Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I.
Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the
Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent
committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCPs objections and despite
serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order 2dated May 11,
2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila)
and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP.
She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the
respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receivers exercise
of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that
she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and
presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionzas financial adviser and, at the same time, as her
financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs
expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.

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 7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to
create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses
to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCPs
requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCPs counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his
every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the courts power to approve the
rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIBs favor and made comments and
rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act
of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details
as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a
shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the respondent
for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation
plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation
proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that
does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal
meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21,
Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it
was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the
parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period
prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to the
SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the complainants motion for
inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not
orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to
the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

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She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainants allegations
were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits
and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the
respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website
"Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under
contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she
is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v.
Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondents acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a
"Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them
to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CAs Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the submission
of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints
were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondents appreciation of
evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason
of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCPs
financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the
complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCPs
interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to
inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings
as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCPs creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondents explanation in
approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel and
ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be a conceited show
of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be
done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be
temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria
should be held liable.16
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On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying
photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) even during these changing times when social
networking websites seem to be the trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the publics
acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all
the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was tantamount
to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant
failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence.
It accepted the respondents explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they
should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sisons
observations that the respondents act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set
forth by the Code.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but
modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the
respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was
a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial
evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and
partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondents bad faith, malice
or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves,
however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21

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"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence
of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases." 22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not
by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies. 24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the respondents alleged
partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainants verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in
light especially of a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give
equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is
not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded
on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondents predisposition to decide the
case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn
the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants failure to establish
with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him
liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors
holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition
of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found necessary to
make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the
functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill
motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule]
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his
official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or
egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed 32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad
faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion
of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

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Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties
must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-companys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders,
parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and
conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a
very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB
witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondents act of denying SCP the opportunity to
disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed
by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures prescribed under the
IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, this does not
mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is
involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act of promptly ordering the creation of a management
committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondents explanation to be
satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling
evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a
rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as
it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still
required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing of the petition,
unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan on December
3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

6
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the
Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 40 He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the
virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to
all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his
reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge may attribute his
intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of
court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural
and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are
displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself
irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As
a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must
never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet a new medium through which more and
more Filipinos communicate with each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in
social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in
cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this
light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account
in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom of
expression. The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of
their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

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This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their
judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she
posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate
regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not
just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but
when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a
judge, may be the object of the publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done
by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of
conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.1wphi1 The very nature of their
functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their
oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It
is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00;
(2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since
this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED
Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for
the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x xxx xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his
office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to
legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal
papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute,
Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as
Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the
case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I
should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no
progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty.
Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even
brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the
City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the
Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my
draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all
of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
9
 "That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following
day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and
only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for
the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

xxx xxx x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2 respondent filed his
Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter
against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's law
office to deliver the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only
for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case.
However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose
services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these
fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the
Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the
need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was
a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former
might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by
Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once
more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the
amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

10
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the
undesirable events, it was he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the
part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client,
the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage
and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the
respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year."4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and
(b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the
complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that
may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter
never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of
one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and
that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

11
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a
client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it
was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. 11Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of
law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of
respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they
may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they
must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal
fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.

12
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved
to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that
he be suspended from the practice of law.

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC)
which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor
paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129
and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition
for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).

The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.

On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to
increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for
review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.

On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However,
on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.

13
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions
of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies.
On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby
the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the
litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been
obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former
cases were secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).

On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral
Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments
on April 14, 1988.

In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988,
denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid
late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise
denied with finality.

Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.

On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed
an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690
and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of
execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.

On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul
the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the
writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions
(CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.

On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition
filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and
Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.

From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R.
SP No. 17040).

II

We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law."
The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns
him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to
his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot

14
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional
Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:

Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory
Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d
Cir. 1971]).

The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated
when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the
execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal
with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his
petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and
dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due
process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."

As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of
due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC
was already ripe for execution.

This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:

. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court
is ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).

(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).

Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844,
to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of
Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;

15
 (4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;

(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of
Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of
forum shopping.

In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in
one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72
SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:

Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to
add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for
willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such
actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).

By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all
rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he
perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and
disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, p. 2).

WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year. SO ORDERED.

16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

17
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of
the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
18
 One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge
or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

19
 MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups
of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593).
The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty
such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
20
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has
become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-
making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas
of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate

21
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in
a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice"
in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience
of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness
more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other

22
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the
risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law"
is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
23
 The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?;
or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the
legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved
in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p.
11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default.
(Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers
for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
24
 Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as
a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
25
 office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a
week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice
of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or
in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from
the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that

No blade shall touch his skin;

26
 No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has
been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification
by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the
Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice
of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
27
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge
as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
"practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant.
In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors
determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice
of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co.,
290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in
the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

28
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform
any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such
position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I
must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no
reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he
has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of
the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies
some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the
SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some
29
law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not
even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or
buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he
does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian
and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-
year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents
but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled
one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5
leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs,
we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our
belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are
not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even
one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity
where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and
all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether
in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
30
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter
has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must
have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

31
 d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a
certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice
for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of
legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply
the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out
of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer,
they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
32
 xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the
twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did
not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that
is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where
he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services
in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent;
more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's
in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for
another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in
practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of
People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice
of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the

33
 Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to
the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the
Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor
but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has
been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification
by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the
Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

34
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice
of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge
as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
"practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant.
In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors
determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice
of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co.,
290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
35
 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in
the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform
any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such
position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I
must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no
reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

36
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he
has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of
the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies
some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the
SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some
law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not
even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or
buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he
does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian
and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-
year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents
but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled
one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5
leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs,
we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our
belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
37
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are
not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even
one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity
where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and
all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether
in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter
has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must
have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

38
 c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a
certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice
for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of
legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply
the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

39
 The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out
of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer,
they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the
twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did
not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that
is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where
he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services
in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent;
more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's
in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for
another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in
practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

40
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of
People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice
of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to
the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the
Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor
but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

41
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161070 April 14, 2008

JOHN HILARIO y SIBAL, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by John Hilario y Sibal (petitioner), seeking
to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated August 19, 20031 and November 28 20032 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75820.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts3 of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the
death of the latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision4 finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.

On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief 5 from the Decision dated
December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa;

42
that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice
but to repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and
learned from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing that the notice of appeal
filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his
representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his
clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did
not inform him of any action taken thereon.

Petitioner claimed that he had a meritorious defense, to wit:

1. The Decision dated December 5, 2001, on page 16 thereof states an imprisonment term of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal - a matter which ought to be rectified;

2. The undersigned is a first time offender;

3. No ruling was laid down on the stipulated facts (Decision, p. 3) relative to the (1) absence of counsel during the alleged
inquest, and (2) absence of warrant in arresting the accused after ten (10) days from the commission of the crime;

4. Absence of a corroborating witness to the purported lone eyewitness, as against the corroborated testimony of accused-
petitioner's alibi;

5. The Commission on Human Rights investigation on the torture of the accused-petitioner;

6. and others.6

Petitioner argued that he was meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to the previous capital punishment of 20 years
which was given an automatic review by the Supreme Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by the
appellate court; and that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is given due course since he continues to languish in jail while the
Petition for Relief is pending.

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief where he contended that the petition should no longer be
entertained; and that perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law was not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal rendered the judgment final and executory.

The records do not show that the RTC required petitioner's counsel to whom petitioner attributed the act of not filing the notice of
appeal to file his comment.

On September 30, 2002, petitioner's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Appearance7 from the case with petitioner's consent. Again, the
documents before us do not show the action taken by the RTC thereon.

In an Order8 dated December 13, 2002, the RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief with the following disquisition:

After a careful study of the instant petition and the arguments raised by the contending parties, the Court is not persuaded by
petitioner/accused's allegation that he was prevented from filing a notice of appeal due to excusable negligence of his
counsel.

Accused's allegation that he indeed specifically instructed his counsel to file a notice of appeal of the Decision dated [sic] and
the latter did not heed his instruction is at best self-serving and unsubstantiated and thus, unworthy of credence. At any rate,
even if said omission should be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the
client. x x x Besides, nowhere does it appear that accused/petitioner was prevented from fairly presenting his defense nor
does it appear that he was prejudiced as the merits of this case were adequately passed upon in the Decision dated December
5, 2001.

43
 It must also be pointed out that in his petition for relief, he stated that he instructed his counsel to file the necessary
motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal of the Decision dated December 5, 2001, whereas in his affidavit of
merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal thereof.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, again by himself, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing his petition for relief. He claims that the delay in appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable negligence to
warrant the granting of his petition for relief.

In a Resolution dated August 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition in this wise:

It appearing that petitioner in the instant petition for certiorari failed to attach the following documents cited in his petition,
namely:

1. The December 5, 2001 Decision;

2. Comment of the City Prosecutor;

3. Manifestation of petitioner's counsel de oficio signifying his withdrawal as petitioner's counsel.

The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and as prayed for by the Solicitor General.10

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2003 for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period, in violation of Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and
pertinent documents. The CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.

Hence, herein recourse filed by petitioner, still unassisted by counsel, raising the following issues:

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably
file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his
appeal?

Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and executory judgment?

Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to
appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced;
that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO,
who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the
RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a
crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the
petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright.

In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal from a final and
executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable; and that
petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's
petition for relief from judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his
client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.

We grant the petition.

44
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 46, on the ground that
petitioner failed to attach certain documents which the CA found to be relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari.

The requirements to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court, thus:

Section 1, Rule 65 provides:

SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari.

xxxx

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto x x x.

Section 3, Rule 46, provides:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.

xxxx

[The petition] shall be x x x accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto x x x.

xxxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.

The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. If,
upon its initial review of the petition, the CA is of the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been submitted
and appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c)
order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period. 11

The RTC Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding petitioner guilty of two counts of homicide, the Comment of the City Prosecutor
as well as the counsel's withdrawal of appearance were considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari,
thus it dismissed the petition for failure to attach the same. However, the CA failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was
filed by petitioner, a detained prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules
of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. 12 We have held in a civil case that to
demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an
intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but
because he does not know how to establish such right.13 This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we
held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:

The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life,
liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there
would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

xxxx
45
 Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose
only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual
may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to
establish such right.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right
that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.

No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the
trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.14 (Emphasis supplied)

The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the CA and should have required petitioner to
cause the entry of appearance of his counsel. Although the petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC
Order dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to be given the chance to file an appeal from
his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more pronounced. To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law
could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal.15 It is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief
from judgment with the RTC.

It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member
of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.

Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.16

The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It appears that the CA Resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari was received at the address written in the petition on September 1, 2003, and that petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration on September 18, 2003, or two days late.

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by
law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla17 we held:

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to
the realities of the situation.

Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.18

46
Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals,19 we also held:

Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:

SECTION 2. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 20

Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his petition for certiorari only on September 4, 2003 even as
the same Resolution was earlier received on September 1, 2003 at the address written in his petition, i.e., c/o Robert S. Bacuraya, No.
9 Iris St., West Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner
being detained at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of
detention. Considering that petitioner only received the Resolution on September 4, 2003, we find the two days delay in filing his
motion for reconsideration pardonable as it did not cause any prejudice to the other party. There is no showing that petitioner was
motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in
this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner.

Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.21

In dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it, the CA clearly put a premium on technicalities and brushed aside the issue
raised before it by petitioner, i.e., whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for relief
thus preventing him from taking an appeal from his conviction.

Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by
himself and counsel.22 However, instead of remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as
not to further delay the final disposition of this case.

The RTC denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel did not heed his instruction to file an appeal to be
unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if there was indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding on
the client.

Petitioner insists that the failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his judgment of conviction despite his explicit
instruction to do so constitutes excusable negligence and so his petition for relief should have been granted.

We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for relief from judgment.

Petitioner was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of PAO Memorandum Circular No.18 series
of 2002, the Amended Standard Office Procedures in Extending Legal Assistance (PAO Memorandum Circular), provides that all
appeals must be made upon the request of the client himself and only meritorious cases shall be appealed; while Section 2, Article II of
PAO Memorandum Circular provides that in criminal cases, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proven, hence cases of defendants in criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore, should be appealed, upon
the client's request.

In this case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under the PAO Memorandum Circular, it was the
duty of the latter to perfect the appeal. Thus, in determining whether the petition for relief from judgment is based on a meritorious
ground, it was crucial to ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to the PAO lawyer to file an appeal but the latter
failed to do so.

To determine the veracity of petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have required the PAO lawyer to comment on the
petition for relief. However, it appears from the records that the RTC only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the
petition.

47
The RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief did not touch on the question whether the PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in not
filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said omission, i.e., not filing the appeal despite his clients instruction to do so, should
be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the client.

While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind the client, 23 the exception is when the negligence
of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. 24 In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals,25 we
held:

x x x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by
the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:

xxxx

The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and binding upon the client, as any
other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the
rule desert its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to
admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

xxxx

The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

xxxx

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious
that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to
give the client another chance to present his case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because
of counsel's error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good
defense and that the acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. What should
guide judicial action is that a party be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.26

The PAO lawyer, Atty. Rivera, filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on September 30, 2002, almost three months before the RTC
rendered its assailed Order dated December 13, 2002, dismissing the petition for relief. The RTC had ample time to require the PAO
lawyer to comment on the petition for relief from judgment, before issuing the questioned Order. Had the RTC done so, there would
have been a factual basis for the RTC to determine whether or not the PAO lawyer was grossly negligent; and eventually, whether the
petition for relief from judgment is meritorious. If there was no instruction from petitioner to file an appeal, then there was no
obligation on the part of the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as stated in the PAO Memorandum Circular and negligence could not be
attributed to him. However, if indeed there was such an instruction to appeal but the lawyer failed to do so, he could be considered
negligent.

Thus, there was no basis for the RTC to conclude that the claim of petitioner that he instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as
self-serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
an undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal.

The RTC faulted petitioner for claiming in his petition for relief that he instructed his counsel to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal; while in his affidavit of merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal.
We do not find such circumstance sufficient ground to dismiss the petition considering that he filed the petition for relief unassisted by
counsel.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. The importance and real
purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals27 where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part
of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and
instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed

48
from the constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a
violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of
the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.

However, we cannot, in the present petition for review on certiorari, make a conclusive finding that indeed there was excusable
negligence on the part of the PAO lawyer which prejudiced petitioner's right to appeal his conviction. To do so would be pure
speculation or conjecture. Therefore, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for
relief from judgment is just and proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 19, 2003 and November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated December 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76,
is SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby ordered to require Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office to file his comment on the
petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner, hold a hearing thereon, and thereafter rule on the merits of the petition for relief
from judgment, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

49
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then
that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and
that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the
oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. 15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it
took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know
whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the
right thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we
can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates
that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law
Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19

50
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1 While the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness
and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll
of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it negates malice or evil
motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At
that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as
such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining
thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized
practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution.
For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount
of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is
ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a
FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
will be severely by this Court.

51
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,

vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
52
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are
enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out
appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for
the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and
12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the
affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his
sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8He admitted having
administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-
notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the
affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants.
Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence
certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits,
it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on
substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with
attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very
essential to the ends of justice."

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the
provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day,
January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In
support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit11 of the two police
officers who had assisted them.

53
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay
Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and
time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only
on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received
by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainants Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted
that request in its Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting the Investigating
Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the
entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors
found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by
increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR --
were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter
its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to
enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a
number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is
recorded."22Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. 23

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary
public and appended to a private instrument."

54
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their
performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in
the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending
before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently
irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling
and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto
Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by
complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath
-- to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for
the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence.27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible
to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. 28 No
custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this
case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of
alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

55
 b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses
from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those
who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness
from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many
people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a
plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is
looked upon as partial and untruthful."33

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for
them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case.34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily
make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the
client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is the fundamental right of the
accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable
doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according
to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save
his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and
mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the
alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance,
the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. 37 Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. 38 The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he
knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his
testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

56
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence.
Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of
complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the
Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*
On leave.

1
Records, pp. 1-4.

2
"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."

3
"CANON 1 x x x

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause."

4
"CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence."

5
"CANON 12 x x x

Rule 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him."

6
Annex A, Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; Report, pp. 1-2.

7
Records, p. 13.

8
Id., pp. 14-18.

9
"Sec. 3. Procedure. x x x

57
 "(a) x x x. The affidavits shall be sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

xxx xxx xxx

"(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents,
the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied
upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph
(a) of this section x x x."

10
Records, pp. 54-55.

11
Joint Affidavit of PO3 Ronaldo S. Gamboa and PO2 Nicasio A. Yambot; records, p. 68.

12
Records, p. 57.

13
See Registry Return Receipt attached to Notice of Hearing.

14
Records, pp. 59-63.

15
Id., pp. 65-67.

16
Id., p. 74.

17
Id., p. 88.

18
Id., pp. 92-100.

19
See Notice of Resolution; records, p. 103.

20
The investigating commissioner recommended that "respondent be reprimanded and fined P1,500.00 for violating Canon 5
of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

21
251 of the Revised Administrative Code.

22
246 of the Revised Administrative Code.

23
249 of the Revised Administrative Code; Protacio v. Mendoza, 395 SCRA 10, 17, January 13, 2003.

24
383 SCRA 498, 504, July 2, 2002, per Bellosillo, J.

25
Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro, 404 SCRA 599, 603, June 25, 2003; Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408, 414, May 14,
1997; Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 253, November 28, 1997.

26
Canon 1 of the CPR.

27
Canon 5 of the CPR.

28
Alitagtag v. Garcia, 403 SCRA 335, 341, June 10, 2003.

29
Ibid.

58
 30
Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, supra.

31
Per 20 of the Rules of Court.

32
Per 24 of the Rules of Court.

33
Vicente J. Francisco, Legal Ethics (1949), p. 203 (citing Williams, Legal Ethics, p. 53; and Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 119).

34
Philippine National Bank v. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil. 337, October 21, 1932.

35
Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; 20 (i) of Rule 138, Rules of Court.

36
Lames v. Lascieras, 89 SCRA 186, 189, March 30, 1979.

37
Manuel R. Pamaran, Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated (1998), p. 161 (citing Tandoc v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37, July
5, 1989).

38
Ibid.

39
Manubay v. Garcia, 386 Phil. 440, 443, April 12, 2000.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118746 September 7, 1995

ATTY. WILFREDO TAGANAS, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MELCHOR ESCULTURA, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

59
Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents in a labor suit for illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-
payment of wages, thirteenth-month pay, attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a contingent fee arrangement granting the
equivalent of fifty percent of the judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee per hearing. 1 The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI)
respondents therein, jointly and severally to reinstate herein private respondents with full backwages, to pay wage differentials,
emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fee, but disallowed the claim for damages for lack of
basis. 2 This decision was appealed by Ultra and PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and subsequently by
PTSI to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage of the decision, petitioner moved to enforce his attorney's charging
lien. 3 Private respondents, aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to the attorney's charging lien, contested the validity of the
contingent fee arrangement they have with petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private respondents have expressed their conformity
thereto. 4

Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee from fifty percent of the
judgment award to ten percent, except for the four private respondents who earlier expressed their conformity. 5 Petitioner appealed to
NLRC which affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent contingent fee should apply also to
the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a higher percentage. 6 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
this petition for certiorari.

The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is warranted. Petitioner argues that
respondent NLRC failed to apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in determining whether or not
the stipulated amount of petitioner's contingent fee is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the invalidation of the contingent
fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without any legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who
manifested their conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.

A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's
professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action is made to depend upon the success of the
litigation. 7 This arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. 8 It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny of the court to protect
clients from unjust charges. 9 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness". Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24 of
the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in large measure it depends on the reasonableness of the
stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory
powers of the courts. 10

We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment award as attorney's fees is excessive and unreasonable. The
financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 11 Noting that
petitioner's clients were lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were precisely represented by petitioner in the
labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay
and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving under the law and to alleviate their living condition, the reduction of
petitioner's contingent fee is proper. Labor cases, it should be stressed, call for compassionate justice.

Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111 of the Labor Code. This article fixes the limit on the
amount of attorney's fees which a lawyer, like petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings since the labor suit
where he represented private respondents asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In fact, We are not even precluded from fixing a
lower amount than the ten percent ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. 12 Nonetheless, considering the
circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be further reduced.
60
The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity with the contingent fee contract did not make the agreement
valid. The contingent fee contract being unreasonable and unconscionable the same was correctly disallowed by public respondent
NLRC even with respect to the four private respondents who agreed to pay higher percentage. Petitioner is reminded that as a lawyer
he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties.
When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control. 13

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion the assailed NLRC decision is hereby affirmed in toto.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1222 February 4, 2004

Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries,

61
Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the
bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court
adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another
examination on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle
University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the
matter.

Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law
Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but
voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or
movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if
another examination on the subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of
the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the examinations on
the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court,
finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate
the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a
Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the
23 September 2003 resolution.

In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for
Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit:

Original Adjusted Adjusted

Relative
Subject Percentage Percentage Relative
Weight
Weight Weight Weight
Political and International Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Labor and Social Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Remedial Law 20% 23.529% 4 4.71%
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%

100% 20%

In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
compose the Investigating Committee:

Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino

Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza

The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might
have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited
from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full;
thus -

62
"In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in commercial law was held
in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried
news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.1

"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a
formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.

"Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the
examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock
in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, and
motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of
such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15)
percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).

"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired
Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before
December 15, 2003.

"The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee:

Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO

Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA

"The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and
those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

"The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The following witnesses appeared and
testified at the investigation:

1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial Application, MlSO;

The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three times to deliberate on its report.

"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified that on Monday morning,
September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme
Court, his secretary,2 Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of
hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the
Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to
the examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She
did not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her review of that
subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from various bar review centers.

63
"However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them were the same questions that were
asked in the just-concluded-examination.

"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice
Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinsons Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.

"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinsons Place at the appointed time and showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained
a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote,
in her own hand, the differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.

"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with the bar examination questions
in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney
Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of those
questions were asked in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared
by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice
Vitug were not among the leaked test questions.

"Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone
and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale
Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of
the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in
mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).

"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions
that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one of
her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review
Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center
gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.

"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in
Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as
chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the assignment
and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he
prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn,
Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to
format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl
Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary
printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which
he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latters office that afternoon. However, as
Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had
been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitugs confidential assistant
to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it. He does not know how to open and close
his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary,
Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71).

"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to
the office every other day only.

"He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover,
when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant
attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Courts Management
Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect
the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network

64
(LAN) and one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos law partner, former Justice Secretary
Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice.

"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos computer, are:

1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)

2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni

"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately
called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of
them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage.

"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in
installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office,
including Attorney Balgos computer, without the latters knowledge and permission.

"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or bar ops of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of
which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-
47, Oct. 24, 2003).

"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU
chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed a copy to a
fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile
law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).

"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his proposed test questions, with
marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or different: (D),
together with the percentage points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos
indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed
the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions.
Attached to this Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1.

"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years, testified that she did not type the test
questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer. She
confirmed Atty. Balgos testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what
appears in Atty. Balgos computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and not in use; that
Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos computer when the latter is open and not in use.

"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo
(Exh. C) giving him 72 hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved
condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid.

"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective immediately. He explained that:

Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but
totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that
I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members.
(Exh. D)

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"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a
student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined
the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of the
fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the fraternitys bar ops.

"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos computer, (which he often did without the owners
knowledge or permission), to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded
the test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might
be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.

"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking
the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not pass.

"On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions
(Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised
Garvida to share the questions with other Betan examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after
the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar
examination.

"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown),
through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still another
brod named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p.
28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text message, that
they were guide questions, not tips, in the mercantile law examination.

"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of the leakage was already in all the
newspapers), De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal
where he got the test questions.

"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test questions. However, Erwin informed
him that the questions were kalat na kalat (all over the place) even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29,
2003).

"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James
Bugain.

"Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the
leaked questions were asked in the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there were some
changes).

"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.

"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and through self-study,
by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer in
2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home.

"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed
her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan,
as testified by De Guzman.

"RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida
graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple
sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling
disease although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and
fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2,
Readers Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when

66
Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement in the leakage of the
examiners test questions in mercantile law.

"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and
was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he
went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his
compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him possible questions in the bar examination in
mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they were not tips but only possible test
questions.

"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as
enrollment fee. However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in his
wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for
treatment. This he did.

"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend the review classes at the Consortium
Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course
(Nahihinayang ako). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of
the test questions in mercantile law.

"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who was reviewing at the Consortium Review
Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test
questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the questions
to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. I could not do that to a brod, he explained.

"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the
Greek initials BEA-MLQU, indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee
subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.

"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar
exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in
June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and
friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their barristers (bar candidates) in the various review centers,
providing meals for their brod-barristers on examination days; and to rent a bar site or place near De la Salle University where the
examinees and the frat members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans bar site for the 2003 bar
examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the examination, Collados
fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test
questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iigo.

"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution
to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test questions
despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out as is - without answers.

"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law
and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one
of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on
Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the
mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last
lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test
questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.

"F I N D I N G S

"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T.
Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions
constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some
cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee

67
who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have
been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!

"The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that
the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.

"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the
leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the
latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman,
who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the
help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and
Erwin Tan.

"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.

"Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta
Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs
30 bar candidates.

"Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer,
without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were
intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.

"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to privacy of communication, and to
security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.

"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for
pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted
cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it
and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the
Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to embark
upon the practice of law.

However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos
proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the
assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as:

"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the only person who knew the password,
who could open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be
accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the
test questions stored therein.

"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the
other computers outside Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the
password of Atty. Balgos computer.
68
"The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test questions, appear to have conspired
with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the
fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (kalat na kalat) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were:

Ronan Garvida,

Arlan,

Erwin Tan,

Randy Iigo,

Ronald Collado, and

Allan Guiapal

"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for
the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the
shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.

"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos computer could have been avoided if
Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a
powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions
that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the
password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use
of the machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive
an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is
quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home,
(instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos
negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the
proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy
of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have
been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

"R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following
reminder for lawyers: Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession. In another case, it likewise intoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a
lawyer who violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the publics
respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.

"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:

"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the
legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC
APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of
the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution.

"2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be required to make a written
APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in
preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law
examination on account of the leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that
examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.

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 "3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine
National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test
questions in mercantile law.

"With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage
in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Courts Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from
including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter." 3

The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court,
certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed
on the Court.

The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to the Management
Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in the office of
Atty. Balgos, found that the Courts Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty.
Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of
the Court. The installation thereof to any external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco
informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty.
Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Courts
CALR database.

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to -

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in
Mercantile Law;

(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma,
Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation
on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court
Administrator to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
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Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and
Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a
monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their
contract. 1 Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was terminated by the union on April 4, 1990. 2

During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year
and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the appropriate complaint was filed by private
respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 24, 1987
and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466. 3

On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay
differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. 4 The NLRC, acting on a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo. 5

However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution, TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the
Supreme Court. The Court, in its decision promulgated on August 30, 1990, 6 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the
award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. 7

The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount of
P175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the amount thus found by TRB. 8 The latter duly paid its concerned employees their respective
entitlement in said sum through their payroll. 9

After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court on September 18, 1990, 10 he notified the petitioner union,
the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay differential
through a letter dated October 8, 1990. 11

Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorney's
fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of
P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. 12

The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose or comment on private respondent's motion
as the claim was directed against the union, 13 while petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15,
1991. 14 After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order 15 on November 26, 1991 granting the motion of
private respondent, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES
UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorney's
fees due the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount of P17,574.43 or ten (10%) per cent of
the P175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to the members of the former.

This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991, seeking a reversal of that order. 16

On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter. 17 The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23, 1995, 18 hence the petition at bar.

Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its
members, in violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null and void, 19 for the reasons
hereunder stated.

Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorney's fees, it contends that the award for
attorney's fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon
the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorney's fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme
Court, no attorney's fees should have been allowed by the NLRC.

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Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorney's fees, as said act constituted a
modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorney's fees. It then cited decisions of the
Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the court which
rendered the same.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorney's fees was just an incident of the main case
where petitioner was awarded its money claims. The grant of attorney's fees was the consequence of his exercise of his attorney's lien.
Such lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable judgment was obtained. To
include the award of the attorney's fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All that the
non-inclusion of attorney's fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorney's
fees in the concept of damages. He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees adjudicated.

In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent on this score, it appears necessary to explain
and consequently clarify the nature of the attorney's fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipate the apparent confusion between
and the conflicting views of the parties.

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. 20 In its ordinary concept, an
attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis
of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article
2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer
as additional compensation or as part thereof.

It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems
from petitioner's apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorney's fees only before its judgment is
reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer entertain claims for attorney's fees.

It will be noted that no claim for attorney's fees was filed by private respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims
of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after the High Tribunal modified
the judgment of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a percentage thereof
as attorney's fees.

It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme Court thereafter to
make an award for attorney's fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts generally rule only on issues and claims
presented to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of attorney's fees, he did not in any way
modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.

As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private
respondent's present claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier
decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. 21

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client. 22 Attorney's fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the
subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only arises when something has been recovered
from which the fee is to be paid. 23

While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to
the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. 24 Of course, a petition for attorney's fees may
be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. 25

72
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence,
private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay
differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same
action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective
the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.

Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all
attorney's fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00 which it has been regularly paying to private
respondent under their retainer agreement. To be entitled to the additional attorney's fees as provided in Part D (Special Billings) of the
agreement, it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance of the
additional services by the latter. Since there was no agreement as to the payment of the additional attorney's fees, then it is considered
waived.

En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorney's fees contemplated for and commensurate to the services
he rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services rendered in
the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten
percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorney's fees.

It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 26 It will thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to
determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer agreement 27 entered into by him and
petitioner.

The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:

xxx xxx xxx

The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the parameters of the following terms and conditions:

A. GENERAL SERVICES

1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-day basis depending
on the Union's needs;

2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter
within the client's normal course of business;

3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day
course of business;

4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a party signatory
thereto but prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party;

5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body
subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter;

6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agency and/or any
private institution which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.

B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES

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 1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by your Union
which do not fall under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or
detailed study and preparation;

2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;

3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRB management or
any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except
CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 &
227);

4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union;

5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,

6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must give his/her
assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and
policies of the Law Firm.

C. FEE STRUCTURE

In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required or necessary, your
Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or
before the fifth day of every month.

An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.

Any and all Attorney's Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong
exclusively to the Law Firm.

It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of all out-of-
pocket expenses covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or
authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or that which redound to the benefit of
the Union.

D. SPECIAL BILLINGS

In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the Law Firm an
amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on
actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and magnitude of the matter referred to by
the Union. However, charges may be WAIVED by the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the
particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly reserved for the Law Firm.

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant
controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter
actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly
fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm's commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services)
and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.

The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually
rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general

74
retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special
retainer. 28

A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal
problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are
secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or
otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for
the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties.
In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.

A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several
cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorney's fees, each
fee is considered a special retainer.

As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hilado vs. David 29 in this wise:

There is in legal practice what is called a "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization that the
attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite
party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue
hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for
consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or
counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and
of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary,
is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation
of the client to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform." (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its "commitment to
render the legal services enumerated." The fee is not payment for private respondent's execution or performance of the services listed
in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.

Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract fixing the compensation for the attorney,
such contract is conclusive as to the amount of compensation. 30 We cannot, however, apply the foregoing rule in the instant petition
and treat the fixed fee of P3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondent's services, as petitioner would have it.

We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondent should
receive in payment for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latter's promise to extend
services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firm's actual performance of services in favor of the union. Hence,
the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondent's services.

We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his right to charge
additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.

Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of
the agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to
determine attorney's fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted
by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondent's right to attorney's fees, as the former
may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm
had relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.

The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees
for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.

75
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. 31 One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the
quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our
law, 32 certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of
petitioner's cause without awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondent's
efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the
cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondent's actual
rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.

Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor
arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. The law firm's services are decidedly
worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on "Fee Structure," it is even provided that all
attorney's fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside
from petitioner's liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.

A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice.
Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the same circumstances. 33

As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding
with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract. 34 Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee
for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to pay compensation to the former.
Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private
respondent's services.

We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyer's
representation may not be held liable for attorney's fees even though he benefited from the lawyer's services. 35 But this doctrine may
not be applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondent's appearance before the NLRC in the case for
differentials.

Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondent's legal services and assistance regarding its claims
against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). 36 This rule of law, likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment,
would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioner's members. In any case,
whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional
services. 37 However, the value of private respondent's legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor
Code alone. Said article provides:

Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.

xxx xxx xxx

The implementing provision 38 of the foregoing article further states:

Sec. 11. Attorney's fees. Attorney's fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages
shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning
party.

In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney's fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and
payable to the prevailing part. In the second place, the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code
and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be granted. 39 Article 111
thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney's fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings
76
and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when
circumstances warrant it. 40

The measure of compensation for private respondent's services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule
of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis for
determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, 41 but recoverable by him from his client.

Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum
meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. 42

It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it
is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. 43

Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyer's
services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered
in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent
and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the
subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorney's fees in favor of private respondent. Instead of adopting the above guidelines,
the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorney's fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He
completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorney's fees at P17,574.43. 44 Observe the conclusion
stated in his order. 45

xxx xxx xxx

FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movant's right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award
due its client. In addition, this right to ten (10%) per cent attorney's fees is supplemented by Sec. 111, Rule VIII,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.

xxx xxx xxx

As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained
by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to
the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney's fees, it
does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney's fees in such maximum limit.

It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between
lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum
meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional
Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the
parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondent's fees.

It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. 46 Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this
case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner. However,
so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present
recourse a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the
accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that
regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair
compensation for the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
77
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the order of the labor arbiter
is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees to
private respondent for the latter's legal services rendered to the former. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO
and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to
the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon
C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that
the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of
the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got
unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in
five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by
the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of

78
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971
bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5)
bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under
which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March
5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the
Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the
Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction
of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned
by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50%
This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law
of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court
of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing
of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under
the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-
respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
79
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully
employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the
Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner
in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%;
No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at
5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its
owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of
the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
80
 instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the
same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the
real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and
permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed
in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972,
he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears
that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing
code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded
it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result
that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to
correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been
decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached
thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on
the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59;
rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know
the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973;
now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to
the present;

81
 4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked
the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name
of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as
an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much
as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of
the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades
of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661
was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not
pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of
the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in
the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing
average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

82
 5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well
in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention
to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within
my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after
Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted
for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been
apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court
to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position
of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein

83
 respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to
9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of
Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement
made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one
subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I
did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never
met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language
and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
84
 answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-
correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought
to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right,
the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved
failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back
to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always
made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first
number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the
first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards
the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on
which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

85
 With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would
contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the
six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I
try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in
assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end
with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a)
On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November
27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at
the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good
faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but
leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to
the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
(47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified
and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code
No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo);
and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below
60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the
office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

86
 4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks
in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only
10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked
him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and
the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to
contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be
done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of
their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts
in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
87
 Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there
made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the
examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp.
3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not
know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said
notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that
the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made
the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that
in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

88
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible
the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent
Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%,
or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing
marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent
and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure
of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised
the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this
particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but
had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation
requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in
three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for
the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular
and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p.
16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper.
The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613
with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase
the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

89
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and
passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had
to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last
bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972,
after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook
bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of
grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 &
2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG,
IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to
the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty
percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the
Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects
and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his
honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him
as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive
cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the
passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in
his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five
90
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In
fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela
Cruz.

91
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades
of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the
corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all
subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage
of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the
Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the
same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for
re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on
August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF
47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political
Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation
with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the
said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee
was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in
92
his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any
such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was
officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent
Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook
in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of
passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred
to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case
of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is
not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee
that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon
the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or
recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said
examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "

93
 Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification
grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
94
A

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a
necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as
Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each.
Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the
Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of
the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit
re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of
Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2,
Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's
personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require
the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal
cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for
the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character.
And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964,
when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court
or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the
applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is

95
required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court
his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court
his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that
he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to
him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one
of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court,
with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court
(165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to
clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by

96
 conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary
to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar
on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on
the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A.
Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and
Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon
the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did
the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so
declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar
examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination
Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent
Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent
Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent
Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he
received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3
and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and
increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?'
and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I
did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

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It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72,
rec.).

Pamatian

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of
them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

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At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that
their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration
of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in
the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian
"in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm.
Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away
on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during
the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal",
does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that
examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971
Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner
Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the
said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972
but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20,
1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00
came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971
in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

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 It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected
and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that
of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because
the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the
time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact,
no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as
borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among
the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973
the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as
the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in
his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972
(as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the
said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the
1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

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It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees
of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property
or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or
taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board
from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955
to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits
was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV,
rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator
Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator
Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine
Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the
MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the
G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol.
V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never

101
bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is
beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits
given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his
duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know
the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p.
49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined
there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment.
He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May
1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-
3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

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