Midwest Modern Language Association

The Textual Space: On the Notion of Text

Author(s): Jenaro Talens and Juan M. Company
Source: The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn, 1984)
, pp. 24-36
Published by: Midwest Modern Language Association
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 The TextualSpace:
On the Notion of Text
JenaroTalensandJuanM. Company

One of the most importantproblemsfacedby theoristswho dealwith the

analysisof "signifyingpractices" is theambiguityof thekeytermuponwhich,in
onewayor another,theirdiscussions hinge:the notionof "text."Eversincethe
early of
activities OPOYAZ and the MoscowLinguisticCircle,literarytheory
hasfunctionedwith threemodelsof semiotics.The firsttwo arebasedon the
workof Saussure aswell ason themathematical theoryof information presented
and for
by Shannon Weaver(1949); both models,the text hasan autonomous
systemof signification, whetherin termsof "structure," asin the firstcase,or in
of
terms "message," in
as thesecondcase.Thethirdmodelderivesfromthework
of Peirceanddoesnot definethe "sign"on the basisof entitiesor relationships.
Rather,it confrontsthe semioticproblemfroma differentperspective, namely,
the analysisanddescription of theconditionsthatarenecessary foractions,facts,
or objectsto functionassigns.Thefirsttwo modelsbelongto a semioticsof com-
municationandarededicated to thestudyof themeansandprocesses usedby sign
producers, not onlyto affectothersin variousways,but alsoto gainrecognition
andacceptance fromthem. In a broadersense,the thirdmodelbelongsto the
semioticsof signification andincludesallusesandbehaviorsthatbecomesignifi-
cantonly becausethey takeplacein a socialcontext.
In thisessay,we wish to addressourselvesto theproductivemanifestations of
the workof "signification." It is perhapsafterMay1968in Francethatsemiotics
ceasesto be understoodas a "scienceof signs"andstartsto functionasa critical
discipline.Becauseitscriticalobjectscometo bedefinedas(a)communication, (b)
the structuresof communication, and(c) the languagesthatareimpliedwithin
communication,semioticsappearsno longeras a study of the signified,but
rather,as a studyof the operationsof signifying.Yet thereis no humanscience
(andsemioticsis no exception)thatdoesnot compromisethosewho practiceit,
sincea scientificpracticenecessarily situatesits practitionersin a fixedzone of
knowledge("saber") andobligesthem to selectamongculturaloptionsthat in
turn act upon the very processof investigation.So it is that the dominant
ideologiesin capitalistmodesof productionnot only determinethe modelsof
communication but alsothe instruments usedto analyzethe structureandfunc-
tionof thosemodels.Thereareno neutral sciences:themythof scientificneutral-
ity is an ideological illusion that ariseswith the "scientificman"of the Renais-
sance.Thereis implicitin anyprocessof the productionof meaning("sentido")

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an entire system of aesthetic, economic, and ideological conditions. The par-
ticularproductionof a scientificdiscoursethat we will urge, therefore,cannotbe
thought of as an intuitiveor neutralactivityin searchof "real"knowledge ("conoci-
miento").
The so-calledexact sciencescan neitherignore nor avoid theseproblems.These
sciences are historically linked to various state apparatusesand are subject
themselvesto an economic law of supply and demand. Today, for example, one
does not investigate nuclear physics in the abstract; rather, one investigates
nuclearphysicswithin the context of specificgeopoliticalpracticesof power. We
could also make similar observationsabout the world of the human sciences,
especiallysince the ideological determinationsupon researchin those disciplines
areeven more obvious. All scientificdiscourseis a processof meaningproduction
and, as such, is at the same time subject to the sameconditions as are the texts,
speech acts, or utterancesthat constitute their field of investigation. A scientific
practicesuch as that of semiotics, therefore,cannot disregardits own inscription
into a determinantideology.
Saussureanandinformation-basedtheoriescanbe saidto err, then, in this initial
respect. Semiotics is born here primarily as a discipline dealing with critical
metalanguages;it claims to offer a scientific base to a kind of work formerly
characterizedby a lack of method (as, for example, in the case of evaluative
analysesof poetic language). Its aim initially is to reducecriticalinterventionto
the translation of utterancesfrom one discursivesystem into a language different
from the one in which such utterancesare constituted. In this view, referenceto
the reality implied in the processof communicationis disregarded;the semiotic
project is limited to an analysis of systems of "communication" (and/or
"significance").The eventual appearanceof a third model does not really solve
much. The work of Peircediffersfrom the proposalsof Saussure,not becauseit re-
opens the question of the recurrenceof an exterior realityin the communicative
process, but rather, becauseit introduces the concepts of "interpretant"and of
"semiosis." By means of this second concept, the communicative process is
opened up to the field of signification;by means of the first concept, a semiotic
mechanism is instrumentalizedthrough which the signified is predicatedby a
signifier.
In the Hjelmslevian concepts of "expression"and "content," for example,
semioticspassesthe problemof content onto semantics,while, with the sameap-
pearanceof neutrality, it continues to analyzethe systematicmechanismsof ex-
pression. The naive quality of Morris's behaviorism, moreover, causes his
semiotic theory to referPeirce'sthird model back to the two earlierones, insofar
as it also tendstowardthe translationof one languageinto another.The only exter-
nal appearanceof the processof communication(and/or signification)figuresas
embodiedwithin the universeof thought and not within the universeof socially
and historicallydeterminedreality: it is conceived of, therefore, as an external

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appearanceimmanentto the act of communication.Consequently,when analyzed
from without, the sum of contents addsan ideologicalcomponent, which never-
thelesshas not been theorizedas reachingthe level of expression.In a crudeway,
we might say that a semiotics so understoodwould end up as the consequenceof
articulating two different practices, which we could label "formalist" and
"sociological."
If the processof the productionof meaning ("sentido") is confrontedas a work
("trabajo"), investigation must refer back critically to the cultural, political, and
ideologicalsystems that have caused the process to occur as it does. Investigation,
then, is no a of
longer question definingcodes, but rather,of discerningthe ma-
trices (with their dependenciesand contradictions)that have formed them and
that govern their operation. We must take into accountthe concrete processof the
of
production meaning, in which not only the elements belonging the discur-
to
sive objectsof analysisaretouched upon, but also others, such as the relationship
to other discourses,and so forth. Becauseall of this relatesto concretefactors,it is
not possible to delimit the field or even to touch bottom within it.
All discourse is the product of a transformationproduced from previous or
paralleldiscourseswhich, simultaneously,is the resultof convertingmatterinto a
signifying element. The analysisof the concrete processmust take into accountthis
characteristicof discursivepractice.The functioning of this double transforma-
tion that is a live process, and for which discourselives, has been definedby Tel
Quel as"'criture." This concept stressesthe materialform of a discourseby linking
that discoursewith other discourses;that is, by fixing discourseas a signifying
practice, it is related and articulated with other practices such as politics,
economics, psychoanalysis,etc.
The analysisof a concrete process of the production of meaning must touch
upon threeaspects:(1) the semioticformalizationof texts, with the analysisof the
communicationsystems that act within them; (2) the semiotic formalizationof
the system of productionof meaning, becausethe text in question is a concrete
manifestationof it, and(3) the relationshipof the text with the context of cultural
objectsinsofaras this context conditions the way in which the text is manifested.
All of this canbe articulatedthrough a multidisciplinaryrule for the analysis;but,
becauseof the very characterof a practice,even though it is specificand differen-
tiated, this rule only exists when it is articulatedin relationto, superimposedon,
and traversedby other practices,in a fixed socialformation.This is why semiotics
has currentlyshiftedits fieldof action fromsignsto systemsofsignification by focus-
ing its gaze on the objectcalledtext.Although such a shift haspermittedan initial
atomismto be overcome,it has not solvedall the problems;this is due to the essen-
tial vaguenesswith which text, as a notion, is used by semiotic theory.
This is how "text" is definedin the DictionaryofPhilologicalTerms:"A special-
ized term (Glossematics)which indicatesany group of analyzablesigns: a pieceof
conversation; an entire conversation;a line of poetry; a novel; language as a

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whole;etc."(LazaroCarreter1968).Thisdefinitionis in facta densesynthesisof
variousdefinitionsproposedupto now and,assuch,it setsupitsown possibilities
aswellasits own problems.Evenif we canderivefromsuchadefinitionLotman's
identificationof "text"and"sign"in thecaseof artistictexts(1973:53ff),we still
cannotescapethefactthatthefeaturesthatsetboundaries aroundit turnout to be
excessivelyvagueandgeneric.
Thefollowingcommentsaremeantasmorethanjustanotherstandard attempt
at establishinga possibleepistemological boundaryforthe notionof "text"asan
operationalinstrumentin the fieldof verbalactivity.Our purposeis to orient
presentresearchtowarda notionof "text"thatcanbe used,withoutmetaphoric
transcendence,in the analysisof anykindof practiceof theproductionof meaning.
Suchanalysisimplies:(1) thatthenotionof text shouldnotbe limitedonlyto ver-
ballanguages(whethertheseareartisticornot);and,(2)thatthefunctionof texts
shouldinclude"non-verbal" languages(whethertheseareartisticor not) aswell
as thoseareasthatwe cancall"paralanguages" (forexample,"bodydiscourse,"
"discourseof desire,""dailylife").
We shallheredefinelanguage asa systemof organizedsignsthatcantransmitin-
formation.We acknowledgethatthisdefinitionis onlypreliminary andperhaps
superficial;it is a reformulation of Lotman's views coupledwith some of our
variants.Yet the definitionis usefulbecauseit putsinto playthreeelements:(a)
the "sign"as a "differentiated" functionfromthe "mark"("seflal"); (b) the exis-
tenceof a "code"thatcanbringaboutthe "articulation"/"organization" of such
"signs";and, (c) the information that such signs "transmit"/"communicate,"
sincesuchinformationis the "signified"thata codegrantsto the signsboth in
isolationandin its articulation with othersigns.
We establish,then, limitsto the conceptof "communication." It is defined
hereasthe concreteactualization of "communicativeness" alreadyanticipated by
the code (andonlythat).We alsodistinguishbetween"signified"(whichevery
languagebearsandin somewaysis) and"meaning"("sense").Now, language
lackssucha "meaning" ("sense"),butits productionis possiblewheneverit is ac-
tualizedasa languagein texts.Yet with a proviso:thatthesetextsareunderstood
(andherewe haveanoperativedefinition[Coseriu1977])notasmanifestations of
language,but rather,as its superiormodalities,in which languageas such
becomesexpressionfor contentsof anotherlevel.
This distinctionbetween"signified"and"meaning"("sense")doesnot cor-
respondto the classicoppositionestablished by Frege(Bedeutung/Sinn), which
relieson the oppositionbetween "semanticreferentialvalue"and "semantic
linguisticvalue."We understand by theterm"signified" theunityof the"seman-
tic linguisticvalue"(thatwhichis communicated) andthe "semanticreferential
value"(thatwhichis produced),because,asa languagein actualperformance, it
bringsinto playthe roleof theexplicitcontext.By the term"meaning" ("sense"
or "sentido"),we understand (followingGarroni1979)the implicitcontextof the

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explicit context, that is, the productof a processas it is individualizedby the ap-
propriation/readingof what is "signified."We shallreturnto this questionlater.
The presentproposalfor defining languageis a way of substituting the broad
and ambiguousfield of communication(which is closerto the Lotmanmodel) by
the more limited andmanageablefield of "transmissibleinformation."In the first
place, there is the triple division of "nonlanguages"elaboratedby Lotman:
(a) systems which utilize nonorganizedsigns as communications;(b) organized
systems that serve for communicationbut do not use signs; (c) systems that use
organized signs but do not serve as communication. These three factorscan be
reducedto only the firstdoublepossibility:the transmissionof informationcanbe
given as long as there is an organizationof utilized signs, that is, a code which
servesas "organizer/decipherer."In the secondinstance(of systemswhich do not
utilize signs even though they might be organized), we shall speak of
"nonlanguage."In the other instance (of systems which utilize signs that are
somewhat or not at all organized), we shall refer to "paralanguages":a "use"
always ends up by establishingits own code becauseit grants meaning to that
which did not have it.
The proposed definition has other advantages.Consider the concept of the
"real"(in Lacan,the "real"is that which cannotbe hallucinatedby the subject:all
that is left outside consciousness,or unconsciousness,and has no possibilityto be
representedby language). How is the "action"or "object"of the "real"suscept-
ible to the production of meaning? This is a challenging problem because the
"real"does not start by having a "signified"and, consequently, it cannot com-
municate anything. Now, what our definition proposesto do is to explain how
and why the "real,"even though without signifieds,is involved in the dailypro-
duction of meanings.
We are thus dealing with the possibility of "meaning"becausemeaning is a
partboth of languagesand of the above mentionedvariantsof nonlanguage.We
haveto attemptviabledefinitionsof the "text"which could functionin both areas
of "language"/"nonlanguage,"yet without being limited to any one of the two.
Contemporarysemiotic theory contains differentnotions about "text." We
need to establishtwo clearlydifferentiatedparadigms:(a) one which considersthe
text as a "closure"so that a structuralpoint of view canbe formalized;and(b) one
which confrontsthe text in the areaof signifyingproductionin orderto formalize
a functionalpoint of view. * Two representativepositions of the first paradigm
can be clearlyperceivedin the proposalsof Todorov (1972) and Lotman (1973).
For Todorov, what definesa text is the notion of "autonomy/closure,"even
though, in anothersense, some texts might not be "closed."The text constitutes
*Alargerdescription byJorgeLozano(1982).Forourpurposes,
of usesof thisconceptis developed
however,thisproposeddoublemodel,in spiteof its genericandsimplisticnature,is moreuseful,
becausethe intelligentandhighlysuggestiveproposalsof Lozanocontinueto accepttheoperative
validityof the notionof text.

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a system that is not to be identifiedwith the linguistic systembut which, never-
theless, is related to it. This relation is one, simultaneously,of proximity and
similarity.As articulatedby Hjelmslev, the text is a "connotative"systembecause
it is secondaryto another system of signification. Such a definition, on the one
hand, limits the notion of text to the fieldof verballanguageswhile, on the other,
it does not manage to clarifythe distinction (text of) "closure"/"closed"even as
far as its own presuppositionsare concerned. As for the notion of autonomy,
Todorov relies on Hjelmslev, which is to say, Saussure'sbinomial set of
"signifier"/"signified"that underlineshis theory; he thus excludes the trial-like,
experimentalcharacterof compromisedsense, that is, the presenceof the subject
and of the spaceoutside the text (hors-texte),as articulatedby Lotman (1970).
For his part, Yuri M. Lotmanestablishesconditions which might be necessary
but, not really, sufficientfor the existence of any text. In a 1969 article, Lotman
accepted Pjatigorskij's1968 formulation of two propertiesas defining the ex-
istenceof texts: (a) the expressionwithin a determinedsystemof signs ('fijacidn");
and (b) the capacitythat the subjectenjoys to presenthimselfundercertainorien-
tational relationships- deictic markers-which allow the utterancesto function
as a whole. A year later, in his fundamentallyimportantStructure of theArtistic
Text, Lotman'sdefinitionof "text" becomes more explicit in termsof threecon-
ditions: (a) that it be composed by "signs" ("expression");(b) that "signs"be
hierarchicallystructured("structuralcharacter");and (c) that "signs"occur be-
tween a beginning and an end ("markingout the boundaries").
The condition of necessitybut not of sufficiencyto which we havealludednow
could be explainedwith two arguments:(1) the ambiguityof Lotman'snotion of
hierarchy, which depends on a type of articulation that does not make clear
whether suchan articulationis inherentto the text or whether, on the contrary,it
belongs to the subjectoutsidethe text (hors-texte); and (2) the absenceof a clear
definitionof the value of the notions of beginning andend. Whether temporalor
symbolic, it is this gap that later theoreticalwork by Lotman tries but fails to
eliminate.
We must indicate next the so-called"functional"approachesto defining tex-
tuality as representedby positions taken by Schmidt (1971)and Kristeva(1969).
Schmidtdistinguishesbetween "textuality"and"text"; he uses linguisticsto con-
struct his theory of the text and then situates both concepts in their field of
reference.He defines textuality as the structureof socio-communicativeactions
among interlocutors.A text, therefore,is the correspondingconcreterealization
of "structuredtextuality" in a determinedmedium of communication. Schmidt
succeeds here in broadening the field of application beyond that of verbal
language. He does so, however, in an ambiguous and contradictoryway. He
merelyextends written language to language-in-situation,that is, to all those ac-
tions whose form of manifestationimpliesandincludesverballanguage. His posi-
tion is part of the polemic surrounding "competence"/"performance"and is

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relatedto the discovery(by Lieb and Henne) that competence, which is suppos-
edly capableof engulfing performance,can only be developedas a performanceof
implicit competence.
In addition, Schmidt'sconception presentstwo points that have in common a
reduction and simplificationof the nature of the problem. Everything seems
limited, strictly, to the theoreticalareaof the so-calledtheory of communication.
Moreover, the presentationof the problemin these terms (which areat the same
time broadand vague) does not allow for a cleardistinctionbetween the level of
what is "expressedutterance"("enunciado") and the level of "expression"(speech
act; "enunciacidn"). For Schmidt, the question is one only of a "trans-
missible"/"decipherable"message. In this way, he sets aside the problems in-
volved, first, in determiningthe space"subject-from-whereit is expressed,"and,
next, in the space "subject-producer-ofsenses." Such considerationsno longer
posit a mere "inter-locutor"which happensto function in an extratextualposi-
tion.
For her part,Julia Kristevadefines"text" as a certaintype of "signifyingpro-
duction" which occupies a definite place in history and which emerges from a
specificscience that must in turn be defined. From this standpoint, she opposes
structuralistpositions becausethey eliminatefrom their horizon the characterof
signification. She considers significationas an ongoing process at a time when
structuralistsproposeonly a mechanicaland staticconceptionof significationas a
totality made up of diverseparts. Her proposalties in with that of Lacan(1966).
Lacandefines"letter"as a materialbasewhich a concretediscourseborrowsfrom
language;that is, "letter"is a structureessentiallylocatedin the "signifier."For
Lacan,the relation"signifier"/"signified"is presentedas a relationof insistence in
the flow of the signifying chainand notas a relationof consistence.No one of the
links in the chain can consist of the "signification"of which the same"moment"
(as a whole) is capable. Kristeva also returns to Saussure:in his conception of
Anagrams,he bases the searchfor "signification"on a "signifier"that has been
dismantled by an insistent meaning("sense"; "sentido")in action. Kristeva's
discoursefocuseson the areaof verballanguage. Yet her proposalis closer to the
one which we are sketching here.
In the two positions sketched above ("structural"and "functional"),"func-
tion" must, in one way or another, play a role. The structuralposition seems
more rigorously autonomous because demarcationsigns are provided to the
"reader"/"receiver" with the help of contextualmarkers.On the other hand, the
functional position derives from a pragmatic focus. It is thus evident that a
"definitionof types of texts dependson the descriptionof types of relationsbe-
tween texts and contexts"- provided, of course, that "the text is not in the
materiality of the writing ("escritura")but rather in the conventional
sign/oriented values"(Segre 1978).

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 To the question "what constitutes a text?" Segre answers lucidly by
eliminating such a question;in its place, he proposesa more generaldefinitionof
that which is "expressed."The following considerationsshould be kept in mind:
(a) the type of "pragmatic"context within which a given text is produced;(b) the
type of "illocutionary"function which the text can develop in that context,
whether it was meant to developit or not; (c) the modalityof the communication
of the text ("improvised"/"nonimprovised,""with"/"without" appealto non-
verbal codes or direct actions, "monological"/"dialogical,""oral"/"written,"
etc.); (d) the existence of precise norms concerning the constitution of texts
(norms that are especiallyrigorous for "written" texts); and (e) the measureof
repeatability("repetibilidad")
(Segre 1978).
This developing classificationdemandsdifferentiatedproceduresfor each level
(as Lotman has shown, 1973). The manner of its articulation is, for Segre,
"paraphrasis,"that is, "the individualityof the text could be affirmed,whenever
it permits, on any level a unitaryparaphrase."This position is richly articulated:
the "superficial"structure(the "textual" one) has a linguistic order, while the
"deep"structure,which makesa paraphrasepossibleby introducingthe context
in a text, has a semiotic order. It is this condition that makesimpossiblethe ex-
istence of so-called"rulesof transformation"between the two of them.
Nevertheless, whether it deals with "writing" or "orality," Segre'sposition
moves in the terrainof the "verbal."It is necessary,therefore, to broaden the
senseof his conclusions. To begin, we can distinguishbetween differentiatedno-
tions: (1) textualspace,which correspondsboth to whatis communicated, that is, to
textual structure, and to what is signified,that is, to the results of the cited
paraphrase;and (2) text, which correspondsto meaning("sense"or "sentido"). The
terms"signified"and"meaning"areto be understoodas they were definedabove.
Lyotard(1979) emphasizesone of the main aspectsof the problem.
Whateverexistsis not a text. . . . It containsa certainkindof density,in other
words,aconstitutivedifference thatwe shouldnotread,butsee.Thisdifference, to-
gether with the immobile mobility which revealsit, is what is continuously
neglectedin the act of signifying.. . . The factthat the worldis legiblebrutally
meansthatthereis an"other"in theothershore,writingthethingsthatexist,andit
alsomeansthatfroma properstandpoint,I shouldbe ableto unravelit.
Whatever exists is not a text, therefore,but a place to which all of us have given
meaning, in the effort to reconstruct/unravelthe presenceof the "other." We
shall call that place "textual space,"as opposed to "text," in orderto distinguish
the double form manifestedin whatever exists. This spacecan be organizedand
fixed- accordingto Lotman'sdefinitionof what a text is - between a beginning
and an end (TS). It can be a simple proposalopen to severalways of organiza-
tion/fixation (TS'); or, finally, it may not imply any kind of fixation/organiza-
tion, lacking the limits or frontiersthat would make possibleits fixation (TS ").

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 Thefirstcaseis thatof suchtextualspacesas:theliterary work(thereis a specific
linguisticorganization between the obvious limitsof the firstandlastpages);can-
vasor painting(realistor non-realistpainting:color is organizedfollowinga
specificcodewithinthelimitsof thecanvasspace);film (orvideo); etc. Thesecond
caseis thatof suchtextualspacesas:play(theso-called"dramatic text"is only a
proposalopento multiplewaysof temporalandspatialorganization, varyingin
everysettingandshow);music(in thiscase,aswell as in the the
forms, flexibility
of theproposal,whichis not evenconsidered assuch- happening,aleatoryscore,
jazz, etc.- makesonly a subtledifference,the sameas in thosealeatoryliterary
"texts"whichUmbertoEcohascalledopenworks(Eco 1962);performance; etc.
Thethirdaspect(TS"'')is thatof suchtextualspacesas:nature (opento be read
aslandscape, forexample);conversation (opento beanalyzedasa dialogueconcern-
ing delimitablerelationships); freeassociation(whichis usedin psychoanalysis in
orderto decodewhata patientdoesorsays);theloverelationship (opento bereadas
thehistoricalrepetitionof a rite);alecture(opento beconfrontedasaperformance
of an actor,herecalledprofessor); etc.
Followingwhat we havesaid,"text"now canbe definedas the resultof a
reading/transformational labormadeoverthetextualspace.Theaimof thislabor
is not to extractan "inherent"meaningfromthe textualspaceby actualizing
language-TS andTS'-so as to adda textualspaceto anothertextualspace;
rather,theaimis to producemeaning.We aretalkingabouta taskof readingand
transformation, not aboutdecodingor unraveling.It must be clearthat this
specificpoint disconnectedfrom what we have previouslyquoted from
is
Lyotard.What remainsto be shownis how this taskof meaningproduction
operates.
In the caseof TS andTS' we will use the word"system"in orderto definea
mannerof organizationor patterning(unitaryin TS, variablein TS'). This
organization assystemimposeslimitsanddirectionson theproductionof mean-
ing by means of what one of us has previouslycalled"semanticrestriction"
(Talens1978). Such restrictionpreventsthe arbitraryand vivid multiplica-
tion/manipulationof meaning, thus establishinglimits of pertinence.The
transformation of the textualspacein varioustextsis madeby reorganizing (re-
systematizing) elementsconstitutingthissystem,whichis sustained
the by a pat-
tern of articulationthat is as complexas one could wish but which still is
analyzableempirically.Such reorganizationimpliesthe projectionover the
systemof a new patternthatcannotbe contradictory to (evenif it is different
from) the earlierone. We call the articulatingpattern of the systemits "organ-
izing principle"(Talens 1975), and the new organizational patternits "seman-
tic gesture"(Mukarovskij). This so-called"semanticgesture"doesnot belong
to the textualspace;therefore,it belongsnot to the realmof the signified(po-
tentiallycontainedin the code, aspreviouslyindicated),but to the realmof the
realsubject,thepersonwho transforms hisorherlessonintoa reading,hisorher

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sightinto a vision,or hisor herhearinginto listening.In doingso, he or sheim-
plies in the meaning,not only the signifieditself of the textualspace,but
everythingthatconsciouslyor unconsciously constituteshisor herexistenceasa
subject.We will callthiswayof organization a "structure."
Thetransformation
of thesystemon a structure(s)is thusanappropriation or generalized,
(individual
but not foreseenby the code) of the textualspace.Thisjustifies,within the
framework of a givensetof semanticrestrictions,thedifferentpossiblemeanings
of the concreteworkor act for all thoseconcretesubjectsfacingit.
In thecaseof TS ', wherewe cannotproperlyspeakabouta systembecausewe
havedefinedit aslackingorganization/fixation, thetransformation will workon
the basis of an implantation/projection of a certainsystemmodel over its
elements.This systemmodelis takenfrom a textualspace(TS or TS') with
whichthe othertextualspace(TS') maintainssomekindof relationship. In this
way, for example,it is possibleto projectover a panoramaof mountainsthe
systemcanvas, makingfeasiblethe productionof a landscape, which"means"an
aestheticfeeling.BertoltBrechtexemplifiesthis processquite accuratelyin a
famouspoemfromthe Buckower Elegien.
DerRauch
1 DaskleineHausunterBaumen anSee
2 VomDachsteightRauch
3 Fehlteer
4 Wietrostlosdannwaren
5 Haus,Baumen undSee
("Thecottagebetweentreesbesidethe lake/ a wire of smoke/ If it is not
there/ whata desolation
/ house,treesandlake")
What givesmeaningto what the poematicprotagonistseesis not so muchthe
possible"natural"dispositionof its elementsas the emotionalvaluesthat the
observerprojectsoverit, placing,therefore,a pictorialmodeloverreality.This
mechanismexplainsthe possibilityof givingcoherence(in otherwords,of pro-
ducingmeaning)to anordinarygestureas happens,forexample,in the analysis
madeby Freudof the symptomaticactof Dora'splayingwith herpurse(Freud
1948).
As a corollary,a two-folddistinctioncanbe established betweenthe "textual
space" and the "text":asa system, the textual spacecharacterizes
itselfby having
a preciseempiricalexistence,whetherstabilized(as in the caseof TS), or as a
changingproposal(as in the caseof TS'), or as a presupposition elaborated a
posteriori
(the caseof TS"). In contrast, the text doesnot havea fixed structure,
or, moreexactly,thereareas manytexts as structure;thatis, thereareasmany
texts as readingappropriations of the corresponding system.Oppositeto what
occursin thecaseof the textualspace,theexistenceof the text is not theresultof
describingan articulationof relationships,but rather,the outcomeof a new ar-
ticulation, individualizedand unrepeatable.

JenaroTalensand]
JuanM. Company 33

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 Nevertheless,the borderlinethat separatesthe notions of TS andT is not a rigid
one and, if both concepts are approachedas functions ratherthan entities, it will
allow us to understandthe processualcharacterof the production of discourse.
For instance,in the caseof the so-called"creativepractices"(poetry, fiction, film,
music, painting, etc.), the raw materialelaboratedby the artist(biographicalex-
perience,culturalor existentialmemory, soundsor colors from nature)will func-
tion as a textual spaceof the third kind (TS "). The processof artisticproduction
transformsthis raw materialinto a text (Ti) which in turn constitutes a textual
spaceof the second kind (TS') for the function "reader"which every processof
productionentails, thus allowing the artistto go back to his draftin orderto cor-
rect it. The correctionor revisionof a text impliesin fact the elaborationof a new
text (T2), which is what we understandas the "author'swork." For the reader,
consideredas an entity outside the discourse,this text (T2)operatesas TS or TS',
dependingon the modality in question.
If this final result belongs to the second type (TS'), as happens,for instance,
with a play, the processof transformationsoccurring until the moment of per-
formancein front of an audiencecould be schematizedin the following fashion:

a) TS' (Dramatictext) Ti (story board)

b) (Ti = ) TS1' T2 (proposalof articulationT2 and what the actors,
choreographers,etc., exhibit as final version
after rehearsing)
c) (T2=) TS2' T3(n) (what every memberof the audiencesees at
the performance)
A first theoreticalresult of this processis the need for redefiningthe conceptsof
authorandreceiver,sinceboth constitute elementsof processratherthan entities;
that is to say, they are to be consideredas inscriptionsof the discourseand not as
physicalpersons.That is why the use of conventionalconcepts such as "author,"
"reader,"or "message"is highly problematicfor the analysisof signifying prac-
tices. When we speakof a "reader,"for example, arewe referringto the reading-
function, or to Bousofio's"idealreader"(1977), or to Eco's model reader(1979),
or to the "socialreader"positioned in a given collectivity, as sociologicalschools
and receptiontheory understandit? The sameambiguityand confusioncould be
found in the terms "author"and "message."
The combinationof diversemethodologies which have developedon the basis
of an ambiguous determinationof their own subject of inquiry cannot achieve
complementarity,since we are not facing a variety of approachesthat deal with
differentaspectsof the same object, but with methodologies that entail different
objects. This is not the casewith the analysisproposedin this essay, sinceour ap-
proachplacesall the elements in the same space(the discourse)and relationships
can be establishedwithout dangerousmetaphysicaltranspositions.

34 The TextualSpace

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 A second theoreticalresult concerns the clarificationthat an approachof this
kind can makeregardingthe role of criticismandtranslationin the processof pro-
duction of meaning. In fact, from the point of view of the operational
mechanism, there is no differencebetween the critic's work and the reading-
function performedby the author while correcting his/her manuscript. They
both operate on a TS in order to produce a T. However, while the T of the
reading-function lies inscribed in the object as a new form of TS, the one
elaboratedby the critic remainsoutside of it. And this meansthat, in the firstin-
stance, the text of the readingfunction on the part of the author transformsits
meaning into signified, while the readingfunction of the critic does not. Yet it
must be kept in mind that the work of the critic, being part of the cultural
heritage of the readers,also remainsintegratedin the process;it should not be
considered,therefore,as a marginaladdition. This is why we could proposethat
Brecht is reflectedin Cervantes,or Valle-Inclin in Shakespeare,since within the
limits imposedby the textual spacesof Don Quijoteor TheMerchant of Venice,our
reading develops from a perspectivein which Brecht and Valle are present. Fi-
nally, it can be arguedthat translationswork similarlyto criticaldiscourse;they
do not inscribethemselvesin the TS in which they operate,but they createa new
TS within the boundariesof a new language and a new culture. Therefore, the
traduttore is never a tradittore,
but rather, another kind of autorewho, instead of
working free of restrictions, as does the original author, is subjectedto them
(TS). Reading, writing, and translatingarejust threevariantsof the sameprocess
of discourseproduction.

Translated
byJenaroTalens

University of Valencia(Spain)

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36 The TextualSpace

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