1 ASIAVEST VS.

CA AND PNCC

March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC

G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under
the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.

Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.

Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of
private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of
the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and
Kuantan By Pass; Project.

The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure
payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.

Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending
that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or
enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal
was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the
proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and
therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the

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petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private respondent by its voluntary submission the courts jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the
High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.

In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed
the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the
Malaysian Court judgment.

Ruling: Yes.

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of
comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states
by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized

insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as
it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before
a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been
conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that
there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which
it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings
and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was

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decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under
Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party
attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive
validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment
of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole witness, testified to
the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was
connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent,
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by
his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of
summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and
on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for
Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill,
Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman,
Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the
regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when
it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a
statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary
judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that
the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where
private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.

In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary
evidence to support their claim.

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Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then
fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent
enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.

FROM ATTY. DOB

CONTINENTAL

PETITIONER Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and

existing under the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed
to do business in the Philippines. Respondent Joseph Basso, a US citizen, resided in
the Philippines prior to his death. In 1990, Basso was employed by Mr. Keith R.
Braden, managing director-Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), as the
general manager of its Philippine branch. In Nov. 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine
operations of Continental with Basso retaining his position as general manager. For
failure to agree on the new terms and conditions of his employment, Basso was
dismissed from the service effective Jan. 31, 1996.
Basso filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with moral and exemplary damages against
CMI. Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the
controversy. Does the motion find merit?
Ruling: No.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law
and by the material allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot
be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by
the acquiescence of the court. That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not
automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try
this case.
This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article
217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

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As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his
citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of service of
summons. We note that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has,
in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts.
Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and
has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign
corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this
being an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed
(Jardeleza, J.:, SC Third Division, Continental Micronesia, Inc. vs. Joseph Basso, G.R.
Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015).

REBESENCIO
In this case, Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and
hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. After undergoing seminars
required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for deployment
overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight
attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then
entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma.
Jopette) on May 16, 1990; Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A.
Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on
August 27, 1995.

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from
service on various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the termination of their
employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because
they were pregnant.

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents maternity leaves and demand for their
resignation on its Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants
(Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant
who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It provides:

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(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on
board to provide various services required in normal or emergency cases on both
domestic/international flights beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and
security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain the required medical
fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall
render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due
to lack of medical fitness.(Emphasis supplied)

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers
for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for
holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation
pay, night shift differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits,
illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.

The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal
dismissal of the respondents?

Image from: www.aviationfigure.com

The Supreme Court's Decision.

Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.

The initial issue here was whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the case. Petitioner Saudia states that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction and
that the law that should be applied in the instant case is Saudi Arabia law. The Court
stated that this is incorrect. The Court has jurisdiction in this case.

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The Court stated in the case;
Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these
stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn,
makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.
Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of
forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem
of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means
devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be
pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed
waived.

It further stated:
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine
tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes
forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant
contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

xxx

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of

Saudias policy. As argued by respondents, Saudias policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the
obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudias
policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration
but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that
may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight
attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a
disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of ones
employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject
to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate
how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse
but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

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Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not
allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e.,
to make an intelligent decision), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law
selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on
the accuracy and reliability of respondents citation) in this case, respondents
themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In their Comment,
respondents write:

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful
to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi
Arabia is even more harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the
employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity
Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as
follows: An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give
her a warning of the same while on maternity leave. (Article 155, Labor Law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)

The Court then decided:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is
not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner
Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011
Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi
Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
( 1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which
each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of
one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six
( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in th~ amount of P200,000.00 per
respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall
likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until
full satisfaction thereof.

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This. case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the
amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay
without delay.

Read the full case here:

Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and Brenda J. Betia vs. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio
Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong, et al.

WILDVALLEY

ADVERTISEMENTS

342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of Foreign Law

In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be
piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of
Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the
services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the
Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while
being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One
such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused
$400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery.
Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the
losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley
de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N o 1 del Orinoco. These two laws
provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of
the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain
vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said
Venezuelan laws.

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HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court.
Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a
foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; and

(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,

consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and
with the seal of his office.

And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of
the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the
foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL
nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon
had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is
competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was
engaged.

YAO KEE

167 SCRA 737 Civil Law Preliminary Title Conflict of Laws Foreign
Laws Applicability of Foreign Marriage Laws

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind

properties here in the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of

administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that
Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The

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trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of
China. Both parties moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.

167 SCRA 737 Civil Law Preliminary Title Conflict of Laws Foreign
Laws Applicability of Foreign Marriage Laws

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind

properties here in the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of

administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that
Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The
trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of
China. Both parties moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.

167 SCRA 737 Civil Law Preliminary Title Conflict of Laws Foreign
Laws Applicability of Foreign Marriage Laws

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind

properties here in the Philippines.

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Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that
Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The
trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of
China. Both parties moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.

RECIORederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court
issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual
Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his
legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce
decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it
was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

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 (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial
evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the
ground of bigamy.

PHIL ALUMINUM

On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of
America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels,
Incorporated (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A.
(FPS), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and
distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI
then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the
shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with the contract.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements
were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein.
Irked by PAWIs persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central
District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI.

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain

satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for
enforcement of foreign judgment, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however,
dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and
clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return
by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to
PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust
enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the
California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr.
Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latters authorization. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed this decision.

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Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.

Held:

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized

insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as
it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before
a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has
acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot,
without a clients authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even
when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his clients interest.
However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the
foreign judgment must be enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its
judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there
was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already
adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder
the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud
based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that
which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or
defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause
of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract is deemed already
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the
foreign judgment.

FUJIKI
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay

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and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving
a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

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