the$ authority$ of$ their$ Constitution."$ In$ the$ last$ and$ ultimate$ analysis$ then,$
must$the$success$of$our$government$in$the$unfolding$years$to$come$be$tested$in$
the$crucible$of$Filipino$minds$and$hearts$than$in$consultation$rooms$and$court$
chambers.$
$
In$the$case$at$bar,$the$National$Assembly$has$by$resolution$(No.$8)$of$December$
3,$1935,$confirmed$the$election$of$the$herein$petitioner$to$the$said$body.$On$the$
other$hand,$the$Electoral$Commission$has$by$resolution$adopted$on$December$9,$
1935,$fixed$said$date$as$the$last$day$for$the$filing$of$protests$against$the$election,$
returns$ and$ qualifications$ of$ members$ of$ the$ National$ Assembly;$
notwithstanding$the$previous$confirmations$made$by$the$National$Assembly$as$
aforesaid.$ If,$ as$ contended$ by$ the$ petitioner,$ the$ resolution$ of$ the$ National$
Assembly$has$the$effect$of$cutting$off$the$power$of$the$Electoral$Commission$to$
entertain$protests$against$the$election,$returns$and$qualifications$of$members$of$
the$National$Assembly,$submitted$after$December$3,$1935$then$the$resolution$of$
the$Electoral$Commission$of$December$9,$1935,$is$mere$surplusage$and$had$no$
effect.$ But,$ if,$ as$ contended$ by$ the$ respondents,$ the$ Electoral$ Commission$ has$
the$ sole$ power$ of$ regulating$ its$ proceedings$ to$ the$ exclusion$ of$ the$ National$
Assembly,$ then$ the$ resolution$ of$ December$ 9,$ 1935,$ by$ which$ the$ Electoral$
Commission$fixed$said$date$as$the$last$day$for$filing$protests$against$the$election,$
returns$ and$ qualifications$ of$ members$ of$ the$ National$ Assembly,$ should$ be$
upheld.$
$ grant$ to$ the$ Electoral$ Commission$ as$ "the$ sole$ judge$ of$ all$ contests$ relating$ to$
Here$is$then$presented$an$actual$controversy$involving$as$it$does$a$conflict$of$a$
grave$constitutional$nature$between$the$National$Assembly$on$the$one$hand$and$
the$Electoral$Commission$on$the$other.$From$the$very$nature$of$the$republican$
government$established$in$our$country$in$the$light$of$American$experience$and$
of$our$own,$upon$the$judicial$department$is$thrown$the$solemn$and$inescapable$
obligation$ of$ interpreting$ the$ Constitution$ and$ defining$ constitutional$
boundaries.$ The$ Electoral$ Commission$ as$ we$ shall$ have$ occasion$ to$ refer$
hereafter,$ is$ a$ constitutional$ organ,$ created$ for$ a$ specific$ purpose,$ namely,$ to$
determine$all$contests$relating$to$the$election,$returns$and$qualifications$of$the$
members$of$the$National$Assembly.$Although$the$Electoral$Commission$may$not$
be$ interfered$ with,$ when$ and$ while$ acting$ within$ the$ limits$ of$ its$ authority,$ it$
does$ not$ follow$ that$ it$ is$ beyond$ the$ reach$ of$ the$ constitutional$ mechanism$
adopted$by$the$people$and$that$it$is$not$subject$to$constitutional$restriction.$The$
Electoral$Commission$is$not$a$separate$department$of$the$government,$and$even$
if$ it$ were,$ conflicting$ claims$ of$ authority$ under$ the$ fundamental$ law$ between$
departmental$ powers$ and$ agencies$ of$ the$ government$ are$ necessarily$
determined$by$the$judiciary$in$justiciable$and$appropriate$cases.$Discarding$the$
English$ type$ and$ other$ European$ types$ of$ constitutional$ government,$ the$
framers$ of$ our$ Constitution$ adopted$ the$ American$ type$ where$ the$ written$
constitution$is$interpreted$and$given$effect$by$the$judicial$department.$In$some$
countries$which$have$declined$to$follow$the$American$example,$provisions$have$
been$ inserted$ in$ their$ constitutions$ prohibiting$ the$ courts$ from$ exercising$ the$
power$to$interpret$the$fundamental$law.$This$is$taken$as$a$recognition$of$what$
otherwise$would$be$the$rule$that$in$the$absence$of$direct$prohibition,$courts$are$
bound$to$assume$what$is$logically$their$function.$For$instance,$the$Constitution$
of$ Poland$ of$ 1921$ expressly$ provides$ that$ courts$ shall$ have$ no$ power$ to$
examine$ the$ validity$ of$ statutes$ (art.$ 81,$ Chap.$ IV).$ The$ former$ Austrian$
Constitution$ contained$ a$ similar$ declaration.$ In$ countries$ whose$ constitution$
are$ silent$ in$ this$ respect,$ courts$ have$ assumed$ this$ power.$ This$ is$ true$ in$
Norway,$Greece,$Australia$and$South$Africa.$Whereas,$in$Czechoslovakia$(arts.$2$
and$3,$Preliminary$Law$to$Constitutional$Charter$of$the$Czechoslavak,$Republic,$
February$ 29,$ 1920)$ and$ Spain$ (arts.$ 121S123,$ Title$ IX,$ Constitution$ of$ the$
Republic$ of$ 1931)$ especial$ constitutional$ courts$ are$ established$ to$ pass$ upon$
the$validity$of$ordinary$laws.$In$our$case,$the$nature$of$the$present$controversy$
shows$the$necessity$of$a$final$constitutional$arbiter$to$determine$the$conflict$of$
authority$between$two$agencies$created$by$the$Constitution.$Were$we$to$decline$
to$ take$ cognizance$ of$ the$ controversy,$ who$ will$ determine$ the$ conflict?$ And$ if$
the$ conflict$ were$ left$ undecided$ and$ undetermined,$ would$ not$ a$ void$ be$ thus$
created$ in$ our$ constitutional$ system$ which$ may$ in$ the$ long$ run$ prove$
destructive$of$the$entire$framework?$To$ask$these$questions$is$to$answer$them.$
Natura$ vacuum$ abhorret,$ so$ must$ we$ avoid$ exhaustion$ in$ our$ constitutional$
system.$Upon$principle,$reason,$and$authority,$we$are$clearly$of$the$opinion$that$
upon$the$admitted$facts$of$the$present$case,$this$court$has$jurisdiction$over$the$
Electoral$Commission$and$the$subject$matter$of$the$present$controversy$for$the$
purpose$ of$ determining$ the$ character,$ scope$ and$ extent$ of$ the$ constitutional$
the$ election,$ returns$ and$ qualifications$ of$ the$ members$ of$ the$ National$
Assembly."$.$
$
As$ the$ Chief$ Justice$ has$ made$ it$ clear$ in$ Gonzales,$ like$ Justice$ Laurel$ did$ in$
Angara,$these$postulates$just$quoted$do$not$apply$only$to$conflicts$of$authority$
between$ the$ three$ existing$ regular$ departments$ of$ the$ government$ but$ to$ all$
such$conflicts$between$and$among$these$departments,$or,$between$any$of$them,$
on$the$one$hand,$and$any$other$constitutionally$created$independent$body,$like$
the$electoral$tribunals$in$Congress,$the$Comelec$and$the$Constituent$assemblies$
constituted$by$the$House$of$Congress,$on$the$other.$We$see$no$reason$of$logic$or$
principle$whatsoever,$and$none$has$been$convincingly$shown$to$Us$by$any$of$the$
respondents$ and$ intervenors,$ why$ the$ same$ ruling$ should$ not$ apply$ to$ the$
present$Convention,$even$if$it$is$an$assembly$of$delegate$elected$directly$by$the$
people,$ since$ at$ best,$ as$ already$ demonstrated,$ it$ has$ been$ convened$ by$
authority$of$and$under$the$terms$of$the$present$Constitution..$
$
Accordingly,$We$are$left$with$no$alternative$but$to$uphold$the$jurisdiction$of$the$
Court$over$the$present$case.$It$goes$without$saying$that$We$do$this$not$because$
the$Court$is$superior$to$the$Convention$or$that$the$Convention$is$subject$to$the$
control$of$the$Court,$but$simply$because$both$the$Convention$and$the$Court$are$
subject$to$the$Constitution$and$the$rule$of$law,$and$"upon$principle,$reason$and$
authority,"$ per$ Justice$ Laurel,$ supra,$ it$ is$ within$ the$ power$ as$ it$ is$ the$ solemn$
duty$of$the$Court,$under$the$existing$Constitution$to$resolve$the$issues$in$which$
petitioner,$respondents$and$intervenors$have$joined$in$this$case.$
$
II$
$
The$issue$of$jurisdiction$thus$resolved,$We$come$to$the$crux$of$the$petition.$Is$it$
within$the$powers$of$the$Constitutional$Convention$of$1971$to$order,$on$its$own$
fiat,$ the$ holding$ of$ a$ plebiscite$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendment$
reducing$to$eighteen$years$the$age$for$the$exercise$of$suffrage$under$Section$1$of$
Article$ V$ of$ the$ Constitution$ proposed$ in$ the$ Convention's$ Organic$ Resolution$
No.$ 1$ in$ the$ manner$ and$ form$ provided$ for$ in$ said$ resolution$ and$ the$
subsequent$implementing$acts$and$resolution$of$the$Convention?$
$ natural$ resources$ and$ the$ national$ patrimony,$ as$ an$ alternative$ to$ violent$ and$
At$the$threshold,$the$environmental$circumstances$of$this$case$demand$the$most$
accurate$ and$ unequivocal$ statement$ of$ the$ real$ issue$ which$ the$ Court$ is$ called$
upon$ to$ resolve.$ Petitioner$ has$ very$ clearly$ stated$ that$ he$ is$ not$ against$ the$
constitutional$ extension$ of$ the$ right$ of$ suffrage$ to$ the$ eighteenSyearSolds,$ as$ a$
matter$of$fact,$he$has$advocated$or$sponsored$in$Congress$such$a$proposal,$and$
that,$ in$ truth,$ the$ herein$ petition$ is$ not$ intended$ by$ him$ to$ prevent$ that$ the$
proposed$amendment$here$involved$be$submitted$to$the$people$for$ratification,$
his$ only$ purpose$ in$ filing$ the$ petition$ being$ to$ comply$ with$ his$ sworn$ duty$ to$
prevent,$ Whenever$ he$ can,$ any$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution$ of$ the$ Philippines$
even$if$it$is$committed$in$the$course$of$or$in$connection$with$the$most$laudable$
undertaking.$Indeed,$as$the$Court$sees$it,$the$specific$question$raised$in$this$case$
is$limited$solely$and$only$to$the$point$of$whether$or$not$it$is$within$the$power$of$
the$ Convention$ to$ call$ for$ a$ plebiscite$ for$ the$ ratification$ by$ the$ people$ of$ the$
constitutional$amendment$proposed$in$the$abovequoted$Organic$Resolution$No.$
1,$in$the$manner$and$form$provided$in$said$resolution$as$well$as$in$the$subject$
question$implementing$actions$and$resolution$of$the$Convention$and$its$officers,$
at$this$juncture$of$its$proceedings,$when$as$it$is$a$matter$of$common$knowledge$
and$ judicial$ notice,$ it$ is$ not$ set$ to$ adjourn$ sine$ die,$ and$ is,$ in$ fact,$ still$ in$ the$
preliminary$stages$of$considering$other$reforms$or$amendments$affecting$other$
parts$ of$ the$ existing$ Constitution;$ and,$ indeed,$ Organic$ Resolution$ No.$ 1$ itself$
expressly$ provides,$ that$ the$ amendment$ therein$ proposed$ "shall$ be$ without$
prejudice$to$other$amendments$that$will$be$proposed$in$the$future$by$the$1971$
Constitutional$Convention$on$other$portions$of$the$amended$section$or$on$other$
portions$of$the$entire$Constitution."$In$other$words,$nothing$that$the$Court$may$
say$ or$ do,$ in$ this$ case$ should$ be$ understood$ as$ reflecting,$ in$ any$ degree$ or$
means$ the$ individual$ or$ collective$ stand$ of$ the$ members$ of$ the$ Court$ on$ the$
fundamental$issue$of$whether$or$not$the$eighteenSyearSolds$should$be$allowed$
to$ vote,$ simply$ because$ that$ issue$ is$ not$ before$ Us$ now.$ There$ should$ be$ no$
doubt$ in$ the$ mind$ of$ anyone$ that,$ once$ the$ Court$ finds$ it$ constitutionally$
permissible,$ it$ will$ not$ hesitate$ to$ do$ its$ part$ so$ that$ the$ said$ proposed$
amendment$may$be$presented$to$the$people$for$their$approval$or$rejection.$
$ this$ case$ to$ be$ properly$ the$ one$ in$ which$ it$ should$ discharge$ its$ constitutional$
Withal,$the$Court$rests$securely$in$the$conviction$that$the$fire$and$enthusiasm$of$
the$ youth$ have$ not$ blinded$ them$ to$ the$ absolute$ necessity,$ under$ the$
fundamental$principles$of$democracy$to$which$the$Filipino$people$is$committed,$
of$adhering$always$to$the$rule$of$law.$Surely,$their$idealism,$sincerity$and$purity$
of$purpose$cannot$permit$any$other$line$of$conduct$or$approach$in$respect$of$the$
problem$before$Us.$The$Constitutional$Convention$of$1971$itself$was$born,$in$a$
great$ measure,$ because$ of$ the$ pressure$ brought$ to$ bear$ upon$ the$ Congress$ of$
the$ Philippines$ by$ various$ elements$ of$ the$ people,$ the$ youth$ in$ particular,$ in$
their$ incessant$ search$ for$ a$ peaceful$ and$ orderly$ means$ of$ bringing$ about$
meaningful$ changes$ in$ the$ structure$ and$ bases$ of$ the$ existing$ social$ and$
governmental$ institutions,$ including$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ fundamental$ law$
related$ to$ the$ wellSbeing$ and$ economic$ security$ of$ the$ underprivileged$ classes$
of$our$people$as$well$as$those$concerning$the$preservation$and$protection$of$our$
chaotic$ways$of$achieving$such$lofty$ideals.$In$brief,$leaving$aside$the$excesses$of$
enthusiasm$ which$ at$ times$ have$ justifiably$ or$ unjustifiably$ marred$ the$
demonstrations$ in$ the$ streets,$ plazas$ and$ campuses,$ the$ youth$ of$ the$
Philippines,$ in$ general,$ like$ the$ rest$ of$ the$ people,$ do$ not$ want$ confusion$ and$
disorder,$anarchy$and$violence;$what$they$really$want$are$law$and$order,$peace$
and$orderliness,$even$in$the$pursuit$of$what$they$strongly$and$urgently$feel$must$
be$done$to$change$the$present$order$of$things$in$this$Republic$of$ours.$It$would$
be$tragic$and$contrary$to$the$plain$compulsion$of$these$perspectives,$if$the$Court$
were$to$allow$itself$in$deciding$this$case$to$be$carried$astray$by$considerations$
other$than$the$imperatives$of$the$rule$of$law$and$of$the$applicable$provisions$of$
the$Constitution.$Needless$to$say,$in$a$larger$measure$than$when$it$binds$other$
departments$of$the$government$or$any$other$official$or$entity,$the$Constitution$
imposes$ upon$ the$ Court$ the$ sacred$ duty$ to$ give$ meaning$ and$ vigor$ to$ the$
Constitution,$by$interpreting$and$construing$its$provisions$in$appropriate$cases$
with$the$proper$parties,$and$by$striking$down$any$act$violative$thereof.$Here,$as$
in$all$other$cases,$We$are$resolved$to$discharge$that$duty.$
$
During$ these$ twice$ when$ most$ anyone$ feels$ very$ strongly$ the$ urgent$ need$ for$
constitutional$reforms,$to$the$point$of$being$convinced$that$meaningful$change$
is$the$only$alternative$to$a$violent$revolution,$this$Court$would$be$the$last$to$put$
any$obstruction$or$impediment$to$the$work$of$the$Constitutional$Convention.$If$
there$are$respectable$sectors$opining$that$it$has$not$been$called$to$supplant$the$
existing$Constitution$in$its$entirety,$since$its$enabling$provision,$Article$XV,$from$
which$ the$ Convention$ itself$ draws$ life$ expressly$ speaks$ only$ of$ amendments$
which$shall$form$part$of$it,$which$opinion$is$not$without$persuasive$force$both$in$
principle$ and$ in$ logic,$ the$ seemingly$ prevailing$ view$ is$ that$ only$ the$ collective$
judgment$ of$ its$ members$ as$ to$ what$ is$ warranted$ by$ the$ present$ condition$ of$
things,$ as$ they$ see$ it,$ can$ limit$ the$ extent$ of$ the$ constitutional$ innovations$ the$
Convention$ may$ propose,$ hence$ the$ complete$ substitution$ of$ the$ existing$
constitution$is$not$beyond$the$ambit$of$the$Convention's$authority.$Desirable$as$
it$may$be$to$resolve,$this$grave$divergence$of$views,$the$Court$does$not$consider$
duty$in$such$premises.$The$issues$raised$by$petitioner,$even$those$among$them$
in$which$respondents$and$intervenors$have$joined$in$an$apparent$wish$to$have$
them$squarely$passed$upon$by$the$Court$do$not$necessarily$impose$upon$Us$the$
imperative$obligation$to$express$Our$views$thereon.$The$Court$considers$it$to$be$
of$ the$ utmost$ importance$ that$ the$ Convention$ should$ be$ untrammelled$ and$
unrestrained$in$the$performance$of$its$constitutionally$as$signed$mission$in$the$
manner$and$form$it$may$conceive$best,$and$so$the$Court$may$step$in$to$clear$up$
doubts$as$to$the$boundaries$set$down$by$the$Constitution$only$when$and$to$the$
specific$extent$only$that$it$would$be$necessary$to$do$so$to$avoid$a$constitutional$
crisis$or$a$clearly$demonstrable$violation$of$the$existing$Charter.$Withal,$it$is$a$
very$familiar$principle$of$constitutional$law$that$constitutional$questions$are$to$
be$resolved$by$the$Supreme$Court$only$when$there$is$no$alternative$but$to$do$it,$
and$this$rule$is$founded$precisely$on$the$principle$of$respect$that$the$Court$must$
accord$to$the$acts$of$the$other$coordinate$departments$of$the$government,$and$
certainly,$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ stands$ almost$ in$ a$ unique$ footing$ in$
that$regard.$
$ to$be$proposed$by$the$Convention$is$exclusively$legislative$and$as$such$may$be$
In$our$discussion$of$the$issue$of$jurisdiction,$We$have$already$made$it$clear$that$
the$Convention$came$into$being$by$a$call$of$a$joint$session$of$Congress$pursuant$
to$ Section$ I$ of$ Article$ XV$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ already$ quoted$ earlier$ in$ this$
opinion.$We$reiterate$also$that$as$to$matters$not$related$to$its$internal$operation$
and$ the$ performance$ of$ its$ assigned$ mission$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$
Constitution,$the$Convention$and$its$officers$and$members$are$all$subject$to$all$
the$ provisions$ of$ the$ existing$ Constitution.$ Now$ We$ hold$ that$ even$ as$ to$ its$
latter$ task$ of$ proposing$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ it$ is$ subject$ to$ the$
provisions$ of$ Section$ I$ of$ Article$ XV.$ This$ must$ be$ so,$ because$ it$ is$ plain$ to$ Us$
that$the$framers$of$the$Constitution$took$care$that$the$process$of$amending$the$
same$should$not$be$undertaken$with$the$same$ease$and$facility$in$changing$an$
ordinary$ legislation.$ Constitution$ making$ is$ the$ most$ valued$ power,$ second$ to$
none,$of$the$people$in$a$constitutional$democracy$such$as$the$one$our$founding$
fathers$have$chosen$for$this$nation,$and$which$we$of$the$succeeding$generations$
generally$cherish.$And$because$the$Constitution$affects$the$lives,$fortunes,$future$
and$ every$ other$ conceivable$ aspect$ of$ the$ lives$ of$ all$ the$ people$ within$ the$
country$ and$ those$ subject$ to$ its$ sovereignty,$ every$ degree$ of$ care$ is$ taken$ in$
preparing$ and$ drafting$ it.$ A$ constitution$ worthy$ of$ the$ people$ for$ which$ it$ is$
intended$ must$ not$ be$ prepared$ in$ haste$ without$ adequate$ deliberation$ and$
study.$It$is$obvious$that$correspondingly,$any$amendment$of$the$Constitution$is$
of$ no$ less$ importance$ than$ the$ whole$ Constitution$ itself,$ and$ perforce$ must$ be$
conceived$ and$ prepared$ with$ as$ much$ care$ and$ deliberation.$ From$ the$ very$
nature$ of$ things,$ the$ drafters$ of$ an$ original$ constitution,$ as$ already$ observed$
earlier,$operate$without$any$limitations,$restraints$or$inhibitions$save$those$that$
they$ may$ impose$ upon$ themselves.$ This$ is$ not$ necessarily$ true$ of$ subsequent$
conventions$called$to$amend$the$original$constitution.$Generally,$the$framers$of$
the$ latter$ see$ to$ it$ that$ their$ handiwork$ is$ not$ lightly$ treated$ and$ as$ easily$
mutilated$ or$ changed,$ not$ only$ for$ reasons$ purely$ personal$ but$ more$
importantly,$because$written$constitutions$are$supposed$to$be$designed$so$as$to$
last$for$some$time,$if$not$for$ages,$or$for,$at$least,$as$long$as$they$can$be$adopted$
to$the$needs$and$exigencies$of$the$people,$hence,$they$must$be$insulated$against$
precipitate$and$hasty$actions$motivated$by$more$or$less$passing$political$moods$
or$fancies.$Thus,$as$a$rule,$the$original$constitutions$carry$with$them$limitations$
and$ conditions,$ more$ or$ less$ stringent,$ made$ so$ by$ the$ people$ themselves,$ in$
regard$ to$ the$ process$ of$ their$ amendment.$ And$ when$ such$ limitations$ or$
conditions$are$so$incorporated$in$the$original$constitution,$it$does$not$lie$in$the$
delegates$ of$ any$ subsequent$ convention$ to$ claim$ that$ they$ may$ ignore$ and$
disregard$such$conditions$because$they$are$as$powerful$and$omnipotent$as$their$
original$counterparts.$
$
Nothing$of$what$is$here$said$is$to$be$understood$as$curtailing$in$any$degree$the$
number$ and$ nature$ and$ the$ scope$ and$ extent$ of$ the$ amendments$ the$
Convention$ may$ deem$ proper$ to$ propose.$ Nor$ does$ the$ Court$ propose$ to$ pass$
on$the$issue$extensively$and$brilliantly$discussed$by$the$parties$as$to$whether$or$
not$the$power$or$duty$to$call$a$plebiscite$for$the$ratification$of$the$amendments$
exercised$ only$ by$ the$ Congress$ or$ whether$ the$ said$ power$ can$ be$ exercised$
concurrently$by$the$Convention$with$the$Congress.$In$the$view$the$Court$takes$
of$present$case,$it$does$not$perceive$absolute$necessity$to$resolve$that$question,$
grave$and$important$as$it$may$be.$Truth$to$tell,$the$lack$of$unanimity$or$even$of$a$
consensus$among$the$members$of$the$Court$in$respect$to$this$issue$creates$the$
need$for$more$study$and$deliberation,$and$as$time$is$of$the$essence$in$this$case,$
for$obvious$reasons,$November$8,$1971,$the$date$set$by$the$Convention$for$the$
plebiscite$ it$ is$ calling,$ being$ nigh,$ We$ will$ refrain$ from$ making$ any$
pronouncement$ or$ expressing$ Our$ views$ on$ this$ question$ until$ a$ more$
appropriate$case$comes$to$Us.$After$all,$the$basis$of$this$decision$is$as$important$
and$decisive$as$any$can$be.$
$
The$ ultimate$ question,$ therefore$ boils$ down$ to$ this:$ Is$ there$ any$ limitation$ or$
condition$in$Section$1$of$Article$XV$of$the$Constitution$which$is$violated$by$the$
act$ of$ the$ Convention$ of$ calling$ for$ a$ plebiscite$ on$ the$ sole$ amendment$
contained$ in$ Organic$ Resolution$ No.$ 1?$ The$ Court$ holds$ that$ there$ is,$ and$ it$ is$
the$ condition$ and$ limitation$ that$ all$ the$ amendments$ to$ be$ proposed$ by$ the$
same$ Convention$ must$ be$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ in$ a$ single$ "election"$ or$
plebiscite.$ It$ being$ indisputable$ that$ the$ amendment$ now$ proposed$ to$ be$
submitted$ to$ a$ plebiscite$ is$ only$ the$ first$ amendment$ the$ Convention$ propose$
We$hold$that$the$plebiscite$being$called$for$the$purpose$of$submitting$the$same$
for$ratification$of$the$people$on$November$8,$1971$is$not$authorized$by$Section$
1$ of$ Article$ XV$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ hence$ all$ acts$ of$ the$ Convention$ and$ the$
respondent$Comelec$in$that$direction$are$null$and$void.$
$
We$have$arrived$at$this$conclusion$for$the$following$reasons:$
$
1.$ The$language$of$the$constitutional$provision$aforequoted$is$sufficiently$
clear.$lt$says$distinctly$that$either$Congress$sitting$as$a$constituent$assembly$or$a$
convention$ called$ for$ the$ purpose$ "may$ propose$ amendments$ to$ this$
Constitution,"$ thus$ placing$ no$ limit$ as$ to$ the$ number$ of$ amendments$ that$
Congress$or$the$Convention$may$propose.$The$same$provision$also$as$definitely$
provides$that$"such$amendments$shall$be$valid$as$part$of$this$Constitution$when$
approved$by$a$majority$of$the$votes$cast$at$an$election$at$which$the$amendments$
are$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ for$ their$ ratification,"$ thus$ leaving$ no$ room$ for$
doubt$ as$ to$ how$ many$ "elections"$ or$ plebiscites$ may$ be$ held$ to$ ratify$ any$
amendment$ or$ amendments$ proposed$ by$ the$ same$ constituent$ assembly$ of$
Congress$ or$ convention,$ and$ the$ provision$ unequivocably$ says$ "an$ election"$
which$means$only$one.$
$ the$verge$of$introducing$substantial$changes,$if$not$radical$ones,$in$almost$every$
(2)$ Very$ little$ reflection$ is$ needed$ for$ anyone$ to$ realize$ the$ wisdom$ and$
appropriateness$of$this$provision.$As$already$stated,$amending$the$Constitution$
is$as$serious$and$important$an$undertaking$as$constitution$making$itself.$Indeed,$
any$ amendment$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$ as$ important$ as$ the$ whole$ of$ it$ if$ only$
because$the$Constitution$has$to$be$an$integrated$and$harmonious$instrument,$if$
it$is$to$be$viable$as$the$framework$of$the$government$it$establishes,$on$the$one$
hand,$and$adequately$formidable$and$reliable$as$the$succinct$but$comprehensive$
articulation$ of$ the$ rights,$ liberties,$ ideology,$ social$ ideals,$ and$ national$ and$
nationalistic$ policies$ and$ aspirations$ of$ the$ people,$ on$ the$ other.$ lt$ is$
inconceivable$how$a$constitution$worthy$of$any$country$or$people$can$have$any$
part$which$is$out$of$tune$with$its$other$parts..$
$ present$state$of$things,$where$the$Convention$has$hardly$started$considering$the$
A$constitution$is$the$work$of$the$people$thru$its$drafters$assembled$by$them$for$
the$purpose.$Once$the$original$constitution$is$approved,$the$part$that$the$people$
play$ in$ its$ amendment$ becomes$ harder,$ for$ when$ a$ whole$ constitution$ is$
submitted$to$them,$more$or$less$they$can$assumed$its$harmony$as$an$integrated$
whole,$ and$ they$ can$ either$ accept$ or$ reject$ it$ in$ its$ entirety.$ At$ the$ very$ least,$
they$can$examine$it$before$casting$their$vote$and$determine$for$themselves$from$
a$study$of$the$whole$document$the$merits$and$demerits$of$all$or$any$of$its$parts$
and$of$the$document$as$a$whole.$And$so$also,$when$an$amendment$is$submitted$
to$them$that$is$to$form$part$of$the$existing$constitution,$in$like$fashion$they$can$
study$ with$ deliberation$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ in$ relation$ to$ the$ whole$
existing$constitution$and$or$any$of$its$parts$and$thereby$arrive$at$an$intelligent$
judgment$as$to$its$acceptability.$
$ submission".$
This$ cannot$ happen$ in$ the$ case$ of$ the$ amendment$ in$ question.$ Prescinding$
already$ from$ the$ fact$ that$ under$ Section$ 3$ of$ the$ questioned$ resolution,$ it$ is$
evident$that$no$fixed$frame$of$reference$is$provided$the$voter,$as$to$what$finally$
will$be$concomitant$qualifications$that$will$be$required$by$the$final$draft$of$the$
constitution$ to$ be$ formulated$ by$ the$ Convention$ of$ a$ voter$ to$ be$ able$ to$ enjoy$
the$right$of$suffrage,$there$are$other$considerations$which$make$it$impossible$to$
vote$ intelligently$ on$ the$ proposed$ amendment,$ although$ it$ may$ already$ be$
observed$that$under$Section$3,$if$a$voter$would$favor$the$reduction$of$the$voting$
age$to$eighteen$under$conditions$he$feels$are$needed$under$the$circumstances,$
and$ he$ does$ not$ see$ those$ conditions$ in$ the$ ballot$ nor$ is$ there$ any$ possible$
indication$ whether$ they$ will$ ever$ be$ or$ not,$ because$ Congress$ has$ reserved$
those$for$future$action,$what$kind$of$judgment$can$he$render$on$the$proposal?$
$ No.$1$and$all$subsequent$acts$of$the$Convention$implementing$the$same$violate$
But$the$situation$actually$before$Us$is$even$worse.$No$one$knows$what$changes$
in$the$fundamental$principles$of$the$constitution$the$Convention$will$be$minded$
to$ approve.$ To$ be$ more$ specific,$ we$ do$ not$ have$ any$ means$ of$ foreseeing$
whether$the$right$to$vote$would$be$of$any$significant$value$at$all.$Who$can$say$
whether$or$not$later$on$the$Convention$may$decide$to$provide$for$varying$types$
of$voters$for$each$level$of$the$political$units$it$may$divide$the$country$into.$The$
root$of$the$difficulty$in$other$words,$lies$in$that$the$Convention$is$precisely$on$
part$ and$ aspect$ of$ the$ existing$ social$ and$ political$ order$ enshrined$ in$ the$
present$ Constitution.$ How$ can$ a$ voter$ in$ the$ proposed$ plebiscite$ intelligently$
determine$ the$ effect$ of$ the$ reduction$ of$ the$ voting$ age$ upon$ the$ different$
institutions$ which$ the$ Convention$ may$ establish$ and$ of$ which$ presently$ he$ is$
not$given$any$idea?$
$
We$are$certain$no$one$can$deny$that$in$order$that$a$plebiscite$for$the$ratification$
of$ an$ amendment$ to$ the$ Constitution$ may$ be$ validly$ held,$ it$ must$ provide$ the$
voter$not$only$sufficient$time$but$ample$basis$for$an$intelligent$appraisal$of$the$
nature$of$the$amendment$per$se$as$well$as$its$relation$to$the$other$parts$of$the$
Constitution$with$which$it$has$to$form$a$harmonious$whole.$In$the$context$of$the$
merits$ of$ hundreds,$ if$ not$ thousands,$ of$ proposals$ to$ amend$ the$ existing$
Constitution,$ to$ present$ to$ the$ people$ any$ single$ proposal$ or$ a$ few$ of$ them$
cannot$ comply$ with$ this$ requirement.$ We$ are$ of$ the$ opinion$ that$ the$ present$
Constitution$ does$ not$ contemplate$ in$ Section$ 1$ of$ Article$ XV$ a$ plebiscite$ or$
"election"$wherein$the$people$are$in$the$dark$as$to$frame$of$reference$they$can$
base$ their$ judgment$ on.$ We$ reject$ the$ rationalization$ that$ the$ present$
Constitution$ is$ a$ possible$ frame$ of$ reference,$ for$ the$ simple$ reason$ that$
intervenors$ themselves$ are$ stating$ that$ the$ sole$ purpose$ of$ the$ proposed$
amendment$ is$ to$ enable$ the$ eighteen$ year$ olds$ to$ take$ part$ in$ the$ election$ for$
the$ ratification$ of$ the$ Constitution$ to$ be$ drafted$ by$ the$ Convention.$ In$ brief,$
under$the$proposed$plebiscite,$there$can$be,$in$the$language$of$Justice$Sanchez,$
speaking$ for$ the$ six$ members$ of$ the$ Court$ in$ Gonzales,$ supra,$ "no$ proper$
$
III$
$
The$Court$has$no$desire$at$all$to$hamper$and$hamstring$the$noble$work$of$the$
Constitutional$Convention.$Much$less$does$the$Court$want$to$pass$judgment$on$
the$merits$of$the$proposal$to$allow$these$eighteen$years$old$to$vote.$But$like$the$
Convention,$ the$ Court$ has$ its$ own$ duties$ to$ the$ people$ under$ the$ Constitution$
which$is$to$decide$in$appropriate$cases$with$appropriate$parties$Whether$or$not$
the$mandates$of$the$fundamental$law$are$being$complied$with.$In$the$best$light$
God$has$given$Us,$we$are$of$the$conviction$that$in$providing$for$the$questioned$
plebiscite$ before$ it$ has$ finished,$ and$ separately$ from,$ the$ whole$ draft$ of$ the$
constitution$it$has$been$called$to$formulate,$the$Convention's$Organic$Resolution$
the$condition$in$Section$1,$Article$XV$that$there$should$only$be$one$"election"$or$
plebiscite$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ all$ the$ amendments$ the$ Convention$ may$
propose.$ We$ are$ not$ denying$ any$ right$ of$ the$ people$ to$ vote$ on$ the$ proposed$
amendment;$ We$ are$ only$ holding$ that$ under$ Section$ 1,$ Article$ XV$ of$ the$
Constitution,$ the$ same$ should$ be$ submitted$ to$ them$ not$ separately$ from$ but$
together$ with$ all$ the$ other$ amendments$ to$ be$ proposed$ by$ this$ present$
Convention.$
$
IN$ VIEW$ OF$ ALL$ THE$ FOREGOING,$ the$ petition$ herein$ is$ granted.$ Organic$
Resolution$No.$1$of$the$Constitutional$Convention$of$1971$and$the$implementing$
acts$and$resolutions$of$the$Convention,$insofar$as$they$provide$for$the$holding$of$
a$ plebiscite$ on$ November$ 8,$ 1971,$ as$ well$ as$ the$ resolution$ of$ the$ respondent$
Comelec$complying$therewith$(RR$Resolution$No.$695)$are$hereby$declared$null$
and$ void.$ The$ respondents$ Comelec,$ Disbursing$ Officer,$ Chief$ Accountant$ and$
Auditor$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Convention$ are$ hereby$ enjoined$ from$ taking$ any$
action$ in$ compliance$ with$ the$ said$ organic$ resolution.$ In$ view$ of$ the$ peculiar$
circumstances$ of$ this$ case,$ the$ Court$ declares$ this$ decision$ immediately$
executory.$No$costs.$
$
Concepcion,$C.J.,$Teehankee,$Villamor$and$Makasiar,$JJ.,$concur.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$LS44640$October$12,$1976$ referendumSplebiscite$on$October$16,$1976.$The$Decree$recites$in$its$"whereas"$
$ clauses$that$the$people's$continued$opposition$to$the$convening$of$the$National$
PABLO$C.$SANIDAD$and$PABLITO$V.$SANIDAD,$petitioner,$$ Assembly$evinces$their$desire$to$have$such$body$abolished$and$replaced$thru$a$
vs.$ constitutional$ amendment,$ providing$ for$ a$ legislative$ body,$ which$ will$ be$
HONORABLE$ COMMISSION$ ON$ ELECTIONS$ and$ HONORABLE$ NATIONAL$ submitted$directly$to$the$people$in$the$referendumSplebiscite$of$October$16.$
TREASURER,$respondents.$ $
$ The$questions$ask,$to$wit:$
G.R.$No.$LS44684.$October$12,1976$ $
$ (1)$ Do$you$want$martial$law$to$be$continued?$
VICENTE$M.$GUZMAN,$petitioner,$$ $
vs.$ (2)$ Whether$or$not$you$want$martial$law$to$be$continued,$do$you$approve$
COMMISSION$ELECTIONS,$respondent.$ the$ following$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution?$ For$ the$ purpose$ of$ the$ second$
$ question,$ the$ referendum$ shall$ have$ the$ effect$ of$ a$ plebiscite$ within$ the$
G.R.$No.$LS44714.$October$12,1976$ contemplation$of$Section$2$of$Article$XVI$of$the$Constitution.$
$ $
RAUL$ M.$ GONZALES,$ RAUL$ T.$ GONZALES,$ JR.,$ and$ ALFREDO$ SALAPANTAN,$ PROPOSED$AMENDMENTS:$
petitioners,$$ $
vs.$ 1.$ There$ shall$ be,$ in$ lieu$ of$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly,$ an$ interim$
HONORABLE$ COMMISSION$ ON$ SELECTIONS$ and$ HONORABLE$ NATIONAL$ Batasang$ Pambansa.$ Members$ of$ the$ interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ which$ shall$
TREASURER,$respondents.$ not$ be$ more$ than$ 120,$ unless$ otherwise$ provided$ by$ law,$ shall$ include$ the$
$ incumbent$ President$ of$ the$ Philippines,$ representatives$ elected$ from$ the$
MARTIN,$J,:$ different$regions$of$the$nation,$those$who$shall$not$be$less$than$eighteen$years$
$ of$ age$ elected$ by$ their$ respective$ sectors,$ and$ those$ chosen$ by$ the$ incumbent$
The$ capital$ question$ raised$ in$ these$ prohibition$ suits$ with$ preliminary$ President$ from$ the$ members$ of$ the$ Cabinet.$ Regional$ representatives$ shall$ be$
injunction$relates$to$the$power$of$the$incumbent$President$of$the$Philippines$to$ apportioned$ among$ the$ regions$ in$ accordance$ with$ the$ number$ of$ their$
propose$amendments$to$the$present$Constitution$in$the$absence$of$the$interim$ respective$inhabitants$and$on$the$basis$of$a$uniform$and$progressive$ratio$while$
National$Assembly$which$has$not$been$convened.$ the$ sectors$ shall$ be$ determined$ by$ law.$ The$ number$ of$ representatives$ from$
$ each$region$or$sector$and$the,$manner$of$their$election$shall$be$prescribed$and$
On$ September$ 2,$ 1976,$ President$ Ferdinand$ E.$ Marcos$ issued$ Presidential$ regulated$by$law.$
Decree$ No.$ 991$ calling$ for$ a$ national$ referendum$ on$ October$ 16,$ 1976$ for$ the$ $
Citizens$Assemblies$("barangays")$to$resolve,$among$other$things,$the$issues$of$ 2.$ The$ interim$ Batasang$ Pambansa$ shall$ have$ the$ same$ powers$ and$ its$
martial$law,$the$I$.$assembly,$its$replacement,$the$powers$of$such$replacement,$ members$shall$have$the$same$functions,$responsibilities,$rights,$privileges,$and$
the$ period$ of$ its$ existence,$ the$ length$ of$ the$ period$ for$ tile$ exercise$ by$ the$ disqualifications$ as$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ and$ the$ regular$ National$
President$of$his$present$powers.1$ Assembly$ and$ the$ members$ thereof.$ However,$ it$ shall$ not$ exercise$ the$ power$
$ provided$in$Article$VIII,$Section$14(l)$of$the$Constitution.$
Twenty$ days$ after$ or$ on$ September$ 22,$ 1976,$ the$ President$ issued$ another$ $
related$ decree,$ Presidential$ Decree$ No.$ 1031,$ amending$ the$ previous$ 3.$ The$incumbent$President$of$the$Philippines$shall,$within$30$days$from$
Presidential$Decree$No.$991,$by$declaring$the$provisions$of$presidential$Decree$ the$ election$ and$ selection$ of$ the$ members,$ convene$ the$ interim$ Batasang$
No.$229$providing$for$the$manner$of$voting$and$canvass$of$votes$in$"barangays"$ Pambansa$ and$ preside$ over$ its$ sessions$ until$ the$ Speaker$ shall$ have$ been$
(Citizens$ Assemblies)$ applicable$ to$ the$ national$ referendumSplebiscite$ of$ elected.$The$incumbent$President$of$the$Philippines$shall$be$the$Prime$Minister$
October$ 16,$ 1976.$ Quite$ relevantly,$ Presidential$ Decree$ No.$ 1031$ repealed$ and$he$shall$continue$to$exercise$all$his$powers$even$after$the$interim$Batasang$
Section$ 4,$ of$ Presidential$ Decree$ No.$ 991,$ the$ full$ text$ of$ which$ (Section$ 4)$ is$ Pambansa$ is$ organized$ and$ ready$ to$ discharge$ its$ functions$ and$ likewise$ he$
quoted$in$the$footnote$below.$2$ shall$ continue$ to$ exercise$ his$ powers$ and$ prerogatives$ under$ the$ nineteen$
$ hundred$ and$ thirty$ five.$ Constitution$ and$ the$ powers$ vested$ in$ the$ President$
On$ the$ same$ date$ of$ September$ 22,$ 1976,$ the$ President$ issued$ Presidential$ and$the$Prime$Minister$under$this$Constitution.$
Decree$ No.$ 1033,$ stating$ the$ questions$ to$ be$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ in$ the$ $
4.$ The$ President$ (Prime$ Minister)$ and$ his$ Cabinet$ shall$ exercise$ all$ the$ Petitioners$ contend$ that$ under$ the$ 1935$ and$ 1973$ Constitutions$ there$ is$ no$
powers$ and$ functions,$ and$ discharge$ the$ responsibilities$ of$ the$ regular$ grant$to$the$incumbent$President$to$exercise$the$constituent$power$to$propose$
President$ (Prime$ Minister)$ and$ his$ Cabinet,$ and$ shall$ be$ subject$ only$ to$ such$ amendments$ to$ the$ new$ Constitution.$ As$ a$ consequence,$ the$ ReferendumS
disqualifications$as$the$President$(Prime$Minister)$may$prescribe.$The$President$ Plebiscite$on$October$16$has$no$constitutional$or$legal$basis.$
(Prime$ Minister)$ if$ he$ so$ desires$ may$ appoint$ a$ Deputy$ Prime$ Minister$ or$ as$ $
many$Deputy$Prime$Ministers$as$he$may$deem$necessary.$ On$ October$ 5,$ 1976,$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ filed$ the$ comment$ for$ respondent$
$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ The$ Solicitor$ General$ principally$ maintains$ that$
5.$ The$ incumbent$ President$ shall$ continue$ to$ exercise$ legislative$ powers$ petitioners$ have$ no$ standing$ to$ sue;$ the$ issue$ raised$ is$ political$ in$ nature,$
until$martial$law$shall$have$been$lifted.$ beyond$ judicial$ cognizance$ of$ this$ Court;$ at$ this$ state$ of$ the$ transition$ period,$
$ only$ the$ incumbent$ President$ has$ the$ authority$ to$ exercise$ constituent$ power;$
6.$ Whenever$ in$ the$ judgment$ of$ the$ President$ (Prime$ Minister),$ there$ the$referendumSplebiscite$is$a$step$towards$normalization.$
exists$ a$ grave$ emergency$ or$ a$ threat$ or$ imminence$ thereof,$ or$ whenever$ the$ $
interim$Batasang$Pambansa$or$the$regular$National$Assembly$fails$or$is$unable$ On$ September$ 30,$ 1976,$ another$ action$ for$ Prohibition$ with$ Preliminary$
to$ act$ adequately$ on$ any$ matter$ for$ any$ reason$ that$ in$ his$ judgment$ requires$ Injunction,$ docketed$ as$ LS44684,$ was$ instituted$ by$ VICENTE$ M.$ GUZMAN,$ a$
immediate$ action,$ he$ may,$ in$ order$ to$ meet$ the$ exigency,$ issue$ the$ necessary$ delegate$ to$ the$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Convention,$ asserting$ that$ the$ power$ to$
decrees,$orders$or$letters$of$instructions,$which$shall$form$part$of$the$law$of$the$ propose$ amendments$ to,$ or$ revision$ of$ the$ Constitution$ during$ the$ transition$
land.$ period$ is$ expressly$ conferred$ on$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ under$ Section$
$ 16,$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution.3$
7.$ The$barangays$and$sanggunians$shall$continue$as$presently$constituted$ $
but$their$functions,$powers,$and$composition$may$be$altered$by$law.$ Still$ another$ petition$ for$ Prohibition$ with$ Preliminary$ Injunction$ was$ filed$ on$
$ October$ 5,$ 1976$ by$ RAUL$ M.$ GONZALES,$ his$ son$ RAUL,$ JR.,$ and$ ALFREDO$
Referenda$ conducted$ thru$ the$ barangays$ and$ under$ the$ Supervision$ of$ the$ SALAPANTAN,$ docketed$ as$ LS$ 44714,$ to$ restrain$ the$ implementation$ of$
Commission$ on$ Elections$ may$ be$ called$ at$ any$ time$ the$ government$ deems$ it$ Presidential$ Decrees$ relative$ to$ the$ forthcoming$ ReferendumSPlebiscite$ of$
necessary$ to$ ascertain$ the$ will$ of$ the$ people$ regarding$ any$ important$ matter$ October$16.$
whether$of$national$or$local$interest.$ $
$ These$ last$ petitioners$ argue$ that$ even$ granting$ him$ legislative$ powers$ under$
8.$ All$ provisions$ of$ this$ Constitution$ not$ inconsistent$ with$ any$ of$ these$ Martial$ Law,$ the$ incumbent$ President$ cannot$ act$ as$ a$ constituent$ assembly$ to$
amendments$shall$continue$in$full$force$and$effect.$ propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution;$a$referendumSplebiscite$is$untenable$
$ under$ the$ Constitutions$ of$ 1935$ and$ 1973;$ the$ submission$ of$ the$ proposed$
9.$ These$amendments$shall$take$effect$after$the$incumbent$President$shall$ amendments$ in$ such$ a$ short$ period$ of$ time$ for$ deliberation$ renders$ the$
have$ proclaimed$ that$ they$ have$ been$ ratified$ by$ I$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ in$ plebiscite$a$nullity;$to$lift$Martial$Law,$the$President$need$not$consult$the$people$
the$referendumSplebiscite."$ via$ referendum;$ and$ allowing$ 15S.year$ olds$ to$ vote$ would$ amount$ to$ an$
$ amendment$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ which$ confines$ the$ right$ of$ suffrage$ to$ those$
The$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ was$ vested$ with$ the$ exclusive$ supervision$ and$ citizens$of$the$Philippines$18$years$of$age$and$above.$
control$of$the$October$1976$National$ReferendumSPlebiscite.$ $
$ We$find$the$petitions$in$the$three$entitled$cases$to$be$devoid$of$merit.$
On$ September$ 27,$ 1976,$ PABLO$ C.$ SANIDAD$ and$ PABLITO$ V.$ SANIDAD,$ father$ $
and$ son,$ commenced$ LS44640$ for$ Prohibition$ with$ Preliminary$ Injunction$ I$
seeking$to$enjoin$the$Commission$on$Elections$from$holding$and$conducting$the$ $
Referendum$ Plebiscite$ on$ October$ 16;$ to$ declare$ without$ force$ and$ effect$ Justiciability$of$question$raised.$
Presidential$Decree$Nos.$991$and$1033,$insofar$as$they$propose$amendments$to$ $
the$Constitution,$as$well$as$Presidential$Decree$No.$1031,$insofar$as$it$directs$the$ 1.$ As$ a$ preliminary$ resolution,$ We$ rule$ that$ the$ petitioners$ in$ LS44640$
Commission$ on$ Elections$ to$ supervise,$ control,$ hold,$ and$ conduct$ the$ (Pablo$C.$Sanidad$and$Pablito$V.$Sanidad)$possess$locus$standi$to$challenge$the$
ReferendumSPlebiscite$scheduled$on$October$16,$1976.$ constitutional$ premise$ of$ Presidential$ Decree$ Nos.$ 991,$ 1031,$ and$ 1033.$ It$ is$
$ now$an$ancient$rule$that$the$valid$source$of$a$stature$Presidential$Decrees$are$of$
such$natureSmay$be$contested$by$one$who$will$sustain$a$direct$injuries$as$a$in$
result$ of$ its$ enforcement.$ At$ the$ instance$ of$ taxpayers,$ laws$ providing$ for$ the$
disbursement$ of$ public$ funds$ may$ be$ enjoined,$ upon$ the$ theory$ that$ the$
expenditure$ of$ public$ funds$ by$ an$ officer$ of$ the$ State$ for$ the$ purpose$ of$
executing$ an$ unconstitutional$ act$ constitutes$ a$ misapplication$ of$ such$ funds.$ 4$
The$ breadth$ of$ Presidential$ Decree$ No.$ 991$ carries$ all$ appropriation$ of$ Five$
Million$ Pesos$ for$ the$ effective$ implementation$ of$ its$ purposes.$ 5$ Presidential$
Decree$ No.$ 1031$ appropriates$ the$ sum$ of$ Eight$ Million$ Pesos$ to$ carry$ out$ its$
provisions.$ 6$ The$ interest$ of$ the$ aforenamed$ petitioners$ as$ taxpayers$ in$ the$
lawful$expenditure$of$these$amounts$of$public$money$sufficiently$clothes$them$
with$ that$ personality$ to$ litigate$ the$ validity$ of$ the$ Decrees$ appropriating$ said$
funds.$ Moreover,$ as$ regards$ taxpayer's$ suits,$ this$ Court$ enjoys$ that$ open$
discretion$ to$ entertain$ the$ same$ or$ not.$ 7$ For$ the$ present$ case,$ We$ deem$ it$
sound$to$exercise$that$discretion$affirmatively$so$that$the$authority$upon$which$
the$disputed$Decrees$are$predicated$may$be$inquired$into.$
$ nonSjusticiability,$ that$ the$ question$ of$ the$ President's$ authority$ to$ propose$
2.$ The$ Solicitor$ General$ would$ consider$ the$ question$ at$ bar$ as$ a$ pure$
political$ one,$ lying$ outside$ the$ domain$ of$ judicial$ review.$ We$ disagree.$ The$
amending$process$both$as$to$proposal$and$ratification,$raises$a$judicial$question.$
8$This$is$especially$true$in$cases$where$the$power$of$the$Presidency$to$initiate$
the$ of$ normally$ exercised$ by$ the$ legislature,$ is$ seriously$ doubted.$ Under$ the$
terms$ of$ the$ 1973$ Constitution,$ the$ power$ to$ propose$ amendments$ o$ the$
constitution$resides$in$the$interim$National$Assembly$in$the$period$of$transition$
(See.$ 15,$ Transitory$ provisions).$ After$ that$ period,$ and$ the$ regular$ National$
Assembly$in$its$active$session,$the$power$to$propose$amendments$becomes$ipso$
facto$the$prerogative$of$the$regular$National$Assembly$(Sec.$1,$pars.$1$and$2$of$
Art.$ XVI,$ 1973$ constitution).$ The$ normal$ course$ has$ not$ been$ followed.$ Rather$
than$ calling$ the$ National$ Assembly$ to$ constitute$ itself$ into$ a$ constituent$
assembly$the$incumbent$President$undertook$the$proposal$of$amendments$and$
submitted$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ thru$ Presidential$ Decree$ 1033$ to$ the$
people$ in$ a$ ReferendumSPlebiscite$ on$ October$ 16.$ Unavoidably,$ the$ regularity$
regularity$ of$ the$ procedure$ for$ amendments,$ written$ in$ lambent$ words$ in$ the$
very$ Constitution$ sought$ to$ be$ amended,$ raises$ a$ contestable$ issue.$ The$
implementing$ Presidential$ Decree$ Nos.$ 991,$ 1031,$ and$ 1033,$ which$ commonly$
purport$ to$ have$ the$ force$ and$ effect$ of$ legislation$ are$ assailed$ as$ invalid,$ thus$
the$ issue$ of$ the$ validity$ of$ said$ Decrees$ is$ plainly$ a$ justiciable$ one,$ within$ the$
competence$ of$ this$ Court$ to$ pass$ upon.$ Section$ 2$ (2),$ Article$ X$ of$ the$ new$
Constitution$ provides:$ "All$ cases$ involving$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ a$ treaty,$
executive$ agreement,$ or$ law$ may$ shall$ be$ heard$ and$ decided$ by$ the$ Supreme$
Court$ en$ banc$ and$ no$ treaty,$ executive$ agreement,$ or$ law$ may$ be$ declared$
unconstitutional$ without$ the$ concurrence$ of$ at$ least$ ten$ Members.$ ..."$ The$
Supreme$ Court$ has$ the$ last$ word$ in$ the$ construction$ not$ only$ of$ treaties$ and$
statutes,$but$also$of$the$Constitution$itself$The$amending,$like$all$other$powers$
organized$in$the$Constitution,$is$in$form$a$delegated$and$hence$a$limited$power,$
so$that$the$Supreme$Court$is$vested$with$that$authorities$to$determine$whether$
that$power$has$been$discharged$within$its$limits.$
$ to$be$held$on$January$15,$1973,$for$the$ratification$or$rejection$of$the$proposed$
Political$ questions$ are$ neatly$ associated$ with$ the$ wisdom,$ of$ the$ legality$ of$ a$
particular$ act.$ Where$ the$ vortex$ of$ the$ controversy$ refers$ to$ the$ legality$ or$
validity$of$the$contested$act,$that$matter$is$definitely$justiciable$or$nonSpolitical.$
What$is$in$the$heels$of$the$Court$is$not$the$wisdom$of$the$act$of$the$incumbent$
President$ in$ proposing$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ but$ his$ constitutional$
authority$to$perform$such$act$or$to$assume$the$power$of$a$constituent$assembly.$
Whether$the$amending$process$confers$on$the$President$that$power$to$propose$
amendments$is$therefore$a$downright$justiciable$question.$Should$the$contrary$
be$found,$the$actuation$of$the$President$would$merely$be$a$brutum$fulmen.$If$the$
Constitution$provides$how$it$may$be$amended,$the$judiciary$as$the$interpreter$
of$ that$ Constitution,$ can$ declare$ whether$ the$ procedure$ followed$ or$ the$
authority$assumed$was$valid$or$not.$10$
$
We$ cannot$ accept$ the$ view$ of$ the$ Solicitor$ General,$ in$ pursuing$ his$ theory$ of$
amendments$and$the$regularity$of$the$procedure$adopted$for$submission$of$the$
proposal$ to$ the$ people$ ultimately$ lie$ in$ the$ judgment$ of$ the$ A$ clear$ Descartes$
fallacy$of$vicious$circle.$Is$it$not$that$the$people$themselves,$by$their$sovereign$
act,$ provided$ for$ the$ authority$ and$ procedure$ for$ the$ amending$ process$ when$
they$ ratified$ the$ present$ Constitution$ in$ 1973?$ Whether,$ therefore,$ the$
constitutional$ provision$ has$ been$ followed$ or$ not$ is$ the$ proper$ subject$ of$
inquiry,$ not$ by$ the$ people$ themselves$ of$ course$ who$ exercise$ no$ power$ of$
judicial$ but$ by$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ in$ whom$ the$ people$ themselves$ vested$ that$
power,$ a$ power$ which$ includes$ the$ competence$ to$ determine$ whether$ the$
constitutional$ norms$ for$ amendments$ have$ been$ observed$ or$ not.$ And,$ this$
inquiry$must$be$done$a$prior$not$a$posterior$i.e.,$before$the$submission$to$and$
ratification$by$the$people.$
$
Indeed,$ the$ precedents$ evolved$ by$ the$ Court$ or,$ prior$ constitutional$ cases$
underline$ the$ preference$ of$ the$ Court's$ majority$ to$ treat$ such$ issue$ of$
Presidential$role$in$the$amending$process$as$one$of$nonSpolitical$impression.$In$
the$Plebiscite$Cases,$11$the$contention$of$the$Solicitor$General$that$the$issue$on$
the$legality$of$Presidential$Decree$No.$73$"submitting$to$the$Pilipino$people$(on$
January$15,$1973)$for$ratification$or$rejection$the$Constitution$of$the$Republic$of$
the$ Philippines$ proposed$ by$ the$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Convention$ and$
appropriating$ fund$ s$ therefore$ "is$ a$ political$ one,$ was$ rejected$ and$ the$ Court$
unanimously$ considered$ the$ issue$ as$ justiciable$ in$ nature.$ Subsequently$ in$ the$
Ratification$ Cases$ 12$ involving$ the$ issue$ of$ whether$ or$ not$ the$ validity$ of$
Presidential$Proclamation$No.$1102.$announcing$the$Ratification$by$the$Filipino$
people$ of$ the$ constitution$ proposed$ by$ the$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Convention,"$
partakes$ of$ the$ nature$ of$ a$ political$ question,$ the$ affirmative$ stand$ of'$ the$
Solicitor$ General$ was$ dismissed,$ the$ Court$ ruled$ that$ the$ question$ raised$ is$
justiciable.$Chief$Justice$Concepcion,$expressing$the$majority$view,$said,$Thus,$in$
the$aforementioned$plebiscite$cases,$We$rejected$the$theory$of$the$respondents$
therein$that$the$question$whether$Presidential$Decree$No.$73$calling$a$plebiscite$
new$Constitution,$was$valid$or$not,$was$not$a$proper$subject$of$judicial$inquiry$ SECTION$15.$ The$interim$National$Assembly,$upon$special$call$by$the$interim$
because,$ they$ claimed,$ it$ partook$ of$ a$ political$ nature,$ and$ We$ unanimously$ Prime$ Minister,$ may,$ by$ a$ majority$ vote$ of$ all$ its$ Members,$ propose$
declared$ that$ the$ issue$ was$ a$ justiciable$ one.$ With$ Identical$ unanimity.$ We$ amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution.$ Such$ amendments$ shall$ take$ effect$ when$
overruled$ the$ respondent's$ contention$ in$ the$ 1971$ habeas$ corpus$ cases,$ ratified$in$accordance$with$Article$Sixteen$hereof.$
questioning$ Our$ authority$ to$ determine$ the$ constitutional$ sufficiency$ of$ the$ $
factual$ bases$ of$ the$ Presidential$ proclamation$ suspending$ the$ privilege$ of$ the$ There$are,$therefore,$two$periods$contemplated$in$the$constitutional$life$of$the$
writ$ of$ habeas$ corpus$ on$ August$ 21,$ 1971,$ despite$ the$ opposite$ view$ taken$ by$ nation,$i.e.,$period$of$normalcy$and$period$of$transition.$In$times$of$normally,$the$
this$ Court$ in$ Barcelon$ vs.$ Baker$ and$ Montenegro$ vs.$ Castaneda,$ insofar$ as$ it$ amending$process$may$be$initiated$by$the$proposals$of$the$(1)$regular$National$
adhered$ to$ the$ former$ case,$ which$ view$ We,$ accordingly,$ abandoned$ and$ Assembly$ upon$ a$ vote$ of$ threeSfourths$ of$ all$ its$ members;$ or$ (2)$ by$ a$
refused$to$apply.$For$the$same$reason,$We$did$not$apply$and$expressly$modified,$ Constitutional$ Convention$ called$ by$ a$ vote$ of$ twoSthirds$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$
in$Gonzales$vs.$Commission$on$Elections,$the$politicalSquestion$theory$adopted$ the$National$Assembly.$However$the$calling$of$a$Constitutional$Convention$may$
in$ Mabanag$ vs.$ Lopez$ Vito."$ 13$ The$ return$ to$ Barcelon$ vs.$ Baker$ and$ Mabanag$ be$submitted$to$the$electorate$in$an$election$voted$upon$by$a$majority$vote$of$all$
vs.$ Lopez$ Vito,$ urged$ by$ the$ Solicitor$ General,$ was$ decisively$ refused$ by$ the$ the$members$of$the$National$Assembly.$In$times$of$transition,$amendments$may$
Court.$ Chief$ Justice$ Concepcion$ continued:$ "The$ reasons$ adduced$ in$ support$ be$ proposed$ by$ a$ majority$ vote$ of$ all$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ National$ Assembly$
thereof$ are,$ however,$ substantially$ the$ same$ as$ those$ given$ in$ support$ on$ the$ upon$special$call$by$the$interim$Prime$Minister,.$
political$ question$ theory$ advanced$ in$ said$ habeas$ corpus$ and$ plebiscite$ cases,$ $
which$ were$ carefully$ considered$ by$ this$ Court$ and$ found$ by$ it$ to$ be$ legally$ 2.$ This$ Court$ in$ Aquino$ v.$ COMELEC,"$ had$ already$ settled$ that$ the$
unsound$and$constitutionally$untenable.$As$a$consequence.$Our$decisions$in$the$ incumbent$President$is$vested$with$that$prerogative$of$discretion$as$to$when$he$
aforementioned$habeas$corpus$cases$partakes$of$the$nature$and$effect$of$a$stare$ shall$initially$convene$the$interim$National$Assembly.$Speaking$for$the$majority$
decisis$which$gained$added$weight$by$its$virtual$reiteration."$ opinion$ in$ that$ case,$ Justice$ Makasiar$ said:$ "The$ Constitutional$ Convention$
$ intended$to$leave$to$the$President$the$determination$of$the$time$when$he$shall$
II$ initially$convene$the$interim$National$Assembly,$consistent$with$the$prevailing$
$ conditions$ of$ peace$ and$ order$ in$ the$ country."$ Concurring,$ Justice$ Fernandez,$
The$amending$process$as$laid$out$ himself$ a$ member$ of$ that$ Constitutional$ Convention,$ revealed:$ "(W)hen$ the$
$ Delegates$to$the$Constitutional$Convention$voted$on$the$Transitory$Provisions,$
in$the$new$Constitution.$ they$were$aware$of$the$fact$that$under$the$same,$the$incumbent$President$was$
$ given$ the$ discretion$ as$ to$ when$ he$ could$ convene$ the$ interim$ National$
1.$ Article$XVI$of$the$1973$Constitution$on$Amendments$ordains:$ Assembly;$it$was$so$stated$plainly$by$the$sponsor,$Delegate$Yaneza;$as$a$matter$
$ of$ fact,$ the$ proposal$ that$ it$ be$ convened$ 'immediately',$ made$ by$ Delegate$
SECTION$1.$(1)$ Any$ amendment$ to,$ or$ revision$ of,$ this$ Constitution$ may$ be$ Pimentel$ (V)$ was$ rejected.$ The$ President's$ decision$ to$ defer$ the$ convening$ of$
proposed$ by$ the$ National$ Assembly$ upon$ a$ vote$ of$ threeSfourths$ of$ all$ its$ the$interim$National$Assembly$soon$found$support$from$the$people$themselves.$
Members,$or$by$a$constitutional$convention.$(2)$The$National$Assembly$may,$by$ In$ the$ plebiscite$ of$ January$ 10S15,$ 1973,$ at$ which$ the$ ratification$ of$ the$ 1973$
a$vote$of$twoSthirds$of$all$its$Members,$call$a$constitutional$convention$or,$by$a$ Constitution$ was$ submitted,$ the$ people$ voted$ against$ the$ convening$ of$ the$
majority$ vote$ of$ all$ its$ Members,$ submit$ the$ question$ of$ calling$ such$ a$ interim$ National$ Assembly.$ In$ the$ referendum$ of$ July$ 24,$ 1973,$ the$ Citizens$
convention$to$the$electorate$in$an$election.$ Assemblies$ ("bagangays")$ reiterated$ their$ sovereign$ will$ to$ withhold$ the$
$ convening$ of$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly.$ Again,$ in$ the$ referendum$ of$
SECTION$2.$ Any$ amendment$ to,$ or$ revision$ of,$ this$ Constitution$ shall$ be$ February$ 27,$ 1975,$ the$ proposed$ question$ of$ whether$ the$ interim$ National$
valid$when$ratified$by$a$majority$of$the$votes$cast$in$a$plebiscite$which$shall$be$ Assembly$ shall$ be$ initially$ convened$ was$ eliminated,$ because$ some$ of$ the$
held$ not$ later$ than$ three$ months$ after$ the$ approval$ of$ such$ amendment$ or$ members$of$Congress$and$delegates$of$the$Constitutional$Convention,$who$were$
revision.$ deemed$ automatically$ members$ of$ the$ I$ interim$ National$ Assembly,$ were$
$ against$its$inclusion$since$in$that$referendum$of$January,$1973,$the$people$had$
In$the$present$period$of$transition,$the$interim$National$Assembly$instituted$in$ already$resolved$against$it.$
the$Transitory$Provisions$is$conferred$with$that$amending$power.$Section$15$of$ $
the$Transitory$Provisions$reads:$ 3.$ In$sensu$strictiore,$when$the$legislative$arm$of$the$state$undertakes$the$
$ proposals$of$amendment$to$a$Constitution,$that$body$is$not$in$the$usual$function$
of$ lawmaking.$ lt$ is$ not$ legislating$ when$ engaged$ in$ the$ amending$ process.16$
Rather,$ it$ is$ exercising$ a$ peculiar$ power$ bestowed$ upon$ it$ by$ the$ fundamental$ The$power$of$the$state$in$crisis$must$not$only$be$concentrated$and$expanded;$it$
charter$itself.$In$the$Philippines,$that$power$is$provided$for$in$Article$XVI$of$the$ must$ also$ be$ freed$ from$ the$ normal$ system$ of$ constitutional$ and$ legal$
1973$ Constitution$ (for$ the$ regular$ National$ Assembly)$ or$ in$ Section$ 15$ of$ the$ limitations.$21$John$Locke,$on$the$other$hand,$claims$for$the$executive$in$its$own$
Transitory$ Provisions$ (for$ the$ National$ Assembly).$ While$ ordinarily$ it$ is$ the$ right$ a$ broad$ discretion$ capable$ even$ of$ setting$ aside$ the$ ordinary$ laws$ in$ the$
business$ of$ the$ legislating$ body$ to$ legislate$ for$ the$ nation$ by$ virtue$ of$ meeting$of$special$exigencies$for$which$the$legislative$power$had$not$provided.$
constitutional$ conferment$ amending$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$ not$ legislative$ in$ 22$ The$ rationale$ behind$ such$ broad$ emergency$ powers$ of$ the$ Executive$ is$ the$
character.$ In$ political$ science$ a$ distinction$ is$ made$ between$ constitutional$ release$ of$ the$ government$ from$ "the$ paralysis$ of$ constitutional$ restrains"$ so$
content$ of$ an$ organic$ character$ and$ that$ of$ a$ legislative$ character'.$ The$ that$the$crisis$may$be$ended$and$normal$times$restored.$
distinction,$ however,$ is$ one$ of$ policy,$ not$ of$ law.$ 17$ Such$ being$ the$ case,$ $
approval$ of$ the$ President$ of$ any$ proposed$ amendment$ is$ a$ misnomer$ 18$ The$ 2.$ The$presidential$exercise$of$legislative$powers$in$time$of$martial$law$is$
prerogative$ of$ the$ President$ to$ approve$ or$ disapprove$ applies$ only$ to$ the$ now$a$conceded$valid$at.$That$sun$clear$authority$of$the$President$is$saddled$on$
ordinary$cases$of$legislation.$The$President$has$nothing$to$do$with$proposition$ Section$3$(pars.$1$and$2)$of$the$Transitory$Provisions,$thus:$23$
or$adoption$of$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$19$ $
$ The$ incumbent$ President$ of$ the$ Philippines$ shall$ initially$ convene$ the$ interim$
III$ National$Assembly$and$shall$preside$over$its$sessions$until$the$interim$Speaker$
$ shall$ have$ been$ elected.$ He$ shall$ continue$ to$ exercise$ his$ powers$ and$
Concentration$of$Powers$ prerogatives$ under$ the$ nineteen$ hundred$ and$ thirtySfive$ Constitution$ and$ the$
$ powers$vested$in$the$President$and$the$Prime$Minister$under$this$Constitution$
in$the$President$during$ until$the$calls$upon$the$interim$National$Assembly$to$elect$the$interim$President$
$ and$the$interim$Prime$Minister,$who$shall$then$exercise$their$respective$powers$
crisis$government.$ vested$by$this$Constitution.$
$ $
1.$ In$ general,$ the$ governmental$ powers$ in$ crisis$ government$ the$ All$ proclamations,$ orders,$ decrees,$ instructions,$ and$ acts$ promulgated,$ issued,$
Philippines$ is$ a$ crisis$ government$ today$ are$ more$ or$ less$ concentrated$ in$ the$ or$done$by$the$incumbent$President$shall$be$part$of$the$law$of$the$land,$and$shall$
President.$20$According$to$Rossiter,$"(t)he$concentration$of$government$power$ remain$ valid,$ binding,$ and$ effective$ even$ after$ lifting$ of$ martial$ law$ or$ the$
in$a$democracy$faced$by$an$emergency$is$a$corrective$to$the$crisis$inefficiencies$ ratification$ of$ this$ Constitution,$ unless$ modified,$ revoked,$ or$ superseded$ by$
inherent$ in$ the$ doctrine$ of$ the$ separation$ of$ powers.$ In$ most$ free$ states$ it$ has$ subsequent$ proclamations,$ orders,$ decrees,$ instructions,$ or$ other$ acts$ of$ the$
generally$been$regarded$as$imperative$that$the$total$power$of$the$government$ incumbent$President,$or$unless$expressly$and$explicitly$modified$or$repealed$by$
be$ parceled$ out$ among$ three$ mutually$ independent$ branches$ executive,$ the$regular$National$Assembly.$
legislature,$and$judiciary.$It$is$believed$to$be$destructive$of$constitutionalism$if$ $
any$one$branch$should$exercise$any$two$or$more$types$of$power,$and$certainly$a$ "It$ is$ unthinkable,"$ said$ Justice$ Fernandez,$ a$ 1971$ Constitutional$ Convention$
total$ disregard$ of$ the$ separation$ of$ powers$ is,$ as$ Madison$ wrote$ in$ the$ delegate,$"that$the$Constitutional$Convention,$while$giving$to$the$President$the$
Federalist,$ No.$ 47,$ 'the$ very$ definition$ of$ tyranny.'$ In$ normal$ times$ the$ discretion$when$to$call$the$interim$National$Assembly$to$session,$and$knowing$
separation$ of$ powers$ forms$ a$ distinct$ obstruction$ to$ arbitrary$ governmental$ that$ it$ may$ not$ be$ convened$ soon,$ would$ create$ a$ vacuum$ in$ the$ exercise$ of$
action.$ By$ this$ same$ token,$ in$ abnormal$ times$ it$ may$ form$ an$ insurmountable$ legislative$ powers.$ Otherwise,$ with$ no$ one$ to$ exercise$ the$ lawmaking$ powers,$
barrier$to$a$decisive$emergency$action$in$behalf$of$the$state$and$its$independent$ there$ would$ be$ paralyzation$ of$ the$ entire$ governmental$ machinery."$ 24$
existence.$ There$ are$ moments$ in$ the$ life$ of$ any$ government$ when$ all$ powers$ Paraphrasing$ Rossiter,$ this$ is$ an$ extremely$ important$ factor$ in$ any$
must$work$together$in$unanimity$of$purpose$and$action,$even$if$this$means$the$ constitutional$dictatorship$which$extends$over$a$period$of$time.$The$separation$
temporary$union$of$executive,$legislative,$and$judicial$power$in$the$hands$of$one$ of$ executive$ and$ legislature$ ordained$ in$ the$ Constitution$ presents$ a$ distinct$
man.$ The$ more$ complete$ the$ separation$ of$ powers$ in$ a$ constitutional$ system,$ obstruction$ to$ efficient$ crisis$ government.$ The$ steady$ increase$ in$ executive$
the$ more$ difficult$ and$ yet$ the$ more$ necessary$ will$ be$ their$ fusion$ in$ time$ of$ power$is$not$too$much$a$cause$for$as$the$steady$increase$in$the$magnitude$and$
crisis.$ This$ is$ evident$ in$ a$ comparison$ of$ the$ crisis$ potentialities$ of$the$ cabinet$ complexity$of$the$problems$the$President$has$been$called$upon$by$the$Filipino$
and$ presidential$ systems$ of$ government.$ In$ the$ former$ the$ allSimportant$ people$ to$ solve$ in$ their$ behalf,$ which$ involve$ rebellion,$ subversion,$ secession,$
harmony$ of$ legislature$ and$ executive$ is$ taken$ for$ granted;$ in$ the$ latter$ it$ is$ recession,$inflation,$and$economic$crisisSa$crisis$greater$than$war.$In$short,$while$
neither$ guaranteed$ nor$ to$ be$ to$ confidently$ expected.$ As$ a$ result,$ cabinet$ is$ conventional$ constitutional$ law$ just$ confines$ the$ President's$ power$ as$
more$ easily$ established$ and$ more$ trustworthy$ than$ presidential$ dictatorship.$ CommanderSinSChief$to$the$direction$of$the$operation$of$the$national$forces,$yet$
the$ facts$ of$ our$ political,$ social,$ and$ economic$ disturbances$ had$ convincingly$ 2.$ The$ President's$ action$ is$ not$ a$ unilateral$ move.$ As$ early$ as$ the$
shown$ that$ in$ meeting$ the$ same,$ indefinite$ power$ should$ be$ attributed$ to$ tile$ referendums$ of$ January$ 1973$ and$ February$ 1975,$ the$ people$ had$ already$
President$to$take$emergency$measures$25$ rejected$ the$ calling$ of$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly.$ The$ Lupong$
$ Tagapagpaganap$ of$ the$ Katipunan$ ng$ mga$ Sanggunian,$ the$ Pambansang$
IV$ Katipunan$ng$mga$Barangay,$and$the$Pambansang$Katipunan$ng$mga$Barangay,$
$ representing$42,000$barangays,$about$the$same$number$of$Kabataang$Barangay$
Authority$of$the$incumbent$ organizations,$ Sanggunians$ in$ 1,458$ municipalities,$ 72$ provinces,$ 3$ subS
$ provinces,$ and$ 60$ cities$ had$ informed$ the$ President$ that$ the$ prevailing$
President$t$to$propose$ sentiment$ of$ the$ people$ is$ for$ the$ abolition$ of$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly.$
$ Other$ issues$ concerned$ the$ lifting$ of$ martial$ law$ and$ amendments$ to$ the$
amendments$to$the$Constitution.$ Constitution$ .27$ The$ national$ organizations$ of$ Sangguniang$ Bayan$ presently$
$ proposed$ to$ settle$ the$ issues$ of$ martial$ law,$ the$ interim$ Assembly,$ its$
1.$ As$ earlier$ pointed$ out,$ the$ power$ to$ legislate$ is$ constitutionally$ replacement,$the$period$of$its$existence,$the$length$of$the$period$for$the$exercise$
consigned$ to$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ during$ the$ transition$ period.$ by$the$President$of$its$present$powers$in$a$referendum$to$be$held$on$October$16$
However,$ the$ initial$ convening$ of$ that$ Assembly$ is$ a$ matter$ fully$ addressed$ to$ .$28$The$Batasang$Bayan$(legislative$council)$created$under$Presidential$Decree$
the$judgment$of$the$incumbent$President.$And,$in$the$exercise$of$that$judgment,$ 995$ of$ September$ 10,$ 1976,$ composed$ of$ 19$ cabinet$ members,$ 9$ officials$ with$
the$President$opted$to$defer$convening$of$that$body$in$utter$recognition$of$the$ cabinet$ rank,$ 91$ members$ of$ the$ Lupong$ Tagapagpaganap$ (executive$
people's$preference.$Likewise,$in$the$period$of$transition,$the$power$to$propose$ committee)$ of$ the$ Katipunan$ ng$ mga$ Sangguniang$ Bayan$ voted$ in$ session$ to$
amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ lies$ in$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ upon$ submit$ directly$ to$ the$ people$ in$ a$ plebiscite$ on$ October$ 16,$ the$ previously$
special$ call$ by$ the$ President$ (See.$ 15$ of$ the$ Transitory$ Provisions).$ Again,$ quoted$proposed$amendments$to$the$Constitution,$including$the$issue$of$martial$
harking$to$the$dictates$of$the$sovereign$will,$the$President$decided$not$to$call$the$ law$ .29$ Similarly,$ the$ "barangays"$ and$ the$ "sanggunians"$ endorsed$ to$ the$
interim$ National$ Assembly.$ Would$ it$ then$ be$ within$ the$ bounds$ of$ the$ President$ the$ submission$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ to$ the$ people$ on$
Constitution$ and$ of$ law$ for$ the$ President$ to$ assume$ that$ constituent$ power$ of$ October$ 16.$ All$ the$ foregoing$ led$ the$ President$ to$ initiate$ the$ proposal$ of$
the$ interim$ Assembly$ visSaSvis$ his$ assumption$ of$ that$ body's$ legislative$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ and$ the$ subsequent$ issuance$ of$ Presidential$
functions?$The$answer$is$yes.$If$the$President$has$been$legitimately$discharging$ Decree$ No,$ 1033$ on$ September$ 22,$ 1976$ submitting$ the$ questions$ (proposed$
the$ legislative$ functions$ of$ the$ interim$ Assembly,$ there$ is$ no$ reason$ why$ he$ amendments)$ to$ the$ people$ in$ the$ National$ ReferendumSPlebiscite$ on$ October$
cannot$validly$discharge$the$function$of$that$Assembly$to$propose$amendments$ 16.$
to$ the$ Constitution,$ which$ is$ but$ adjunct,$ although$ peculiar,$ to$ its$ gross$ $
legislative$power.$This,$of$course,$is$not$to$say$that$the$President$has$converted$ V$
his$office$into$a$constituent$assembly$of$that$nature$normally$constituted$by$the$ $
legislature.$Rather,$with$the$interim$National$Assembly$not$convened$and$only$ The$People$is$Sovereign$
the$ Presidency$ and$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ in$ operation,$ the$ urges$ of$ absolute$ $
necessity$ render$ it$ imperative$ upon$ the$ President$ to$ act$ as$ agent$ for$ and$ in$ 1.$ Unlike$in$a$federal$state,$the$location$of$sovereignty$in$a$unitary$state$is$
behalf$ of$ the$ people$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ easily$ seen.$ In$ the$ Philippines,$ a$ republican$ and$ unitary$ state,$ sovereignty$
Parenthetically,$ by$ its$ very$ constitution,$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ possesses$ no$ "resides$in$the$people$and$all$government$authority$emanates$from$them$.30$In$
capacity$ to$ propose$ amendments$ without$ constitutional$ infractions.$ For$ the$ its$ fourth$ meaning,$ Savigny$ would$ treat$ people$ as$ "that$ particular$ organized$
President$ to$ shy$ away$ from$ that$ actuality$ and$ decline$ to$ undertake$ the$ assembly$ of$ individuals$ in$ which,$ according$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ highest$
amending$process$would$leave$the$governmental$machineries$at$a$stalemate$or$ power$exists."$31$This$is$the$concept$of$popular$sovereignty.$It$means$that$the$
create$ in$ the$ powers$ of$ the$ State$ a$ destructive$ vacuum,$ thereby$ impeding$ the$ constitutional$legislator,$namely$the$people,$is$sovereign$32$In$consequence,$the$
objective$of$a$crisis$government$"to$end$the$crisis$and$restore$normal$times."$In$ people$ may$ thus$ write$ into$ the$ Constitution$ their$ convictions$ on$ any$ subject$
these$ parlous$ times,$ that$ Presidential$ initiative$ to$ reduce$ into$ concrete$ forms$ they$ choose$ in$ the$ absence$ of$ express$ constitutional$ prohibition.$ 33$ This$ is$
the$ constant$ voices$ of$ the$ people$ reigns$ supreme.$ After$ all,$ constituent$ because,$ as$ Holmes$ said,$ the$ Constitution$ "is$ an$ experiment,$ as$ all$ life$ is$ all$
assemblies$ or$ constitutional$ conventions,$ like$ the$ President$ now,$ are$ mere$ experiment."$ 34$ "The$ necessities$ of$ orderly$ government,"$ wrote$ Rottschaefer,$
agents$of$the$people$.26$ "do$not$require$that$one$generation$should$be$permitted$to$permanently$fetter$
$ all$ future$ generations."$ A$ constitution$ is$ based,$ therefore,$ upon$ a$ selfSlimiting$
decision$of$the$people$when$they$adopt$it.$35$
$ assessing$ public$ reaction$ to$ the$ given$ issues$ submitted$ to$ the$ people$ foe$ their$
2.$ The$October$16$referendumSplebiscite$is$a$resounding$call$to$the$people$ consideration,$the$calling$of$which$is$derived$from$or$within$the$totality$of$the$
to$ exercise$ their$ sovereign$ power$ as$ constitutional$ legislator.$ The$ proposed$ executive$power$of$the$President.$39$It$is$participated$in$by$all$citizens$from$the$
amendments,$ as$ earlier$ discussed,$ proceed$ not$ from$ the$ thinking$ of$ a$ single$ age$of$fifteen,$regardless$of$whether$or$not$they$are$illiterates,$feebleSminded,$or$
man.$ Rather,$ they$ are$ the$ collated$ thoughts$ of$ the$ sovereign$ will$ reduced$ only$ exS$convicts$.$40$A$"plebiscite,"$on$the$other$hand,$involves$the$constituent$act$of$
into$enabling$forms$by$the$authority$who$can$presently$exercise$the$powers$of$ those$ "citizens$ of$ the$ Philippines$ not$ otherwise$ disqualified$ by$ law,$ who$ are$
the$government.$In$equal$vein,$the$submission$of$those$proposed$amendments$ eighteen$years$of$age$or$over,$and$who$shall$have$resided$in$the$Philippines$for$
and$ the$ question$ of$ martial$ law$ in$ a$ referendumSplebiscite$ expresses$ but$ the$ at$least$one$year$and$in$the$place$wherein$they$propose$to$vote$for$at$least$six$
option$ of$ the$ people$ themselves$ implemented$ only$ by$ the$ authority$ of$ the$ months$ preceding$ the$ election$ Literacy,$ property$ or$ any$ other$ substantive$
President.$Indeed,$it$may$well$be$said$that$the$amending$process$is$a$sovereign$ requirement$ is$ not$ imposed.$ It$ is$ generally$ associated$ with$ the$ amending$
act,$although$the$authority$to$initiate$the$same$and$the$procedure$to$be$followed$ process$of$the$Constitution,$more$particularly,$the$ratification$aspect.$
reside$somehow$in$a$particular$body.$ $
$ VII$
VI$ $
$ 1.$ There$ appeals$ to$ be$ no$ valid$ basis$ for$ the$ claim$ that$ the$ regime$ of$
ReferendumSPlebiscite$not$ martial$ law$ stultifies$ in$ main$ the$ freedom$ to$ dissent.$ That$ speaks$ of$ a$ bygone$
$ fear.$The$martial$law$regime$which,$in$the$observation$of$Justice$Fernando,$41$is$
rendered$nugatory$by$the$ impressed$ with$ a$ mild$ character$ recorded$ no$ State$ imposition$ for$ a$ muffled$
$ voice.$ To$ be$ sure,$ there$ are$ restraints$ of$ the$ individual$ liberty,$ but$ on$ certain$
participation$of$the$15Syear$olds.$ grounds$no$total$suppression$of$that$liberty$is$aimed$at.$The$for$the$referendumS
$ plebiscite$ on$ October$ 16$ recognizes$ all$ the$ embracing$ freedoms$ of$ expression$
1.$ October$16$is$in$parts$a$referendum$and$a$plebiscite.$The$question$S$(1)$ and$ assembly$ The$ President$ himself$ had$ announced$ that$ he$ would$ not$
Do$you$want$martial$law$to$be$continued?$S$is$a$referendum$question,$wherein$ countenance$ any$ suppression$ of$ dissenting$ views$ on$ the$ issues,$ as$ he$ is$ not$
the$ 15Syear$ olds$ may$ participate.$ This$ was$ prompted$ by$ the$ desire$ of$ the$ interested$in$winning$a$"yes"$or$"no"$vote,$but$on$the$genuine$sentiment$of$the$
Government$to$reach$the$larger$mas$of$the$people$so$that$their$true$pulse$may$ people$ on$ the$ issues$ at$ hand.$ 42$ Thus,$ the$ dissenters$ soon$ found$ their$ way$ to$
be$felt$to$guide$the$President$in$pursuing$his$program$for$a$New$Order.$For$the$ the$ public$ forums,$ voicing$ out$ loud$ and$ clear$ their$ adverse$ views$ on$ the$
succeeding$question$on$the$proposed$amendments,$only$those$of$voting$age$of$ proposed$ amendments$ and$ even$ (in$ the$ valid$ ratification$ of$ the$ 1973$
18$ years$ may$ participate.$ This$ is$ the$ plebiscite$ aspect,$ as$ contemplated$ in$ Constitution,$which$is$already$a$settled$matter.$43$Even$government$employees$
Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVI$ of$ the$ new$ Constitution.$ 36$ On$ this$ second$ question,$ it$ have$ been$ held$ by$ the$ Civil$ Service$ Commission$ free$ to$ participate$ in$ public$
would$only$be$the$votes$of$those$18$years$old$and$above$which$will$have$valid$ discussion$ and$ even$ campaign$ for$ their$ stand$ on$ the$ referendumSplebiscite$
bearing$ on$ the$ results.$ The$ fact$ that$ the$ voting$ populace$ are$ simultaneously$ issues.$44$
asked$to$answer$the$referendum$question$and$the$plebiscite$question$does$not$ $
infirm$ the$ referendumSplebiscite.$ There$ is$ nothing$ objectionable$ in$ consulting$ VIII$
the$people$on$a$given$issue,$which$is$of$current$one$and$submitting$to$them$for$ $
ratification$ of$ proposed$ constitutional$ amendments.$ The$ fear$ of$ commingled$ Time$for$deliberation$
votes$(15Syear$olds$and$18Syear$olds$above)$is$readily$dispelled$by$the$provision$ $
of$ two$ ballot$ boxes$ for$ every$ barangay$ center,$ one$ containing$ the$ ballots$ of$ is$not$short.$
voters$ fifteen$ years$ of$ age$ and$ under$ eighteen,$ and$ another$ containing$ the$ $
ballots$ of$ voters$ eighteen$ years$ of$ age$ and$ above.$ 37$ The$ ballots$ in$ the$ ballot$ 1.$ The$period$from$September$21$to$October$16$or$a$period$of$3$weeks$is$
box$for$voters$fifteen$years$of$age$and$under$eighteen$shall$be$counted$ahead$of$ not$ too$ short$ for$ free$ debates$ or$ discussions$ on$ the$ referendumSplebiscite$
the$ballots$of$voters$eighteen$years$and$above$contained$in$another$ballot$box.$ issues.$ The$ questions$ are$ not$ new.$ They$ are$ the$ issues$ of$ the$ day.$ The$ people$
And,$ the$ results$ of$ the$ referendumSplebiscite$ shall$ be$ separately$ prepared$ for$ have$been$living$with$them$since$the$proclamation$of$martial$law$four$years$ago.$
the$age$groupings,$i.e.,$ballots$contained$in$each$of$the$two$boxes.$38$ The$referendums$of$1973$and$1975$carried$the$same$issue$of$martial$law.$That$
$ notwithstanding,$ the$ contested$ brief$ period$ for$ discussion$ is$ not$ without$
2.$ It$is$apt$to$distinguish$here$between$a$"referendum"$and$a$"plebiscite."$ counterparts$ in$ previous$ plebiscites$ for$ constitutional$ amendments.$ Justice$
A$ "referendum"$ is$ merely$ consultative$ in$ character.$ It$ is$ simply$ a$ means$ of$ Makasiar,$in$the$Referendum$Case,$recalls:$"Under$the$old$Society,$15$days$were$
allotted$for$the$publication$in$three$consecutive$issues$of$the$Official$Gazette$of$ $
the$ women's$ suffrage$ amendment$ to$ the$ Constitution$ before$ the$ scheduled$ 3.$ Is$the$submission$to$the$people$of$the$proposed$amendments$within$the$
plebiscite$on$April$30,$1937$(Com.$Act$No.$34).$The$constitutional$amendment$to$ time$frame$allowed$therefor$a$sufficient$and$proper$submission?$
append$ as$ ordinance$ the$ complicated$ TydingsSKocialskowski$ was$ published$ in$ $
only$ three$ consecutive$ issues$ of$ the$ Official$ Gazette$ for$ 10$ days$ prior$ to$ the$ Upon$ the$ first$ issue,$ Chief$ Justice$ Fred$ Ruiz$ Castro$ and$ Associate$ Justices$
scheduled$ plebiscite$ (Com.$ Act$ 492).$ For$ the$ 1940$ Constitutional$ amendments$ Enrique$ M.$ Fernando,$ Claudio$ Teehankee,$ Antonio$ P.$ Barredo,$ Cecilia$ Munoz$
providing$ for$ the$ bicameral$ Congress,$ the$ reelection$ of$ the$ President$ and$ Vice$ Palma,$ Hermogenes$ Concepcion$ Jr.$ and$ Ruperto$ G.$ Martin$ are$ of$ the$ view$ that$
President,$ and$ the$ creation$ of$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ 20$ days$ of$ the$question$posed$is$justiciable,$while$Associate$Justices$Felix$V.$Makasiar,$Felix$
publication$in$three$consecutive$issues$of$the$Official$Gazette$was$fixed$(Com$Act$ Q.$Antonio$and$Ramon$C.$Aquino$hold$the$view$that$the$question$is$political.$
No.$ 517).$ And$ the$ Parity$ Amendment,$ an$ involved$ constitutional$ amendment$ $
affecting$ the$ economy$ as$ well$ as$ the$ independence$ of$ the$ Republic$ was$ Upon$ the$ second$ issue,$ Chief$ Justice$ Castro$ and$ Associate$ Justices$ Barredo,$
publicized$in$three$consecutive$issues$of$the$Official$Gazette$for$20$days$prior$to$ Makasiar,$ Antonio,$ Aquino,$ Concepcion$ Jr.$ and$ Martin$ voted$ in$ the$ affirmative,$
the$plebiscite$(Rep.$Act$No.$73)."$45$ while$ Associate$ Justices$ Teehankee$ and$ Munoz$ Palma$ voted$ in$ the$ negative.$
$ Associate$ Justice$ Fernando,$ conformably$ to$ his$ concurring$ and$ dissenting$
2.$ It$ is$ worthy$ to$ note$ that$ Article$ XVI$ of$ the$ Constitution$ makes$ no$ opinion$ in$ Aquino$ vs.$ Enrile$ (59$ SCRA$ 183),$ specifically$ dissents$ from$ the$
provision$ as$ to$ the$ specific$ date$ when$ the$ plebiscite$ shall$ be$ held,$ but$ simply$ proposition$ that$ there$ is$ concentration$ of$ powers$ in$ the$ Executive$ during$
states$ that$ it$ "shall$ be$ held$ not$ later$ than$ three$ months$ after$ the$ approval$ of$ periods$of$crisis,$thus$raising$serious$doubts$as$to$the$power$of$the$President$to$
such$ amendment$ or$ revision."$ In$ Coleman$ v.$ Miller,$ 46$ the$ United$ States$ propose$amendments.$
Supreme$ court$ held$ that$ this$ matter$ of$ submission$ involves$ "an$ appraisal$ of$ a$ $
great$variety$of$relevant$conditions,$political,$social$and$economic,"$which$"are$ Upon$ the$ third$ issue,$ Chief$ Justice$ Castro$ and$ Associate$ Justices$ Barredo,$
essentially$ political$ and$ not$ justiciable."$ The$ constituent$ body$ or$ in$ the$ instant$ Makasiar,$ Aquino,$ Concepcion$ Jr.$ and$ Martin$ are$ of$ the$ view$ that$ there$ is$ a$
cases,$the$President,$may$fix$the$time$within$which$the$people$may$act.$This$is$ sufficient$ and$ proper$ submission$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ for$ ratification$
because$ proposal$ and$ ratification$ are$ not$ treated$ as$ unrelated$ acts,$ but$ as$ by$ the$ people.$ Associate$ Justices$ Barredo$ and$ Makasiar$ expressed$ the$ hope,$
succeeding$steps$in$a$single$endeavor,$the$natural$inference$being$that$they$are$ however$that$the$period$of$time$may$be$extended.$Associate$Justices$Fernando,$
not$to$be$widely$separated$in$time;$second,$it$is$only$when$there$is$deemed$to$be$ Makasiar$and$Antonio$are$of$the$view$that$the$question$is$political$and$therefore$
a$ necessity$ therefor$ that$ amendments$ are$ to$ be$ proposed,$ the$ reasonable$ beyond$ the$ competence$ and$ cognizance$ of$ this$ Court,$ Associate$ Justice$
implication$being$that$when$proposed,$they$are$to$be$considered$and$disposed$ Fernando$adheres$to$his$concurrence$in$the$opinion$of$Chief$Justice$Concepcion$
of$ presently,$ and$ third,$ ratification$ is$ but$ the$ expression$ of$ the$ approbation$ of$ in$ Gonzales$ vs.$ COMELEC$ (21$ SCRA$ 774).Associate$ Justices$ Teehankee$ and$
the$ people,$ hence,$ it$ must$ be$ done$ contemporaneously.$ 47$ In$ the$ words$ of$ MUNOZ$ Palma$ hold$ that$ prescinding$ from$ the$ President's$ lack$ of$ authority$ to$
Jameson,$"(a)n$alteration$of$the$Constitution$proposed$today$has$relation$to$the$ exercise$ the$ constituent$ power$ to$ propose$ the$ amendments,$ etc.,$ as$ above$
sentiment$ and$ the$ felt$ needs$ of$ today,$ and$ that,$ if$ not$ ratified$ early$ while$ that$ stated,$ there$ is$ no$ fair$ and$ proper$ submission$ with$ sufficient$ information$ and$
sentiment$ may$ fairly$ be$ supposed$ to$ exist.$ it$ ought$ to$ be$ regarded$ as$ waived,$ time$ to$ assure$ intelligent$ consent$ or$ rejection$ under$ the$ standards$ set$ by$ this$
and$not$again$to$be$voted$upon,$unless$a$second$time$proposed$by$proper$body$ Court$ in$ the$ controlling$ cases$ of$ Gonzales,$ supra,$ and$ Tolentino$ vs.$ COMELEC$
$ (41$SCRA$702).$
IN$RESUME$ $
$ Chief$Justice$Castro$and$Associate$Justices$Barredo,$Makasiar,$Antonio,$Aquino,$
The$three$issues$are$ Concepcion$ Jr.$ and$ Martin$ voted$ to$ dismiss$ the$ three$ petitions$ at$ bar.$ For$
$ reasons$ as$ expressed$ in$ his$ separate$ opinion,$ Associate$ Justice$ Fernando$
1.$ Is$the$question$of$the$constitutionality$of$Presidential$Decrees$Nos.$991,$ concurs$ in$ the$ result.$ Associate$ Justices$ Teehankee$ and$ Munoz$ Palma$ voted$ to$
1031$and$1033$political$or$justiciable?$ grant$the$petitions.$
$ $
2.$ During$ the$ present$ stage$ of$ the$ transition$ period,$ and$ under,$ the$ ACCORDINGLY,$ the$ vote$ being$ 8$ to$ 2$ to$ dismiss,$ the$ said$ petitions$ are$ hereby$
environmental$circumstances$now$obtaining,$does$the$President$possess$power$ dismissed.$This$decision$is$immediately$executory.$
to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ as$ well$ as$ set$ up$ the$ required$ $
machinery$ and$ prescribe$ the$ procedure$ for$ the$ ratification$ of$ his$ proposals$ by$ SO$ORDERED.$
the$people?$ $ $
EN$BANC$ GEN.$ HERMOGENES$ ESPERON,$ JR.,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ the$ present$ and$ duly$
$$ appointed$ Presidential$ Adviser$ on$ the$ Peace$ Process;$ and/or$ SEC.$ EDUARDO$
THE$PROVINCE$OF$NORTH$COTABATO,$duly$represented$by$GOVERNOR$JESUS$ ERMITA,$in$his$capacity$as$Executive$Secretary.$
SACDALAN$ and/or$ VICESGOVERNOR$ EMMANUEL$ PIOL,$ for$ and$ in$ his$ own$ Respondents.$
behalf,$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
Petitioners,$ THE$PROVINCIAL$GOVERNMENT$OF$ZAMBOANGA$DEL$NORTE,$as$represented$
$$ by$ HON.$ ROLANDO$ E.$ YEBES,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ Provincial$ Governor,$ HON.$
S$versus$S$ FRANCIS$H.$OLVIS,$in$his$capacity$as$ViceSGovernor$and$Presiding$Officer$of$the$
$$ Sangguniang$ Panlalawigan,$ HON.$ CECILIA$ JALOSJOS$ CARREON,$
$$ Congresswoman,$ 1st$ Congressional$ District,$ HON.$ CESAR$ G.$ JALOSJOS,$
THE$GOVERNMENT$OF$THE$REPUBLIC$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES$PEACE$PANEL$ON$ Congressman,$ 3rd$ Congressional$ District,$ and$ Members$ of$ the$ Sangguniang$
ANCESTRAL$ DOMAIN$ (GRP),$ represented$ by$ SEC.$ RODOLFO$ GARCIA,$ ATTY.$ Panlalawigan$ of$ the$ Province$ of$ Zamboanga$ del$ Norte,$ namely,$ HON.$ SETH$
LEAH$ ARMAMENTO,$ ATTY.$ SEDFREY$ CANDELARIA,$ MARK$ RYAN$ SULLIVAN$ FREDERICK$P.$JALOSJOS,$HON.$FERNANDO$R.$CABIGON,$JR.,$HON.$ULDARICO$M.$
and/or$ GEN.$ HERMOGENES$ ESPERON,$ JR.,$ the$ latter$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ the$ MEJORADA$ II,$ HON.$ EDIONAR$ M.$ ZAMORAS,$ HON.$ EDGAR$ J.$ BAGUIO,$ HON.$
present$and$dulySappointed$Presidential$Adviser$on$the$Peace$Process$(OPAPP)$ CEDRIC$L.$ADRIATICO,$HON.$FELIXBERTO$C.$BOLANDO,$HON.$JOSEPH$BRENDO$
or$the$soScalled$Office$of$the$Presidential$Adviser$on$the$Peace$Process,$ C.$ AJERO,$ HON.$ NORBIDEIRI$ B.$ EDDING,$ HON.$ ANECITO$ S.$ DARUNDAY,$ HON.$
Respondents.$ ANGELICA$J.$CARREON$and$HON.$LUZVIMINDA$E.$TORRINO,$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ Petitioners,$
CITY$ GOVERNMENT$ OF$ ZAMBOANGA,$ as$ represented$ by$ HON.$ CELSO$ L.$ $$
LOBREGAT,$City$Mayor$of$Zamboanga,$and$in$his$personal$capacity$as$resident$ $$
of$the$City$of$Zamboanga,$Rep.$MA.$ISABELLE$G.$CLIMACO,$District$1,$and$Rep.$ S$versus$S$
ERICO$BASILIO$A.$FABIAN,$District$2,$City$of$Zamboanga,$ $$
Petitioners,$ $$
$$ THE$ GOVERNMENT$ OF$ THE$ REPUBLIC$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ PEACE$
$$ NEGOTIATING$PANEL$[GRP],$as$represented$by$HON.$RODOLFO$C.$GARCIA$and$
S$versus$S$ HON.$ HERMOGENES$ ESPERON,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ the$ Presidential$ Adviser$ of$
$$ Peace$Process,$
$$ Respondents.$
THE$ GOVERNMENT$ OF$ THE$ REPUBLIC$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ PEACE$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
NEGOTIATING$ PANEL$ (GRP),$ as$ represented$ by$ RODOLFO$ C.$ GARCIA,$ LEAH$ ERNESTO$M.$MACEDA,$JEJOMAR$C.$BINAY,$and$AQUILINO$L.$PIMENTEL$III,$
ARMAMENTO,$ SEDFREY$ CANDELARIA,$ MARK$ RYAN$ SULLIVAN$ and$ Petitioners,$
HERMOGENES$ ESPERON,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ the$ Presidential$ Adviser$ on$ Peace$ $$
Process,$ S$versus$S$
Respondents.$ $$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $$
THE$ CITY$ OF$ ILIGAN,$ duly$ represented$ by$ CITY$ MAYOR$ LAWRENCE$ LLUCH$ THE$ GOVERNMENT$ OF$ THE$ REPUBLIC$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ PEACE$
CRUZ,$ NEGOTIATING$ PANEL,$ represented$ by$ its$ Chairman$ RODOLFO$ C.$ GARCIA,$ and$
Petitioner,$ the$ MORO$ ISLAMIC$ LIBERATION$ FRONT$ PEACE$ NEGOTIATING$ PANEL,$
$$ represented$by$its$Chairman$MOHAGHER$IQBAL,$
$$ Respondents.$
S$versus$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
$$ FRANKLIN$M.$DRILON$and$ADEL$ABBAS$TAMANO,$
$$ PetitionersSinSIntervention.$
THE$GOVERNMENT$OF$THE$REPUBLIC$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES$PEACE$PANEL$ON$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
ANCESTRAL$ DOMAIN$ (GRP),$ represented$ by$ SEC.$ RODOLFO$ GARCIA,$ ATTY.$ SEN.$MANUEL$A.$ROXAS,$
LEAH$ ARMAMENTO,$ ATTY.$ SEDFREY$ CANDELARIA,$ MARK$ RYAN$ SULLIVAN;$ PetitionersSinSIntervention.$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ CHICOSNAZARIO,$
MUNICIPALITY$OF$LINAMON$duly$represented$by$its$Municipal$Mayor$NOEL$N.$ VELASCO,$JR.,$
DEANO,$ NACHURA,$
PetitionersSinSIntervention,$ REYES,$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ LEONARDOSDE$CASTRO,$&$
THE$ CITY$ OF$ ISABELA,$ BASILAN$ PROVINCE,$ represented$ by$ MAYOR$ BRION,$JJ.$
CHERRYLYN$P.$SANTOSSAKBAR,$ Promulgated:$
PetitionersSinSIntervention.$ $$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ October$14,$2008$
THE$ PROVINCE$ OF$ SULTAN$ KUDARAT,$ rep.$ by$ HON.$ SUHARTO$ T.$ G.R.$No.$183752$
MANGUDADATU,$ in$ his$ capacity$ as$ Provincial$ Governor$ and$ a$ resident$ of$ the$ G.R.$No.$183893$
Province$of$Sultan$Kudarat,$ G.R.$No.$183951$
PetitionerSinSIntervention.$ G.R.$No.$183962$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ x$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$S$Sx$
$$ $$
RUY$ ELIAS$ LOPEZ,$ for$ and$ in$ his$ own$ behalf$ and$ on$ behalf$ of$ Indigenous$ D$E$C$I$S$I$O$N$
Peoples$in$Mindanao$Not$Belonging$to$the$MILF,$ $$
PetitionerSinSIntervention.$ CARPIO$MORALES,$J.:$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $$
CARLO$B.$GOMEZ,$GERARDO$S.$DILIG,$NESARIO$G.$AWAT,$JOSELITO$C.$ALISUAG$ Subject$of$these$consolidated$cases$is$the$extent$of$the$powers$of$the$President$
and$RICHALEX$G.$JAGMIS,$as$citizens$and$residents$of$Palawan,$ in$ pursuing$ the$ peace$ process.$ While$ the$ facts$ surrounding$ this$ controversy$
PetitionersSinSIntervention.$ center$ on$ the$ armed$ conflict$ in$ Mindanao$ between$ the$ government$ and$ the$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ Moro$Islamic$Liberation$Front$(MILF),$the$legal$issue$involved$has$a$bearing$on$
MARINO$RIDAO$and$KISIN$BUXANI,$ all$areas$in$the$country$where$there$has$been$a$longSstanding$armed$conflict.$Yet$
PetitionersSinSIntervention.$ again,$ the$ Court$ is$ tasked$ to$ perform$ a$ delicate$ balancing$ act.$ It$ must$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ uncompromisingly$ delineate$ the$ bounds$ within$ which$ the$ President$ may$
MUSLIM$LEGAL$ASSISTANCE$FOUNDATION,$INC$(MUSLAF),$ lawfully$ exercise$ her$ discretion,$ but$ it$ must$ do$ so$ in$ strict$ adherence$ to$ the$
RespondentSinSIntervention.$ Constitution,$lest$its$ruling$unduly$restricts$the$freedom$of$action$vested$by$that$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ same$ Constitution$ in$ the$ Chief$ Executive$ precisely$ to$ enable$ her$ to$ pursue$ the$
MUSLIM$ MULTISSECTORAL$ MOVEMENT$ FOR$ PEACE$ &$ DEVELOPMENT$ peace$process$effectively.$
(MMMPD),$ I.$FACTUAL$ANTECEDENTS$OF$THE$PETITIONS$
RespondentSinSIntervention.$ $$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $$
$$ On$August$5,$2008,$the$Government$of$the$Republic$of$the$Philippines$(GRP)$and$
G.R.$No.$183591$ the$MILF,$through$the$Chairpersons$of$their$respective$peace$negotiating$panels,$
Present:$ were$scheduled$to$sign$a$Memorandum$of$Agreement$on$the$Ancestral$Domain$
$$ (MOASAD)$Aspect$of$the$GRPSMILF$Tripoli$Agreement$on$Peace$of$2001$in$Kuala$
PUNO,$C.J.,$ Lumpur,$Malaysia.$
QUISUMBING,$ $$
YNARESSSANTIAGO,$ The$ MILF$ is$ a$ rebel$ group$ which$ was$ established$ in$ March$ 1984$ when,$ under$
CARPIO,$ the$leadership$of$the$late$Salamat$Hashim,$it$splintered$from$the$Moro$National$
AUSTRIASMARTINEZ,$ Liberation$ Front$ (MNLF)$ then$ headed$ by$ Nur$ Misuari,$ on$ the$ ground,$ among$
CORONA,$ others,$ of$ what$ Salamat$ perceived$ to$ be$ the$ manipulation$ of$ the$ MNLF$ away$
CARPIO$MORALES,$ from$an$Islamic$basis$towards$MarxistSMaoist$orientations.[1]$
AZCUNA,$ $$
TINGA,$
The$ signing$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ between$ the$ GRP$ and$ the$ MILF$ was$ not$ to$
materialize,$ however,$ for$ upon$ motion$ of$ petitioners,$ specifically$ those$ who$
filed$their$cases$before$the$scheduled$signing$of$the$MOASAD,$this$Court$issued$a$
Temporary$Restraining$Order$enjoining$the$GRP$from$signing$the$same.$
$$
The$MOASAD$was$preceded$by$a$long$process$of$negotiation$and$the$concluding$
of$ several$ prior$ agreements$ between$ the$ two$ parties$ beginning$ in$ 1996,$ when$
the$ GRPSMILF$ peace$ negotiations$ began.$ On$ July$ 18,$ 1997,$ the$ GRP$ and$ MILF$
Peace$ Panels$ signed$ the$ Agreement$ on$ General$ Cessation$ of$ Hostilities.$ The$
following$ year,$ they$ signed$ the$ General$ Framework$ of$ Agreement$ of$ Intent$ on$
August$27,$1998.$
$$
The$Solicitor$General,$who$represents$respondents,$summarizes$the$MOASAD$by$
stating$that$the$same$contained,$among$others,$the$commitment$of$the$parties$to$
pursue$ peace$ negotiations,$ protect$ and$ respect$ human$ rights,$ negotiate$ with$
sincerity$in$the$resolution$and$pacific$settlement$of$the$conflict,$and$refrain$from$
the$ use$ of$ threat$ or$ force$ to$ attain$ undue$ advantage$ while$ the$ peace$
negotiations$on$the$substantive$agenda$are$onSgoing.[2]$
$$
Early$ on,$ however,$ it$ was$ evident$ that$ there$ was$ not$ going$ to$ be$ any$ smooth$
sailing$ in$ the$ GRPSMILF$ peace$ process.$ Towards$ the$ end$ of$ 1999$ up$ to$ early$
2000,$the$MILF$attacked$a$number$of$municipalities$in$Central$Mindanao$and,$in$
March$2000,$it$took$control$of$the$town$hall$of$Kauswagan,$Lanao$del$Norte.[3]$
In$response,$then$President$Joseph$Estrada$declared$and$carried$out$an$allSoutS
war$against$the$MILF.$
$$
When$President$Gloria$MacapagalSArroyo$assumed$office,$the$military$offensive$
against$ the$ MILF$ was$ suspended$ and$ the$ government$ sought$ a$ resumption$ of$
the$ peace$ talks.$ The$ MILF,$ according$ to$ a$ leading$ MILF$ member,$ initially$
responded$ with$ deep$ reservation,$ but$ when$ President$ Arroyo$ asked$ the$
Government$ of$ Malaysia$ through$ Prime$ Minister$ Mahathir$ Mohammad$ to$ help$
convince$ the$ MILF$ to$ return$ to$ the$ negotiating$ table,$ the$ MILF$ convened$ its$
Central$ Committee$ to$ seriously$ discuss$ the$ matter$ and,$ eventually,$ decided$ to$
meet$with$the$GRP.[4]$
$$
The$ parties$ met$ in$ Kuala$ Lumpur$ on$ March$ 24,$ 2001,$ with$ the$ talks$ being$
facilitated$ by$ the$ Malaysian$ government,$ the$ parties$ signing$ on$ the$ same$ date$
the$ Agreement$ on$ the$ General$ Framework$ for$ the$ Resumption$ of$ Peace$ Talks$
Between$the$GRP$and$the$MILF.$The$MILF$thereafter$suspended$all$its$military$
actions.[5]$
$$
Formal$ peace$ talks$ between$ the$ parties$ were$ held$ in$ Tripoli,$ Libya$ from$ June$
20S22,$ 2001,$ the$ outcome$ of$ which$ was$ the$ GRPSMILF$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ on$
Peace$(Tripoli$Agreement$2001)$containing$the$basic$principles$and$agenda$on$
the$following$aspects$of$the$negotiation:$Security$Aspect,$Rehabilitation$Aspect,$
and$Ancestral$Domain$Aspect.$With$regard$to$the$Ancestral$Domain$Aspect,$the$
parties$ in$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ 2001$ simply$ agreed$ that$ the$ same$ be$ discussed$
further$by$the$Parties$in$their$next$meeting.$
$$
A$ second$ round$ of$ peace$ talks$ was$ held$ in$ Cyberjaya,$ Malaysia$ on$ August$ 5S7,$
2001$ which$ ended$ with$ the$ signing$ of$ the$ Implementing$ Guidelines$ on$ the$
Security$ Aspect$ of$ the$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ 2001$ leading$ to$ a$ ceasefire$ status$
between$the$parties.$This$was$followed$by$the$Implementing$Guidelines$on$the$
Humanitarian$ Rehabilitation$ and$ Development$ Aspects$ of$ the$ Tripoli$
Agreement$ 2001,$ which$ was$ signed$ on$ May$ 7,$ 2002$ at$ Putrajaya,$ Malaysia.$
Nonetheless,$ there$ were$ many$ incidence$ of$ violence$ between$ government$
forces$and$the$MILF$from$2002$to$2003.$
$$
Meanwhile,$then$MILF$Chairman$Salamat$Hashim$passed$away$on$July$13,$2003$
and$he$was$replaced$by$Al$Haj$Murad,$who$was$then$the$chief$peace$negotiator$
of$ the$ MILF.$ Murads$ position$ as$ chief$ peace$ negotiator$ was$ taken$ over$ by$
Mohagher$Iqbal.[6]$
$$
In$ 2005,$ several$ exploratory$ talks$ were$ held$ between$ the$ parties$ in$ Kuala$
Lumpur,$eventually$leading$to$the$crafting$of$the$draft$MOASAD$in$its$final$form,$
which,$as$mentioned,$was$set$to$be$signed$last$August$5,$2008.$
$$
II.$STATEMENT$OF$THE$PROCEEDINGS$
$$
$$
Before$ the$ Court$ is$ what$ is$ perhaps$ the$ most$ contentious$ consensus$ ever$
embodied$ in$ an$ instrument$ the$ MOASAD$ which$ is$ assailed$ principally$ by$ the$
present$ petitions$ bearing$ docket$ numbers$ 183591,$ 183752,$ 183893,$ 183951$
and$183962.$
$$
Commonly$ impleaded$ as$ respondents$ are$ the$ GRP$ Peace$ Panel$ on$ Ancestral$
Domain[7]$ and$ the$ Presidential$ Adviser$ on$ the$ Peace$ Process$ (PAPP)$
Hermogenes$Esperon,$Jr.$
$$
On$ July$ 23,$ 2008,$ the$ Province$ of$ North$ Cotabato[8]$ and$ ViceSGovernor$
Emmanuel$Piol$filed$a$petition,$docketed$as$G.R.$No.$183591,$for$Mandamus$and$
Prohibition$ with$ Prayer$ for$ the$ Issuance$ of$ Writ$ of$ Preliminary$ Injunction$ and$
Temporary$ Restraining$ Order.[9]$ Invoking$ the$ right$ to$ information$ on$ matters$
of$ public$ concern,$ petitioners$ seek$ to$ compel$ respondents$ to$ disclose$ and$
furnish$ them$ the$ complete$ and$ official$ copies$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ including$ its$
attachments,$ and$ to$ prohibit$ the$ slated$ signing$ of$ the$ MOASAD,$ pending$ the$
disclosure$ of$ the$ contents$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ and$ the$ holding$ of$ a$ public$
consultation$ thereon.$ Supplementarily,$ petitioners$ pray$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ be$
declared$unconstitutional.[10]$
$$
This$initial$petition$was$followed$by$another$one,$docketed$as$G.R.$No.$183752,$
also$ for$ Mandamus$ and$ Prohibition[11]$ filed$ by$ the$ City$ of$ Zamboanga,[12]$
Mayor$ Celso$ Lobregat,$ Rep.$ Ma.$ Isabelle$ Climaco$ and$ Rep.$ Erico$ Basilio$ Fabian$
who$ likewise$ pray$ for$ similar$ injunctive$ reliefs.$ Petitioners$ herein$ moreover$
pray$ that$ the$ City$ of$ Zamboanga$ be$ excluded$ from$ the$ Bangsamoro$ Homeland$
and/or$Bangsamoro$Juridical$Entity$and,$in$the$alternative,$that$the$MOASAD$be$
declared$null$and$void.$
$$
By$ Resolution$ of$ August$ 4,$ 2008,$ the$ Court$ issued$ a$ Temporary$ Restraining$
Order$commanding$and$directing$public$respondents$and$their$agents$to$cease$
and$desist$from$formally$signing$the$MOASAD.[13]$The$Court$also$required$the$
Solicitor$General$to$submit$to$the$Court$and$petitioners$the$official$copy$of$the$
final$draft$of$the$MOASAD,[14]$to$which$she$complied.[15]$
$$
Meanwhile,$ the$ City$ of$ Iligan[16]$ filed$ a$ petition$ for$ Injunction$ and/or$
Declaratory$ Relief,$ docketed$ as$ G.R.$ No.$ 183893,$ praying$ that$ respondents$ be$
enjoined$from$signing$the$MOASAD$or,$if$the$same$had$already$been$signed,$from$
implementing$ the$ same,$ and$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ be$ declared$ unconstitutional.$
Petitioners$herein$additionally$implead$Executive$Secretary$Eduardo$Ermita$as$
respondent.$
$$
The$ Province$ of$ Zamboanga$ del$ Norte,[17]$ Governor$ Rolando$ Yebes,$ ViceS
Governor$ Francis$ Olvis,$ Rep.$ Cecilia$ JalosjosSCarreon,$ Rep.$ Cesar$ Jalosjos,$ and$
the$ members[18]$ of$ the$ Sangguniang$ Panlalawigan$ of$ Zamboanga$ del$ Norte$
filed$ on$ August$ 15,$ 2008$ a$ petition$ for$ Certiorari,$ Mandamus$ and$
Prohibition,[19]$ docketed$ as$ G.R.$ No.$ 183951.$ They$ pray,$ inter$ alia,$ that$ the$
MOASAD$ be$ declared$ null$ and$ void$ and$ without$ operative$ effect,$ and$ that$
respondents$be$enjoined$from$executing$the$MOASAD.$
$$
On$ August$ 19,$ 2008,$ Ernesto$ Maceda,$ Jejomar$ Binay,$ and$ Aquilino$ Pimentel$ III$
filed$ a$ petition$ for$ Prohibition,[20]$ docketed$ as$ G.R.$ No.$ 183962,$ praying$ for$ a$
judgment$ prohibiting$ and$ permanently$ enjoining$ respondents$ from$ formally$
signing$ and$ executing$ the$ MOASAD$ and$ or$ any$ other$ agreement$ derived$
therefrom$ or$ similar$ thereto,$ and$ nullifying$ the$ MOASAD$ for$ being$
unconstitutional$ and$ illegal.$ Petitioners$ herein$ additionally$ implead$ as$
respondent$ the$ MILF$ Peace$ Negotiating$ Panel$ represented$ by$ its$ Chairman$
Mohagher$Iqbal.$
Various$parties$moved$to$intervene$and$were$granted$leave$of$court$to$file$their$
petitionsS/commentsSinSintervention.$ PetitionersSinSIntervention$ include$
Senator$ Manuel$ A.$ Roxas,$ former$ Senate$ President$ Franklin$ Drilon$ and$ Atty.$
Adel$ Tamano,$ the$ City$ of$ Isabela[21]$ and$ Mayor$ Cherrylyn$ SantosSAkbar,$ the$
Province$of$Sultan$Kudarat[22]$and$Gov.$Suharto$Mangudadatu,$the$Municipality$
of$ Linamon$ in$ Lanao$ del$ Norte,[23]$ Ruy$ Elias$ Lopez$ of$ Davao$ City$ and$ of$ the$
Bagobo$tribe,$Sangguniang$Panlungsod$member$Marino$Ridao$and$businessman$
Kisin$ Buxani,$ both$ of$ Cotabato$ City;$ and$ lawyers$ Carlo$ Gomez,$ Gerardo$ Dilig,$
Nesario$Awat,$Joselito$Alisuag,$Richalex$Jagmis,$all$of$Palawan$City.$The$Muslim$
Legal$ Assistance$ Foundation,$ Inc.$ (Muslaf)$ and$ the$ Muslim$ MultiSSectoral$
Movement$ for$ Peace$ and$ Development$ (MMMPD)$ filed$ their$ respective$
CommentsSinSIntervention.$
$$
By$subsequent$Resolutions,$the$Court$ordered$the$consolidation$of$the$petitions.$
Respondents$ filed$ Comments$ on$ the$ petitions,$ while$ some$ of$ petitioners$
submitted$their$respective$Replies.$
$$
Respondents,$ by$ Manifestation$ and$ Motion$ of$ August$ 19,$ 2008,$ stated$ that$ the$
Executive$Department$shall$thoroughly$review$the$MOASAD$and$pursue$further$
negotiations$to$address$the$issues$hurled$against$it,$and$thus$moved$to$dismiss$
the$cases.$In$the$succeeding$exchange$of$pleadings,$respondents$motion$was$met$
with$vigorous$opposition$from$petitioners.$
$$
The$ cases$ were$ heard$ on$ oral$ argument$ on$ August$ 15,$ 22$ and$ 29,$ 2008$ that$
tackled$the$following$principal$issues:$
$$
1.$Whether$the$petitions$have$become$moot$and$academic$
$$
(i)$ insofar$ as$ the$ mandamus$ aspect$ is$ concerned,$ in$ view$ of$ the$ disclosure$ of$
official$copies$of$the$final$draft$of$the$Memorandum$of$Agreement$(MOA);$and$
$$
(ii)$ insofar$ as$ the$ prohibition$ aspect$ involving$ the$ Local$ Government$ Units$ is$
concerned,$ if$ it$ is$ considered$ that$ consultation$ has$ become$ fait$ accompli$ with$
the$finalization$of$the$draft;$
$$
2.$ Whether$ the$ constitutionality$ and$ the$ legality$ of$ the$ MOA$ is$ ripe$ for$
adjudication;$
$$
3.$ Whether$ respondent$ Government$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ Philippines$ Peace$
Panel$ committed$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$
jurisdiction$when$it$negotiated$and$initiated$the$MOA$visSSvis$ISSUES$Nos.$4$and$
5;$
$$
4.$Whether$there$is$a$violation$of$the$peoples$right$to$information$on$matters$of$
public$concern$(1987$Constitution,$Article$III,$Sec.$7)$under$a$state$policy$of$full$
disclosure$ of$ all$ its$ transactions$ involving$ public$ interest$ (1987$ Constitution,$
Article$ II,$ Sec.$ 28)$ including$ public$ consultation$ under$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 7160$
(LOCAL$GOVERNMENT$CODE$OF$1991)[;]$
$$
If$it$is$in$the$affirmative,$whether$prohibition$under$Rule$65$of$the$1997$Rules$of$
Civil$Procedure$is$an$appropriate$remedy;$
$$
5.$ Whether$ by$ signing$ the$ MOA,$ the$ Government$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$
Philippines$would$be$BINDING$itself$
$$
a)$ to$ create$ and$ recognize$ the$ Bangsamoro$ Juridical$ Entity$ (BJE)$ as$ a$ separate$
state,$or$a$juridical,$territorial$or$political$subdivision$not$recognized$by$law;$
$$
b)$to$revise$or$amend$the$Constitution$and$existing$laws$to$conform$to$the$MOA;$
$$
c)$to$concede$to$or$recognize$the$claim$of$the$Moro$Islamic$Liberation$Front$for$
ancestral$ domain$ in$ violation$ of$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 8371$ (THE$ INDIGENOUS$
PEOPLES$ RIGHTS$ ACT$ OF$ 1997),$ particularly$ Section$ 3(g)$ &$ Chapter$ VII$
(DELINEATION,$RECOGNITION$OF$ANCESTRAL$DOMAINS)[;]$
$$
If$in$the$affirmative,$whether$the$Executive$Branch$has$the$authority$to$so$bind$
the$Government$of$the$Republic$of$the$Philippines;$
$$
6.$Whether$the$inclusion/exclusion$of$the$Province$of$North$Cotabato,$Cities$of$
Zamboanga,$ Iligan$ and$ Isabela,$ and$ the$ Municipality$ of$ Linamon,$ Lanao$ del$
Norte$ in/from$ the$ areas$ covered$ by$ the$ projected$ Bangsamoro$ Homeland$ is$ a$
justiciable$question;$and$
$$
7.$ Whether$ desistance$ from$ signing$ the$ MOA$ derogates$ any$ prior$ valid$
commitments$of$the$Government$of$the$Republic$of$the$Philippines.[24]$
$$
The$ Court,$ thereafter,$ ordered$ the$ parties$ to$ submit$ their$ respective$
Memoranda.$Most$of$the$parties$submitted$their$memoranda$on$time.$
$$
III.$OVERVIEW$OF$THE$MOASAD$
$$
As$ a$ necessary$ backdrop$ to$ the$ consideration$ of$ the$ objections$ raised$ in$ the$
subject$ five$ petitions$ and$ six$ petitionsSinSintervention$ against$ the$ MOASAD,$ as$
well$ as$ the$ two$ commentsSinSintervention$ in$ favor$ of$ the$ MOASAD,$ the$ Court$
takes$an$overview$of$the$MOA.$
$$
The$MOASAD$identifies$the$Parties$to$it$as$the$GRP$and$the$MILF.$
$$
Under$ the$ heading$ Terms$ of$ Reference$ (TOR),$ the$ MOASAD$ includes$ not$ only$
four$ earlier$ agreements$ between$ the$ GRP$ and$ MILF,$ but$ also$ two$ agreements$
between$ the$ GRP$ and$ the$ MNLF:$ the$ 1976$ Tripoli$ Agreement,$ and$ the$ Final$
Peace$Agreement$on$the$Implementation$of$the$1976$Tripoli$Agreement,$signed$
on$September$2,$1996$during$the$administration$of$President$Fidel$Ramos.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ also$ identifies$ as$ TOR$ two$ local$ statutes$ the$ organic$ act$ for$ the$
Autonomous$ Region$ in$ Muslim$ Mindanao$ (ARMM)[25]$ and$ the$ Indigenous$
Peoples$ Rights$ Act$ (IPRA),[26]$ and$ several$ international$ law$ instruments$ the$
ILO$ Convention$ No.$ 169$ Concerning$ Indigenous$ and$ Tribal$ Peoples$ in$
Independent$ Countries$ in$ relation$ to$ the$ UN$ Declaration$ on$ the$ Rights$ of$ the$
Indigenous$Peoples,$and$the$UN$Charter,$among$others.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ includes$ as$ a$ final$ TOR$ the$ generic$ category$ of$ compact$ rights$
entrenchment$ emanating$ from$ the$ regime$ of$ darSulSmuahada$ (or$ territory$
under$ compact)$ and$ darSulSsulh$ (or$ territory$ under$ peace$ agreement)$ that$
partakes$the$nature$of$a$treaty$device.$
$$
During$the$height$of$the$Muslim$Empire,$early$Muslim$jurists$tended$to$see$the$
world$ through$ a$ simple$ dichotomy:$ there$ was$ the$ darSulSIslam$ (the$ Abode$ of$
Islam)$ and$ darSulSharb$ (the$ Abode$ of$ War).$ The$ first$ referred$ to$ those$ lands$
where$ Islamic$ laws$ held$ sway,$ while$ the$ second$ denoted$ those$ lands$ where$
Muslims$ were$ persecuted$ or$ where$ Muslim$ laws$ were$ outlawed$ or$
ineffective.[27]$This$way$of$viewing$the$world,$however,$became$more$complex$
through$ the$ centuries$ as$ the$ Islamic$ world$ became$ part$ of$ the$ international$
community$of$nations.$
$$
As$ Muslim$ States$ entered$ into$ treaties$ with$ their$ neighbors,$ even$ with$ distant$
States$and$interSgovernmental$organizations,$the$classical$division$of$the$world$
into$darSulSIslam$and$darSulSharb$eventually$lost$its$meaning.$New$terms$were$
drawn$ up$ to$ describe$ novel$ ways$ of$ perceiving$ nonSMuslim$ territories.$ For$
instance,$areas$like$darSulSmuahada$(land$of$compact)$and$darSulSsulh$(land$of$
treaty)$referred$to$countries$which,$though$under$a$secular$regime,$maintained$
peaceful$ and$ cooperative$ relations$ with$ Muslim$ States,$ having$ been$ bound$ to$
each$ other$ by$ treaty$ or$ agreement.$ DarSulSaman$ (land$ of$ order),$ on$ the$ other$
hand,$ referred$ to$ countries$ which,$ though$ not$ bound$ by$ treaty$ with$ Muslim$
States,$maintained$freedom$of$religion$for$Muslims.[28]$
$$
It$ thus$ appears$ that$ the$ compact$ rights$ entrenchment$ emanating$ from$ the$
regime$of$darSulSmuahada$and$darSulSsulh$simply$refers$to$all$other$agreements$
between$the$MILF$and$the$Philippine$government$the$Philippines$being$the$land$
of$ compact$ and$ peace$ agreement$ that$ partake$ of$ the$ nature$ of$ a$ treaty$ device,$
treaty$ being$ broadly$ defined$ as$ any$ solemn$ agreement$ in$ writing$ that$ sets$ out$
understandings,$obligations,$and$benefits$for$both$parties$which$provides$for$a$
framework$that$elaborates$the$principles$declared$in$the$[MOASAD].[29]$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ states$ that$ the$ Parties$ HAVE$ AGREED$ AND$ ACKNOWLEDGED$ AS$
FOLLOWS,$and$starts$with$its$main$body.$
$$
The$ main$ body$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ is$ divided$ into$ four$ strands,$ namely,$ Concepts$
and$Principles,$Territory,$Resources,$and$Governance.$
$$
A.$CONCEPTS$AND$PRINCIPLES$
$$
This$strand$begins$with$the$statement$that$it$is$the$birthright$of$all$Moros$and$all$
Indigenous$ peoples$ of$ Mindanao$ to$ identify$ themselves$ and$ be$ accepted$ as$
Bangsamoros.$ It$ defines$ Bangsamoro$ people$ as$ the$ natives$ or$ original$
inhabitants$of$Mindanao$and$its$adjacent$islands$including$Palawan$and$the$Sulu$
archipelago$ at$ the$ time$ of$ conquest$ or$ colonization,$ and$ their$ descendants$
whether$mixed$or$of$full$blood,$including$their$spouses.[30]$
$$
Thus,$ the$ concept$ of$ Bangsamoro,$ as$ defined$ in$ this$ strand$ of$ the$ MOASAD,$
includes$ not$ only$ Moros$ as$ traditionally$ understood$ even$ by$ Muslims,[31]$ but$
all$indigenous$peoples$of$Mindanao$and$its$adjacent$islands.$The$MOASAD$adds$
that$the$freedom$of$choice$of$indigenous$peoples$shall$be$respected.$What$this$
freedom$of$choice$consists$in$has$not$been$specifically$defined.$
$$
The$MOASAD$proceeds$to$refer$to$the$Bangsamoro$homeland,$the$ownership$of$
which$ is$ vested$ exclusively$ in$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$ by$ virtue$ of$ their$ prior$
rights$ of$ occupation.[32]$ Both$ parties$ to$ the$ MOASAD$ acknowledge$ that$
ancestral$domain$does$not$form$part$of$the$public$domain.[33]$
$$
The$ Bangsamoro$ people$ are$ acknowledged$ as$ having$ the$ right$ to$ selfS
governance,$which$right$is$said$to$be$rooted$on$ancestral$territoriality$exercised$
originally$ under$ the$ suzerain$ authority$ of$ their$ sultanates$ and$ the$ Pat$ a$
Pangampong$ ku$ Ranaw.$ The$ sultanates$ were$ described$ as$ states$ or$
karajaan/kadatuan$resembling$a$body$politic$endowed$with$all$the$elements$of$
a$nationSstate$in$the$modern$sense.[34]$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ thus$ grounds$ the$ right$ to$ selfSgovernance$ of$ the$ Bangsamoro$
people$ on$ the$ past$ suzerain$ authority$ of$ the$ sultanates.$ As$ gathered,$ the$
territory$defined$as$the$Bangsamoro$homeland$was$ruled$by$several$sultanates$
and,$specifically$in$the$case$of$the$Maranao,$by$the$Pat$a$Pangampong$ku$Ranaw,$
a$ confederation$ of$ independent$ principalities$ (pangampong)$ each$ ruled$ by$
datus$and$sultans,$none$of$whom$was$supreme$over$the$others.[35]$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ goes$ on$ to$ describe$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$ as$ the$ First$ Nation$
with$ defined$ territory$ and$ with$ a$ system$ of$ government$ having$ entered$ into$
treaties$of$amity$and$commerce$with$foreign$nations.$
The$term$First$Nation$is$of$Canadian$origin$referring$to$the$indigenous$peoples$
of$ that$ territory,$ particularly$ those$ known$ as$ Indians.$ In$ Canada,$ each$ of$ these$
indigenous$ peoples$ is$ equally$ entitled$ to$ be$ called$ First$ Nation,$ hence,$ all$ of$
them$are$usually$described$collectively$by$the$plural$First$Nations.[36]$To$that$
extent,$ the$ MOASAD,$ by$ identifying$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$ as$ the$ First$ Nation$
suggesting$ its$ exclusive$ entitlement$ to$ that$ designation$ departs$ from$ the$
Canadian$usage$of$the$term.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ then$ mentions$ for$ the$ first$ time$ the$ Bangsamoro$ Juridical$ Entity$
(BJE)$ to$ which$ it$ grants$ the$ authority$ and$ jurisdiction$ over$ the$ Ancestral$
Domain$and$Ancestral$Lands$of$the$Bangsamoro.[37]$
$$
$$
$$
B.$TERRITORY$
$$
The$territory$of$the$Bangsamoro$homeland$is$described$as$the$land$mass$as$well$
as$ the$ maritime,$ terrestrial,$ fluvial$ and$ alluvial$ domains,$ including$ the$ aerial$
domain$ and$ the$ atmospheric$ space$ above$ it,$ embracing$ the$ MindanaoSSuluS
Palawan$geographic$region.[38]$
$$
More$specifically,$the$core$of$the$BJE$is$defined$as$the$present$geographic$area$of$
the$ ARMM$ thus$ constituting$ the$ following$ areas:$ Lanao$ del$ Sur,$ Maguindanao,$
Sulu,$TawiSTawi,$Basilan,$and$Marawi$City.$Significantly,$this$core$also$includes$
certain$municipalities$of$Lanao$del$Norte$that$voted$for$inclusion$in$the$ARMM$
in$the$2001$plebiscite.[39]$
$$
Outside$ of$ this$ core,$ the$ BJE$ is$ to$ cover$ other$ provinces,$ cities,$ municipalities$
and$barangays,$which$are$grouped$into$two$categories,$Category$A$and$Category$
B.$ Each$ of$ these$ areas$ is$ to$ be$ subjected$ to$ a$ plebiscite$ to$ be$ held$ on$ different$
dates,$years$apart$from$each$other.$Thus,$Category$A$areas$are$to$be$subjected$to$
a$plebiscite$not$later$than$twelve$(12)$months$following$the$signing$of$the$MOAS
AD.[40]$ Category$ B$ areas,$ also$ called$ Special$ Intervention$ Areas,$ on$ the$ other$
hand,$are$to$be$subjected$to$a$plebiscite$twentySfive$(25)$years$from$the$signing$
of$a$separate$agreement$the$Comprehensive$Compact.[41]$
$$
The$Parties$to$the$MOASAD$stipulate$that$the$BJE$shall$have$jurisdiction$over$all$
natural$ resources$ within$ its$ internal$ waters,$ defined$ as$ extending$ fifteen$ (15)$
kilometers$ from$ the$ coastline$ of$ the$ BJE$ area;[42]$ that$ the$ BJE$ shall$ also$ have$
territorial$waters,$which$shall$stretch$beyond$the$BJE$internal$waters$up$to$the$
baselines$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ Philippines$ (RP)$ south$ east$ and$ south$ west$ of$
mainland$ Mindanao;$ and$ that$ within$ these$ territorial$ waters,$ the$ BJE$ and$ the$
Central$ Government$ (used$ interchangeably$ with$ RP)$ shall$ exercise$ joint$
jurisdiction,$authority$and$management$over$all$natural$resources.[43]$Notably,$
the$jurisdiction$over$the$internal$waters$is$not$similarly$described$as$joint.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ further$ provides$ for$ the$ sharing$ of$ minerals$ on$ the$ territorial$
waters$ between$ the$ Central$ Government$ and$ the$ BJE,$ in$ favor$ of$ the$ latter,$
through$ production$ sharing$ and$ economic$ cooperation$ agreement.[44]$ The$
activities$which$the$Parties$are$allowed$to$conduct$on$the$territorial$waters$are$
enumerated,$ among$ which$ are$ the$ exploration$ and$ utilization$ of$ natural$
resources,$regulation$of$shipping$and$fishing$activities,$and$the$enforcement$of$
police$and$safety$measures.[45]$There$is$no$similar$provision$on$the$sharing$of$
minerals$and$allowed$activities$with$respect$to$the$internal$waters$of$the$BJE.$
$$
C.$RESOURCES$
$$
The$MOASAD$states$that$the$BJE$is$free$to$enter$into$any$economic$cooperation$
and$trade$relations$with$foreign$countries$and$shall$have$the$option$to$establish$
trade$ missions$ in$ those$ countries.$ Such$ relationships$ and$ understandings,$
however,$are$not$to$include$aggression$against$the$GRP.$The$BJE$may$also$enter$
into$environmental$cooperation$agreements.[46]$
$$
The$ external$ defense$ of$ the$ BJE$ is$ to$ remain$ the$ duty$ and$ obligation$ of$ the$
Central$ Government.$ The$ Central$ Government$ is$ also$ bound$ to$ take$ necessary$
steps$to$ensure$the$BJEs$participation$in$international$meetings$and$events$like$
those$ of$ the$ ASEAN$ and$ the$ specialized$ agencies$ of$ the$ UN.$ The$ BJE$ is$ to$ be$
entitled$ to$ participate$ in$ Philippine$ official$ missions$ and$ delegations$ for$ the$
negotiation$ of$ border$ agreements$ or$ protocols$ for$ environmental$ protection$
and$ equitable$ sharing$ of$ incomes$ and$ revenues$ involving$ the$ bodies$ of$ water$
adjacent$to$or$between$the$islands$forming$part$of$the$ancestral$domain.[47]$
$$
With$regard$to$the$right$of$exploring$for,$producing,$and$obtaining$all$potential$
sources$ of$ energy,$ petroleum,$ fossil$ fuel,$ mineral$ oil$ and$ natural$ gas,$ the$
jurisdiction$ and$ control$ thereon$ is$ to$ be$ vested$ in$ the$ BJE$ as$ the$ party$ having$
control$ within$ its$ territorial$ jurisdiction.$ This$ right$ carries$ the$ proviso$ that,$ in$
times$ of$ national$ emergency,$ when$ public$ interest$ so$ requires,$ the$ Central$
Government$ may,$ for$ a$ fixed$ period$ and$ under$ reasonable$ terms$ as$ may$ be$
agreed$ upon$ by$ both$ Parties,$ assume$ or$ direct$ the$ operation$ of$ such$
resources.[48]$
$$
The$ sharing$ between$ the$ Central$ Government$ and$ the$ BJE$ of$ total$ production$
pertaining$to$natural$resources$is$to$be$75:25$in$favor$of$the$BJE.[49]$
The$ MOASAD$ provides$ that$ legitimate$ grievances$ of$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$
arising$from$any$unjust$dispossession$of$their$territorial$and$proprietary$rights,$
customary$ land$ tenures,$ or$ their$ marginalization$ shall$ be$ acknowledged.$
Whenever$restoration$is$no$longer$possible,$reparation$is$to$be$in$such$form$as$
mutually$determined$by$the$Parties.[50]$
$$
The$BJE$may$modify$or$cancel$the$forest$concessions,$timber$licenses,$contracts$
or$ agreements,$ mining$ concessions,$ Mineral$ Production$ and$ Sharing$
Agreements$ (MPSA),$ Industrial$ Forest$ Management$ Agreements$ (IFMA),$ and$
other$land$tenure$instruments$granted$by$the$Philippine$Government,$including$
those$issued$by$the$present$ARMM.[51]$
$$
D.$GOVERNANCE$
The$ MOASAD$ binds$ the$ Parties$ to$ invite$ a$ multinational$ thirdSparty$ to$ observe$
and$monitor$the$implementation$of$the$Comprehensive$Compact.$This$compact$
is$to$embody$the$details$for$the$effective$enforcement$and$the$mechanisms$and$
modalities$for$the$actual$implementation$of$the$MOASAD.$The$MOASAD$explicitly$
provides$that$the$participation$of$the$third$party$shall$not$in$any$way$affect$the$
status$of$the$relationship$between$the$Central$Government$and$the$BJE.[52]$
$$
The$associative$relationship$
between$the$Central$Government$
and$the$BJE$
$$
The$MOASAD$describes$the$relationship$of$the$Central$Government$and$the$BJE$
as$ associative,$ characterized$ by$ shared$ authority$ and$ responsibility.$ And$ it$
states$ that$ the$ structure$ of$ governance$ is$ to$ be$ based$ on$ executive,$ legislative,$
judicial,$ and$ administrative$ institutions$ with$ defined$ powers$ and$ functions$ in$
the$Comprehensive$Compact.$
$$
The$MOASAD$provides$that$its$provisions$requiring$amendments$to$the$existing$
legal$ framework$ shall$ take$ effect$ upon$ signing$ of$ the$ Comprehensive$ Compact$
and$ upon$ effecting$ the$ aforesaid$ amendments,$ with$ due$ regard$ to$ the$ nonS
derogation$ of$ prior$ agreements$ and$ within$ the$ stipulated$ timeframe$ to$ be$
contained$ in$ the$ Comprehensive$ Compact.$ As$ will$ be$ discussed$ later,$ much$ of$
the$present$controversy$hangs$on$the$legality$of$this$provision.$
$$
The$BJE$is$granted$the$power$to$build,$develop$and$maintain$its$own$institutions$
inclusive$of$civil$service,$electoral,$financial$and$banking,$education,$legislation,$
legal,$ economic,$ police$ and$ internal$ security$ force,$ judicial$ system$ and$
correctional$ institutions,$ the$ details$ of$ which$ shall$ be$ discussed$ in$ the$
negotiation$of$the$comprehensive$compact.$
$$
As$ stated$ early$ on,$ the$ MOASAD$ was$ set$ to$ be$ signed$ on$ August$ 5,$ 2008$ by$
Rodolfo$ Garcia$ and$ Mohagher$ Iqbal,$ Chairpersons$ of$ the$ Peace$ Negotiating$
Panels$ of$ the$ GRP$ and$ the$ MILF,$ respectively.$ Notably,$ the$ penultimate$
paragraph$of$the$MOASAD$identifies$the$signatories$as$the$representatives$of$the$
Parties,$ meaning$ the$ GRP$ and$ MILF$ themselves,$ and$ not$ merely$ of$ the$
negotiating$ panels.[53]$ In$ addition,$ the$ signature$ page$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ states$
that$ it$ is$ WITNESSED$ BY$ Datuk$ Othman$ Bin$ Abd$ Razak,$ Special$ Adviser$ to$ the$
Prime$Minister$of$Malaysia,$ENDORSED$BY$Ambassador$Sayed$Elmasry,$Adviser$
to$ Organization$ of$ the$ Islamic$ Conference$ (OIC)$ Secretary$ General$ and$ Special$
Envoy$ for$ Peace$ Process$ in$ Southern$ Philippines,$ and$ SIGNED$ IN$ THE$
PRESENCE$OF$Dr.$Albert$G.$Romulo,$Secretary$of$Foreign$Affairs$of$RP$and$Dato$
Seri$Utama$Dr.$Rais$Bin$Yatim,$Minister$of$Foreign$Affairs,$Malaysia,$all$of$whom$
were$scheduled$to$sign$the$Agreement$last$August$5,$2008.$
$$
Annexed$to$the$MOASAD$are$two$documents$containing$the$respective$lists$cum$
maps$of$the$provinces,$municipalities,$and$barangays$under$Categories$A$and$B$
earlier$mentioned$in$the$discussion$on$the$strand$on$TERRITORY.$
$$
IV.$PROCEDURAL$ISSUES$
$$
$$
A.$RIPENESS$
$$
$$
The$ power$ of$ judicial$ review$ is$ limited$ to$ actual$ cases$ or$ controversies.[54]$
Courts$ decline$ to$ issue$ advisory$ opinions$ or$ to$ resolve$ hypothetical$ or$ feigned$
problems,$ or$ mere$ academic$ questions.[55]$ The$ limitation$ of$ the$ power$ of$
judicial$review$to$actual$cases$and$controversies$defines$the$role$assigned$to$the$
judiciary$ in$ a$ tripartite$ allocation$ of$ power,$ to$ assure$ that$ the$ courts$ will$ not$
intrude$into$areas$committed$to$the$other$branches$of$government.[56]$
$$
An$actual$case$or$controversy$involves$a$conflict$of$legal$rights,$an$assertion$of$
opposite$legal$claims,$susceptible$of$judicial$resolution$as$distinguished$from$a$
hypothetical$ or$ abstract$ difference$ or$ dispute.$ There$ must$ be$ a$ contrariety$ of$
legal$rights$that$can$be$interpreted$and$enforced$on$the$basis$of$existing$law$and$
jurisprudence.[57]$The$Court$can$decide$the$constitutionality$of$an$act$or$treaty$
only$ when$ a$ proper$ case$ between$ opposing$ parties$ is$ submitted$ for$ judicial$
determination.[58]$
$$
Related$to$the$requirement$of$an$actual$case$or$controversy$is$the$requirement$
of$ ripeness.$ A$ question$ is$ ripe$ for$ adjudication$ when$ the$ act$ being$ challenged$
has$had$a$direct$adverse$effect$on$the$individual$challenging$it.[59]$For$a$case$to$
be$considered$ripe$for$adjudication,$it$is$a$prerequisite$that$something$had$then$
been$accomplished$or$performed$by$either$branch$before$a$court$may$come$into$
the$picture,[60]$and$the$petitioner$must$allege$the$existence$of$an$immediate$or$
threatened$injury$to$itself$as$a$result$of$the$challenged$action.[61]$He$must$show$
that$ he$ has$ sustained$ or$ is$ immediately$ in$ danger$ of$ sustaining$ some$ direct$
injury$as$a$result$of$the$act$complained$of.[62]$
$$
The$Solicitor$General$argues$that$there$is$no$justiciable$controversy$that$is$ripe$
for$judicial$review$in$the$present$petitions,$reasoning$that$
$$
The$ unsigned$ MOASAD$ is$ simply$ a$ list$ of$ consensus$ points$ subject$ to$ further$
negotiations$ and$ legislative$ enactments$ as$ well$ as$ constitutional$ processes$
aimed$at$attaining$a$final$peaceful$agreement.$Simply$put,$the$MOASAD$remains$
to$ be$ a$ proposal$ that$ does$ not$ automatically$ create$ legally$ demandable$ rights$
and$obligations$until$the$list$of$operative$acts$required$have$been$duly$complied$
with.$x$x$x$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
In$the$cases$at$bar,$it$is$respectfully$submitted$that$this$Honorable$Court$has$no$
authority$ to$ pass$ upon$ issues$ based$ on$ hypothetical$ or$ feigned$ constitutional$
problems$ or$ interests$ with$ no$ concrete$ bases.$ Considering$ the$ preliminary$
character$of$the$MOASAD,$there$are$no$concrete$acts$that$could$possibly$violate$
petitioners$ and$ intervenors$ rights$ since$ the$ acts$ complained$ of$ are$ mere$
contemplated$steps$toward$the$formulation$of$a$final$peace$agreement.$Plainly,$
petitioners$ and$ intervenors$ perceived$ injury,$ if$ at$ all,$ is$ merely$ imaginary$ and$
illusory$ apart$ from$ being$ unfounded$ and$ based$ on$ mere$ conjectures.$
(Underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
The$Solicitor$General$cites[63]$the$following$provisions$of$the$MOASAD:$
$$
TERRITORY$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
2.$Toward$this$end,$the$Parties$enter$into$the$following$stipulations:$
x$x$x$x$
$$
d.$ Without$ derogating$ from$ the$ requirements$ of$ prior$ agreements,$ the$
Government$stipulates$to$conduct$and$deliver,$using$all$possible$legal$measures,$
within$ twelve$ (12)$ months$ following$ the$ signing$ of$ the$ MOASAD,$ a$ plebiscite$
covering$ the$ areas$ as$ enumerated$ in$ the$ list$ and$ depicted$ in$ the$ map$ as$
Category$A$attached$herein$(the$Annex).$The$Annex$constitutes$an$integral$part$
of$ this$ framework$ agreement.$ Toward$ this$ end,$ the$ Parties$ shall$ endeavor$ to$
complete$ the$ negotiations$ and$ resolve$ all$ outstanding$ issues$ on$ the$
Comprehensive$ Compact$ within$ fifteen$ (15)$ months$ from$ the$ signing$ of$ the$
MOASAD.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
GOVERNANCE$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
7.$ The$ Parties$ agree$ that$ mechanisms$ and$ modalities$ for$ the$ actual$
implementation$ of$ this$ MOASAD$ shall$ be$ spelt$ out$ in$ the$ Comprehensive$
Compact$to$mutually$take$such$steps$to$enable$it$to$occur$effectively.$
$$
Any$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ requiring$ amendments$ to$ the$ existing$ legal$
framework$shall$come$into$force$upon$the$signing$of$a$Comprehensive$Compact$
and$ upon$ effecting$ the$ necessary$ changes$ to$ the$ legal$ framework$ with$ due$
regard$ to$ nonSderogation$ of$ prior$ agreements$ and$ within$ the$ stipulated$
timeframe$ to$ be$ contained$ in$ the$ Comprehensive$ Compact.[64]$ (Underscoring$
supplied)$
$$
$$
The$Solicitor$Generals$arguments$fail$to$persuade.$
$$
Concrete$ acts$ under$ the$ MOASAD$ are$ not$ necessary$ to$ render$ the$ present$
controversy$ripe.$In$Pimentel,$Jr.$v.$Aguirre,[65]$this$Court$held:$
$$
x$ x$ x$ [B]y$ the$ mere$ enactment$ of$ the$ questioned$ law$ or$ the$ approval$ of$ the$
challenged$action,$the$dispute$is$said$to$have$ripened$into$a$judicial$controversy$
even$ without$ any$ other$ overt$ act.$ Indeed,$ even$ a$ singular$ violation$ of$ the$
Constitution$and/or$the$law$is$enough$to$awaken$judicial$duty.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
By$ the$ same$ token,$ when$ an$ act$ of$ the$ President,$ who$ in$ our$ constitutional$
scheme$ is$ a$ coequal$ of$ Congress,$ is$ seriously$ alleged$ to$ have$ infringed$ the$
Constitution$ and$ the$ laws$ x$ x$ x$ settling$ the$ dispute$ becomes$ the$ duty$ and$ the$
responsibility$of$the$courts.[66]$
$$
$$
In$Santa$Fe$Independent$School$District$v.$Doe,[67]$the$United$States$Supreme$
Court$ held$ that$ the$ challenge$ to$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ the$ schools$ policy$
allowing$ studentSled$ prayers$ and$ speeches$ before$ games$ was$ ripe$ for$
adjudication,$even$if$no$public$prayer$had$yet$been$led$under$the$policy,$because$
the$policy$was$being$challenged$as$unconstitutional$on$its$face.[68]$
$$
That$the$law$or$act$in$question$is$not$yet$effective$does$not$negate$ripeness.$For$
example,$ in$ New$ York$ v.$ United$ States,[69]$ decided$ in$ 1992,$ the$ United$ States$
Supreme$ Court$ held$ that$ the$ action$ by$ the$ State$ of$ New$ York$ challenging$ the$
provisions$ of$ the$ LowSLevel$ Radioactive$ Waste$ Policy$ Act$ was$ ripe$ for$
adjudication$ even$ if$ the$ questioned$ provision$ was$ not$ to$ take$ effect$ until$
January$ 1,$ 1996,$ because$ the$ parties$ agreed$ that$ New$ York$ had$ to$ take$
immediate$action$to$avoid$the$provision's$consequences.[70]$
$$
The$ present$ petitions$ pray$ for$ Certiorari,[71]$ Prohibition,$ and$ Mandamus.$
Certiorari$ and$ Prohibition$ are$ remedies$ granted$ by$ law$ when$ any$ tribunal,$
board$or$officer$has$acted,$in$the$case$of$certiorari,$or$is$proceeding,$in$the$case$
of$ prohibition,$ without$ or$ in$ excess$ of$ its$ jurisdiction$ or$ with$ grave$ abuse$ of$
discretion$ amounting$ to$ lack$ or$ excess$ of$ jurisdiction.[72]$ Mandamus$ is$ a$
remedy$granted$by$law$when$any$tribunal,$corporation,$board,$officer$or$person$
unlawfully$neglects$the$performance$of$an$act$which$the$law$specifically$enjoins$
as$ a$ duty$ resulting$ from$ an$ office,$ trust,$ or$ station,$ or$ unlawfully$ excludes$
another$ from$ the$ use$ or$ enjoyment$ of$ a$ right$ or$ office$ to$ which$ such$ other$ is$
entitled.[73]$Certiorari,$Mandamus$and$Prohibition$are$appropriate$remedies$to$
raise$constitutional$issues$and$to$review$and/or$prohibit/nullify,$when$proper,$
acts$of$legislative$and$executive$officials.[74]$
$$
The$authority$of$the$GRP$Negotiating$Panel$is$defined$by$Executive$Order$No.$3$
(E.O.$No.$3),$issued$on$February$28,$2001.[75]$The$said$executive$order$requires$
that$ [t]he$ government's$ policy$ framework$ for$ peace,$ including$ the$ systematic$
approach$and$the$administrative$structure$for$carrying$out$the$comprehensive$
peace$process$x$x$x$be$governed$by$this$Executive$Order.[76]$
$$
The$ present$ petitions$ allege$ that$ respondents$ GRP$ Panel$ and$ PAPP$ Esperon$
drafted$the$terms$of$the$MOASAD$without$consulting$the$local$government$units$
or$ communities$ affected,$ nor$ informing$ them$ of$ the$ proceedings.$ As$ will$ be$
discussed$in$greater$detail$later,$such$omission,$by$itself,$constitutes$a$departure$
by$respondents$from$their$mandate$under$E.O.$No.$3.$
$$
Furthermore,$the$petitions$allege$that$the$provisions$of$the$MOASAD$violate$the$
Constitution.$ The$ MOASAD$ provides$ that$ any$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD$
requiring$ amendments$ to$ the$ existing$ legal$ framework$ shall$ come$ into$ force$
upon$the$signing$of$a$Comprehensive$Compact$and$upon$effecting$the$necessary$
changes$to$the$legal$framework,$implying$an$amendment$of$the$Constitution$to$
accommodate$ the$ MOASAD.$ This$ stipulation,$ in$ effect,$ guaranteed$ to$ the$ MILF$
the$amendment$of$the$Constitution.$Such$act$constitutes$another$violation$of$its$
authority.$Again,$these$points$will$be$discussed$in$more$detail$later.$
As$the$petitions$allege$acts$or$omissions$on$the$part$of$respondent$that$exceed$
their$authority,$by$violating$their$duties$under$E.O.$No.$3$and$the$provisions$of$
the$ Constitution$ and$ statutes,$ the$ petitions$ make$ a$ prima$ facie$ case$ for$
Certiorari,$ Prohibition,$ and$ Mandamus,$ and$ an$ actual$ case$ or$ controversy$ ripe$
for$ adjudication$ exists.$ When$ an$ act$ of$ a$ branch$ of$ government$ is$ seriously$
alleged$to$have$infringed$the$Constitution,$it$becomes$not$only$the$right$but$in$
fact$the$duty$of$the$judiciary$to$settle$the$dispute.[77]$
$$
B.$LOCUS$STANDI$
$$
$$
For$ a$ party$ to$ have$ locus$ standi,$ one$ must$ allege$ such$ a$ personal$ stake$ in$ the$
outcome$ of$ the$ controversy$ as$ to$ assure$ that$ concrete$ adverseness$ which$
sharpens$the$presentation$of$issues$upon$which$the$court$so$largely$depends$for$
illumination$of$difficult$constitutional$questions.[78]$
$$
Because$constitutional$cases$are$often$public$actions$in$which$the$relief$sought$
is$ likely$ to$ affect$ other$ persons,$ a$ preliminary$ question$ frequently$ arises$ as$ to$
this$interest$in$the$constitutional$question$raised.[79]$
$$
When$suing$as$a$citizen,$the$person$complaining$must$allege$that$he$has$been$or$
is$about$to$be$denied$some$right$or$privilege$to$which$he$is$lawfully$entitled$or$
that$he$is$about$to$be$subjected$to$some$burdens$or$penalties$by$reason$of$the$
statute$ or$ act$ complained$ of.[80]$ When$ the$ issue$ concerns$ a$ public$ right,$ it$ is$
sufficient$that$the$petitioner$is$a$citizen$and$has$an$interest$in$the$execution$of$
the$laws.[81]$
$$
For$ a$ taxpayer,$ one$ is$ allowed$ to$ sue$ where$ there$ is$ an$ assertion$ that$ public$
funds$are$illegally$disbursed$or$deflected$to$an$illegal$purpose,$or$that$there$is$a$
wastage$ of$ public$ funds$ through$ the$ enforcement$ of$ an$ invalid$ or$
unconstitutional$law.[82]$The$Court$retains$discretion$whether$or$not$to$allow$a$
taxpayers$suit.[83]$
$$
In$ the$ case$ of$ a$ legislator$ or$ member$ of$ Congress,$ an$ act$ of$ the$ Executive$ that$
injures$ the$ institution$ of$ Congress$ causes$ a$ derivative$ but$ nonetheless$
substantial$injury$that$can$be$questioned$by$legislators.$A$member$of$the$House$
of$Representatives$has$standing$to$maintain$inviolate$the$prerogatives,$powers$
and$privileges$vested$by$the$Constitution$in$his$office.[84]$
$$
An$ organization$ may$ be$ granted$ standing$ to$ assert$ the$ rights$ of$ its$
members,[85]$but$the$mere$invocation$by$the$Integrated$Bar$of$the$Philippines$
or$ any$ member$ of$ the$ legal$ profession$ of$ the$ duty$ to$ preserve$ the$ rule$ of$ law$
does$not$suffice$to$clothe$it$with$standing.[86]$
$$
As$regards$a$local$government$unit$(LGU),$it$can$seek$relief$in$order$to$protect$
or$vindicate$an$interest$of$its$own,$and$of$the$other$LGUs.[87]$
$$
Intervenors,$meanwhile,$may$be$given$legal$standing$upon$showing$of$facts$that$
satisfy$the$requirements$of$the$law$authorizing$intervention,[88]$such$as$a$legal$
interest$in$the$matter$in$litigation,$or$in$the$success$of$either$of$the$parties.$
$$
In$ any$ case,$ the$ Court$ has$ discretion$ to$ relax$ the$ procedural$ technicality$ on$
locus$standi,$given$the$liberal$attitude$it$has$exercised,$highlighted$in$the$case$of$
David$v.$MacapagalSArroyo,[89]$where$technicalities$of$procedure$were$brushed$
aside,$ the$ constitutional$ issues$ raised$ being$ of$ paramount$ public$ interest$ or$ of$
transcendental$importance$deserving$the$attention$of$the$Court$in$view$of$their$
seriousness,$ novelty$ and$ weight$ as$ precedents.[90]$ The$ Courts$ forbearing$
stance$ on$ locus$ standi$ on$ issues$ involving$ constitutional$ issues$ has$ for$ its$
purpose$the$protection$of$fundamental$rights.$
$$
In$not$a$few$cases,$the$Court,$in$keeping$with$its$duty$under$the$Constitution$to$
determine$ whether$ the$ other$ branches$ of$ government$ have$ kept$ themselves$
within$ the$ limits$ of$ the$ Constitution$ and$ the$ laws$ and$ have$ not$ abused$ the$
discretion$given$them,$has$brushed$aside$technical$rules$of$procedure.[91]$
$$
In$the$petitions$at$bar,$petitioners$Province$of$North$Cotabato$(G.R.$No.$183591)$
Province$ of$ Zamboanga$ del$ Norte$ (G.R.$ No.$ 183951),$ City$ of$ Iligan$ (G.R.$ No.$
183893)$ and$ City$ of$ Zamboanga$ (G.R.$ No.$ 183752)$ and$ petitionersSinS
intervention$ Province$ of$ Sultan$ Kudarat,$ City$ of$ Isabela$ and$ Municipality$ of$
Linamon$have$locus$standi$in$view$of$the$direct$and$substantial$injury$that$they,$
as$LGUs,$would$suffer$as$their$territories,$whether$in$whole$or$in$part,$are$to$be$
included$ in$ the$ intended$ domain$ of$ the$ BJE.$ These$ petitioners$ allege$ that$ they$
did$not$vote$for$their$inclusion$in$the$ARMM$which$would$be$expanded$to$form$
the$BJE$territory.$Petitioners$legal$standing$is$thus$beyond$doubt.$
$$
In$ G.R.$ No.$ 183962,$ petitioners$ Ernesto$ Maceda,$ Jejomar$ Binay$ and$ Aquilino$
Pimentel$III$would$have$no$standing$as$citizens$and$taxpayers$for$their$failure$to$
specify$ that$ they$ would$ be$ denied$ some$ right$ or$ privilege$ or$ there$ would$ be$
wastage$of$public$funds.$The$fact$that$they$are$a$former$Senator,$an$incumbent$
mayor$ of$ Makati$ City,$ and$ a$ resident$ of$ Cagayan$ de$ Oro,$ respectively,$ is$ of$ no$
consequence.$Considering$their$invocation$of$the$transcendental$importance$of$
the$issues$at$hand,$however,$the$Court$grants$them$standing.$
$$
Intervenors$ Franklin$ Drilon$ and$ Adel$ Tamano,$ in$ alleging$ their$ standing$ as$
taxpayers,$assert$that$government$funds$would$be$expended$for$the$conduct$of$
an$illegal$and$unconstitutional$plebiscite$to$delineate$the$BJE$territory.$On$that$
score$ alone,$ they$ can$ be$ given$ legal$ standing.$ Their$ allegation$ that$ the$ issues$
involved$in$these$petitions$are$of$undeniable$transcendental$importance$clothes$
them$with$added$basis$for$their$personality$to$intervene$in$these$petitions.$
$$
With$ regard$ to$ Senator$ Manuel$ Roxas,$ his$ standing$ is$ premised$ on$ his$ being$ a$
member$of$the$Senate$and$a$citizen$to$enforce$compliance$by$respondents$of$the$
publics$ constitutional$ right$ to$ be$ informed$ of$ the$ MOASAD,$ as$ well$ as$ on$ a$
genuine$ legal$ interest$ in$ the$ matter$ in$ litigation,$ or$ in$ the$ success$ or$ failure$ of$
either$of$the$parties.$He$thus$possesses$the$requisite$standing$as$an$intervenor.$
$$
With$ respect$ to$ Intervenors$ Ruy$ Elias$ Lopez,$ as$ a$ former$ congressman$ of$ the$
3rd$district$of$Davao$City,$a$taxpayer$and$a$member$of$the$Bagobo$tribe;$Carlo$B.$
Gomez,$ et$ al.,$ as$ members$ of$ the$ IBP$ Palawan$ chapter,$ citizens$ and$ taxpayers;$
Marino$ Ridao,$ as$ taxpayer,$ resident$ and$ member$ of$ the$ Sangguniang$
Panlungsod$of$Cotabato$City;$and$Kisin$Buxani,$as$taxpayer,$they$failed$to$allege$
any$ proper$ legal$ interest$ in$ the$ present$ petitions.$ Just$ the$ same,$ the$ Court$
exercises$its$discretion$to$relax$the$procedural$technicality$on$locus$standi$given$
the$paramount$public$interest$in$the$issues$at$hand.$
$$
Intervening$ respondents$ Muslim$ MultiSSectoral$ Movement$ for$ Peace$ and$
Development,$ an$ advocacy$ group$ for$ justice$ and$ the$ attainment$ of$ peace$ and$
prosperity$in$Muslim$Mindanao;$and$Muslim$Legal$Assistance$Foundation$Inc.,$a$
nonSgovernment$ organization$ of$ Muslim$ lawyers,$ allege$ that$ they$ stand$ to$ be$
benefited$ or$ prejudiced,$ as$ the$ case$ may$ be,$ in$ the$ resolution$ of$ the$ petitions$
concerning$the$MOASAD,$and$prays$for$the$denial$of$the$petitions$on$the$grounds$
therein$stated.$Such$legal$interest$suffices$to$clothe$them$with$standing.$
$$
B.$MOOTNESS$
$$
Respondents$insist$that$the$present$petitions$have$been$rendered$moot$with$the$
satisfaction$ of$ all$ the$ reliefs$ prayed$ for$ by$ petitioners$ and$ the$ subsequent$
pronouncement$ of$ the$ Executive$ Secretary$ that$ [n]o$ matter$ what$ the$ Supreme$
Court$ultimately$decides[,]$the$government$will$not$sign$the$MOA.[92]$
$$
In$lending$credence$to$this$policy$decision,$the$Solicitor$General$points$out$that$
the$President$had$already$disbanded$the$GRP$Peace$Panel.[93]$
$$
In$David$v.$MacapagalSArroyo,[94]$ this$ Court$ held$ that$ the$ moot$ and$ academic$
principle$ not$ being$ a$ magical$ formula$ that$ automatically$ dissuades$ courts$ in$
resolving$ a$ case,$ it$ will$ decide$ cases,$ otherwise$ moot$ and$ academic,$ if$ it$ finds$
that$(a)$there$is$a$grave$violation$of$the$Constitution;[95]$(b)$the$situation$is$of$
exceptional$ character$ and$ paramount$ public$ interest$ is$ involved;[96]$ (c)$ the$
constitutional$ issue$ raised$ requires$ formulation$ of$ controlling$ principles$ to$
guide$ the$ bench,$ the$ bar,$ and$ the$ public;[97]$ and$ (d)$ the$ case$ is$ capable$ of$
repetition$yet$evading$review.[98]$
$$
Another$exclusionary$circumstance$that$may$be$considered$is$where$there$is$a$
voluntary$cessation$of$the$activity$complained$of$by$the$defendant$or$doer.$Thus,$
once$ a$ suit$ is$ filed$ and$ the$ doer$ voluntarily$ ceases$ the$ challenged$ conduct,$ it$
does$not$automatically$deprive$the$tribunal$of$power$to$hear$and$determine$the$
case$ and$ does$ not$ render$ the$ case$ moot$ especially$ when$ the$ plaintiff$ seeks$
damages$ or$ prays$ for$ injunctive$ relief$ against$ the$ possible$ recurrence$ of$ the$
violation.[99]$
$$
The$ present$ petitions$ fall$ squarely$ into$ these$ exceptions$ to$ thus$ thrust$ them$
into$the$domain$of$judicial$review.$The$grounds$cited$above$in$David$are$just$as$
applicable$ in$ the$ present$ cases$ as$ they$ were,$ not$ only$ in$ David,$ but$ also$ in$
Province$ of$ Batangas$ v.$ Romulo[100]$ and$ Manalo$ v.$ Calderon[101]$ where$ the$
Court$ similarly$ decided$ them$ on$ the$ merits,$ supervening$ events$ that$ would$
ordinarily$have$rendered$the$same$moot$notwithstanding.$
$ policies$ and$ standard$ principles$ on$ contracts,$ the$ majority$ opinion$ in$ Suplico$
$$
Petitions$not$mooted$
$$
$$
Contrary$then$to$the$asseverations$of$respondents,$the$nonSsigning$of$the$MOAS
AD$ and$ the$ eventual$ dissolution$ of$ the$ GRP$ Peace$ Panel$ did$ not$ moot$ the$
present$petitions.$It$bears$emphasis$that$the$signing$of$the$MOASAD$did$not$push$
through$due$to$the$Courts$issuance$of$a$Temporary$Restraining$Order.$
$$
Contrary$too$to$respondents$position,$the$MOASAD$cannot$be$considered$a$mere$
list$ of$ consensus$ points,$ especially$ given$ its$ nomenclature,$ the$ need$ to$ have$ it$
signed$or$initialed$by$all$the$parties$concerned$on$August$5,$2008,$and$the$farS
reaching$ Constitutional$ implications$ of$ these$ consensus$ points,$ foremost$ of$
which$is$the$creation$of$the$BJE.$
$$
In$ fact,$ as$ what$ will,$ in$ the$ main,$ be$ discussed,$ there$ is$ a$ commitment$ on$ the$
part$of$respondents$to$amend$and$effect$necessary$changes$to$the$existing$legal$
framework$ for$ certain$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ to$ take$ effect.$ Consequently,$
the$present$petitions$are$not$confined$to$the$terms$and$provisions$of$the$MOAS
AD,$but$to$other$onSgoing$and$future$negotiations$and$agreements$necessary$for$
its$ realization.$ The$ petitions$ have$ not,$ therefore,$ been$ rendered$ moot$ and$
academic$ simply$ by$ the$ public$ disclosure$ of$ the$ MOASAD,[102]$ the$
manifestation$ that$ it$ will$ not$ be$ signed$ as$ well$ as$ the$ disbanding$ of$ the$ GRP$
Panel$not$withstanding.$
$$
Petitions$are$imbued$with$paramount$public$interest$
$$
$$
There$ is$ no$ gainsaying$ that$ the$ petitions$ are$ imbued$ with$ paramount$ public$
interest,$ involving$ a$ significant$ part$ of$ the$ countrys$ territory$ and$ the$ wideS
ranging$political$modifications$of$affected$LGUs.$The$assertion$that$the$MOASAD$
is$ subject$ to$ further$ legal$ enactments$ including$ possible$ Constitutional$
amendments$ more$ than$ ever$ provides$ impetus$ for$ the$ Court$ to$ formulate$
controlling$principles$to$guide$the$bench,$the$bar,$the$public$and,$in$this$case,$the$
government$and$its$negotiating$entity.$
$$
Respondents$ cite$ Suplico$ v.$ NEDA,$ et$ al.[103]$ where$ the$ Court$ did$ not$
pontificat[e]$on$issues$which$no$longer$legitimately$constitute$an$actual$case$or$
controversy$[as$this]$will$do$more$harm$than$good$to$the$nation$as$a$whole.$
$$
The$present$petitions$must$be$differentiated$from$Suplico.$Primarily,$in$Suplico,$
what$ was$ assailed$ and$ eventually$ cancelled$ was$ a$ standSalone$ government$
procurement$ contract$ for$ a$ national$ broadband$ network$ involving$ a$ oneStime$
contractual$ relation$ between$ two$ partiesthe$ government$ and$ a$ private$ foreign$
corporation.$ As$ the$ issues$ therein$ involved$ specific$ government$ procurement$
found$nothing$exceptional$therein,$the$factual$circumstances$being$peculiar$only$
to$the$transactions$and$parties$involved$in$the$controversy.$
The$MOASAD$is$part$of$a$series$of$agreements$
$$
In$ the$ present$ controversy,$ the$ MOASAD$ is$ a$ significant$ part$ of$ a$ series$ of$
agreements$ necessary$ to$ carry$ out$ the$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ 2001.$ The$ MOASAD$
which$ dwells$ on$ the$ Ancestral$ Domain$ Aspect$ of$ said$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ is$ the$
third$ such$ component$ to$ be$ undertaken$ following$ the$ implementation$ of$ the$
Security$ Aspect$ in$ August$ 2001$ and$ the$ Humanitarian,$ Rehabilitation$ and$
Development$Aspect$in$May$2002.$
$$
Accordingly,$even$if$the$Executive$Secretary,$in$his$Memorandum$of$August$28,$
2008$to$the$Solicitor$General,$has$stated$that$no$matter$what$the$Supreme$Court$
ultimately$decides[,]$the$government$will$not$sign$the$MOA[SAD],$mootness$will$
not$set$in$in$light$of$the$terms$of$the$Tripoli$Agreement$2001.$
$$
Need$to$formulate$principlesSguidelines$
$$
Surely,$the$present$MOASAD$can$be$renegotiated$or$another$one$will$be$drawn$
up$to$carry$out$the$Ancestral$Domain$Aspect$of$the$Tripoli$Agreement$2001,$in$
another$ or$ in$ any$ form,$ which$ could$ contain$ similar$ or$ significantly$ drastic$
provisions.$While$the$Court$notes$the$word$of$the$Executive$Secretary$that$the$
government$ is$ committed$ to$ securing$ an$ agreement$ that$ is$ both$ constitutional$
and$ equitable$ because$ that$ is$ the$ only$ way$ that$ longSlasting$ peace$ can$ be$
assured,$it$is$minded$to$render$a$decision$on$the$merits$in$the$present$petitions$
to$ formulate$ controlling$ principles$ to$ guide$ the$ bench,$ the$ bar,$ the$ public$ and,$
most$ especially,$ the$ government$ in$ negotiating$ with$ the$ MILF$ regarding$
Ancestral$Domain.$
$$
Respondents$ invite$ the$ Courts$ attention$ to$ the$ separate$ opinion$ of$ then$ Chief$
Justice$ Artemio$ Panganiban$ in$ Sanlakas$ v.$ Reyes[104]$ in$ which$ he$ stated$ that$
the$doctrine$of$capable$of$repetition$yet$evading$review$can$override$mootness,$
provided$ the$ party$ raising$ it$ in$ a$ proper$ case$ has$ been$ and/or$ continue$ to$ be$
prejudiced$or$damaged$as$a$direct$result$of$their$issuance.$They$contend$that$the$
Court$ must$ have$ jurisdiction$ over$ the$ subject$ matter$ for$ the$ doctrine$ to$ be$
invoked.$
$$
The$present$petitions$all$contain$prayers$for$Prohibition$over$which$this$Court$
exercises$original$jurisdiction.$While$G.R.$No.$183893$(City$of$Iligan$v.$GRP)$is$a$
petition$ for$ Injunction$ and$ Declaratory$ Relief,$ the$ Court$ will$ treat$ it$ as$ one$ for$
Prohibition$as$it$has$far$reaching$implications$and$raises$questions$that$need$to$
be$ resolved.[105]$ At$ all$ events,$ the$ Court$ has$ jurisdiction$ over$ most$ if$ not$ the$
rest$of$the$petitions.$
$$
Indeed,$the$present$petitions$afford$a$proper$venue$for$the$Court$to$again$apply$
the$ doctrine$ immediately$ referred$ to$ as$ what$ it$ had$ done$ in$ a$ number$ of$
landmark$ cases.[106]$ There$ is$ a$ reasonable$ expectation$ that$ petitioners,$
particularly$ the$ Provinces$ of$ North$ Cotabato,$ Zamboanga$ del$ Norte$ and$ Sultan$
Kudarat,$ the$ Cities$ of$ Zamboanga,$ Iligan$ and$ Isabela,$ and$ the$ Municipality$ of$
Linamon,$ will$ again$ be$ subjected$ to$ the$ same$ problem$ in$ the$ future$ as$
respondents$actions$are$capable$of$repetition,$in$another$or$any$form.$
$$
It$is$with$respect$to$the$prayers$for$Mandamus$that$the$petitions$have$become$
moot,$respondents$having,$by$Compliance$of$August$7,$2008,$provided$this$Court$
and$ petitioners$ with$ official$ copies$ of$ the$ final$ draft$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ and$ its$
annexes.$ Too,$ intervenors$ have$ been$ furnished,$ or$ have$ procured$ for$
themselves,$copies$of$the$MOASAD.$
V.$SUBSTANTIVE$ISSUES$
$$
$$
As$ culled$ from$ the$ Petitions$ and$ PetitionsSinSIntervention,$ there$ are$ basically$
two$ SUBSTANTIVE$ issues$ to$ be$ resolved,$ one$ relating$ to$ the$ manner$ in$ which$
the$ MOASAD$ was$ negotiated$ and$ finalized,$ the$ other$ relating$ to$ its$ provisions,$
viz:$
$$
1.$ Did$ respondents$ violate$ constitutional$ and$ statutory$ provisions$ on$ public$
consultation$ and$ the$ right$ to$ information$ when$ they$ negotiated$ and$ later$
initialed$the$MOASAD?$
$$
2.$Do$the$contents$of$the$MOASAD$violate$the$Constitution$and$the$laws?$
ON$THE$FIRST$SUBSTANTIVE$ISSUE$
$$
Petitioners$invoke$their$constitutional$right$to$information$on$matters$of$public$
concern,$as$provided$in$Section$7,$Article$III$on$the$Bill$of$Rights:$
$$
Sec.$7.$The$right$of$the$people$to$information$on$matters$of$public$concern$shall$
be$ recognized.$ Access$ to$ official$ records,$ and$ to$ documents,$ and$ papers$
pertaining$ to$ official$ acts,$ transactions,$ or$ decisions,$ as$ well$ as$ to$ government$
research$data$used$as$basis$for$policy$development,$shall$be$afforded$the$citizen,$
subject$to$such$limitations$as$may$be$provided$by$law.[107]$
$$
$$
As$ early$ as$ 1948,$ in$ Subido$ v.$ Ozaeta,[108]$ the$ Court$ has$ recognized$ the$
statutory$ right$ to$ examine$ and$ inspect$ public$ records,$ a$ right$ which$ was$
eventually$accorded$constitutional$status.$
$$
The$ right$ of$ access$ to$ public$ documents,$ as$ enshrined$ in$ both$ the$ 1973$
Constitution$and$the$1987$Constitution,$has$been$recognized$as$a$selfSexecutory$
constitutional$right.[109]$
$$
In$ the$ 1976$ case$ of$ Baldoza$ v.$ Hon.$ Judge$ Dimaano,[110]$ the$ Court$ ruled$ that$
access$ to$ public$ records$ is$ predicated$ on$ the$ right$ of$ the$ people$ to$ acquire$
information$ on$ matters$ of$ public$ concern$ since,$ undoubtedly,$ in$ a$ democracy,$
the$pubic$has$a$legitimate$interest$in$matters$of$social$and$political$significance.$
$$
x$ x$ x$ The$ incorporation$ of$ this$ right$ in$ the$ Constitution$ is$ a$ recognition$ of$ the$
fundamental$role$of$free$exchange$of$information$in$a$democracy.$There$can$be$
no$realistic$perception$by$the$public$of$the$nations$problems,$nor$a$meaningful$
democratic$decisionSmaking$if$they$are$denied$access$to$information$of$general$
interest.$ Information$ is$ needed$ to$ enable$ the$ members$ of$ society$ to$ cope$ with$
the$exigencies$of$the$times.$As$has$been$aptly$observed:$Maintaining$the$flow$of$
such$ information$ depends$ on$ protection$ for$ both$ its$ acquisition$ and$ its$
dissemination$since,$if$either$process$is$interrupted,$the$flow$inevitably$ceases.$x$
x$x[111]$
$$
$$
In$ the$ same$ way$ that$ free$ discussion$ enables$ members$ of$ society$ to$ cope$ with$
the$ exigencies$ of$ their$ time,$ access$ to$ information$ of$ general$ interest$ aids$ the$
people$in$democratic$decisionSmaking$by$giving$them$a$better$perspective$of$the$
vital$issues$confronting$the$nation[112]$so$that$they$may$be$able$to$criticize$and$
participate$ in$ the$ affairs$ of$ the$ government$ in$ a$ responsible,$ reasonable$ and$
effective$ manner.$ It$ is$ by$ ensuring$ an$ unfettered$ and$ uninhibited$ exchange$ of$
ideas$ among$ a$ wellSinformed$ public$ that$ a$ government$ remains$ responsive$ to$
the$changes$desired$by$the$people.[113]$
$$
The$MOASAD$is$a$matter$of$public$concern$
$$
That$ the$ subject$ of$ the$ information$ sought$ in$ the$ present$ cases$ is$ a$ matter$ of$
public$concern[114]$faces$no$serious$challenge.$In$fact,$respondents$admit$that$
the$MOASAD$is$indeed$of$public$concern.[115]$In$previous$cases,$the$Court$found$
that$ the$ regularity$ of$ real$ estate$ transactions$ entered$ in$ the$ Register$ of$
Deeds,[116]$the$need$for$adequate$notice$to$the$public$of$the$various$laws,[117]$
the$civil$service$eligibility$of$a$public$employee,[118]$the$proper$management$of$
GSIS$funds$allegedly$used$to$grant$loans$to$public$officials,[119]$the$recovery$of$
the$ Marcoses$ alleged$ illSgotten$ wealth,[120]$ and$ the$ identity$ of$ partySlist$
nominees,[121]$among$others,$are$matters$of$public$concern.$Undoubtedly,$the$
MOASAD$ subject$ of$ the$ present$ cases$ is$ of$ public$ concern,$ involving$ as$ it$ does$
the$ sovereignty$ and$ territorial$ integrity$ of$ the$ State,$ which$ directly$ affects$ the$
lives$of$the$public$at$large.$
$$
Matters$of$public$concern$covered$by$the$right$to$information$include$steps$and$
negotiations$leading$to$the$consummation$of$the$contract.$In$not$distinguishing$
as$to$the$executory$nature$or$commercial$character$of$agreements,$the$Court$has$
categorically$ruled:$
$$
x$ x$ x$ [T]he$ right$ to$ information$contemplates$inclusion$of$negotiations$leading$
to$ the$ consummation$ of$ the$ transaction.$ Certainly,$ a$ consummated$ contract$ is$
not$ a$ requirement$ for$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ right$ to$ information.$ Otherwise,$ the$
people$can$never$exercise$the$right$if$no$contract$is$consummated,$and$if$one$is$
consummated,$it$may$be$too$late$for$the$public$to$expose$its$defects.$
Requiring$ a$ consummated$ contract$ will$ keep$ the$ public$ in$ the$ dark$ until$ the$
contract,$ which$ may$ be$ grossly$ disadvantageous$ to$ the$ government$ or$ even$
illegal,$becomes$fait$accompli.$This$negates$the$State$policy$of$full$transparency$
on$matters$of$public$concern,$a$situation$which$the$framers$of$the$Constitution$
could$ not$ have$ intended.$ Such$ a$ requirement$ will$ prevent$ the$ citizenry$ from$
participating$ in$ the$ public$ discussion$ of$ any$ proposed$ contract,$ effectively$
truncating$a$basic$right$enshrined$in$the$Bill$of$Rights.$We$can$allow$neither$an$
emasculation$ of$ a$ constitutional$ right,$ nor$ a$ retreat$ by$ the$ State$ of$ its$ avowed$
policy$ of$ full$ disclosure$ of$ all$ its$ transactions$ involving$ public$ interest.[122]$
(Emphasis$and$italics$in$the$original)$
$$
$$
Intended$as$a$splendid$symmetry[123]$to$the$right$to$information$under$the$Bill$
of$ Rights$ is$ the$ policy$ of$ public$ disclosure$ under$ Section$ 28,$ Article$ II$ of$ the$
Constitution$reading:$
$$
Sec.$28.$Subject$to$reasonable$conditions$prescribed$by$law,$the$State$adopts$and$
implements$ a$ policy$ of$ full$ public$ disclosure$ of$ all$ its$ transactions$ involving$
public$interest.[124]$
$$
The$ policy$ of$ full$ public$ disclosure$ enunciated$ in$ aboveSquoted$ Section$ 28$
complements$ the$ right$ of$ access$ to$ information$ on$ matters$ of$ public$ concern$
found$in$the$Bill$of$Rights.$The$right$to$information$guarantees$the$right$of$the$
people$ to$ demand$ information,$ while$ Section$ 28$ recognizes$ the$ duty$ of$
officialdom$to$give$information$even$if$nobody$demands.[125]$
$$
The$ policy$ of$ public$ disclosure$ establishes$ a$ concrete$ ethical$ principle$ for$ the$
conduct$of$public$affairs$in$a$genuinely$open$democracy,$with$the$peoples$right$
to$ know$ as$ the$ centerpiece.$ It$ is$ a$ mandate$ of$ the$ State$ to$ be$ accountable$ by$
following$ such$ policy.[126]$ These$ provisions$ are$ vital$ to$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$
freedom$ of$ expression$ and$ essential$ to$ hold$ public$ officials$ at$ all$ times$
accountable$to$the$people.[127]$
$$
Whether$ Section$ 28$ is$ selfSexecutory,$ the$ records$ of$ the$ deliberations$ of$ the$
Constitutional$Commission$so$disclose:$
$$
MR.$ SUAREZ.$ And$ since$ this$ is$ not$ selfSexecutory,$ this$ policy$ will$ not$ be$
enunciated$ or$ will$ not$ be$ in$ force$ and$ effect$ until$ after$ Congress$ shall$ have$
provided$it.$
$$
MR.$OPLE.$I$expect$it$to$influence$the$climate$of$public$ethics$immediately$but,$of$
course,$the$implementing$law$will$have$to$be$enacted$by$Congress,$Mr.$Presiding$
Officer.[128]$
$$
$$
The$ following$ discourse,$ after$ Commissioner$ Hilario$ Davide,$ Jr.,$ sought$
clarification$on$the$issue,$is$enlightening.$
$$
MR.$DAVIDE.$I$would$like$to$get$some$clarifications$on$this.$Mr.$Presiding$Officer,$
did$I$get$the$Gentleman$correctly$as$having$said$that$this$is$not$a$selfSexecuting$
provision?$It$would$require$a$legislation$by$Congress$to$implement?$
$$
MR.$ OPLE.$ Yes.$ Originally,$ it$ was$ going$ to$ be$ selfSexecuting,$ but$ I$ accepted$ an$
amendment$ from$ Commissioner$ Regalado,$ so$ that$ the$ safeguards$ on$ national$
interest$are$modified$by$the$clause$as$may$be$provided$by$law$
$$
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ But$ as$ worded,$ does$ it$ not$ mean$ that$ this$ will$ immediately$ take$
effect$and$Congress$may$provide$for$reasonable$safeguards$on$the$sole$ground$
national$interest?$
$$
MR.$ OPLE.$ Yes.$ I$ think$ so,$ Mr.$ Presiding$ Officer,$ I$ said$ earlier$ that$ it$ should$
immediately$influence$the$climate$of$the$conduct$of$public$affairs$but,$of$course,$
Congress$ here$ may$ no$ longer$ pass$ a$ law$ revoking$ it,$ or$ if$ this$ is$ approved,$
revoking$ this$ principle,$ which$ is$ inconsistent$ with$ this$ policy.[129]$ (Emphasis$
supplied)$
$$
$$
Indubitably,$the$effectivity$of$the$policy$of$public$disclosure$need$not$await$the$
passing$ of$ a$ statute.$ As$ Congress$ cannot$ revoke$ this$ principle,$ it$ is$ merely$
directed$ to$ provide$ for$ reasonable$ safeguards.$ The$ complete$ and$ effective$
exercise$ of$ the$ right$ to$ information$ necessitates$ that$ its$ complementary$
provision$on$public$disclosure$derive$the$same$selfSexecutory$nature.$Since$both$
provisions$ go$ handSinShand,$ it$ is$ absurd$ to$ say$ that$ the$ broader[130]$ right$ to$
information$ on$ matters$ of$ public$ concern$ is$ already$ enforceable$ while$ the$
correlative$duty$of$the$State$to$disclose$its$transactions$involving$public$interest$
is$not$enforceable$until$there$is$an$enabling$law.$Respondents$cannot$thus$point$
to$the$absence$of$an$implementing$legislation$as$an$excuse$in$not$effecting$such$
policy.$
$$
An$essential$element$of$these$freedoms$is$to$keep$open$a$continuing$dialogue$or$
process$of$communication$between$the$government$and$the$people.$It$is$in$the$
interest$of$the$State$that$the$channels$for$free$political$discussion$be$maintained$
to$the$end$that$the$government$may$perceive$and$be$responsive$to$the$peoples$
will.[131]$ Envisioned$ to$ be$ corollary$ to$ the$ twin$ rights$ to$ information$ and$
disclosure$is$the$design$for$feedback$mechanisms.$
$$
MS.$ ROSARIO$ BRAID.$ Yes.$ And$ lastly,$ Mr.$ Presiding$ Officer,$ will$ the$ people$ be$
able$to$participate?$Will$the$government$provide$feedback$mechanisms$so$that$
the$people$can$participate$and$can$react$where$the$existing$media$facilities$are$
not$able$to$provide$full$feedback$mechanisms$to$the$government?$I$suppose$this$
will$be$part$of$the$government$implementing$operational$mechanisms.$
$$
MR.$ OPLE.$ Yes.$ I$ think$ through$ their$ elected$ representatives$ and$ that$ is$ how$
these$courses$take$place.$There$is$a$message$and$a$feedback,$both$ways.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
MS.$ROSARIO$BRAID.$Mr.$Presiding$Officer,$may$I$just$make$one$last$sentence?$
$$
I$ think$ when$ we$ talk$ about$ the$ feedback$ network,$ we$ are$ not$ talking$ about$
public$ officials$ but$ also$ network$ of$ private$ business$ o[r]$ communitySbased$
organizations$ that$ will$ be$ reacting.$ As$ a$ matter$ of$ fact,$ we$ will$ put$ more$
credence$ or$ credibility$ on$ the$ private$ network$ of$ volunteers$ and$ voluntary$
communitySbased$organizations.$So$I$do$not$think$we$are$afraid$that$there$will$
be$another$OMA$in$the$making.[132]$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$$
The$imperative$of$a$public$consultation,$as$a$species$of$the$right$to$information,$
is$evident$in$the$marching$orders$to$respondents.$The$mechanics$for$the$duty$to$
disclose$ information$ and$ to$ conduct$ public$ consultation$ regarding$ the$ peace$
agenda$ and$ process$ is$ manifestly$ provided$ by$ E.O.$ No.$ 3.[133]$ The$
preambulatory$ clause$ of$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$ declares$ that$ there$ is$ a$ need$ to$ further$
enhance$the$contribution$of$civil$society$to$the$comprehensive$peace$process$by$
institutionalizing$the$peoples$participation.$
One$ of$ the$ three$ underlying$ principles$ of$ the$ comprehensive$ peace$ process$ is$
that$ it$ should$ be$ communitySbased,$ reflecting$ the$ sentiments,$ values$ and$
principles$important$to$all$Filipinos$and$shall$be$defined$not$by$the$government$
alone,$ nor$ by$ the$ different$ contending$ groups$ only,$ but$ by$ all$ Filipinos$ as$ one$
community.[134]$Included$as$a$component$of$the$comprehensive$peace$process$
is$ consensusSbuilding$ and$ empowerment$ for$ peace,$ which$ includes$ continuing$
consultations$ on$ both$ national$ and$ local$ levels$ to$ build$ consensus$ for$ a$ peace$
agenda$ and$ process,$ and$ the$ mobilization$ and$ facilitation$ of$ peoples$
participation$in$the$peace$process.[135]$
$$
Clearly,$E.O.$No.$3$contemplates$not$just$the$conduct$of$a$plebiscite$to$effectuate$
continuing$ consultations,$ contrary$ to$ respondents$ position$ that$ plebiscite$ is$
more$than$sufficient$consultation.[136]$
$$
Further,$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$ enumerates$ the$ functions$ and$ responsibilities$ of$ the$ PAPP,$
one$ of$ which$ is$ to$ [c]onduct$ regular$ dialogues$ with$ the$ National$ Peace$ Forum$
(NPF)$ and$ other$ peace$ partners$ to$ seek$ relevant$ information,$ comments,$
recommendations$ as$ well$ as$ to$ render$ appropriate$ and$ timely$ reports$ on$ the$
progress$ of$ the$ comprehensive$ peace$ process.[137]$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$ mandates$ the$
establishment$of$the$NPF$to$be$the$principal$forum$for$the$PAPP$to$consult$with$
and$ seek$ advi[c]e$ from$ the$ peace$ advocates,$ peace$ partners$ and$ concerned$
sectors$of$society$on$both$national$and$local$levels,$on$the$implementation$of$the$
comprehensive$peace$process,$as$well$as$for$government[S]civil$society$dialogue$
and$consensusSbuilding$on$peace$agenda$and$initiatives.[138]$
$$
In$ fine,$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$ establishes$ petitioners$ right$ to$ be$ consulted$ on$ the$ peace$
agenda,$as$a$corollary$to$the$constitutional$right$to$information$and$disclosure.$
$$
PAPP$Esperon$committed$grave$abuse$of$discretion$
$$
$$
The$PAPP$committed$grave$abuse$of$discretion$when$he$failed$to$carry$out$the$
pertinent$consultation.$The$furtive$process$by$which$the$MOASAD$was$designed$
and$crafted$runs$contrary$to$and$in$excess$of$the$legal$authority,$and$amounts$to$
a$whimsical,$capricious,$oppressive,$arbitrary$and$despotic$exercise$thereof.$
$$
The$Court$may$not,$of$course,$require$the$PAPP$to$conduct$the$consultation$in$a$
particular$way$or$manner.$It$may,$however,$require$him$to$comply$with$the$law$
and$discharge$the$functions$within$the$authority$granted$by$the$President.[139]$
$$
Petitioners$ are$ not$ claiming$ a$ seat$ at$ the$ negotiating$ table,$ contrary$ to$
respondents$ retort$ in$ justifying$ the$ denial$ of$ petitioners$ right$ to$ be$ consulted.$
Respondents$ stance$ manifests$ the$ manner$ by$ which$ they$ treat$ the$ salient$
provisions$of$E.O.$No.$3$on$peoples$participation.$Such$disregard$of$the$express$
mandate$of$the$President$is$not$much$different$from$superficial$conduct$toward$
token$ provisos$ that$ border$ on$ classic$ lip$ service.[140]$ It$ illustrates$ a$ gross$
evasion$of$positive$duty$and$a$virtual$refusal$to$perform$the$duty$enjoined.$
$$
As$ for$ respondents$ invocation$ of$ the$ doctrine$ of$ executive$ privilege,$ it$ is$ not$
tenable$ under$ the$ premises.$ The$ argument$ defies$ sound$ reason$ when$
contrasted$ with$ E.O.$ No.$ 3s$ explicit$ provisions$ on$ continuing$ consultation$ and$
dialogue$on$both$national$and$local$levels.$The$executive$order$even$recognizes$
the$ exercise$ of$ the$ publics$ right$ even$ before$ the$ GRP$ makes$ its$ official$
recommendations$ or$ before$ the$ government$ proffers$ its$ definite$
propositions.[141]$ It$ bear$ emphasis$ that$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$ seeks$ to$ elicit$ relevant$
advice,$information,$comments$and$recommendations$from$the$people$through$
dialogue.$
$$
AT$ ALL$ EVENTS,$ respondents$ effectively$ waived$ the$ defense$ of$ executive$
privilege$in$view$of$their$unqualified$disclosure$of$the$official$copies$of$the$final$
draft$ of$ the$ MOASAD.$ By$ unconditionally$ complying$ with$ the$ Courts$ August$ 4,$
2008$ Resolution,$ without$ a$ prayer$ for$ the$ documents$ disclosure$ in$ camera,$ or$
without$ a$ manifestation$ that$ it$ was$ complying$ therewith$ ex$ abundante$ ad$
cautelam.$
$$
Petitioners$assertion$that$the$Local$Government$Code$(LGC)$of$1991$declares$it$
a$ State$ policy$ to$ require$ all$ national$ agencies$ and$ offices$ to$ conduct$ periodic$
consultations$ with$ appropriate$ local$ government$ units,$ nonSgovernmental$ and$
people's$ organizations,$ and$ other$ concerned$ sectors$ of$ the$ community$ before$
any$project$or$program$is$implemented$in$their$respective$jurisdictions[142]$is$
wellStaken.$The$LGC$chapter$on$intergovernmental$relations$puts$flesh$into$this$
avowed$policy:$
$$
Prior$ Consultations$ Required.$ No$ project$ or$ program$ shall$ be$ implemented$ by$
government$ authorities$ unless$ the$ consultations$ mentioned$ in$ Sections$ 2$ (c)$
and$ 26$ hereof$ are$ complied$ with,$ and$ prior$ approval$ of$ the$ sanggunian$
concerned$ is$ obtained:$ Provided,$ That$ occupants$ in$ areas$ where$ such$ projects$
are$ to$ be$ implemented$ shall$ not$ be$ evicted$ unless$ appropriate$ relocation$ sites$
have$been$provided,$in$accordance$with$the$provisions$of$the$Constitution.[143]$
(Italics$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
In$ Lina,$ Jr.$ v.$ Hon.$ Pao,[144]$ the$ Court$ held$ that$ the$ aboveSstated$ policy$ and$
aboveSquoted$provision$of$the$LGU$apply$only$to$national$programs$or$projects$
which$ are$ to$ be$ implemented$ in$ a$ particular$ local$ community.$ Among$ the$
programs$ and$ projects$ covered$ are$ those$ that$ are$ critical$ to$ the$ environment$
and$human$ecology$including$those$that$may$call$for$the$eviction$of$a$particular$
group$of$people$residing$in$the$locality$where$these$will$be$implemented.[145]$
The$MOASAD$is$one$peculiar$program$that$unequivocally$and$unilaterally$vests$
ownership$ of$ a$ vast$ territory$ to$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people,[146]$ which$ could$
pervasively$ and$ drastically$ result$ to$ the$ diaspora$ or$ displacement$ of$ a$ great$
number$of$inhabitants$from$their$total$environment.$
$$
With$ respect$ to$ the$ indigenous$ cultural$ communities/indigenous$ peoples$
(ICCs/IPs),$whose$interests$are$represented$herein$by$petitioner$Lopez$and$are$
adversely$affected$by$the$MOASAD,$the$ICCs/IPs$have,$under$the$IPRA,$the$right$
to$participate$fully$at$all$levels$of$decisionSmaking$in$matters$which$may$affect$
their$ rights,$ lives$ and$ destinies.[147]$ The$ MOASAD,$ an$ instrument$ recognizing$
ancestral$ domain,$ failed$ to$ justify$ its$ nonScompliance$ with$ the$ clearScut$
mechanisms$ ordained$ in$ said$ Act,[148]$ which$ entails,$ among$ other$ things,$ the$
observance$of$the$free$and$prior$informed$consent$of$the$ICCs/IPs.$
Notably,$the$IPRA$does$not$grant$the$Executive$Department$or$any$government$
agency$the$power$to$delineate$and$recognize$an$ancestral$domain$claim$by$mere$
agreement$or$compromise.$The$recognition$of$the$ancestral$domain$is$the$raison$
detre$of$the$MOASAD,$without$which$all$other$stipulations$or$consensus$points$
necessarily$must$fail.$In$proceeding$to$make$a$sweeping$declaration$on$ancestral$
domain,$ without$ complying$ with$ the$ IPRA,$ which$ is$ cited$ as$ one$ of$ the$ TOR$ of$
the$MOASAD,$respondents$clearly$transcended$the$boundaries$of$their$authority.$
As$it$seems,$even$the$heart$of$the$MOASAD$is$still$subject$to$necessary$changes$
to$ the$ legal$ framework.$ While$ paragraph$ 7$ on$ Governance$ suspends$ the$
effectivity$ of$ all$ provisions$ requiring$ changes$ to$ the$ legal$ framework,$ such$
clause$is$itself$invalid,$as$will$be$discussed$in$the$following$section.$
$$
Indeed,$ ours$ is$ an$ open$ society,$ with$ all$ the$ acts$ of$ the$ government$ subject$ to$
public$scrutiny$and$available$always$to$public$cognizance.$This$has$to$be$so$if$the$
country$is$to$remain$democratic,$with$sovereignty$residing$in$the$people$and$all$
government$authority$emanating$from$them.[149]$
$$
$$
ON$THE$SECOND$SUBSTANTIVE$ISSUE$
$$
With$regard$to$the$provisions$of$the$MOASAD,$there$can$be$no$question$that$they$
cannot$ all$ be$ accommodated$ under$ the$ present$ Constitution$ and$ laws.$
Respondents$ have$ admitted$ as$ much$ in$ the$ oral$ arguments$ before$ this$ Court,$
and$ the$ MOASAD$ itself$ recognizes$ the$ need$ to$ amend$ the$ existing$ legal$
framework$ to$ render$ effective$ at$ least$ some$ of$ its$ provisions.$ Respondents,$
nonetheless,$counter$that$the$MOASAD$is$free$of$any$legal$infirmity$because$any$
provisions$therein$which$are$inconsistent$with$the$present$legal$framework$will$
not$ be$ effective$ until$ the$ necessary$ changes$ to$ that$ framework$ are$ made.$ The$
validity$of$this$argument$will$be$considered$later.$For$now,$the$Court$shall$pass$
upon$how$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ is$ inconsistent$ with$ the$ Constitution$ and$ laws$ as$ presently$
worded.$
$$
In$ general,$ the$ objections$ against$ the$ MOASAD$ center$ on$ the$ extent$ of$ the$
powers$conceded$therein$to$the$BJE.$Petitioners$assert$that$the$powers$granted$
to$ the$ BJE$ exceed$ those$ granted$ to$ any$ local$ government$ under$ present$ laws,$
and$ even$ go$ beyond$ those$ of$ the$ present$ ARMM.$ Before$ assessing$ some$ of$ the$
specific$ powers$ that$ would$ have$ been$ vested$ in$ the$ BJE,$ however,$ it$ would$ be$
useful$to$turn$first$to$a$general$idea$that$serves$as$a$unifying$link$to$the$different$
provisions$of$the$MOASAD,$namely,$the$international$law$concept$of$association.$
Significantly,$ the$ MOASAD$ explicitly$ alludes$ to$ this$ concept,$ indicating$ that$ the$
Parties$actually$framed$its$provisions$with$it$in$mind.$
$$
Association$ is$ referred$ to$ in$ paragraph$ 3$ on$ TERRITORY,$ paragraph$ 11$ on$
RESOURCES,$ and$ paragraph$ 4$ on$ GOVERNANCE.$ It$ is$ in$ the$ last$ mentioned$
provision,$ however,$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ most$ clearly$ uses$ it$ to$ describe$ the$
envisioned$relationship$between$the$BJE$and$the$Central$Government.$
$$
4.$ The$ relationship$ between$ the$ Central$ Government$ and$ the$ Bangsamoro$
juridical$ entity$ shall$ be$ associative$ characterized$ by$ shared$ authority$ and$
responsibility$ with$ a$ structure$ of$ governance$ based$ on$ executive,$ legislative,$
judicial$ and$ administrative$ institutions$ with$ defined$ powers$ and$ functions$ in$
the$ comprehensive$ compact.$ A$ period$ of$ transition$ shall$ be$ established$ in$ a$
comprehensive$peace$compact$specifying$the$relationship$between$the$Central$
Government$and$the$BJE.$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
The$nature$of$the$associative$relationship$may$have$been$intended$to$be$defined$
more$ precisely$ in$ the$ still$ to$ be$ forged$ Comprehensive$ Compact.$ Nonetheless,$
given$that$there$is$a$concept$of$association$in$international$law,$and$the$MOASAD$
by$ its$ inclusion$ of$ international$ law$ instruments$ in$ its$ TOR$ placed$ itself$ in$ an$
international$legal$context,$that$concept$of$association$may$be$brought$to$bear$
in$understanding$the$use$of$the$term$associative$in$the$MOASAD.$
$$
Keitner$and$Reisman$state$that$
$$
[a]n$ association$ is$ formed$ when$ two$ states$ of$ unequal$ power$ voluntarily$
establish$ durable$ links.$ In$ the$ basic$ model,$ one$ state,$ the$ associate,$ delegates$
certain$ responsibilities$ to$ the$ other,$ the$ principal,$ while$ maintaining$ its$
international$ status$ as$ a$ state.$ Free$ associations$ represent$ a$ middle$ ground$
between$integration$and$independence.$x$x$x[150]$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$
supplied)$
$$
$$
For$ purposes$ of$ illustration,$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ Marshall$ Islands$ and$ the$
Federated$ States$ of$ Micronesia$ (FSM),$ formerly$ part$ of$ the$ U.S.Sadministered$
Trust$ Territory$ of$ the$ Pacific$ Islands,[151]$ are$ associated$ states$ of$ the$ U.S.$
pursuant$ to$ a$ Compact$ of$ Free$ Association.$ The$ currency$ in$ these$ countries$ is$
the$U.S.$dollar,$indicating$their$very$close$ties$with$the$U.S.,$yet$they$issue$their$
own$ travel$ documents,$ which$ is$ a$ mark$ of$ their$ statehood.$ Their$ international$
legal$ status$ as$ states$ was$ confirmed$ by$ the$ UN$ Security$ Council$ and$ by$ their$
admission$to$UN$membership.$
$$
According$ to$ their$ compacts$ of$ free$ association,$ the$ Marshall$ Islands$ and$ the$
FSM$ generally$ have$ the$ capacity$ to$ conduct$ foreign$ affairs$ in$ their$ own$ name$
and$right,$such$capacity$extending$to$matters$such$as$the$law$of$the$sea,$marine$
resources,$ trade,$ banking,$ postal,$ civil$ aviation,$ and$ cultural$ relations.$ The$ U.S.$
government,$when$conducting$its$foreign$affairs,$is$obligated$to$consult$with$the$
governments$ of$ the$ Marshall$ Islands$ or$ the$ FSM$ on$ matters$ which$ it$ (U.S.$
government)$regards$as$relating$to$or$affecting$either$government.$
$$
In$ the$ event$ of$ attacks$ or$ threats$ against$ the$ Marshall$ Islands$ or$ the$ FSM,$ the$
U.S.$government$has$the$authority$and$obligation$to$defend$them$as$if$they$were$
part$ of$ U.S.$ territory.$ The$ U.S.$ government,$ moreover,$ has$ the$ option$ of$
establishing$and$using$military$areas$and$facilities$within$these$associated$states$
and$has$the$right$to$bar$the$military$personnel$of$any$third$country$from$having$
access$to$these$territories$for$military$purposes.$
$$
It$ bears$ noting$ that$ in$ U.S.$ constitutional$ and$ international$ practice,$ free$
association$ is$ understood$ as$ an$ international$ association$ between$ sovereigns.$
The$ Compact$ of$ Free$ Association$ is$ a$ treaty$ which$ is$ subordinate$ to$ the$
associated$ nations$ national$ constitution,$ and$ each$ party$ may$ terminate$ the$
association$consistent$with$the$right$of$independence.$It$has$been$said$that,$with$
the$admission$of$the$U.S.Sassociated$states$to$the$UN$in$1990,$the$UN$recognized$
that$the$American$model$of$free$association$is$actually$based$on$an$underlying$
status$of$independence.[152]$
$$
In$ international$ practice,$ the$ associated$ state$ arrangement$ has$ usually$ been$
used$ as$ a$ transitional$ device$ of$ former$ colonies$ on$ their$ way$ to$ full$
independence.$ Examples$ of$ states$ that$ have$ passed$ through$ the$ status$ of$
associated$ states$ as$ a$ transitional$ phase$ are$ Antigua,$ St.$ KittsSNevisSAnguilla,$
Dominica,$St.$Lucia,$St.$Vincent$and$Grenada.$All$have$since$become$independent$
states.[153]$
$$
Back$to$the$MOASAD,$it$contains$many$provisions$which$are$consistent$with$the$
international$ legal$ concept$ of$ association,$ specifically$ the$ following:$ the$ BJEs$
capacity$to$enter$into$economic$and$trade$relations$with$foreign$countries,$the$
commitment$ of$ the$ Central$ Government$ to$ ensure$ the$ BJEs$ participation$ in$
meetings$ and$ events$ in$ the$ ASEAN$ and$ the$ specialized$ UN$ agencies,$ and$ the$
continuing$ responsibility$ of$ the$ Central$ Government$ over$ external$ defense.$
Moreover,$the$BJEs$right$to$participate$in$Philippine$official$missions$bearing$on$
negotiation$ of$ border$ agreements,$ environmental$ protection,$ and$ sharing$ of$
revenues$ pertaining$ to$ the$ bodies$ of$ water$ adjacent$ to$ or$ between$ the$ islands$
forming$part$of$the$ancestral$domain,$resembles$the$right$of$the$governments$of$
FSM$ and$ the$ Marshall$ Islands$ to$ be$ consulted$ by$ the$ U.S.$ government$ on$ any$
foreign$affairs$matter$affecting$them.$
$$
These$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOA$ indicate,$ among$ other$ things,$ that$ the$ Parties$
aimed$to$vest$in$the$BJE$the$status$of$an$associated$state$or,$at$any$rate,$a$status$
closely$approximating$it.$
$$
The$concept$of$association$is$not$recognized$under$the$present$Constitution$
$$
No$province,$city,$or$municipality,$not$even$the$ARMM,$is$recognized$under$our$
laws$ as$ having$ an$ associative$ relationship$ with$ the$ national$ government.$
Indeed,$the$concept$implies$powers$that$go$beyond$anything$ever$granted$by$the$
Constitution$to$any$local$or$regional$government.$It$also$implies$the$recognition$
of$ the$ associated$ entity$ as$ a$ state.$ The$ Constitution,$ however,$ does$ not$
contemplate$any$state$in$this$jurisdiction$other$than$the$Philippine$State,$much$
less$ does$ it$ provide$ for$ a$ transitory$ status$ that$ aims$ to$ prepare$ any$ part$ of$
Philippine$territory$for$independence.$
$$
Even$ the$ mere$ concept$ animating$ many$ of$ the$ MOASADs$ provisions,$ therefore,$
already$ requires$ for$ its$ validity$ the$ amendment$ of$ constitutional$ provisions,$
specifically$the$following$provisions$of$Article$X:$
$$
SECTION$ 1.$ The$ territorial$ and$ political$ subdivisions$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$
Philippines$are$the$provinces,$cities,$municipalities,$and$barangays.$There$shall$
be$autonomous$regions$in$Muslim$Mindanao$and$the$Cordilleras$as$hereinafter$
provided.$
$$
SECTION$ 15.$ There$ shall$ be$ created$ autonomous$ regions$ in$ Muslim$ Mindanao$
and$ in$ the$ Cordilleras$ consisting$ of$ provinces,$ cities,$ municipalities,$ and$
geographical$ areas$ sharing$ common$ and$ distinctive$ historical$ and$ cultural$
heritage,$ economic$ and$ social$ structures,$ and$ other$ relevant$ characteristics$
within$the$framework$of$this$Constitution$and$the$national$sovereignty$as$well$
as$territorial$integrity$of$the$Republic$of$the$Philippines.$
$$
$$
The$BJE$is$a$far$more$powerful$
entity$than$the$autonomous$region$
recognized$in$the$Constitution$
$$
$$
It$is$not$merely$an$expanded$version$of$the$ARMM,$the$status$of$its$relationship$
with$ the$ national$ government$ being$ fundamentally$ different$ from$ that$ of$ the$
ARMM.$ Indeed,$ BJE$ is$ a$ state$ in$ all$ but$ name$ as$ it$ meets$ the$ criteria$ of$ a$ state$
laid$down$in$the$Montevideo$Convention,[154]$namely,$a$permanent$population,$
a$ defined$ territory,$ a$ government,$ and$ a$ capacity$ to$ enter$ into$ relations$ with$
other$states.$
$$
Even$ assuming$ arguendo$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ would$ not$ necessarily$ sever$ any$
portion$of$Philippine$territory,$the$spirit$animating$it$which$has$betrayed$itself$
by$its$use$of$the$concept$of$association$runs$counter$to$the$national$sovereignty$
and$territorial$integrity$of$the$Republic.$
$$
The$ defining$ concept$ underlying$ the$ relationship$ between$ the$ national$
government$ and$ the$ BJE$ being$ itself$ contrary$ to$ the$ present$ Constitution,$ it$ is$
not$ surprising$ that$ many$ of$ the$ specific$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ on$ the$
formation$ and$ powers$ of$ the$ BJE$ are$ in$ conflict$ with$ the$ Constitution$ and$ the$
laws.$
$$
Article$ X,$ Section$ 18$ of$ the$ Constitution$ provides$ that$ [t]he$ creation$ of$ the$
autonomous$region$shall$be$effective$when$approved$by$a$majority$of$the$votes$
cast$by$the$constituent$units$in$a$plebiscite$called$for$the$purpose,$provided$that$
only$ provinces,$ cities,$ and$ geographic$ areas$ voting$ favorably$ in$ such$ plebiscite$
shall$be$included$in$the$autonomous$region.$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$$
As$ reflected$ above,$ the$ BJE$ is$ more$ of$ a$ state$ than$ an$ autonomous$ region.$ But$
even$ assuming$ that$ it$ is$ covered$ by$ the$ term$ autonomous$ region$ in$ the$
constitutional$provision$just$quoted,$the$MOASAD$would$still$be$in$conflict$with$
it.$Under$paragraph$2(c)$on$TERRITORY$in$relation$to$2(d)$and$2(e),$the$present$
geographic$ area$ of$ the$ ARMM$ and,$ in$ addition,$ the$ municipalities$ of$ Lanao$ del$
Norte$which$voted$for$inclusion$in$the$ARMM$during$the$2001$plebiscite$Baloi,$
Munai,$ Nunungan,$ Pantar,$ Tagoloan$ and$ Tangkal$ are$ automatically$ part$ of$ the$
BJE$without$need$of$another$plebiscite,$in$contrast$to$the$areas$under$Categories$
A$and$B$mentioned$earlier$in$the$overview.$That$the$present$components$of$the$
ARMM$ and$ the$ aboveSmentioned$ municipalities$ voted$ for$ inclusion$ therein$ in$
2001,$ however,$ does$ not$ render$ another$ plebiscite$ unnecessary$ under$ the$
Constitution,$ precisely$ because$ what$ these$ areas$ voted$ for$ then$ was$ their$
inclusion$in$the$ARMM,$not$the$BJE.$
$$
$$
The$MOASAD,$moreover,$would$not$
comply$with$Article$X,$Section$20$of$
the$Constitution$
$$
since$that$provision$defines$the$powers$of$autonomous$regions$as$follows:$
$$
SECTION$ 20.$ Within$ its$ territorial$ jurisdiction$ and$ subject$ to$ the$ provisions$ of$
this$Constitution$and$national$laws,$the$organic$act$of$autonomous$regions$shall$
provide$for$legislative$powers$over:$
$$
(1)$Administrative$organization;$
(2)$Creation$of$sources$of$revenues;$
(3)$Ancestral$domain$and$natural$resources;$
(4)$Personal,$family,$and$property$relations;$
(5)$Regional$urban$and$rural$planning$development;$
(6)$Economic,$social,$and$tourism$development;$
(7)$Educational$policies;$
(8)$Preservation$and$development$of$the$cultural$heritage;$and$
(9)$ Such$ other$ matters$ as$ may$ be$ authorized$ by$ law$ for$ the$ promotion$ of$ the$
general$welfare$of$the$people$of$the$region.$(Underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
Again$ on$ the$ premise$ that$ the$ BJE$ may$ be$ regarded$ as$ an$ autonomous$ region,$
the$MOASAD$would$require$an$amendment$that$would$expand$the$aboveSquoted$
provision.$The$mere$passage$of$new$legislation$pursuant$to$subSparagraph$No.$9$
of$said$constitutional$provision$would$not$suffice,$since$any$new$law$that$might$
vest$in$the$BJE$the$powers$found$in$the$MOASAD$must,$itself,$comply$with$other$
provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ It$ would$ not$ do,$ for$ instance,$ to$ merely$ pass$
legislation$vesting$the$BJE$with$treatySmaking$power$in$order$to$accommodate$
paragraph$4$of$the$strand$on$RESOURCES$which$states:$The$BJE$is$free$to$enter$
into$ any$ economic$ cooperation$ and$ trade$ relations$ with$ foreign$ countries:$
provided,$ however,$ that$ such$ relationships$ and$ understandings$ do$ not$ include$
aggression$ against$ the$ Government$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ Philippines$ x$ x$ x.$
Under$ our$ constitutional$ system,$ it$ is$ only$ the$ President$ who$ has$ that$ power.$
Pimentel$v.$Executive$Secretary[155]$instructs:$
$$
In$our$system$of$government,$the$President,$being$the$head$of$state,$is$regarded$
as$ the$ sole$ organ$ and$ authority$ in$ external$ relations$ and$ is$ the$ country's$ sole$
representative$with$foreign$nations.$As$the$chief$architect$of$foreign$policy,$the$
President$acts$as$the$country's$mouthpiece$with$respect$to$international$affairs.$
Hence,$the$President$is$vested$with$the$authority$to$deal$with$foreign$states$and$
governments,$ extend$ or$ withhold$ recognition,$ maintain$ diplomatic$ relations,$
enter$ into$ treaties,$ and$ otherwise$ transact$ the$ business$ of$ foreign$ relations.$ In$
the$ realm$ of$ treatySmaking,$ the$ President$ has$ the$ sole$ authority$ to$ negotiate$
with$other$states.$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
Article$ II,$ Section$ 22$ of$ the$ Constitution$ must$ also$ be$ amended$ if$ the$ scheme$
envisioned$in$the$MOASAD$is$to$be$effected.$That$constitutional$provision$states:$
The$ State$ recognizes$ and$ promotes$ the$ rights$ of$ indigenous$ cultural$
communities$ within$ the$ framework$ of$ national$ unity$ and$ development.$
(Underscoring$ supplied)$ An$ associative$ arrangement$ does$ not$ uphold$ national$
unity.$ While$ there$ may$ be$ a$ semblance$ of$ unity$ because$ of$ the$ associative$ ties$
between$ the$ BJE$ and$ the$ national$ government,$ the$ act$ of$ placing$ a$ portion$ of$
Philippine$ territory$ in$ a$ status$ which,$ in$ international$ practice,$ has$ generally$
been$ a$ preparation$ for$ independence,$ is$ certainly$ not$ conducive$ to$ national$
unity.$
$$
Besides$ being$ irreconcilable$ with$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ MOASAD$ is$ also$
inconsistent$with$prevailing$statutory$law,$among$which$are$R.A.$No.$9054[156]$
or$the$Organic$Act$of$the$ARMM,$and$the$IPRA.[157]$
$$
$$
Article$X,$Section$3$of$the$Organic$Act$of$the$ARMM$is$a$bar$to$the$adoption$of$
the$ definition$ of$ Bangsamoro$ people$ used$ in$ the$ MOASAD.$ Paragraph$ 1$ on$
CONCEPTS$AND$PRINCIPLES$states:$
$$
1.$ It$ is$ the$ birthright$ of$ all$ Moros$ and$ all$ Indigenous$ peoples$ of$ Mindanao$ to$
identify$ themselves$ and$ be$ accepted$ as$ Bangsamoros.$ The$ Bangsamoro$ people$
refers$ to$ those$ who$ are$ natives$ or$ original$ inhabitants$ of$ Mindanao$ and$ its$
adjacent$ islands$ including$ Palawan$ and$ the$ Sulu$ archipelago$ at$ the$ time$ of$
conquest$ or$ colonization$ of$ its$ descendants$ whether$ mixed$ or$ of$ full$ blood.$
Spouses$ and$ their$ descendants$ are$ classified$ as$ Bangsamoro.$ The$ freedom$ of$
choice$of$the$Indigenous$people$shall$be$respected.$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$
supplied)$
$$
This$ use$ of$ the$ term$ Bangsamoro$ sharply$ contrasts$ with$ that$ found$ in$ the$
Article$X,$Section$3$of$the$Organic$Act,$which,$rather$than$lumping$together$the$
identities$of$the$Bangsamoro$and$other$indigenous$peoples$living$in$Mindanao,$
clearly$ distinguishes$ between$ Bangsamoro$ people$ and$ Tribal$ peoples,$ as$
follows:$
$$
As$used$in$this$Organic$Act,$the$phrase$indigenous$cultural$community$refers$to$
Filipino$citizens$residing$in$the$autonomous$region$who$are:$
$$
(a)$ Tribal$ peoples.$ These$ are$ citizens$ whose$ social,$ cultural$ and$ economic$
conditions$distinguish$them$from$other$sectors$of$the$national$community;$and$
$$
(b)$Bangsa$Moro$people.$These$are$citizens$who$are$believers$in$Islam$and$who$
have$ retained$ some$ or$ all$ of$ their$ own$ social,$ economic,$ cultural,$ and$ political$
institutions.$
$$
$$
Respecting$ the$ IPRA,$ it$ lays$ down$ the$ prevailing$ procedure$ for$ the$ delineation$
and$recognition$of$ancestral$domains.$The$MOASADs$manner$of$delineating$the$
ancestral$ domain$ of$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$ is$ a$ clear$ departure$ from$ that$
procedure.$By$paragraph$1$of$TERRITORY,$the$Parties$simply$agree$that,$subject$
to$ the$ delimitations$ in$ the$ agreed$ Schedules,$ [t]he$ Bangsamoro$ homeland$ and$
historic$ territory$ refer$ to$ the$ land$ mass$ as$ well$ as$ the$ maritime,$ terrestrial,$
fluvial$ and$ alluvial$ domains,$ and$ the$ aerial$ domain,$ the$ atmospheric$ space$
above$it,$embracing$the$MindanaoSSuluSPalawan$geographic$region.$
$$
Chapter$VIII$of$the$IPRA,$on$the$other$hand,$lays$down$a$detailed$procedure,$as$
illustrated$in$the$following$provisions$thereof:$
$$
SECTION$52.$Delineation$Process.$The$identification$and$delineation$of$ancestral$
domains$shall$be$done$in$accordance$with$the$following$procedures:$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
b)$Petition$for$Delineation.$The$process$of$delineating$a$specific$perimeter$may$
be$initiated$by$the$NCIP$with$the$consent$of$the$ICC/IP$concerned,$or$through$a$
Petition$for$Delineation$filed$with$the$NCIP,$by$a$majority$of$the$members$of$the$
ICCs/IPs;$
$$
c)$ Delineation$ Proper.$ The$ official$ delineation$ of$ ancestral$ domain$ boundaries$
including$ census$ of$ all$ community$ members$ therein,$ shall$ be$ immediately$
undertaken$by$the$Ancestral$Domains$Office$upon$filing$of$the$application$by$the$
ICCs/IPs$ concerned.$ Delineation$ will$ be$ done$ in$ coordination$ with$ the$
community$ concerned$ and$ shall$ at$ all$ times$ include$ genuine$ involvement$ and$
participation$by$the$members$of$the$communities$concerned;$
$$
d)$Proof$Required.$Proof$of$Ancestral$Domain$Claims$shall$include$the$testimony$
of$elders$or$community$under$oath,$and$other$documents$directly$or$indirectly$
attesting$to$the$possession$or$occupation$of$the$area$since$time$immemorial$by$
such$ ICCs/IPs$ in$ the$ concept$ of$ owners$ which$ shall$ be$ any$ one$ (1)$ of$ the$
following$authentic$documents:$
$$
1)$Written$accounts$of$the$ICCs/IPs$customs$and$traditions;$
$$
2)$Written$accounts$of$the$ICCs/IPs$political$structure$and$institution;$
$$
3)$ Pictures$ showing$ long$ term$ occupation$ such$ as$ those$ of$ old$ improvements,$
burial$grounds,$sacred$places$and$old$villages;$
$$
4)$ Historical$ accounts,$ including$ pacts$ and$ agreements$ concerning$ boundaries$
entered$into$by$the$ICCs/IPs$concerned$with$other$ICCs/IPs;$
$$
5)$Survey$plans$and$sketch$maps;$
$$
6)$Anthropological$data;$
$$
7)$Genealogical$surveys;$
$$
8)$ Pictures$ and$ descriptive$ histories$ of$ traditional$ communal$ forests$ and$
hunting$grounds;$
$$
9)$ Pictures$ and$ descriptive$ histories$ of$ traditional$ landmarks$ such$ as$
mountains,$rivers,$creeks,$ridges,$hills,$terraces$and$the$like;$and$
$$
10)$ WriteSups$ of$ names$ and$ places$ derived$ from$ the$ native$ dialect$ of$ the$
community.$
$$
e)$ Preparation$ of$ Maps.$ On$ the$ basis$ of$ such$ investigation$ and$ the$ findings$ of$
fact$ based$ thereon,$ the$ Ancestral$ Domains$ Office$ of$ the$ NCIP$ shall$ prepare$ a$
perimeter$ map,$ complete$ with$ technical$ descriptions,$ and$ a$ description$ of$ the$
natural$features$and$landmarks$embraced$therein;$
$$
f)$ Report$ of$ Investigation$ and$ Other$ Documents.$ A$ complete$ copy$ of$ the$
preliminary$ census$ and$ a$ report$ of$ investigation,$ shall$ be$ prepared$ by$ the$
Ancestral$Domains$Office$of$the$NCIP;$
$$
g)$ Notice$ and$ Publication.$ A$ copy$ of$ each$ document,$ including$ a$ translation$ in$
the$ native$ language$ of$ the$ ICCs/IPs$ concerned$ shall$ be$ posted$ in$ a$ prominent$
place$therein$for$at$least$fifteen$(15)$days.$A$copy$of$the$document$shall$also$be$
posted$ at$ the$ local,$ provincial$ and$ regional$ offices$ of$ the$ NCIP,$ and$ shall$ be$
published$ in$ a$ newspaper$ of$ general$ circulation$ once$ a$ week$ for$ two$ (2)$
consecutive$ weeks$ to$ allow$ other$ claimants$ to$ file$ opposition$ thereto$ within$
fifteen$ (15)$ days$ from$ date$ of$ such$ publication:$ Provided,$ That$ in$ areas$ where$
no$ such$ newspaper$ exists,$ broadcasting$ in$ a$ radio$ station$ will$ be$ a$ valid$
substitute:$ Provided,$ further,$ That$ mere$ posting$ shall$ be$ deemed$ sufficient$ if$
both$newspaper$and$radio$station$are$not$available;$
$$
h)$ Endorsement$ to$ NCIP.$ Within$ fifteen$ (15)$ days$ from$ publication,$ and$ of$ the$
inspection$ process,$ the$ Ancestral$ Domains$ Office$ shall$ prepare$ a$ report$ to$ the$
NCIP$endorsing$a$favorable$action$upon$a$claim$that$is$deemed$to$have$sufficient$
proof.$However,$if$the$proof$is$deemed$insufficient,$the$Ancestral$Domains$Office$
shall$ require$ the$ submission$ of$ additional$ evidence:$ Provided,$ That$ the$
Ancestral$Domains$Office$shall$reject$any$claim$that$is$deemed$patently$false$or$
fraudulent$ after$ inspection$ and$ verification:$ Provided,$ further,$ That$ in$ case$ of$
rejection,$the$Ancestral$Domains$Office$shall$give$the$applicant$due$notice,$copy$
furnished$ all$ concerned,$ containing$ the$ grounds$ for$ denial.$ The$ denial$ shall$ be$
appealable$ to$ the$ NCIP:$ Provided,$ furthermore,$ That$ in$ cases$ where$ there$ are$
conflicting$ claims$ among$ ICCs/IPs$ on$ the$ boundaries$ of$ ancestral$ domain$
claims,$the$Ancestral$Domains$Office$shall$cause$the$contending$parties$to$meet$
and$ assist$ them$ in$ coming$ up$ with$ a$ preliminary$ resolution$ of$ the$ conflict,$
without$prejudice$to$its$full$adjudication$according$to$the$section$below.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
To$remove$all$doubts$about$the$irreconcilability$of$the$MOASAD$with$the$present$
legal$system,$a$discussion$of$not$only$the$Constitution$and$domestic$statutes,$but$
also$of$international$law$is$in$order,$for$
$$
Article$ II,$ Section$ 2$ of$ the$ Constitution$ states$ that$ the$ Philippines$ adopts$ the$
generally$accepted$principles$of$international$law$as$part$of$the$law$of$the$land.$
$$
$$
Applying$ this$ provision$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ Court,$ in$ Mejoff$ v.$ Director$ of$
Prisons,[158]$held$that$the$Universal$Declaration$of$Human$Rights$is$part$of$the$
law$of$the$land$on$account$of$which$it$ordered$the$release$on$bail$of$a$detained$
alien$of$Russian$descent$whose$deportation$order$had$not$been$executed$even$
after$two$years.$Similarly,$the$Court$in$Agustin$v.$Edu[159]$applied$the$aforesaid$
constitutional$ provision$ to$ the$ 1968$ Vienna$ Convention$ on$ Road$ Signs$ and$
Signals.$
$$
International$law$has$long$recognized$the$right$to$selfSdetermination$of$peoples,$
understood$ not$ merely$ as$ the$ entire$ population$ of$ a$ State$ but$ also$ a$ portion$
thereof.$In$considering$the$question$of$whether$the$people$of$Quebec$had$a$right$
to$unilaterally$secede$from$Canada,$the$Canadian$Supreme$Court$in$REFERENCE$
RE$SECESSION$OF$QUEBEC[160]$had$occasion$to$acknowledge$that$the$right$of$a$
people$ to$ selfSdetermination$ is$ now$ so$ widely$ recognized$ in$ international$
conventions$ that$ the$ principle$ has$ acquired$ a$ status$ beyond$ convention$ and$ is$
considered$a$general$principle$of$international$law.$
Among$the$conventions$referred$to$are$the$International$Covenant$on$Civil$and$
Political$ Rights[161]$ and$ the$ International$ Covenant$ on$ Economic,$ Social$ and$
Cultural$Rights[162]$which$state,$in$Article$1$of$both$covenants,$that$all$peoples,$
by$ virtue$ of$ the$ right$ of$ selfSdetermination,$ freely$ determine$ their$ political$
status$and$freely$pursue$their$economic,$social,$and$cultural$development.$
$$
The$peoples$right$to$selfSdetermination$should$not,$however,$be$understood$as$
extending$ to$ a$ unilateral$ right$ of$ secession.$ A$ distinction$ should$ be$ made$
between$ the$ right$ of$ internal$ and$ external$ selfSdetermination.$ REFERENCE$ RE$
SECESSION$OF$QUEBEC$is$again$instructive:$
$$
(ii)$Scope$of$the$Right$to$SelfSdetermination$
$$
126.$The$recognized$sources$of$international$law$establish$that$the$right$to$selfS
determination$ of$ a$ people$ is$ normally$ fulfilled$ through$ internal$ selfS
determination$ a$ peoples$ pursuit$ of$ its$ political,$ economic,$ social$ and$ cultural$
development$within$the$framework$of$an$existing$state.$A$right$to$external$selfS
determination$(which$in$this$case$potentially$takes$the$form$of$the$assertion$of$a$
right$to$unilateral$secession)$arises$in$only$the$most$extreme$of$cases$and,$even$
then,$under$carefully$defined$circumstances.$x$x$x$
$$
External$ selfSdetermination$ can$ be$ defined$ as$ in$ the$ following$ statement$ from$
the$Declaration$on$Friendly$Relations,$supra,$as$
$$
The$establishment$of$a$sovereign$and$independent$State,$the$free$association$or$
integration$with$an$independent$State$or$the$emergence$into$any$other$political$
status$ freely$ determined$ by$ a$ people$ constitute$ modes$ of$ implementing$ the$
right$of$selfSdetermination$by$that$people.$(Emphasis$added)$
$$
127.$The$international$law$principle$of$selfSdetermination$has$evolved$within$a$
framework$of$respect$for$the$territorial$integrity$of$existing$states.$The$various$
international$ documents$ that$ support$ the$ existence$ of$ a$ peoples$ right$ to$ selfS
determination$also$contain$parallel$statements$supportive$of$the$conclusion$that$
the$exercise$of$such$a$right$must$be$sufficiently$limited$to$prevent$threats$to$an$
existing$ states$ territorial$ integrity$ or$ the$ stability$ of$ relations$ between$
sovereign$states.$
$$
x$x$x$x$(Emphasis,$italics$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
The$Canadian$Court$went$on$to$discuss$the$exceptional$cases$in$which$the$right$
to$ external$ selfSdetermination$ can$ arise,$ namely,$ where$ a$ people$ is$ under$
colonial$rule,$is$subject$to$foreign$domination$or$exploitation$outside$a$colonial$
context,$ and$ less$ definitely$ but$ asserted$ by$ a$ number$ of$ commentators$ is$
blocked$from$the$meaningful$exercise$of$its$right$to$internal$selfSdetermination.$
The$ Court$ ultimately$ held$ that$ the$ population$ of$ Quebec$ had$ no$ right$ to$
secession,$as$the$same$is$not$under$colonial$rule$or$foreign$domination,$nor$is$it$
being$ deprived$ of$ the$ freedom$ to$ make$ political$ choices$ and$ pursue$ economic,$
social$and$cultural$development,$citing$that$Quebec$is$equitably$represented$in$
legislative,$ executive$ and$ judicial$ institutions$ within$ Canada,$ even$ occupying$
prominent$positions$therein.$
$$
The$ exceptional$ nature$ of$ the$ right$ of$ secession$ is$ further$ exemplified$ in$ the$
REPORT$ OF$ THE$ INTERNATIONAL$ COMMITTEE$ OF$ JURISTS$ ON$ THE$ LEGAL$
ASPECTS$OF$THE$AALAND$ISLANDS$QUESTION.[163]$There,$Sweden$presented$
to$the$Council$of$the$League$of$Nations$the$question$of$whether$the$inhabitants$
of$ the$ Aaland$ Islands$ should$ be$ authorized$ to$ determine$ by$ plebiscite$ if$ the$
archipelago$should$remain$under$Finnish$sovereignty$or$be$incorporated$in$the$
kingdom$ of$ Sweden.$ The$ Council,$ before$ resolving$ the$ question,$ appointed$ an$
International$Committee$composed$of$three$jurists$to$submit$an$opinion$on$the$
preliminary$issue$of$whether$the$dispute$should,$based$on$international$law,$be$
entirely$ left$ to$ the$ domestic$ jurisdiction$ of$ Finland.$ The$ Committee$ stated$ the$
rule$as$follows:$
$$
x$x$x$[I]n$the$absence$of$express$provisions$in$international$treaties,$the$right$of$
disposing$ of$ national$ territory$ is$ essentially$ an$ attribute$ of$ the$ sovereignty$ of$
every$State.$Positive$International$Law$does$not$recognize$the$right$of$national$
groups,$as$such,$to$separate$themselves$from$the$State$of$which$they$form$part$
by$ the$ simple$ expression$ of$ a$ wish,$ any$ more$ than$ it$ recognizes$ the$ right$ of$
other$States$to$claim$such$a$separation.$Generally$speaking,$the$grant$or$refusal$
of$the$right$to$a$portion$of$its$population$of$determining$its$own$political$fate$by$
plebiscite$ or$ by$ some$ other$ method,$ is,$ exclusively,$ an$ attribute$ of$ the$
sovereignty$of$every$State$which$is$definitively$constituted.$A$dispute$between$
two$ States$ concerning$ such$ a$ question,$ under$ normal$ conditions$ therefore,$
bears$upon$a$question$which$International$Law$leaves$entirely$to$the$domestic$
jurisdiction$of$one$of$the$States$concerned.$Any$other$solution$would$amount$to$
an$ infringement$ of$ sovereign$ rights$ of$ a$ State$ and$ would$ involve$ the$ risk$ of$
creating$difficulties$and$a$lack$of$stability$which$would$not$only$be$contrary$to$
the$very$idea$embodied$in$term$State,$but$would$also$endanger$the$interests$of$
the$ international$ community.$ If$ this$ right$ is$ not$ possessed$ by$ a$ large$ or$ small$
section$ of$ a$ nation,$ neither$ can$ it$ be$ held$ by$ the$ State$ to$ which$ the$ national$
group$ wishes$ to$ be$ attached,$ nor$ by$ any$ other$ State.$ (Emphasis$ and$
underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
The$Committee$held$that$the$dispute$concerning$the$Aaland$Islands$did$not$refer$
to$ a$ question$ which$ is$ left$ by$ international$ law$ to$ the$ domestic$ jurisdiction$ of$
Finland,$ thereby$ applying$ the$ exception$ rather$ than$ the$ rule$ elucidated$ above.$
Its$ground$for$departing$from$the$general$rule,$however,$was$a$very$narrow$one,$
namely,$ the$ Aaland$ Islands$ agitation$ originated$ at$ a$ time$ when$ Finland$ was$
undergoing$ drastic$ political$ transformation.$ The$ internal$ situation$ of$ Finland$
was,$according$to$the$Committee,$so$abnormal$that,$for$a$considerable$time,$the$
conditions$ required$ for$ the$ formation$ of$ a$ sovereign$ State$ did$ not$ exist.$ In$ the$
midst$of$revolution,$anarchy,$and$civil$war,$the$legitimacy$of$the$Finnish$national$
government$ was$ disputed$ by$ a$ large$ section$ of$ the$ people,$ and$ it$ had,$ in$ fact,$
been$ chased$ from$ the$ capital$ and$ forcibly$ prevented$ from$ carrying$ out$ its$
duties.$The$armed$camps$and$the$police$were$divided$into$two$opposing$forces.$
In$ light$ of$ these$ circumstances,$ Finland$ was$ not,$ during$ the$ relevant$ time$
period,$ a$ definitively$ constituted$ sovereign$ state.$ The$ Committee,$ therefore,$
found$ that$ Finland$ did$ not$ possess$ the$ right$ to$ withhold$ from$ a$ portion$ of$ its$
population$ the$ option$ to$ separate$ itself$ a$ right$ which$ sovereign$ nations$
generally$have$with$respect$to$their$own$populations.$
$$
Turning$now$to$the$more$specific$category$of$indigenous$peoples,$this$term$has$
been$used,$in$scholarship$as$well$as$international,$regional,$and$state$practices,$
to$ refer$ to$ groups$ with$ distinct$ cultures,$ histories,$ and$ connections$ to$ land$
(spiritual$ and$ otherwise)$ that$ have$ been$ forcibly$ incorporated$ into$ a$ larger$
governing$society.$These$groups$are$regarded$as$indigenous$since$they$are$the$
living$ descendants$ of$ preSinvasion$ inhabitants$ of$ lands$ now$ dominated$ by$
others.$ Otherwise$ stated,$ indigenous$ peoples,$ nations,$ or$ communities$ are$
culturally$ distinctive$ groups$ that$ find$ themselves$ engulfed$ by$ settler$ societies$
born$of$the$forces$of$empire$and$conquest.[164]$Examples$of$groups$who$have$
been$ regarded$ as$ indigenous$ peoples$ are$ the$ Maori$ of$ New$ Zealand$ and$ the$
aboriginal$peoples$of$Canada.$
$$
As$ with$ the$ broader$ category$ of$ peoples,$ indigenous$ peoples$ situated$ within$
states$ do$ not$ have$ a$ general$ right$ to$ independence$ or$ secession$ from$ those$
states$under$international$law,[165]$but$they$do$have$rights$amounting$to$what$
was$discussed$above$as$the$right$to$internal$selfSdetermination.$
$$
In$ a$ historic$ development$ last$ September$ 13,$ 2007,$ the$ UN$ General$ Assembly$
adopted$ the$ United$ Nations$ Declaration$ on$ the$ Rights$ of$ Indigenous$ Peoples$
(UN$DRIP)$through$General$Assembly$Resolution$61/295.$The$vote$was$143$to$
4,$ the$ Philippines$ being$ included$ among$ those$ in$ favor,$ and$ the$ four$ voting$
against$ being$ Australia,$ Canada,$ New$ Zealand,$ and$ the$ U.S.$ The$ Declaration$
clearly$ recognized$ the$ right$ of$ indigenous$ peoples$ to$ selfSdetermination,$
encompassing$the$right$to$autonomy$or$selfSgovernment,$to$wit:$
$$
Article$3$
$$
Indigenous$peoples$have$the$right$to$selfSdetermination.$By$virtue$of$that$right$
they$ freely$ determine$ their$ political$ status$ and$ freely$ pursue$ their$ economic,$
social$and$cultural$development.$
$$
Article$4$
$$
Indigenous$ peoples,$ in$ exercising$ their$ right$ to$ selfSdetermination,$ have$ the$
right$ to$ autonomy$ or$ selfSgovernment$ in$ matters$ relating$ to$ their$ internal$ and$
local$ affairs,$ as$ well$ as$ ways$ and$ means$ for$ financing$ their$ autonomous$
functions.$
$$
Article$5$
$$
Indigenous$ peoples$ have$ the$ right$ to$ maintain$ and$ strengthen$ their$ distinct$
political,$ legal,$ economic,$ social$ and$ cultural$ institutions,$ while$ retaining$ their$
right$to$participate$fully,$if$they$so$choose,$in$the$political,$economic,$social$and$
cultural$life$of$the$State.$
$$
$$
SelfSgovernment,$ as$ used$ in$ international$ legal$ discourse$ pertaining$ to$
indigenous$ peoples,$ has$ been$ understood$ as$ equivalent$ to$ internal$ selfS
determination.[166]$ The$ extent$ of$ selfSdetermination$ provided$ for$ in$ the$ UN$
DRIP$is$more$particularly$defined$in$its$subsequent$articles,$some$of$which$are$
quoted$hereunder:$
Article$8$
1.$ Indigenous$ peoples$ and$ individuals$ have$ the$ right$ not$ to$ be$ subjected$ to$
forced$assimilation$or$destruction$of$their$culture.$
2.$$States$shall$provide$effective$mechanisms$for$prevention$of,$and$redress$for:$
(a)$$Any$action$which$has$the$aim$or$effect$of$depriving$them$of$their$integrity$as$
distinct$peoples,$or$of$their$cultural$values$or$ethnic$identities;$
(b)$$Any$action$which$has$the$aim$or$effect$of$dispossessing$them$of$their$lands,$
territories$or$resources;$
(c)$ $ Any$ form$ of$ forced$ population$ transfer$ which$ has$ the$ aim$ or$ effect$ of$
violating$or$undermining$any$of$their$rights;$
(d)$$Any$form$of$forced$assimilation$or$integration;$
$
(e)$ $ Any$ form$ of$ propaganda$ designed$ to$ promote$ or$ incite$ racial$ or$ ethnic$
discrimination$directed$against$them.$
Article$21$
$$
1.$ $ Indigenous$ peoples$ have$ the$ right,$ without$ discrimination,$ to$ the$
improvement$of$their$economic$and$social$conditions,$including,$inter$alia,$in$the$
areas$ of$ education,$ employment,$ vocational$ training$ and$ retraining,$ housing,$
sanitation,$health$and$social$security.$
2.$ $ States$ shall$ take$ effective$ measures$ and,$ where$ appropriate,$ special$
measures$ to$ ensure$ continuing$ improvement$ of$ their$ economic$ and$ social$
conditions.$ Particular$ attention$ shall$ be$ paid$ to$ the$ rights$ and$ special$ needs$ of$
indigenous$elders,$women,$youth,$children$and$persons$with$disabilities.$
$$
Article$26$
$$
1.$ $ Indigenous$ peoples$ have$ the$ right$ to$ the$ lands,$ territories$ and$ resources$
which$they$have$traditionally$owned,$occupied$or$otherwise$used$or$acquired.$
2.$$Indigenous$peoples$have$the$right$to$own,$use,$develop$and$control$the$lands,$
territories$ and$ resources$ that$ they$ possess$ by$ reason$ of$ traditional$ ownership$
or$ other$ traditional$ occupation$ or$ use,$ as$ well$ as$ those$ which$ they$ have$
otherwise$acquired.$
3.$ $ States$ shall$ give$ legal$ recognition$ and$ protection$ to$ these$ lands,$ territories$
and$ resources.$ Such$ recognition$ shall$ be$ conducted$ with$ due$ respect$ to$ the$
customs,$ traditions$ and$ land$ tenure$ systems$ of$ the$ indigenous$ peoples$
concerned.$
$$
Article$30$
$$
1.$$Military$activities$shall$not$take$place$in$the$lands$or$territories$of$indigenous$
peoples,$unless$justified$by$a$relevant$public$interest$or$otherwise$freely$agreed$
with$or$requested$by$the$indigenous$peoples$concerned.$
$$
2.$ $ States$ shall$ undertake$ effective$ consultations$ with$ the$ indigenous$ peoples$
concerned,$ through$ appropriate$ procedures$ and$ in$ particular$ through$ their$
representative$institutions,$prior$to$using$their$lands$or$territories$for$military$
activities.$
$$
Article$32$
$$
1.$ $ Indigenous$ peoples$ have$ the$ right$ to$ determine$ and$ develop$ priorities$ and$
strategies$ for$ the$ development$ or$ use$ of$ their$ lands$ or$ territories$ and$ other$
resources.$
$$
2.$$States$shall$consult$and$cooperate$in$good$faith$with$the$indigenous$peoples$
concerned$through$their$own$representative$institutions$in$order$to$obtain$their$
free$ and$ informed$ consent$ prior$ to$ the$ approval$ of$ any$ project$ affecting$ their$
lands$ or$ territories$ and$ other$ resources,$ particularly$ in$ connection$ with$ the$
development,$utilization$or$exploitation$of$mineral,$water$or$other$resources.$
$$
3.$ $ States$ shall$ provide$ effective$ mechanisms$ for$ just$ and$ fair$ redress$ for$ any$
such$ activities,$ and$ appropriate$ measures$ shall$ be$ taken$ to$ mitigate$ adverse$
environmental,$economic,$social,$cultural$or$spiritual$impact.$
$$
Article$37$
$$
1.$ $ Indigenous$ peoples$ have$ the$ right$ to$ the$ recognition,$ observance$ and$
enforcement$ of$ treaties,$ agreements$ and$ other$ constructive$ arrangements$
concluded$with$States$or$their$successors$and$to$have$States$honour$and$respect$
such$treaties,$agreements$and$other$constructive$arrangements.$
$$
2.$$Nothing$in$this$Declaration$may$be$interpreted$as$diminishing$or$eliminating$
the$ rights$ of$ indigenous$ peoples$ contained$ in$ treaties,$ agreements$ and$ other$
constructive$arrangements.$
$$
Article$38$
$$
States$ in$ consultation$ and$ cooperation$ with$ indigenous$ peoples,$ shall$ take$ the$
appropriate$measures,$including$legislative$measures,$to$achieve$the$ends$of$this$
Declaration.$
$$
$$
$$
Assuming$ that$ the$ UN$ DRIP,$ like$ the$ Universal$ Declaration$ on$ Human$ Rights,$
must$ now$ be$ regarded$ as$ embodying$ customary$ international$ law$ a$ question$
which$the$Court$need$not$definitively$resolve$here$the$obligations$enumerated$
therein$ do$ not$ strictly$ require$ the$ Republic$ to$ grant$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people,$
through$ the$ instrumentality$ of$ the$ BJE,$ the$ particular$ rights$ and$ powers$
provided$for$in$the$MOASAD.$Even$the$more$specific$provisions$of$the$UN$DRIP$
are$ general$ in$ scope,$ allowing$ for$ flexibility$ in$ its$ application$ by$ the$ different$
States.$
There$is,$for$instance,$no$requirement$in$the$UN$DRIP$that$States$now$guarantee$
indigenous$peoples$their$own$police$and$internal$security$force.$Indeed,$Article$
8$presupposes$that$it$is$the$State$which$will$provide$protection$for$indigenous$
peoples$against$acts$like$the$forced$dispossession$of$their$lands$a$function$that$is$
normally$performed$by$police$officers.$If$the$protection$of$a$right$so$essential$to$
indigenous$ peoples$ identity$ is$ acknowledged$ to$ be$ the$ responsibility$ of$ the$
State,$ then$ surely$ the$ protection$ of$ rights$ less$ significant$ to$ them$ as$ such$
peoples$ would$ also$ be$ the$ duty$ of$ States.$ Nor$ is$ there$ in$ the$ UN$ DRIP$ an$
acknowledgement$ of$ the$ right$ of$ indigenous$ peoples$ to$ the$ aerial$ domain$ and$
atmospheric$ space.$ What$ it$ upholds,$ in$ Article$ 26$ thereof,$ is$ the$ right$ of$
indigenous$ peoples$ to$ the$ lands,$ territories$ and$ resources$ which$ they$ have$
traditionally$owned,$occupied$or$otherwise$used$or$acquired.$
$$
Moreover,$ the$ UN$ DRIP,$ while$ upholding$ the$ right$ of$ indigenous$ peoples$ to$
autonomy,$ does$ not$ obligate$ States$ to$ grant$ indigenous$ peoples$ the$ nearS
independent$ status$ of$ an$ associated$ state.$ All$ the$ rights$ recognized$ in$ that$
document$are$qualified$in$Article$46$as$follows:$
$$
1.$ $ Nothing$ in$ this$ Declaration$ may$ be$ interpreted$ as$ implying$ for$ any$ State,$
people,$group$or$person$any$right$to$engage$in$any$activity$or$to$perform$any$act$
contrary$ to$ the$ Charter$ of$ the$ United$ Nations$ or$ construed$ as$ authorizing$ or$
encouraging$any$action$which$would$dismember$or$impair,$totally$or$in$part,$the$
territorial$integrity$or$political$unity$of$sovereign$and$independent$States.$
$$
$$
Even$if$the$UN$DRIP$were$considered$as$part$of$the$law$of$the$land$pursuant$to$
Article$II,$Section$2$of$the$Constitution,$it$would$not$suffice$to$uphold$the$validity$
of$the$MOASAD$so$as$to$render$its$compliance$with$other$laws$unnecessary.$
$$
It$ is,$ therefore,$ clear$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ contains$ numerous$ provisions$ that$
cannot$ be$ reconciled$ with$ the$ Constitution$ and$ the$ laws$ as$ presently$ worded.$
Respondents$proffer,$however,$that$the$signing$of$the$MOASAD$alone$would$not$
have$ entailed$ any$ violation$ of$ law$ or$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ on$ their$ part,$
precisely$because$it$stipulates$that$the$provisions$thereof$inconsistent$with$the$
laws$shall$not$take$effect$until$these$laws$are$amended.$They$cite$paragraph$7$of$
the$ MOASAD$ strand$ on$ GOVERNANCE$ quoted$ earlier,$ but$ which$ is$ reproduced$
below$for$convenience:$
$$
7.$ The$ Parties$ agree$ that$ the$ mechanisms$ and$ modalities$ for$ the$ actual$
implementation$ of$ this$ MOASAD$ shall$ be$ spelt$ out$ in$ the$ Comprehensive$
Compact$to$mutually$take$such$steps$to$enable$it$to$occur$effectively.$
Any$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ requiring$ amendments$ to$ the$ existing$ legal$
framework$shall$come$into$force$upon$signing$of$a$Comprehensive$Compact$and$
upon$effecting$the$necessary$changes$to$the$legal$framework$with$due$regard$to$
non$derogation$of$prior$agreements$and$within$the$stipulated$timeframe$to$be$
contained$in$the$Comprehensive$Compact.$
Indeed,$ the$ foregoing$ stipulation$ keeps$ many$ controversial$ provisions$ of$ the$
MOASAD$ from$ coming$ into$ force$ until$ the$ necessary$ changes$ to$ the$ legal$
framework$ are$ effected.$ While$ the$ word$ Constitution$ is$ not$ mentioned$ in$ the$
provision$now$under$consideration$or$anywhere$else$in$the$MOASAD,$the$term$
legal$framework$is$certainly$broad$enough$to$include$the$Constitution.$
$$
Notwithstanding$ the$ suspensive$ clause,$ however,$ respondents,$ by$ their$ mere$
act$ of$ incorporating$ in$ the$ MOASAD$ the$ provisions$ thereof$ regarding$ the$
associative$ relationship$ between$ the$ BJE$ and$ the$ Central$ Government,$ have$
already$ violated$ the$ Memorandum$ of$ Instructions$ From$ The$ President$ dated$
March$ 1,$ 2001,$ which$ states$ that$ the$ negotiations$ shall$ be$ conducted$ in$
accordance$with$x$x$x$the$principles$of$the$sovereignty$and$territorial$integrity$
of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$ Philippines.$ (Emphasis$ supplied)$ Establishing$ an$
associative$relationship$between$the$BJE$and$the$Central$Government$is,$for$the$
reasons$ already$ discussed,$ a$ preparation$ for$ independence,$ or$ worse,$ an$
implicit$acknowledgment$of$an$independent$status$already$prevailing.$
$$
Even$apart$from$the$aboveSmentioned$Memorandum,$however,$the$MOASAD$is$
defective$because$the$suspensive$clause$is$invalid,$as$discussed$below.$
$$
The$authority$of$the$GRP$Peace$Negotiating$Panel$to$negotiate$with$the$MILF$is$
founded$on$E.O.$No.$3,$Section$5(c),$which$states$that$there$shall$be$established$
Government$ Peace$ Negotiating$ Panels$ for$ negotiations$ with$ different$ rebel$
groups$ to$ be$ appointed$ by$ the$ President$ as$ her$ official$ emissaries$ to$ conduct$
negotiations,$ dialogues,$ and$ faceStoSface$ discussions$ with$ rebel$ groups.$ These$
negotiating$ panels$ are$ to$ report$ to$ the$ President,$ through$ the$ PAPP$ on$ the$
conduct$and$progress$of$the$negotiations.$
$$
It$ bears$ noting$ that$ the$ GRP$ Peace$ Panel,$ in$ exploring$ lasting$ solutions$ to$ the$
Moro$Problem$through$its$negotiations$with$the$MILF,$was$not$restricted$by$E.O.$
No.$3$only$to$those$options$available$under$the$laws$as$they$presently$stand.$One$
of$ the$ components$ of$ a$ comprehensive$ peace$ process,$ which$ E.O.$ No.$ 3$
collectively$refers$to$as$the$Paths$to$Peace,$is$the$pursuit$of$social,$economic,$and$
political$ reforms$ which$ may$ require$ new$ legislation$ or$ even$ constitutional$
amendments.$ Sec.$ 4(a)$ of$ E.O.$ No.$ 3,$ which$ reiterates$ Section$ 3(a),$ of$ E.O.$ No.$
125,[167]$states:$
$$
SECTION$4.$The$Six$Paths$to$Peace.$The$components$of$the$comprehensive$peace$
process$comprise$the$processes$known$as$the$Paths$to$Peace.$These$component$
processes$ are$ interrelated$ and$ not$ mutually$ exclusive,$ and$ must$ therefore$ be$
pursued$ simultaneously$ in$ a$ coordinated$ and$ integrated$ fashion.$ They$ shall$
include,$but$may$not$be$limited$to,$the$following:$
$$
a.$PURSUIT$OF$SOCIAL,$ECONOMIC$AND$POLITICAL$REFORMS.$This$component$
involves$ the$ vigorous$ implementation$ of$ various$ policies,$ reforms,$ programs$
and$projects$aimed$at$addressing$the$root$causes$of$internal$armed$conflicts$and$
social$ unrest.$ This$ may$ require$ administrative$ action,$ new$ legislation$ or$ even$
constitutional$amendments.$
$$
x$x$x$x$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$$
$$
The$ MOASAD,$ therefore,$ may$ reasonably$ be$ perceived$ as$ an$ attempt$ of$
respondents$to$address,$pursuant$to$this$provision$of$E.O.$No.$3,$the$root$causes$
of$the$armed$conflict$in$Mindanao.$The$E.O.$authorized$them$to$think$outside$the$
box,$ so$ to$ speak.$ Hence,$ they$ negotiated$ and$ were$ set$ on$ signing$ the$ MOASAD$
that$ included$ various$ social,$ economic,$ and$ political$ reforms$ which$ cannot,$
however,$all$be$accommodated$within$the$present$legal$framework,$and$which$
thus$would$require$new$legislation$and$constitutional$amendments.$
$$
The$inquiry$on$the$legality$of$the$suspensive$clause,$however,$cannot$stop$here,$
because$it$must$be$asked$
$$
whether$ the$ President$ herself$ may$ exercise$ the$ power$ delegated$ to$ the$ GRP$
Peace$Panel$under$E.O.$No.$3,$Sec.$4(a).$
The$ President$ cannot$ delegate$ a$ power$ that$ she$ herself$ does$ not$ possess.$ May$
the$President,$in$the$course$of$peace$negotiations,$agree$to$pursue$reforms$that$
would$ require$ new$ legislation$ and$ constitutional$ amendments,$ or$ should$ the$
reforms$be$restricted$only$to$those$solutions$which$the$present$laws$allow?$The$
answer$to$this$question$requires$a$discussion$of$
$$
the$extent$of$the$Presidents$power$to$conduct$peace$negotiations.$
$$
$$
That$ the$ authority$ of$ the$ President$ to$ conduct$ peace$ negotiations$ with$ rebel$
groups$ is$ not$ explicitly$ mentioned$ in$ the$ Constitution$ does$ not$ mean$ that$ she$
has$no$such$authority.$In$Sanlakas$v.$Executive$Secretary,[168]$in$issue$was$the$
authority$ of$ the$ President$ to$ declare$ a$ state$ of$ rebellion$ an$ authority$ which$ is$
not$expressly$provided$for$in$the$Constitution.$The$Court$held$thus:$
$$
In$ her$ ponencia$ in$ Marcos$ v.$ Manglapus,$ Justice$ Cortes$ put$ her$ thesis$ into$
jurisprudence.$ There,$ the$ Court,$ by$ a$ slim$ 8S7$ margin,$ upheld$ the$ President's$
power$ to$ forbid$ the$ return$ of$ her$ exiled$ predecessor.$ The$ rationale$ for$ the$
majority's$ruling$rested$on$the$President's$
$$
.$ .$ .$ unstated$ residual$ powers$ which$ are$ implied$ from$ the$ grant$ of$ executive$
power$ and$ which$ are$ necessary$ for$ her$ to$ comply$ with$ her$ duties$ under$ the$
Constitution.$The$powers$of$the$President$are$not$limited$to$what$are$expressly$
enumerated$ in$ the$ article$ on$ the$ Executive$ Department$ and$ in$ scattered$
provisions$of$the$Constitution.$This$is$so,$notwithstanding$the$avowed$intent$of$
the$ members$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Commission$ of$ 1986$ to$ limit$ the$ powers$ of$
the$President$as$a$reaction$to$the$abuses$under$the$regime$of$Mr.$Marcos,$for$the$
result$ was$ a$ limitation$ of$ specific$ powers$ of$ the$ President,$ particularly$ those$
relating$ to$ the$ commanderSinSchief$ clause,$ but$ not$ a$ diminution$ of$ the$ general$
grant$of$executive$power.$
Thus,$the$President's$authority$to$declare$a$state$of$rebellion$springs$in$the$main$
from$her$powers$as$chief$executive$and,$at$the$same$time,$draws$strength$from$
her$CommanderSinSChief$powers.$x$x$x$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
Similarly,$ the$ Presidents$ power$ to$ conduct$ peace$ negotiations$ is$ implicitly$
included$ in$ her$ powers$ as$ Chief$ Executive$ and$ CommanderSinSChief.$ As$ Chief$
Executive,$the$President$has$the$general$responsibility$to$promote$public$peace,$
and$ as$ CommanderSinSChief,$ she$ has$ the$ more$ specific$ duty$ to$ prevent$ and$
suppress$rebellion$and$lawless$violence.[169]$
$$
As$the$experience$of$nations$which$have$similarly$gone$through$internal$armed$
conflict$ will$ show,$ however,$ peace$ is$ rarely$ attained$ by$ simply$ pursuing$ a$
military$ solution.$ Oftentimes,$ changes$ as$ farSreaching$ as$ a$ fundamental$
reconfiguration$ of$ the$ nations$ constitutional$ structure$ is$ required.$ The$
observations$of$Dr.$Kirsti$Samuels$are$enlightening,$to$wit:$
$$
x$ x$ x$ [T]he$ fact$ remains$ that$ a$ successful$ political$ and$ governance$ transition$
must$ form$ the$ core$ of$ any$ postSconflict$ peaceSbuilding$ mission.$ As$ we$ have$
observed$in$Liberia$and$Haiti$over$the$last$ten$years,$conflict$cessation$without$
modification$ of$ the$ political$ environment,$ even$ where$ stateSbuilding$ is$
undertaken$ through$ technical$ electoral$ assistance$ and$ institutionS$ or$ capacityS
building,$ is$ unlikely$ to$ succeed.$ On$ average,$ more$ than$ 50$ percent$ of$ states$
emerging$from$conflict$return$to$conflict.$Moreover,$a$substantial$proportion$of$
transitions$have$resulted$in$weak$or$limited$democracies.$
$$
The$ design$ of$ a$ constitution$ and$ its$ constitutionSmaking$ process$ can$ play$ an$
important$ role$ in$ the$ political$ and$ governance$ transition.$ ConstitutionSmaking$
after$conflict$is$an$opportunity$to$create$a$common$vision$of$the$future$of$a$state$
and$ a$ road$ map$ on$ how$ to$ get$ there.$ The$ constitution$ can$ be$ partly$ a$ peace$
agreement$ and$ partly$ a$ framework$ setting$ up$ the$ rules$ by$ which$ the$ new$
democracy$will$operate.[170]$
In$the$same$vein,$Professor$Christine$Bell,$in$her$article$on$the$nature$and$legal$
status$ of$ peace$ agreements,$ observed$ that$ the$ typical$ way$ that$ peace$
agreements$ establish$ or$ confirm$ mechanisms$ for$ demilitarization$ and$
demobilization$ is$ by$ linking$ them$ to$ new$ constitutional$ structures$ addressing$
governance,$elections,$and$legal$and$human$rights$institutions.[171]$
$$
In$ the$ Philippine$ experience,$ the$ link$ between$ peace$ agreements$ and$
constitutionSmaking$ has$ been$ recognized$ by$ no$ less$ than$ the$ framers$ of$ the$
Constitution.$ Behind$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution$ on$ autonomous$
regions[172]$ is$ the$ framers$ intention$ to$ implement$ a$ particular$ peace$
agreement,$ namely,$ the$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ of$ 1976$ between$ the$ GRP$ and$ the$
MNLF,$ signed$ by$ then$ Undersecretary$ of$ National$ Defense$ Carmelo$ Z.$ Barbero$
and$then$MNLF$Chairman$Nur$Misuari.$
$$
MR.$ ROMULO.$ There$ are$ other$ speakers;$ so,$ although$ I$ have$ some$ more$
questions,$ I$ will$ reserve$ my$ right$ to$ ask$ them$ if$ they$ are$ not$ covered$ by$ the$
other$speakers.$I$have$only$two$questions.$
I$heard$one$of$the$Commissioners$say$that$local$autonomy$already$exists$in$the$
Muslim$region;$it$is$working$very$well;$it$has,$in$fact,$diminished$a$great$deal$of$
the$problems.$So,$my$question$is:$since$that$already$exists,$why$do$we$have$to$go$
into$something$new?$
$$
MR.$ OPLE.$ May$ I$ answer$ that$ on$ behalf$ of$ Chairman$ Nolledo.$ Commissioner$
Yusup$ Abubakar$ is$ right$ that$ certain$ definite$ steps$ have$ been$ taken$ to$
implement$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ with$ respect$ to$ an$
autonomous$ region$ in$ Mindanao.$ This$ is$ a$ good$ first$ step,$ but$ there$ is$ no$
question$ that$ this$ is$ merely$ a$ partial$ response$ to$ the$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ itself$
and$ to$ the$ fuller$ standard$ of$ regional$ autonomy$ contemplated$ in$ that$
agreement,$and$now$by$state$policy.[173]$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$$
$$
The$constitutional$provisions$on$autonomy$and$the$statutes$enacted$pursuant$to$
them$ have,$ to$ the$ credit$ of$ their$ drafters,$ been$ partly$ successful.$ Nonetheless,$
the$ Filipino$ people$ are$ still$ faced$ with$ the$ reality$ of$ an$ onSgoing$ conflict$
between$the$Government$and$the$MILF.$If$the$President$is$to$be$expected$to$find$
means$ for$ bringing$ this$ conflict$ to$ an$ end$ and$ to$ achieve$ lasting$ peace$ in$
Mindanao,$then$she$must$be$given$the$leeway$to$explore,$in$the$course$of$peace$
negotiations,$ solutions$ that$ may$ require$ changes$ to$ the$ Constitution$ for$ their$
implementation.$ Being$ uniquely$ vested$ with$ the$ power$ to$ conduct$ peace$
negotiations$ with$ rebel$ groups,$ the$ President$ is$ in$ a$ singular$ position$ to$ know$
the$ precise$ nature$ of$ their$ grievances$ which,$ if$ resolved,$ may$ bring$ an$ end$ to$
hostilities.$
$$
The$President$may$not,$of$course,$unilaterally$implement$the$solutions$that$she$
considers$ viable,$ but$ she$ may$ not$ be$ prevented$ from$ submitting$ them$ as$
recommendations$to$Congress,$which$could$then,$if$it$is$minded,$act$upon$them$
pursuant$to$the$legal$procedures$for$constitutional$amendment$and$revision.$In$
particular,$Congress$would$have$the$option,$pursuant$to$Article$XVII,$Sections$1$
and$3$of$the$Constitution,$to$propose$the$recommended$amendments$or$revision$
to$ the$ people,$ call$ a$ constitutional$ convention,$ or$ submit$ to$ the$ electorate$ the$
question$of$calling$such$a$convention.$
$$
While$the$President$does$not$possess$constituent$powers$as$those$powers$may$
be$ exercised$ only$ by$ Congress,$ a$ Constitutional$ Convention,$ or$ the$ people$
through$initiative$and$referendum$she$may$submit$proposals$for$constitutional$
change$ to$ Congress$ in$ a$ manner$ that$ does$ not$ involve$ the$ arrogation$ of$
constituent$powers.$
$$
In$Sanidad$v.$COMELEC,[174]$in$issue$was$the$legality$of$then$President$Marcos$
act$ of$ directly$ submitting$ proposals$ for$ constitutional$ amendments$ to$ a$
referendum,$ bypassing$ the$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ which$ was$ the$ body$
vested$by$the$1973$Constitution$with$the$power$to$propose$such$amendments.$
President$ Marcos,$ it$ will$ be$ recalled,$ never$ convened$ the$ interim$ National$
Assembly.$ The$ majority$ upheld$ the$ Presidents$ act,$ holding$ that$ the$ urges$ of$
absolute$necessity$compelled$the$President$as$the$agent$of$the$people$to$act$as$
he$ did,$ there$ being$ no$ interim$ National$ Assembly$ to$ propose$ constitutional$
amendments.$ Against$ this$ ruling,$ Justices$ Teehankee$ and$ Muoz$ Palma$
vigorously$ dissented.$ The$ Courts$ concern$ at$ present,$ however,$ is$ not$ with$
regard$to$the$point$on$which$it$was$then$divided$in$that$controversial$case,$but$
on$that$which$was$not$disputed$by$either$side.$
$$
Justice$Teehankees$dissent,[175]$in$particular,$bears$noting.$While$he$disagreed$
that$the$President$may$directly$submit$proposed$constitutional$amendments$to$
a$referendum,$implicit$in$his$opinion$is$a$recognition$that$he$would$have$upheld$
the$ Presidents$ action$ along$ with$ the$ majority$ had$ the$ President$ convened$ the$
interim$ National$ Assembly$ and$ coursed$ his$ proposals$ through$ it.$ Thus$ Justice$
Teehankee$opined:$
$$
Since$ the$ Constitution$ provides$ for$ the$ organization$ of$ the$ essential$
departments$ of$ government,$ defines$ and$ delimits$ the$ powers$ of$ each$ and$
prescribes$ the$ manner$ of$ the$ exercise$ of$ such$ powers,$ and$ the$ constituent$
power$ has$ not$ been$ granted$ to$ but$ has$ been$ withheld$ from$ the$ President$ or$
Prime$Minister,$it$follows$that$the$Presidents$questioned$decrees$proposing$and$
submitting$ constitutional$ amendments$ directly$ to$ the$ people$ (without$ the$
intervention$of$the$interim$National$Assembly$in$whom$the$power$is$expressly$
vested)$are$devoid$of$constitutional$and$legal$basis.[176]$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$$
$$
From$the$foregoing$discussion,$the$principle$may$be$inferred$that$the$President$
in$ the$ course$ of$ conducting$ peace$ negotiations$ may$ validly$ consider$
implementing$even$those$policies$that$require$changes$to$the$Constitution,$but$
she$may$not$unilaterally$implement$them$without$the$intervention$of$Congress,$
or$act$in$any$way$as$if$the$assent$of$that$body$were$assumed$as$a$certainty.$
$$
Since,$under$the$present$Constitution,$the$people$also$have$the$power$to$directly$
propose$ amendments$ through$ initiative$ and$ referendum,$ the$ President$ may$
also$submit$her$recommendations$to$the$people,$not$as$a$formal$proposal$to$be$
voted$on$in$a$plebiscite$similar$to$what$President$Marcos$did$in$Sanidad,$but$for$
their$ independent$ consideration$ of$ whether$ these$ recommendations$ merit$
being$formally$proposed$through$initiative.$
$$
These$ recommendations,$ however,$ may$ amount$ to$ nothing$ more$ than$ the$
Presidents$suggestions$to$the$people,$for$any$further$involvement$in$the$process$
of$initiative$by$the$Chief$Executive$may$vitiate$its$character$as$a$genuine$peoples$
initiative.$The$only$initiative$recognized$by$the$Constitution$is$that$which$truly$
proceeds$from$the$people.$As$the$Court$stated$in$Lambino$v.$COMELEC:[177]$
$$
The$ Lambino$ Group$ claims$ that$ their$ initiative$ is$ the$ people's$ voice.$ However,$
the$Lambino$Group$unabashedly$states$in$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02,$in$the$
verification$ of$ their$ petition$ with$ the$ COMELEC,$ that$ ULAP$ maintains$ its$
unqualified$ support$ to$ the$ agenda$ of$ Her$ Excellency$ President$ Gloria$
MacapagalSArroyo$ for$ constitutional$ reforms.$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ thus$ admits$
that$ their$ people's$ initiative$ is$ an$ unqualified$ support$ to$ the$ agenda$ of$ the$
incumbent$President$to$change$the$Constitution.$This$forewarns$the$Court$to$be$
wary$of$incantations$of$people's$voice$or$sovereign$will$in$the$present$initiative.$
It$ will$ be$ observed$ that$ the$ President$ has$ authority,$ as$ stated$ in$ her$ oath$ of$
office,[178]$ only$ to$ preserve$ and$ defend$ the$ Constitution.$ Such$ presidential$
power$does$not,$however,$extend$to$allowing$her$to$change$the$Constitution,$but$
simply$to$recommend$proposed$amendments$or$revision.$As$long$as$she$limits$
herself$ to$ recommending$ these$ changes$ and$ submits$ to$ the$ proper$ procedure$
for$ constitutional$ amendments$ and$ revision,$ her$ mere$ recommendation$ need$
not$be$construed$as$an$unconstitutional$act.$
$$
The$ foregoing$ discussion$ focused$ on$ the$ Presidents$ authority$ to$ propose$
constitutional$ amendments,$ since$ her$ authority$ to$ propose$ new$ legislation$ is$
not$ in$ controversy.$ It$ has$ been$ an$ accepted$ practice$ for$ Presidents$ in$ this$
jurisdiction$ to$ propose$ new$ legislation.$ One$ of$ the$ more$ prominent$ instances$
the$ practice$ is$ usually$ done$ is$ in$ the$ yearly$ State$ of$ the$ Nation$ Address$ of$ the$
President$ to$ Congress.$ Moreover,$ the$ annual$ general$ appropriations$ bill$ has$
always$ been$ based$ on$ the$ budget$ prepared$ by$ the$ President,$ which$ for$ all$
intents$ and$ purposes$ is$ a$ proposal$ for$ new$ legislation$ coming$ from$ the$
President.[179]$
$$
The$ suspensive$ clause$ in$ the$ MOASAD$ viewed$ in$ light$ of$ the$ aboveSdiscussed$
standards$
$$
Given$ the$ limited$ nature$ of$ the$ Presidents$ authority$ to$ propose$ constitutional$
amendments,$ she$ cannot$ guarantee$ to$ any$ third$ party$ that$ the$ required$
amendments$ will$ eventually$ be$ put$ in$ place,$ nor$ even$ be$ submitted$ to$ a$
plebiscite.$ The$ most$ she$ could$ do$ is$ submit$ these$ proposals$ as$
recommendations$ either$ to$ Congress$ or$ the$ people,$ in$ whom$ constituent$
powers$are$vested.$
$$
Paragraph$7$on$Governance$of$the$MOASAD$states,$however,$that$all$provisions$
thereof$which$cannot$be$reconciled$with$the$present$Constitution$and$laws$shall$
come$ into$ force$ upon$ signing$ of$ a$ Comprehensive$ Compact$ and$ upon$ effecting$
the$necessary$changes$to$the$legal$framework.$This$stipulation$does$not$bear$the$
marks$ of$ a$ suspensive$ condition$ defined$ in$ civil$ law$ as$ a$ future$ and$ uncertain$
event$but$of$a$term.$It$is$not$a$question$of$whether$the$necessary$changes$to$the$
legal$ framework$ will$ be$ effected,$ but$ when.$ That$ there$ is$ no$ uncertainty$ being$
contemplated$is$plain$from$what$follows,$for$the$paragraph$goes$on$to$state$that$
the$ contemplated$ changes$ shall$ be$ with$ due$ regard$ to$ non$ derogation$ of$ prior$
agreements$ and$ within$ the$ stipulated$ timeframe$ to$ be$ contained$ in$ the$
Comprehensive$Compact.$
$$
Pursuant$to$this$stipulation,$therefore,$it$is$mandatory$for$the$GRP$to$effect$the$
changes$ to$ the$ legal$ framework$ contemplated$ in$ the$ MOASAD$ which$ changes$
would$include$constitutional$amendments,$as$discussed$earlier.$It$bears$noting$
that,$
$$
$$
By$the$time$these$changes$are$put$in$place,$the$MOASAD$itself$would$be$counted$
among$the$prior$agreements$from$which$there$could$be$no$derogation.$
What$ remains$ for$ discussion$ in$ the$ Comprehensive$ Compact$ would$ merely$ be$
the$implementing$details$for$these$consensus$points$and,$notably,$the$deadline$
for$effecting$the$contemplated$changes$to$the$legal$framework.$
$$
Plainly,$stipulationSparagraph$7$on$GOVERNANCE$is$inconsistent$with$the$limits$
of$ the$ Presidents$ authority$ to$ propose$ constitutional$ amendments,$ it$ being$ a$
virtual$ guarantee$ that$ the$ Constitution$ and$ the$ laws$ of$ the$ Republic$ of$ the$
Philippines$ will$ certainly$ be$ adjusted$ to$ conform$ to$ all$ the$ consensus$ points$
found$in$the$MOASAD.$Hence,$it$must$be$struck$down$as$unconstitutional.$
$$
A$ comparison$ between$ the$ suspensive$ clause$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ with$ a$ similar$
provision$appearing$in$the$1996$final$peace$agreement$between$the$MNLF$and$
the$GRP$is$most$instructive.$
$$
As$ a$ backdrop,$ the$ parties$ to$ the$ 1996$ Agreement$ stipulated$ that$ it$ would$ be$
implemented$ in$ two$ phases.$ Phase$ I$ covered$ a$ threeSyear$ transitional$ period$
involving$ the$ putting$ up$ of$ new$ administrative$ structures$ through$ Executive$
Order,$ such$ as$ the$ Special$ Zone$ of$ Peace$ and$ Development$ (SZOPAD)$ and$ the$
Southern$Philippines$Council$for$Peace$and$Development$(SPCPD),$while$Phase$
II$ covered$ the$ establishment$ of$ the$ new$ regional$ autonomous$ government$
through$amendment$or$repeal$of$R.A.$No.$6734,$which$was$then$the$Organic$Act$
of$the$ARMM.$
$$
The$stipulations$on$Phase$II$consisted$of$specific$agreements$on$the$structure$of$
the$expanded$autonomous$region$envisioned$by$the$parties.$To$that$extent,$they$
are$ similar$ to$ the$ provisions$ of$ the$ MOASAD.$ There$ is,$ however,$ a$ crucial$
difference$between$the$two$agreements.$While$the$MOASAD$virtually$guarantees$
that$the$necessary$changes$to$the$legal$framework$will$be$put$in$place,$the$GRPS
MNLF$ final$ peace$ agreement$ states$ thus:$ Accordingly,$ these$ provisions$ [on$
Phase$II]$shall$be$recommended$by$the$GRP$to$Congress$for$incorporation$in$the$
amendatory$or$repealing$law.$
$$
Concerns$have$been$raised$that$the$MOASAD$would$have$given$rise$to$a$binding$
international$ law$ obligation$ on$ the$ part$ of$ the$ Philippines$ to$ change$ its$
Constitution$ in$ conformity$ thereto,$ on$ the$ ground$ that$ it$ may$ be$ considered$
either$ as$ a$ binding$ agreement$ under$ international$ law,$ or$ a$ unilateral$
declaration$of$the$Philippine$government$to$the$international$community$that$it$
would$ grant$ to$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people$ all$ the$ concessions$ therein$ stated.$
Neither$ground$finds$sufficient$support$in$international$law,$however.$
$$
The$ MOASAD,$ as$ earlier$ mentioned$ in$ the$ overview$ thereof,$ would$ have$
included$foreign$dignitaries$as$signatories.$In$addition,$representatives$of$other$
nations$ were$ invited$ to$ witness$ its$ signing$ in$ Kuala$ Lumpur.$ These$
circumstances$readily$lead$one$to$surmise$that$the$MOASAD$would$have$had$the$
status$of$a$binding$international$agreement$had$it$been$signed.$An$examination$
of$the$prevailing$principles$in$international$law,$however,$leads$to$the$contrary$
conclusion.$
$$
The$Decision$on$CHALLENGE$TO$JURISDICTION:$LOM$ACCORD$AMNESTY[180]$
(the$Lom$Accord$case)$of$the$Special$Court$of$Sierra$Leone$is$enlightening.$The$
Lom$ Accord$ was$ a$ peace$ agreement$ signed$ on$ July$ 7,$ 1999$ between$ the$
Government$of$Sierra$Leone$and$the$Revolutionary$United$Front$(RUF),$a$rebel$
group$with$which$the$Sierra$Leone$Government$had$been$in$armed$conflict$for$
around$ eight$ years$ at$ the$ time$ of$ signing.$ There$ were$ nonScontracting$
signatories$ to$ the$ agreement,$ among$ which$ were$ the$ Government$ of$ the$
Togolese$Republic,$the$Economic$Community$of$West$African$States,$and$the$UN.$
$$
On$January$16,$2002,$after$a$successful$negotiation$between$the$UN$SecretaryS
General$and$the$Sierra$Leone$Government,$another$agreement$was$entered$into$
by$the$UN$and$that$Government$whereby$the$Special$Court$of$Sierra$Leone$was$
established.$The$sole$purpose$of$the$Special$Court,$an$international$court,$was$to$
try$ persons$ who$ bore$ the$ greatest$ responsibility$ for$ serious$ violations$ of$
international$ humanitarian$ law$ and$ Sierra$ Leonean$ law$ committed$ in$ the$
territory$of$Sierra$Leone$since$November$30,$1996.$
$$
Among$the$stipulations$of$the$Lom$Accord$was$a$provision$for$the$full$pardon$of$
the$ members$ of$ the$ RUF$ with$ respect$ to$ anything$ done$ by$ them$ in$ pursuit$ of$
their$objectives$as$members$of$that$organization$since$the$conflict$began.$
$$
In$ the$ Lom$ Accord$ case,$ the$ Defence$ argued$ that$ the$ Accord$ created$ an$
internationally$ binding$ obligation$ not$ to$ prosecute$ the$ beneficiaries$ of$ the$
amnesty$ provided$ therein,$ citing,$ among$ other$ things,$ the$ participation$ of$
foreign$ dignitaries$ and$ international$ organizations$ in$ the$ finalization$ of$ that$
agreement.$The$Special$Court,$however,$rejected$this$argument,$ruling$that$the$
Lome$Accord$is$not$a$treaty$and$that$it$can$only$create$binding$obligations$and$
rights$between$the$parties$in$municipal$law,$not$in$international$law.$Hence,$the$
Special$Court$held,$it$is$ineffective$in$depriving$an$international$court$like$it$of$
jurisdiction.$
$$
37.$ In$ regard$ to$ the$ nature$ of$ a$ negotiated$ settlement$ of$ an$ internal$ armed$
conflict$ it$ is$ easy$ to$ assume$ and$ to$ argue$ with$ some$ degree$ of$ plausibility,$ as$
Defence$counsel$for$the$defendants$seem$to$have$done,$that$the$mere$fact$that$in$
addition$to$the$parties$to$the$conflict,$the$document$formalizing$the$settlement$
is$signed$by$foreign$heads$of$state$or$their$representatives$and$representatives$
of$ international$ organizations,$ means$ the$ agreement$ of$ the$ parties$ is$
internationalized$so$as$to$create$obligations$in$international$law.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
40.$ Almost$ every$ conflict$ resolution$ will$ involve$ the$ parties$ to$ the$ conflict$ and$
the$mediator$or$facilitator$of$the$settlement,$or$persons$or$bodies$under$whose$
auspices$the$settlement$took$place$but$who$are$not$at$all$parties$to$the$conflict,$
are$ not$ contracting$ parties$ and$ who$ do$ not$ claim$ any$ obligation$ from$ the$
contracting$parties$or$incur$any$obligation$from$the$settlement.$
$$
41.$ In$ this$ case,$ the$ parties$ to$ the$ conflict$ are$ the$ lawful$ authority$ of$ the$ State$
and$the$RUF$which$has$no$status$of$statehood$and$is$to$all$intents$and$purposes$
a$ faction$ within$ the$ state.$ The$ nonScontracting$ signatories$ of$ the$ Lom$
Agreement$were$moral$guarantors$of$the$principle$that,$in$the$terms$of$Article$
XXXIV$ of$ the$ Agreement,$ this$ peace$ agreement$ is$ implemented$ with$ integrity$
and$ in$ good$ faith$ by$ both$ parties.$ The$ moral$ guarantors$ assumed$ no$ legal$
obligation.$It$is$recalled$that$the$UN$by$its$representative$appended,$presumably$
for$ avoidance$ of$ doubt,$ an$ understanding$ of$ the$ extent$ of$ the$ agreement$ to$ be$
implemented$as$not$including$certain$international$crimes.$
$$
42.$An$international$agreement$in$the$nature$of$a$treaty$must$create$rights$and$
obligations$regulated$by$international$law$so$that$a$breach$of$its$terms$will$be$a$
breach$ determined$ under$ international$ law$ which$ will$ also$ provide$ principle$
means$ of$ enforcement.$ The$ Lom$ Agreement$ created$ neither$ rights$ nor$
obligations$capable$of$being$regulated$by$international$law.$An$agreement$such$
as$ the$ Lom$ Agreement$ which$ brings$ to$ an$ end$ an$ internal$ armed$ conflict$ no$
doubt$ creates$ a$ factual$ situation$ of$ restoration$ of$ peace$ that$ the$ international$
community$acting$through$the$Security$Council$may$take$note$of.$That,$however,$
will$ not$ convert$ it$ to$ an$ international$ agreement$ which$ creates$ an$ obligation$
enforceable$ in$ international,$ as$ distinguished$ from$ municipal,$ law.$ A$ breach$ of$
the$terms$of$such$a$peace$agreement$resulting$in$resumption$of$internal$armed$
conflict$or$creating$a$threat$to$peace$in$the$determination$of$the$Security$Council$
may$ indicate$ a$ reversal$ of$ the$ factual$ situation$ of$ peace$ to$ be$ visited$ with$
possible$ legal$ consequences$ arising$ from$ the$ new$ situation$ of$ conflict$ created.$
Such$consequences$such$as$action$by$the$Security$Council$pursuant$to$Chapter$
VII$arise$from$the$situation$and$not$from$the$agreement,$nor$from$the$obligation$
imposed$ by$ it.$ Such$ action$ cannot$ be$ regarded$ as$ a$ remedy$ for$ the$ breach.$ A$
peace$agreement$which$settles$an$internal$armed$conflict$cannot$be$ascribed$the$
same$ status$ as$ one$ which$ settles$ an$ international$ armed$ conflict$ which,$
essentially,$must$be$between$two$or$more$warring$States.$The$Lom$Agreement$
cannot$be$characterised$as$an$international$instrument.$x$x$x$(Emphasis,$italics$
and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
Similarly,$that$the$MOASAD$would$have$been$signed$by$representatives$of$States$
and$ international$ organizations$ not$ parties$ to$ the$ Agreement$ would$ not$ have$
sufficed$to$vest$in$it$a$binding$character$under$international$law.$
$$
In$ another$ vein,$ concern$ has$ been$ raised$ that$ the$ MOASAD$ would$ amount$ to$ a$
unilateral$ declaration$ of$ the$ Philippine$ State,$ binding$ under$ international$ law,$
that$it$would$comply$with$all$the$stipulations$stated$therein,$with$the$result$that$
it$would$have$to$amend$its$Constitution$accordingly$regardless$of$the$true$will$of$
the$ people.$ Cited$ as$ authority$ for$ this$ view$ is$ Australia$ v.$ France,[181]$ also$
known$as$the$Nuclear$Tests$Case,$decided$by$the$International$Court$of$Justice$
(ICJ).$
$$
In$ the$ Nuclear$ Tests$ Case,$ Australia$ challenged$ before$ the$ ICJ$ the$ legality$ of$
Frances$nuclear$tests$in$the$South$Pacific.$France$refused$to$appear$in$the$case,$
but$ public$ statements$ from$ its$ President,$ and$ similar$ statements$ from$ other$
French$ officials$ including$ its$ Minister$ of$ Defence,$ that$ its$ 1974$ series$ of$
atmospheric$tests$would$be$its$last,$persuaded$the$ICJ$to$dismiss$the$case.[182]$
Those$ statements,$ the$ ICJ$ held,$ amounted$ to$ a$ legal$ undertaking$ addressed$ to$
the$ international$ community,$ which$ required$ no$ acceptance$ from$ other$ States$
for$it$to$become$effective.$
$$
Essential$to$the$ICJ$ruling$is$its$finding$that$the$French$government$intended$to$
be$bound$to$the$international$community$in$issuing$its$public$statements,$viz:$
$$
43.$ It$ is$ well$ recognized$ that$ declarations$ made$ by$ way$ of$ unilateral$ acts,$
concerning$ legal$ or$ factual$ situations,$ may$ have$ the$ effect$ of$ creating$ legal$
obligations.$Declarations$of$this$kind$may$be,$and$often$are,$very$specific.$When$
it$ is$ the$ intention$ of$ the$ State$ making$ the$ declaration$ that$ it$ should$ become$
bound$ according$ to$ its$ terms,$ that$ intention$ confers$ on$ the$ declaration$ the$
character$of$a$legal$undertaking,$the$State$being$thenceforth$legally$required$to$
follow$ a$ course$ of$ conduct$ consistent$ with$ the$ declaration.$ An$ undertaking$ of$
this$ kind,$ if$ given$ publicly,$ and$ with$ an$ intent$ to$ be$ bound,$ even$ though$ not$
made$ within$ the$ context$ of$ international$ negotiations,$ is$ binding.$ In$ these$
circumstances,$ nothing$ in$ the$ nature$ of$ a$ quid$ pro$ quo$ nor$ any$ subsequent$
acceptance$of$the$declaration,$nor$even$any$reply$or$reaction$from$other$States,$
is$required$for$the$declaration$to$take$effect,$since$such$a$requirement$would$be$
inconsistent$with$the$strictly$unilateral$nature$of$the$juridical$act$by$which$the$
pronouncement$by$the$State$was$made.$
$$
44.$Of$course,$not$all$unilateral$acts$imply$obligation;$but$a$State$may$choose$to$
take$up$a$certain$position$in$relation$to$a$particular$matter$with$the$intention$of$
being$boundthe$intention$is$to$be$ascertained$by$interpretation$of$the$act.$When$
States$ make$ statements$ by$ which$ their$ freedom$ of$ action$ is$ to$ be$ limited,$ a$
restrictive$interpretation$is$called$for.$
$$
x$x$x$x$
$$
51.$ In$ announcing$ that$ the$ 1974$ series$ of$ atmospheric$ tests$ would$ be$ the$ last,$
the$French$Government$conveyed$to$the$world$at$large,$including$the$Applicant,$
its$ intention$ effectively$ to$ terminate$ these$ tests.$ It$ was$ bound$ to$ assume$ that$
other$ States$ might$ take$ note$ of$ these$ statements$ and$ rely$ on$ their$ being$
effective.$The$validity$of$these$statements$and$their$legal$consequences$must$be$
considered$ within$ the$ general$ framework$ of$ the$ security$ of$ international$
intercourse,$and$the$confidence$and$trust$which$are$so$essential$in$the$relations$
among$States.$It$is$from$the$actual$substance$of$these$statements,$and$from$the$
circumstances$ attending$ their$ making,$ that$ the$ legal$ implications$ of$ the$
unilateral$ act$ must$ be$ deduced.$ The$ objects$ of$ these$ statements$ are$ clear$ and$
they$were$addressed$to$the$international$community$as$a$whole,$and$the$Court$
holds$ that$ they$ constitute$ an$ undertaking$ possessing$ legal$ effect.$ The$ Court$
considers$*270$that$the$President$of$the$Republic,$in$deciding$upon$the$effective$
cessation$ of$ atmospheric$ tests,$ gave$ an$ undertaking$ to$ the$ international$
community$ to$ which$ his$ words$ were$ addressed.$ x$ x$ x$ (Emphasis$ and$
underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
As$gathered$from$the$aboveSquoted$ruling$of$the$ICJ,$public$statements$of$a$state$
representative$ may$ be$ construed$ as$ a$ unilateral$ declaration$ only$ when$ the$
following$conditions$are$present:$the$statements$were$clearly$addressed$to$the$
international$community,$the$state$intended$to$be$bound$to$that$community$by$
its$ statements,$ and$ that$ not$ to$ give$ legal$ effect$ to$ those$ statements$ would$ be$
detrimental$ to$ the$ security$ of$ international$ intercourse.$ Plainly,$ unilateral$
declarations$arise$only$in$peculiar$circumstances.$
$$
The$ limited$ applicability$ of$ the$ Nuclear$ Tests$ Case$ ruling$ was$ recognized$ in$ a$
later$case$decided$by$the$ICJ$entitled$Burkina$Faso$v.$Mali,[183]$also$known$as$
the$Case$Concerning$the$Frontier$Dispute.$The$public$declaration$subject$of$that$
case$was$a$statement$made$by$the$President$of$Mali,$in$an$interview$by$a$foreign$
press$ agency,$ that$ Mali$ would$ abide$ by$ the$ decision$ to$ be$ issued$ by$ a$
commission$ of$ the$ Organization$ of$ African$ Unity$ on$ a$ frontier$ dispute$ then$
pending$between$Mali$and$Burkina$Faso.$
Unlike$ in$ the$ Nuclear$ Tests$ Case,$ the$ ICJ$ held$ that$ the$ statement$ of$ Malis$
President$ was$ not$ a$ unilateral$ act$ with$ legal$ implications.$ It$ clarified$ that$ its$
ruling$ in$ the$ Nuclear$ Tests$ case$ rested$ on$ the$ peculiar$ circumstances$
surrounding$the$French$declaration$subject$thereof,$to$wit:$
$$
40.$ In$ order$ to$ assess$ the$ intentions$ of$ the$ author$ of$ a$ unilateral$ act,$ account$
must$ be$ taken$ of$ all$ the$ factual$ circumstances$ in$ which$ the$ act$ occurred.$ For$
example,$ in$ the$ Nuclear$ Tests$ cases,$ the$ Court$ took$ the$ view$ that$ since$ the$
applicant$States$were$not$the$only$ones$concerned$at$the$possible$continuance$
of$atmospheric$testing$by$the$French$Government,$that$Government's$unilateral$
declarations$ had$ conveyed$ to$ the$ world$ at$ large,$ including$ the$ Applicant,$ its$
intention$ effectively$ to$ terminate$ these$ tests$ (I.C.J.$ Reports$ 1974,$ p.$ 269,$ para.$
51;$p.$474,$para.$53).$In$the$particular$circumstances$of$those$cases,$the$French$
Government$ could$ not$ express$ an$ intention$ to$ be$ bound$ otherwise$ than$ by$
unilateral$declarations.$It$is$difficult$to$see$how$it$could$have$accepted$the$terms$
of$ a$ negotiated$ solution$ with$ each$ of$ the$ applicants$ without$ thereby$
jeopardizing$its$contention$that$its$conduct$was$lawful.$The$circumstances$of$the$
present$ case$ are$ radically$ different.$ Here,$ there$ was$ nothing$ to$ hinder$ the$
Parties$ from$ manifesting$ an$ intention$ to$ accept$ the$ binding$ character$ of$ the$
conclusions$ of$ the$ Organization$ of$ African$ Unity$ Mediation$ Commission$ by$ the$
normal$ method:$ a$ formal$ agreement$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ reciprocity.$ Since$ no$
agreement$ of$ this$ kind$ was$ concluded$ between$ the$ Parties,$ the$ Chamber$ finds$
that$ there$ are$ no$ grounds$ to$ interpret$ the$ declaration$ made$ by$ Mali's$ head$ of$
State$on$11$April$1975$as$a$unilateral$act$with$legal$implications$in$regard$to$the$
present$case.$(Emphasis$and$underscoring$supplied)$
$$
$$
Assessing$the$MOASAD$in$light$of$the$above$criteria,$it$would$not$have$amounted$
to$a$unilateral$declaration$on$the$part$of$the$Philippine$State$to$the$international$
community.$The$Philippine$panel$did$not$draft$the$same$with$the$clear$intention$
of$ being$ bound$ thereby$ to$ the$ international$ community$ as$ a$ whole$ or$ to$ any$
State,$ but$ only$ to$ the$ MILF.$ While$ there$ were$ States$ and$ international$
organizations$ involved,$ one$ way$ or$ another,$ in$ the$ negotiation$ and$ projected$
signing$of$the$MOASAD,$they$participated$merely$as$witnesses$or,$in$the$case$of$
Malaysia,$ as$ facilitator.$ As$ held$ in$ the$ Lom$ Accord$ case,$ the$ mere$ fact$ that$ in$
addition$ to$ the$ parties$ to$ the$ conflict,$ the$ peace$ settlement$ is$ signed$ by$
representatives$of$states$and$international$organizations$does$not$mean$that$the$
agreement$is$internationalized$so$as$to$create$obligations$in$international$law.$
$$
Since$the$commitments$in$the$MOASAD$were$not$addressed$to$States,$not$to$give$
legal$ effect$ to$ such$ commitments$ would$ not$ be$ detrimental$ to$ the$ security$ of$
international$ intercourse$ to$ the$ trust$ and$ confidence$ essential$ in$ the$ relations$
among$States.$
$$
In$ one$ important$ respect,$ the$ circumstances$ surrounding$ the$ MOASAD$ are$
closer$to$that$of$Burkina$Faso$wherein,$as$already$discussed,$the$Mali$Presidents$
statement$ was$ not$ held$ to$ be$ a$ binding$ unilateral$ declaration$ by$ the$ ICJ.$ As$ in$
that$ case,$ there$ was$ also$ nothing$ to$ hinder$ the$ Philippine$ panel,$ had$ it$ really$
been$ its$ intention$ to$ be$ bound$ to$ other$ States,$ to$ manifest$ that$ intention$ by$
formal$agreement.$Here,$that$formal$agreement$would$have$come$about$by$the$
inclusion$ in$ the$ MOASAD$ of$ a$ clear$ commitment$ to$ be$ legally$ bound$ to$ the$
international$ community,$ not$ just$ the$ MILF,$ and$ by$ an$ equally$ clear$ indication$
that$the$signatures$of$the$participating$statesSrepresentatives$would$constitute$
an$ acceptance$ of$ that$ commitment.$ Entering$ into$ such$ a$ formal$ agreement$
would$not$have$resulted$in$a$loss$of$face$for$the$Philippine$government$before$
the$ international$ community,$ which$ was$ one$ of$ the$ difficulties$ that$ prevented$
the$ French$ Government$ from$ entering$ into$ a$ formal$ agreement$ with$ other$
countries.$That$the$Philippine$panel$did$not$enter$into$such$a$formal$agreement$
suggests$that$it$had$no$intention$to$be$bound$to$the$international$community.$On$
that$ground,$the$MOASAD$may$not$be$considered$a$unilateral$declaration$under$
international$law.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ not$ being$ a$ document$ that$ can$ bind$ the$ Philippines$ under$
international$ law$ notwithstanding,$ respondents$ almost$ consummated$ act$ of$
guaranteeing$ amendments$ to$ the$ legal$ framework$ is,$ by$ itself,$ sufficient$ to$
constitute$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion.$ The$ grave$ abuse$ lies$ not$ in$ the$ fact$ that$
they$ considered,$ as$ a$ solution$ to$ the$ Moro$ Problem,$ the$ creation$ of$ a$ state$
within$ a$ state,$ but$ in$ their$ brazen$ willingness$ to$ guarantee$ that$ Congress$ and$
the$ sovereign$ Filipino$ people$ would$ give$ their$ imprimatur$ to$ their$ solution.$
Upholding$ such$ an$ act$ would$ amount$ to$ authorizing$ a$ usurpation$ of$ the$
constituent$powers$vested$only$in$Congress,$a$Constitutional$Convention,$or$the$
people$ themselves$ through$ the$ process$ of$ initiative,$ for$ the$ only$ way$ that$ the$
Executive$ can$ ensure$ the$ outcome$ of$ the$ amendment$ process$ is$ through$ an$
undue$influence$or$interference$with$that$process.$
$$
The$sovereign$people$may,$if$it$so$desired,$go$to$the$extent$of$giving$up$a$portion$
of$ its$ own$ territory$ to$ the$ Moros$ for$ the$ sake$ of$ peace,$ for$ it$ can$ change$ the$
Constitution$in$any$it$wants,$so$long$as$the$change$is$not$inconsistent$with$what,$
in$international$law,$is$known$as$Jus$Cogens.[184]$Respondents,$however,$may$
not$preempt$it$in$that$decision.$
$$
$$
SUMMARY$
$$
The$petitions$are$ripe$for$adjudication.$The$failure$of$respondents$to$consult$the$
local$ government$ units$ or$ communities$ affected$ constitutes$ a$ departure$ by$
respondents$ from$ their$ mandate$ under$ E.O.$ No.$ 3.$ Moreover,$ respondents$
exceeded$ their$ authority$ by$ the$ mere$ act$ of$ guaranteeing$ amendments$ to$ the$
Constitution.$ Any$ alleged$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution$ by$ any$ branch$ of$
government$is$a$proper$matter$for$judicial$review.$
$$
As$ the$ petitions$ involve$ constitutional$ issues$ which$ are$ of$ paramount$ public$
interest$ or$ of$ transcendental$ importance,$ the$ Court$ grants$ the$ petitioners,$
petitionersSinSintervention$ and$ intervening$ respondents$ the$ requisite$ locus$
standi$in$keeping$with$the$liberal$stance$adopted$in$David$v.$MacapagalSArroyo.$
$$
Contrary$ to$ the$ assertion$ of$ respondents$ that$ the$ nonSsigning$ of$ the$ MOASAD$
and$ the$ eventual$ dissolution$ of$ the$ GRP$ Peace$ Panel$ mooted$ the$ present$
petitions,$the$Court$finds$that$the$present$petitions$provide$an$exception$to$the$
moot$ and$ academic$ principle$ in$ view$ of$ (a)$ the$ grave$ violation$ of$ the$
Constitution$ involved;$ (b)$ the$ exceptional$ character$ of$ the$ situation$ and$
paramount$ public$ interest;$ (c)$ the$ need$ to$ formulate$ controlling$ principles$ to$
guide$the$bench,$the$bar,$and$the$public;$and$(d)$the$fact$that$the$case$is$capable$
of$repetition$yet$evading$review.$
$$
The$ MOASAD$ is$ a$ significant$ part$ of$ a$ series$ of$ agreements$ necessary$ to$ carry$
out$ the$ GRPSMILF$ Tripoli$ Agreement$ on$ Peace$ signed$ by$ the$ government$ and$
the$MILF$back$in$June$2001.$Hence,$the$present$MOASAD$can$be$renegotiated$or$
another$ one$ drawn$ up$ that$ could$ contain$ similar$ or$ significantly$ dissimilar$
provisions$compared$to$the$original.$
The$ Court,$ however,$ finds$ that$ the$ prayers$ for$ mandamus$ have$ been$ rendered$
moot$ in$ view$ of$ the$ respondents$ action$ in$ providing$ the$ Court$ and$ the$
petitioners$ with$ the$ official$ copy$ of$ the$ final$ draft$ of$ the$ MOASAD$ and$ its$
annexes.$
$$
The$ peoples$ right$ to$ information$ on$ matters$ of$ public$ concern$ under$ Sec.$ 7,$
Article$III$of$the$Constitution$is$in$splendid$symmetry$with$the$state$policy$of$full$
public$ disclosure$ of$ all$ its$ transactions$ involving$ public$ interest$ under$ Sec.$ 28,$
Article$II$of$the$Constitution.$The$right$to$information$guarantees$the$right$of$the$
people$ to$ demand$ information,$ while$ Section$ 28$ recognizes$ the$ duty$ of$
officialdom$ to$ give$ information$ even$ if$ nobody$ demands.$ The$ complete$ and$
effective$ exercise$ of$ the$ right$ to$ information$ necessitates$ that$ its$
complementary$ provision$ on$ public$ disclosure$ derive$ the$ same$ selfSexecutory$
nature,$subject$only$to$reasonable$safeguards$or$limitations$as$may$be$provided$
by$law.$
$$
The$contents$of$the$MOASAD$is$a$matter$of$paramount$public$concern$involving$
public$ interest$ in$ the$ highest$ order.$ In$ declaring$ that$ the$ right$ to$ information$
contemplates$ steps$ and$ negotiations$ leading$ to$ the$ consummation$ of$ the$
contract,$ jurisprudence$ finds$ no$ distinction$ as$ to$ the$ executory$ nature$ or$
commercial$character$of$the$agreement.$
An$essential$element$of$these$twin$freedoms$is$to$keep$a$continuing$dialogue$or$
process$of$communication$between$the$government$and$the$people.$Corollary$to$
these$ twin$ rights$ is$ the$ design$ for$ feedback$ mechanisms.$ The$ right$ to$ public$
consultation$was$envisioned$to$be$a$species$of$these$public$rights.$
$$
At$ least$ three$ pertinent$ laws$ animate$ these$ constitutional$ imperatives$ and$
justify$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ peoples$ right$ to$ be$ consulted$ on$ relevant$ matters$
relating$to$the$peace$agenda.$
$$
One,$E.O.$No.$3$itself$is$replete$with$mechanics$for$continuing$consultations$on$
both$national$and$local$levels$and$for$a$principal$forum$for$consensusSbuilding.$
In$fact,$it$is$the$duty$of$the$Presidential$Adviser$on$the$Peace$Process$to$conduct$
regular$ dialogues$ to$ seek$ relevant$ information,$ comments,$ advice,$ and$
recommendations$from$peace$partners$and$concerned$sectors$of$society.$
$$
Two,$Republic$Act$No.$7160$or$the$Local$Government$Code$of$1991$requires$all$
national$offices$to$conduct$consultations$before$any$project$or$program$critical$
to$ the$ environment$ and$ human$ ecology$ including$ those$ that$ may$ call$ for$ the$
eviction$of$a$particular$group$of$people$residing$in$such$locality,$is$implemented$
therein.$ The$ MOASAD$ is$ one$ peculiar$ program$ that$ unequivocally$ and$
unilaterally$ vests$ ownership$ of$ a$ vast$ territory$ to$ the$ Bangsamoro$ people,$
which$could$pervasively$and$drastically$result$to$the$diaspora$or$displacement$
of$a$great$number$of$inhabitants$from$their$total$environment.$
$$
Three,$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 8371$ or$ the$ Indigenous$ Peoples$ Rights$ Act$ of$ 1997$
provides$for$clearScut$procedure$for$the$recognition$and$delineation$of$ancestral$
domain,$which$entails,$among$other$things,$the$observance$of$the$free$and$prior$
informed$consent$of$the$Indigenous$Cultural$Communities/Indigenous$Peoples.$
Notably,$ the$ statute$ does$ not$ grant$ the$ Executive$ Department$ or$ any$
government$agency$the$power$to$delineate$and$recognize$an$ancestral$domain$
claim$by$mere$agreement$or$compromise.$
$$
The$invocation$of$the$doctrine$of$executive$privilege$as$a$defense$to$the$general$
right$ to$ information$ or$ the$ specific$ right$ to$ consultation$ is$ untenable.$ The$
various$explicit$legal$provisions$fly$in$the$face$of$executive$secrecy.$In$any$event,$
respondents$ effectively$ waived$ such$ defense$ after$ it$ unconditionally$ disclosed$
the$official$copies$of$the$final$draft$of$the$MOASAD,$for$judicial$compliance$and$
public$scrutiny.$
$$
IN$ SUM,$ the$ Presidential$ Adviser$ on$ the$ Peace$ Process$ committed$ grave$ abuse$
of$discretion$when$he$failed$to$carry$out$the$pertinent$consultation$process,$as$
mandated$by$E.O.$No.$3,$Republic$Act$No.$7160,$and$Republic$Act$No.$8371.$The$
furtive$process$by$which$the$MOASAD$was$designed$and$crafted$runs$contrary$to$
and$ in$ excess$ of$ the$ legal$ authority,$ and$ amounts$ to$ a$ whimsical,$ capricious,$
oppressive,$arbitrary$and$despotic$exercise$thereof.$It$illustrates$a$gross$evasion$
of$positive$duty$and$a$virtual$refusal$to$perform$the$duty$enjoined.$
$$
The$MOASAD$cannot$be$reconciled$with$the$present$Constitution$and$laws.$Not$
only$ its$ specific$ provisions$ but$ the$ very$ concept$ underlying$ them,$ namely,$ the$
associative$ relationship$ envisioned$ between$ the$ GRP$ and$ the$ BJE,$ are$
unconstitutional,$ for$ the$ concept$ presupposes$ that$ the$ associated$ entity$ is$ a$
state$and$implies$that$the$same$is$on$its$way$to$independence.$
$$
While$ there$ is$ a$ clause$ in$ the$ MOASAD$ stating$ that$ the$ provisions$ thereof$
inconsistent$ with$ the$ present$ legal$ framework$ will$ not$ be$ effective$ until$ that$
framework$ is$ amended,$ the$ same$ does$ not$ cure$ its$ defect.$ The$ inclusion$ of$
provisions$in$the$MOASAD$establishing$an$associative$relationship$between$the$
BJE$ and$ the$ Central$ Government$ is,$ itself,$ a$ violation$ of$ the$ Memorandum$ of$
Instructions$ From$ The$ President$ dated$ March$ 1,$ 2001,$ addressed$ to$ the$
government$ peace$ panel.$ Moreover,$ as$ the$ clause$ is$ worded,$ it$ virtually$
guarantees$that$the$necessary$amendments$to$the$Constitution$and$the$laws$will$
eventually$ be$ put$ in$ place.$ Neither$ the$ GRP$ Peace$ Panel$ nor$ the$ President$
herself$ is$ authorized$ to$ make$ such$ a$ guarantee.$ Upholding$ such$ an$ act$ would$
amount$ to$ authorizing$ a$ usurpation$ of$ the$ constituent$ powers$ vested$ only$ in$
Congress,$ a$ Constitutional$ Convention,$ or$ the$ people$ themselves$ through$ the$
process$of$initiative,$for$the$only$way$that$the$Executive$can$ensure$the$outcome$
of$ the$ amendment$ process$ is$ through$ an$ undue$ influence$ or$ interference$ with$
that$process.$
$$
While$ the$ MOASAD$ would$ not$ amount$ to$ an$ international$ agreement$ or$
unilateral$ declaration$ binding$ on$ the$ Philippines$ under$ international$ law,$
respondents$ act$ of$ guaranteeing$ amendments$ is,$ by$ itself,$ already$ a$
constitutional$violation$that$renders$the$MOASAD$fatally$defective.$
$$
WHEREFORE,$ respondents$ motion$ to$ dismiss$ is$ DENIED.$ The$ main$ and$
intervening$petitions$are$GIVEN$DUE$COURSE$and$hereby$GRANTED.$
$$
The$ Memorandum$ of$ Agreement$ on$ the$ Ancestral$ Domain$ Aspect$ of$ the$ GRPS
MILF$Tripoli$Agreement$on$Peace$of$2001$is$declared$CONTRARY$TO$LAW$AND$
THE$CONSTITUTION.$
$$
SO$ORDERED.$
$ $
[G.R.$No.$127325.$March$19,$1997]$ other$volunteers$intend$to$exercise$the$power$to$directly$propose$amendments$
$ to$the$Constitution$granted$under$Section$2,$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution;$that$
MIRIAM$ DEFENSOR$ SANTIAGO,$ ALEXANDER$ PADILLA$ and$ MARIA$ ISABEL$ the$exercise$of$that$power$shall$be$conducted$in$proceedings$under$the$control$
ONGPIN,$petitioners,$vs.$COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS,$JESUS$DELFIN,$ALBERTO$ and$supervision$of$the$COMELEC;$that,$as$required$in$COMELEC$Resolution$No.$
PEDROSA$&$CARMEN$PEDROSA,$in$their$capacities$as$founding$members$of$the$ 2300,$ signature$ stations$ shall$ be$ established$ all$ over$ the$ country,$ with$ the$
Peoples$Initiative$for$Reforms,$Modernization$and$Action$(PIRMA),$respondents,$ assistance$ of$ municipal$ election$ registrars,$ who$ shall$ verify$ the$ signatures$
SENATOR$ RAUL$ S.$ ROCO,$ DEMOKRASYASIPAGTANGGOL$ ANG$ KONSTITUSYON$ affixed$ by$ individual$ signatories;$ that$ before$ the$ Movement$ and$ other$
(DIK),$ MOVEMENT$ OF$ ATTORNEYS$ FOR$ BROTHERHOOD$ INTEGRITY$ AND$ volunteers$ can$ gather$ signatures,$ it$ is$ necessary$ that$ the$ time$ and$ dates$ to$ be$
NATIONALISM,$ INC.$ (MABINI),$ INTEGRATED$ BAR$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES$ (IBP)$ designated$ for$ the$ purpose$ be$ first$ fixed$ in$ an$ order$ to$ be$ issued$ by$ the$
and$LABAN$NG$DEMOKRATIKONG$PILIPINO$(LABAN),$petitionersSintervenors.$ COMELEC;$ and$ that$ to$ adequately$ inform$ the$ people$ of$ the$ electoral$ process$
D$E$C$I$S$I$O$N$ involved,$it$is$likewise$necessary$that$the$said$order,$as$well$as$the$Petition$on$
DAVIDE,$JR.,$J.:$ which$the$signatures$shall$be$affixed,$be$published$in$newspapers$of$general$and$
$ local$circulation,$under$the$control$and$supervision$of$the$COMELEC.$
The$heart$of$this$controversy$brought$to$us$by$way$of$a$petition$for$prohibition$ $
under$Rule$65$of$the$Rules$of$Court$is$the$right$of$the$people$to$directly$propose$ The$Delfin$Petition$further$alleged$that$the$provisions$sought$to$be$amended$are$
amendments$to$the$Constitution$through$the$system$of$initiative$under$Section$ Sections$ 4$ and$ 7$ of$ Article$ VI,[7]$ Section$ 4$ of$ Article$ VII,[8]$ and$ Section$ 8$ of$
2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution.$ Undoubtedly,$ this$ demands$ special$ Article$ X[9]$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ Attached$ to$ the$ petition$ is$ a$ copy$ of$ a$ Petition$
attention,$as$this$system$of$initiative$was$unknown$to$the$people$of$this$country,$ for$ Initiative$ on$ the$ 1987$ Constitution[10]$ embodying$ the$ proposed$
except$perhaps$to$a$few$scholars,$before$the$drafting$of$the$1987$Constitution.$ amendments$ which$ consist$ in$ the$ deletion$ from$ the$ aforecited$ sections$ of$ the$
The$ 1986$ Constitutional$ Commission$ itself,$ through$ the$ original$ proponent[1]$ provisions$concerning$term$limits,$and$with$the$following$proposition:$
and$the$main$sponsor[2]$of$the$proposed$Article$on$Amendments$or$Revision$of$ $
the$ Constitution,$ characterized$ this$ system$ as$ innovative.[3]$ Indeed$ it$ is,$ for$ DO$ YOU$ APPROVE$ OF$ LIFTING$ THE$ TERM$ LIMITS$ OF$ ALL$ ELECTIVE$
both$ under$ the$ 1935$ and$ 1973$ Constitutions,$ only$ two$ methods$ of$ proposing$ GOVERNMENT$OFFICIALS,$AMENDING$FOR$THE$PURPOSE$SECTIONS$4$AND$7$
amendments$ to,$ or$ revision$ of,$ the$ Constitution$ were$ recognized,$ viz.,$ (1)$ by$ OF$ARTICLE$VI,$SECTION$4$OF$ARTICLE$VII,$AND$SECTION$8$OF$ARTICLE$X$OF$
Congress$ upon$ a$ vote$ of$ threeSfourths$ of$ all$ its$ members$ and$ (2)$ by$ a$ THE$1987$PHILIPPINE$CONSTITUTION?$
constitutional$convention.[4]$For$this$and$the$other$reasons$hereafter$discussed,$ $
we$resolved$to$give$due$course$to$this$petition.$ According$to$Delfin,$the$said$Petition$for$Initiative$will$first$be$submitted$to$the$
$ people,$and$after$it$is$signed$by$at$least$twelve$per$cent$of$the$total$number$of$
On$6$December$1996,$private$respondent$Atty.$Jesus$S.$Delfin$filed$with$public$ registered$voters$in$the$country$it$will$be$formally$filed$with$the$COMELEC.$
respondent$Commission$on$Elections$(hereafter,$COMELEC)$a$Petition$to$Amend$ $
the$ Constitution,$ to$ Lift$ Term$ Limits$ of$ Elective$ Officials,$ by$ Peoples$ Initiative$ Upon$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ Delfin$ Petition,$ which$ was$ forthwith$ given$ the$ number$
(hereafter,$Delfin$Petition)[5]$wherein$Delfin$asked$the$COMELEC$for$an$order$ UND$ 96S037$ (INITIATIVE),$ the$ COMELEC,$ through$ its$ Chairman,$ issued$ an$
$ Order[11]$(a)$directing$Delfin$to$cause$the$publication$of$the$petition,$together$
1.$Fixing$the$time$and$dates$for$signature$gathering$all$over$the$country;$ with$the$attached$Petition$for$Initiative$on$the$1987$Constitution$(including$the$
$ proposal,$proposed$constitutional$amendment,$and$the$signature$form),$and$the$
2.$Causing$the$necessary$publications$of$said$Order$and$the$attached$Petition$for$ notice$of$hearing$in$three$(3)$daily$newspapers$of$general$circulation$at$his$own$
Initiative$ on$ the$ 1987$ Constitution,$ in$ newspapers$ of$ general$ and$ local$ expense$not$later$than$9$December$1996;$and$(b)$setting$the$case$for$hearing$on$
circulation;$ 12$December$1996$at$10:00$a.m.$
$ $
3.$Instructing$Municipal$Election$Registrars$in$all$Regions$of$the$Philippines,$to$ At$ the$ hearing$ of$ the$ Delfin$ Petition$ on$ 12$ December$ 1996,$ the$ following$
assist$Petitioners$and$volunteers,$in$establishing$signing$stations$at$the$time$and$ appeared:$ Delfin$ and$ Atty.$ Pete$ Q.$ Quadra;$ representatives$ of$ the$ Peoples$
on$the$dates$designated$for$the$purpose.$ Initiative$for$Reforms,$Modernization$and$Action$(PIRMA);$intervenorSoppositor$
$ Senator$Raul$S.$Roco,$together$with$his$two$other$lawyers;$and$representatives$
Delfin$alleged$in$his$petition$that$he$is$a$founding$member$of$the$Movement$for$ of,$ or$ counsel$ for,$ the$ Integrated$ Bar$ of$ the$ Philippines$ (IBP),$ DemokrasyaS
Peoples$Initiative,[6]$a$group$of$citizens$desirous$to$avail$of$the$system$intended$ Ipagtanggol$ ang$ Konstitusyon$ (DIK),$ Public$ Interest$ Law$ Center,$ and$ Laban$ ng$
to$institutionalize$people$power;$that$he$and$the$members$of$the$Movement$and$ Demokratikong$ Pilipino$ (LABAN).[12]$ Senator$ Roco,$ on$ that$ same$ day,$ filed$ a$
Motion$to$Dismiss$the$Delfin$Petition$on$the$ground$that$it$is$not$the$initiatory$ (6)$ Finally,$ Congress$ has$ not$ yet$ appropriated$ funds$ for$ peoples$ initiative;$
petition$properly$cognizable$by$the$COMELEC.$ neither$ the$ COMELEC$ nor$ any$ other$ government$ department,$ agency,$ or$ office$
$ has$realigned$funds$for$the'purpose.$
After$hearing$their$arguments,$the$COMELEC$directed$Delfin$and$the$oppositors$ $
to$file$their$memoranda$and/or$oppositions/memoranda$within$five$days.[13]$ To$ justify$ their$ recourse$ to' us' via$ the$ special$ civil$ action$ for$ prohibition,$ the$
$ petitioners$allege'that$in$the$event$the$COMELEC$grants$the$Delfin$Petition,$the$
On$ 18$ December$ 1996,$ the$ petitioners$ herein$ SS$ Senator$ Miriam$ Defensor$ peoples$initiative$spearheaded$by$PIRMA$would$entail$expenses$to$the$national$
Santiago,$ Alexander$ Padilla,$ and$ Maria$ Isabel$ Ongpin$ SS$ filed$ this$ special$ civil$ treasury$for$general$reSregistration$of$voters$amounting$to$at$least$P180$million,$
action$for$prohibition$raising$the$following$arguments:$ not$ to$ mention$ the$ millions$ of$ additional$ pesos$ in$ expenses$ which$ would$ be$
$ incurred$ in$ the$ conduct$ of$ the$ initiative$ itself.$ Hence,$ the$ transcendental$
(1)$The$constitutional$provision$on$peoples$initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution$ importance$to$the$public$and$the$nation$of$the$issues$raised$demands$that$this$
can$ only$ be$ implemented$ by$ law$ to$ be$ passed$ by$ Congress.$ No$ such$ law$ has$ petition$ for$ prohibition$ be$ settled$ promptly$ and$ definitely,$ brushing$ aside$
been$ passed;$ in$ fact,$ Senate$ Bill$ No.$ 1290$ entitled$ An$ Act$ Prescribing$ and$ technicalities$ of$ procedure$ and$ calling$ for$ the$ admission$ of$ a$ taxpayers$ and$
Regulating$ Constitutional$ Amendments$ by$ Peoples$ Initiative,$ which$ petitioner$ legislators$ suit.[14]$ Besides,$ there$ is$ no$ other$ plain,$ speedy,$ and$ adequate$
Senator$Santiago$filed$on$24$November$1995,$is$still$pending$before$the$Senate$ remedy$in$the$ordinary$course$of$law.$
Committee$on$Constitutional'Amendments.$ $
$ On$19$December$1996,$this$Court$(a)$required$the$respondents$to$comment$on$
(2)$It$is$true$that$R.A.$No.$6735$provides$for$three$systems$of$initiative,$namely,$ the$ petition$ within$ a$ nonSextendible$ period$ of$ ten$ days$ from$ notice;$ and$ (b)$
initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution,$ on$ statutes,$ and$ on$ local$ legislation.' However,' it' issued$ a$ temporary$ restraining$ order,$ effective$ immediately$ and$ continuing$
failed'to'provide'any'subtitle'on'initiative'on'the'Constitution,$unlike$in$the$other$ until$ further$ orders,$ enjoining$ public$ respondent$ COMELEC$ from$ proceeding$
modes$of$initiative,$which$are$specifically$provided$for$in$Subtitle$II$and$Subtitle$ with$the$Delfin$Petition,$and$private$respondents$Alberto$and$Carmen$Pedrosa$
III.$ This$ deliberate$ omission$ indicates$ that$ the$ matter$ of$ peoples$ initiative$ to$ from$ conducting$ a$ signature$ drive$ for$ peoples$ initiative$ to$ amend$ the$
amend$ the$ Constitution$ was$ left$ to$ some$ future$ law.$ Former$ Senator$ Arturo$ Constitution.$
Tolentino$ stressed$ this$ deficiency$ in$ the$ law$ in$ his$ privilege$ speech$ delivered$ $
before$the$Senate$in$1994:$There$is$not$a$single$word$in$that$law$which$can$be$ On$ 2$ January$ 1997,$ private$ respondents,$ through$ Atty$ Quadra,$ filed$ their$
considered$ as$ implementing$ [the$ provision$ on$ constitutional$ initiative].$ Such$ Comment[15]$on$the$petition.$They$argue$therein$that:$
implementing$provisions$have$been$obviously'left$to$a$separate$law.$ $
$ 1.$ IT$ IS$ NOT$ TRUE$ THAT$ IT$ WOULD$ ENTAIL$ EXPENSES$ TO$ THE$ NATIONAL$
(3)$Republic$Act$No.$6735$provides$for$the$effectivity$of$the$law$after$publication$ TREASURY$ FOR$ GENERAL$ REGISTRATION$ OF$ VOTERS$ AMOUNTING$ TO$ AT$
in$ print$ media.$ This$ indicates$ that$ the$ Act$ covers$ only$ laws$ and$ not$ LEAST$ PESOS:$ ONE$ HUNDRED$ EIGHTY$ MILLION$ (P180,000,000.00)$ IF$ THE$
constitutional$amendments$because$the$latter$take$effect$only$upon$ratification$ COMELEC$ GRANTS$ THE$ PETITION$ FILED$ BY$ RESPONDENT$ DELFIN$ BEFORE$
and$not$after$publication.$ THE$COMELEC.$
$ $
(4)$COMELEC$Resolution$No.$2300,$adopted$on$16$January$1991$to$govern$the$ 2.$ NOT$ A$ SINGLE$ CENTAVO$ WOULD$ BE$ SPENT$ BY$ THE$ NATIONAL$
conduct$ of$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution$ and$ initiative$ and$ referendum$ on$ GOVERNMENT$ IF$ THE$ COMELEC$ GRANTS$ THE$ PETITION$ OF$ RESPONDENT$
national$and$local$laws,$is$ultra$vires$insofar$as$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$ DELFIN.$ ALL$ EXPENSES$ IN$ THE$ SIGNATURE$ GATHERING$ ARE$ ALL$ FOR$ THE$
Constitution$ is$ concerned,$ since$ the$ COMELEC$ has$ no$ power$ to$ provide$ rules$ ACCOUNT$ OF$ RESPONDENT$ DELFIN$ AND$ HIS$ VOLUNTEERS$ PER$ THEIR$
and$ regulations$ for$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ right$ of$ initiative$ to$ amend$ the$ PROGRAM$ OF$ ACTIVITIES$ AND$ EXPENDITURES$ SUBMITTED$ TO$ THE$
Constitution.$ Only$ Congress$ is$ authorized$ by$ the$ Constitution$ to$ pass$ the$ COMELEC.$ THE$ ESTIMATED$ COST$ OF$ THE$ DAILY$ PER$ DIEM$ OF$ THE$
implementing$law.$ SUPERVISING$ SCHOOL$ TEACHERS$ IN$ THE$ SIGNATURE$ GATHERING$ TO$ BE$
$ DEPOSITED$ and$ TO$ BE$ PAID$ BY$ DELFIN$ AND$ HIS$ VOLUNTEERS$ IS$ P2,571,$
(5)The$ peoples$ initiative$ is$ limited$ to$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,' not$ to$ 200.00;$
revision'thereof.$Extending$or$lifting$of$term$limits$constitutes$a$revision$and$is,$ $
therefore,$outside$the$power$of$the$peoples$initiative.$ 3.$ THE$ PENDING$ PETITION$ BEFORE$ THE$ COMELEC$ IS$ ONLY$ ON$ THE$
$ SIGNATURE$ GATHERING$ WHICH$ BY$ LAW$ COMELEC$ IS$ DUTY$ BOUND$ TO$
SUPERVISE$ CLOSELY$ PURSUANT$ TO$ ITS$ INITIATORY$ JURISDICTION$ UPHELD$
BY$ THE$ HONORABLE$ COURT$ IN$ ITS$ RECENT$ SEPTEMBER$ 26,$ 1996$ DECISION$ of$a$subtitle$for$such$initiative$is$not$fatal,$since$subtitles$are$not$requirements$
IN$THE$CASE$OF$SUBIC$BAY$METROPOLITAN$AUTHORITY$VS.$COMELEC,$ET$AL.$ for$the$validity$or$sufficiency$of$laws.$
G.R.$NO.$125416;$ $
$ (2)$Section$9(b)$of$R.A.$No.$6735$specifically$provides$that$the$proposition$in$an$
4.$REP.$ACT$NO.$6735$APPROVED$ON$AUGUST$4,$1989$IS$THE$ENABLING$LAW$ initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution$approved$by$the$majority$of$the$votes$cast$
IMPLEMENTING$ THE$ POWER$ OF$ PEOPLE$ INITIATIVE$ TO$ PROPOSE$ in$the$plebiscite$shall$become$effective$as$of$the$day$of$the$plebiscite.$
AMENDMENTS$ TO$ THE$ CONSTITUTION.$ SENATOR$ DEFENSORSSANTIAGOS$ $
SENATE$BILL$NO.$1290$IS$A$DUPLICATION$OF$WHAT$ARE$ALREADY$PROVIDED$ (3)$The$claim'that'COMELEC$Resolution$No.$2300$is$ultra$vires$is$contradicted$
FOR$IN$REP.$ACT$NO.$6735;$ by$(a)$Section$2,$Article$IXSC$of$the$Constitution,$which$grants$the$COMELEC$the$
$ power$to$enforce$and$administer$all$laws$and$regulations$relative$to$the$conduct$
5.$ COMELEC$ RESOLUTION$ NO.$ 2300$ PROMULGATED$ ON$ JANUARY$ 16,$ 1991' of$an$election,$plebiscite,$initiative,'referendum,$and$recall;$and$(b)$Section$20$of$
PURSUANT'TO'REP.'ACT'6735'WAS'UPHELD'BY'THE'HONORABLE$COURT$IN$THE$ R.A.$ 6735,$ which$ empowers$ the$ COMELEC$ to$ promulgate$ such$ rules$ and$
RECENT$ SEPTEMBER$ 26,$ 1996$ DECISION$ IN$ THE$ CASE$ OF$ SUBIC$ BAY$ regulations$as$may$be$necessary$to$carry$out$the$purposes$of$the$Act.$
METROPOLITAN$ AUTHORITY$ VS.$ COMELEC,$ ET$ AL.$ G.R.$ NO.$ 125416$ WHERE$ $
THE$HONORABLE$COURT$SAID:$THE$COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS$CAN$DO$NO$ (4)$The$proposed'initiative$does$not$involve$a$revision$of,$but$mere$amendment$
LESS$ BY$ SEASONABLY$ AND$ JUDICIOUSLY$ PROMULGATING$ GUIDELINES$ AND$ to,$the$Constitution$because$it$seeks$to$alter$only$a$few$specific$provisions$of$the$
RULES$ FOR$ BOTH$ NATIONAL$ AND$ LOCAL$ USE,$ IN$ IMPLEMENTING$ OF$ THESE$ Constitution,$ or$ more$ specifically,$ only$ those$ which$ lay$ term$ limits.$ It'does'not$
LAWS.$ seek$to$reexamine$or$overhaul$the$entire$document.$
$ $
6.$EVEN$SENATOR$DEFENSORSSANTIAGOS$SENATE$BILL$NO.$1290$CONTAINS$A$ As$ to$ the$ public$ expenditures$ for$ registration$ of$ voters,$ Delfin$ considers$
PROVISION$ DELEGATING$ TO$ THE$ COMELEC$ THE$ POWER$ TO$ PROMULGATE$ petitioners$ estimate$ of$ P180$ million$ as$ unreliable,$ for$ only$ the$ COMELEC$ can$
SUCH$ RULES' AND' REGULATIONS' AS' MAY' BE' NECESSARY' TO' CARRY' OUT$ THE$ give$the$exact$figure.$Besides,$if$there$will$be$a$plebiscite$it$will$be$simultaneous$
PURPOSES$ OF$ THIS$ ACT.$ (SEC.$ 12,$ S.B.$ NO.$ 1290,$ ENCLOSED$ AS$ ANNEX$ E,$ with$the$1997$Barangay$Elections.$In$any$event,$fund$requirements$for$initiative$
PETITION);$ will$be$a$priority$government$expense$because$it$will$be$for$the$exercise$of$the$
$ sovereign$power$of$the$people.$
7.$ THE$ LIFTING$ OF$ THE$ LIMITATION$ ON$ THE$ TERM$ OF$ OFFICE$ OF$ ELECTIVE$ $
OFFICIALS$ PROVIDED$ UNDER$ THE$ 1987$ CONSTITUTION$ IS$ NOT$ A$ REVISION$ In$the$Comment[17]$for$the$public$respondent$COMELEC,$filed$also$on$2$January$
OF$ THE$ CONSTITUTION.$ IT$ IS$ ONLY$ AN$ AMENDMENT.$ AMENDMENT$ 1997,$the$Office$of$the$Solicitor$General$contends$that:$
ENVISAGES$AN$ALTERATION$OF$ONE$OR$A$FEW$SPECIFIC$PROVISIONS$OF$THE$ $
CONSTITUTION.$ REVISION$ CONTEMPLATES$ A$ RESEXAMINATION$ OF$ THE$ (1)$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ deals$ with,$ inter$ alia,$ peoples$ initiative$ to$ amend$ the$
ENTIRE$DOCUMENT$TO$DETERMINE$HOW$AND$TO$WHAT$EXTENT$IT$SHOULD$ Constitution.$Its$Section$2$on$Statement$of$Policy$explicitly$affirms,$recognizes,$
BE$ ALTERED.$ (PP.$ 412S413,$ 2ND.$ ED.$ 1992,$ 1097$ PHIL.$ CONSTITUTION,$ BY$ and$ guarantees$ that$ power;$ and$ its$ Section$ 3,$ which$ enumerates$ the$ three$
JOAQUIN$G.$BERNAS,$S.J.).$ systems$of$initiative,$includes$initiative$on$the$Constitution$and$defines$the$same$
$ as$the$power$to$propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$Likewise,$its$Section$5$
Also$ on$ 2$ January$ 1997,$ private$ respondent$ Delfin$ filed$ in$ his$ own$ behalf$ a$ repeatedly$mentions$initiative$on$the$Constitution.$
Comment[16]$ which$ starts$ off$ with$ an$ assertion$ that$ the$ instant$ petition$ is$ a$ $
kneeSjerk$ reaction$ to$ a$ draft$ Petition$ for$ Initiative$ on$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ ...$ (2)$ A$ separate$ subtitle$ on$ initiative$ on'the'Constitution$ is'not'necessary$ in$ R.A.$
which$ is$ not$ formally$ filed$ yet.$ What$ he$ filed$ on$ 6$ December$ 1996$ was$ an$ No.$ 6735$ because,$ being$ national$ in$ scope,$ that$ system$ of$ initiative$ is$ deemed$
Initiatory$ Pleading$ or$ Initiatory$ Petition,$ which$ was$ legally$ necessary$ to$ start$ included$ in$ the$ subtitle$ on$ National$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum;$ and$ Senator$
the$ signature$ campaign$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution$ or$ to$ put$ the$ movement$ to$ Tolentino$ simply' overlooked$ pertinent$ provisions$ of$ the$ law$ when$ he$ claimed$
gather$ signatures$ under$ COMELEC$ power$ and$ function.$ On$ the$ substantive$ that$nothing$therein$was$provided$for$initiative$on$the$Constitution.$
allegations$of$the$petitioners,$Delfin$maintains$as$follows:$ $
$ (3)$Senate$Bill$No.$1290$is$neither$a'competent$nor$a$material$proof$that$R.A.$No.$
(1)$Contrary$to$the$claim$of$the$petitioners,$there$is$a$law,$R.A.$No.$6735,$which$ 6735$does$not'deal'with'initiative$on$the$Constitution.$
governs$the$conduct$of$initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution.$The$absence$therein$ $
(4)$Extension$of$term$limits$of$elected$officials$constitutes$a$mere$amendment'to$ performance$ of$ their$ elective$ officials,$ but$ not$ as$ a$ premium$ for$ good$
the$Constitution,$not$a$revision$thereof.$ performance.[20]$
$ $
(5)$ COMELEC$ Resolution$ No.$ 2300$ was$ validly$ issued$ under$ Section$ 20$ of$ R.A.$ (4)$R.A.$No.$6735$is$deficient$and$inadequate$in$itself$to$be$called$the$enabling$
No.$6735$and$under$the$Omnibus$Election$Code.$The$ruleSmaking$power$of$the$ law$that$implements$the$peoples$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$
COMELEC' to' implement$ the$ provisions' of$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ was$ in$ fact$ upheld$ by$ It$ fails$ to$ state$ (a)$ the$ proper$ parties$ who$ may$ file$ the$ petition,$ (b)$ the$
this$Court$in$Subic$Bay$Metropolitan$Authority$vs.$COMELEC$.$ appropriate$ agency$ before$ whom$ the$ petition$ is$ to$ be$ filed,'(c)'the$ contents$ of$
$ the$ petition,$ (d)$ the$ publication$ of$ the$ same,$ (e)$ the$ ways$ and$ means$ of$
On$ 14$ January' 1997,$ this$ Court$ (a)$ confirmed$ nunc$ pro$ tunc$ the$ temporary$ gathering$ the$ signatures$ of$ the$ voters$ nationwide$ and$ 3%$ per$ legislative$
restraining$ order;$ (b)$ noted$ the$ aforementioned$ Comments$ and$ the$ Motion$ to$ district,$(f)$the$proper$parties$who$may$oppose$or$question$the$veracity$of$the$
Lift$ Temporary$ Restraining$ Order$ filed$ by$ private$ respondents$ through$ Atty.$ signatures,$(g)$the$role$of$the$COMELEC$in$the$verification$of$the$signatures$and$
Quadra,$ as$ well$ as$ the$ latters$ Manifestation$ stating$ that$ he$ is$ the$ counsel$ for$ the$sufficiency$of$the'petition,$(h)$the$appeal$from$any$decision$of$the$COMELEC,$
private$ respondents$ Alberto$ and$ Carmen$ Pedrosa$ only$ and$ the$ Comment$ he$ (I)$ the$ holding$ of$ a$ plebiscite,$ and$ (g)$ the$ appropriation$ of$ funds$ for$ such$
filed$was$for$the$Pedrosas;$and'(c)'granted'the'Motion'for'Intervention'filed$on$6$ peoples$ initiative.$ Accordingly,$ there$ being$ no$ enabling$ law,$ the$ COMELEC$ has$
January$ 1997$ by$ Senator$ Raul$ Roco$ and$ allowed$ him$ to$ file$ his$ Petition$ in$ no$jurisdiction$to$hear$Delfins$petition.$
Intervention$not$later$than$20$January$1997;$and$(d)$set$the$case$for$hearing$on$ $
23$January$1997$at$9:30$a.m.$ (5)$The$deficiency$of$R.A.$No.$6735$cannot$be$rectified$or$remedied$by$COMELEC$
$ Resolution$ No.$ 2300,$ since$ the$ COMELEC$ is$ without$ authority$ to$ legislate$ the$
On$ 17$ January$ 1997,$ the$ DemokrasyaSIpagtanggol$ ang$ Konstitusyon$ (DIK)$ and$ procedure$ for$ a$ peoples$ initiative$ under$ Section$ 2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$
the$ Movement$ of$ Attorneys$ for$ Brotherhood$ Integrity$ and$ Nationalism,$ Inc.$ Constitution.$ That$ function$ exclusively$ pertains$ to$ Congress.$ Section$ 20$ of$ R.A.$
(MABINI),$ filed$ a$ Motion$ for$ Intervention.$ Attached$ to$ the$ motion$ was$ their$ No.$6735$does$not$constitute$a$legal$basis$for$the$Resolution,$as$the$former$does$
Petition$ in$ Intervention,$ which$ was$ later$ replaced$ by$ an$ Amended$ Petition$ in$ not$set$a$sufficient$standard$for$a$valid$delegation$of$power.$
Intervention$wherein$they$contend$that:$ $
$ On$20$January$1997,$Senator$Raul$Roco$filed$his$Petition$in$Intervention.[21]$He$
(1)$The$Delfin$proposal$does$not$involve$a$mere$amendment$to,$but$a$revision$ avers$that$R.A.$No.$6735$is$the$enabling$law$that$implements$the$peoples$right$to$
of,$the$Constitution$because,$in$the$words$of$Fr.$Joaquin$Bernas,$S.J.,[18]$it$would$ initiate$constitutional$amendments.$This$law$is$a$consolidation$of$Senate$Bill$No.$
involve$a$change$from$a$political$philosophy$that$rejects$unlimited$tenure$to$one$ 17$and$House'Bill'No.$21505;$he$coSauthored$the$House$Bill$and$even$delivered$a$
that$ accepts$ unlimited$ tenure;$ and$ although$ the$ change$ might$ appear$ to$ be$ an$ sponsorship$ speech$ thereon.$ He$ likewise$ submits$ that$ the$ COMELEC$ was$
isolated$ one,$ it$ can$ affect$ other$ provisions,$ such$ as,$ on$ synchronization$ of$ empowered$ under$ Section$ 20$ of$ that$ law$ to$ promulgate$ COMELEC$ Resolution$
elections$and$on$the$State$policy$of$guaranteeing$equal$access$to$opportunities$ No.$2300.$Nevertheless,$he$contends$that$the$respondent$Commission$is$without$
for$ public$ service$ and$ prohibiting$ political$ dynasties.[19]$ A$ revision$ cannot$ be$ jurisdiction$to$take$cognizance$of$the$Delfin$Petition$and$to$order$its$publication$
done$by$initiative$which,$by$express$provision$of$Section$2$of$Article$XVII$of$the$ because$the$said$petition$is$not$the$initiatory$pleading$contemplated$under$the$
Constitution,$is$limited$to$amendments.$ Constitution,$Republic$Act$No.$6735,$and$COMELEC$Resolution$No.$2300.$What$
$ vests$jurisdiction$upon$the$COMELEC$in$an$initiative$on$the$Constitution$is$the$
(2)$The$prohibition$against$reelection$of$the$President$and$the$limits$provided$ filing$ of$ a$ petition$ for$ initiative$ which$ is$ signed$ by$ the$ required$ number$ of$
for$all$other$national$and$local$elective$officials$are$based$on$the$philosophy$of$ registered$ voters.$ He$ also$ submits$ that$ the$ proponents$ of$ a$ constitutional$
governance,$ to$ open$ up$ the$ political$ arena$ to$ as$ many$ as$ there$ are$ Filipinos$ amendment$ cannot$ avail$ of$ the$ authority$ and$ resources$ of$ the$ COMELEC$ to$
qualified$ to$ handle$ the$ demands$ of$ leadership,$ to$ break$ the$ concentration$ of$ assist$ them$ is$ securing$ the$ required$ number$ of$ signatures,$ as$ the$ COMELECs$
political$ and$ economic$ powers$ in$ the$ hands$ of$ a'few,'and$ to$ promote$ effective' role$ in$ an$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution$ is$ limited$ to$ the$ determination$ of$ the$
proper$ empowerment$ for$ participation$ in$ policy$ and$ decisionSmaking$ for$ the$ sufficiency$of$the$initiative$petition$and$the$call$and$supervision$of$a$plebiscite,$if$
common$ good;$ hence,$ to$ remove$ the$ term$ limits$ is$ to$ negate$ and$ nullify$ the$ warranted.$
noble$vision$of$the$1987$Constitution.$ $
$ On$20$January$1997,$LABAN$filed$a$Motion$for$Leave$to$Intervene.$
(3)$The$Delfin$proposal$runs$counter$to$the$purpose$of$initiative,$particularly$in$ $
a$ conflictSofSinterest$ situation.$ Initiative$ is$ intended$ as$ a$ fallback$ position$ that$ The$following$day,$the$IBP$filed$a$Motion$for$Intervention$to$which$it$attached$a$
may$ be$ availed$ of$ by$ the$ people$ only$ if$ they$ are$ dissatisfied$ with$ the$ Petition$in$Intervention$raising$the$following$arguments:$
$ movement$and$volunteers$in$establishing$signature$stations;$and$(c)$directing$or$
(1)$ Congress$ has$ failed$ to$ enact$ an$ enabling$ law$ mandated$ under$ Section$ 2,$ causing$ the$ publication$ of,$ inter$ alia,$ the$ unsigned$ proposed$ Petition$ for$
Article$XVII$of$the$1987$Constitution.$ Initiative$on$the$1987$Constitution.$
$ $
(2)$ COMELEC$ Resolution$ No.$ 2300$ cannot$ substitute$ for$ the$ required$ 5.$Whether$it$is$proper$for$the$Supreme$Court$to$take$cognizance$of$the$petition$
implementing$law$on$the$initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution.$ when$there$is$a$pending$case$before$the$COMELEC.$
$ $
(3)$The$Petition$for$Initiative$suffers$from$a$fatal$defect$in$that$it$does$not$have$ After$ hearing$ them$ on$ the$ issues,$ we$ required$ the$ parties$ to$ submit$
the$required$number$of$signatures.$ simultaneously$their$respective$memoranda$within$twenty$days$and$requested$
$ intervenor$Senator$Roco$to$submit$copies$of$the$deliberations$on$House$Bill$No.$
(4)$ The$ petition$ seeks,$ in$ effect$ a$ revision$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ which$ can$ be$ 21505.$
proposed$only$by$Congress$or$a$constitutional$convention.[22]$ $
$ On$27$January$1997,$LABAN$filed$its$Petition$in$Intervention$wherein$it$adopts$
On$21$January$1997,$we$promulgated$a$Resolution$(a)$granting$the$Motions$for$ the$ allegations$ and$ arguments$ in$ the$ main$ Petition.'It'further$ submits$ that$ the$
Intervention$filed$by$the$DIK$and$MABINI$and$by$the$IBP,$as$well$as$the$Motion$ COMELEC$ should$ have$ dismissed$ the$ Delfin$ Petition$ for$ failure$ to$ state$ a$
for$ Leave$ to$ Intervene$ filed$ by$ LABAN;$ (b)$ admitting$ the$ Amended$ Petition$ in$ sufficient$ cause$ of$ action$ and$ that$ the$ Commissions$ failure$ or$ refusal$ to$ do$ so$
Intervention$ of$ DIK$ and$ MABINI,$ and$ the$ Petitions$ in$ Intervention$ of$ Senator$ constituted$grave$abuse$of$discretion$amounting$to$lack$of$jurisdiction.$
Roco$and$of$the$IBP;$(c)$requiring$the$respondents$to$file$within$a$nonextendible$ $
period$ of$ five$ days$ their$ Consolidated$ Comments$ on$ the$ aforesaid$ Petitions$ in$ On$ 28$ January$ 1997,$ Senator$ Roco$ submitted$ copies$ of$ portions$ of$ both$ the$
Intervention;$and$(d)$requiring$LABAN$to$file$its$Petition$in$Intervention$within$ Journal$ and$ the$ Record$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ relating$ to$ the$
a$ nonextendible$ period$ of$ three$ days$ from$ notice,$ and$ the$ respondents$ to$ deliberations$of$House$Bill$No.$21505,$as$well$as$the$transcripts$of$stenographic$
comment$thereon$within$a$nonextendible$period$of$five$days$from$receipt$of$the$ notes$ on$ the$ proceedings$ of$ the$ Bicameral$ Conference$ Committee,$ Committee$
said$Petition$in$Intervention.$ on$Suffrage$and$Electoral$Reforms,$of$6$June$1989$on$House$Bill$No.$21505$and$
$ Senate$Bill$No.$17.$
At$ the$ hearing$ of$ the$ case$ on$ 23$ January$ 1997,$ the$ parties$ argued$ on$ the$ $
following$ pivotal$ issues,$ which$ the$ Court$ formulated$ in$ light$ of$ the$ allegations$ Private$ respondents$ Alberto$ and$ Carmen$ Pedrosa$ filed$ their$ Consolidated$
and$arguments$raised$in$the$pleadings$so$far$filed:$ Comments$ on$ the$ Petitions$ in$ Intervention$ of$ Senator$ Roco,$ DIK$ and$ MABINI,$
$ and$ IBP.[23]$ The$ parties$ thereafter$ filed,$ in$ due$ time,$ their$ separate$
1.$ Whether$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735,$ entitled$ An$ Act$ Providing$ for$ a$ System$ of$ Initiative$ memoranda.[24]$
and$Referendum$and$Appropriating$Funds$Therefor,$was$intended$to$include$or$ $
cover$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution;$and$if$so,$whether$the$Act,$ As$we$stated$in$the$beginning,$we$resolved$to$give$due$course$to$this$special$civil$
as$worded,$adequately$covers$such$initiative.$ action.$
$ $
2.$ Whether$ that$ portion$ of$ COMELEC$ Resolution$ No.$ 2300$ (In$ re:$ Rules$ and$ For$a$more$logical$discussion$of$the$formulated$issues,$we$shall$first$take$up$the$
Regulations$ Governing$ the$ Conduct$ of$ Initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution,$ and$ fifth$issue$which$appears$to$pose$a$prejudicial$procedural$question.$
Initiative$and$Referendum$on$National$and$Local$Laws)$regarding$the$conduct$of$ $
initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution$is$valid,$considering$the$absence$in$ I$
the$law$of$specific$provisions$on$the$conduct$of$such$initiative.$ $
$ THE$INSTANT$PETITION$IS$VIABLE$DESPITE$THE$
3.$ Whether$ the$ lifting$ of$ term$ limits$ of$ elective$ national$ and$ local$ officials,$ as$ PENDENCY$IN$THE$COMELEC$OF$THE$DELFIN$
proposed' in$ the$ draft$ Petition$ for$ Initiative$ on$ the$ 1987$ Constitution,$ would$ PETITION.$
constitute$a$revision$of,$or$an'amendment'to,$the$Constitution.$ $
$ Except$ for$ the$ petitioners$ and$ intervenor$ Roco,$ the$ parties$ paid$ no$ serious$
4.$ Whether$ the$ COMELEC$ can$ take$ cognizance$ of,$ or$ has$ jurisdiction$ over,$ a$ attention$ to$ the$ fifth$ issue,$ i.e.,$ whether$ it$ is$ proper$ for$ this$ Court$ to$ take$
petition$ solely$ intended$ to$ obtain$ an$ order$ (a)$ fixing$ the$ time$ and$ dates$ for$ cognizance$ of$ this$ special$ civil$ action$ when$ there$ is$ a$ pending$ case$ before$ the$
signature$gathering;$(b)$instructing$municipal$election$officers$to$assist$Delfin's$ COMELEC.$The$petitioners$provide$an$affirmative$answer.$Thus:$
$ the$ Delfin$ Petition,$ which$ does$ not$ contain$ the$ required$ number$ of$ signatures.$
28.$ The$ Comelec$ has$ no$ jurisdiction$ to$ take$ cognizance$ of$ the$ petition$ filed$ by$ In$light$of$these$claims,$the$instant$case$may$likewise$be$treated$as$a$special$civil$
private$ respondent$ Delfin.$ This$ being$ so,$ it$ becomes$ imperative$ to$ stop$ the$ action$for$certiorari$under$Section$I$of$Rule$65$of$the$Rules$of$Court.$
Comelec$ from$ proceeding$ any$ further,$ and$ under$ the$ Rules$ of$ Court,$ Rule$ 65,$ $
Section$2,$a$petition$for$prohibition$is$the$proper$remedy.$ In$any$event,$as$correctly$pointed$out$by$intervenor$Roco$in$his$Memorandum,$
$ this$ Court$ may$ brush$ aside$ technicalities$ of$ procedure$ in$ cases$ of$
29.$The$writ$of$prohibition$is$an$extraordinary$judicial$writ$issuing$out$of$a$court$ transcendental$importance.$As$we$stated$in$Kilosbayan,$Inc.$v.$Guingona,$Jr.:[28]$
of$ superior$ jurisdiction$ and$ directed$ to$ an$ inferior$ court,$ for$ the$ purpose$ of$ $
preventing$the$inferior$tribunal$from$usurping$a$jurisdiction$with$which$it$is$not$ A$partys$standing$before$this$Court$is$a$procedural$technicality$which$it$may,$in$
legally$ vested.$ (People$ v.$ Vera,$ supra.,$ p.$ 84).$ In$ this$ case$ the$ writ$ is$ an$ urgent$ the$exercise$of$its$discretion,$set$aside$in$view$of$the$importance$of$issues$raised.$
necessity,$ in$ view$ of$ the$ highly$ divisive$ and$ adverse$ environmental$ In$ the$ landmark$ Emergency$ Powers$ Cases,$ this$ Court$ brushed$ aside$ this$
consequences$ on$ the$ body$ politic$ of$ the$ questioned$ Comelec$ order.$ The$ technicality$because$the$transcendental$importance$to$the$public$of$these$cases$
consequent$ climate$ of$ legal$ confusion$ and$ political$ instability$ begs$ for$ judicial$ demands$ that$ they$ be$ settled$ promptly$ and$ definitely,$ brushing$ aside,$ if$ we$
statesmanship.$ must,$technicalities$of$procedure.$
$ $
30.$In$the$final$analysis,$when$the$system$of$constitutional$law$is$threatened$by$ II$
the$political$ambitions$of$man,$only$the$Supreme$Court$can$save$a$nation$in$peril$ $
and$uphold$the$paramount$majesty$of$the$Constitution.[25]$ R.A.$NO.$6735$INTENDED$TO$INCLUDE$THE$SYSTEM$
$ OF$INITIATIVE$ON$AMENDMENTS$TO$THE$
It$ must$ be$ recalled$ that$ intervenor$ Roco$ filed$ with$ the$ COMELEC$ a$ motion$ to$ CONSTITUTION,$BUT$IS,$UNFORTUNATELY,$
dismiss$the$Delfin$Petition'on'the'ground$that$the$COMELEC$has$no$jurisdiction$ INADEQUATE$TO$COVER$THAT$SYSTEM.$
or$ authority$ to$ entertain$ the$ petition.[26]$ The$ COMELEC$ made$ no$ ruling$ $
thereon$ evidently$ because$ after$ having$ heard$ the$ arguments$ of$ Delfin$ and$ the$ Section$2$of$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution$provides:$
oppositors$ at$ the$ hearing$ on$ 12$ December$ 1996,$ it$ required$ them$ to$ submit$ $
within$ five$ days$ their$ memoranda$ or$ oppositions/memoranda.[27]$ Earlier,$ or$ SEC.$2.$Amendments$to$this$Constitution$may$likewise$be$directly$proposed$by$
specifically$ on$ 6$ December$ 1996,$ it$ practically$ gave$ due$ course$ to$ the$ Delfin$ the$people$through$initiative$upon$a$petition$of$at$least$twelve$per$centum$of$the$
Petition$by$ordering$Delfin$to$cause$the$publication$of$the$petition,$together$with$ total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters,$ of$ which$ every$ legislative$ district$ must$ be$
the$attached$Petition$for$Initiative,$the$signature$form,$and$the$notice$of$hearing;$ represented$ by$ at$ least$ three$ per$ centum' of' the' registered$ voters$ therein.$ No$
and$ by$ setting$ the$ case$ for$ hearing.$ The$ COMELECs$ failure$ to$ act$ on$ Rocos$ amendment$ under$ this$ section$ shall$ be$ authorized$ within$ five$ years$ following$
motion$to$dismiss$and$its$insistence$to$hold$on$to$the$petition$rendered$ripe$and$ the$ ratification$ of$ this$ Constitution$ nor$ oftener$ than$ once$ every$ five$ years$
viable$ the$ instant$ petition$ under$ Section$ 2$ of$ Rule$ 65$ of$ the$ Rules$ of$ Court,$ thereafter.$
which$provides:$ $
$ The$Congress$shall$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$exercise$of$this$right.$
SEC.$ 2.$ Petition$ for$ prohibition.$ SS$ Where$ the$ proceedings$ of$ any$ tribunal,$ $
corporation,$ board,$ or$ person,$ whether$ exercising$ functions$ judicial$ or$ This$provision$is$not$selfSexecutory.$In$his$book,[29]$Joaquin$Bernas,$a$member$
ministerial,$are$without$or$in$excess$of$its$or$his$jurisdiction,$or$with$grave$abuse$ of$the$1986$Constitutional$Commission,$stated:$
of$ discretion,$ and$ there$ is$ no$ appeal$ or$ any$ other$ plain,$ speedy$ and$ adequate$ $
remedy$ in$ the$ ordinary$ course$ of$ law,$ a$ person$ aggrieved$ thereby$ may$ file$ a$ Without$implementing$legislation$Section$2$cannot$operate.$Thus,$although$this$
verified$petition$in$the$proper$court$alleging$the$facts$with$certainty$and$praying$ mode$ of$ amending$ the$ Constitution$ is$ a$ mode$ of$ amendment$ which$ bypasses$
that$ judgment$ be$ rendered$ commanding$ the$ defendant$ to$ desist$ from$ further$ congressional$ action,$ in$ the' last' analysis$ it$ still$ is$ dependent$ on$ congressional$
proceedings$in$the$action$or$matter$specified$therein.$ action.$
$ $
It$ must$ also$ be$ noted$ that$ intervenor$ Roco$ claims$ that$ the$ COMELEC$ has$ no$ Bluntly$ stated,$ the$ right$ of$ the$ people$ to$ directly$ propose$ amendments' to$ the$
jurisdiction$over$the$Delfin$Petition$because'the'said'petition$is$not$supported$by$ Constitution$ through$ the$ system$ of$ initiative$ would$ remain$ entombed$ in$ the$
the$ required$ minimum$ number$ of$ signatures$ of$ registered$ voters.$ LABAN$ also$ cold$ niche$ of$ the$ Constitution$ until$ Congress$ provides$ for$ its$ implementation.$
asserts$ that$ the$ COMELEC$ gravely$ abused$ its$ discretion$ in$ refusing$ to$ dismiss$ Stated$ otherwise,$ while$ the$ Constitution$ has$ recognized$ or$ granted$ that$ right,$
the$people$cannot$exercise$it$if$Congress,$for$whatever$reason,$does$not$provide$ $
for$its$implementation.$ FR.$ BERNAS.$ And$ do$ we$ also$ understand,$ therefore,$ that$ for$ as$ long$ as$ the$
$ legislature$does$not$pass$the$necessary$implementing$law$on$this,$this$will$not$
This$system$of$initiative$was$originally$included$in$Section$1$of$the$draft$Article$ operate?$
on$ Amendment$ or$ Revision$ proposed$ by$ the$ Committee$ on$ Amendments$ and$ $
Transitory$ Provisions$ of$ the$ 1986$ Constitutional$ Commission$ in$ its$ Committee$ MR.$ SUAREZ.$ That$ matter$ was$ also$ taken$ up$ during$ the$ committee$ hearing,$
Report$No.$7$(Proposed$Resolution$No.$332).[30]$That$section$reads$as$follows:$ especially$ with$ respect$ to$ the$ budget$ appropriations$ which$ would$ have$ to$ be$
$ legislated$ so$ that$ the$ plebiscite$ could$ be$ called.$ We$ deemed$ it$ best$ that$ this$
SECTION$ 1.$ Any$ amendment$ to,$ or$ revision$ of,$ this$ Constitution$ may$ be$ matter$ be$ left$ to$ the$ legislature.$ The$ Gentleman$ is$ right.$ In$ any$ event,$ as$
proposed:$ envisioned,$ no$ amendment$ through$ the$ power$ of$ initiative$ can$ be$ called$ until$
$ after$five$years$from$the$date$of$the$ratification$of$this$Constitution.$Therefore,$
(a)$by$the$National$Assembly$upon$a$vote$of$threeSfourths$of$all$its$members;$or$ the$ first$ amendment$ that$ could$ be$ proposed$ through$ the$ exercise$ of$ this$
$ initiative$power$would$be$after$five$years.$It$is$reasonably$expected$that$within$
(b)$by$a$constitutional$convention;$or$ that$fiveSyear$period,$the$National$Assembly$can$come$up$with$the$appropriate$
$ rules$governing$the$exercise$of$this$power.$
(c)$ directly$ by$ the$ people$ themselves$ thru$ initiative$ as$ provided$ for$ in$ Article$ $
____$Section$____$of$the$Constitution.[31]$ FR.$BERNAS.$Since$the$matter$is$left$to$the$legislature$S$the$details$on$how$this$is$
$ to$ be$ carried$ out$ S$ is$ it$ possible$ that,$ in$ effect,$ what$ will$ be$ presented$ to$ the$
After$ several$ interpellations,$ but$ before$ the$ period$ of$ amendments,$ the$ people$ for$ ratification$ is$ the$ work$ of$ the$ legislature$ rather$ than$ of$ the$ people?$
Committee$ submitted$ a$ new$ formulation$ of$ the$ concept$ of$ initiative$ which$ it$ Does$this$provision$exclude$that$possibility?$
denominated$as$Section$2;$thus:$ $
$ MR.$ SUAREZ.$ No,$ it$ does$ not$ exclude$ that$ possibility$ because$ even$ the$
MR.$SUAREZ.$Thank$you,$Madam$President.$May$we$respectfully$call$attention$of$ legislature$ itself$ as$ a$ body$ could$ propose$ that$ amendment,$ maybe$ individually$
the$Members$of$the$Commission$that$pursuant$to$the$mandate$given$to$us$last$ or$collectively,$if$it$fails$to$muster$the$threeSfourths$vote$in$order$to$constitute$
night,$ we$ submitted$ this$ afternoon$ a$ complete$ Committee$ Report$ No.$ 7$ which$ itself$ as$ a$ constituent$ assembly$ and$ submit$ that$ proposal$ to$ the$ people$ for$
embodies$the$proposed$provision$governing$the$matter$of$initiative.$This$is$now$ ratification$through$the$process$of$an$initiative.$
covered$by$Section$2$of$the$complete$committee$report.$With$the$permission$of$ $
the$Members,$may$I$quote$Section$2:$ x$x$x$
$ $
The$people$may,$after$five$years$from$the$date$of$the$last$plebiscite$held,$directly$ MS.$ AQUINO.$ Do$ I$ understand$ from$ the$ sponsor$ that$ the$ intention$ in$ the$
propose$amendments$to$this$Constitution$thru$initiative$upon$petition$of$at$least$ proposal$is$to$vest$constituent$power$in$the$people$to$amend$the$Constitution?$
ten$percent$of$the$registered$voters.$ $
$ MR.$SUAREZ.$That$is$absolutely$correct,$Madam$President.$
This$ completes$ the$ blanks$ appearing$ in$ the$ original$ Committee$ Report$ No.$ $
7.[32]$ MS.$AQUINO.$I$fully$concur$with$the$underlying$precept$of$the$proposal$in$terms$
$ of$institutionalizing$popular$participation$in$the$drafting$of$the$Constitution$or$
The$interpellations$on$Section$2$showed$that$the$details$for$carrying$out$Section$ in$ the$ amendment$ thereof,$ but$ I$ would$ have$ a$ lot$ of$ difficulties$ in$ terms$ of$
2$are$left$to$the$legislature.$Thus:$ accepting$ the$ draft$ of$ Section$ 2,$ as$ written.$ Would$ the$ sponsor$ agree$ with$ me$
$ that$ in$ the$ hierarchy$ of$ legal$ mandate,$ constituent$ power$ has$ primacy$ over$ all$
FR.$BERNAS.$Madam$President,$just$two$simple,$clarificatory$questions.$ other$legal$mandates?$
$ $
First,$on$Section$1$on$the$matter$of$initiative$upon$petition$of$at$least$10$percent,$ MR.$SUAREZ.$The$Commissioner$is$right,$Madam$President.$
there$are$no$details$in$the$provision$on$how$to$carry$this$out.$Do$we$understand,$ $
therefore,$that$we$are$leaving$this$matter$to$the$legislature?$ MS.$AQUINO.$And$would$the$sponsor$agree$with$me$that$in$the$hierarchy$of$legal$
$ values,$ the$ Constitution$ is$ source$ of$ all$ legal$ mandates$ and$ that$ therefore$ we$
MR.$SUAREZ.$That$is$right,$Madam$President.$
require$a$great$deal$of$circumspection$in$the$drafting$and$in$the$amendments$of$ whereas$the$process$of$initiation$to$amend,$which$is$given$to$the$public,$would$
the$Constitution?$ only$apply$to$amendments?$
$ $
MR.$SUAREZ.$That$proposition$is$nondebatable.$ MR.$ SUAREZ.That$ is$ right.$ Those$ were$ the$ terms$ envisioned$ in$ the$
$ Committee.[35]$
MS.$AQUINO.$Such$that$in$order$to$underscore$the$primacy$of$constituent$power$ $
we$have$a$separate$article$in$the$constitution$that$would$specifically$cover$the$ Amendments$ to$ the$ proposed$ Section$ 2$ were$ thereafter$ introduced$ by$ then$
process$and$the$modes$of$amending$the$Constitution?$ Commissioner$Hilario$G.$Davide,$Jr.,$which$the$Committee$accepted.$Thus:$
$ $
MR.$SUAREZ.$That$is$right,$Madam$President.$ MR.$ DAVIDE.$ Thank$ you$ Madam$ President.$ I$ propose$ to$ substitute$ the$ entire$
$ Section$2$with$the$following:$
MS.$ AQUINO.$ Therefore,$ is$ the$ sponsor$ inclined,$ as$ the$ provisions$ are$ drafted$ $
now,$ to$ again$ concede$ to$ the$ legislature$ the$ process$ or$ the$ requirement$ of$ x$x$x$
determining$the$mechanics$of$amending$the$Constitution$by$people's$initiative?$ $
$ MR.$DAVIDE.$Madam$President,$I$have$modified$the$proposed$amendment$after$
MR.$SUAREZ.$The$matter$of$implementing$this$could$very$well$be$placed$in$the$ taking$into$account$the$modifications$submitted$by$the$sponsor$himself$and$the$
hands$ of$ the$ National$ Assembly,$ not$ unless$ we$ can$ incorporate$ into$ this$ honorable$ Commissioners$ Guingona,$ Monsod,$ Rama,$ Ople,$ de$ los$ Reyes$ and$
provision$ the$ mechanics$ that$ would$ adequately$ cover$ all$ the$ conceivable$ Romulo.$The$modified$amendment$in$substitution$of$the$proposed$Section$2$will$
situations.[33]$ now$ read$ as$ follows:$ "SECTION$ 2.$ SS$ AMENDMENTS$ TO$ THIS$ CONSTITUTION$
$ MAY$ LIKEWISE$ BE$ DIRECTLY$ PROPOSED$ BY$ THE$ PEOPLE$ THROUGH$
It$was$made$clear$during$the$interpellations$that$the$aforementioned$Section$2$ INITIATIVE$UPON$A$PETITION$OF$AT$LEAST$TWELVE$PERCENT$OF$THE$TOTAL$
is$limited$to$proposals$to$AMEND$SS$not$to$REVISE$SS$the$Constitution;$thus:$ NUMBER$OF$REGISTERED$VOTERS,$OF$WHICH$EVERY$LEGISLATIVE$DISTRICT$
$ MUST$BE$REPRESENTED$BY$AT$LEAST$THREE$PERCENT$OF$THE$REGISTERED$
MR.$ SUAREZ.$ ...$ This$ proposal$ was$ suggested$ on$ the$ theory$ that$ this$ matter$ of$ VOTERS$ THEREOF.$ NO$ AMENDMENT$ UNDER$ THIS$ SECTION$ SHALL$ BE$
initiative,$ which$ came$ about$ because$ of$ the$ extraordinary$ developments$ this$ AUTHORIZED$ WITHIN$ FIVE$ YEARS$ FOLLOWING$ THE$ RATIFICATION$ OF$ THIS$
year,$ has$ to$ be$ separated$ from$ the$ traditional$ modes$ of$ amending$ the$ CONSTITUTION$NOR$OFTENER$THAN$ONCE$EVERY$FIVE$YEARS$THEREAFTER.$
Constitution$ as$ embodied$ in$ Section$ 1.$ The$ committee$ members$ felt$ that$ this$ $
system$of$initiative$should$not$extend$to$the$revision$of$the$entire$Constitution,$ THE$ NATIONAL$ ASSEMBLY$ SHALL$ BY$ LAW$ PROVIDE$ FOR$ THE$
so$ we$ removed$ it$ from$ the$ operation$ of$ Section$ 1$ of$ the$ proposed$ Article$ on$ IMPLEMENTATION$OF$THE$EXERCISE$OF$THIS$RIGHT.$
Amendment$or$Revision.[34]$ $
$ MR.$ SUAREZ.$ Madam$ President,$ considering$ that$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ is$
x$x$x$ reflective$ of$ the$ sense$ contained$ in$ Section$ 2$ of$ our$ completed$ Committee$
$ Report$No.$7,$we$accept$the$proposed$amendment.[36]$
MS.$AQUINO.$In$which$case,$I$am$seriously$bothered$by$providing$this$process$of$ $
initiative$as$a$separate$section$in$the$Article$on$Amendment.$Would$the$sponsor$ The$ interpellations$ which$ ensued$ on$ the$ proposed$ modified$ amendment$ to$
be$ amenable$ to$ accepting$ an$ amendment$ in$ terms$ of$ realigning$ Section$ 2$ as$ Section$2$clearly$showed$that$it$was$a$legislative$act$which$must$implement$the$
another$ subparagraph$ (c)$ of$ Section$ 1,$ instead$ of$ setting$ it$ up$ as$ another$ exercise$of$the$right.$Thus:$
separate$section$as$if$it$were$a$selfSexecuting$provision?$ $
$ MR.$ ROMULO.$ Under$ Commissioner$ Davide's$ amendment,$ is$ it$ possible$ for$ the$
MR.$ SUAREZ.$ We$ would$ be$ amenable$ except$ that,$ as$ we$ clarified$ a$ while$ ago,$ legislature$to$set$forth$certain$procedures$to$carry$out$the$initiative...?$
this$process$of$initiative$is$limited$to$the$matter$of$amendment$and$should$not$ $
expand$into$a$revision$which$contemplates$a$total$overhaul$of$the$Constitution.$ MR.$DAVIDE.$It$can.$
That$was$the$sense$that$was$conveyed$by$the$Committee.$ $
$ x$x$x$
MS.$AQUINO.$In$other$words,$the$Committee$was$attempting$to$distinguish$the$ $
coverage$ of$ modes$ (a)$ and$ (b)$ in$ Section$ 1$ to$ include$ the$ process$ of$ revision;$
MR.$ ROMULO.$ But$ the$ Commissioners$ amendment$ does$ not$ prevent$ the$ National$ Assembly$ by$ way$ of$ a$ referendum.$ I$ cannot$ agree$ to$ reducing$ the$
legislature$from$asking$another$body$to$set$the$proposition$in$proper$form.$ requirement$ approved$ by$ the$ Committee$ on$ the$ Legislative$ because$ it$ would$
$ require$another$voting$by$the$Committee,$and$the$voting$as$precisely$based$on$a$
MR.$DAVIDE.$The$Commissioner$is$correct.$In$other$words,$the$implementation$ requirement$of$10$percent.$Perhaps,$I$might$present$such$a$proposal,$by$way$of$
of$this$particular$right$would$be$subject$to$legislation,$provided$the$legislature$ an$ amendment,$ when$ the$ Commission$ shall$ take$ up$ the$ Article$ on$ the$
cannot$determine$anymore$the$percentage$of$the$requirement.$ Legislative$or$on$the$National$Assembly$on$plenary$sessions.[39]$
$ $
MR.$ ROMULO.$ But$ the$ procedures,$ including$ the$ determination$ of$ the$ proper$ The$Davide$modified$amendments$to$Section$2$were$subjected$to$amendments,$
form$for$submission$to$the$people,$may$be$subject$to$legislation.$ and$the$final$version,$which$the$Commission$approved$by$a$vote$of$31$in$favor$
$ and$3$against,$reads$as$follows:$
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ As$ long$ as$ it$ will$ not$ destroy$ the$ substantive$ right$ to$ initiate.$ In$ $
other$ words,$ none$ of$ the$ procedures$ to$ be$ proposed$ by$ the$ legislative$ body$ MR.$ DAVIDE.$ Thank$ you$ Madam$ President.$ Section$ 2,$ as$ amended,$ reads$ as$
must$diminish$or$impair$the$right$conceded$here.$ follows:$"AMENDMENT$TO$THIS$CONSTITUTION$MAY$LIKEWISE$BE$DIRECTLY$
$ PROPOSED$ BY$ THE$ PEOPLE$ THROUGH$ INITIATIVE$ UPON$ A$ PETITION$ OF$ AT$
MR.$ROMULO.$In$that$provision$of$the$Constitution$can$the$procedures$which$I$ LEAST$ TWELVE$ PERCENT$ OF$ THE$ TOTAL$ NUMBER$ OF$ REGISTERED$ VOTERS,$
have$discussed$be$legislated?$ OF$ WHICH$ EVERY$ LEGISLATIVE$ DISTRICT$ MUST$ BE$ REPRESENTED$ BY$ AT$
$ LEAST$ THREE$ PERCENT$ OF$ THE$ REGISTERED$ VOTERS$ THEREOF.$ NO$
MR.$DAVIDE.$Yes.[37]$ AMENDMENT$ UNDER$ THIS$ SECTION$ SHALL$ BE$ AUTHORIZED$ WITHIN$ FIVE$
$ YEARS$ FOLLOWING$ THE$ RATIFICATION$ OF$ THIS$ CONSTITUTION$ NOR$
Commissioner$ Davide$ also$ reaffirmed$ that$ his$ modified$ amendment$ strictly$ OFTENER$THAN$ONCE$EVERY$FIVE$YEARS$THEREAFTER.$
confines$initiative$to$AMENDMENTS$to$SS$NOT$REVISION$of$SS$the$Constitution.$ $
Thus:$ THE$ NATIONAL$ ASSEMBLY$ SHALL$ BY$ LAW$ PROVIDE$ FOR$ THE$
$ IMPLEMENTATION$OF$THE$EXERCISE$OF$THIS$RIGHT.[40]$
MR.$DAVIDE.$With$pleasure,$Madam$President.$ $
$ The$ entire$ proposed$ Article$ on$ Amendments$ or$ Revisions$ was$ approved$ on$
MR.$ MAAMBONG.$ My$ first$ question:$ Commissioner$ Davide's$ proposed$ second$ reading$ on$ 9$ July$ 1986.[41]$ Thereafter,$ upon$ his$ motion$ for$
amendment$ on$ line$ 1$ refers$ to$ "amendment."$ Does$ it$ not$ cover$ the$ word$ reconsideration,$ Commissioner$ Gascon$ was$ allowed$ to$ introduce$ an$
"revision"$ as$ defined$ by$ Commissioner$ Padilla$ when$ he$ made$ the$ distinction$ amendment$ to$ Section$ 2$ which,$ nevertheless,$ was$ withdrawn.$ In$ view$ thereof,$
between$the$words$"amendments"$and$"revision"?$ the$ Article$ was$ again$ approved$ on$ Second$ and$ Third$ Readings$ on$ 1$ August$
$ 1986.[42]$
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ No,$ it$ does$ not,$ because$ "amendments"$ and$ "revision"$ should$ be$ $
covered$by$Section$1.$So$insofar$as$initiative$is$concerned,$it$can$only$relate$to$ However,$the$Committee$on$Style$recommended$that$the$approved$Section$2$be$
"amendments"$not$"revision."[38]$ amended$by$changing$percent$to$per$centum$and$thereof$to$therein$and$deleting$
$ the$ phrase$ by$ law$ in$ the$ second$ paragraph$ so$ that$ said$ paragraph$ reads:$ The$
Commissioner$ Davide$ further$ emphasized$ that$ the$ process$ of$ proposing$ Congress[43]$ shall$ provide$ for$ the$ implementation$ of$ the$ exercise$ of$ this$
amendments$ through$ initiative$ must$ be$ more$ rigorous$ and$ difficult$ than$ the$ right.[44]$This$amendment$was$approved$and$is$the$text$of$the$present$second$
initiative$on$legislation.$Thus:$ paragraph$of$Section$2.$
$ $
MR.$ DAVIDE.$ A$ distinction$ has$ to$ be$ made$ that$ under$ this$ proposal,$ what$ is$ The$ conclusion$ then$ is$ inevitable$ that,$ indeed,$ the$ system$ of$ initiative$ on$ the$
involved$is$an$amendment$to$the$Constitution.$To$amend$a$Constitution$would$ Constitution$ under$ Section$ 2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$ not$ selfS
ordinarily$ require$ a$ proposal$ by$ the$ National$ Assembly$ by$ a$ vote$ of$ threeS executory.$
fourths;$and$to$call$a$constitutional$convention$would$require$a$higher$number.$ $
Moreover,$ just$ to$ submit$ the$ issue$ of$ calling$ a$ constitutional$ convention,$ a$ Has$ Congress$ provided$ for$ the$ implementation$ of$ the$ exercise$ of$ this$ right?$
majority$of$the$National$Assembly$is$required,$the$import$being$that$the$process$ Those$who$answer$the$question$in$the$affirmative,$like$the$private$respondents$
of$ amendment$ must$ be$ made$ more$ rigorous$ and$ difficult$ than$ probably$ and$intervenor$Senator$Roco,$point$to$us$R.A.$No.$6735.$
initiating$ an$ ordinary$ legislation$ or$ putting$ an$ end$ to$ a$ law$ proposed$ by$ the$ $
There$is,$of$course,$no$other$better$way$for$Congress$to$implement$the$exercise$ legislative$ body$ upon$ compliance$ with$ the$ requirements$ of$ this$ Act$ is$ hereby$
of$ the$ right$ than$ through$ the$ passage$ of$ a$ statute$ or$ legislative$ act.$ This$ is$ the$ affirmed,$recognized$and$guaranteed.$(Underscoring$supplied).$
essence$ or$ rationale$ of$ the$ last$ minute$ amendment$ by$ the$ Constitutional$ $
Commission$ to$ substitute$ the$ last$ paragraph$ of$ Section$ 2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ then$ The$inclusion$of$the$word$Constitution$therein$was$a$delayed$afterthought.$That$
reading:$ word$is$neither$germane$nor$relevant$to$said$section,$which$exclusively$relates$
$ to$ initiative$ and$ referendum$ on$ national$ laws$ and$ local$ laws,$ ordinances,$ and$
The$Congress[45]$shall$by$law$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$exercise$of$ resolutions.$ That$ section$ is$ silent$ as$ to$ amendments$ on$ the$ Constitution.$ As$
this$right.$ pointed$out$earlier,$initiative$on$the$Constitution$is$confined$only$to$proposals$to$
$ AMEND.$ The$ people$ are$ not$ accorded$ the$ power$ to$ directly$ propose,$ enact,$
with$ approve,$ or$ reject,$ in$ whole$ or$ in$ part,$ the$ Constitution$ through$ the$ system$ of$
$ initiative.$They$can$only$do$so$with$respect$to$laws,$ordinances,$or$resolutions.$
The$Congress$shall$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$exercise$of$this$right.$ $
$ The$foregoing$conclusion$is$further$buttressed$by$the$fact$that$this$section$was$
This$ substitute$ amendment$ was$ an$ investiture$ on$ Congress$ of$ a$ power$ to$ lifted$from$Section$1$of$Senate$Bill$No.$17,$which$solely$referred$to$a$statement$
provide$ for$ the$ rules$ implementing$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ right.$ The$ rules$ means$ of$policy$on$local$initiative$and$referendum$and$appropriately$used$the$phrases$
the$details$on$how$[the$right]$is$to$be$carried$out.[46]$ propose$and$enact,$approve$or$reject$and$in$whole$or$in$part.[52]$
$ $
We$ agree$ that$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ was,$ as$ its$ history$ reveals,$ intended$ to$ cover$ Second.'It'is'true'that'Section$3$(Definition$of$Terms)$of$the$Act$defines$initiative$
initiative$to$propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$The$Act$is$a$consolidation$ on$amendments$to$the$Constitution$and$mentions$it$as$one$of$the$three$systems$
of$House$Bill$No.$21505$and$Senate$Bill$No.$17.$The$former$was$prepared$by$the$ of$ initiative,$ and$ that$ Section$ 5$ (Requirements)$ restates$ the$ constitutional$
Committee$ on$ Suffrage$ and$ Electoral$ Reforms$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ requirements$as$to$the$percentage$of$the$registered$voters$who$must$submit$the$
on$ the$ basis$ of$ two$ House$ Bills$ referred$ to$ it,$ viz.,$ (a)$ House$ Bill$ No.$ 497,[47]$ proposal.$But$unlike$in$the$case$of$the$other$systems$of$initiative,$the$Act$does$
which$dealt$with$the$initiative$and$referendum$mentioned$in$Sections$1$and$32$ not$ provide$ for$ the$ contents$ of$ a$ petition$ for$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution.$
of$ Article$ VI$ of$ the$ Constitution;$ and$ (b)$ House$ Bill$ No.$ 988,[48]$ which$ dealt$ Section$ 5,$ paragraph$ (c)$ requires,$ among$ other$ things,$ statement$ of$ the$
with$ the$ subject$ matter$ of$ House$ Bill$ No.$ 497,$ as$ well$ as$ with$ initiative$ and$ proposed$law$sought$to$be$enacted,$approved$or$rejected,$amended$or$repealed,$
referendum$ under$ Section$ 3$ of$ Article$ X$ (Local$ Government)$ and$ initiative$ as$the$case$may$be.$It$does$not$include,$as$among$the$contents$of$the$petition,$the$
provided$ for$ in$ Section$ 2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ Senate$ Bill$ No.$ provisions$of$the$Constitution$sought$to$be$amended,$in$the$case$of$initiative$on$
17[49]$ solely$ dealt$ with$ initiative$ and$ referendum$ concerning$ ordinances$ or$ the$Constitution.$Said$paragraph$(c)$reads$in$full$as$follows:$
resolutions$ of$ local$ government$ units.$ The$ Bicameral$ Conference$ Committee$ $
consolidated$Senate$Bill$No.$17$and$House$Bill$No.$21505$into$a$draft$bill,$which$ (c)$The$petition$shall$state$the$following:$
was$subsequently$approved$on$8$June$1989$by$the$Senate[50]$and$by$the$House$ $
of$Representatives.[51]$This$approved$bill$is$now$R.A.$No.$6735.$ c.1$ contents$ or$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ law$ sought$ to$ be$ enacted,$ approved$ or$
$ rejected,$amended$or$repealed,$as$the$case$may$be;$
But$ is$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$a$ full$ compliance$ with$ the$ power$ and$ duty$ of$ Congress$ to$ $
provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$exercise$of$the$right?$ c.2$the$proposition;$
$ $
A$careful$scrutiny$of$the$Act$yields$a$negative$answer.$ c.3$the$reason$or$reasons$therefor;$
$ $
First.$Contrary$to$the$assertion$of$public$respondent$COMELEC,$Section$2$of$the$ c.4$that$it$is$not$one$of$the$exceptions$provided$therein;$
Act$does$not$suggest$an$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$The$said$ $
section$reads:$ c.5$signatures$of$the$petitioners$or$registered$voters;$and$
$ $
SECTION$2.$Statement$and$Policy.$SS$The$power$of$the$people$under$a$system$of$ c.6$ an$ abstract$ or$ summary$ proposition$ is$ not$ more$ than$ one$ hundred$ (100)$
initiative$and$referendum$to$directly$propose,$enact,$approve$or$reject,$in$whole$ words$which$shall$be$legibly$written$or$printed$at$the$top$of$every$page$of$the$
or$ in$ part,$ the$ Constitution,$ laws,$ ordinances,$ or$ resolutions$ passed$ by$ any$ petition.$(Underscoring$supplied).$
$
The$use$of$the$clause$proposed$laws$sought$to$be$enacted,$approved$or$rejected,$ Hence,$ to$ complete$ the$ classification$ under$ subtitles$ there$ should$ have$ been$ a$
amended$ or$ repealed$ only$ strengthens$ the$ conclusion$ that$ Section$ 2,$ quoted$ subtitle$on$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution.[53]$
earlier,$excludes$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution.$ $
$ A$further$examination$of$the$Act$even$reveals$that$the$subtitling$is$not$accurate.$
Third.$ While$ the$ Act$ provides$ subtitles$ for$ National$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum$ Provisions$ not$ germane$ to$ the$ subtitle$ on$ National$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum$
(Subtitle$II)$and$for$Local$Initiative$and$Referendum$(Subtitle$III),$no$subtitle$is$ are$placed$therein,$like$(1)$paragraphs$(b)$and$(c)$of$Section$9,$which$reads:$
provided$ for$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution.$ This$ conspicuous$ silence$ as$ to$ the$ $
latter$simply$means$that$the$main$thrust$of$the$Act$is$initiative$and$referendum$ (b)$The$proposition$in$an$initiative$on$the$Constitution$approved$by$the$majority$
on$ national$ and$ local$ laws.$ If$ Congress$ intended$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ to$ fully$ provide$ of$ the$ votes$ cast$ in$ the$ plebiscite$ shall$ become$ effective$ as$ to$ the$ day$ of$ the$
for$ the$ implementation$ of$ the$ initiative$ on$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ it$ plebiscite.$
could$ have$ provided$ for$ a$ subtitle$ therefor,$ considering$ that$ in$ the$ order$ of$ $
things,$the$primacy$of$interest,$or$hierarchy$of$values,$the$right$of$the$people$to$ (c)$ A$ national$ or$ local$ initiative$ proposition$ approved$ by$ majority$ of$ the$ votes$
directly$propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution$is$far$more$important$than$the$ cast$in$an$election$called$for$the$purpose$shall$become$effective$fifteen$(15)$days$
initiative$on$national$and$local$laws.$ after$ certification$ and$ proclamation$ of$ the$ Commission.$ (Underscoring$
$ supplied).$
We$ cannot$ accept$ the$ argument$ that$ the$ initiative$ on$ amendments$ to$ the$ $
Constitution$ is$ subsumed$ under$ the$ subtitle$ on$ National$ Initiative$ and$ (2)$that$portion$of$Section$11$(Indirect$Initiative)'referring'to'indirect$initiative$
Referendum$because$it$is$national$in$scope.$Our$reading$of$Subtitle$II$(National$ with$the$legislative$bodies$of$local$governments;$thus:$
Initiative$ and$ Referendum)$ and$ Subtitle$ III$ (Local$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum)$ $
leaves$no$room$for$doubt$that$the$classification$is$not$based$on$the$scope$of$the$ SEC.$ 11.$ Indirect$ Initiative.$ SS$ Any$ duly$ accredited$ peoples$ organization,$ as$
initiative$ involved,$ but$ on$ its$ nature$ and$ character.$ It$ is$ national$ initiative,$ if$ defined$ by$ law,$ may$ file$ a$ petition$ for$ indirect$ initiative$ with$ the$ House$ of$
what$is$proposed$to$be$adopted$or$enacted$is$a$national$law,$or$a$law$which$only$ Representatives,$and$other$legislative$bodies....$
Congress$ can$ pass.$ It$ is$ local$ initiative$ if$ what$ is$ proposed$ to$ be$ adopted$ or$ $
enacted$is$a$law,$ordinance,$or$resolution$which$only$the$legislative$bodies$of$the$ and$ (3)$ Section$ 12$ on$ Appeal,$ since$ it$ applies$ to$ decisions$ of$ the$ COMELEC$ on$
governments$ of$ the$ autonomous$ regions,$ provinces,$ cities,$ municipalities,$ and$ the$ findings$ of$ sufficiency$ or$ insufficiency$ of$ the$ petition$ for$ initiative$ or$
barangays$ can$ pass.$ This$ classification$ of$ initiative$ into$ national$ and$ local$ is$ referendum,$which$could$be$petitions$for$both$national$and$local$initiative$and$
actually$based$on$Section$3$of$the$Act,$which$we$quote$for$emphasis$and$clearer$ referendum.$
understanding:$ $
$ Upon$ the$ other$ hand,$ Section$ 18$ on$ Authority$ of$ Courts$ under$ subtitle$ III$ on$
SEC.$3.$Definition$of$terms$SS$ Local$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum$ is$ misplaced,[54]$ since$ the$ provision$ therein$
$ applies$to$both$national$and$local$initiative$and$referendum.$It$reads:$
x$x$x$ $
$ SEC.$18.$Authority$of$Courts.$SS$Nothing$in$this$Act$shall$prevent$or$preclude$the$
There$are$three$(3)$systems$of$initiative,$namely:$ proper$courts$from$declaring$null$and$void$any$proposition$approved$pursuant$
$ to$ this$ Act$ for$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution$ or$ want$ of$ capacity$ of$ the$ local$
a.1$ Initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution$ which$ refers$ to$ a$ petition$ proposing$ legislative$body$to$enact$the$said$measure.$
amendments$to$the$Constitution;$ $
$ Curiously,$ too,$ while$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ exerted$ utmost$ diligence$ and$ care$ in$
a.2$Initiative$on$Statutes$which$refers$to$a$petition$proposing$to$enact$a$national$ providing$for$the$details$in$the$implementation$of$initiative$and$referendum$on$
legislation;$and$ national$ and$ local$ legislation$ thereby$ giving$ them$ special$ attention,$ it$ failed,$
$ rather$intentionally,$to$do$so$on$the$system$of$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$
a.3$Initiative$on$local$legislation$which$refers$to$a$petition$proposing$to$enact$a$ Constitution.$Anent$the$initiative$on$national$legislation,$the$Act$provides'for'the'
regional,$ provincial,$ city,$ municipal,$ or$ barangay$ law,$ resolution$ or$ ordinance.$ following:$
(Underscoring$supplied).$ $
$ (a)$ The$ required$ percentage$ of$ registered$ voters$ to$ sign$ the$ petition$ and$ the$
contents$of$the$petition;$
$ Upon$ the$ other$ hand,$ as$ to$ initiative$ on$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ R.A.$
(b)$The$conduct$and$date$of$the$initiative;$ No.$ 6735,$ in$ all$ of$ its$ twentySthree$ sections,$ merely$ (a)$ mentions,$ the$ word$
$ Constitution$in$Section$2;$(b)$defines$initiative$on$the$Constitution$and$includes$
(c)$The$submission$to$the$electorate$of$the$proposition$and$the$required$number$ it$in$the$enumeration$of$the$three$systems$of$initiative$in$Section$3;$(c)$speaks$of$
of$votes$for$its$approval;$ plebiscite$ as$ the$ process$ by$ which$ the$ proposition$ in$ an$ initiative$ on$ the$
$ Constitution$ may$ be$ approved$ or$ rejected$ by$ the$ people;$ (d)$ reiterates$ the$
(d)$The$certification$by$the$COMELEC$of$the$approval$of$the$proposition;$ constitutional$ requirements$ as$ to$ the$ number$ of$ voters$ who$ should$ sign$ the$
$ petition;$and$(e)$provides$for$the$date$of$effectivity$of$the$approved$proposition.$
(e)$ The$ publication$ of$ the$ approved$ proposition$ in$ the$ Official$ Gazette$ or$ in$ a$ $
newspaper$of$general$circulation$in$the$Philippines;$and$ There$ was,$ therefore,$ an$ obvious$ downgrading$ of$ the$ more$ important$ or$ the$
$ paramount$system$of$initiative.$R.A.$No.$6735$thus$delivered$a$humiliating$blow$
(f)$The$effects$of$the$approval$or$rejection$of$the$proposition.[55]$ to$the$system$of$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution$by$merely$paying$
$ it$a$reluctant$lip$service.[57]$
As$regards$local$initiative,$the$Act$provides$for$the$following:$ $
$ The$ foregoing$ brings$ us$ to$ the$ conclusion$ that$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ is$ incomplete,$
(a)$ The$ preliminary$ requirement$ as$ to$ the$ number$ of$ signatures$ of$ registered$ inadequate,$or$wanting$in$essential$terms$and$conditions$insofar$as$initiative$on$
voters$for'the'petition;' amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ is$ concerned.$ Its$ lacunae$ on$ this$ substantive$
' matter$ are$ fatal$ and$ cannot$ be$ cured$ by$ empowering$ the$ COMELEC$ to$
(b)$The$submission$of$the$petition$to$the$local$legislative$body$concerned;$ promulgate$ such$ rules$ and$ regulations$ as$ may$ be$ necessary$ to$ carry$ out$ the$
$ purposes$of$[the]$Act.[58]$
(c)$ The$ effect$ of$ the$ legislative$ bodys$ failure$ to$ favorably$ act$ thereon,$ and$ the$ $
invocation$of$the$power$of$initiative$as$a$consequence$thereof;$ The$rule$is$that$what$has$been$delegated,$cannot$be$delegated$or$as$expressed$in$
$ a$ Latin$ maxim:$ potestas$ delegata$ non$ delegari$ potest.[59]$ The$ recognized$
(d)$The$formulation$of$the$proposition;$ exceptions$to$the$rule$are$as$follows:$
$ $
(e)$The$period$within$which$to$gather$the$signatures;$ (1)$Delegation$of$tariff$powers$to$the$President$under$Section$28(2)$of$Article$VI$
$ of$the$Constitution;$
(f)$The$persons$before$whom$the$petition$shall$be$signed;$ $
$ (2)$ Delegation$ of$ emergency$ powers$ to$ the$ President$ under$ Section$ 23(2)$ of$
(g)$ The$ issuance$ of$ a$ certification$ by$ the$ COMELEC$ through$ its$ official$ in$ the$ Article$VI$of$the$Constitution;$
local$ government$ unit$ concerned$ as$ to$ whether$ the$ required$ number$ of$ $
signatures$have$been$obtained;$ (3)$Delegation$to$the$people$at$large;$
$ $
(h)$The$setting$of$a$date$by$the$COMELEC$for$the$submission$of$the$proposition$ (4)$Delegation$to$local$governments;$and$
to$ the$ registered$ voters$ for$ their$ approval,$ which$ must$ be$ within$ the$ period$ $
specified$therein;$ (5)$Delegation$to$administrative$bodies.[60]$
$ $
(i)$The$issuance$of$a$certification$of$the$result;$ Empowering$ the$ COMELEC,$ an$ administrative$ body$ exercising$ quasiSjudicial$
$ functions,$ to$ promulgate$ rules$ and$ regulations$ is$ a$ form$ of$ delegation$ of$
(j)$The$date$of$effectivity$of$the$approved$proposition;$ legislative$ authority$ under$ no.$ 5$ above.$ However,$ in$ every$ case$ of$ permissible$
$ delegation,$there$must$be$a$showing$that$the$delegation$itself$is$valid.$It$is$valid$
(k)$The$limitations$on$local$initiative;$and$ only$ if$ the$ law$ (a)$ is$ complete$ in$ itself,$ setting$ forth$ therein$ the$ policy$ to$ be$
$ executed,$carried$out,$or$implemented$by$the$delegate;$and$(b)$fixes$a$standard$S
(l)$The$limitations$upon$local$legislative$bodies.[56]$ S$ the$ limits$ of$ which$ are$ sufficiently$ determinate$ and$ determinable$SS$ to$ which$
$ the$delegate$must$conform$in$the$performance$of$his$functions.[61]$A$sufficient$
standard$ is$ one$ which$ defines$ legislative$ policy,$ marks$ its$ limits,$ maps$ out$ its$
boundaries$ and$ specifies$ the$ public$ agency$ to$ apply$ it.$ It$ indicates$ the$ The$ COMELEC$ acquires$ jurisdiction$ over$ a$ petition$ for$ initiative$ only$ after$ its$
circumstances$under$which$the$legislative$command$is$to$be$effected.[62]$ filing.$ The$ petition$ then$ is$ the$ initiatory$ pleading.$ Nothing$ before$ its$ filing$ is$
$ cognizable$ by$ the$ COMELEC,$ sitting$ en$ banc.$ The$ only$ participation$ of$ the$
Insofar$ as$ initiative$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ is$ concerned,$ COMELEC$or$its$personnel$before$the$filing$of$such$petition$are$(1)$to$prescribe$
R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ miserably$ failed$ to$ satisfy$ both$ requirements$ in$ subordinate$ the$ form$ of$ the$ petition;[63]$ (2)$ to$ issue$ through$ its$ Election$ Records$ and$
legislation.$The$delegation$of$the$power$to$the$COMELEC$is$then$invalid.$ Statistics$ Office$ a$ certificate$ on$ the$ total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters$ in$ each$
$ legislative$ district;[64]$ (3)$ to$ assist,$ through$ its$ election$ registrars,$ in$ the$
III$ establishment$ of$ signature$ stations;[65]$ and$ (4)$ to$ verify,$ through$ its$ election$
$ registrars,$ the$ signatures$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ the$ registry$ list$ of$ voters,$ voters$
COMELEC$ RESOLUTION$ NO.$ 2300,$ INSOFAR$ AS$ IT$ PRESCRIBES$ RULES$ AND$ affidavits,$ and$ voters$ identification$ cards$ used$ in$ the$ immediately$ preceding$
REGULATIONS$ ON$ THE$ CONDUCT$ OF$ INITIATIVE$ ON$ AMENDMENTS$ TO$ THE$ election.[66]$
CONSTITUTION,$IS$VOID.$ $
$ Since$ the$ Delfin$ Petition$ is$ not$ the$ initiatory$ petition$ under$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ and$
It$ logically$ follows$ that$ the$ COMELEC$ cannot$ validly$ promulgate$ rules$ and$ COMELEC$Resolution$No.$2300,$it$cannot$be$entertained$or$given$cognizance$of$
regulations$ to$ implement$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ right$ of$ the$ people$ to$ directly$ by$the$COMELEC.$The$latter$knew$that$the$petition$does$not$fall$under$any$of$the$
propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ through$ the$ system$ of$ initiative.$ It$ actions$ or$ proceedings$ under$ the$ COMELEC$ Rules$ of$ Procedure$ or$ under$
does$ not$ have$ that$ power$ under$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735.$ Reliance$ on$ the$ COMELECs$ Resolution$No.$2300,$for$which$reason$it$did$not$assign$to$the$petition$a$docket$
power$under$Section$2(1)$of$Article$IXSC$of$the$Constitution$is$misplaced,$for$the$ number.$ Hence,$ the$ said$ petition$ was$ merely$ entered$ as$ UND,$ meaning,$
laws$ and$ regulations$ referred$ to$ therein$ are$ those$ promulgated$ by$ the$ undocketed.$That$petition$was$nothing$more$than$a$mere$scrap$of$paper,$which$
COMELEC$ under$ (a)$ Section$ 3$ of$ Article$ IXSC$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ or$ (b)$ a$ law$ should$not$have$been$dignified$by$the$Order$of$6$December$1996,$the$hearing$on$
where$ subordinate$ legislation$ is$ authorized$ and$ which$ satisfies$ the$ 12$ December$ 1996,$ and$ the$ order$ directing$ Delfin$ and$ the$ oppositors$ to$ file$
completeness$and$the$sufficient$standard$tests.$ their$memoranda$or$oppositions.$In$so$dignifying$it,$the$COMELEC$acted$without$
$ jurisdiction$ or$ with$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ and$ merely$ wasted$ its$ time,$
IV$ energy,$and$resources.$
$ $
COMELEC$ ACTED$ WITHOUT$ JURISDICTION$ OR$ WITH$ GRAVE$ ABUSE$ OF$ The$ foregoing$ considered,$ further$ discussion$ on$ the$ issue$ of$ whether$ the$
DISCRETION$IN$ENTERTAINING$THE$DELFIN$PETITION.$ proposal$ to$ lift$ the$ term$ limits$ of$ the$ elective$ national$ and$ local$ officials$ is$ an$
$ amendment$to,$and$not$a$revision$of,$the$Constitution$is$rendered$unnecessary,$
Even$if$it$be$conceded$ex$gratia$that$R.A.$No.$6735$is$a$full$compliance$with$the$ if$not$academic.$
power$ of$ Congress$ to$ implement$ the$ right$ to$ initiate$ constitutional$ $
amendments,$ or$ that$ it$ has$ validly$ vested$ upon$ the$ COMELEC$ the$ power$ of$ CONCLUSION$
subordinate$ legislation$ and$ that$ COMELEC$ Resolution$ No.$ 2300$ is$ valid,$ the$ $
COMELEC$ acted$ without$ jurisdiction$ or$ with$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ in$ This$ petition$ must$ then$ be$ granted,$ and$ the$ COMELEC$ should$ be$ permanently$
entertaining$the$Delfin$Petition.$ enjoined$from$entertaining$or$taking$cognizance$of$any$petition$for$initiative$on$
$ amendments$ on$ the$ Constitution$ until$ a$ sufficient$ law$ shall$ have$ been$ validly$
Under$Section$2$of$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution$and$Section$5(b)$of$R.A.$No.$ enacted$to$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$system.$
6735,$a$petition$for$initiative$on$the$Constitution$must$be$signed$by$at$least$12%$ $
of$ the$ total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters$ of$ which$ every$ legislative$ district$ is$ We$ feel,$ however,$ that$ the$ system$ of$ initiative$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$
represented$by$at$least$3%$of$the$registered$voters$therein.$The$Delfin$Petition$ Constitution$ should$ no$ longer$ be$ kept$ in$ the$ cold;$ it$ should$ be$ given$ flesh$ and$
does$ not$ contain$ signatures$ of$ the$ required$ number$ of$ voters.$ Delfin$ himself$ blood,$energy$and$strength.$Congress$should$not$tarry$any$longer$in$complying$
admits$ that$ he$ has$ not$ yet$ gathered$ signatures$ and$ that$ the$ purpose$ of$ his$ with$the$constitutional$mandate$to$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$right$
petition$ is$ primarily$ to$ obtain$ assistance$ in$ his$ drive$ to$ gather$ signatures.$ of$the$people$under$that$system.$
Without$ the$ required$ signatures,$ the$ petition$ cannot$ be$ deemed$ validly$ $
initiated.$ WHEREFORE,$judgment$is$hreby$rendered$
$ $
a)$GRANTING$the$instant$petition;$
$
b)$ DECLARING$ R.A.$ No.$ 6735$ inadequate$ to$ cover$ the$ system$ of$ initiative$ on$
amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution,$ and$ to$ have$ failed$ to$ provide$ sufficient$
standard$for$subordinate$legislation;$
$
c)$DECLARING$void$those$parts$of$Resolutions$No.$2300$of$the$Commission$on$
Elections$ prescribing$ rules$ and$ regulations$ on$ the$ conduct$ of$ initiative$ or$
amendments$to$the$Constitution;$and$
$
d)$ ORDERING$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections$ to$ forthwith$ DISMISS$ the$ DELFIN$
petition$(UNDS96S037).$
$
The$ Temporary$ Restraining$ Order$ issued$ on$ 18$ December$ 1996$ is$ made$
permanent$ as$ against$ the$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ but$ is$ LIFTED$ against$
private$respondents.$
$
Resolution$on$the$matter$of$contempt$is$hereby$reserved.$
$
SO$ORDERED.$
$ $
G.R.$No.$174153$$$$$$$$$$$$$October$25,$2006$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
$ $
RAUL$ L.$ LAMBINO$ and$ ERICO$ B.$ AUMENTADO,$ TOGETHER$ WITH$ 6,327,952$ TRADE$UNION$CONGRESS$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$Intervenor.$
REGISTERED$VOTERS,$Petitioners,$$ $
vs.$ xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
THE$COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS,$Respondent.$ $
$ LUWALHATI$RICASA$ANTONINO,$Intervenor.$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $
$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
ALTERNATIVE$LAW$GROUPS,$INC.,$Intervenor.$ $
$ PHILIPPINE$ CONSTITUTION$ ASSOCIATION$ (PHILCONSA),$ CONRADO$ F.$
x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$ ESTRELLA,$ TOMAS$ C.$ TOLEDO,$ MARIANO$ M.$ TAJON,$ FROILAN$ M.$ BACUNGAN,$
$ JOAQUIN$ T.$ VENUS,$ JR.,$ FORTUNATO$ P.$ AGUAS,$ and$ AMADO$ GAT$ INCIONG,$
ONEVOICE$INC.,$CHRISTIAN$S.MONSOD,$RENE$B.$AZURIN,$MANUEL$L.$QUEZON$ Intervenors.$
III,$ BENJAMIN$ T.$ TOLOSA,$ JR.,$ SUSAN$ V.$ OPLE,$ and$ CARLOS$ P.$ MEDINA,$ JR.,$ $
Intervenors.$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
$ $
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$ RONALD$ L.$ ADAMAT,$ ROLANDO$ MANUEL$ RIVERA,$ and$ RUELO$ BAYA,$
$ Intervenors.$
ATTY.$PETE$QUIRINO$QUADRA,$Intervenor.$ $
$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ $
$ PHILIPPINE$TRANSPORT$AND$GENERAL$WORKERS$ORGANIZATION$(PTGWO)$
BAYAN$ represented$ by$ its$ Chairperson$ Dr.$ Carolina$ PagaduanSAraullo,$ BAYAN$ and$MR.$VICTORINO$F.$BALAIS,$Intervenors.$
MUNA$ represented$ by$ its$ Chairperson$ Dr.$ Reynaldo$ Lesaca,$ KILUSANG$ MAYO$ $
UNO$represented$by$its$Secretary$General$Joel$Maglunsod,$HEAD$represented$by$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
its$Secretary$General$Dr.$Gene$Alzona$Nisperos,$ECUMENICAL$BISHOPS$FORUM$ $
represented$by$Fr.$Dionito$Cabillas,$MIGRANTE$represented$by$its$Chairperson$ SENATE$OF$THE$PHILIPPINES,$represented$by$its$President,$MANUEL$VILLAR,$
Concepcion$ BragasSRegalado,$ GABRIELA$ represented$ by$ its$ Secretary$ General$ JR.,$Intervenor.$
Emerenciana$ de$ Jesus,$ GABRIELA$ WOMEN'S$ PARTY$ represented$ by$ Sec.$ Gen.$ $
Cristina$Palabay,$ANAKBAYAN$represented$by$Chairperson$Eleanor$de$Guzman,$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
LEAGUE$ OF$ FILIPINO$ STUDENTS$ represented$ by$ Chair$ Vencer$ Crisostomo$ $
Palabay,$ JOJO$ PINEDA$ of$ the$ League$ of$ Concerned$ Professionals$ and$ SULONG$BAYAN$MOVEMENT$FOUNDATION,$INC.,$Intervenor.$
Businessmen,$DR.$DARBY$SANTIAGO$of$the$Solidarity$of$Health$Against$Charter$ $
Change,$ DR.$ REGINALD$ PAMUGAS$ of$ Health$ Action$ for$ Human$ Rights,$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
Intervenors.$ $
$ JOSE$ ANSELMO$ I.$ CADIZ,$ BYRON$ D.$ BOCAR,$ MA.$ TANYA$ KARINA$ A.$ LAT,$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ ANTONIO$L.$SALVADOR,$and$RANDALL$TABAYOYONG,$Intervenors.$
$ $
LORETTA$ ANN$ P.$ ROSALES,$ MARIO$ JOYO$ AGUJA,$ and$ ANA$ THERESA$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$x$
HONTIVEROSSBARAQUEL,$Intervenors.$ $
$ INTEGRATED$ BAR$ OF$ THE$ PHILIPPINES,$ CEBU$ CITY$ AND$ CEBU$ PROVINCE$
xSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ CHAPTERS,$Intervenors.$
$ $
ARTURO$M.$DE$CASTRO,$Intervenor.$ x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$
$ $
SENATE$ MINORITY$ LEADER$ AQUILINO$ Q.$ PIMENTEL,$ JR.$ and$ SENATORS$ (3%)$ of$ its$ registered$ voters.$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ also$ claimed$ that$ COMELEC$
SERGIO$R.$OSMENA$III,$JAMBY$MADRIGAL,$JINGGOY$ESTRADA,$ALFREDO$S.$LIM$ election$registrars$had$verified$the$signatures$of$the$6.3$million$individuals.$
and$PANFILO$LACSON,$Intervenors.$ $
$ The$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ petition$ changes$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ by$
x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ modifying$Sections$1S7$of$Article$VI$(Legislative$Department)4$and$Sections$1S4$
$ of$ Article$ VII$ (Executive$ Department)5$ and$ by$ adding$ Article$ XVIII$ entitled$
JOSEPH$EJERCITO$ESTRADA$and$PWERSA$NG$MASANG$PILIPINO,$Intervenors.$ "Transitory$ Provisions."6$ These$ proposed$ changes$ will$ shift$ the$ present$
$ BicameralSPresidential$ system$ to$ a$ UnicameralSParliamentary$ form$ of$
x$SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSx$ government.$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ prayed$ that$ after$ due$ publication$ of$ their$
$ petition,$ the$ COMELEC$ should$ submit$ the$ following$ proposition$ in$ a$ plebiscite$
G.R.$No.$174299$$$$$$$$$$$$$October$25,$2006$ for$the$voters'$ratification:$
$ $
MARSLEN$ABIGAIL$BINAY,$SOFRONIO$UNTALAN,$JR.,$and$RENE$A.V.$SAGUISAG,$ DO$ YOU$ APPROVE$ THE$ AMENDMENT$ OF$ ARTICLES$ VI$ AND$ VII$ OF$ THE$ 1987$
Petitioners,$$ CONSTITUTION,$CHANGING$THE$FORM$OF$GOVERNMENT$FROM$THE$PRESENT$
vs.$ BICAMERALSPRESIDENTIAL$ TO$ A$ UNICAMERALSPARLIAMENTARY$ SYSTEM,$
COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS,$represented$by$Chairman$BENJAMIN$S.$ABALOS,$ AND$ PROVIDING$ ARTICLE$ XVIII$ AS$ TRANSITORY$ PROVISIONS$ FOR$ THE$
SR.,$ and$ Commissioners$ RESURRECCION$ Z.$ BORRA,$ FLORENTINO$ A.$ TUASON,$ ORDERLY$SHIFT$FROM$ONE$SYSTEM$TO$THE$OTHER?$
JR.,$ ROMEO$ A.$ BRAWNER,$ RENE$ V.$ SARMIENTO,$ NICODEMO$ T.$ FERRER,$ and$ $
John$Doe$and$Peter$Doe,,$Respondent.$ On$ 30$ August$ 2006,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ filed$ an$ Amended$ Petition$ with$ the$
$ COMELEC$ indicating$ modifications$ in$ the$ proposed$ Article$ XVIII$ (Transitory$
$ Provisions)$of$their$initiative.7$
D$E$C$I$S$I$O$N$ $
$ The$Ruling$of$the$COMELEC$
$ $
CARPIO,$J.:$ On$31$August$2006,$the$COMELEC$issued$its$Resolution$denying$due$course$to$
$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ petition$ for$ lack$ of$ an$ enabling$ law$ governing$ initiative$
The$Case$ petitions$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution.$ The$ COMELEC$ invoked$ this$ Court's$ ruling$
$ in$ Santiago$ v.$ Commission$ on$ Elections8$ declaring$ RA$ 6735$ inadequate$ to$
These$are$consolidated$petitions$on$the$Resolution$dated$31$August$2006$of$the$ implement$the$initiative$clause$on$proposals$to$amend$the$Constitution.9$
Commission$ on$ Elections$ ("COMELEC")$ denying$ due$ course$ to$ an$ initiative$ $
petition$to$amend$the$1987$Constitution.$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 174153,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ prays$ for$ the$ issuance$ of$ the$ writs$ of$
$ certiorari$ and$ mandamus$ to$ set$ aside$ the$ COMELEC$ Resolution$ of$ 31$ August$
Antecedent$Facts$ 2006$and$to$compel$the$COMELEC$to$give$due$course$to$their$initiative$petition.$
$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ contends$ that$ the$ COMELEC$ committed$ grave$ abuse$ of$
On$ 15$ February$ 2006,$ petitioners$ in$ G.R.$ No.$ 174153,$ namely$ Raul$ L.$ Lambino$ discretion$in$denying$due$course$to$their$petition$since$Santiago$is$not$a$binding$
and$ Erico$ B.$ Aumentado$ ("Lambino$ Group"),$ with$ other$ groups1$ and$ precedent.$Alternatively,$the$Lambino$Group$claims$that$Santiago$binds$only$the$
individuals,$commenced$gathering$signatures$for$an$initiative$petition$to$change$ parties$to$that$case,$and$their$petition$deserves$cognizance$as$an$expression$of$
the$ 1987$ Constitution.$ On$ 25$ August$ 2006,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ filed$ a$ petition$ the$"will$of$the$sovereign$people."$
with$ the$ COMELEC$ to$ hold$ a$ plebiscite$ that$ will$ ratify$ their$ initiative$ petition$ $
under$ Section$ 5(b)$ and$ (c)2$ and$ Section$ 73$ of$ Republic$ Act$ No.$ 6735$ or$ the$ In$ G.R.$ No.$ 174299,$ petitioners$ ("Binay$ Group")$ pray$ that$ the$ Court$ require$
Initiative$and$Referendum$Act$("RA$6735").$ respondent$ COMELEC$ Commissioners$ to$ show$ cause$ why$ they$ should$ not$ be$
$ cited$ in$ contempt$ for$ the$ COMELEC's$ verification$ of$ signatures$ and$ for$
The$ Lambino$ Group$ alleged$ that$ their$ petition$ had$ the$ support$ of$ 6,327,952$ "entertaining"$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ petition$ despite$ the$ permanent$ injunction$
individuals$ constituting$ at$ least$ twelve$ per$ centum$ (12%)$ of$ all$ registered$ in$ Santiago.$ The$ Court$ treated$ the$ Binay$ Group's$ petition$ as$ an$ oppositionSinS
voters,$ with$ each$ legislative$ district$ represented$ by$ at$ least$ three$ per$ centum$ intervention.$
$
In$ his$ Comment$ to$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ petition,$ the$ Solicitor$ General$ joined$ to$ revisit$ Santiago,$ as$ the$ present$ petition$ warrants$ dismissal$ based$ alone$ on$
causes$ with$ the$ petitioners,$ urging$ the$ Court$ to$ grant$ the$ petition$ despite$ the$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ glaring$ failure$ to$ comply$ with$ the$ basic$ requirements$ of$
Santiago$ ruling.$ The$ Solicitor$ General$ proposed$ that$ the$ Court$ treat$ RA$ 6735$ the$Constitution.$For$following$the$Court's$ruling$in$Santiago,$no$grave$abuse$of$
and$ its$ implementing$ rules$ "as$ temporary$ devises$ to$ implement$ the$ system$ of$ discretion$is$attributable$to$the$Commision$on$Elections.$
initiative."$ $
$ 1.$ The$ Initiative$ Petition$ Does$ Not$ Comply$ with$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$
Various$groups$and$individuals$sought$intervention,$filing$pleadings$supporting$ Constitution$on$Direct$Proposal$by$the$People$
or$ opposing$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ petition.$ The$ supporting$ intervenors10$ $
uniformly$hold$the$view$that$the$COMELEC$committed$grave$abuse$of$discretion$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ is$ the$ governing$ constitutional$
in$relying$on$Santiago.$On$the$other$hand,$the$opposing$intervenors11$hold$the$ provision$ that$ allows$ a$ people's$ initiative$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$
contrary$view$and$maintain$that$Santiago$is$a$binding$precedent.$The$opposing$ Constitution.$This$section$states:$
intervenors$ also$ challenged$ (1)$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ standing$ to$ file$ the$ $
petition;$(2)$the$validity$of$the$signature$gathering$and$verification$process;$(3)$ Sec.$ 2.$ Amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution$ may$ likewise$ be$ directly$ proposed$ by$
the$ Lambino$ Group's$ compliance$ with$ the$ minimum$ requirement$ for$ the$ the$people$through$initiative$upon$a$petition$of$at$least$twelve$per$centum$of$the$
percentage$ of$ voters$ supporting$ an$ initiative$ petition$ under$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters$ of$ which$ every$ legislative$ district$ must$ be$
XVII$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution;12$ (4)$ the$ nature$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes$ as$ represented$by$at$least$three$per$centum$of$the$registered$voters$therein.$x$x$x$x$
revisions$and$not$mere$amendments$as$provided$under$Section$2,$Article$XVII$of$ (Emphasis$supplied)$
the$ 1987$ Constitution;$ and$ (5)$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ compliance$ with$ the$ $
requirement$in$Section$10(a)$of$RA$6735$limiting$initiative$petitions$to$only$one$ The$deliberations$of$the$Constitutional$Commission$vividly$explain$the$meaning$
subject.$ of$ an$ amendment$ "directly$ proposed$ by$ the$ people$ through$ initiative$ upon$ a$
$ petition,"$thus:$
The$Court$heard$the$parties$and$intervenors$in$oral$arguments$on$26$September$ $
2006.$ After$ receiving$ the$ parties'$ memoranda,$ the$ Court$ considered$ the$ case$ MR.$ RODRIGO:$ Let$ us$ look$ at$ the$ mechanics.$ Let$ us$ say$ some$ voters$ want$ to$
submitted$for$resolution.$ propose$a$constitutional$amendment.$Is$the$draft$of$the$proposed$constitutional$
$ amendment$ready$to$be$shown$to$the$people$when$they$are$asked$to$sign?$
The$Issues$ $
$ MR.$SUAREZ:$That$can$be$reasonably$assumed,$Madam$President.$
The$petitions$raise$the$following$issues:$ $
$ MR.$RODRIGO:$What$does$the$sponsor$mean?$The$draft$is$ready$and$shown$to$
1.$ Whether$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ petition$ complies$ with$ Section$ 2,$ them$before$they$sign.$Now,$who$prepares$the$draft?$
Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ on$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ through$ a$ $
people's$initiative;$ MR.$SUAREZ:$The$people$themselves,$Madam$President.$
$ $
2.$ Whether$ this$ Court$ should$ revisit$ its$ ruling$ in$ Santiago$ declaring$ RA$ 6735$ MR.$ RODRIGO:$ No,$ because$ before$ they$ sign$ there$ is$ already$ a$ draft$ shown$ to$
"incomplete,$ inadequate$ or$ wanting$ in$ essential$ terms$ and$ conditions"$ to$ them$ and$ they$ are$ asked$ whether$ or$ not$ they$ want$ to$ propose$ this$
implement$the$initiative$clause$on$proposals$to$amend$the$Constitution;$and$ constitutional$amendment.$
$ $
3.$ Whether$ the$ COMELEC$ committed$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ in$ denying$ due$ MR.$ SUAREZ:$ As$ it$ is$ envisioned,$ any$ Filipino$ can$ prepare$ that$ proposal$ and$
course$to$the$Lambino$Group's$petition.$ pass$it$around$for$signature.13$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$ $
The$Ruling$of$the$Court$ Clearly,$the$framers$of$the$Constitution$intended$that$the$"draft$of$the$proposed$
$ constitutional$amendment"$should$be$"ready$and$shown"$to$the$people$"before"$
There$is$no$merit$to$the$petition.$ they$sign$such$proposal.$The$framers$plainly$stated$that$"before$they$sign$there$
$ is$already$a$draft$shown$to$them."$The$framers$also$"envisioned"$that$the$people$
The$Lambino$Group$miserably$failed$to$comply$with$the$basic$requirements$of$ should$ sign$ on$ the$ proposal$ itself$ because$ the$ proponents$ must$ "prepare$ that$
the$Constitution$for$conducting$a$people's$initiative.$Thus,$there$is$even$no$need$ proposal$and$pass$it$around$for$signature."$
$ $
The$essence$of$amendments$"directly$proposed$by$the$people$through$initiative$ Likewise,$in$Kerr$v.$Bradbury,18$the$Court$of$Appeals$of$Oregon$explained:$
upon$a$petition"$is$that$the$entire$proposal$on$its$face$is$a$petition$by$the$people.$ $
This$ means$ two$ essential$ elements$ must$ be$ present.$ First,$ the$ people$ must$ The$ purposes$ of$ "full$ text"$ provisions$ that$ apply$ to$ amendments$ by$ initiative$
author$and$thus$sign$the$entire$proposal.$No$agent$or$representative$can$sign$on$ commonly$ are$ described$ in$ similar$ terms.$ x$ x$ x$ (The$ purpose$ of$ the$ full$ text$
their$ behalf.$ Second,$ as$ an$ initiative$ upon$ a$ petition,$ the$ proposal$ must$ be$ requirement$ is$ to$ provide$ sufficient$ information$ so$ that$ registered$ voters$ can$
embodied$in$a$petition.$ intelligently$evaluate$whether$to$sign$the$initiative$petition.");$x$x$x$(publication$
$ of$full$text$of$amended$constitutional$provision$required$because$it$is$"essential$
These$ essential$ elements$ are$ present$ only$ if$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ for$ the$ elector$ to$ have$ x$ x$ x$ the$ section$ which$ is$ proposed$ to$ be$ added$ to$ or$
amendments$ is$ first$ shown$ to$ the$ people$ who$ express$ their$ assent$ by$ signing$ subtracted$ from.$ If$ he$ is$ to$ vote$ intelligently,$ he$ must$ have$ this$ knowledge.$
such$complete$proposal$in$a$petition.$Thus,$an$amendment$is$"directly$proposed$ Otherwise$ in$ many$ instances$ he$ would$ be$ required$ to$ vote$ in$ the$ dark.")$
by$ the$ people$ through$ initiative$ upon$ a$ petition"$ only$ if$ the$ people$ sign$ on$ a$ (Emphasis$supplied)$
petition$that$contains$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$amendments.$ $
$ Moreover,$ "an$ initiative$ signer$ must$ be$ informed$ at$ the$ time$ of$ signing$ of$ the$
The$full$text$of$the$proposed$amendments$may$be$either$written$on$the$face$of$ nature$ and$ effect$ of$ that$ which$ is$ proposed"$ and$ failure$ to$ do$ so$ is$ "deceptive$
the$petition,$or$attached$to$it.$If$so$attached,$the$petition$must$state$the$fact$of$ and$misleading"$which$renders$the$initiative$void.19$
such$attachment.$This$is$an$assurance$that$every$one$of$the$several$millions$of$ $
signatories$ to$ the$ petition$ had$ seen$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ does$ not$ expressly$ state$ that$ the$
before$signing.$Otherwise,$it$is$physically$impossible,$given$the$time$constraint,$ petition$must$set$forth$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$amendments.$However,$the$
to$prove$that$every$one$of$the$millions$of$signatories$had$seen$the$full$text$of$the$ deliberations$ of$ the$ framers$ of$ our$ Constitution$ clearly$ show$ that$ the$ framers$
proposed$amendments$before$signing.$ intended$to$adopt$the$relevant$American$jurisprudence$on$people's$initiative.$In$
$ particular,$ the$ deliberations$ of$ the$ Constitutional$ Commission$ explicitly$ reveal$
The$ framers$ of$ the$ Constitution$ directly$ borrowed14$ the$ concept$ of$ people's$ that$ the$ framers$ intended$ that$ the$ people$ must$ first$ see$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$
initiative$from$the$United$States$where$various$State$constitutions$incorporate$ proposed$ amendments$ before$ they$ sign,$ and$ that$ the$ people$ must$ sign$ on$ a$
an$ initiative$ clause.$ In$ almost$ all$ States15$ which$ allow$ initiative$ petitions,$ the$ petition$containing$such$full$text.$Indeed,$Section$5(b)$of$Republic$Act$No.$6735,$
unbending$ requirement$ is$ that$ the$ people$ must$ first$ see$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ the$ Initiative$ and$ Referendum$ Act$ that$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ invokes$ as$ valid,$
proposed$ amendments$ before$ they$ sign$ to$ signify$ their$ assent,$ and$ that$ the$ requires$that$the$people$must$sign$the$"petition$x$x$x$as$signatories."$
people$ must$ sign$ on$ an$ initiative$ petition$ that$ contains$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ $
proposed$amendments.16$ The$ proponents$ of$ the$ initiative$ secure$ the$ signatures$ from$ the$ people.$ The$
$ proponents$ secure$ the$ signatures$ in$ their$ private$ capacity$ and$ not$ as$ public$
The$ rationale$ for$ this$ requirement$ has$ been$ repeatedly$ explained$ in$ several$ officials.$ The$ proponents$ are$ not$ disinterested$ parties$ who$ can$ impartially$
decisions$ of$ various$ courts.$ Thus,$ in$ Capezzuto$ v.$ State$ Ballot$ Commission,$ the$ explain$the$advantages$and$disadvantages$of$the$proposed$amendments$to$the$
Supreme$Court$of$Massachusetts,$affirmed$by$the$First$Circuit$Court$of$Appeals,$ people.$ The$ proponents$ present$ favorably$ their$ proposal$ to$ the$ people$ and$ do$
declared:$ not$ present$ the$ arguments$ against$ their$ proposal.$ The$ proponents,$ or$ their$
$ supporters,$often$pay$those$who$gather$the$signatures.$
[A]$ signature$ requirement$ would$ be$ meaningless$ if$ the$ person$ supplying$ the$ $
signature$has$not$first$seen$what$it$is$that$he$or$she$is$signing.$Further,$and$more$ Thus,$there$is$no$presumption$that$the$proponents$observed$the$constitutional$
importantly,$ loose$ interpretation$ of$ the$ subscription$ requirement$ can$ pose$ a$ requirements$ in$ gathering$ the$ signatures.$ The$ proponents$ bear$ the$ burden$ of$
significant$ potential$ for$ fraud.$ A$ person$ permitted$ to$ describe$ orally$ the$ proving$ that$ they$ complied$ with$ the$ constitutional$ requirements$ in$ gathering$
contents$of$an$initiative$petition$to$a$potential$signer,$without$the$signer$having$ the$signatures$S$that$the$petition$contained,$or$incorporated$by$attachment,$the$
actually$examined$the$petition,$could$easily$mislead$the$signer$by,$for$example,$ full$text$of$the$proposed$amendments.$
omitting,$ downplaying,$ or$ even$ flatly$ misrepresenting,$ portions$ of$ the$ petition$ $
that$ might$ not$ be$ to$ the$ signer's$ liking.$ This$ danger$ seems$ particularly$ acute$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ did$ not$ attach$ to$ their$ present$ petition$ with$ this$ Court$ a$
when,$in$this$case,$the$person$giving$the$description$is$the$drafter$of$the$petition,$ copy$of$the$paper$that$the$people$signed$as$their$initiative$petition.$The$Lambino$
who$ obviously$ has$ a$ vested$ interest$ in$ seeing$ that$ it$ gets$ the$ requisite$ Group$ submitted$ to$ this$ Court$ a$ copy$ of$ a$ signature$ sheet20$ after$ the$ oral$
signatures$to$qualify$for$the$ballot.17$(Boldfacing$and$underscoring$supplied)$ arguments$ of$ 26$ September$ 2006$ when$ they$ filed$ their$ Memorandum$ on$ 11$
October$ 2006.$ The$ signature$ sheet$ with$ this$ Court$ during$ the$ oral$ arguments$ Birthdate$
was$the$signature$sheet$attached21$to$the$opposition$in$intervention$filed$on$7$ $
September$2006$by$intervenor$Atty.$Pete$QuirinoSQuadra.$ MM/DD/YY$
$ $
The$ signature$ sheet$ attached$ to$ Atty.$ Quadra's$ opposition$ and$ the$ signature$ Signature$
sheet$ attached$ to$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ Memorandum$ are$ the$ same.$ We$ $
reproduce$below$the$signature$sheet$in$full:$ Verification$
$ $
Province:$ 1$
$ $
City/Municipality:$ $$
$ $
No.$of$ $$
$ $
Verified$ $$
$ $
Signatures:$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
Legislative$District:$ $$
$ $
Barangay:$ 2$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
PROPOSITION:$"DO$YOU$APPROVE$OF$THE$AMENDMENT$OF$ARTICLES$VI$AND$ $$
VII$ OF$ THE$ 1987$ CONSTITUTION,$ CHANGING$ THE$ FORM$ OF$ GOVERNMENT$ $
FROM$ THE$ PRESENT$ BICAMERALSPRESIDENTIAL$ TO$ A$ UNICAMERALS $$
PARLIAMENTARY$ SYSTEM$ OF$ GOVERNMENT,$ IN$ ORDER$ TO$ ACHIEVE$ $
GREATER$ EFFICIENCY,$ SIMPLICITY$ AND$ ECONOMY$ IN$ GOVERNMENT;$ AND$ $$
PROVIDING$ AN$ ARTICLE$ XVIII$ AS$ TRANSITORY$ PROVISIONS$ FOR$ THE$ $
ORDERLY$SHIFT$FROM$ONE$SYSTEM$TO$ANOTHER?"$ $$
$ $
I$ hereby$ APPROVE$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ to$ the$ 1987$ Constitution.$ My$ $$
signature$herein$which$shall$form$part$of$the$petition$for$initiative$to$amend$the$ $
Constitution$signifies$my$support$for$the$filing$thereof.$ 3$
$ $
Precinct$Number$ $$
$ $
Name$ $$
$ $
Last$Name,$First$Name,$M.I.$ $$
$ $
Address$ $$
$ $
$$ 7$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
4$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ 8$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
5$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ 9$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
6$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ 10$
$ $
$$ $$
$ $
$$ The$Lambino$Group$would$have$this$Court$believe$that$they$prepared$the$draft$
$ of$ the$ 30$ August$ 2006$ amended$ petition$ almost$ seven$ months$ earlier$ in$
$$ February$ 2006$ when$ they$ started$ gathering$ signatures.$ Petitioner$ Erico$ B.$
$ Aumentado's$"Verification/Certification"$of$the$25$August$2006$petition,$as$well$
$$ as$ of$ the$ 30$ August$ 2006$ amended$ petition,$ filed$ with$ the$ COMELEC,$ states$ as$
$ follows:$
$$ $
$ I$ have$ caused$ the$ preparation$ of$ the$ foregoing$ [Amended]$ Petition$ in$ my$
$$ personal$capacity$as$a$registered$voter,$for$and$on$behalf$of$the$Union$of$Local$
$ Authorities$of$the$Philippines,$as$shown$by$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02$hereto$
_________________$ attached,$ and$ as$ representative$ of$ the$ mass$ of$ signatories$ hereto.$ (Emphasis$
Barangay$Official$ supplied)$
(Print$Name$and$Sign)$ $
$ The$Lambino$Group$failed$to$attach$a$copy$of$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02$to$
_________________$ the$ present$ petition.$ However,$ the$ "Official$ Website$ of$ the$ Union$ of$ Local$
Witness$ Authorities$of$the$Philippines"22$has$posted$the$full$text$of$Resolution$No.$2006S
(Print$Name$and$Sign)$ 02,$which$provides:$
$ $
__________________$ RESOLUTION$NO.$2006S02$
Witness$ $
(Print$Name$and$Sign)$ RESOLUTION$ SUPPORTING$ THE$ PROPOSALS$ OF$ THE$ PEOPLE'S$
$ CONSULTATIVE$ COMMISSION$ ON$ CHARTER$ CHANGE$ THROUGH$ PEOPLE'S$
There$ is$ not$ a$ single$ word,$ phrase,$ or$ sentence$ of$ text$ of$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ INITIATIVE$ AND$ REFERENDUM$ AS$ A$ MODE$ OF$ AMENDING$ THE$ 1987$
proposed$changes$in$the$signature$sheet.$Neither$does$the$signature$sheet$state$ CONSTITUTION$
that$ the$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes$ is$ attached$ to$ it.$ Petitioner$ Atty.$ Raul$ $
Lambino$ admitted$ this$ during$ the$ oral$ arguments$ before$ this$ Court$ on$ 26$ WHEREAS,$there$is$a$need$for$the$Union$of$Local$Authorities$of$the$Philippines$
September$2006.$ (ULAP)$to$adopt$a$common$stand$on$the$approach$to$support$the$proposals$of$
$ the$People's$Consultative$Commission$on$Charter$Change;$
The$signature$sheet$merely$asks$a$question$whether$the$people$approve$a$shift$ $
from$ the$ BicameralSPresidential$ to$ the$ UnicameralSParliamentary$ system$ of$ WHEREAS,$ ULAP$ maintains$ its$ unqualified$ support$ to$ the$ agenda$ of$ Her$
government.$ The$ signature$ sheet$ does$ not$ show$ to$ the$ people$ the$ draft$ of$ the$ Excellency$ President$ Gloria$ MacapagalSArroyo$ for$ constitutional$ reforms$ as$
proposed$changes$before$they$are$asked$to$sign$the$signature$sheet.$Clearly,$the$ embodied$ in$ the$ ULAP$ Joint$ Declaration$ for$ Constitutional$ Reforms$ signed$ by$
signature$ sheet$ is$ not$ the$ "petition"$ that$ the$ framers$ of$ the$ Constitution$ the$ members$ of$ the$ ULAP$ and$ the$ majority$ coalition$ of$ the$ House$ of$
envisioned$when$they$formulated$the$initiative$clause$in$Section$2,$Article$XVII$ Representatives$in$Manila$Hotel$sometime$in$October$2005;$
of$the$Constitution.$ $
$ WHEREAS,$the$People's$Consultative$Commission$on$Charter$Change$created$by$
Petitioner$ Atty.$ Lambino,$ however,$ explained$ that$ during$ the$ signatureS Her$ Excellency$ to$ recommend$ amendments$ to$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ has$
gathering$ from$ February$ to$ August$ 2006,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ circulated,$ submitted$its$final$report$sometime$in$December$2005;$
together$with$the$signature$sheets,$printed$copies$of$the$Lambino$Group's$draft$ $
petition$ which$ they$ later$ filed$ on$ 25$ August$ 2006$ with$ the$ COMELEC.$ When$ WHEREAS,$ the$ ULAP$ is$ mindful$ of$ the$ current$ political$ developments$ in$
asked$if$his$group$also$circulated$the$draft$of$their$amended$petition$filed$on$30$ Congress$ which$ militates$ against$ the$ use$ of$ the$ expeditious$ form$ of$ amending$
August$ 2006$ with$ the$ COMELEC,$ Atty.$ Lambino$ initially$ replied$ that$ they$ the$1987$Constitution;$
circulated$ both.$ However,$ Atty.$ Lambino$ changed$ his$ answer$ and$ stated$ that$ $
what$ his$ group$ circulated$ was$ the$ draft$ of$ the$ 30$ August$ 2006$ amended$ WHEREAS,$subject$to$the$ratification$of$its$institutional$members$and$the$failure$
petition,$not$the$draft$of$the$25$August$2006$petition.$ of$ Congress$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution$ as$ a$ constituent$ assembly,$ ULAP$ has$
$ unanimously$ agreed$ to$ pursue$ the$ constitutional$ reform$ agenda$ through$
People's$Initiative$and$Referendum$without$prejudice$to$other$pragmatic$means$ and$ paragraph$ 2$ of$ Section$ 5$ of$ the$ Transitory$ Provisions$ were$ inaccurately$
to$pursue$the$same;$ stated$and$failed$to$correctly$reflect$their$proposed$amendments.$
$ $
WHEREFORE,$ BE$ IT$ RESOLVED$ AS$ IT$ IS$ HEREBY$ RESOLVED,$ THAT$ ALL$ THE$ The$Lambino$Group$did$not$allege$that$they$were$amending$the$petition$because$
MEMBERSLEAGUES$ OF$ THE$ UNION$ OF$ LOCAL$ AUTHORITIES$ OF$ THE$ the$ amended$ petition$ was$ what$ they$ had$ shown$ to$ the$ people$ during$ the$
PHILIPPINES$ (ULAP)$ SUPPORT$ THE$ PORPOSALS$ (SIC)$ OF$ THE$ PEOPLE'S$ February$ to$ August$ 2006$ signatureSgathering.$ Instead,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$
CONSULATATIVE$ (SIC)$ COMMISSION$ ON$ CHARTER$ CHANGE$ THROUGH$ alleged$ that$ the$ petition$ of$ 25$ August$ 2006$ "inaccurately$ stated$ and$ failed$ to$
PEOPLE'S$ INITIATIVE$ AND$ REFERENDUM$ AS$ A$ MODE$ OF$ AMENDING$ THE$ correctly$reflect$their$proposed$amendments."$
1987$CONSTITUTION;$ $
$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ never$ alleged$ in$ the$ 25$ August$ 2006$ petition$ or$ the$ 30$
DONE,$ during$ the$ ULAP$ National$ Executive$ Board$ special$ meeting$ held$ on$ 14$ August$2006$amended$petition$with$the$COMELEC$that$they$circulated$printed$
January$2006$at$the$Century$Park$Hotel,$Manila.23$(Underscoring$supplied)$ copies$ of$ the$ draft$ petition$ together$ with$ the$ signature$ sheets.$ Likewise,$ the$
$ Lambino$ Group$ did$ not$ allege$ in$ their$ present$ petition$ before$ this$ Court$ that$
ULAP$ Resolution$ No.$ 2006S02$ does$ not$ authorize$ petitioner$ Aumentado$ to$ they$ circulated$ printed$ copies$ of$ the$ draft$ petition$ together$ with$ the$ signature$
prepare$the$25$August$2006$petition,$or$the$30$August$2006$amended$petition,$ sheets.$ The$ signature$ sheets$ do$ not$ also$ contain$ any$ indication$ that$ the$ draft$
filed$ with$ the$ COMELEC.$ ULAP$ Resolution$ No.$ 2006S02$ "support(s)$ the$ petition$is$attached$to,$or$circulated$with,$the$signature$sheets.$
porposals$ (sic)$ of$ the$ Consulatative$ (sic)$ Commission$ on$ Charter$ Change$ $
through$ people's$ initiative$ and$ referendum$ as$ a$ mode$ of$ amending$ the$ 1987$ It$is$only$in$their$Consolidated$Reply$to$the$OppositionSinSInterventions$that$the$
Constitution."$ The$ proposals$ of$ the$ Consultative$ Commission24$ are$ vastly$ Lambino$Group$first$claimed$that$they$circulated$the$"petition$for$initiative$filed$
different$ from$ the$ proposed$ changes$ of$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ in$ the$ 25$ August$ with$the$COMELEC,"$thus:$
2006$petition$or$30$August$2006$amended$petition$filed$with$the$COMELEC.$ $
$ [T]here$ is$ persuasive$ authority$ to$ the$ effect$ that$ "(w)here$ there$ is$ not$ (sic)$
For$ example,$ the$ proposed$ revisions$ of$ the$ Consultative$ Commission$ affect$ all$ fraud,$a$signer$who$did$not$read$the$measure$attached$to$a$referendum$petition$
provisions$ of$ the$ existing$ Constitution,$ from$ the$ Preamble$ to$ the$ Transitory$ cannot$ question$ his$ signature$ on$ the$ ground$ that$ he$ did$ not$ understand$ the$
Provisions.$The$proposed$revisions$have$profound$impact$on$the$Judiciary$and$ nature$of$the$act."$[82$C.J.S.$S128h.$Mo.$State$v.$Sullivan,$224,$S.W.$327,$283$Mo.$
the$ National$ Patrimony$ provisions$ of$ the$ existing$ Constitution,$ provisions$ that$ 546.]$ Thus,$ the$ registered$ voters$ who$ signed$ the$ signature$ sheets$ circulated$
the$ Lambino$ Group's$ proposed$ changes$ do$ not$ touch.$ The$ Lambino$ Group's$ together$ with$ the$ petition$ for$ initiative$ filed$ with$ the$ COMELEC$ below,$ are$
proposed$ changes$ purport$ to$ affect$ only$ Articles$ VI$ and$ VII$ of$ the$ existing$ presumed$ to$ have$ understood$ the$ proposition$ contained$ in$ the$ petition.$
Constitution,$including$the$introduction$of$new$Transitory$Provisions.$ (Emphasis$supplied)$
$ $
The$ULAP$adopted$Resolution$No.$2006S02$on$14$January$2006$or$more$than$six$ The$Lambino$Group's$statement$that$they$circulated$to$the$people$"the$petition$
months$before$the$filing$of$the$25$August$2006$petition$or$the$30$August$2006$ for$initiative$filed$with$the$COMELEC"$appears$an$afterthought,$made$after$the$
amended$ petition$ with$ the$ COMELEC.$ However,$ ULAP$ Resolution$ No.$ 2006S02$ intervenors$ Integrated$ Bar$ of$ the$ Philippines$ (Cebu$ City$ Chapter$ and$ Cebu$
does$not$establish$that$ULAP$or$the$Lambino$Group$caused$the$circulation$of$the$ Province$Chapters)$and$Atty.$Quadra$had$pointed$out$that$the$signature$sheets$
draft$ petition,$ together$ with$ the$ signature$ sheets,$ six$ months$ before$ the$ filing$ did$ not$ contain$ the$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes.$ In$ their$ Consolidated$ Reply,$
with$the$COMELEC.$On$the$contrary,$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02$casts$grave$ the$Lambino$Group$alleged$that$they$circulated$"the$petition$for$initiative"$but$
doubt$ on$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ claim$ that$ they$ circulated$ the$ draft$ petition$ failed$ to$ mention$ the$ amended$ petition.$ This$ contradicts$ what$ Atty.$ Lambino$
together$with$the$signature$sheets.$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02$does$not$refer$ finally$stated$during$the$oral$arguments$that$what$they$circulated$was$the$draft$
at$all$to$the$draft$petition$or$to$the$Lambino$Group's$proposed$changes.$ of$the$amended$petition$of$30$August$2006.$
$ $
In$ their$ Manifestation$ explaining$ their$ amended$ petition$ before$ the$ COMELEC,$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ cites$ as$ authority$ Corpus$ Juris$ Secundum,$ stating$ that$ "a$
the$Lambino$Group$declared:$ signer$who$did$not$read$the$measure$attached$to$a$referendum$petition$cannot$
$ question$his$signature$on$the$ground$that$he$ did$not$understand$the$nature$of$
After$ the$ Petition$ was$ filed,$ Petitioners$ belatedly$ realized$ that$ the$ proposed$ the$act."$The$Lambino$Group$quotes$an$authority$that$cites$a$proposed$change$
amendments$alleged$in$the$Petition,$more$specifically,$paragraph$3$of$Section$4$ attached$ to$ the$ petition$ signed$ by$ the$ people.$ Even$ the$ authority$ the$ Lambino$
Group$ quotes$ requires$ that$ the$ proposed$ change$ must$ be$ attached$ to$ the$
petition.$The$same$authority$the$Lambino$Group$quotes$requires$the$people$to$ text$of$the$proposed$changes.$If$ever,$not$more$than$one$million$signatories$saw$
sign$on$the$petition$itself.$ the$petition$before$they$signed$the$signature$sheets.$
$ $
Indeed,$ it$ is$ basic$ in$ American$ jurisprudence$ that$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ In$any$event,$the$Lambino$Group's$signature$sheets$do$not$contain$the$full$text$
must$ be$ incorporated$ with,$ or$ attached$ to,$ the$ initiative$ petition$ signed$ by$ the$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes,$ either$ on$ the$ face$ of$ the$ signature$ sheets,$ or$ as$
people.$ In$ the$ present$ initiative,$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ proposed$ changes$ were$ attachment$ with$ an$ indication$ in$ the$ signature$ sheet$ of$ such$ attachment.$
not$ incorporated$ with,$ or$ attached$ to,$ the$ signature$ sheets.$ The$ Lambino$ Petitioner$ Atty.$ Lambino$ admitted$ this$ during$ the$ oral$ arguments,$ and$ this$
Group's$citation$of$Corpus$Juris$Secundum$pulls$the$rug$from$under$their$feet.$ admission$ binds$ the$ Lambino$ Group.$ This$ fact$ is$ also$ obvious$ from$ a$ mere$
$ reading$ of$ the$ signature$ sheet.$ This$ omission$ is$ fatal.$ The$ failure$ to$ so$ include$
It$ is$ extremely$ doubtful$ that$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ prepared,$ printed,$ circulated,$ the$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes$ in$ the$ signature$ sheets$ renders$ the$ initiative$
from$February$to$August$2006$during$the$signatureSgathering$period,$the$draft$ void$ for$ nonScompliance$ with$ the$ constitutional$ requirement$ that$ the$
of$ the$ petition$ or$ amended$ petition$ they$ filed$ later$ with$ the$ COMELEC.$ The$ amendment$must$be$"directly$proposed$by$the$people$through$initiative$upon$a$
Lambino$Group$are$less$than$candid$with$this$Court$in$their$belated$claim$that$ petition."$ The$ signature$ sheet$ is$ not$ the$ "petition"$ envisioned$ in$ the$ initiative$
they$ printed$ and$ circulated,$ together$ with$ the$ signature$ sheets,$ the$ petition$ or$ clause$of$the$Constitution.$
amended$ petition.$ Nevertheless,$ even$ assuming$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ circulated$ $
the$ amended$ petition$ during$ the$ signatureSgathering$ period,$ the$ Lambino$ For$sure,$the$great$majority$of$the$6.3$million$people$who$signed$the$signature$
Group$admitted$circulating$only$very$limited$copies$of$the$petition.$ sheets$ did$ not$ see$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes$ before$ signing.$ They$
$ could$ not$ have$ known$ the$ nature$ and$ effect$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes,$ among$
During$the$oral$arguments,$Atty.$Lambino$expressly$admitted$that$they$printed$ which$are:$
only$100,000$copies$of$the$draft$petition$they$filed$more$than$six$months$later$ $
with$the$COMELEC.$Atty.$Lambino$added$that$he$also$asked$other$supporters$to$ 1.$The$term$limits$on$members$of$the$legislature$will$be$lifted$and$thus$members$
print$additional$copies$of$the$draft$petition$but$he$could$not$state$with$certainty$ of$Parliament$can$be$reSelected$indefinitely;26$
how$many$additional$copies$the$other$supporters$printed.$Atty.$Lambino$could$ $
only$ assure$ this$ Court$ of$ the$ printing$ of$ 100,000$ copies$ because$ he$ himself$ 2.$ The$ interim$ Parliament$ can$ continue$ to$ function$ indefinitely$ until$ its$
caused$the$printing$of$these$100,000$copies.$ members,$ who$ are$ almost$ all$ the$ present$ members$ of$ Congress,$ decide$ to$ call$
$ for$ new$ parliamentary$ elections.$ Thus,$ the$ members$ of$ the$ interim$ Parliament$
Likewise,$ in$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ Memorandum$ filed$ on$ 11$ October$ 2006,$ the$ will$determine$the$expiration$of$their$own$term$of$office;$27$
Lambino$Group$expressly$admits$that$"petitioner$Lambino$initiated$the$printing$ $
and$ reproduction$ of$ 100,000$ copies$ of$ the$ petition$ for$ initiative$ x$ x$ x."25$ This$ 3.$ Within$ 45$ days$ from$ the$ ratification$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes,$ the$ interim$
admission$binds$the$Lambino$Group$and$establishes$beyond$any$doubt$that$the$ Parliament$ shall$ convene$ to$ propose$ further$ amendments$ or$ revisions$ to$ the$
Lambino$Group$failed$to$show$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$changes$to$the$great$ Constitution.28$
majority$of$the$people$who$signed$the$signature$sheets.$ $
$ These$ three$ specific$ amendments$ are$ not$ stated$ or$ even$ indicated$ in$ the$
Thus,$ of$ the$ 6.3$ million$ signatories,$ only$ 100,000$ signatories$ could$ have$ Lambino$Group's$signature$sheets.$The$people$who$signed$the$signature$sheets$
received$ with$ certainty$ one$ copy$ each$ of$ the$ petition,$ assuming$ a$ 100$ percent$ had$no$idea$that$they$were$proposing$these$amendments.$These$three$proposed$
distribution$with$no$wastage.$If$Atty.$Lambino$and$company$attached$one$copy$ changes$are$highly$controversial.$The$people$could$not$have$inferred$or$divined$
of$the$petition$to$each$signature$sheet,$only$100,000$signature$sheets$could$have$ these$proposed$changes$merely$from$a$reading$or$rereading$of$the$contents$of$
circulated$ with$ the$ petition.$ Each$ signature$ sheet$ contains$ space$ for$ ten$ the$signature$sheets.$
signatures.$Assuming$ten$people$signed$each$of$these$100,000$signature$sheets$ $
with$ the$ attached$ petition,$ the$ maximum$ number$ of$ people$ who$ saw$ the$ During$ the$ oral$ arguments,$ petitioner$ Atty.$ Lambino$ stated$ that$ he$ and$ his$
petition$before$they$signed$the$signature$sheets$would$not$exceed$1,000,000.$ group$ assured$ the$ people$ during$ the$ signatureSgathering$ that$ the$ elections$ for$
$ the$ regular$ Parliament$ would$ be$ held$ during$ the$ 2007$ local$ elections$ if$ the$
With$ only$ 100,000$ printed$ copies$ of$ the$ petition,$ it$ would$ be$ physically$ proposed$ changes$ were$ ratified$ before$ the$ 2007$ local$ elections.$ However,$ the$
impossible$for$all$or$a$great$majority$of$the$6.3$million$signatories$to$have$seen$ text$of$the$proposed$changes$belies$this.$
the$petition$before$they$signed$the$signature$sheets.$The$inescapable$conclusion$ $
is$that$the$Lambino$Group$failed$to$show$to$the$6.3$million$signatories$the$full$
The$ proposed$ Section$ 5(2),$ Article$ XVIII$ on$ Transitory$ Provisions,$ as$ found$ in$ this$ Constitution$ consistent$ with$ the$ principles$ of$ local$ autonomy,$
the$amended$petition,$states:$ decentralization$and$a$strong$bureaucracy.$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$ $
Section$ 5(2).$ The$ interim$ Parliament$ shall$ provide$ for$ the$ election$ of$ the$ During$ the$ oral$ arguments,$ Atty.$ Lambino$ stated$ that$ this$ provision$ is$ a$
members$ of$ Parliament,$ which$ shall$ be$ synchronized$ and$ held$ simultaneously$ "surplusage"$ and$ the$ Court$ and$ the$ people$ should$ simply$ ignore$ it.$ Far$ from$
with$the$election$of$all$local$government$officials.$x$x$x$x$(Emphasis$supplied)$ being$a$surplusage,$this$provision$invalidates$the$Lambino$Group's$initiative.$
$ $
Section$5(2)$does$not$state$that$the$elections$for$the$regular$Parliament$will$be$ Section$4(4)$is$a$subject$matter$totally$unrelated$to$the$shift$from$the$BicameralS
held$simultaneously$with$the$2007$local$elections.$This$section$merely$requires$ Presidential$ to$ the$ UnicameralSParliamentary$ system.$ American$ jurisprudence$
that$the$elections$for$the$regular$Parliament$shall$be$held$simultaneously$with$ on$ initiatives$ outlaws$ this$ as$ logrolling$ S$ when$ the$ initiative$ petition$
the$local$elections$without$specifying$the$year.$ incorporates$ an$ unrelated$ subject$ matter$ in$ the$ same$ petition.$ This$ puts$ the$
$ people$ in$ a$ dilemma$ since$ they$ can$ answer$ only$ either$ yes$ or$ no$ to$ the$ entire$
Petitioner$Atty.$Lambino,$who$claims$to$be$the$principal$drafter$of$the$proposed$ proposition,$ forcing$ them$ to$ sign$ a$ petition$ that$ effectively$ contains$ two$
changes,$could$have$easily$written$the$word$"next"$before$the$phrase$"election$ propositions,$one$of$which$they$may$find$unacceptable.$
of$all$local$government$officials."$This$would$have$insured$that$the$elections$for$ $
the$ regular$ Parliament$ would$ be$ held$ in$ the$ next$ local$ elections$ following$ the$ Under$ American$ jurisprudence,$ the$ effect$ of$ logrolling$ is$ to$ nullify$ the$ entire$
ratification$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes.$ However,$ the$ absence$ of$ the$ word$ "next"$ proposition$ and$ not$ only$ the$ unrelated$ subject$ matter.$ Thus,$ in$ Fine$ v.$
allows$ the$ interim$ Parliament$ to$ schedule$ the$ elections$ for$ the$ regular$ Firestone,29$the$Supreme$Court$of$Florida$declared:$
Parliament$simultaneously$with$any$future$local$elections.$ $
$ Combining$ multiple$ propositions$ into$ one$ proposal$ constitutes$ "logrolling,"$
Thus,$the$members$of$the$interim$Parliament$will$decide$the$expiration$of$their$ which,$if$our$judicial$responsibility$is$to$mean$anything,$we$cannot$permit.$The$
own$ term$ of$ office.$ This$ allows$ incumbent$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ very$broadness$of$the$proposed$amendment$amounts$to$logrolling$because$the$
Representatives$ to$ hold$ office$ beyond$ their$ current$ threeSyear$ term$ of$ office,$ electorate$ cannot$ know$ what$ it$ is$ voting$ on$ S$ the$ amendment's$ proponents'$
and$possibly$even$beyond$the$fiveSyear$term$of$office$of$regular$members$of$the$ simplistic$explanation$reveals$only$the$tip$of$the$iceberg.$x$x$x$x$The$ballot$must$
Parliament.$ Certainly,$ this$ is$ contrary$ to$ the$ representations$ of$ Atty.$ Lambino$ give$the$electorate$fair$notice$of$the$proposed$amendment$being$voted$on.$x$x$x$
and$ his$ group$ to$ the$ 6.3$ million$ people$ who$ signed$ the$ signature$ sheets.$ Atty.$ x$The$ballot$language$in$the$instant$case$fails$to$do$that.$The$very$broadness$of$
Lambino$and$his$group$deceived$the$6.3$million$signatories,$and$even$the$entire$ the$ proposal$ makes$ it$ impossible$ to$ state$ what$ it$ will$ affect$ and$ effect$ and$
nation.$ violates$the$requirement$that$proposed$amendments$embrace$only$one$subject.$
$ (Emphasis$supplied)$
This$lucidly$shows$the$absolute$need$for$the$people$to$sign$an$initiative$petition$ $
that$ contains$ the$ full$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendments$ to$ avoid$ fraud$ or$ Logrolling$ confuses$ and$ even$ deceives$ the$ people.$ In$ Yute$ Air$ Alaska$ v.$
misrepresentation.$ In$ the$ present$ initiative,$ the$ 6.3$ million$ signatories$ had$ to$ McAlpine,30$the$Supreme$Court$of$Alaska$warned$against$"inadvertence,$stealth$
rely$on$the$verbal$representations$of$Atty.$Lambino$and$his$group$because$the$ and$fraud"$in$logrolling:$
signature$sheets$did$not$contain$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$changes.$The$result$ $
is$a$grand$deception$on$the$6.3$million$signatories$who$were$led$to$believe$that$ Whenever$a$bill$becomes$law$through$the$initiative$process,$all$of$the$problems$
the$ proposed$ changes$ would$ require$ the$ holding$ in$ 2007$ of$ elections$ for$ the$ that$the$singleSsubject$rule$was$enacted$to$prevent$are$exacerbated.$There$is$a$
regular$Parliament$simultaneously$with$the$local$elections.$ greater$danger$of$logrolling,$or$the$deliberate$intermingling$of$issues$to$increase$
$ the$ likelihood$ of$ an$ initiative's$ passage,$ and$ there$ is$ a$ greater$ opportunity$ for$
The$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ springs$ another$ surprise$ on$ the$ people$ who$ "inadvertence,$ stealth$ and$ fraud"$ in$ the$ enactmentSbySinitiative$ process.$ The$
signed$ the$ signature$ sheets.$ The$ proposed$ changes$ mandate$ the$ interim$ drafters$of$an$initiative$operate$independently$of$any$structured$or$supervised$
Parliament$ to$ make$ further$ amendments$ or$ revisions$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ The$ process.$They$often$emphasize$particular$provisions$of$their$proposition,$while$
proposed$Section$4(4),$Article$XVIII$on$Transitory$Provisions,$provides:$ remaining$ silent$ on$ other$ (more$ complex$ or$ less$ appealing)$ provisions,$ when$
$ communicating$ to$ the$ public.$ x$ x$ x$ Indeed,$ initiative$ promoters$ typically$ use$
Section$4(4).$Within$fortySfive$days$from$ratification$of$these$amendments,$the$ simplistic$advertising$to$present$their$initiative$to$potential$petitionSsigners$and$
interim$ Parliament$ shall$ convene$ to$ propose$ amendments$ to,$ or$ revisions$ of,$ eventual$voters.$Many$voters$will$never$read$the$full$text$of$the$initiative$before$
the$election.$More$importantly,$there$is$no$process$for$amending$or$splitting$the$
several$provisions$in$an$initiative$proposal.$These$difficulties$clearly$distinguish$ 2010,$ the$ Prime$ Minister$ will$ come$ only$ from$ the$ present$ members$ of$ the$
the$initiative$from$the$legislative$process.$(Emphasis$supplied)$ House$of$Representatives$to$the$exclusion$of$the$present$Senators.$
$ $
Thus,$ the$ present$ initiative$ appears$ merely$ a$ preliminary$ step$ for$ further$ The$ signature$ sheets$ do$ not$ explain$ this$ discrimination$ against$ the$ Senators.$
amendments$ or$ revisions$ to$ be$ undertaken$ by$ the$ interim$ Parliament$ as$ a$ The$ 6.3$ million$ people$ who$ signed$ the$ signature$ sheets$ could$ not$ have$ known$
constituent$ assembly.$ The$ people$ who$ signed$ the$ signature$ sheets$ could$ not$ that$their$signatures$would$be$used$to$discriminate$against$the$Senators.$They$
have$ known$ that$ their$ signatures$ would$ be$ used$ to$ propose$ an$ amendment$ could$not$have$known$that$their$signatures$would$be$used$to$limit,$after$30$June$
mandating$the$interim$Parliament$to$propose$further$amendments$or$revisions$ 2010,$the$interim$Parliament's$choice$of$Prime$Minister$only$to$members$of$the$
to$the$Constitution.$ existing$House$of$Representatives.$
$ $
Apparently,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ inserted$ the$ proposed$ Section$ 4(4)$ to$ compel$ An$ initiative$ that$ gathers$ signatures$ from$ the$ people$ without$ first$ showing$ to$
the$interim$Parliament$to$amend$or$revise$again$the$Constitution$within$45$days$ the$people$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$amendments$is$most$likely$a$deception,$
from$ratification$of$the$proposed$changes,$or$before$the$May$2007$elections.$In$ and$can$operate$as$a$gigantic$fraud$on$the$people.$That$is$why$the$Constitution$
the$ absence$ of$ the$ proposed$ Section$ 4(4),$ the$ interim$ Parliament$ has$ the$ requires$ that$ an$ initiative$ must$ be$ "directly$ proposed$ by$ the$ people$ x$ x$ x$ in$ a$
discretion$ whether$ to$ amend$ or$ revise$ again$ the$ Constitution.$ With$ the$ petition"$S$meaning$that$the$people$must$sign$on$a$petition$that$contains$the$full$
proposed$ Section$ 4(4),$ the$ initiative$ proponents$ want$ the$ interim$ Parliament$ text$of$the$proposed$amendments.$On$so$vital$an$issue$as$amending$the$nation's$
mandated$to$immediately$amend$or$revise$again$the$Constitution.$ fundamental$law,$the$writing$of$the$text$of$the$proposed$amendments$cannot$be$
$ hidden$ from$ the$ people$ under$ a$ general$ or$ special$ power$ of$ attorney$ to$
However,$ the$ signature$ sheets$ do$ not$ explain$ the$ reason$ for$ this$ rush$ in$ unnamed,$faceless,$and$unelected$individuals.$
amending$ or$ revising$ again$ so$ soon$ the$ Constitution.$ The$ signature$ sheets$ do$ $
not$ also$ explain$ what$ specific$ amendments$ or$ revisions$ the$ initiative$ The$ Constitution$ entrusts$ to$ the$ people$ the$ power$ to$ directly$ propose$
proponents$ want$ the$ interim$ Parliament$ to$ make,$ and$ why$ there$ is$ a$ need$ for$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ This$ Court$ trusts$ the$ wisdom$ of$ the$ people$
such$further$amendments$or$revisions.$The$people$are$again$left$in$the$dark$to$ even$if$the$members$of$this$Court$do$not$personally$know$the$people$who$sign$
fathom$ the$ nature$ and$ effect$ of$ the$ proposed$ changes.$ Certainly,$ such$ an$ the$petition.$However,$this$trust$emanates$from$a$fundamental$assumption:$the$
initiative$ is$ not$ "directly$ proposed$ by$ the$ people"$ because$ the$ people$ do$ not$ full$ text$ of$ the$ proposed$ amendment$ is$ first$ shown$ to$ the$ people$ before$ they$
even$know$the$nature$and$effect$of$the$proposed$changes.$ sign$the$petition,$not$after$they$have$signed$the$petition.$
$ $
There$is$another$intriguing$provision$inserted$in$the$Lambino$Group's$amended$ In$short,$the$Lambino$Group's$initiative$is$void$and$unconstitutional$because$it$
petition$ of$ 30$ August$ 2006.$ The$ proposed$ Section$ 4(3)$ of$ the$ Transitory$ dismally$ fails$ to$ comply$ with$ the$ requirement$ of$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$
Provisions$states:$ Constitution$ that$ the$ initiative$ must$ be$ "directly$ proposed$ by$ the$ people$
$ through$initiative$upon$a$petition."$
Section$ 4(3).$ Senators$ whose$ term$ of$ office$ ends$ in$ 2010$ shall$ be$ members$ of$ $
Parliament$until$noon$of$the$thirtieth$day$of$June$2010.$ 2.$The$Initiative$Violates$Section$2,$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution$Disallowing$
$ Revision$through$Initiatives$
After$30$June$2010,$not$one$of$the$present$Senators$will$remain$as$member$of$ $
Parliament$if$the$interim$Parliament$does$not$schedule$elections$for$the$regular$ A$people's$initiative$to$change$the$Constitution$applies$only$to$an$amendment$of$
Parliament$by$30$June$2010.$However,$there$is$no$counterpart$provision$for$the$ the$Constitution$and$not$to$its$revision.$In$contrast,$Congress$or$a$constitutional$
present$ members$ of$ the$ House$ of$ Representatives$ even$ if$ their$ term$ of$ office$ convention$ can$ propose$ both$ amendments$ and$ revisions$ to$ the$ Constitution.$
will$all$end$on$30$June$2007,$three$years$earlier$than$that$of$half$of$the$present$ Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution$provides:$
Senators.$ Thus,$ all$ the$ present$ members$ of$ the$ House$ will$ remain$ members$ of$ $
the$interim$Parliament$after$30$June$2010.$ ARTICLE$XVII$
$ AMENDMENTS$OR$REVISIONS$
The$ term$ of$ the$ incumbent$ President$ ends$ on$ 30$ June$ 2010.$ Thereafter,$ the$ $
Prime$ Minister$ exercises$ all$ the$ powers$ of$ the$ President.$ If$ the$ interim$ Sec.$1.$Any$amendment$to,$or$revision$of,$this$Constitution$may$be$proposed$by:$
Parliament$ does$ not$ schedule$ elections$ for$ the$ regular$ Parliament$ by$ 30$ June$ $
(1)$The$Congress,$upon$a$vote$of$threeSfourths$of$all$its$Members,$or$
$ $
(2)$A$constitutional$convention.$ MR.$ SUAREZ:$ We$ would$ be$ amenable$ except$ that,$ as$ we$ clarified$ a$ while$ ago,$
$ this$process$of$initiative$is$limited$to$the$matter$of$amendment$and$should$not$
Sec.$ 2.$ Amendments$ to$ this$ Constitution$ may$ likewise$ be$ directly$ proposed$ by$ expand$into$a$revision$which$contemplates$a$total$overhaul$of$the$Constitution.$
the$people$through$initiative$x$x$x.$(Emphasis$supplied)$ That$was$the$sense$that$was$conveyed$by$the$Committee.$
$ $
Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ speaks$ of$ three$ modes$ of$ amending$ the$ MS.$AQUINO:$In$other$words,$the$Committee$was$attempting$to$distinguish$the$
Constitution.$The$first$mode$is$through$Congress$upon$threeSfourths$vote$of$all$ coverage$ of$ modes$ (a)$ and$ (b)$ in$ Section$ 1$ to$ include$ the$ process$ of$ revision;$
its$Members.$The$second$mode$is$through$a$constitutional$convention.$The$third$ whereas,$the$process$of$initiation$to$amend,$which$is$given$to$the$public,$would$
mode$is$through$a$people's$initiative.$ only$apply$to$amendments?$
$ $
Section$ 1$ of$ Article$ XVII,$ referring$ to$ the$ first$ and$ second$ modes,$ applies$ to$ MR.$SUAREZ:$That$is$right.$Those$were$the$terms$envisioned$in$the$Committee.$
"[A]ny$amendment$to,$or$revision$of,$this$Constitution."$In$contrast,$Section$2$of$ $
Article$XVII,$referring$to$the$third$mode,$applies$only$to$"[A]mendments$to$this$ MS.$AQUINO:$I$thank$the$sponsor;$and$thank$you,$Madam$President.$
Constitution."$ This$ distinction$ was$ intentional$ as$ shown$ by$ the$ following$ $
deliberations$of$the$Constitutional$Commission:$ x$x$x$x$
$ $
MR.$SUAREZ:$Thank$you,$Madam$President.$ MR.$ MAAMBONG:$ My$ first$ question:$ Commissioner$ Davide's$ proposed$
$ amendment$ on$ line$ 1$ refers$ to$ "amendments."$ Does$ it$ not$ cover$ the$ word$
May$ we$ respectfully$ call$ the$ attention$ of$ the$ Members$ of$ the$ Commission$ that$ "revision"$ as$ defined$ by$ Commissioner$ Padilla$ when$ he$ made$ the$ distinction$
pursuant$ to$ the$ mandate$ given$ to$ us$ last$ night,$ we$ submitted$ this$ afternoon$ a$ between$the$words$"amendments"$and$"revision"?$
complete$ Committee$ Report$ No.$ 7$ which$ embodies$ the$ proposed$ provision$ $
governing$ the$ matter$ of$ initiative.$ This$ is$ now$ covered$ by$ Section$ 2$ of$ the$ MR.$ DAVIDE:$ No,$ it$ does$ not,$ because$ "amendments"$ and$ "revision"$ should$ be$
complete$ committee$ report.$ With$ the$ permission$ of$ the$ Members,$ may$ I$ quote$ covered$by$Section$1.$So$insofar$as$initiative$is$concerned,$it$can$only$relate$to$
Section$2:$ "amendments"$not$"revision."$
$ $
The$people$may,$after$five$years$from$the$date$of$the$last$plebiscite$held,$directly$ MR.$MAAMBONG:$Thank$you.31$(Emphasis$supplied)$
propose$amendments$to$this$Constitution$thru$initiative$upon$petition$of$at$least$ $
ten$percent$of$the$registered$voters.$ There$can$be$no$mistake$about$it.$The$framers$of$the$Constitution$intended,$and$
$ wrote,$ a$ clear$ distinction$ between$ "amendment"$ and$ "revision"$ of$ the$
This$ completes$ the$ blanks$ appearing$ in$ the$ original$ Committee$ Report$ No.$ 7.$ Constitution.$ The$ framers$ intended,$ and$ wrote,$ that$ only$ Congress$ or$ a$
This$proposal$was$suggested$on$the$theory$that$this$matter$of$initiative,$which$ constitutional$ convention$ may$ propose$ revisions$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ The$
came$ about$ because$ of$ the$ extraordinary$ developments$ this$ year,$ has$ to$ be$ framers$ intended,$ and$ wrote,$ that$ a$ people's$ initiative$ may$ propose$ only$
separated$from$the$traditional$modes$of$amending$the$Constitution$as$embodied$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ Where$ the$ intent$ and$ language$ of$ the$
in$Section$1.$The$committee$members$felt$that$this$system$of$initiative$should$be$ Constitution$clearly$withhold$from$the$people$the$power$to$propose$revisions$to$
limited$to$amendments$to$the$Constitution$and$should$not$extend$to$the$revision$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ people$ cannot$ propose$ revisions$ even$ as$ they$ are$
of$the$entire$Constitution,$so$we$removed$it$from$the$operation$of$Section$1$of$ empowered$to$propose$amendments.$
the$proposed$Article$on$Amendment$or$Revision.$x$x$x$x$ $
$ This$has$been$the$consistent$ruling$of$state$supreme$courts$in$the$United$States.$
x$x$x$x$ Thus,$in$McFadden$v.$Jordan,32$the$Supreme$Court$of$California$ruled:$
$ $
MS.$AQUINO:$[I]$am$seriously$bothered$by$providing$this$process$of$initiative$as$ The$initiative$power$reserved$by$the$people$by$amendment$to$the$Constitution$x$
a$ separate$ section$ in$ the$ Article$ on$ Amendment.$ Would$ the$ sponsor$ be$ x$ x$ applies$ only$ to$ the$ proposing$ and$ the$ adopting$ or$ rejecting$ of$ 'laws$ and$
amenable$ to$ accepting$ an$ amendment$ in$ terms$ of$ realigning$ Section$ 2$ as$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution'$ and$ does$ not$ purport$ to$ extend$ to$ a$
another$ subparagraph$ (c)$ of$ Section$ 1,$ instead$ of$ setting$ it$ up$ as$ another$ constitutional$revision.$x$x$x$x$It$is$thus$clear$that$a$revision$of$the$Constitution$
separate$section$as$if$it$were$a$selfSexecuting$provision?$ may$ be$ accomplished$ only$ through$ ratification$ by$ the$ people$ of$ a$ revised$
constitution$ proposed$ by$ a$ convention$ called$ for$ that$ purpose$ as$ outlined$ revise$a$constitution$in$a$manner$other$than$the$one$provided$in$the$instrument$
hereinabove.$ Consequently$ if$ the$ scope$ of$ the$ proposed$ initiative$ measure$ is$ almost$ invariably$ treated$ as$ extraSconstitutional$ and$ revolutionary.$ x$ x$ x$ x$
(hereinafter$ termed$ 'the$ measure')$ now$ before$ us$ is$ so$ broad$ that$ if$ such$ "While$ it$ is$ universally$ conceded$ that$ the$ people$ are$ sovereign$ and$ that$ they$
measure$ became$ law$ a$ substantial$ revision$ of$ our$ present$ state$ Constitution$ have$power$to$adopt$a$constitution$and$to$change$their$own$work$at$will,$they$
would$ be$ effected,$ then$ the$ measure$ may$ not$ properly$ be$ submitted$ to$ the$ must,$ in$ doing$ so,$ act$ in$ an$ orderly$ manner$ and$ according$ to$ the$ settled$
electorate$until$and$unless$it$is$first$agreed$upon$by$a$constitutional$convention,$ principles$ of$ constitutional$ law.$ And$ where$ the$ people,$ in$ adopting$ a$
and$the$writ$sought$by$petitioner$should$issue.$x$x$x$x$(Emphasis$supplied)$ constitution,$ have$ prescribed$ the$ method$ by$ which$ the$ people$ may$ alter$ or$
$ amend$ it,$ an$ attempt$ to$ change$ the$ fundamental$ law$ in$ violation$ of$ the$ selfS
Likewise,$the$Supreme$Court$of$Oregon$ruled$in$Holmes$v.$Appling:33$ imposed$restrictions,$is$unconstitutional."$x$x$x$x$(Emphasis$supplied)$
$ $
It$is$well$established$that$when$a$constitution$specifies$the$manner$in$which$it$ This$ Court,$ whose$ members$ are$ sworn$ to$ defend$ and$ protect$ the$ Constitution,$
may$be$amended$or$revised,$it$can$be$altered$by$those$who$favor$amendments,$ cannot$shirk$from$its$solemn$oath$and$duty$to$insure$compliance$with$the$clear$
revision,$ or$ other$ change$ only$ through$ the$ use$ of$ one$ of$ the$ specified$ means.$ command$of$the$Constitution$$that$a$people's$initiative$may$only$amend,$never$
The$ constitution$ itself$ recognizes$ that$ there$ is$ a$ difference$ between$ an$ revise,$the$Constitution.$
amendment$ and$ a$ revision;$ and$ it$ is$ obvious$ from$ an$ examination$ of$ the$ $
measure$here$in$question$that$it$is$not$an$amendment$as$that$term$is$generally$ The$ question$ is,$ does$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ constitute$ an$ amendment$
understood$and$as$it$is$used$in$Article$IV,$Section$1.$The$document$appears$to$be$ or$ revision$ of$ the$ Constitution?$ If$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ constitutes$ a$
based$ in$ large$ part$ on$ the$ revision$ of$ the$ constitution$ drafted$ by$ the$ revision,$ then$ the$ present$ petition$ should$ be$ dismissed$ for$ being$ outside$ the$
'Commission$ for$ Constitutional$ Revision'$ authorized$ by$ the$ 1961$ Legislative$ scope$of$Section$2,$Article$XVII$of$the$Constitution.$
Assembly,$ x$ x$ x$ and$ submitted$ to$ the$ 1963$ Legislative$ Assembly.$ It$ failed$ to$ $
receive$ in$ the$ Assembly$ the$ twoSthird's$ majority$ vote$ of$ both$ houses$ required$ Courts$ have$ long$ recognized$ the$ distinction$ between$ an$ amendment$ and$ a$
by$Article$XVII,$Section$2,$and$hence$failed$of$adoption,$x$x$x.$ revision$ of$ a$ constitution.$ One$ of$ the$ earliest$ cases$ that$ recognized$ the$
$ distinction$described$the$fundamental$difference$in$this$manner:$
While$ differing$ from$ that$ document$ in$ material$ respects,$ the$ measure$ $
sponsored$ by$ the$ plaintiffs$ is,$ nevertheless,$ a$ thorough$ overhauling$ of$ the$ [T]he$ very$ term$ "constitution"$ implies$ an$ instrument$ of$ a$ permanent$ and$
present$constitution$x$x$x.$ abiding$nature,$and$the$provisions$contained$therein$for$its$revision$indicate$the$
$ will$of$the$people$that$the$underlying$principles$upon$which$it$rests,$as$well$as$
To$call$it$an$amendment$is$a$misnomer.$ the$ substantial$ entirety$ of$ the$ instrument,$ shall$ be$ of$ a$ like$ permanent$ and$
$ abiding$ nature.$ On$ the$ other$ hand,$ the$ significance$ of$ the$ term$ "amendment"$
Whether$it$be$a$revision$or$a$new$constitution,$it$is$not$such$a$measure$as$can$be$ implies$such$an$addition$or$change$within$the$lines$of$the$original$instrument$as$
submitted$ to$ the$ people$ through$ the$ initiative.$ If$ a$ revision,$ it$ is$ subject$ to$ the$ will$ effect$ an$ improvement,$ or$ better$ carry$ out$ the$ purpose$ for$ which$ it$ was$
requirements$ of$ Article$ XVII,$ Section$ 2(1);$ if$ a$ new$ constitution,$ it$ can$ only$ be$ framed.35$(Emphasis$supplied)$
proposed$at$a$convention$called$in$the$manner$provided$in$Article$XVII,$Section$ $
1.$x$x$x$x$ Revision$ broadly$ implies$ a$ change$ that$ alters$ a$ basic$ principle$ in$ the$
$ constitution,$like$altering$the$principle$of$separation$of$powers$or$the$system$of$
Similarly,$ in$ this$ jurisdiction$ there$ can$ be$ no$ dispute$ that$ a$ people's$ initiative$ checksSandSbalances.$ There$ is$ also$ revision$ if$ the$ change$ alters$ the$ substantial$
can$ only$ propose$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution$ since$ the$ Constitution$ itself$ entirety$of$the$constitution,$as$when$the$change$affects$substantial$provisions$of$
limits$ initiatives$ to$ amendments.$ There$ can$ be$ no$ deviation$ from$ the$ the$constitution.$On$the$other$hand,$amendment$broadly$refers$to$a$change$that$
constitutionally$ prescribed$ modes$ of$ revising$ the$ Constitution.$ A$ popular$ adds,$reduces,$or$deletes$without$altering$the$basic$principle$involved.$Revision$
clamor,$ even$ one$ backed$ by$ 6.3$ million$ signatures,$ cannot$ justify$ a$ deviation$ generally$ affects$ several$ provisions$ of$ the$ constitution,$ while$ amendment$
from$the$specific$modes$prescribed$in$the$Constitution$itself.$ generally$affects$only$the$specific$provision$being$amended.$
$ $
As$the$Supreme$Court$of$Oklahoma$ruled$in$In$re$Initiative$Petition$No.$364:34$ In$California$where$the$initiative$clause$allows$amendments$but$not$revisions$to$
$ the$constitution$just$like$in$our$Constitution,$courts$have$developed$a$twoSpart$
It$is$a$fundamental$principle$that$a$constitution$can$only$be$revised$or$amended$ test:$ the$ quantitative$ test$ and$ the$ qualitative$ test.$ The$ quantitative$ test$ asks$
in$ the$ manner$ prescribed$ by$ the$ instrument$ itself,$ and$ that$ any$ attempt$ to$ whether$ the$ proposed$ change$ is$ "so$ extensive$ in$ its$ provisions$ as$ to$ change$
directly$the$'substantial$entirety'$of$the$constitution$by$the$deletion$or$alteration$ An$ amendment$ envisages$ an$ alteration$ of$ one$ or$ a$ few$ specific$ and$ separable$
of$ numerous$ existing$ provisions."36$ The$ court$ examines$ only$ the$ number$ of$ provisions.$ The$ guiding$ original$ intention$ of$ an$ amendment$ is$ to$ improve$
provisions$affected$and$does$not$consider$the$degree$of$the$change.$ specific$ parts$ or$ to$ add$ new$ provisions$ deemed$ necessary$ to$ meet$ new$
$ conditions$ or$ to$ suppress$ specific$ portions$ that$ may$ have$ become$ obsolete$ or$
The$qualitative$test$inquires$into$the$qualitative$effects$of$the$proposed$change$ that$ are$ judged$ to$ be$ dangerous.$ In$ revision,$ however,$ the$ guiding$ original$
in$ the$ constitution.$ The$ main$ inquiry$ is$ whether$ the$ change$ will$ "accomplish$ intention$and$plan$contemplates$a$reSexamination$of$the$entire$document,$or$of$
such$ far$ reaching$ changes$ in$ the$ nature$ of$ our$ basic$ governmental$ plan$ as$ to$ provisions$ of$ the$ document$ which$ have$ overSall$ implications$ for$ the$ entire$
amount$ to$ a$ revision."37$ Whether$ there$ is$ an$ alteration$ in$ the$ structure$ of$ document,$ to$ determine$ how$ and$ to$ what$ extent$ they$ should$ be$ altered.$ Thus,$
government$is$a$proper$subject$of$inquiry.$Thus,$"a$change$in$the$nature$of$[the]$ for$ instance$ a$ switch$ from$ the$ presidential$ system$ to$ a$ parliamentary$ system$
basic$governmental$plan"$includes$"change$in$its$fundamental$framework$or$the$ would$ be$ a$ revision$ because$ of$ its$ overSall$ impact$ on$ the$ entire$ constitutional$
fundamental$ powers$ of$ its$ Branches."38$ A$ change$ in$ the$ nature$ of$ the$ basic$ structure.$So$would$a$switch$from$a$bicameral$system$to$a$unicameral$system$be$
governmental$ plan$ also$ includes$ changes$ that$ "jeopardize$ the$ traditional$ form$ because$ of$ its$ effect$ on$ other$ important$ provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution.41$
of$government$and$the$system$of$check$and$balances."39$ (Emphasis$supplied)$
$ $
Under$both$the$quantitative$and$qualitative$tests,$the$Lambino$Group's$initiative$ In$ Adams$ v.$ Gunter,42$ an$ initiative$ petition$ proposed$ the$ amendment$ of$ the$
is$ a$ revision$ and$ not$ merely$ an$ amendment.$ Quantitatively,$ the$ Lambino$ Florida$State$constitution$to$shift$from$a$bicameral$to$a$unicameral$legislature.$
Group's$proposed$changes$overhaul$two$articles$ S$Article$VI$on$the$Legislature$ The$ issue$ turned$ on$ whether$ the$ initiative$ "was$ defective$ and$ unauthorized$
and$Article$VII$on$the$Executive$S$affecting$a$total$of$105$provisions$in$the$entire$ where$[the]$proposed$amendment$would$x$x$x$affect$several$other$provisions$of$
Constitution.40$Qualitatively,$the$proposed$changes$alter$substantially$the$basic$ [the]$Constitution."$The$Supreme$Court$of$Florida,$striking$down$the$initiative$as$
plan$ of$ government,$ from$ presidential$ to$ parliamentary,$ and$ from$ a$ bicameral$ outside$the$scope$of$the$initiative$clause,$ruled$as$follows:$
to$a$unicameral$legislature.$ $
$ The$proposal$here$to$amend$Section$1$of$Article$III$of$the$1968$Constitution$to$
A$ change$ in$ the$ structure$ of$ government$ is$ a$ revision$ of$ the$ Constitution,$ as$ provide$for$a$Unicameral$Legislature$affects$not$only$many$other$provisions$of$
when$ the$ three$ great$ coSequal$ branches$ of$ government$ in$ the$ present$ the$Constitution$but$provides$for$a$change$in$the$form$of$the$legislative$branch$
Constitution$ are$ reduced$ into$ two.$ This$ alters$ the$ separation$ of$ powers$ in$ the$ of$government,$which$has$been$in$existence$in$the$United$States$Congress$and$in$
Constitution.$ A$ shift$ from$ the$ present$ BicameralSPresidential$ system$ to$ a$ all$ of$ the$ states$ of$ the$ nation,$ except$ one,$ since$ the$ earliest$ days.$ It$ would$ be$
UnicameralSParliamentary$system$is$a$revision$of$the$Constitution.$Merging$the$ difficult$to$visualize$a$more$revolutionary$change.$The$concept$of$a$House$and$a$
legislative$ and$ executive$ branches$ is$ a$ radical$ change$ in$ the$ structure$ of$ Senate$is$basic$in$the$American$form$of$government.$It$would$not$only$radically$
government.$ change$the$whole$pattern$of$government$in$this$state$and$tear$apart$the$whole$
$ fabric$of$the$Constitution,$but$would$even$affect$the$physical$facilities$necessary$
The$abolition$alone$of$the$Office$of$the$President$as$the$locus$of$Executive$Power$ to$carry$on$government.$
alters$ the$ separation$ of$ powers$ and$ thus$ constitutes$ a$ revision$ of$ the$ $
Constitution.$Likewise,$the$abolition$alone$of$one$chamber$of$Congress$alters$the$ x$x$x$x$
system$of$checksSandSbalances$within$the$legislature$and$constitutes$a$revision$ $
of$the$Constitution.$ We$ conclude$ with$ the$ observation$ that$ if$ such$ proposed$ amendment$ were$
$ adopted$by$the$people$at$the$General$Election$and$if$the$Legislature$at$its$next$
By$ any$ legal$ test$ and$ under$ any$ jurisdiction,$ a$ shift$ from$ a$ BicameralS session$ should$ fail$ to$ submit$ further$ amendments$ to$ revise$ and$ clarify$ the$
Presidential$ to$ a$ UnicameralSParliamentary$ system,$ involving$ the$ abolition$ of$ numerous$ inconsistencies$ and$ conflicts$ which$ would$ result,$ or$ if$ after$
the$ Office$ of$ the$ President$ and$ the$ abolition$ of$ one$ chamber$ of$ Congress,$ is$ submission$of$appropriate$amendments$the$people$should$refuse$to$adopt$them,$
beyond$ doubt$ a$ revision,$ not$ a$ mere$ amendment.$ On$ the$ face$ alone$ of$ the$ simple$ chaos$ would$ prevail$ in$ the$ government$ of$ this$ State.$ The$ same$ result$
Lambino$Group's$proposed$changes,$it$is$readily$apparent$that$the$changes$will$ would$ obtain$ from$ an$ amendment,$ for$ instance,$ of$ Section$ 1$ of$ Article$ V,$ to$
radically$ alter$ the$ framework$ of$ government$ as$ set$ forth$ in$ the$ Constitution.$ provide$ for$ only$ a$ Supreme$ Court$ and$ Circuit$ CourtsSand$ there$ could$ be$ other$
Father$Joaquin$Bernas,$S.J.,$a$leading$member$of$the$Constitutional$Commission,$ examples$ too$ numerous$ to$ detail.$ These$ examples$ point$ unerringly$ to$ the$
writes:$ answer.$
$ $
The$purpose$of$the$long$and$arduous$work$of$the$hundreds$of$men$and$women$ $
and$many$sessions$of$the$Legislature$in$bringing$about$the$Constitution$of$1968$ 100.$ Stated$ otherwise,$ the$ difference$ between$ "amendment"$ and$ "revision"$
was$to$eliminate$inconsistencies$and$conflicts$and$to$give$the$State$a$workable,$ cannot$ reasonably$ be$ in$ the$ substance$ or$ extent$ of$ the$ correction.$ x$ x$ x$ x$
accordant,$ homogenous$ and$ upStoSdate$ document.$ All$ of$ this$ could$ disappear$ (Underlining$in$the$original;$boldfacing$supplied)$
very$ quickly$ if$ we$ were$ to$ hold$ that$ it$ could$ be$ amended$ in$ the$ manner$ $
proposed$in$the$initiative$petition$here.43$(Emphasis$supplied)$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ in$ effect$ argues$ that$ if$ Congress$ or$ a$ constitutional$
$ convention$ had$ drafted$ the$ same$ proposed$ changes$ that$ the$ Lambino$ Group$
The$ rationale$ of$ the$ Adams$ decision$ applies$ with$ greater$ force$ to$ the$ present$ wrote$ in$ the$ present$ initiative,$ the$ changes$ would$ constitute$ a$ revision$ of$ the$
petition.$The$Lambino$Group's$initiative$not$only$seeks$a$shift$from$a$bicameral$ Constitution.$ Thus,$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ concedes$ that$ the$ proposed$ changes$ in$
to$a$unicameral$legislature,$it$also$seeks$to$merge$the$executive$and$legislative$ the$ present$ initiative$ constitute$ a$ revision$ if$ Congress$ or$ a$ constitutional$
departments.$ The$ initiative$ in$ Adams$ did$ not$ even$ touch$ the$ executive$ convention$ had$ drafted$ the$ changes.$ However,$ since$ the$ Lambino$ Group$ as$
department.$ private$ individuals$ drafted$ the$ proposed$ changes,$ the$ changes$ are$ merely$
$ amendments$ to$ the$ Constitution.$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ trivializes$ the$ serious$
In$Adams,$the$Supreme$Court$of$Florida$enumerated$18$sections$of$the$Florida$ matter$of$changing$the$fundamental$law$of$the$land.$
Constitution$ that$ would$ be$ affected$ by$ the$ shift$ from$ a$ bicameral$ to$ a$ $
unicameral$ legislature.$ In$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ present$ initiative,$ no$ less$ than$ The$ express$ intent$ of$ the$ framers$ and$ the$ plain$ language$ of$ the$ Constitution$
105$ provisions$ of$ the$ Constitution$ would$ be$ affected$ based$ on$ the$ count$ of$ contradict$the$Lambino$Group's$theory.$Where$the$intent$of$the$framers$and$the$
Associate$ Justice$ Romeo$ J.$ Callejo,$ Sr.44$ There$ is$ no$ doubt$ that$ the$ Lambino$ language$of$the$Constitution$are$clear$and$plainly$stated,$courts$do$not$deviate$
Group's$ present$ initiative$ seeks$ far$ more$ radical$ changes$ in$ the$ structure$ of$ from$ such$ categorical$ intent$ and$ language.45$ Any$ theory$ espousing$ a$
government$than$the$initiative$in$Adams.$ construction$contrary$to$such$intent$and$language$deserves$scant$consideration.$
$ More$so,$if$such$theory$wreaks$havoc$by$creating$inconsistencies$in$the$form$of$
The$ Lambino$ Group$ theorizes$ that$ the$ difference$ between$ "amendment"$ and$ government$ established$ in$ the$ Constitution.$ Such$ a$ theory,$ devoid$ of$ any$
"revision"$is$only$one$of$procedure,$not$of$substance.$The$Lambino$Group$posits$ jurisprudential$ mooring$ and$ inviting$ inconsistencies$ in$ the$ Constitution,$ only$
that$when$a$deliberative$body$drafts$and$proposes$changes$to$the$Constitution,$ exposes$the$flimsiness$of$the$Lambino$Group's$position.$Any$theory$advocating$
substantive$changes$are$called$"revisions"$because$members$of$the$deliberative$ that$ a$ proposed$ change$ involving$ a$ radical$ structural$ change$ in$ government$
body$ work$ fullStime$ on$ the$ changes.$ However,$ the$ same$ substantive$ changes,$ does$not$constitute$a$revision$justly$deserves$rejection.$
when$ proposed$ through$ an$ initiative,$ are$ called$ "amendments"$ because$ the$ $
changes$ are$ made$ by$ ordinary$ people$ who$ do$ not$ make$ an$ "occupation,$ The$ Lambino$ Group$ simply$ recycles$ a$ theory$ that$ initiative$ proponents$ in$
profession,$or$vocation"$out$of$such$endeavor.$ American$jurisdictions$have$attempted$to$advance$without$any$success.$In$Lowe$
$ v.$Keisling,46$the$Supreme$Court$of$Oregon$rejected$this$theory,$thus:$
Thus,$the$Lambino$Group$makes$the$following$exposition$of$their$theory$in$their$ $
Memorandum:$ Mabon$ argues$ that$ Article$ XVII,$ section$ 2,$ does$ not$ apply$ to$ changes$ to$ the$
$ constitution$ proposed$ by$ initiative.$ His$ theory$ is$ that$ Article$ XVII,$ section$ 2$
99.$ With$ this$ distinction$ in$ mind,$ we$ note$ that$ the$ constitutional$ provisions$ merely$provides$a$procedure$by$which$the$legislature$can$propose$a$revision$of$
expressly$ provide$ for$ both$ "amendment"$ and$ "revision"$ when$ it$ speaks$ of$ the$ constitution,$ but$ it$ does$ not$ affect$ proposed$ revisions$ initiated$ by$ the$
legislators$ and$ constitutional$ delegates,$ while$ the$ same$ provisions$ expressly$ people.$
provide$only$for$"amendment"$when$it$speaks$of$the$people.$It$would$seem$that$ $
the$apparent$distinction$is$based$on$the$actual$experience$of$the$people,$that$on$ Plaintiffs$ argue$ that$ the$ proposed$ ballot$ measure$ constitutes$ a$ wholesale$
one$hand$the$common$people$in$general$are$not$expected$to$work$fullStime$on$ change$to$the$constitution$that$cannot$be$enacted$through$the$initiative$process.$
the$ matter$ of$ correcting$ the$ constitution$ because$ that$ is$ not$ their$ occupation,$ They$assert$that$the$distinction$between$amendment$and$revision$is$determined$
profession$ or$ vocation;$ while$ on$ the$ other$ hand,$ the$ legislators$ and$ by$reviewing$the$scope$and$subject$matter$of$the$proposed$enactment,$and$that$
constitutional$convention$delegates$are$expected$to$work$fullStime$on$the$same$ revisions$ are$ not$ limited$ to$ "a$ formal$ overhauling$ of$ the$ constitution."$ They$
matter$ because$ that$ is$ their$ occupation,$ profession$ or$ vocation.$ Thus,$ the$ argue$ that$ this$ ballot$ measure$ proposes$ far$ reaching$ changes$ outside$ the$ lines$
difference$between$the$words$"revision"$and$"amendment"$pertain$only$to$the$ of$the$original$instrument,$including$profound$impacts$on$existing$fundamental$
process$ or$ procedure$ of$ coming$ up$ with$ the$ corrections,$ for$ purposes$ of$ rights$and$radical$restructuring$of$the$government's$relationship$with$a$defined$
interpreting$the$constitutional$provisions.$ group$ of$ citizens.$ Plaintiffs$ assert$ that,$ because$ the$ proposed$ ballot$ measure$
"will$refashion$the$most$basic$principles$of$Oregon$constitutional$law,"$the$trial$ The$ changes$ in$ these$ examples$ do$ not$ entail$ any$ modification$ of$ sections$ or$
court$correctly$held$that$it$violated$Article$XVII,$section$2,$and$cannot$appear$on$ articles$ of$ the$ Constitution$ other$ than$ the$ specific$ provision$ being$ amended.$
the$ballot$without$the$prior$approval$of$the$legislature.$ These$changes$do$not$also$affect$the$structure$of$government$or$the$system$of$
$ checksSandSbalances$among$or$within$the$three$branches.$These$three$examples$
We$ first$ address$ Mabon's$ argument$ that$ Article$ XVII,$ section$ 2(1),$ does$ not$ are$located$at$the$far$green$end$of$the$spectrum,$opposite$the$far$red$end$where$
prohibit$ revisions$ instituted$ by$ initiative.$ In$ Holmes$ v.$ Appling,$ x$ x$ x,$ the$ the$revision$sought$by$the$present$petition$is$located.$
Supreme$ Court$ concluded$ that$ a$ revision$ of$ the$ constitution$ may$ not$ be$ $
accomplished$ by$ initiative,$ because$ of$ the$ provisions$ of$ Article$ XVII,$ section$ 2.$ However,$there$can$be$no$fixed$rule$on$whether$a$change$is$an$amendment$or$a$
After$ reviewing$ Article$ XVII,$ section1,$ relating$ to$ proposed$ amendments,$ the$ revision.$A$change$in$a$single$word$of$one$sentence$of$the$Constitution$may$be$a$
court$said:$ revision$ and$ not$ an$ amendment.$ For$ example,$ the$ substitution$ of$ the$ word$
$ "republican"$ with$ "monarchic"$ or$ "theocratic"$ in$ Section$ 1,$ Article$ II50$ of$ the$
"From$ the$ foregoing$ it$ appears$ that$ Article$ IV,$ Section$ 1,$ authorizes$ the$ use$ of$ Constitution$ radically$ overhauls$ the$ entire$ structure$ of$ government$ and$ the$
the$initiative$as$a$means$of$amending$the$Oregon$Constitution,$but$it$contains$no$ fundamental$ ideological$ basis$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ Thus,$ each$ specific$ change$
similar$sanction$for$its$use$as$a$means$of$revising$the$constitution."$x$x$x$x$ will$ have$ to$ be$ examined$ caseSbyScase,$ depending$ on$ how$ it$ affects$ other$
$ provisions,$ as$ well$ as$ how$ it$ affects$ the$ structure$ of$ government,$ the$ carefully$
It$then$reviewed$Article$XVII,$section$2,$relating$to$revisions,$and$said:$"It$is$the$ crafted$ system$ of$ checksSandSbalances,$ and$ the$ underlying$ ideological$ basis$ of$
only$ section$ of$ the$ constitution$ which$ provides$ the$ means$ for$ constitutional$ the$existing$Constitution.$
revision$and$it$excludes$the$idea$that$an$individual,$through$the$initiative,$may$ $
place$such$a$measure$before$the$electorate."$x$x$x$x$ Since$a$revision$of$a$constitution$affects$basic$principles,$or$several$provisions$of$
$ a$ constitution,$ a$ deliberative$ body$ with$ recorded$ proceedings$ is$ best$ suited$ to$
Accordingly,$ we$ reject$ Mabon's$ argument$ that$ Article$ XVII,$ section$ 2,$ does$ not$ undertake$ a$ revision.$ A$ revision$ requires$ harmonizing$ not$ only$ several$
apply$to$constitutional$revisions$proposed$by$initiative.$(Emphasis$supplied)$ provisions,$ but$ also$ the$ altered$ principles$ with$ those$ that$ remain$ unaltered.$
$ Thus,$ constitutions$ normally$ authorize$ deliberative$ bodies$ like$ constituent$
Similarly,$this$Court$must$reject$the$Lambino$Group's$theory$which$negates$the$ assemblies$ or$ constitutional$ conventions$ to$ undertake$ revisions.$ On$ the$ other$
express$intent$of$the$framers$and$the$plain$language$of$the$Constitution.$ hand,$ constitutions$ allow$ people's$ initiatives,$ which$ do$ not$ have$ fixed$ and$
$ identifiable$ deliberative$ bodies$ or$ recorded$ proceedings,$ to$ undertake$ only$
We$can$visualize$amendments$and$revisions$as$a$spectrum,$at$one$end$green$for$ amendments$and$not$revisions.$
amendments$and$at$the$other$end$red$for$revisions.$Towards$the$middle$of$the$ $
spectrum,$ colors$ fuse$ and$ difficulties$ arise$ in$ determining$ whether$ there$ is$ an$ In$ the$ present$ initiative,$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ proposed$ Section$ 2$ of$ the$
amendment$or$revision.$The$present$initiative$is$indisputably$located$at$the$far$ Transitory$Provisions$states:$
end$ of$ the$ red$ spectrum$ where$ revision$ begins.$ The$ present$ initiative$ seeks$ a$ $
radical$overhaul$of$the$existing$separation$of$powers$among$the$three$coSequal$ Section$2.$Upon$the$expiration$of$the$term$of$the$incumbent$President$and$Vice$
departments$ of$ government,$ requiring$ farSreaching$ amendments$ in$ several$ President,$with$the$exception$of$Sections$1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6$and$7$of$Article$VI$of$the$
sections$and$articles$of$the$Constitution.$ 1987$ Constitution$ which$ shall$ hereby$ be$ amended$ and$ Sections$ 18$ and$ 24$
$ which$shall$be$deleted,$all$other$Sections$of$Article$VI$are$hereby$retained$and$
Where$ the$ proposed$ change$ applies$ only$ to$ a$ specific$ provision$ of$ the$ renumbered$ sequentially$ as$ Section$ 2,$ ad$ seriatim$ up$ to$ 26,$ unless$ they$ are$
Constitution$ without$ affecting$ any$ other$ section$ or$ article,$ the$ change$ may$ inconsistent$with$the$Parliamentary$system$of$government,$in$which$case,$they$
generally$ be$ considered$ an$ amendment$ and$ not$ a$ revision.$ For$ example,$ a$ shall$ be$ amended$ to$ conform$ with$ a$ unicameral$ parliamentary$ form$ of$
change$reducing$the$voting$age$from$18$years$to$15$years47$is$an$amendment$ government;$x$x$x$x$(Emphasis$supplied)$
and$ not$ a$ revision.$ Similarly,$ a$ change$ reducing$ Filipino$ ownership$ of$ mass$ $
media$ companies$ from$ 100$ percent$ to$ 60$ percent$ is$ an$ amendment$ and$ not$ a$ The$ basic$ rule$ in$ statutory$ construction$ is$ that$ if$ a$ later$ law$ is$ irreconcilably$
revision.48$ Also,$ a$ change$ requiring$ a$ college$ degree$ as$ an$ additional$ inconsistent$ with$ a$ prior$ law,$ the$ later$ law$ prevails.$ This$ rule$ also$ applies$ to$
qualification$ for$ election$ to$ the$ Presidency$ is$ an$ amendment$ and$ not$ a$ construction$of$constitutions.$However,$the$Lambino$Group's$draft$of$Section$2$
revision.49$ of$the$Transitory$Provisions$turns$on$its$head$this$rule$of$construction$by$stating$
$ that$in$case$of$such$irreconcilable$inconsistency,$the$earlier$provision$"shall$be$
amended$ to$ conform$ with$ a$ unicameral$ parliamentary$ form$ of$ government."$
The$ effect$ is$ to$ freeze$ the$ two$ irreconcilable$ provisions$ until$ the$ earlier$ one$ revisit$ this$ Court's$ ruling$ in$ Santiago$ declaring$ RA$ 6735$ "incomplete,$
"shall$ be$ amended,"$ which$ requires$ a$ future$ separate$ constitutional$ inadequate$or$wanting$in$essential$terms$and$conditions"$to$cover$the$system$of$
amendment.$ initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution.$An$affirmation$or$reversal$of$Santiago$will$
$ not$change$the$outcome$of$the$present$petition.$Thus,$this$Court$must$decline$to$
Realizing$ the$ absurdity$ of$ the$ need$ for$ such$ an$ amendment,$ petitioner$ Atty.$ revisit$Santiago$which$effectively$ruled$that$RA$6735$does$not$comply$with$the$
Lambino$readily$conceded$during$the$oral$arguments$that$the$requirement$of$a$ requirements$ of$ the$ Constitution$ to$ implement$ the$ initiative$ clause$ on$
future$amendment$is$a$"surplusage."$In$short,$Atty.$Lambino$wants$to$reinstate$ amendments$to$the$Constitution.$
the$ rule$ of$ statutory$ construction$ so$ that$ the$ later$ provision$ automatically$ $
prevails$ in$ case$ of$ irreconcilable$ inconsistency.$ However,$ it$ is$ not$ as$ simple$ as$ This$ Court$ must$ avoid$ revisiting$ a$ ruling$ involving$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ a$
that.$ statute$if$the$case$before$the$Court$can$be$resolved$on$some$other$grounds.$Such$
$ avoidance$ is$ a$ logical$ consequence$ of$ the$ wellSsettled$ doctrine$ that$ courts$ will$
The$ irreconcilable$ inconsistency$ envisioned$ in$ the$ proposed$ Section$ 2$ of$ the$ not$ pass$ upon$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ a$ statute$ if$ the$ case$ can$ be$ resolved$ on$
Transitory$ Provisions$ is$ not$ between$ a$ provision$ in$ Article$ VI$ of$ the$ 1987$ some$other$grounds.51$
Constitution$ and$ a$ provision$ in$ the$ proposed$ changes.$ The$ inconsistency$ is$ $
between$ a$ provision$ in$ Article$ VI$ of$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ and$ the$ Nevertheless,$ even$ assuming$ that$ RA$ 6735$ is$ valid$ to$ implement$ the$
"Parliamentary$system$of$government,"$and$the$inconsistency$shall$be$resolved$ constitutional$ provision$ on$ initiatives$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution,$ this$ will$ not$
in$favor$of$a$"unicameral$parliamentary$form$of$government."$ change$ the$ result$ here$ because$ the$ present$ petition$ violates$ Section$ 2,$ Article$
$ XVII$of$the$Constitution.$To$be$a$valid$initiative,$the$present$initiative$must$first$
Now,$ what$ "unicameral$ parliamentary$ form$ of$ government"$ do$ the$ Lambino$ comply$ with$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ even$ before$ complying$
Group's$ proposed$ changes$ refer$ to$ $ the$ Bangladeshi,$ Singaporean,$ Israeli,$ or$ with$RA$6735.$
New$ Zealand$ models,$ which$ are$ among$ the$ few$ countries$ with$ unicameral$ $
parliaments?$ The$ proposed$ changes$ could$ not$ possibly$ refer$ to$ the$ traditional$ Even$then,$the$present$initiative$violates$Section$5(b)$of$RA$6735$which$requires$
and$ wellSknown$ parliamentary$ forms$ of$ government$ $ the$ British,$ French,$ that$ the$ "petition$ for$ an$ initiative$ on$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ must$ have$ at$ least$
Spanish,$German,$Italian,$Canadian,$Australian,$or$Malaysian$models,$which$have$ twelve$ per$ centum$ (12%)$ of$ the$ total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters$ as$
all$ bicameral$ parliaments.$ Did$ the$ people$ who$ signed$ the$ signature$ sheets$ signatories."$ Section$ 5(b)$ of$ RA$ 6735$ requires$ that$ the$ people$ must$ sign$ the$
realize$ that$ they$ were$ adopting$ the$ Bangladeshi,$ Singaporean,$ Israeli,$ or$ New$ "petition$x$x$x$as$signatories."$
Zealand$parliamentary$form$of$government?$ $
$ The$ 6.3$ million$ signatories$ did$ not$ sign$ the$ petition$ of$ 25$ August$ 2006$ or$ the$
This$drives$home$the$point$that$the$people's$initiative$is$not$meant$for$revisions$ amended$ petition$ of$ 30$ August$ 2006$ filed$ with$ the$ COMELEC.$ Only$ Atty.$
of$ the$ Constitution$ but$ only$ for$ amendments.$ A$ shift$ from$ the$ present$ Lambino,$ Atty.$ Demosthenes$ B.$ Donato,$ and$ Atty.$ Alberto$ C.$ Agra$ signed$ the$
BicameralSPresidential$ to$ a$ UnicameralSParliamentary$ system$ requires$ petition$ and$ amended$ petition$ as$ counsels$ for$ "Raul$ L.$ Lambino$ and$ Erico$ B.$
harmonizing$several$provisions$in$many$articles$of$the$Constitution.$Revision$of$ Aumentado,$ Petitioners."$ In$ the$ COMELEC,$ the$ Lambino$ Group,$ claiming$ to$ act$
the$ Constitution$ through$ a$ people's$ initiative$ will$ only$ result$ in$ gross$ "together$with"$the$6.3$million$signatories,$merely$attached$the$signature$sheets$
absurdities$in$the$Constitution.$ to$ the$ petition$ and$ amended$ petition.$ Thus,$ the$ petition$ and$ amended$ petition$
$ filed$with$the$COMELEC$did$not$even$comply$with$the$basic$requirement$of$RA$
In$ sum,$ there$ is$ no$ doubt$ whatsoever$ that$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ is$ a$ 6735$that$the$Lambino$Group$claims$as$valid.$
revision$ and$ not$ an$ amendment.$ Thus,$ the$ present$ initiative$ is$ void$ and$ $
unconstitutional$ because$ it$ violates$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ The$Lambino$Group's$logrolling$initiative$also$violates$Section$10(a)$of$RA$6735$
limiting$ the$ scope$ of$ a$ people's$ initiative$ to$ "[A]mendments$ to$ this$ stating,$"No$petition$embracing$more$than$one$(1)$subject$shall$be$submitted$to$
Constitution."$ the$ electorate;$ x$ x$ x."$ The$ proposed$ Section$ 4(4)$ of$ the$ Transitory$ Provisions,$
$ mandating$the$interim$Parliament$to$propose$further$amendments$or$revisions$
3.$A$Revisit$of$Santiago$v.$COMELEC$is$Not$Necessary$ to$the$Constitution,$is$a$subject$matter$totally$unrelated$to$the$shift$in$the$form$
$ of$ government.$ Since$ the$ present$ initiative$ embraces$ more$ than$ one$ subject$
The$ present$ petition$ warrants$ dismissal$ for$ failure$ to$ comply$ with$ the$ basic$ matter,$RA$6735$prohibits$submission$of$the$initiative$petition$to$the$electorate.$
requirements$ of$ Section$ 2,$ Article$ XVII$ of$ the$ Constitution$ on$ the$ conduct$ and$ Thus,$even$if$RA$6735$is$valid,$the$Lambino$Group's$initiative$will$still$fail.$
scope$ of$ a$ people's$ initiative$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution.$ There$ is$ no$ need$ to$ $
4.$ The$ COMELEC$ Did$ Not$ Commit$ Grave$ Abuse$ of$ Discretion$ in$ Dismissing$ the$ $
Lambino$Group's$Initiative$ Incantations$ of$ "people's$ voice,"$ "people's$ sovereign$ will,"$ or$ "let$ the$ people$
$ decide"$ cannot$ override$ the$ specific$ modes$ of$ changing$ the$ Constitution$ as$
In$ dismissing$ the$ Lambino$ Group's$ initiative$ petition,$ the$ COMELEC$ en$ banc$ prescribed$in$the$Constitution$itself.$Otherwise,$the$Constitution$$the$people's$
merely$ followed$ this$ Court's$ ruling$ in$ Santiago$ and$ People's$ Initiative$ for$ fundamental$ covenant$ that$ provides$ enduring$ stability$ to$ our$ society$ $
Reform,$ Modernization$ and$ Action$ (PIRMA)$ v.$ COMELEC.52$ For$ following$ this$ becomes$ easily$ susceptible$ to$ manipulative$ changes$ by$ political$ groups$
Court's$ruling,$no$grave$abuse$of$discretion$is$attributable$to$the$COMELEC.$On$ gathering$signatures$through$false$promises.$Then,$the$Constitution$ceases$to$be$
this$ ground$ alone,$ the$ present$ petition$ warrants$ outright$ dismissal.$ Thus,$ this$ the$bedrock$of$the$nation's$stability.$
Court$should$reiterate$its$unanimous$ruling$in$PIRMA:$ $
$ The$Lambino$Group$claims$that$their$initiative$is$the$"people's$voice."$However,$
The$ Court$ ruled,$ first,$ by$ a$ unanimous$ vote,$ that$ no$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ the$Lambino$Group$unabashedly$states$in$ULAP$Resolution$No.$2006S02,$in$the$
could$ be$ attributed$ to$ the$ public$ respondent$ COMELEC$ in$ dismissing$ the$ verification$ of$ their$ petition$ with$ the$ COMELEC,$ that$ "ULAP$ maintains$ its$
petition$ filed$ by$ PIRMA$ therein,$ it$ appearing$ that$ it$ only$ complied$ with$ the$ unqualified$ support$ to$ the$ agenda$ of$ Her$ Excellency$ President$ Gloria$
dispositions$ in$ the$ Decisions$ of$ this$ Court$ in$ G.R.$ No.$ 127325,$ promulgated$ on$ MacapagalSArroyo$for$constitutional$reforms."$The$Lambino$Group$thus$admits$
March$19,$1997,$and$its$Resolution$of$June$10,$1997.$ that$ their$ "people's"$ initiative$ is$ an$ "unqualified$ support$ to$ the$ agenda"$ of$ the$
$ incumbent$President$to$change$the$Constitution.$This$forewarns$the$Court$to$be$
5.$Conclusion$ wary$ of$ incantations$ of$ "people's$ voice"$ or$ "sovereign$ will"$ in$ the$ present$
$ initiative.$
The$ Constitution,$ as$ the$ fundamental$ law$ of$ the$ land,$ deserves$ the$ utmost$ $
respect$and$obedience$of$all$the$citizens$of$this$nation.$No$one$can$trivialize$the$ This$ Court$ cannot$ betray$ its$ primordial$ duty$ to$ defend$ and$ protect$ the$
Constitution$ by$ cavalierly$ amending$ or$ revising$ it$ in$ blatant$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ The$ Constitution,$ which$ embodies$ the$ people's$ sovereign$ will,$ is$
clearly$ specified$ modes$ of$ amendment$ and$ revision$ laid$ down$ in$ the$ the$bible$of$this$Court.$This$Court$exists$to$defend$and$protect$the$Constitution.$
Constitution$itself.$ To$ allow$ this$ constitutionally$ infirm$ initiative,$ propelled$ by$ deceptively$
$ gathered$ signatures,$ to$ alter$ basic$ principles$ in$ the$ Constitution$ is$ to$ allow$ a$
To$allow$such$change$in$the$fundamental$law$is$to$set$adrift$the$Constitution$in$ desecration$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ To$ allow$ such$ alteration$ and$ desecration$ is$ to$
unchartered$waters,$to$be$tossed$and$turned$by$every$dominant$political$group$ lose$this$Court's$raison$d'etre.$
of$ the$ day.$ If$ this$ Court$ allows$ today$ a$ cavalier$ change$ in$ the$ Constitution$ $
outside$ the$ constitutionally$ prescribed$ modes,$ tomorrow$ the$ new$ dominant$ WHEREFORE,$we$DISMISS$the$petition$in$G.R.$No.$174153.$
political$ group$ that$ comes$ will$ demand$ its$ own$ set$ of$ changes$ in$ the$ same$ $
cavalier$ and$ unconstitutional$ fashion.$ A$ revolvingSdoor$ constitution$ does$ not$ SO$ORDERED.$
augur$well$for$the$rule$of$law$in$this$country.$ $
$ Panganiban,$ C.J.,$ Puno,$ Quisumbing,$ YnaresSSantiago,$ SandovalSGutierrez,$
An$overwhelming$majority$$16,622,111$voters$comprising$76.3$percent$of$the$ AustriaSMartinez,$ Corona,$ Carpio$ Morales,$ Callejo,$ Sr.,$ Azcuna,$ Tinga,$ ChicoS
total$ votes$ cast53$ $ approved$ our$ Constitution$ in$ a$ national$ plebiscite$ held$ on$ Nazario,$Garcia,$and$Velasco,$Jr.,$JJ.,$concur.$
11$ February$ 1987.$ That$ approval$ is$ the$ unmistakable$ voice$ of$ the$ people,$ the$ $
full$ expression$ of$ the$ people's$ sovereign$ will.$ That$ approval$ included$ the$ ____________________$
prescribed$modes$for$amending$or$revising$the$Constitution.$ $
$ EN$BANC$
No$amount$of$signatures,$not$even$the$6,327,952$million$signatures$gathered$by$ $
the$Lambino$Group,$can$change$our$Constitution$contrary$to$the$specific$modes$ G.R.$No.$174153$ October$25,$2006$
that$ the$ people,$ in$ their$ sovereign$ capacity,$ prescribed$ when$ they$ ratified$ the$ $
Constitution.$ The$ alternative$ is$ an$ extraSconstitutional$ change,$ which$ means$ RAUL$ L.$ LAMBINO$ AND$ ERICO$ B.$ AUMENTADO,$ TOGETHER$ WITH$ 6,327,952$
subverting$ the$ people's$ sovereign$ will$ and$ discarding$ the$ Constitution.$ This$ is$ REGISTERED$VOTERS$V.$COMMISSION$ON$ELECTIONS$ET$AL.$
one$ act$ the$ Court$ cannot$ and$ should$ never$ do.$ As$ the$ ultimate$ guardian$ of$ the$ $
Constitution,$ this$ Court$ is$ sworn$ to$ perform$ its$ solemn$ duty$ to$ defend$ and$ SEPARATE$CONCURRING$OPINION$
protect$the$Constitution,$which$embodies$the$real$sovereign$will$of$the$people.$ $
PANGANIBAN,$CJ.:$ "While$ R.A.$ 6735$ may$ not$ be$ a$ perfect$ law,$ it$ was$ $ as$ the$ majority$ openly$
$ concedes$ $ intended$ by$ the$ legislature$ to$ cover$ and,$ I$ respectfully$ submit,$ it$
Without$ the$ rule$ of$ law,$ there$ can$ be$ no$ lasting$ prosperity$ and$ certainly$ no$ contains$ enough$ provisions$ to$ effectuate$ an$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution.$ I$
liberty.$ completely$agree$with$the$inspired$and$inspiring$opinions$of$Mr.$Justice$Reynato$
$ S.$ Puno$ and$ Mr.$ Justice$ Ricardo$ J.$ Francisco$ that$ RA$ 6735,$ the$ Roco$ law$ on$
Beverley$McLachlin$1$ initiative,$sufficiently$implements$the$right$of$the$people$to$initiate$amendments$
Chief$Justice$of$Canada$ to$the$Constitution.$Such$views,$which$I$shall$no$longer$repeat$nor$elaborate$on,$
$ are$thoroughly$consistent$with$this$Court's$unanimous$en$banc$rulings$in$Subic$
After$ a$ deep$ reflection$ on$ the$ issues$ raised$ and$ a$ careful$ evaluation$ of$ the$ Bay$ Metropolitan$ Authority$ vs.$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ that$ "provisions$ for$
parties'$ respective$ arguments$ SS$ both$ oral$ and$ written$ SS$ as$ well$ as$ the$ initiative$ .$ .$ .$ are$ (to$ be)$ liberally$ construed$ to$ effectuate$ their$ purposes,$ to$
enlightened$and$enlightening$Opinions$submitted$by$my$esteemed$colleagues,$I$ facilitate$ and$ not$ hamper$ the$ exercise$ by$ the$ voters$ of$ the$ rights$ granted$
am$fully$convinced$that$the$present$Petition$must$be$dismissed.$ thereby";$ and$ in$ Garcia$ vs.$ Comelec,$ that$ any$ "effort$ to$ trivialize$ the$
$ effectiveness$of$people's$initiatives$ought$to$be$rejected."$
I$write,$however,$to$show$that$my$present$disposition$is$completely$consistent$ $
with$ my$ previous$ Opinions$ and$ votes$ on$ the$ two$ extant$ Supreme$ Court$ cases$ "No$ law$ can$ completely$ and$ absolutely$ cover$ all$ administrative$ details.$ In$
involving$an$initiative$to$change$the$Constitution.$ recognition$of$this,$R.A.$6735$wisely$empowered$the$Commission$on$Election$"to$
$ promulgate$ such$ rules$ and$ regulations$ as$ may$ be$ necessary$ to$ carry$ out$ the$
In$ my$ Separate$ Opinion$ in$ Santiago$ v.$ Comelec,2$ I$ opined$ "that$ taken$ together$ purposes$ of$ this$ Act."$ And$ pursuant$ thereto,$ the$ Comelec$ issued$ its$ Resolution$
and$ interpreted$ properly$ and$ liberally,$ the$ Constitution$ (particularly$ Art.$ XVII,$ 2300$on$16$January$1991.$Such$Resolution,$by$its$very$words,$was$promulgated$
Sec.$ 2),$ Republic$ Act$ 6735$ and$ Comelec$ Resolution$ 2300$ provide$ more$ than$ "to$ govern$ the$ conduct$ of$ initiative$ on$ the$ Constitution$ and$ initiative$ and$
sufficient$ referendum$ on$ national$ and$ local$ laws,"$ not$ by$ the$ incumbent$ Commission$ on$
$ Elections$ but$ by$ one$ then$ composed$ of$ Acting$ Chairperson$ Haydee$ B.$ Yorac,$
__________________$ Comms.$Alfredo$
$ $
'SEC.$2.$Amendments$to$this$Constitution$may$likewise$be$directly$proposed$by$ authority$to$implement,$effectuate$and$realize$our$people's$power$to$amend$the$
the$people$through$initiative$upon$a$petition$of$at$least$twelve$per$centum$of$the$ Constitution."$
total$ number$ of$ registered$ voters,$ of$ which$ every$ legislative$ district$ must$ be$ $
represented$ by$ at$ least$ three$ per$ centum$ of$ the$ registered$ voters$ therein.$ No$ __________________$
amendment$ under$ this$ section$ shall$ be$ authorized$ within$ five$ years$ following$ $
the$ ratification$ of$ this$ Constitution$ nor$ oftener$ than$ once$ every$ five$ years$ E.$Abueg,$Jr.,$Leopoldo$L.$Africa,$Andres$R.$Flores,$Dario$C.$Rama$and$Magdara$B.$
thereafter.'$ Dimaampao.$ All$ of$ these$ Commissioners$ who$ signed$ Resolution$ 2300$ have$
$ retired$from$the$Commission,$and$thus$we$cannot$ascribe$any$vile$motive$unto$
"With$all$due$respect,$I$find$the$majority's$position$all$too$sweeping$and$all$too$ them,$ other$ than$ an$ honest,$ sincere$ and$ exemplary$ effort$ to$ give$ life$ to$ a$
extremist.$ It$ is$ equivalent$ to$ burning$ the$ whole$ house$ to$ exterminate$ the$ rats,$ cherished$right$of$our$people.$
and$ to$ killing$ the$ patient$ to$ relieve$ him$ of$ pain.$ What$ Citizen$ Delfin$ wants$ the$ $
Comelec$to$do$we$should$reject.$But$we$should$not$thereby$preempt$any$future$ "The$ majority$ argues$ that$ while$ Resolution$ 2300$ is$ valid$ in$ regard$ to$ national$
effort$ to$ exercise$ the$ right$ of$ initiative$ correctly$ and$ judiciously.$ The$ fact$ that$ laws$and$local$legislations,$it$is$void$in$reference$to$constitutional$amendments.$
the$Delfin$Petition$proposes$a$misuse$of$initiative$does$not$justify$a$ban$against$ There$ is$ no$ basis$ for$ such$ differentiation.$ The$ source$ of$ and$ authority$ for$ the$
its$proper$use.$Indeed,$there$is$a$right$way$to$do$the$right$thing$at$the$right$time$ Resolution$is$the$same$law,$R.A.$6735.$
and$for$the$right$reason.$ $
$ "I$ respectfully$ submit$ that$ taken$ together$ and$ interpreted$ properly$ and$
Taken$Together$and$Interpreted$Properly,$$ liberally,$the$Constitution$(particularly$Art.$XVII,$Sec.$2),$R.A.$6735$and$Comelec$
the$Constitution,$R.A.$6735$and$Comelec$Resolution$$ Resolution$2300$provide$more$than$sufficient$authority$to$implement,$effectuate$
2300$Are$Sufficient$to$Implement$Constitutional$Initiatives$ and$realize$our$people's$power$to$amend$the$Constitution.$
$ $
Petitioner$Delfin$and$the$Pedrosa$
Spouses$Should$Not$Be$Muzzled$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ and$ contumacious$ disregard$ of$ this$ Court's$ supremacy$ as$
$ the$final$arbiter$of$justiciable$controversies.$
"I$ am$ glad$ the$ majority$ decided$ to$ heed$ our$ plea$ to$ lift$ the$ temporary$ $
restraining$ order$ issued$ by$ this$ Court$ on$ 18$ December$ 1996$ insofar$ as$ it$ Second$Issue:$
prohibited$Petitioner$Delfin$and$the$Spouses$Pedrosa$from$exercising$their$right$ Sufficiency$of$RA$6735$
of$ initiative.$ In$ fact,$ I$ believe$ that$ such$ restraining$ order$ as$ against$ private$ $
respondents$ should$ not$ have$ been$ issued,$ in$ the$ first$ place.$ While$ I$ agree$ that$ "I$repeat$my$firm$legal$position$that$RA$6735$is$adequate$to$cover$initiatives$on$
the$ Comelec$ should$ be$ stopped$ from$ using$ public$ funds$ and$ government$ the$ Constitution,$ and$ that$ whatever$ administrative$ details$ may$ have$ been$
resources$to$help$them$gather$signatures,$I$firmly$believe$that$this$Court$has$no$ omitted$in$said$law$are$satisfactorily$provided$by$Comelec$Resolution$2300.$The$
power$ to$ restrain$ them$ from$ exercising$ their$ right$ of$ initiative.$ The$ right$ to$ promulgation$of$Resolution$2300$is$sanctioned$by$Section$2,$Article$IXSC$of$the$
propose$amendments$to$the$Constitution$is$really$a$species$of$the$right$of$free$ Constitution,$ which$ vests$ upon$ the$ Comelec$ the$ power$ to$ "enforce$ and$
speech$and$free$assembly.$And$certainly,$it$would$be$tyrannical$and$despotic$to$ administer$ all$ laws$ and$ regulations$ relative$ to$ the$ conduct$ of$ an$ election,$
stop$anyone$from$speaking$freely$and$persuading$others$to$conform$to$his/her$ plebiscite,$ initiative,$ referendum$ and$ recall."$ The$ Omnibus$ Election$ Code$
beliefs.$As$the$eminent$Voltaire$once$said,$'I$may$disagree$with$what$you$say,$but$ likewise$ empowers$ the$ electoral$ body$ to$ "promulgate$ rules$ and$ regulations$
I$will$defend$to$the$death$your$right$to$say$it.'$After$all,$freedom$is$not$really$for$ implementing$the$provisions$of$this$Code$or$other$laws$which$the$Commission$
the$ thought$ we$ agree$ with,$ but$ as$ Justice$ Holmes$ wrote,$ 'freedom$ for$ the$ is$required$to$enforce$and$administer$x$x$x."$Finally$and$most$relevantly,$Section$
thought$that$we$hate.'$ 20$ of$ Ra$ 6735$ specifically$ authorizes$ Comelec$ "to$ promulgate$ rules$ and$
$ regulations$as$may$be$necessary$to$carry$out$the$purposes$of$this$Act."$
Epilogue$ $
$ "In$my$dissent$in$Santiago,$I$wrote$that$"there$is$a$right$way$to$do$the$right$thing$
"By$ way$ of$ epilogue,$ let$ me$ stress$ the$ guiding$ tenet$ of$ my$ Separate$ Opinion.$ at$the$right$time$and$for$the$right$reason."$Let$me$explain$further.$
Initiative,$ like$ referendum$ and$ recall,$ is$ a$ new$ and$ treasured$ feature$ of$ the$ $
Filipino$ constitutional$ system.$ All$ three$ are$ institutionalized$ legacies$ of$ the$ The$Right$Thing$
worldSadmired$ EDSA$ people$ power.$ Like$ elections$ and$ plebiscites,$ they$ are$ $
hallowed$expressions$of$popular$sovereignty.$They$are$sacred$democratic$rights$ "A$ people's$ initiative$ is$ direct$ democracy$ in$ action.$ It$ is$ the$ right$ thing$ that$
of$our$people$to$be$used$as$ citizens$may$avail$themselves$of$to$articulate$their$will.$It$is$a$new$and$treasured$
$ feature$ of$ the$ Filipino$ constitutional$ system.$ Even$ the$ majority$ implicitly$
Six$ months$ after,$ in$ my$ Separate$ Opinion$ in$ People's$ Initiative$ for$ Reform,$ conceded$its$value$and$worth$in$our$legal$firmament$when$it$implored$Congress$
Modernization$ and$ Action$ (PIRMA)$ v.$ Comelec,3$ I$ joined$ the$ rest$ of$ the$ "not$ to$ tarry$ any$ longer$ in$ complying$ with$ the$ constitutional$ mandate$ to$
members$ of$ the$ Court$ in$ ruling$ "by$ a$ unanimous$ vote,$ that$ no$ grave$ abuse$ of$ provide$for$implementation$of$the$right$(of$initiative)$of$the$people$x$x$x."$Hence,$
discretion$could$be$attributed$to$the$Comelec$in$dismissing$the$petition$filed$by$ in$ the$ en$ banc$ case$ of$ Subic$ Bay$ Metropolitan$ Authority$ vs.$ Comelec,$ [G.R.$ No.$
$ 125416,$ September$ 26,$ 1996],$ this$ Court$ unanimously$ held$ that$ "(l)ike$
__________________$ elections,$ initiative$ and$ referendum$ are$ powerful$ and$ valuable$ modes$ of$
$ expressing$popular$
Constitution$ x$ x$ x."$ While$ concededly,$ petitioners$ in$ this$ case$ were$ not$ direct$ $
parties$ in$ Santiago,$ nonetheless$ the$ Court's$ injunction$ against$ the$ Comelec$ PIRMA$ therein,"$ since$ the$ Commission$ had$ "only$ complied"$ with$ the$ Santiago$
covered$ ANY$ petition,$ not$ just$ the$ Delfin$ petition$ which$ was$ the$ immediate$ Decision.$
subject$of$said$case.$As$a$dissenter$in$Santiago,$I$believed,$and$still$do,$that$the$ $
majority$ gravely$ erred$ in$ rendering$ such$ a$ sweeping$ injunction,$ but$ I$ cannot$ __________________$
fault$ the$ Comelec$ for$ complying$ with$ the$ ruling$ even$ if$ it,$ too,$ disagreed$ with$ $
said$ decision's$ ratio$ decidendi.$ Respondent$ Comelec$ was$ directly$ enjoined$ by$ sovereignty.$ And$ this$ Court$ as$ a$ matter$ of$ policy$ and$ doctrine$ will$ exert$ every$
the$highest$Court$of$the$land.$It$had$no$choice$but$to$obey.$Its$obedience$cannot$ effort$to$nurture,$protect$and$promote$their$legitimate$exercise."$
constitute$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion.$ Refusal$ to$ act$ on$ the$ PIRMA$ petition$ was$ $
the$ only$ recourse$ open$ to$ the$ Comelec.$ Any$ other$ mode$ of$ action$ would$ have$ The$Right$Way$
constituted$ defiance$ of$ the$ Court$ and$ would$ have$ been$ struck$ down$ as$ grave$ $
"From$the$outset,$I$have$already$maintained$the$view$that$"taken$together$and$ I$added$"that$my$position$upholding$the$adequacy$of$RA$6735$and$the$validity$of$
interpreted$ properly$ and$ liberally,$ the$ Constitution$ (particularly$ Art.$ XVII,$ Sec.$ Comelec$Resolution$2300$will$not$ipso$
2),$ RA$ 6735$ and$ Comelec$ Resolution$ 2300$ provide$ more$ than$ sufficient$ $
authority$to$implement,$effectuate$and$realize$our$people's$power$to$amend$the$ __________________$
Constitution."$Let$me$now$demonstrate$the$adequacy$of$RA$6735$by$outlining,$in$ $
concrete$ terms,$ the$ steps$ to$ be$ taken$ $ the$ right$ way$ $ to$ amend$ the$ "Within$ thirty$ (30)$ days$ from$ receipt$ of$ the$ petition,$ and$ after$ the$
Constitution$through$a$people's$initiative.$ determination$ of$ its$ sufficiency,$ the$ Comelec$ shall$ publish$ the$ same$ in$ Filipino$
$ and$English$at$least$twice$in$newspapers$of$general$and$local$circulation,$and$set$
"Pursuant$to$Section$3(f)$of$the$law,$the$Comelec$shall$prescribe$the$form$of$the$ the$ date$ of$ the$ plebiscite.$ The$ conduct$ of$ the$ plebiscite$ should$ not$ be$ earlier$
petition$ which$ shall$ contain$ the$ proposition$ and$ the$ required$ number$ of$ than$sixty$(60)$days,$but$not$later$than$ninety$(90)$days$after$certification$by$the$
signatories.$Under$Sec.$5(c)$thereof,$the$petition$shall$state$the$following:$ Comelec$ of$ the$ sufficiency$ of$ the$ petition.$ The$ proposition,$ if$ approved$ by$ a$
$ majority$of$the$votes$cast$in$the$plebiscite,$becomes$effective$as$of$the$day$of$the$
'c.1$contents$or$text$of$the$[provision$or$provisions]$sought$to$be$x$x$x$amended,$ plebiscite.$
x$x$x;$ $
$ "From$the$foregoing,$it$should$be$clear$that$my$position$upholding$the$adequacy$
c.2$the$proposition$[in$full$text];$ of$ RA$ 6735$ and$ the$ validity$ of$ Comelec$ Resolution$ 2300$ will$ not$ ipso$ facto$
$ validate$the$PIRMA$petition$and$automatically$lead$to$a$plebiscite$to$amend$the$
c.3$the$reason$or$reasons$therefor$[fully$and$clearly$explained];$ Constitution.$ Far$ from$ it.$ Among$ others,$ PIRMA$ must$ still$ satisfactorily$ hurdle$
$ the$following$searching$issues:$
c.4$that$it$is$not$one$of$exceptions$provided$herein;$ $
$ 1.$Does$the$proposed$change$$the$lifting$of$the$term$limits$of$elective$officials$SS$
c.5$signatures$of$the$petitioners$or$registered$voters;$and$ constitute$a$mere$amendment$and$not$a$revision$of$the$Constitution?$
$ $
c.6$ an$ abstract$ or$ summary$ proposition$ in$ not$ more$ than$ one$ hundred$ (100)$ 2.$Which$registry$of$voters$will$be$used$to$verify$the$signatures$in$the$petition?$
words$which$shall$be$legibly$written$or$printed$at$the$top$of$every$page$of$the$ This$ question$ is$ relevant$ considering$ that$ under$ RA$ 8189,$ the$ old$ registry$ of$
petition.'$ voters$ used$ in$ the$ 1995$ national$ elections$ was$ voided$ after$ the$ barangay$
$ elections$on$May$12,$1997,$while$the$new$list$may$be$used$starting$only$in$the$
"Section$8(f)$of$Comelec$Resolution$2300$additionally$requires$that$the$petition$ elections$of$May$1998.$
include$ a$ formal$ designation$ of$ the$ duly$ authorized$ representatives$ of$ the$ $
signatories.$ 3.$Does$the$clamor$for$the$proposed$change$in$the$Constitution$really$emanate$
$ from$the$people$who$signed$the$petition$for$initiative?$Or$it$is$the$beneficiaries$
"Being$ a$ constitutional$ requirement,$ the$ number$ of$ signatures$ becomes$ a$ of$term$extension$who$are$in$fact$orchestrating$such$move$to$advance$their$own$
condition$ precedent$ to$ the$ filing$ of$ the$ petition,$ and$ is$ jurisdictional.$ Without$ political$selfSinterest?$
such$ requisite$ signatures,$ the$ Commission$ shall$ motu$ proprio$ reject$ the$ $
petition.$ 4.$Are$the$six$million$signatures$genuine$and$verifiable?$Do$they$really$belong$to$
$ qualified$ warm$ bodies$ comprising$ at$ least$ 12%$ of$ the$ registered$ voters$
"Where$the$initiators$have$substantially$complied$with$the$above$requirements,$ nationwide,$ of$ which$ every$ legislative$ district$ is$ represented$ by$ at$ least$ 3%$ of$
they$may$thence$file$the$petition$with$the$Comelec$which$is$tasked$to$determine$ the$registered$voters$therein?$
the$ sufficiency$ thereof$ and$ to$ verify$ the$ signatures$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ the$ registry$ $
list$ of$ voters,$ voters'$ affidavits$ and$ voters'$ identification$ cards.$ In$ deciding$ "I$ shall$ expound$ on$ the$ third$ question$ in$ the$ next$ section,$ The$ Right$ Reason.$
whether$ the$ petition$ is$ sufficient,$ the$ Comelec$ shall$ also$ determine$ if$ the$ Question$ Nos.$ 1$ and$ 2$ above,$ while$ important,$ are$ basically$ legal$ in$ character$
proposition$is$proper$for$an$initiative,$i.e.,$if$it$consists$of$an$amendment,$not$a$ and$can$be$determined$by$argumentation$and$memoranda.$However,$Question$
revision,$of$the$Constitution.$Any$decision$of$the$electoral$body$may$be$appealed$ No.$ 4$ involves$ not$ only$ legal$ issues$ but$ gargantuan$ hurdles$ of$ factual$
to$the$Supreme$Court$within$thirty$(30)$days$from$notice.$ determination.$ This$ to$ my$ mind$ is$ the$ crucible,$ the$ litmus$ test,$ of$ a$ people's$
$ petition$for$initiative.$If$herein$petitioners,$led$by$PIRMA,$succeed$in$proving$SS$
not$just$alleging$SS$that$six$million$voters$of$this$country$indeed$want$to$amend$
the$ Constitution,$ what$ power$ on$ earth$ can$ stop$ them?$ Not$ this$ Court,$ not$ the$ $
Comelec,$not$even$the$President$or$Congress.$ "[Initiative$ is]$ a$ check$ on$ a$ legislative$ that$ is$ not$ responsive$ [and$ resorted$ to]$
$ only$ if$ the$ legislature$ is$ not$ as$ responsive$ to$ the$ vital$ and$ urgent$ needs$ of$
facto$ validate$ the$ PIRMA$ petition$ and$ automatically$ lead$ to$ a$ plebiscite$ to$ people."$SS$Commissioner$Gascon$
amend$ the$ Constitution.$ Far$ from$ it."$ I$ stressed$ that$ PIRMA$ must$ show$ the$ $
following,$among$others:$ (1)$ The$ proposed$ change$ SS$ the$ lifting$ of$ term$ limits$ of$ elective$ officials$ SS$
$ "constitute[s]$a$mere$amendment$and$not$a$revision$of$the$Constitution."$
__________________$ $
$ _________________$
"It$took$only$one$million$people$to$stage$a$peaceful$revolution$at$EDSA,$and$the$ $
very$ rafters$ and$ foundations$ of$ the$ martial$ law$ society$ trembled,$ quaked$ and$ "[Initiative$ is$ an]$ extraordinary$ power$ given$ to$ the$ people$ [and]$ reserved$ for$
crumbled.$ On$ the$ other$ hand,$ PIRMA$ and$ its$ coSpetitioners$ are$ claiming$ that$ the$ people$ [which]$ should$ not$ be$ frivolously$ resorted$ to."$ SS$ Commissioner$
they$ have$ gathered$ six$ million$ signatures.$ If,$ as$ claimed$ by$ many,$ these$ six$ Romulo$
million$signatures$are$fraudulent,$then$let$them$be$exposed$and$damned$for$all$ $
history$in$a$signatureSverification$process$conducted$under$our$open$system$of$ "Indeed,$ if$ the$ powersSthatSbe$ desire$ to$ amend$ the$ Constitution,$ or$ even$ to$
legal$advocacy.$ revise$ it,$ our$ Charter$ itself$ provides$ them$ other$ ways$ of$ doing$ so,$ namely,$ by$
$ calling$ a$ constitutional$ convention$ or$ constituting$ Congress$ into$ a$ constituent$
"More$than$anything$else,$it$is$the$truth$that$I,$as$a$member$of$this$Court$and$as$a$ assembly.$These$are$officialdom's$weapons.$But$initiative$belongs$to$the$people.$
citizen$of$this$country,$would$like$to$seek:$Are$these$six$million$signatures$real?$ $
By$ insisting$ on$ an$ entirely$ new$ doctrine$ of$ statutory$ inadequacy,$ the$ majority$ "In$ the$ present$ case,$ are$ PIRMA$ and$ its$ coSpetitioners$ legitimate$ people's$
effectively$suppressed$the$quest$for$that$truth.$ organizations$ or$ are$ they$ merely$ fronts$ for$ incumbents$ who$ want$ to$ extend$
$ their$terms?$This$is$a$factual$question$which,$unfortunately,$cannot$be$judicially$
The$Right$Reason$ answered$anymore,$because$the$Supreme$Court$majority$ruled$that$the$law$that$
$ implements$it,$RA$6735,$is$inadequate$or$insufficient$insofar$as$initiatives$to$the$
"As$mentioned,$the$third$question$that$must$be$answered,$even$if$the$adequacy$ Constitutions$ are$ concerned.$ With$ such$ ruling,$ the$ majority$ effectively$
of$ RA$ 6735$ and$ the$ validity$ of$ Comelec$ Resolution$ 2300$ were$ upheld$ by$ the$ abrogated$ a$ constitutional$ right$ of$ our$ people.$ That$ is$ why$ in$ my$ Separate$
majority$is:$Does$the$clamor$for$the$proposed$change$to$the$Constitution$really$ Opinion$ in$ Santiago,$ I$ exclaimed$ that$ such$ precipitate$ action$ "is$ equivalent$ to$
emanate$ from$ the$ people$ who$ signed$ the$ petition$ for$ initiative?$ Or$ is$ it$ the$ burning$ the$ whole$ house$ to$ exterminate$ the$ rats,$ and$ to$ killing$ the$ patient$ to$
beneficiaries$ of$ term$ extension$ who$ are$ in$ fact$ orchestrating$ such$ move$ to$ relieve$him$of$pain."$I$firmly$maintain$that$to$defeat$PIRMA's$effort,$there$is$no$
advance$their$own$political$selfSinterests?$In$other$words,$is$PIRMA's$exercise$of$ need$ to$ "burn"$ the$ constitutional$ right$ to$ initiative.$ If$ PIRMA's$ exercise$ is$ not$
the$ right$ to$ initiative$ being$ done$ in$ accordance$ with$ our$ Constitution$ and$ our$ "legitimate,"$ it$ can$ be$ exposed$ as$ such$ in$ the$ ways$ I$ have$ discussed$ $ short$ of$
laws?$Is$such$attempted$exercise$legitimate?$ abrogating$the$right$itself.$On$the$other$hand,$if$PIRMA's$position$is$proven$to$be$
$ legitimate$ $ if$ it$ hurdles$ the$ four$ issues$ I$ outlined$ earlier$ $ by$ all$ means,$ we$
"In$ Garcia$ vs.$ Commission$ on$ Elections,$ we$ described$ initiative,$ along$ with$ should$allow$and$encourage$it.$But$the$majority's$theory$of$statutory$inadequacy$
referendum,$ as$ the$ 'ultimate$ weapon$ of$ the$ people$ to$ negate$ government$ has$ preSempted$ $ unnecessarily$ and$ invalidly,$ in$ my$ view$ $ any$ judicial$
malfeasance$ and$ misfeasance.'$ In$ Subic$ Bay,$ we$ specified$ that$ 'initiative$ is$ determination$ of$ such$ legitimacy$ or$ illegitimacy.$ It$ has$ silenced$ the$ quest$ for$
entirely$the$work$of$the$electorate$x$x$x$a$process$of$lawmaking$by$the$people$ truth$into$the$interstices$of$the$PIRMA$petition.$
themselves$ without$ the$ participation$ and$ against$ the$ wishes$ of$ their$ elected$ $
representatives.'$As$ponente$of$Subic$Bay,$I$stand$foursquare$on$this$principle:$ The$Right$Time$
The$ right$ to$ amend$ through$ initiative$ belongs$ only$ to$ the$ people$ $ not$ to$ the$ $
government$and$its$minions.$This$principle$finds$clear$support$from$utterances$ "The$Constitution$itself$sets$a$time$limitation$on$when$changes$thereto$may$be$
of$many$constitutional$commissioners$like$those$quoted$below:$ proposed.$ Section$ 2$ of$ Article$ XVII$ precludes$ amendments$ "within$ five$ years$
$ following$ [its]$ ratification$ x$ x$ x$ nor$ oftener$ than$ once$ every$ five$ years$
"[Initiative$ is]$ a$ reserve$ power$ of$ the$ sovereign$ people,$ when$ they$ are$ thereafter."$ Since$ its$ ratification,$ the$ 1987$ Constitution$ has$ never$ been$
dissatisfied$with$the$National$Assembly$x$x$x$[and]$precisely$a$fallback$position$ amended.$Hence,$the$fiveSyear$prohibition$is$now$inoperative$and$amendments$
of$the$people$in$the$event$that$they$are$dissatisfied."$SS$Commissioner$Ople$ may$theoretically$be$proposed$at$any$time.$
$ "That$ term$ limits$ may$ no$ longer$ be$ lifted$ prior$ to$ the$ 1998$ elections$ via$ a$
"Be$that$as$it$may,$I$believe$$given$the$present$circumstances$$that$there$is$no$ people's$ initiative$ does$ not$ detract$ one$ whit$ from$ (1)$ my$ firm$ conviction$ that$
more$time$to$lift$term$limits$to$enable$incumbents$to$seek$reelection$in$the$May$ RA$ 6735$ is$ sufficient$ and$ adequate$ to$ implement$ this$ constitutional$ right$ and,$
11,$1998$polls.$Between$today$and$the$next$national$ more$ important,$ (2)$ my$ faith$ in$ the$ power$ of$ the$ people$ to$ initiate$ changes$ in$
$ local$ and$ national$ laws$ and$ the$ Constitution.$ In$ fact,$ I$ think$ the$ Court$ can$
(2)$ The$ "six$ million$ signatures$ are$ genuine$ and$ verifiable";$ and$ they$ "really$ deliberate$ on$ these$ two$ items$ even$ more$ serenely$ and$ wisely$ now$ that$ the$
belong$to$qualified$warm$bodies$comprising$at$ debates$will$be$free$from$the$din$and$distraction$of$the$1998$elections.$After$all,$
$ jurisprudence$is$not$merely$for$the$here$and$now$but,$more$so,$for$the$hereafter$
__________________$ and$ the$ morrow.$ Let$ me$ therefore$ stress,$ by$ way$ of$ epilogue,$ my$ unbending$
$ credo$in$favor$of$our$people's$right$to$initiative.$
elections,$less$than$eight$(8)$months$remain.$Santiago,$where$the$single$issue$of$ $
the$sufficiency$of$RA$6735$was$resolved,$took$this$Court$three$(3)$months,$and$ least$12%$of$the$registered$voters$nationwide,$of$which$every$legislative$district$
another$ two$ (2)$ months$ to$ decide$ the$ motion$ for$ reconsideration.$ The$ instant$ is$represented$by$at$least$3%$of$the$registered$voters$therein."$
case,$ where$ the$ same$ issue$ is$ also$ raised$ by$ the$ petitioners,$ took$ two$ months,$ $
not$counting$a$possible$motion$for$reconsideration.$These$time$spans$could$not$ __________________$
be$ abbreviated$ any$ further,$ because$ due$ process$ requires$ that$ all$ parties$ be$ $
given$sufficient$time$to$file$their$pleadings.$ Epilogue$
$ $
"Thus,$even$if$the$Court$were$to$rule$now$in$favor$of$the$adequacy$of$RA$6735$$ "I$ believe$ in$ democracy$ $ in$ our$ people's$ natural$ right$ to$ determine$ our$ own$
as$I$believe$it$should$$and$allow$the$Comelec$to$act$on$the$PIRMA$petition,$such$ destiny.$
eightSmonth$ period$ will$ not$ be$ enough$ to$ tackle$ the$ four$ weighty$ issues$ I$ $
mentioned$ earlier,$ considering$ that$ two$ of$ them$ involve$ tedious$ factual$ "I$ believe$ in$ the$ process$ of$ initiative$ as$ a$ democratic$ method$ of$ enabling$ our$
questions.$The$Comelec's$decision$on$any$of$these$issues$can$still$be$elevated$to$ people$to$express$their$will$and$chart$their$history.$Initiative$is$an$alternative$to$
this$ Court$ for$ review,$ and$ reconsiderations$ on$ our$ decisions$ on$ each$ of$ those$ bloody$ revolution,$ internal$ chaos$ and$ civil$ strife.$ It$ is$ an$ inherent$ right$ of$ the$
issues$may$again$be$sought.$ people$ $ as$ basic$ as$ the$ right$ to$ elect,$ the$ right$ to$ selfSdetermination$ and$ the$
$ right$ to$ individual$ liberties.$ I$ believe$ that$ Filipinos$ have$ the$ ability$ and$ the$
"Comelec's$herculean$task$alone$of$verifying$each$of$the$six$million$signatures$is$ capacity$ to$ rise$ above$ themselves,$ to$ use$ this$ right$ of$ initiative$ wisely$ and$
enormously$ timeSconsuming,$ considering$ that$ any$ person$ may$ question$ the$ maturely,$and$to$choose$what$is$best$for$themselves$and$their$posterity.$
authenticity$ of$ each$ and$ every$ signature,$ initially$ before$ the$ election$ registrar,$ $
then$ before$ the$ Comelec$ on$ appeal$ and$ finally,$ before$ this$ Court$ in$ a$ separate$ "Such$ beliefs,$ however,$ should$ not$ be$ equated$ with$ a$ desire$ to$ perpetuate$ a$
proceeding.$Moreover,$the$plebiscite$itself$$assuming$such$stage$can$be$reached$ particular$official$or$group$of$officials$in$power.$Far$from$it.$Such$perpetuation$is$
$ may$ be$ scheduled$ only$ after$ sixty$ (60)$ but$ not$ more$ than$ ninety$ (90)$ days,$ anathema$ to$ democracy.$ My$ firm$ conviction$ that$ there$ is$ an$ adequate$ law$
from$the$time$the$Comelec$and$this$Court,$on$appeal,$finally$declare$the$petition$ implementing$ the$ constitutional$ right$ of$ initiative$ does$ not$ ipso$ facto$ result$ in$
to$be$sufficient.$ the$ victory$ of$ the$ PIRMA$ petition$ or$ of$ any$ proposed$ constitutional$ change.$
$ There$ are,$ after$ all,$ sufficient$ safeguards$ to$ guarantee$ the$ proper$ use$ of$ such$
"Meanwhile,$ under$ Comelec$ Resolution$ 2946,$ political$ parties,$ groups$ constitutional$right$and$to$forestall$its$misuse$and$abuse.$First,$initiative$cannot$
organizations$ or$ coalitions$ may$ start$ selecting$ their$ official$ candidates$ for$ be$ used$ to$ revise$ the$ Constitution,$ only$ to$ amend$ it.$ Second,$ the$ petitioners'$
President,$ Vice$ President$ and$ Senators$ on$ November$ 27,$ 1997;$ the$ period$ for$ signatures$ must$ be$ validated$ against$ an$ existing$ list$ of$ voters$ and/or$ voters'$
filing$ certificates$ of$ candidacy$ is$ from$ January$ 11$ to$ February$ 9,$ 1998;$ the$ identification$cards.$Third,$initiative$is$a$reverse$power$of$and$by$the$people,$not$
election$period$and$campaign$for$national$officials$start$on$February$10,$1998,$ of$incumbent$officials$and$their$machinators.$Fourth$and$most$important$of$all,$
while$the$campaign$period$for$other$elective$officials,$on$March$17,$1998.$This$ the$signatures$must$be$verified$as$real$and$genuine;$not$concocted,$fictitious$or$
means,$ by$ the$ time$ PIRMA's$ proposition$ is$ ready$ $ if$ ever$ $ for$ submission$ fabricated.$ The$ only$ legal$ way$ to$ do$ this$ is$ to$ enable$ the$ Commission$ on$
directly$to$the$voters$at$large,$it$will$have$been$overcome$by$the$elections.$Time$ Elections$ to$ conduct$ a$ nationwide$ verification$ process$ as$ mandated$ by$ the$
will$simply$run$out$on$PIRMA,$if$the$intention$is$to$lift$term$limits$in$time$for$the$ Constitution$ and$ the$ law.$ Such$ verification,$ it$ bears$ stressing,$ is$ subject$ to$
1998$elections.$ review$by$this$Court.$
$ $
"There$ were,$ by$ the$ most$ generous$ estimate,$ only$ a$ million$ people$ who$ Court's$ jurisprudence$ in$ Santiago$ and$ PIRMA.$ Even$ assuming$ arguendo$ that$
gathered$ at$ EDSA$ in$ 1986,$ and$ yet$ they$ changed$ the$ history$ of$ our$ country.$ Comelec$ erred$ in$ ruling$ on$ a$ very$ difficult$ and$ unsettled$ question$ of$ law,$ this$
PIRMA$claims$six$times$that$number,$not$just$from$the$National$Capital$Region$ Court$ still$ cannot$ attribute$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ to$ the$ poll$ body$ with$
but$ from$ all$ over$ the$ country.$ Is$ this$ claim$ through$ the$ invention$ of$ its$ novel$ respect$to$that$action.6$
theory$ of$ statutory$ insufficiency,$ the$ Court's$ majority$ has$ stifled$ the$ only$ legal$ $
method$of$determining$whether$PIRMA$is$real$or$not,$whether$there$is$indeed$a$ The$present$Lambino$Petition$is$in$exactly$the$same$situation$as$that$of$PIRMA$
popular$ clamor$ to$ lift$ term$ limits$ of$ elected$ officials,$ and$ whether$ six$ million$ in$ 1997.$ The$ differences$ pointed$ out$ by$ Justice$ Reynato$ S.$ Puno$ are,$ with$ due$
voters$ want$ to$ initiate$ amendments$ to$ their$ most$ basic$ law.$ In$ suppressing$ a$ respect,$ superficial.$ It$ is$ argued$ that,$ unlike$ the$ present$ Lambino$ Petition,$
judicial$ answer$ to$ such$ questions,$ the$ Court$ may$ have$ unwittingly$ yielded$ to$ PIRMA$ did$ not$ contain$ verified$ signatures.$ These$ are$ distinctions$ that$ do$ not$
PIRMA$ the$ benefit$ of$ the$ legal$ presumption$ of$ legality$ and$ regularity.$ In$ its$ make$ a$ difference.$ Precisely,$ Justice$ Puno$ is$ urging$ a$ remand,$ because$ the$
misplaced$ zeal$ to$ exterminate$ the$ rats,$ it$ burned$ down$ the$ whole$ house.$ It$ verification$issue$is$"contentious"$and$remains$unproven$by$petitioners.$Clearly,$
unceremoniously$divested$the$people$of$a$basic$constitutional$right.$ both$ the$ PIRMA$ and$ the$ Lambino$ Petitions$ contain$ unverified$ signatures.$
$ Therefore,$they$both$deserve$the$same$treatment:$DISMISSAL.$
In$ both$ Opinions,$ I$ concluded$ that$ we$ must$ implement$ "the$ right$ thing$ $
[initiative]$in$the$right$way$at$the$right$time$and$for$the$right$reason."$ Besides,$ the$ only$ reason$ given$ in$ the$ unanimous$ Resolution$ on$ PIRMA$ v.$
$ Comelec$ was$ that$ the$ Commission$ had$ "only$ complied"$ with$ this$ Court's$
In$the$present$case,$I$steadfastly$stand$by$my$foregoing$Opinions$in$Santiago$and$ Decision$ in$ Santiago,$ the$ same$ reason$ given$ by$ Comelec$ in$ this$ case.$ The$
PIRMA.$ Tested$ against$ them,$ the$ present$ Petition$ of$ Raul$ Lambino$ and$ Erico$ Separate$ Opinions$ in$ PIRMA$ gave$ no$ other$ reason.$ No$ one$ argued,$ even$
Aumentado$must$be$DISMISSED.$Unfortunately,$the$right$thing$is$being$rushed$ remotely,$ that$ the$ PIRMA$ Petition$ should$ have$ been$ dismissed$ because$ the$
in$the$wrong$way$and$for$the$wrong$reasons.$Let$me$explain.$ signatures$were$unverified.$
$ $
No$Grave$Abuse$ To$ stress,$ I$ adhere$ to$ my$ Opinion$ in$ PIRMA$ that,$ "[b]eing$ a$ constitutional$
$ requirement,$ the$ number$ of$ signatures$ becomes$ a$ condition$ precedent$ to$ the$
of$Discretion$by$Comelec$ filing$ of$ the$ petition,$ and$ is$ jurisdictional.7$ Without$ those$ signatures,$ the$
$ Comelec$shall$motu$proprio$reject$the$petition."$
As$ in$ PIRMA,$ I$ find$ no$ grave$ abuse$ of$ discretion$ in$ Comelec's$ dismissal$ of$ the$ $
Lambino$ Petition.$ After$ all,$ the$ Commission$ merely$ followed$ the$ holding$ in$ So,$until$and$unless$Santiago$is$revisited$and$changed$by$this$Court$or$the$legal$
Santiago$permanently$ moorings$ of$ the$ exercise$ of$ the$ right$ are$ substantially$ changed,$ the$ Comelec$
$ cannot$ be$ faulted$ for$ acting$ in$ accord$ with$ this$ Court's$ pronouncements.$
____________________$ Respondent$ Commission$ has$ no$ discretion,$ under$ any$ guise,$ to$ refuse$
$ enforcement$of$any$final$decision$of$this$Court.8$The$refusal$of$the$poll$body$to$
"In$the$ultimate,$the$mission$of$the$judiciary$is$to$discover$truth$and$to$make$it$ act$ on$ the$ Lambino$ Petition$ was$ its$ only$ recourse.$ Any$ other$ mode$ of$ action$
prevail.$ This$ mission$ is$ undertaken$ not$ only$ to$ resolve$ the$ vagaries$ of$ present$ would$ appear$ not$ only$ presumptuous,$ but$ also$ contemptuous.$ It$ would$ have$
events$but$also$to$build$the$pathways$of$tomorrow.$The$sum$total$of$the$entire$ constituted$ defiance$ of$ the$ Court$ and$ would$ have$ surely$ been$ struck$ down$ as$
process$of$adversarial$litigation$is$the$verity$of$facts$and$the$application$of$law$ grave$abuse$of$discretion$and$contumacious$disregard$of$the$supremacy$of$this$
thereto.$ By$ the$ majority$ copSout$ in$ this$ mission$ of$ discovery,$ our$ country$ and$ Court$as$the$final$arbiter$of$justiciable$controversies.$
our$people$have$been$deprived$not$only$of$a$basic$constitutional$right,$as$earlier$ $
noted,$but$also$of$the$judicial$opportunity$to$verify$the$truth."$ Even$ assuming$ further$ that$ this$ Court$ rules,$ as$ I$ believe$ it$ should$ (for$ the$
$ reasons$given$in$my$Opinions$in$Santiago$and$PIRMA),$that$Republic$Act$6735$is$
enjoining$the$poll$body$"from$entertaining$or$taking$cognizance$of$any$petition$ indeed$sufficient$to$implement$an$initiative$to$amend$the$Constitution,$still,$no$
for$initiative$on$amendments$to$the$Constitution$until$a$sufficient$law$shall$have$ grave$abuse$of$discretion$can$be$attributed$to$the$Comelec$for$merely$following$
been$validly$enacted$to$provide$for$the$implementation$of$the$system."$ prevailing$jurisprudence$extant$at$the$time$it$rendered$its$ruling$in$question.$
$ $
Indeed,$ the$ Comelec$ did$ not$ violate$ the$ Constitution,$ the$ laws$ or$ any$ Only$Amendments,$
jurisprudence.4$ Neither$ can$ whim,$ caprice,$ arbitrariness$ or$ personal$ bias$ be$ $
attributed$ to$ the$ Commission.5$ Quite$ the$ contrary,$ it$ prudently$ followed$ this$ Not$Revisions$
$ $
I$reiterate$that$only$amendments,$not$revisions,$may$be$the$proper$subject$of$an$ Added$ to$ the$ constitutional$ mandate$ barring$ revisions$ is$ the$ provision$ of$ RA$
initiative$to$change$the$Constitution.$This$principle$is$crystal$clear$from$even$a$ 6735$ expressly$ prohibiting$ petitions$ for$ initiative$ from$ "embracing$ more$ than$
layperson's$reading$of$the$basic$law.9$ one$ subject$ matter."10$ The$ present$ initiative$ covers$ at$ least$ two$ subjects:$ (1)$
$ the$shift$from$a$presidential$to$a$parliamentary$form$of$government;$and$(2)$the$
I$ submit$ that$ changing$ the$ system$ of$ government$ from$ presidential$ to$ change$ from$ a$ bicameral$ to$ a$ unicameral$ legislature.11$ Thus,$ even$ under$
parliamentary$ and$ the$ form$ of$ the$ legislature$ from$ bicameral$ to$ unicameral$ Republic$ Act$ 6735$ SS$ the$ law$ that$ Justice$ Puno$ and$ I$ hold$ to$ be$ sufficient$ and$
contemplates$ an$ overhaul$ of$ the$ structure$ of$ government.$ The$ ponencia$ has$ valid$SS$the$Lambino$Petition$deserves$dismissal.$
amply$ demonstrated$ that$ the$ merger$ of$ the$ legislative$ and$ the$ executive$ $
branches$ under$ a$ unicameralSparliamentary$ system,$ "[b]y$ any$ legal$ test$ and$ 12$Percent$and$3$Percent$Thresholds$
under$any$jurisdiction,"$will$"radically$alter$the$framework$of$government$as$set$ Not$Proven$by$Petitioners$
forth$ in$ the$ Constitution."$ Indeed,$ the$ proposed$ changes$ have$ an$ overall$ $
implication$ on$ the$ entire$ Constitution;$ they$ effectively$ rewrite$ its$ most$ The$ litmus$ test$ of$ a$ people's$ petition$ for$ initiative$ is$ its$ ability$ to$ muster$ the$
important$ and$ basic$ provisions.$ The$ prolixity$ and$ complexity$ of$ the$ changes$ constitutional$ requirement$ that$ it$ be$ supported$ by$ at$ least$ 12$ percent$ of$ the$
cannot$be$categorized,$even$by$semantic$generosity,$as$"amendments."$ registered$voters$nationwide,$of$which$at$least$3$percent$of$the$registered$voters$
$ in$every$legislative$district$must$be$represented.$As$pointed$out$by$Intervenors$
In$ addition,$ may$ I$ say$ that$ of$ the$ three$ modes$ of$ changing$ the$ Constitution,$ One$Voice,$Inc.,$et$al.,$however,$records$show$that$there$was$a$failure$to$meet$the$
revisions$ (or$ amendments)$ may$ be$ proposed$ only$ through$ the$ first$ two:$ by$ minimum$percentages$required.12$
Congress$ or$ by$ a$ constitutional$ convention.$ Under$ the$ third$ mode$ SS$ people's$ $
initiative$SS$only$amendments$are$allowed.$Many$of$the$justices'$Opinions$have$ Even$ Justice$ Puno$ concedes$ that$ the$ 12$ percent$ and$ 3$ percent$ constitutional$
cited$ the$ historical,$ philosophical$ and$ jurisprudential$ bases$ of$ their$ respective$ requirements$ involve$ "contentious$ facts,"$ which$ have$ not$ been$ proven$ by$ the$
positions.$I$will$not$add$to$the$woes$of$the$reader$by$reiterating$them$here.$ Lambino$Petition.$Thus,$he$is$urging$a$remand$to$the$Comelec.$
$ $
Suffice$ it$ to$ say$ that,$ to$ me,$ the$ practical$ test$ to$ differentiate$ an$ amendment$ But$ a$ remand$ is$ both$ imprudent$ and$ futile.$ It$ is$ imprudent$ because$ the$
from$a$revision$is$found$in$the$Constitution$itself:$a$revision$may$be$done$only$ Constitution$itself$mandates$the$said$requisites$of$an$initiative$petition.$In$other$
when$ the$ proposed$ change$ can$ be$ drafted,$ defined,$ articulated,$ discussed$ and$ words,$ a$ petition$ that$ does$ not$ show$ the$ required$ percentages$ is$ fatally$
agreed$ upon$ after$ a$ mature$ and$ democratic$ debate$ in$ a$ deliberative$ body$ like$ defective$and$must$be$dismissed,$as$the$Delfin$Petition$was,$in$Santiago.$
Congress$ or$ a$ Convention.$ The$ changes$ proposed$ must$ necessarily$ be$ $
scrutinized,$ as$ their$ adoption$ or$ nonSadoption$ must$ result$ from$ an$ informed$ Furthermore,$as$the$ponencia$had$discussed$extensively,$the$present$Petition$is$
judgment.$ void$and$unconstitutional.$It$points$out$that$the$Petition$dismally$fails$to$comply$
$ with$the$constitutional$requirement$that$an$initiative$must$be$directly$proposed$
Indeed,$the$constitutional$bodies$that$drafted$the$1935,$the$1972$and$the$1987$ by$the$people.$Specifically,$the$ponencia$has$amply$established$that$petitioners$
Constitutions$had$to$spend$many$months$of$purposeful$discussions,$democratic$ were$ unable$ to$ show$ that$ the$ Lambino$ Petition$ contained,$ or$ incorporated$ by$
debates$and$rounds$of$voting$before$they$could$agree$on$the$wordings$covering$ attachment,$the$full$text$of$the$proposed$changes.$
the$ philosophy,$ the$ underlying$ principles,$ and$ the$ structure$ of$ government$ of$ $
our$Republic.$ So,$ too,$ a$ remand$ is$ futile.$ Even$ if$ the$ required$ percentages$ are$ proven$ before$
$ the$ Commission,$ the$ Petition$ must$ still$ be$ dismissed$ for$ proposing$ a$ revision,$
Verily,$ even$ bills$ creating$ or$ changing$ the$ administrative$ structure$ of$ local$ not$ an$ amendment,$ in$ gross$ violation$ of$ the$ Constitution.$ At$ the$ very$ least,$ it$
governments$ take$ several$ weeks$ or$ even$ months$ of$ drafting,$ reading,$ and$ proposes$more$than$one$subject,$in$violation$of$Republic$Act$6735.$
debating$before$Congress$can$approve$them.$How$much$more$when$it$comes$to$ $
constitutional$changes?$ Summation$
$ $
A$change$in$the$form$of$government$of$our$country$from$presidentialSbicameral$ Petitioners$plead$with$this$Court$to$hear$the$voice$of$the$people$because,$in$the$
to$ parliamentarySunicameral$ is$ monumental.$ Even$ the$ initiative$ proponents$ words$of$Justice$Puno$who$supports$them,$the$"people's$voice$is$sovereign$in$a$
admit$this$fact.$So,$why$should$a$revision$be$rammed$down$our$people's$throats$ democracy."$
without$the$benefit$of$intelligent$discussion$in$a$deliberative$assembly?$ $
I,$too,$believe$in$heeding$the$people's$voice.$I$reiterate$my$Separate$Opinion$in$ $
PIRMA$that$"initiative$is$a$democratic$method$of$enabling$our$people$to$express$ Upon$assuming$office,$each$of$the$justices$of$the$Supreme$Court$took$a$solemn$
their$ will$ and$ chart$ their$ history.$ x$ x$ x.$ I$ believe$ that$ Filipinos$ have$ the$ ability$ oath$to$uphold$the$Constitution.$Being$the$protectors$of$the$fundamental$law$as$
and$ the$ capacity$ to$ rise$ above$ themselves,$ to$ use$ this$ right$ of$ initiative$ wisely$ the$ highest$ expression$ of$ the$ sovereign$ will,$ they$ must$ subject$ to$ the$ strictest$
and$maturely,$and$to$choose$what$is$best$for$themselves$and$their$posterity."$ scrutiny$ any$ attempt$ to$ change$ it,$ lest$ it$ be$ trivialized$ and$ degraded$ by$ the$
$ assaults$ of$ the$ mob$ and$ of$ illSconceived$ designs.$ The$ Court$ must$ singleS
This$belief$will$not,$however,$automatically$and$blindly$result$in$an$initiative$to$ mindedly$ defend$ the$ Constitution$ from$ bogus$ efforts$ falsely$ attributed$ to$ the$
change$the$Constitution,$because$the$present$Petition$violates$the$following:$ sovereign$people.$
$ $
$The$Constitution$(specifically$Article$XVII,$which$allows$only$amendments,$not$ The$ judiciary$ may$ be$ the$ weakest$ branch$ of$ government.$ Nonetheless,$ when$
revisions,$and$requires$definite$percentages$of$verified$signatures)$ ranged$ against$ incessant$ voices$ from$ the$ more$ powerful$ branches$ of$
$ government,$it$should$never$cower$in$submission.$On$the$other$hand,$I$daresay$
$The$law$(specifically,$Republic$Act$6735,$which$prohibits$petitions$containing$ that$ the$ same$ weakness$ of$ the$ Court$ becomes$ its$ strength$ when$ it$ speaks$
more$than$one$subject)$ independently$ through$ decisions$ that$ rightfully$ uphold$ the$ supremacy$ of$ the$
$ Constitution$and$the$Rule$of$Law.$The$strength$of$the$judiciary$lies$not$in$its$lack$
$ Jurisprudence$ (specifically,$ PIRMA$ v.$ Comelec,$ which$ dismissed$ the$ Petition$ of$brute$power,$but$in$its$moral$courage$to$perform$its$constitutional$duty$at$all$
then$under$consideration$ on$ the$ ground$ that,$ by$ following$ the$ Santiago$ruling,$ times$against$all$odds.$Its$might$is$in$its$being$right.15$
the$Comelec$had$not$gravely$abused$its$discretion).$ $
$ During$ the$ past$ weeks,$ media$ outfits$ have$ been$ ablaze$ with$ reports$ and$
I$ submit$ further$ that$ a$ remand$ of$ the$ Lambino$ Petition$ is$ both$ imprudent$ and$ innuendoes$about$alleged$carrots$offered$and$sticks$drawn$by$those$interested$
futile.$ More$ tellingly,$ it$ is$ a$ copSout,$ a$ handSwashing$ already$ discredited$ 2000$ in$the$outcome$of$this$case.16$There$being$no$judicial$proof$of$these$allegations,$
years$ago.$Instead$of$fingerSpointing,$I$believe$we$must$confront$the$issues$head$ I$ shall$ not$ comment$ on$ them$ for$ the$ nonce,$ except$ to$ quote$ the$ Good$ Book,$
on,$because$the$people$expect$no$less$from$this$august$and$venerable$institution$ which$ says,$ "There$ is$ nothing$ hidden$ that$ will$ not$ be$ revealed,$ and$ nothing$
of$supreme$justice.$ secret$that$will$not$be$known$and$come$to$light."17$
$ $
Epilogue$ Verily,$ the$ Supreme$ Court$ is$ now$ on$ the$ crossroads$ of$ history.$ By$ its$ decision,$
$ the$Court$and$each$of$its$members$shall$be$judged$by$posterity.$Ten$years,$fifty$
At$ bottom,$ the$ issue$ in$ this$ case$ is$ simply$ the$ Rule$ of$ Law.13$ Initiative,$ like$ years,$a$hundred$years$SS$or$even$a$thousand$years$SS$from$now,$what$the$Court$
referendum$ and$ recall,$ is$ a$ treasured$ feature$ of$ the$ Filipino$ constitutional$ did$here,$and$how$each$justice$opined$and$voted,$will$still$be$talked$about,$either$
system.$It$was$born$out$of$our$worldSadmired$and$oftenSimitated$People$Power,$ in$ shame$ or$ in$ pride.$ Indeed,$ the$ handSwashing$ of$ Pontius$ Pilate,$ the$
but$ its$ misuse$ and$ abuse$ must$ be$ resolutely$ rejected.$ Democracy$ must$ be$ abomination$of$Dred$Scott,$and$the$loathing$of$Javellana$still$linger$and$haunt$to$
cherished,$but$mob$rule$vanquished.$ this$day.$
$ $
The$ Constitution$ is$ a$ sacred$ social$ compact,$ forged$ between$ the$ government$ Let$not$this$case$fall$into$the$same$damnation.$Rather,$let$this$Court$be$known$
and$the$people,$between$each$individual$and$the$rest$of$the$citizenry.$Through$ throughout$ the$ nation$ and$ the$ world$ for$ its$ independence,$ integrity,$ industry$
it,$ the$ people$ have$ solemnly$ expressed$ their$ will$ that$ all$ of$ them$ shall$ be$ and$intelligence.$
governed$ by$ laws,$ and$ their$ rights$ limited$ by$ agreedSupon$ covenants$ to$ $
promote$the$common$good.$If$we$are$to$uphold$the$Rule$of$Law$and$reject$the$ WHEREFORE,$I$vote$to$DISMISS$the$Petition.$
rule$of$the$mob,$we$must$faithfully$abide$by$the$processes$the$Constitution$has$
ordained$in$order$to$bring$about$a$peaceful,$just$and$humane$society.$Assuming$
arguendo$ that$ six$ million$ people$ allegedly$ gave$ their$ assent$ to$ the$ proposed$
changes$ in$ the$ Constitution,$ they$ are$ nevertheless$ still$ bound$ by$ the$ social$
covenant$ SS$ the$ present$ Constitution$ SS$ which$ was$ ratified$ by$ a$ far$ greater$
majority$ almost$ twenty$ years$ ago.14$ I$ do$ not$ denigrate$ the$ majesty$ of$ the$
sovereign$ will;$ rather,$ I$ elevate$ our$ society$ to$ the$ loftiest$ perch,$ because$ our$
government$must$remain$as$one$of$laws$and$not$of$men.$