Loras College

Political Polarization Plague:

The Federal Affliction is Spreading

Lucas Tully

POL 489: Politics Senior Seminar Thesis

Dr. David Cochran

19 May 2016
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During his historic run for the presidency, then-Senator Barack Obama campaigned on a

strong message of hope and change. A promise to shake up the status quo, a government of

cooperation in the pursuit of the good, an end to politics as usual. During his 2008 Iowa Caucus

victory speech, candidate-Senator Obama drew upon a powerful moment from his national debut

as the keynote speaker at the Democratic National Convention just four years prior. Following

his upset victory in the Hawkeye State, a confident Obama assured the nation that [] we are

not a collection of red states and blue states. We are the United States of America. And in this

moment, in this election, we are ready to believe again (New York Times, Barack Obamas

Caucus Speech Transcript).

After a landslide victory against Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, Barack

Obama took the presidential oath of office on January 20, 2009. Along with the rest of the

nation, he would soon realize firsthand the challenge that faced him. Even though the

Democratic Party now controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress, Obama and his

fellow Democrats faced harsh opposition from the Republican wing of the nation. In his first two

years, Obama busied himself with overseeing the recovery from the Great Recession of 2008, the

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and on passing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

The midterm elections of 2010 would not be kind to his party. Obama watched on as Democrats

would lose six Senate seats, barely maintaining their majority. The greatest losses were in the

House of Representatives where a wave of Tea Party Republican would gain a whopping 68

seats to reclaim the House majority. As then-Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell put it,

Were determined to stop the agenda Americans have rejected and to turn the ship around

(Balz). Like with Ronald Reagan in 1982 and Bill Clinton in 1994, President Obama and his

administration was trampled by the opposing party during the first midterm congressional
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election following his election. President George W. Bush would buck this trend during the 2002

elections following the first anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001; but would lose

both the House and the Senate to the Democrats in 2006 following his narrow 2004 reelection

(Democrats win house, promise new direction, CNN).

While President Obama would win a second term in 2012 it was just four years after

losing the House in 2010 that Obama would lose nine seats and thus the majority in the Senate

during the 2014 midterm elections. With both houses of Congress now controlled by

Republicans and the White House in Democratic hands, the United States seemed to be a

collection of deeper shades of red and darker blue states than ever before.

In the years following the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections, congressional gridlock has

seemingly reached its fever pitch. On top of procedural stand offs like government shutdowns

and continued integration of the principle known as the Hastert rule, politics generally has

become far more personal and as such nastier than ever before. As the next election nears, this

divide has grown worse. The most recent Gallop poll shows that congressional approval ratings

are abysmal. Nearly 85 percent of Americans polled disapprove of the way that Congress is

handling its job (Congress and the Public, March 2016). Congressional disapproval ratings

have been hovering between 75 and 85 percent since February of 2010, around the same time as

the passage of the Obamacare health care reform acts (Frymer 335). According to the Pew

Forum, the United States is in the midst of her most polarized political time periods, except

perhaps during the period leading up to the American Civil War and during the resulting

Reconstruction era (7 Things to Know About Polarization in America, Hare & Poole 411).

Since 2010, weve seen government shutdowns, lengthy filibusters and the complete avoidance

of confirming Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court following the death of conservative
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Justice Antonin Scalia in February of 2016. Though, the most prominent showcase of just how

polarized American politics has become is the in the behavior and in the rhetoric present in the

campaign to become President Obamas successor. The United States is coming to realize the

reality of living in such a polarized climate the consequences of our grave disagreements.

In 2016, the stakes seem higher than ever as we have come to a time where debates

between voters and politicians have become increasingly more bitter, compromise appears nearly

impossible. Are our elected officials bickering made its way down to the voters or was it the

voters who have become so ideologically extreme that only polarizing politicians can win

elections? Let us explore the effects that federal-level partisan polarization has had on the

ideologies of voters and on the polarization trend among their counterparts in state legislatures

across our increasingly divided nation.

Defining Polarization

Now, before we dig into the root of the political sensation, it should be explained what is

and essentially what is not considered polarization. Simply put, polarization is the extent to

which liberal and conservative political identities end up pushing their members political

behavior and attitudes towards the extreme side of their respective partys ideology (Fiorina 12;

Hare et. al. 411; Mason 31; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers & Judd 122-124). Polarization

highlights the expansion of the liberal-conservative dimension of conflict to a wider set of

social and cultural conflicts in American society (Hare et. al. 411). Carmines, Ensley & Wagner

point out that a key characteristic of polarization is ideological homogeneity with a party

coupled with ideological separation between parties across the issues (3). At the same time that

the political parties in this nation are becoming more distinct from each other the members of

each party themselves are becoming far more consistent amongst each other (Fiorina, Abrams &
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Pope 556-557). This is not to say that there are not internal disagreements within the parties

themselves. Rather, this is to say that the divide between the parties is far greater than the

disagreements between partisans. As sense of teamsmanship and competition has begun to run

deep. Every issue, every bill, every action now seems up for debate; nevertheless both sides seem

sure to land on opposites of that debate whatever it may be about. Traditional battles over the

size and scope of the federal government have been replaced with more unbending stances on

social issues like abortion, gay marriage, religious liberty, immigration and gun control to name

a few. [D]ivided government in the United Statesreflects a lack of popular consensus

about important issues and a consequent unwillingness to trust either party with the full power to

govern (Fiorina 5). With full power withheld from both parties in either branch, there are

countless examples of there the U.S. Government has been left to function at a limited capacity.

As we will discuss, this, itself, can eventually result in increased apathy and partisanship as

parties blame each other for the governmental inefficiencies.

Dr. Morris Fiorina has devoted much of his political science scholarly work towards

exploring the causes and consequences of American political polarization. In explaining

polarization Dr. Fiorina makes it a point to distinguish between what he considers two different,

yet interwoven types of political polarization: elite polarization and popular polarization

(Fiorina, et al. 556). For the sake of this present analysis, I also feel it is important that we make

a distinction between the two. Elite polarization describes the polarization of party elites, such as

party organizers and volunteers, but especially among elected officials themselves. Polarized

political parties are internally homogenous, unified, programmatic, and cohesive in the

governing and in their organization (Fiorina, et al. 556-558). Popular political polarization refers

to the shift in the general electorates political ideologies towards becoming starkly divided
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along distinct partisan lines. This is typically associated with a sort of culture war between the

value-voters on the right and progressives on the left (Fiorina, et al. 557).

We will be exploring the effect that elite polarization at the federal level has caused

popular polarization at the general publics level and how that, in turn, has had an effect on the

elite polarization of state level elected officials. Many political scientists (Carmines, et al. 3-4;

Fiorina 3; Fiorina, et al. 561) consider political polarization to a top-down phenomenon where

elite polarization leads toif not at least precedespopular polarization. For my personal sake

of clarity, I have opted to refer to popular polarization as societal polarization to better reflect

the different levels of polarization (elected officials at every level versus the general public).

This describes more accurately the relationship the environment has on the populous and the

effect the populous has on its environment. Political polarization research is a topic where the

political science at work is one part Psychology and one part Sociology. We are exploring both

mental and social intentions, the intersecting of personal political identities and how they play

out in the ever more heated political arena.

We will begin by delving into the theory and ideas behind why both elite and societal

polarization has occurred and break these down into systemic causes versus those cause of

polarization that happen to be at more societal, psychological level. We start with the effect that

the political system itself has had on its own polarization.

Partisan Primaries Causes of Elite Polarization

Preceding most November elections for federal, state and even municipal seats are a

series of smaller elections that are specific to each party. Before most Republicans and

Democrats face each other, they have already run and won against members of their own party.

In going through the process, candidates are appealing to special factions of single-party voters
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and loyalists. Jacobsen writes, Primary electorates are much more partisan and prone to

ideological extremity, and the need to please them is one of the forces behind party

polarization (16). The principle behind why partisan, closed, first-past-the-post primaries

cause worsening ideological polarization is a simple one according to McGhee, Masket, Shor,

Rogers and McCarthy (2). Elected officered are pulled to the extremes in large part because

they must appeal to the extreme voters who disproportionally influence party nominations. In the

absence of the primary electoral pressures, political could adhere more to the political center...

(McGhee et al. 2). In a 2014 survey, the Pew Research Center found that 34 percent of

consistent liberals responded that they always vote in primaries compared to 54 percent of

consistent conservatives who answered the same. Furthermore, this data points to an even

more angry side of each of these groups turning on primary day. 33 percent of Democrats with a

deeply unfavorable view for the Republican Party and over four-in-ten (43 percent) of

Republican with a deeply unfavorable view towards the Democratic Party indicated that they

are far more likely than others in their own party to remain active in the primary process

(Political Polarization in the American Public 74).

When Democrats debate Democrats and Republicans fight with fellow Republicans, the

argument is far less centered on who is right and who is wrong, but rather who is more right.

Rather than discussing what should or should not be on the party platform of issues, primary

opponents squabble over who adheres best to what it means to be a conservative or liberal. You

see this most poignantly in the ongoing 2016 presidential primaries. Candidates like Republican

Senator used slogans like Consistently Conservative to differentiate himself from Donald

Trump. On the other side, the Democratic candidates former-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

versus the self-described democratic-socialist Senator Bernie Sanders trading barbs on party
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loyalty. When appealing to the smaller sect of the party who turns out to vote in a primary, a

candidate wants to appear faithful to the party and to party stances across the board. When an

ideological divide exist between the primary electorate and the two parties and primary elections

are fully contested, strategic candidates will take policy positions away from the general election

median voter and towards the median voter of their primary electorate (Hirano, Snyder,

Ansulabchere & Hansen 170).

Hack and Pierson content that even sitting incumbents may be likely to adjust their

position to minimize electoral threats because even when a primary challenger does not

materialize, the fact that one might occur can effectively pull candidates towards their base

(126). Researchers David W. Brady, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope found that:

Candidates who are ideologically closer to the preferences of the general-election

constituency do better in general elections, but they do worse in primary elections.
In fact, Democrats who are more liberal than their [House] districts and
Republicans who are more conservative than their districts do better in primary
elections (91-92)
Where other candidates may try to use Richard Nixons famed strategy of running to the right

for the primaries and then running to the middle for the general election, incumbents are in an

almost constant state of running for reelection. This is a challenge because votes and stances they

take in office are in essence what they will be seen as running on. The dilemma is where they

must choose between acting on what they believe is best or will look the best to the general

electorate versus acting on what they believe will shore up support amongst the more entrenched,

partisan base of support for the primary (Brady et al. 82-83). Punishment for trying to straddle

this fine line could occur in the primary or the general election, where elite activist often

mobilize other voters and candidates who are out of step with the [general] electorate are more

likely to lose (Brady et al. 82).

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Primary contest can come in multiple forms between the different states or between the

different parties. Primary elections can either be closed, fully open, or maybe somewhere in

between. In the purest form of closed primaries, only voters who have registered under a

specific party affiliation some time in advance of the primary are permitted to vote; semi-closed

systems further permit new or unaffiliated voters to vote without declaring an affiliation in

advance. About half the states use closed or semi-closed primaries (Pildes 298-299). With voter

turnout already on the low end for general elections, primary elections attract even far few voters

turning out to voice their opinion on their partys candidate and platform (Hirano et al. 176).

The most ideologically committed and hardcore party activist tend to dominate closed primaries

even more than they already dominate primaries in general (Pildes 299). Closed and even semi-

closed primaries cut moderate voters out of the mix because they force the undecided voter to

declare their party allegiance months before the actual vote takes place. As Senator Chuck

Schumer put it:

primaries poison the health of [the] system and warps its natural balance,
because the vast majority of Americans dont typically vote in primaries. Instead,
it is the third of the third most to the right or to the left who come on to vote
the ten percent at each of the two extremes of the political spectrum. Making
things worse, in most states, laws prohibit independentswho are not registered
with either party and make up a growing proportion of the electoratefrom
voting at all (End Partisan Primaries, Save America, The New York Times).
Ultimately, primaries, but especially those that are closed in one way or another, are an

institution that values the votes of those in the ideological extreme of either party, albeit the party

they are loyal to. This serves to silence the voice of the undecided and those in the party with

more moderate views (Pildes 307; Frymer 340-343). Not only are moderate voters set aside, so

are the moderate candidates they might be likely to support. When one considers that voters

must hear of a candidate before they vote for that person, it becomes clear how the absence of

moderate sources of campaign funds and volunteer activity many hamper moderate candidates
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Open primaries give voters the option to cross party lines, but partisan actors give candidates the

means to convince voters that they should do so (McGhee et al. 20).It has been argued and it is

worth nothing that primaries do not have an absolute direct connection to causing worsening

polarization (Hirano et al. 173, 183; Barber & McCarthy 29). The point is not that primaries

necessarily generate more apathy and distain for the other party, but instead it pushes candidates

of either party to seek out what makes them different from their fellow party candidates. In doing

so, they may tend to strategically adjust their stances towards being more appealing to those who

will end up actually voting on primary day.

Societal Causes of Polarization

Political scientists have long looked into the causes of elite and societal polarization and

much of that research dives into the psychology of the American voter. How do the most internal

feelings, perceptions, attitudes, self-identification, preferences, and emotions factor into shaping

political action. In return, what does effects does the game of politics have on the voters psyche?

More than ever, more people are becoming aware of polarization and may be cognizant of their

place on the spectrum, but rather than working with their in-group to dampen polarization,

research points to both of the parties blaming one another of the gridlock, partisanship and

admistrative inefficiency.

Group Identity

As humans we naturally long to belong to groups that we fell we best identify with on a

personal level. We relate on multiple levels drawing on mental emotions, perceptions and

passions combined with past experiences, background and education (Bishop 89-93). More than

simply serving as a label, more than the ever we are beginning to identify with political parties

on a much deeper level. We seek a group that is like us in many ways, we strive for an in-group
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group that we can join and connect with via shared backgrounds, lifestyles, theology,

demographics and may be dependent on the other in-groups any given person already belongs to.

Belonging to an in-group, such as self-classifying as conservative or liberal, is seen as a way of

life and belonging to such a group comes with a real sense of belonging, membership, and

status security (Blankenhorn). Neither political elites nor the voting general electorate are

immune to this deep-seeded, humanistic tendency. Self-categorization theory argues that the

key to in-group conformity and between-group polarization is social identity, i.e. a persons

incorporation of a group membership into his or her self-concept (Suhay 226). Mason argues

that this partisan group identity so much more closely held than many other in-groups,

particularly a partisan behaves more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an investment

(129). By this, it is meant that whatever in-group the partisan belongs to they will feel a deep

emotion connection to the welfare of their party. They prefer to spend time with other members

of the party; and when the party is threatened they become angry and work to conquer the threat,

even if they disagree with some of the issue position taken by the party (Mason 129).

This is the root of polarization. A strong sense of belonging to one in-group paired with

animosity or a general dislike for the opposite out-group (Bishop 82-97; Mason 129-133; Suhay

227-229; Westfall et al. 146-151). To belong to one in-group inherently means a person

identifies far less, misunderstands or has completely written off the other party, the out-group.

When people learn of a norm held by an out-group, particularly a derogated one, they tend to

shift their attitudes or actions in the opposite direction (Suhay 228). In a hyper-political world,

such as ours currently, we have the tendency to search for an in-group with a consistent ideology

and policy content because we feel we must pick a side or risk being left behind (Cohen

809).One of the theories of why group identity effects political polarization and the resulting
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actions taken is the theory of group mentality or also known as herd mentality. Author Bill

Bishop argues that is a well-known occurrence in psychology and sociology that individuals are

far more likely to act upon their more extreme tendencies when doing so as a member of a group

as opposed to going it alone (192).

Our self-perception and our group identity are not only reliant on our prior beliefs and

actions, but also yield massive influence on shaping our future beliefs and actions. We are self-

conscious beings, not only do we want to join a group, our intention is to remain a member of

that group. Many researchers point to our belonging to a group identity as the mechanism in

which we learn to identify and cement norms (Bishop 96). It is these norms that guide or

pressure members actions. Masons research led her to identify three outcomes of stronger

partisan self-sorting and identification: higher levels of (1) bias, (2) activism, and (3) anger

(130).

Bias is a well-researched psychological phenomenon. In her research, Mason found that

Identical partisans (who are also identical in their issue positions) are significantly more biased

in their evaluation of the two parties when their ideological identity is strong and in line with

their partisan identity (139). It is in our nature to believe we (me and my in-group) are right so

they (the opposing out-group) must be wrong. We are less likely to be receptive to new or

conflicting ideas, concepts or positions when we immediately discount the other side as

consistently wrong. Even when it comes to self-recognition and ideological, partisan

polarization, we are biased in our self-perception. Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, and Judd

contend that while we may be aware of gridlock and partisan division, we are likely to see it as

problem for and by the other party (146).

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Coinciding with the rise in partisan polarization is the rise in political engagement and

activism. The advent of the Internet has opened a number of avenues for liberals and

conservatives to participate in the political process by using the Internet for discussion and

debate, research and news gathering, as well as interacting with candidates via social media or

online donation tabs. Research points to a reciprocating relationship where polarization fuels

further participation but that participation is what drives greater perceptions of polarization

(Westfall et al. 152). The more politically consistent or more politically adamant are more likely

to participate in politics in a number of direct and support riles. For example, nearly six-in-ten

(58 percent) of consistently liberal and nearly eight-in-ten (78 percent) of consistently

conservative survey respondents indicated that they always vote. Of that, 31 percent of

consistent liberals and 26 percent of consistent conservatives responded that in the past two years

(2012-2014) they have contributed money to a candidates, political party, political action

committee or other political fundraising group (Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in

the American Public 8). Among Americans who meek up with politics and government and

regularly vote, full 99 percent of Republicans are now more conservative than the median

Democrat, while 98 percent of Democrats are more liberal than the median Republican. Just ten

years before in 2004, these numbers were only 88 percent and 84 percent, respectively (Pew

Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public 24). A closer look at this data

show that ideological polarization among the politically engaged has reached all-time heights. In

1994, during Bill Clintons Democratic presidency and Republican Speaker of the House Newt

Gingrichs Contract with America era, the percentage of politically engaged Democrats with

political values that were consistently liberal was only eight percent compared to 23 percent of

active Republicans holding consistently conservative values and stances. In 2004, between
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George W. Bushs first and second term, consistently loyal liberals doubled to 20 percent while

conservatives consistency dropped to ten percent. Then, another ten years later, during President

Obamas second term, the numbers jump again. Consistent liberals now number near four-in-ten

(38 percent of politically engaged Democrats identifying with dependably liberal principles.

Between President Bushs and Obamas second terms, Republicans tripled to 33 percent of

political engaged Republican harboring unwavering conservative opinions (Pew Research

Center, Political Polarization in the American Public 24-26). The more engagement and

interaction that voters have with the political process puts them in situations where they meet and

interact with other politically engageand as such like more partisan-ideologically divided

persons (Suhay 235).

Apathy can take many forms. Polarization should not be equated as simply strong

disagreement. In a free society, like ours, voters are naturally have diverse and strongly held

views. It is healthy to disagree about the issues, to have a wholehearted debate on the issues, to

push for what we believe is best for the governments direction. Discourse is the lifeblood of our

representative democracy. Polarization is a phenomenon that takes apathy up to a whole new

level. Members of the polarized extremes are likely to have strong, persona, emotionally charged

negative feeling towards the other political camp. Rather than disagreeing on a solely

professional level, polarization has paved the way for more distrust between parties. The Pew

Research Center found that 27 percent of Democrats and 36 percent of Republicans view the

other party as a threat to the nations well-being (Political Polarization in the American Public

61). That same survey found that Americans today are far less likely to describe those in the

other party as intelligent and would be far more likely to be disappointed or unhappy if they
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had a child who married a member of the opposite political party. One way to look at

polarization is that it is:

a condition revealed when a candidate for public office is regarded by a

competitor and his supporters not simply as wrong, but as corrupt or wicked;
when one way of thinking about the world is assumed to be morally superior to
another way; when one set of political beliefs is considered to be entirely correct
and a rival set wholly wrong (Blankenhorn).
Where a party lands on the issues becomes an ingrained part of the partys identity. A win or a

loss on any given issue can be taken as much personal and moral as it is political or procedural.

Previous eras of high-conflict in the United States tended to be centered on a few, often related

issues. From debates about the size of government around 1800, the National Bank in the 1830s,

the stark spilt over slavery in the 1850s, the agrarian revolt and the related currency disputes

back in the 1890s and on into ideological battles over Vietnam and civil rights in the 1960s.

Todays polarization seems to be much broader and more comprehensive than those hotly

contested historical divides. Legislative debates between Republicans and Democrats draw from

almost all issues. Both parties have taken hard line stances on issues from guns to educational

standards to climate change to foreign policy to church-state issues. The key difference is that by

historical standards, polarization has become less issue-specific and more generalized in what we

disagree about.

New Media

The Internet has paved the way for those interested in politics to browse and interact with

more outlets than any political age ever before these past two decades. Since the elections of

1996, the Internet and increased offerings on cable television has had an increasing effect on

politics and governance, in general. On one hand, expanding media should provide voters with

more information and more access to the political process than any time before. Social media has

proven itself to be one of the more direct forms of communication between voters and
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candidates. Improved websites have allowed for voters to interact with, contribute to and

generally just get to know more about a candidate, party, or issue. Cable television news

channels like CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and the rest started what is known now to be the 24

hour news cycle. No longer were voters beholden to networks, parties or even the campaigns

for their information. Responsiveness between candidates and the electorate is nearing instant.

What a candidate tweets one minutes is what they are addressing before dozens of live cameras

the next. While the course of American politics has been wildly altered by the advent of the

Internet and it surely can be argued that the effects have been largely positive as it is now the

platform of which voters have used to become more informed and engaged. It has also

undoubtedly contributed to the increasing political polarization of both the elites producing the

content and the societal class that consumes their every sound byte, tweet, selfie and post.

In 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama famously made successful use of social media

websites like MySpace and Facebook to reach unprecedented numbers of young, energetic

voters. Even as early as 2004, candidates like Howard Dean were using Internet forums to

fundraise and coordinate across the nation. They cut out a corner of the Internet for themselves

and their supporters. As outlets like this have grown in popularity and legitimacy, the Internet

has become a huge setting for political discussion, debate, and information gathering. The

vastness of the Internet ultimately allows for sects of the World Wide Web to cater to specific

audiences. As weve discussed previously, humans have a natural longing to belong to a group

(Mason 129-133; Suhay 222-224; Westfall et al. 151-154). The Internet has made this much

easier. While the Web houses an unimaginable amount of data and information about anything

and everything. The Internet is also customizable in such a way that users have the ability to be

much more selective in what information they directly or indirectly come across. This is known
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to researchers as selective partisan exposure theory (Barber et al. 33; Mutz 224-240; Lee,

Choi, Kim, & Kim 702-724; Stroud 2-20). Stroud defines a person engaging in partisan selective

exposure as engaging in the selection of media outlets that match ones political predispositions

(2). She goes on to say that As peoples media options increase and they find outlets offering

more congenial perspectives, the potential for selective exposure arguable increases (2). This

relates to partisan polarization because If partisan selective exposure is widespread, the public

may develop more polarized, or extreme attitudes in the direction of their political

predispositions because they are further reassured in their in-group identity and their ideology

by finding steady support and allies on the Web (Stroud 3). Professor Mutz further backs this up

by saying:

Greater choice in sources of political news is relevant to political polarization

because it means that people must decide on some basis which sources to use and
which not to sue To the extent that the many sources of political news have
identifiable political complexions, some people may end up choosing news
sources that reinforce and intensify their preexisting views (224).
The problem this causes in regards to partisan polarization at the societal level is that

much of what is at play in the selective partisan exposure theory is also what makes up much

of the theory first made famous by psychologist Leon Festinger, cognitive dissonancealso

commonly referred to as confirmation bias. Festinger suggested that people want to avoid

information that conflicts with their preexisting beliefs, and that they seek out information

though activities such as selective exposurethat confirm their current beliefs (Mutz 225). As

media consumers increasingly have the option to customize the news that surround them to their

own preferences and predispositions, the likelihood is that news will reinforce existing views

and produce a subsequent polarization of partisan groups seems all the more plausible (Mutz

230). The consequences that this poses to partisan polarization is made worse because:
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selectivity is made easier on the Internet by search engines and links between
websites that espouse similar vies. The voices represented on the Internet include
those fringe groups whose extremist ideas would never be covered by more
traditional mainstream media (Mutz 225).
Beyond what is simply available from reputable news outlets such as Fox News, CNN, NPR and

BBC, there is an endless number of websites and social media pages created by and for those on

the extreme side of the liberal and conservative ideologies.

Social media is particularly vulnerable to selective partisan exposure, confirmation bias

and the reinforcement of extremist proclivities. On social media, users have the ability to

cultivate a homogeneous community composed of friends, family, and acquaintances that share

much in common with them Twitter, Facebook and others provide ideal platforms for users to

spread not only information in general but also political opinions through their network (Stieglitz

& Dang-Xuan 2). Social media websites, weblogs, microblogs, wikis and other Internet-based

user-generated content sites have become forums for massive amounts of political discourse to

play out between friends ad between complete strangers. In one study, researchers observed and

examined sex weeks worth of tweets leading up to the 2010 U.S. congressional midterm

elections. Using a series of algorithms and manually annotated data, the research demonstrated

that the network of political retweets exhibited a highly segregated partisan structure, with

extremely limited connectivity between left- and right-leaning users. Liberal and conservative

users of social media networks like Facebook and Twitter can fall into the trap of knowingly or

unknowingly selectively exposing themselves only to their partisan side of the endless debate

(Lee et al. 705). This can create a phenomenon known as an ideological echo chamber. The feed

of posts and tweets they see back up previously held opinions and personal expression of

political opinions are more likely to generate positive responses that reinforce the view and

group identity. Those on the consistently partisan side of their respective ideology are known to
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speak actively about government and politics with those around themincluding doing so on the

Internet. It is also worth noting here that because of this flurry of discussion and share, there is

credible research that social media use can still expose use to oppositional information. Whether

you knowingly try or not, it is impossible to escape the other side entirely. Yet, liberals are more

likely to defriend someone on a social networking site because of their political discussion while

conservatives are more likely to hear political views similar to their own on Facebook (Pew

Research Center, Political Polarization & Media Habits). 63 percent of consistent

conservatives described their close friends as sharing their political views. Only 49 percent of

consistent liberals felt they could say the same (Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in

the American Public 52). Online or in real life, surrounding oneself with others who are nearly

ideologically identical can certainly have the tendency to allow polarization to flourish

(Blankenhorn). Mixed company moderates; like-minded company polarizes. Heterogeneous

communities restrain group excesses; homogeneous communities march towards the extremes

(Bishop 193).

Relationship between Federal-Elite Polarization and State-Elite Polarization

While many are interested in the working and proceedings of the federal government, it is

a well-known fact that most governanceespecially that of which affects our everyday livesis

actually accomplished at the state level. Professor Nolan McCarthy has argued that:

Polarization has reduced congressional capacity to govern. Congress has been less
productive in legislation, more prone to delays in appropriating funds, and
increasingly slow in handling executive and judicial appointments. While are to
quantify, there is considerable evidence for a decline in the quality of legislative
deliberation and legislation (What we know and dont know about our polarized
politics The Washington Post).
Has the behavior of their federal counterparts led to more partisan polarization in the state houses

and governors offices in states across the nations?

 Tully 19

All of the political and societal causes of polarization that we have already explored have

not only caused the polarization that we have seen in the federal branches of government, but

have also had a massive effect on the political climate and efficiency of state governments

around the country. At the end of the day, state level elected officialslike their federal

counterpartsare still mere humans and as such are still impervious to the systemic roots of

ideological separation. Meaning they can and have fallen victim to partisan primaries, the effects

of group identification, ideological homogeny, and identity politics that have plagued the general

electorate. Many of the same issues that Congress struggles to find common ground on are also

shaping the debates and agendas of state parties, as well. Bills passed at the state level can have

huge, even national, implications, as we have seen play out over labor unions in Wisconsin,

LGBT rights in North Carolina, abortion in Texas, recreational marijuana in Washington and

Colorado and the minimum wage in New York and California. The debates can mirror or even

shape the national debate on a huge number of issues.

State legislators are still human themselves before all else. Group identity does not only

effect the societal level, but very much the elite level, as well. State-level elected officials do not

only have the sense that they belong to one party, they are what makes up the party. They felt so

close to the party identity and platform that they were willing to more on the line than most to

serve the party. Party leadership, for their part, are stronger than ever. This is due large in part to

the massive amounts of money and influence flooding into the states. Increasingly, big-money

conservatives support challenges to moderate Republican lawmakers on the state level to

enforce ideological purity. The Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC) spent around

$30 million to elect GOP lawmakers in 2010 and another $25 million in 2012. This is compared

to just around $10 million dollars on behalf of Democrats (Rapoport). In many of these state-
 Tully 20

level races, just a few thousand dollars can go a long way and make a huge difference. The big

national spenders help ensure that state lawmakers will be more in line with the national agenda

(Rapoport). Groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) have been

successful at promoting model legislation to legislators in nearly every state, although

primarily focused towards Republican lawmakers. Advocacy groups like ALEC, initiatives like

Grover Norquists no-new-taxes pledge, and more coordination of the many party levels have

helped to create a method for the nationalizing of state issues and have increasingly allowed for

national groups to call the shots for state-level lawmakers (Matthews).

Our perception of polarization actually hurts us more than the polarization itself (Westfall

et al. 148). This is true at the societal level (Suhay 222) and at elite level (Barber et al. 31).

Political polarization discourages moderate state legislators from running for Congress, making

the problem worse (Thomsen 793). Serving in the state House of Representative or Senate are

wildly regarded as stepping stones to future public office. Exactly half of U.S. presidents served

in colonial and/or state legislative bodies before rising to the executive office. A little under half

of the current U.S. Senate is made up of former-state legislators with 22 Democrats and 22

Republicans serving in the state-level chambers before coming to Washington. 215 of the voting

representatives in the House had chalked up legislative experience in their state-level equivalents

(Former State Legislators in Congress and the White House, National Conference of State

Legislatures). It is not surprising that state legislators go on to have successful careers holding

larger and larger offices. They have a leg up on their novice challenger by having more elite-

activist connections, name recognition, and campaign experience. The problem is that

congressional candidates are no longer emerging from the ideological centerthe very small

pool of people who run for Congress have become even shallower, and the choices that voters
 Tully 21

face have become increasingly extreme (Thomsen). After examining a huge dataset complied

by Stanford University political scientist Adam Bonica, researcher Danielle Thomsen found that

ideologically moderate state legislators are less likely to run for office, because of their

concerns about winning their primary or the general election, and their perceived likely

difficulties in pushing their legislative agenda forward if elected (Thomsen 786). The

perception of the worsening polarization serves to scare moderate potential candidates from

running for higher office because they fear facing extreme candidates in the primary, fear they

will not excite the party base enough to win the general or if they do land in Congress, they fear

they will be unable to act on their moderate positions considering its current state of division

(Thomsen 784-789). Thomsen explains that they feel as if they cannot adequately excite enough

of the party activists who participate in primaries, contribute money to candidates, and spend

their time working on campaigns. [Activists] have a greater impact on the electoral process than

ordinary voters (Thomsen 787). Would it be worth the huge person and professional cost

associated with running for congressional office if they do not see a place for themselves in the

contemporary congressional environment? Potential moderate candidates may think it would be

an uphill battle to win the primary or the general election, and if elected, it would be difficult to

pass their desired policies, and all but impossible to gain an influential position in the party or the

legislature (Thomsen 787). With party leaders more extreme than the median member of the

party caucus (Fiorina 45), even if a moderate candidate is elected to join Congress, they will be

at the will of party leadership to sort out setting the legislative agenda, structuring debate on the

floor, and allocating committee assignments. This is just one example of the relationship

between how federal-level elite polarization contributes to worsening state-level elite

polarization and, as illustrated, vice versa.

 Tully 22

The gap between Democrats and Republicans in some state legislatures isnt just big as

in Congressits bigger (Rapaport). Nolan McCarthy and Boris Shor, political scientist at

Princeton and Georgetown Universities, respectively, are popularly regarded as the go-to source

for comparative data analyzing state legislative ideological movements. They measure the

polarization in each state by examining the average ideological distance between the median

Democrat and Republican in state legislature. They use a multidimensional scaling statistical

analytical application relied upon by many other political scientists. Dynamic, Weighted Nominal

Three-Step Estimation, or DW-NOMINATE for short, looks into more preferential and choice

data sets like legislative roll-calls and agendas by assigning scores between 1 and -1 for

conservative to liberal political ideologies, actors, parties and institutions. Looking at data from

1993 to 2013, Shor and McCarthy found that more than half of the states are more politically

polarized ideologically than Congress. There are a few states where the ideological distance

between party medians is relatively less polarized. In Louisiana and Arkansas both parties are

pretty conservative, in Delaware and Rhode Islands, they are both fairly liberal. Some of the top

polarized states include California, Colorado, Arizona, Washington, Michigan, and Wisconsin. It

is worth noting that in California, Democrats both dominate the state so thoroughly and no

longer need to attain supermajorities to pass budgets, so this polarization is not as much of an

obstacle to actual lawmaking in the California state legislature (Shor). These reflect states

where one party holds a majority of the control and that party is made up of enough ideologically

extreme members that push their median average up, this is paired with the other party making

up a smaller minority. Shor and McCarthy found that Not only are states polarized, that

polarization has increased over time. States like Arizona, Colorado and even Nebraska, who
 Tully 23

boasts the nations only unicameral, (semi-) non-partisan legislature, have polarized most rapidly

over the past 20 years from a relatively low base.

Consequences of State-Elite Polarization

It should be clear by this point that polarization is worsening phenomenon affecting the

efficiency and effectiveness of our government from the top to the bottom. Partisan rancor now

dominates nearly each and every public policy issue. Polarization brings out the worse elements

of politics and as discontent with the gridlocked system grows that discontent breed more

distrust, apathy and hard line ideological separation. James Madison expressed some concern in

his Federalist essay no. 55 that man may not have sufficient virtue to successfully maintain

self-governance. This due large in part to the qualities in human nature which justify a certain

position of esteem and confidencerepublican government presupposes the existence of these

qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Partisan political polarization corrodes exactly

what self-government presupposes and fundamentally depends on. Polarization leads to: stuck

politics, less trust in our political institutions and in each other, more separation, less empathy,

more inequality, poorer cooperation, shoddier public discourse, and the diminishment of our

civic capacity.

We are a nation of people of varying backgrounds and situations, with different wants

and desires. A polarized, homogenous body of government may not accurately of effectively

represent the different sects of the constituencies. Polarization whether at the federal or state-

level, leads to more government inefficacy (Barber et al. 44); decreased legislative

productivity/increased gridlock (Masket & Shor 19); worsening delays and brinkmanship (Lee

136); decreased quality in legislation passed (Barber et al. 41); and lends itself to producing a

nastier, more personal political environmentfelt both by elites and the general electorate
 Tully 24

(Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 559). Polarization spawns more polarization. Greater polarization

may also increase the incentives to engage in strategic disagreements or the blame game which

leaders to more bargaining failure and gridlock (McCarthy 6). The more gridlocked, inefficient

and nasty governing there is, the angrier the electorate becomes. Expressing their frustration in

the voting booth, voters have recently shown the tendency to elect even more politicians who

offer themselves as the answer to politics as usual, who promise to be unbending as they stand

up for their principles, and assure the angry voter they will fight fire with fire. Voters have

opted that rather than elect politicians willing to compromise, work across the aisle to

accomplish what they can, to combat the other partys ideological extremity with electing

equally as polarized politicians to their own party (Lee 145).

Just as the last few Congressional sessions have been among some of the gridlocked.

Barber & McCarthy found that the same problem is causing major backlogs at a large number of

state legislatures (43). Systems of separation of powers and bicameralism require an

extraordinary level of consensus to pass new legislation so that the enacting coalitions are quite

often required to be bipartisan (McCarthy 4). Polarization, at the levels we are seeing today, are

causing paralysis in our governance that can delay or prevent our states from responding to new

challenges or solving our current problems. Hyperpartisanship contributes to the emotional

motivation that drives brinksmanship. In 2014, a record number of states had all-out budget

battles where large swaths of state servicesif not allwere threatened to be shutdown,

furloughed, or suspended (Masket et al. 6). While budgets and state finances have long been a

point of contention in states large and small, it appears that threatened budget shutdowns have

become a battleground to fight about more than just dollars and cents. States like Illinois,

Florida, Washington and Minnesota were each on the brink of shutting down state agencies as
 Tully 25

the state legislatures engaged in a standoff over the budget. In each of those states, budget

negotiations stalled leading governors and other state officials to make contingency plans. In

many of the states, a government shutdown would affect citizens from across the state. States

parks, museums, lotteries, drivers licenses bureaus, and county fairs could face full shutdowns,

while departments like Corrections and Health & Social Services would face partial shutdowns.

Most states have avoided shutting down, but if polarization maintains its course in states like

Illinois, a partial to full government shutdown very well might be in the future. In a polarized

climate, some bodies have found it easier to kick the can down the road rather than confront

the larger issues they fear they would be unable to adequately fix in the environment as it is. Like

in Congress, state legislative leaders have learned to govern crisis-to-crisis, with some of those

crises being artificial or the result of polarization (McGhee et al. 34).

The power of the legislative body in any state is in its constitutional ability to make laws.

While we have discussed how partisan polarization has impeded the legislative process, there is

little reason or research that points to the same polarization impeding the other two branches of

government as much as the legislative (Fiorina 14; McGhee et al. 12). An inability to pass

corrective legislation allows for much greater autonomy for executive and judicial actors in the

policy process (McCarthy 12). Research has found that governors are more likely to act

unilaterally and govern by decree during periods of ongoing executive-legislative conflict

(Barber et al. 44; McCarthy 12). [P]olarization also increases the opportunities for state

judges and courts to pursue their policy goals because such judicial activism is unlikely to be

check be legislative statute (Barber et al. 44). Just as the judiciary branch is strengthened by

gridlock in the legislative branch, it can also be hampered in states that require the legislative
 Tully 26

bodies consent or approval for judicial appointments in state district courts or even the state

supreme courts (Barber et al. 45; McGhee et al. 25).

Conclusion

When President Abraham Lincoln gave his second annual message to Congress, the

nation and her government were more polarized than any time in American history before and

surely ever since. While we are not currently on the verge of a literal civil war, our elected

officials and even we the voters are engaged in war of words and ideologies. Speaking to his

divided nation, Lincoln challenged them not to ask Can any of us imagine better? but instead

Can we all do better? History has proven to us time and time again the age old adage United

we stand, divided we fall. Lincoln understood that even when the occasion is piled high with

difficulty we must do what it takes to mend the division and to rise to the occasion. His words

ring as true today as they did over 150 years ago in 1862: As our case is new, so we must think

anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

American depolarization in the generations of politicians and voters to come will requires similar

undertaking. We must be willing to think anew and more importantly act anew. We must be

willing to disenthrall ourselves from this long-developed bureaucracy and distain for one

another. We must be willing to free ourselves from this notion that we can fight fire with fire,

ideological extremes with ideological extremes. What once seemed to only have its grip on the

federal government has spread and has begun to produce state governments that mirror the

federal government in disorganization and ineffectiveness.

Change may not come quickly, nor will it be installed easily. Political polarization is just

the paramount of all of the partitions that continue to divide our politicians and citizenry.

Political polarization sheds light on the scourges of the separations existing between races,
 Tully 27

religions, economic statuses, genders, expressions of sexuality, and the greater evolution of

societal progress as the generation Y millennial take over the mantel from the aging generation

X baby boomers. Polarization highlights the lack of understanding and consensus that exist

between many of these separate, but loud groups.

The first step towards remedying political ideological polarization is the willingness to be

cognizant of the issue. Instead of acting as if it is a problem one that only effect one side of the

political spectrum, voters and political elites on both sides of the aisle need to be willing to admit

guilt for creating this problematic situation and for allowing it to fester for as long as we have.

Neither Democrats nor Republicans bear the responsibility of settling these differences. We can

only become more united by actually acting in good faith towards true unity. Regardless of this

trend is top-down or flows through the electorate upwards to the elites, it is the responsibility of

both to correct our future course. Even in an election year as heated as this, politicians and voters

and should hold each other accountable to continue to debate the issues facing our country, but

doing so in a respectful, civil manner. They need to hold each other accountable so as neither act

as if words like negotiation, consensus-building, and moderate do not exist in their

dictionary. To be willing to admit when they are wrong, bite the bullet and pass legislation not to

spite the other party, but to promote the common good of all of us.

From our Facebook walls to the halls of state houses across the country, a frank

conversation about how we can continue moving the country forward by breaking the mold.

Conversations need to take place within and between both of the parties with special attention

spent to include the voices of the moderate middle. In all of his extensive work on elite and

societal polarization, Dr. Morris Fiorina still believes that at the end of the day the general

electorate is still very much ideologically centrist (Fiorina 125-134; Fiorina et al. 4-6). It is only
 Tully 28

after watching the behavior of our elected officials at the state and federal levels that we perceive

polarization to worse than it actually is. This perception scares the moderate middle from making

their voices heard out of fear of being shouted down by the loudest voices on the extremes of the

spectrum. As fewer moderate voters voice their preferences, fewer moderate candidates emerge.

Moderate voters, and the candidates they may have been willing to elect, may feel that they are

alone, that the system is too far gone (Thomsen). When moderate voices feel disenfranchised,

they are unknowingly allowing for those on the ideological poles maintain their strong hold on

the policy direction and their disproportionate influence on the candidate nominations.

Going forward, efforts needs to be made include the moderate sides of each party,

independents and third party voters in the political process. Of course, an important element of

the contemporary American political process is the primary election system. What was once

intended to weaken the power of party bosses, has opened the door for the extreme wings of

our two party system to accumulate greater and greater influence on who candidates are, what

they will stand for, and ultimately what they are likely to act on upon entering office. A far

greater threat than the establishment bosses, is the polarization led by radical sects of each

party and deep-pocketed interests who often lie at the extremes. The loosening of campaign

finance restrictions by the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts across the country, has

unleashed a flood of independent spending that has allowed for more candidates to run well-

funded campaigns. Polarization has gotten so bad in the 2016 primary election, that Republicans

and Democrats have become increasingly polarized amongst their own parties. As the primaries

have continued there has been a split between wings of the Democratic and Republican parties,

while the hostile environment has harden distain for the opposite party more than ever. 2016 is

on course to be one of the most personal, and arguably destructive elections in many decades.
 Tully 29

For as much physiological reexamining is needed, we will need to be willing to change

the process and procedures that have allowed for polarization to worsen. As a number of

researchers and even some politicians themselves have suggested, partisanship and polarization

would be dampen even just a little by adopting more open, less party-oriented primaries as the

candidate nomination process for seats from president all the way down to state representatives.

This would allow for more moderate and independent voters to have their voices heard and could

very well led to more moderate and independent candidates putting themselves forward as

potential elected officials one day. Procedural changes that weaken heavy handed party leaders

will also serve to create a climate in state legislatures that are more conducive to moderate

members and bipartisanship consensus-building.

It should never be mistaken that calls for depolarization are calling for an end to

disagreements or that the two parties should somehow become homogeneous and

indistinguishable from each other. The very founding of this country was born out of

disagreements and conflicting ideologies. Yet, the founders and some of the proceeding

American political heroes are those who fostered compromise, promoted mutual understanding,

and acknowledged the importance of the freedom of expression. The present-day Republican

Party can continue to believe what they would like to believe and the Democratic Party may hold

dear what they believe is worthy. It should not be forgotten that both parties are still doing what

they believe is best for this country and the future. There will always be disagreements about the

best approach to doing just that. The act of disagreeing over what is best for the greater good

should not, itself, be what holds that same country back from achieving that greater future.
 Tully 30

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