Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87698 September 24, 1991

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OSCAR IRINEO, respondents.

The Legal Department, PAL for petitioner.

Francisco M. Delos Reyes for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:p

This case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), who was dismissed from his work
on August 23, 1967 on the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel,
submitted on August 11, 1967 after an investigation commenced in July, 1967 in coordination with a
well known accounting firm. 1 The Fact Finding Panel recommended the criminal prosecution of the
employee, Oscar Irineo, together with four others, namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, Jacinto
Macatol and Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular refunds of international plane tickets. 2

On the basis of the panel's report, and the testimony of witnesses taken in the course of the
investigation, criminal proceedings were also initiated against four of the PAL employees above
named, namely: Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, and Jacinto Macatol. They were
prosecuted for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, under an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal on September 25, 1968. 3 The case resulted
in the conviction after due trial of all the accused on March 1, 1976; this, despite the fiscal's having earlier
moved for the dismissal of the charges as against Irineo and Macatol. 4

All four (4) defendants filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial. All the motions were denied
except Macatol's. After due hearing on said motions, the Trial Court rendered an amended decision
dated September 23, 1977 absolving Macatol of any liability for the offense charged, "for lack of
sufficient evidence." The other three appealed. 5

On July 6, 1978 about twelve (12) years after his dismissal from employment Macatol filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL in the Department of Labor. His complaint was however
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that his right of action had prescribed. That dismissal
was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission in a decision promulgated on May 30,
1980. The Commission ruled that "the running of the prescriptive period ... commenced on the
date ... (Macatol's) cause of action accrued;" that such cause of action did not accrue "upon the
termination of the criminal case," but upon "his dismissal, the legality or illegality of which could be
determined soon after it was effected ... (and a) suit to contest its legality could proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings;" that "if no criminal case was instituted, following the
logic of the complainant's argument, the cause of action would not and could not have accrued at all;
... (and) the institution of the criminal action did not bar the complainant from filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal." 6

On the other hand, the appeal taken by Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, resulted in
a decision promulgated on September 23, 1983 by the Intermediate Appellate Court, 7 affirming the
judgment of conviction only as regards Rogelio Damian, but acquitting Irineo and Rabasco "on grounds of
reasonable doubt." 8

On May 10, 1984, seventeen (17) years after the termination of his employment on August 23, 1967,
Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that
termination was illegal. It is the action thus instituted that has given rise to the proceedings now
before this Court.

Irineo's action eventuated in a decision of the Labor Arbiter dated November 12, 1985, 9 decreeing his
reinstatement to his position in 1967 without loss of seniority rights and the payment to him of back wages
"from August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement," as well as moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00.

The Arbiter overruled the defense of prescription asserted by PAL, among others. The Arbiter held
that since there was a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged
with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until
the final adjudication of his case," and there was, too, a standing order by the Court of Industrial
Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, the
termination by PAL of Irineo's employment on August 23, 1967 merely "amounted to a suspension
per (said) PAL IRD Circular No. 66-11." According to the Arbiter, said IRD Circular No. 66-11 was not
raised in issue in the earlier case instituted by Macatol, supra, 10 and this serves to distinguish
Macatol's case from Irineo's, precluding reaching a conclusion in the latter similar to that in the former
(i.e., that the claim was barred by prescription). The Arbiter held, in fine, that in view of said Circular No.
66-11, PAL's termination of Irineo's employment should be deemed only as an act by which "Irineo was
placed under preventive suspension until his (criminal) case was finally adjudicated, for after all, the
arbitration branch of the Commission should put meaning to the law between the parties and unless such
law between the parties are (sic) implemented the same would become useless." The Arbiter concluded
with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing PAL to terminate the

suspension of Irineo which it imposed on August 23, 1967 and to reinstate him to his
position without loss of seniority rights and with backwages from August 13, 1967 up
to his actual reinstatement.

Lastly, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is (sic) awarded to

complainant.
PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's judgment. In a Resolution
promulgated on February 28, 1989, the Third Division of the NLRC upheld all the Arbiter's
conclusions. 11 The NLRC agreed with the Arbiter that "applying the mandate of IRD Circular No. 66-11
which respondent PAL itself solely promulgated," Irineo was never dismissed from employment but "was
merely under preventive suspension;" and that PAL's termination of Irineo's work was violative of the
"Injunction Order dated September 3, 1963 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA" (forbidding, during the pendency of
said case, the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority), even though that order "lost its
efficacy when the parties concerned entered into a valid Certified Bargaining Agreement" (on December
7, 1965, according to petitioner PAL 12 ). It also affirmed the award of moral damages.

PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside
the NLRC Resolution of February 28, 1989 as constituting "a plain case of patent abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same an exemplary example of power arbitrarily
exercised without due regard to the rule of law." The Court issued a temporary restraining order on
April 26, 1989 prohibiting enforcement or implementation of the challenged resolution. 13

Required to comment in public respondent's behalf, the Office of the Solicitor General begged to be
excused, declaring that "(a)fter an exhaustive and judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, as
well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the issues involved, ... (it could not), without violating
the law, espouse the position taken by the respondent ... (NLRC) ..." Comments were filed by private
respondent 14 and the Senior Research Attorney of the NLRC in the latter's behalf, 15 which the Court
resolved to treat as their answers to PAL's petition.

In light of the material facts above set out, it is not indeed possible, as the Solicitor General holds, to
defend the decision of the respondent Commission or that of the Labor Arbiter.

That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen
cannot be gainsaid; but that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or
eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a
disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and
commiseration.

The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr. dated August 23, 1967, based
evidently on the investigation and report of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's
employment was being ended; the language is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently as follows: 16

To: Oscar Ireneo

Comptroller's Department

For being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in the international service to the
damage and prejudice of the company, you are dismissed from the service effective
immediately.

The acts committed being criminal, resulting in the swindling of the company, the
Legal Department is directed to file immediately the corresponding criminal cases
against you.
To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that declaration, "you are
dismissed from the service effective immediately," should be construed merely as a suspension, not
a dismissal, from employment, is illogical if not downright ludicrous. They attempt to justify this
conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee
charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive
suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and construe this as a complete foreclosure or
prohibition of any alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as the imposition of
administrative sanctions or penalties; in other words, any disciplinary action against an erring
employee was absolutely dependent on the outcome of the criminal action against the latter, no
disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the final
adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a construction that has nothing to support it, is contrary to
common sense, and one certainly not justified by the recorded facts.

The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-qua-suspension by referring to a standing

order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by
PAL without court authority, is equally indefensible. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a
labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. That dispute however ended
when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo
was fired on August 23, 1967. In other words, when Irineo's employment was terminated, the CIR
injunction adverted was already functions officio and could no longer have any relevance to that
event.

There is moreover, nothing in the record to excuse respondent Irineo's omission to impugn his
termination of employment by PAL in line with the respondent commission's theory, i.e., that under
existing PAL rules and the CIR injunction, he could only be placed under preventive suspension and
therefore his dismissal was illegal. His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his
discharge from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not
share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be
rejected as time-barred, as being unpardonably tardy.

Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the respondent Commission's conclusions
are flawed by errors so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account
be struck down.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of certiorari prayed for,
NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE the respondent Commission's Resolutions promulgated on
February 28, 1989 and on March 20, 1989, MAKING PERMANENT the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on April 26, 1989, and DISMISSING private respondent's complaint. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
 1 Rollo, pp. 50-51, 61; SEE, also, pp. 169-178.

2 Id., pp. 177-178.

3 Id., p. 51.

4 Id., pp. 61-65.

5 Id., pp. 65-66.

6 Id., pp. 84-86.

7 In the appellate proceedings docketed as AC-G.R. No. 23219-CR.

8 Rollo, p. 83.

9 Id., pp. 48-58. The Arbiter was Domingo V. del Rosario.

10 SEE footnote 5 and related text.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83018 March 13, 1991

MANNING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION/ABDULASIS & MOHAMED A.

ALJOMAIH, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FRANCISCO "LAZARO" S.
BENEDICTO, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente for petitioners.

Andres S. Fidelino for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

Francisco Benedicto a.k.a. Lazaro Benedicto, according to his passport was hired by a foreign
firm, Abdulasis & Mohamed A. Aljomaih Co., thru its Philippine representative, Manning International
Corporation, as a truck driver for its establishment in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Benedicto was engaged
for a stipulated term of two (2) years. He left for Saudi Arabia on December 1, 1980 to fulfill his
employment contract.

Some months before the expiration of his contract with Abdulasis, etc., Benedicto was involved in a
vehicular accident, was injured, and in consequence, lost both his legs. From the date of the
accident, February 2, 1982, he was confined at a hospital in Saudi Arabia until sometime in May,
1982, when his employment was terminated. He was repatriated to the Philippines in August, 1982.
In October 18, 1982, Benedicto filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for the recovery of his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract,
insurance benefits and projected cost of medical expenses amounting to P25,000.00. Despite due
service of summons and several subsequent notices, no appearance was entered, and no evidence
presented, in behalf of the impleaded respondents, Benedicto's erstwhile employers: Manning and
Abdulasis, etc. The last order addressed to the latter, dated December 13, 1983, gave them one final
opportunity to submit their position paper with the warning that their failure to do so would constitute
a waiver of the right to present evidence, and the case would be deemed "immediately submitted for
decision based on the evidence on record." Still nothing was heard from the respondents.

Judgment was thereafter rendered by the POEA on March 19, 1984. The judgment dismissed
1wphi1

Benedicto's claim for salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract, upon
a finding that "complainant was legally terminated from employment" because of his disability. The
judgment however ordered Manning and Abdulasis, etc., in accordance with their contractual
undertaking to provide workmen's compensation benefits for service-connected illness, injuries or
death, "jointly and severally, to pay . . . (Benedicto) P12,000.00 as total and permanent disability
benefit . . (as well as) the actual medical expenses incurred by (him) in the treatment of his disability
for at least one hundred twenty (120) days subject to verification . . . . "

The respondents filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial," which however was not
deemed meritorious by the National Labor Relations Commission to which it was referred for action.
By Resolution dated September 28, 1984, the Commission denied the motion and affirmed the
judgment of the POEA. In that Resolution the Commission declared, too, that the evidence sought to
be introduced by the respondents: a letter supposedly written by Benedicto to his employer in May,
1982 and a formal acknowledgment of receipt by him of all monetary benefits for the period of his
employment, was not in truth newly discovered evidence, as respondents already knew about it at
the time of the original proceedings before the POEA and could have presented it therein but did not,
despite numerous opportunities to do so.

On May 27, 1985, the judgment having become executory, Benedicto moved for computation of the
amounts due him, and in substantiation, submitted receipts evidencing his actual medical expenses
from September 3, 1982 to January 26, 1985. His former employers opposed the motion on the
ground that the medical expenses referred to another person, Lazaro Benedicto. In an Order dated
July 8, 1986, the Administrator overruled the objection, pointing out that the
names Lazaro and Francisco Benedicto both referred to one and the same person, and directed the
issuance of an alias writ of execution to enforce payment by respondents of P12,000.00 as total and
permanent disability benefits and P19,450.00 as hospitalization and medical expenses for one
hundred twenty (120) days, or a total of P31,450.00.

Benedicto protested the limitation of the award to him of medical expenses to the period
corresponding to only 120 days and filed a motion for partial reconsideration to correct this claimed
error. The NLRC adjudged his motion to be possessed of sufficient merit. In a Decision dated April
15, 1988, the NLRC set aside the POEA Order of July 8, 1986 and, on considerations of equity and
social justice as well as the theory that "medical treatment should not be stopped until . . .
(Benedicto's) injury or disability is completely healed," entered "a new judgment approving the
payment to Benedicto by his employers, jointly and severally, of P65,621.03 as "reimbursement of
actual medical expenses from September 3, 1982 up to January 26, 1985."

Benedicto's former employers are now before this Court on a petition for certiorari, assailing that
Decision of April 15, 1988 of the NLRC. They contend that the Decision should be nullified and set
aside because
1) Benedicto is estopped from further claims for medical expenses, having been fully compensated
for his injury; and

2) the challenged decision is without legal basis and unjust. Benedicto's employment contract
provides that
1

The employer shall provide the employee: Workmen's Compensation Benefits for service-
connected illness, injuries or death in accordance with social Insurance Law and other
pertinent laws of Saudi Arabia and whenever applicable, war hazards protection.

Since there was nothing in the record to indicate the benefits that are granted by the laws of Saudi
Arabia to individuals suffering injuries similar to Benedicto's, the POEA saw fit to determine those
benefits exclusively in accordance with relevant Philippine law.

Under Philippine law, employees who, like Benedicto, are injured, or fall ill due to service-connected
causes, and thereby become totally and permanently incapacitated, are entitled to

1) disability benefits of no less than P12,000.00 where the disability lasts continuously for
more than one hundred twenty (120) days; and 2

2) such medical expenses as have been actually incurred and necessary for the employees'
treatment, during the period of disability as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress
of his recovery may require, subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the
Commission. 3

It was precisely in accordance with these legal norms that the POE Administrator, in his Order dated
July 8, 1986, directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution to enforce payment by respondents
of P12,000.00 as total and permanent disability benefits and P19,450.00 as hospitalization and
medical expenses for one hundred twenty (120) days, or a total of P31,450.00. This, notwithstanding
indications in the record that all hospital, surgical and medical expenses entailed by Benedicto's
injuries while in Saudi Arabia, totaling 31,082 Saudi rials were defrayed by Abdulasis, etc., and that
he (Benedicto) also received from the persons responsible for the accident causing his injuries, the
sum of 20,000 rials in consideration of which he released them from further liability.

The NLRC however opined in its Decision dated April 15, 1988 that there should be no limitation to
the hospitalization and medical expenses payable to Benedicto, and that the employer should
continue to be liable therefor until the former's injury or disability is completely healed." The opinion
is quite frankly grounded onconsiderations of equity and social justice, and not on any explicit
provision of law or regulation, And upon such a theory, the Commission rendered a new judgment
commanding the payment to Benedicto by his employers, jointly and severally, of P65,621.03 as
"reimbursement of actual medical expenses from September 3, 1982 up to January 26, 1985."

It is at once apparent that the NLRC's "new judgment" of April 15, 1988 is at odds with the final and
executory judgment rendered by the POEA on March 19, 1984. For whereas the Administrator's
judgment of March 19, 1984 ordered Manning and Abdulasis, etc., Benedicto's employers, "jointly
and severally to pay . . (Benedicto) P12,000.00 as total and permanent disability benefit . . (as well
as) the actual medical expenses incurred by (him) in the treatment of his disability for at least one
hundred twenty (120) days subject to verification . . .," the "new judgment" of April 15, 1988 decrees
payment to Benedicto of P65,621.03 as "reimbursement of actual medical expenses from
September 3, 1982 up to January 26, 1985 "an amount considerably greater than the sum of
P19,450.00 as hospitalization and medical expenses for one hundred twenty (120) days," computed
on the basis of the Administrator's final and executory decision.
Now, nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and, of course, where the judgment is void. It may not be amiss to advert to the teaching
4

of Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, which quotes Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South 640, 641; 126
5

Ala., 268, as to the nature and object of judgments nunc pro tunc, viz.:

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that has beenpreviously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was,not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, not to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been.

The alteration made by the NLRC judgment on the final and executory judgment of the POE
Administrator cannot in any sense be characterized as the correction of a clerical mistake, or a nunc
pro tunc entry. Nor may the latter judgment be considered as void in any aspect. It is in truth the
"new judgment" of the NLRC that is void ab initio,. insofar as it attempts to vary the disposition of the
final and executory decision of the POE Administrator. Said "new judgment" is utterly inefficacious to
work any change in the Administrator's decision.

There is another reason to strike down the NLRC's "new judgment" of April 15, 1988, and that is, that
in disregard of the relevant provisions of the law, it is made to rest on "considerations of equity and
social justice." This is impermissible. As this Court held in the analogous situation of an employee
whom the NLRC found had been dismissed by her employer for cause (dishonesty) but whom it
nonetheless awarded separation pay on equitable and compassionate grounds:

The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein
is not entitled to separation pay. The cases above cited constitute the exception, based upon
considerations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather
than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts
of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the
expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without
any provision for separation pay.6

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, and the writ of certiorari thereby solicited is hereby issued,
ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the contested Decision dated April 15, 1988 of the respondent
Commission, and REINSTATING and AFFIRMING the Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administrator dated July 8, 1986. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
 1
In paragraph B (3).

2
ART. 192, Labor Code; Sec. 2 (c), Rule IX, Amended Rules on Workmen's Compensation.

3
ART. 185, Labor Code; Secs. 1 and 2, Rule VIII, Amended Rules on Workmen's
Compensation.

4
Contreras, et al. v. Felix, et al., 78 Phil. 570, 574, citing 1 Freeman on Judgments, pp. 269-
271; Marasigan v. Ronquillo, 94 Phil. 237, 240-241, citing Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 1,
Secs. 141, 273, 274-275; Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., 110 Phil. 4, 7, citing Veluz v. Justice of the
Peace of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557.

5
51 Phil. 862, 880 (1923), cited in Cardoza vs. Singson, 181 SCRA 45; emphasis supplied.

6
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 679, and cases cited
therein; SEE alsoconcurring opinion of Barredo, J. in National Federation of Sugar Workers

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 46727. September 27, 1939. ]

PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS, composed of Honorables Francisco Zulueta, Leopoldo Rovira, and Jose
Generoso, and PAMPANGA Bus COMPANY, INC., Respondents.

Jose Alejandrino for Petitioner.

Manuel Escudero for respondent court.

L. D. Lockwood for respondent Pampanga Bus Co., Inc.

SYLLABUS

1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; COMPENSATION FOR OVERTIME

WORK. In Kapisanan ng mga Mangagawa sa Pantranco v. Pangasinan Transportation Co. (39 Off.
Gaz., 1217), it was held that, to be entitled to the benefits of section 5 of Act No. 4123, fulfillment of
the mandate of the law is necessary, this being a matter of public interest. Where both parties, as in
this case, have violated the law, this court must decline to extend the strong arm of equity, as neither
party is entitled to its aid. This is especially true in view of the findings of fact made by the Court of
Industrial Relations which we should not disturb.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. Industrial disputes should be decided with an eye on the welfare of the working
class, who, in the inter-play of economic forces, is said to find itself in the "end of the stick." In the
case at bar, however, there is no reason for disturbing the action taken by the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, which is a special court enjoined to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable" (sec. 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103).
 DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
promulgated on January 14, 1939, denying the demands of the Pambusco Employees Union, Inc.

The following are the pertinent facts which have given occasion to this industrial dispute: On March
26, 1938, the Pambusco Employees Union, Inc., addressed a thirteen point petition to the
management of the Pampanga Bus Co. Upon the failure of the company officials to act upon the
petition, a strike was declared by the workers on April 14, 1938. However, through the timely
mediation of the Department of Labor, a provisional agreement was reached, by virtue of which the
strike was called off, eight demands were granted, and the remaining five were submitted to the Court
of Industrial Relations for settlement. One of these demands, in the language of the petitioner, is that
the respondent Pampanga Bus Co. "pay to all Company drivers affiliated with the Pambusco
Employees Union, Inc., all the back overtime pay due them under the law." After trial on the disputed
demands, the Court of Industrial Relations decided inter alia that the claim for back overtime pay
could not be allowed.

The pertinent portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"The evidence is clear that even before the final approval of Act No. 4242 amending Act No. 4123, the
Eight Hour Labor Law, by extending the provisions of the latter to other class of laborers including
drivers of public service vehicles, a petition was addressed by 44 drivers of the company to the
Governor-General asking him to veto the bill amending the law extending it to drivers for the reasons
stated in their petition (Exhibits 5 and 5-a). About the 6th day of September, 1935, a petition was
again addressed by 97 drivers of the company to the Commissioner of Labor requesting adjustment of
working hours to permit them to retain their present status with the company as nearly as possible
under the law (Exhibits 4, 4-a, 4-b, 4-c, 4-d and 4-e). This petition was prepared after a meeting of
the employees was held and was drawn with the help of the manager of the respondent about the last
days of August, 1935. In September, 1937, about 347 employees of the different departments of the
company again addressed a petition to the Director of Labor expressing their satisfaction with the
hours they work and the pay they receive for their labor including the special bonuses and overtime
pay they receive for extra work, and asking, in view thereof, that the law be not applied to them
(Exhibits 6, 6-a to 6-g).

"After the enactment of Act No. 4242 several transportation companies operating motor buses filed
with the Commissioner of Labor petitions for a readjustment of the hours of labor specified in section 1
of the Act on the basis of maintaining the status quo as to the hours the drivers were required to be
actually on duty in order to enable them to make the prescribed hours daily that the exigencies of the
service required. The petitions were based on the impracticability of applying the provisions of the law
to drivers of public service vehicles without disrupting the public service and causing pecuniary loss to
both employers and employees alike, and the resulting difficulties on the part of the drivers. The
testimony of Atty. Carlos Alvear on this point is uncontradicted. He testified that in 1936, he was
president of the Philippine Motor Association composed of bus operators operating in the Philippines,
of which the respondent is a member. Major Olson, who was at the time the executive secretary of the
association, and himself took up the matter with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Labor after the passage of the Act extending the operation of the Eight Hour Labor Law to drivers. In
their conference with the Commissioner of Labor, they were told to take advantage of the provisions of
the law in which they may apply for the readjustment of the working hours, and in conformity with
that suggestion, the executive secretary of the association filed a formal petition, Exhibit 10, on
September 5, 1935. When this was filed the Department of Labor further suggested that the drivers of
each company file and address a petition of similar nature designating their representatives who will
represent them in a conference that the Commissioner of Labor may call for the purpose. With the
filing of the petition, the conferees were assured by the Under-Secretary of Labor that the
enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law in so far as the drivers were concerned, will be held in
abeyance until such time as the meeting or investigations are held. It is not clear as to whether
investigations and hearings were finally made but the evidence indicates that the petition was never
decided and the companies continued its schedule of hours.

"Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4123 read as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"SEC. 3. The Commissioner of Labor, with the advice of two representatives of the employers
concerned, designated by the latter, and of two representatives of the laborers concerned, designated
by these, shall, at the request of an interested party, decide in each case whether or not it is proper to
increase or decrease the number of hours of labor fixed in section one of this Act, either because the
organization or nature of the work require it, or because of lack or insufficiency of competent laborers
for certain work in a locality, or because the relieving of laborers must be done under certain
conditions, or by reason of any other exceptional circumstances or conditions of the work or industry
concerned; but the number of hours of labor shall in no case exceed twelve daily or seventy-two
weekly.

"SEC. 4. Employees or laborers desiring an increase or decrease of the number of hours of labor shall
address an application to this effect to the Commissioner of Labor, stating their reasons. Upon receipt
of an application of this kind, the Commissioner of Labor shall call a meeting of the employers and
laborers of the establishment or industry concerned, for the designation of advisers as provided in the
preceding section hereof. The Commissioner of Labor or his authorized representative, together with
the advisers, shall make an investigation of the facts, giving special attention, in the first place, to the
human aspect, and in the second place, to the economic aspect of the matter, and he may for this
purpose administer oaths, take affidavits, examine witnesses and documents and issue subp

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 78090. July 26, 1991.]

PACIFIC MILLS, INC., Petitioner, v. ZENAIDA ALONZO, Respondent.

Napoleon L. Apostol for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION; WENPHIL DOCTRINE APPLIES
WHERE DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE IS FOR CAUSE BUT WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS
PRIOR TO REMOVAL. The Court perceives no sufficient cause, it has indeed been cited to none by
the respondents, to decline to apply the Wenphil doctrine to the case at bar. While it is true that Pacific
Mills, Inc. had not complied with the requirements of due process prior to removing Zenaida Alonzo
from employment, it is also true that subsequently, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter in
which Zenaida Alonzo had of course taken active part, it had succeeded in satisfactorily proving the
commission by Zenaida of many violations of company rules and regulations justifying termination of
her employment.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN EMPLOYEE DISMISSED FOR CAUSE IS NOT ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT; IT IS
OPPRESSIVE AND UNJUST FOR THE EMPLOYER TO RETAIN AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE CONTINUANCE IN
SERVICE IS PATENTLY INIMICAL TO THE EMPLOYERS INTEREST. It is clear that, as the Solicitor
General has pointed out, the continuance in the service of the respondent is patently inimical to her
employers interests and that, citing San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC (115 SCRA 329 [1982]), the law,
in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. And it was oppressive and unjust in the premises to require reinstatement of the employee.
 DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

From July 30, 1973, Zenaida Alonzo was employed as a ring frame operator in the Pacific Mills, Inc.
until September 30, 1982 when she was discharged by Management.

The record shows that in the early afternoon of September 22, 1982, Zenaida challenged Company
Inspector Ernesto Tamondong to a fight, saying: "Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, tarantado, kalalaki
mong tao, duwag ka . . . Ipagugulpi kita sa labas at kaya kitang ipakaladkad dito sa loob ng
compound palabas ng gate sa mga kamag-anak ko." And suiting action to the word, she thereupon
boxed Tamondong in the stomach. The motive for the assault was Zenaidas resentment at having
been reprimanded, together with other employees, two days earlier by Tamondong for wasting time by
engaging in idle chatter. 1 Tamondong forthwith reported the incident to the firms Administrative
Manager 2 as well as the Chairman of Barangay Balombato, Quezon City. 3

On September 30, 1982, Zenaida Alonzo was given a Memorandum by the companys Executive Vice
President & General Manager terminating her employment as of October 1, 1982 on various grounds:
poor work, habitual absences and tardiness, wasting time, insubordination and gross disrespect. The
service of that memorandum of dismissal on her was not preceded by any complaint, hearing or other
formality. These were apparently considered unnecessary by Management 4 in view of the provision in
the Company Rules and Relations (embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
company and the union representing the employees) that: jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Fighting or attempting to inflict harm to another employee, will render (sic) the aggressor to outright
dismissal." cralaw virtua1aw library

It was only at the hearing of the complaint for illegal dismissal (and non-payment of proportionate
13th month pay) instituted by Zenaida on October 4, 1982 in the NCR Arbitration Branch, that
evidence was presented by the company not only of the assault by Zenaida on her superior but also of
many other violations by her of company rules and regulations, in an attempt to substantiate the
validity of her dismissal from work.

The Labor Arbiter found that Alonzo had indeed verbally abused and struck her superior, Tamondong,
and rejected her contention that the assault was not punishable since it was "not work-connected and
was provoked instigated by Ernesto Tamondong." 5 The Arbiter also declared as "fully established the
previous infractions of complainant," these being "a matter of record and not denied by complainant
(Zenaida)." cralaw virtua1aw library

The Arbiter was of the view, however, that Alonzo was entitled to relief, because (a) the penalty
imposed was "harsh and severe and not commensurate with the offense, . . . suspension of three (3)
months . . . (being) the proper, just and reasonable penalty . . .;" and because (b) the company had
failed "to investigate complainant before she was dismissed." The Arbiter thus ordered Pacific Mills,
Inc., Zenaidas employer: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

". . . to reinstate complainant without loss of seniority rights and to pay her backwages from January
1, 1983 until fully reinstated, the period from October 1, 1982 to December 31, 1982 complainant
being under suspension without pay . . . (as well as) to pay complainants 13th month pay in the
amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE PESOS ONLY (P351.00)." cralaw virtua1aw library

Acting on the employers appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered judgment on
March 23, 1987, sustaining the Labor Arbiters findings. It however limited the award of back wages to
Zenaida only to three (3) years, in accordance with this Courts judgment in Feati University Faculty
Club (PAFLU) v. Feati University, 58 SCRA 396. 6

Pacific Mills, Inc. has instituted in this Court the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying for
nullification of the judgment of the NLRC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

In the comment thereon, 7 required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General opined that: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

". . . both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC apparently failed to take into consideration the fact that
Zenaida Alonzo was dismissed not because of this isolated act (of assault against her superior) but
rather because of numerous and repeated violations of company rules and regulations. It was only this
last incident which compelled Pacific Mills, Inc. to finally terminate her services. It is the totality of the
infractions committed by the employee which should have been considered in determining whether or
not there is just cause for her dismissal.

Zenaida Alonzo was caught several times leaving her place of work to chat with her co-employees.
This is reprehensible conduct since, as ring frame operator, she must be at her post during work hours
to prevent the occurrence of incidents which could damage the machine. The company inspector
precisely warned her against doing this. She had also been repeatedly reprimanded for insubordination
habitual tardiness, wasting time and not wearing the required company uniform. In spite of these
infractions the company bore with her services and did not see fit to dismiss her. Her assault on the
company inspector was apparently the last straw which compelled Pacific Mills, Inc. to terminate her
services." cralaw virtua1aw library

Accordingly, the Solicitor General recommended "payment of separation pay equivalent to three (3)
years backwages but without reinstatement" and of "proportionate 13th month pay." cralaw virtua1aw library

For their part, the Chief Legal Officer of the NLRC, 8 and the private respondent, 9 insist that since the
dismissal of Zenaida Alonzo was not preceded by any notice of the charges and a hearing thereon, the
judgment of the NLRC must be sustained.
Decisive of this controversy is the judgment of the Court en banc in Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC,
promulgated on February 8, 1989, 10 in which the following policy pronoucements were made: chanroble s.com:cralaw:red

"The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without
loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until his actual
reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it appears he
was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in
an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, should be re-examined. It will be
highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who
has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it
will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service.

Thus in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper, caused
trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him, should not be
rewarded with reemployment and back wages. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render
a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances,
the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return
to his former employer.

However, the petitioner (employer) must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to
private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as
above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due
process (Section 1, Rule XIV, Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code). Petitioner committed an
infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a
formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing . . . (respondent) from
employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private
respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case
and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer." cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court perceives no sufficient cause, it has indeed been cited to none by the respondents, to
decline to apply the Wenphil doctrine to the case at bar.

While it is true that Pacific Mills, Inc. had not complied with the requirements of due process prior to
removing Zenaida Alonzo from employment, it is also true that subsequently, in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter in which Zenaida Alonzo had of course taken active part, it had succeeded in
satisfactorily proving the commission by Zenaida of many violations of company rules and regulations
justifying termination of her employment. Under the circumstances, it is clear that, as the Solicitor
General has pointed out, the continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to her
employers interests and that, citing San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 11 the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. And it was
oppressive and unjust in the premises to require reinstatement of the employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the challenged decision of the respondent Commission dated
March 23, 1987 and that of the Labor Arbiter thereby affirmed, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
However, the petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent a proportionate part of the 13th month
pay due her, amounting to P351.00 as well as to indemnify her in the sum of P1,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Endnotes: