May 5, 2017
and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
Sec. 13 - People v. Nitcha
FACTS: On October 1990, at around 7 o'clock in the evening, Jojo Belmonte
went out of his house located at Purok IV, Barangay Alac, San Quintin,
Pangasinan to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store. Before Jojo Belmonte could buy the
cigarettes, Doro Nitch aarrived, uttered the words "You are one of them" in the vernacular, then
started mauling him. Unable to endure the pain, Jojo fought back. A few minutes had gone into
the fight when May Villarica Joselito, Agustin and Marcelina, all surnamed Sibayan, arrived.
Mayand Joselito tried to pacify the two protagonists, however, their efforts proved futile as Doro
Nitcha refused to be pacified. The fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Victoria
Corpuz who, upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro away from the fight and brought him
home. Likewise, Marcelina, Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded towards their house located
in front of the store where the incident occurred. Not long thereafter and while the Sibayans
were still on their way, appellant Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari store
brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog, "Walanghiya kayo, putangina ninyo, papatayin ko
kayong lahat!" After uttering those words, appellant fired his gun in the direction of
the Sibayans, the bullet hittingMay at the back of her head and existing through the middle
of her forehead. Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but missed. May was brought to
the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital in Tayug, Pangasinanwhere she was
given first aid treatment. Upon the advice of a doctor, the victim was brought to a
hospital in Dagupan City. May, however, expired on the way thereto. Shortly after the
shooting incident, appellant went back to his mother's house beforeproceeding to
the police station of San Quintin, Pangasinan where he surrendered himself
together with his service firearm. An indictment for murder was filed against herein accused-
appellant who, after trial, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on account of the positive
identification made by the People's witnesses, the defence of accused-appellant
anchored on denial being found unavailing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation
HELD: Act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not
guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion Perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense
charged is punishable by reclusion Perpetua; If accused ins convicted by the
crime (reclusion Perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion.
Bail must not be granted. The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who
is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion Perpetua is convicted by the trial court
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong
which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail
must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Sec 14-1 - Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently,
the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to
try criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a
penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal
from taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void.
Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in
a previous case Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme
Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling is
now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or
modified in so far as the case at bar is concerned?
HELD: Yes.
REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the
case is still pending, military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall
be held void already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting
views of some justices in Aquino v. MilComm, stating that Civilians like the petitioner
placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law are entited o trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military processxxx..Judicial power exist only in courts.1Moreover, the Court
emphasized that Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when
constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be
abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important
than anything else is that this Court should be right.
Sec 14-2 -Dumlao v. COMELEC
1 | Page
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Eligibility to Office years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for re-election to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however
have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing
the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of
the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should
have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues.
Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review.
There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone,
might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in
our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years
old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year
old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same
office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Sec 14-3 - Malana v. People
Malana and Tiaga vs. PeopleG.R. No. 173612,
March 26, 2008Facts:
The petitioners Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel Tiaga (Rodel), together with their
acquitted co-accused Elenito Malana (Elenito), were charged with the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
12. The charges stemmed from an incident on 28 May 2000 that left Betty Capsa-Roxas(Betty)
dead, and her daughter and granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty during
the arraignment. Suzette, who was awakened by her parents panicked reaction to the kitchen
fire, cradled Jenny and saw the three men enter their house when her mother opened the main
door. Dominador and Rodel were standing behind the third man.She testified that the third man
carried a round one-gallon container with a wick of three to four inches in length. Rodel lit the
wick with a match, and the third man threw the container into Suzettes bedroom. After that, the
three men simultaneously ran away. Suzette saw the container burst into flames and explode.
The explosion killed Betty instantly, blowing apart her legs and one of her arms. Her body,
from the waist down, was burned. The explosion also shattered and exposed the bone of
Suzettes left leg and knocked her front teeth out. The doctors could not save Suzettes
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shattered left leg so the same was amputated from below the knee. Had it not been for the
prompt medical attention she received, Suzette would have died from the injuries she had
sustained from the explosion.
Jenny survived the blast with barely any injury.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in view
of what to them are doubts as to their guilt.
Held: We have no doubt in Suzettes testimony as she would not have lightly accused
the herein accused-appellants if they were not the true malefactors of the crime committed.
Indeed, as a direct victim, who lost her left leg to the crime; as mother, who had to bear the
sight of her eight-month old baby injured by burns; and as a daughter, who witnessed her own
mother burn to death, Suzette could never have just pinpointed to anyone to the crime. There
is no merit in appellants assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise
rule in view of what to themare doubts as to their guilt. This rule provides that where the
evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the
evidence is not evenly balanced.
Said rule is not applicable in the case before us because the evidence here presented is not
equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution
is overwhelming.
Sec 14-4-People v. Liwanag
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120468. August 15, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE LIWANAG y
BUENAVENTURA, SANDY SIMBULAN y GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y
CASTRO, accused.
LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-accused Randy Simbulan
and Ramil Vendibil, were charged with the crime of highway robbery with multiple rape in an
Information[1] which reads, thus:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with an icepick, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, rob and divest from the complainant, Corazon
Hernandez y Delfin the amount of P60.00; That on the occasion thereof, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and each of them mutually helping and aiding
one another and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously one at a time have carnal knowledge of the said complainant, inside the Levitown
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, against her will and consent;
That accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old, has acted with
discernment in the commission of the offense; and
That the aggravating circumstance of that means employed or circumstance brought about
which add ignominy to the natural effect of the act where one of the accused, by means of
force and intimidation, caused the victim to suck his penis made the effect of the crime more
humiliating to the victim, attended the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During the arraignment, all of them pleaded not guilty to the charge. Accused Randy
Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil were earlier released on recognizance, and were later ordered
rearrested for their failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. However, the warrants for their
arrest were not implemented. Trial on the merits, thus, ensued only against accused-appellant
Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura.
Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home to Paraaque at around 1:00
oclock in the early morning of April 27, 1992. Upon reaching the tricycle terminal at Doa
Soledad St., Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, she was offered by tricycle
driver Ramil Vendibil a special trip, which means that she would be brought right in front of her
house. She agreed and boarded the tricycle. While they were about to leave, Randy Simbulan
and Lope Liwanag also rode the tricycle behind the driver. When they reached India Street,
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Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar and sat beside complainant. He immediately grabbed went home and told her mother the whole incident. Together, they proceeded to the Fort
complainants shoulder, pointed an instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold- Bonifacio police station and reported the matter. The police, in turn, devised an entrapment
up. Surprised and fearing for her life, complainant told accused-appellant that she only had operation.
sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag. Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe, Makati, bringing with her an
to get her bag.
envelope containing pieces of plain paper. Accused-appellant arrived after 45
While the tricycle was traversing the road leading to the municipal building of Paraaque, minutes. Complainant handed the envelope to him, then she ran away. Accused-appellant also
accused-appellant informed complainant that since they could not get anything from her ran and boarded a bus, but he was collared and arrested by the police.
anyway, she might as well submit herself to them. Then, accused-appellant began kissing
Dr. Louella Nario, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted
complainant and touching her private parts. Randy Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger
an examination on the complainant and issued a medical certificate [2] with the following
into complainants vagina.
findings:
As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-appellant ordered complainant to
act naturally while they passed the guardhouse. Once they got through, accused-appellant Extragenital Physical Injuries:
asked her to give in to his desire, and then, he again began touching her private
parts. Complainant answered that she would rather be killed than accede to his desire. This Abrasions, linear, leg, right, upper third, anterior aspect, 4.8 cms., in length and left, lower third,
prompted accused-appellant to hit her with an icepick on the abdomen. anterior aspect, 4.7 cm. in length.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered Vendibil to stop the tricycle. He
Contused abrasion, epigastric region, 2.4 x 0.3 cm.
then tried to strangle complainant, causing her to fall down from her seat and lose
consciousness.When she regained consciousness, she was forced to board the tricycle. Again,
Contusions, reddish, mandibular region, right side, 1.8 x 1.5 cm. and left side, 2.0 x 1.0 cms.;
they rode around the village. Accused-appellant tried to strangle her with a bandana and
neck, lateral aspect, right side, 5.5 x 0.5 cms., and 9.8 x 0.5 cms. and 2.5 x 0.5 cms. deltoid
ordered her to remove her underwear. When she refused, accused-appellant himself removed
region, left side, 2.4 x 1.3 cms. purplish, deltoid region, left side, 4.2 x 2.5 cms.
her underwear, opened his pant zipper and forced her to sit on his lap. Complainant struggled,
so accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to stop and dragged complainant out. Accused-
Genital Examination:
appellant then brought complainant to a grassy vacant lot and forced himself on her. After
satisfying his lust, they again boarded the tricycle and accused-appellant informed complainant
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular
that his companions would follow. Complainants pleas were in vain. After a few minutes of
mucosa, congested, with fresh superficial abrasion at the fossa navicularis. Hymen, thick,
driving around, they came upon another vacant lot where accused-appellant and Vendibil
short, intact. Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms., in diameter with moderate
dragged complainant. There, Vendibil forced complainant to put his penis into her
resistance. Vagina walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
mouth. Unsatisfied, Vendibil forced her to lie down and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan watched. Thereafter, Simbulan took his
turn. After he satisfied his lust, they talked of killing complainant. Conclusion:

Complainant pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered them money in 1. The above-described extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the
exchange for her life. Accused-appellant asked her if she can produce P10,000.00, but she time of examination.
said she could not.Accused-appellant lowered his demand to P5,000.00. They negotiated until
they finally agreed on the sum of P2,000.00. Accused-appellant instructed complainant to 2. Genital injury present.
deliver the money at Guadalupe, Makati. She was to place the amount inside a bag together
with a sandwich she was to buy at Burger Machine. They agreed to meet at 11:30 that same
morning. When they finally let go of her, complainant proceeded to a church. At daybreak, she
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 Accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that at around 12:00
oclock midnight of April 27, 1992, he was at his house at Texas Street, Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. His uncle, Emilio Changco, dropped by and, together
with Ponciano Buenaventura and Hermenegildo Liwanag, they had a drinking session up to
3:00 oclock in the morning. At around 4:00 oclock in the morning, Changco left and accused-
appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 7:30 in the morning to prepare for his trip to San
Miguel, Bulacan to see his grandfather.
He alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at Guadalupe, Makati, he was
arrested by policemen in civilian clothes for being a rebel soldier, based on a mark on his right
fist indicating his membership in the Guardians Luzon, an association of soldiers. He was
brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for the first time Randy Simbulan and Ramil
Vendibil. He claimed that the three of them were beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He
also claimed that policemen forced his co-accused to point to him.
On April 17, 1995, a decision[3] was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of having violated Presidential Decree No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Considering that on the occasion of the highway robbery,
rape was committed, a situation which calls for the imposition of death penalty under
Presidential Decree No. 532 but which penalty was still proscribed at the time of the
commission of the offense alleged in the Information, said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower in degree (People v. Miranda,
235 SCRA 202). He is further ordered to indemnify the complainant Corazon Hernandez of the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) representing moral damages; P20,000.00 as
litigation expenses and attorneys fees and to return the P60.00 taken from her. Filing fees due
on the award shall be a lien on the amount which may be recovered by the complainant from
the accused.
As to the two other co-accused, Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, trial of the case shall
therefore continue.
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal
assigning as errors the following:
1. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding the fact that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to effective and competent counsel, and, consequently, other
constitutional rights afforded an accused;
2. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding that there was no
sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime charged;
3. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the inconsistencies that
tainted the evidence for the prosecution;
4. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the improbability of the
manner by which the crime was allegedly committed;
5. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant inspite of complainants failure to offer
any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape; and
6. The trial court erred in disregarding the defense of accused-appellant as a mere alibi.
Accused-appellant submits that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel
under Article III, Section 14, (2) of the 1987 Constitution which provides, thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x. (Italics supplied)
As a consequence, accused-appellant claims that from the time he was arrested up to the
time of his conviction, he was deprived of his other constitutional rights, particularly his right to
be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures, [4] his right to preliminary
investigation,[5] and his right to bail.[6]
In addition, accused-appellant claims that the assistance extended to him by his former
counsel was ineffective to the extent that private complainant, as well as prosecution witnesses
SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha Hernandez, were hardly cross-examined, while Dra.
Louella Nario was not cross-examined at all.
In any case, accused-appellant claims that he could not have committed the crime being
imputed to him as he was engaged in a drinking session at the very moment when the alleged
crime was committed.
Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in convicting him because: 1) the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the perpetrator of
the crime; 2) inconsistencies tainted the prosecution evidence; 3) the manner by which the
crime was committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant failed to offer any resistance prior
to and even during her alleged rape.
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 This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-appellant was denied his
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by himself and counsel. He argues that his right to
be heard through his counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel
throughout the proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the time judgment is
rendered.
The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial court, accused-
appellant was represented by counsel de officio, Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys
Office. In the middle of the trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de
parte Atty. Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the judgment
of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on behalf of accused-appellant. Atty.
Brioso, however, failed to file the appellants brief because of the refusal of accused-appellants
mother to transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant was required
to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon
accused-appellants failure to reply, Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio.
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a counsel de officio who
assisted him during the arraignment and conducted the cross examination of all prosecution
witnesses as well as his direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined
up to the presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his choice.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgado[7] and Powell v. Alabama,[8] insofar as the
right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is misleading. Both cases only defined the right to
be heard by counsel as the right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these
cases that the right to be heard by counsel presupposes the right to an intelligent counsel. The
requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent, but to be effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in the light of Article III,
Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers to the right of persons under custodial
investigation. In People v. Lucero,[9] the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by
this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of
our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from
a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. In providing for
said right, this Court has held in the same case that when the Constitution requires the right to
counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before arraignment
were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible. (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The reason for the latter
provision was explained in People v. Holgado, thus:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and that all accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficiofor him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.[10] (Italics supplied)
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to be assisted by
counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due
process, a fundamental right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for
due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words,
there can be no due process accorded an accused if he is not given the right to be heard
through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be
accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel must be effective as implied in the
rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to American
jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a
fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence,
for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. [11]
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends that the right to be
heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Citing Strickland v.
Washington,[12]accused-appellant contends that the assistance rendered by counsel is
ineffective or is defective if the following elements are present: (1) that counsels performance
was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsels errors were so serious as to
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deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial which result is reliable. Accused-appellant claims only raised the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal, their right to a
that the assistance afforded him by his counsel during the course of the trial was ineffective preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they entered their respective pleas of not
since the counsel de officio failed to safeguard his rights necessary for the reversal of his guilty.[16]
conviction.
Accused-appellant next contends that he was deprived of his right to bail. He contends
One of the rights which accused-appellant contends his counsel de officio failed to
that had his counsel de officio been effective, he would have filed the proper motion.
safeguard was his right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and
seizures as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He claims that his right was violated when he was The contention is without any merit. As ruled by this Court in People v. Manes:[17]
arrested without a warrant which his counsel should have contested.
The issue of bail has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an
Accused-appellants argument is not well-taken. As reiterated in People v. Costelo:[13]
accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither
[A]ppellants failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and presenting
a matter of right nor of discretion.
evidence in his behalf, placed him in estoppel to make such challenge. He has patently waived
any objection or irregularities and is deemed as having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
In the case of Strickland,[18] the United States Supreme Court:
the court. It should be noted that the legality of arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objection on such ground is waived, the
Judicial scrutiny of counsels performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a
illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment
defendant to secondguess counsels assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is
rendered after the trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent
all too easy for a court, examining counsels defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when the facts on the
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of
record point to the culpability of the accused. (Italics supplied)
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsels challenged conduct, and to evaluate
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest must be made before he enters his plea,
the conduct from counsels perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. [14]
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsels conduct falls
Accused-appellant, likewise, claims that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
investigation. Had his counsel de oficio been effective, he should have filed the proper motion overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
on his behalf. considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client
There is no merit in this contention.
in the same way.
Considering that accused-appellant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. In showing the ineffectiveness of the assistance rendered by counsel de officio, accused-
appellant points out the following:
As aptly stated in People v. Buluran:[15]
The private complainant, whose testimony was the principal basis of the conviction, was hardly
The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity cross-examined. The same is true with prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and
of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. While the right to preliminary Editha Hernandez. In fact, prosecution witness Dra. Louella Nario was not cross-examined at
investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the accused, all.
nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. It appearing that appellants

7 | Page
As a result of the insufficient cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution,
particularly the private complainant, the defense of the accused-appellant failed to bring to the
attention of the trial court several matters which amplify the improbability, if not impossibility, in
the complainants testimony on how the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the defense was
not able to highlight several crucial points, among which are: (1) the impossibility that the
alleged crime, particularly the rape, was committed in a populated area - an inhabited and well-
developed subdivision in Paraaque, with a 24-hour store (Burger Machine) at that - without
being noticed; (2) the fact that, assuming that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the latter did not offer any form of resistance; and (3) the impossibility that after
the crime charged was allegedly committed, accused-appellant and his co-accused
gentlemanly accompanied complainant to a place of her choice (the church).
Moreover, several questions remained unanswered. For example (1) What time did the
complainant report the incident to the police?; (2) How long did the police plan the alleged
entrapment?; (3) Were there other officers involved in the entrapment?; and (4) Why was the
money and other materials used for entrapment not presented in evidence?
Furthermore, there were also no attempts to impeach the testimony of the private complainant
on the scene of the crime through the use of contradictory evidence as provided in the
Rules. For instance, accused-appellants counsel could have presented a resident of the
subdivision where the crime was allegedly committed to describe the area. Such witness can
establish: (1) whether or not the area where the crime was allegedly committed was indeed too
dark for anyone to notice the commission of the alleged crime; (2) whether or not the houses in
the subdivision are indeed too far apart that occurrences outside one house would not be
discernible from within; and (3) whether or not the location of the houses in the subdivision is
such that it would indeed be useless for a woman, faced with the threat of rape to even attempt
to ask for help.
We are not convinced. The assistance extended by Attorney Uy of the Public Attorneys
Office was sufficiently effective. As noted by the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that appellants counsel de oficio,
Atty. William Uy, cross-examined the private complainant extensively as well as two other
prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Sevilla and Edith Hernandez). That said counsel opted not to
cross-examine the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario, is of no moment because
said witness merely explained in court her findings and conclusions that she had arrived at
after conducting the medical examination on the private complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN, March
30, 1993, pp. 10-12).In fact, at one point, Atty. Uy raised an objection to the private prosecutors
question on how private complainants genital injuries were sustained for being incompetent to
answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial judge (Ibid., p. 13).
In assessing the effectiveness of counsels assistance, the Strickland standard invoked by
accused-appellant is too stringent for application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only
seeks to ensure that the adversarial testing process is present in a case by requiring that the
assistance rendered by counsel be effective. The presence of an adversarial testing process,
in other words, ensures that the trial is fair by according the accused due process through the
effective assistance of counsel.
While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Philippine
Constitution, the assistance afforded by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine
constitutional requirement need only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics. In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be
providing all the necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the circumstances in
accordance with said norms.
In this regard, a counsel assisting an accused is guided by the following provisions of
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -- It is the duty of an attorney:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as
are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
xxxxxxxxx
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
8 | Page
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law. (Italics supplied)
The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, likewise, provide:
Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 19 -- A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Lastly, the Canons of Professional Ethics provide:
4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any
trivial reason and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf.
5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken
such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense
that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty but
by due process of law.
15. x x x x x x x x x
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing
be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial
disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the
judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy
or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a counsels conduct in the
performance of his duty to assist a client in an effective manner as required by Article III,
Section 14 (2).Said constitutional provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the
American Constitution. As in Article III, Section 14 (2), the Sixth Amendment refers simply to
counsel, not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the
legal professions maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the laws presumption that
counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. The proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.[19]
Coupled with the presumption that counsels performance was reasonable under the
circumstances, as long as the trial was fair in that the accused was accorded due process by
means of an effective assistance of counsel, then the constitutional requirement that an
accused shall have the right to be heard by himself and counsel is satisfied. The only instance
when the quality of counsels assistance can be questioned is when an accused is deprived of
his right to due process. Otherwise, there is the danger that questioning counsels acts or
omissions in the conduct of his duties as counsel for an accused may breed more unwanted
consequences than merely upholding an accuseds constitutional right or raising the standard
of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants right to due process has been observed and the
trial was conducted in a fair manner. Corollarily, this Court sees no reason to doubt or
overcome the presumption that counsel de officio reasonably assisted accused-appellant in
accordance with the prevailing norms of professional conduct and his sworn duties as an
officer of the court.
Based on the findings of the trial court, accused-appellant was not at all prejudiced by the
alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. The alleged failures by his counsel to safeguard his
rights from the time he was arrested up to the time he was sentenced and the alleged
9 | Page
inadequacies in the direct and cross-examinations of prosecution witnesses were ultimately
inconsequential to the eventual outcome of the case. If at all, the outcome was the result of the
strength of the prosecution evidence rather than the failures and inadequacies in the conduct
of the defense as shown by the following:
First, counsels decision to adopt the defense of denial and alibi as part of the trial strategy
merely highlighted the strength of the prosecution evidence. While its adoption may have been
dictated by the factual circumstances of the case as perceived by accused-appellant, however,
denial is an inherently weak defense vis--vis the positive and categorical assertion of
prosecution witnesses. In fact, the trial court found accused-appellants denial to be self-
serving.
Like denial, accused-appellants alibi was not looked upon with favor by the trial court. Not
only is it one of the weakest defenses due to its being capable of easy fabrication, it also
cannot prevail over witnesses positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused
can prove his being at another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that
he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[20] The trial court found
accused-appellants and his witnesses testimonies on the formers alibi unconvincing.
In the instant case, accused-appellant claims that he was engaged in a drinking session
with some persons at their house in Texas Street, Better Living Subdivision at about the time
when the crime was committed until 3:00 oclock in the morning. However, Better Living
Subdivision is adjacent to Levitown Subdivision, where the rape was committed. In fact, it was
in Better Living Subdivision where complainant was robbed and sexually molested prior to
being raped at Levitown Subdivision.
Second, accused-appellant also points to alleged discrepancies between some of
complainants accounts in her sworn statement and some of her declarations in her direct
testimony regarding the position of accused relative to that of complainant, the kind of
instrument used to threaten complainant and the person who got complainants money. The
apparent discrepancies, however, only refer to immaterial or irrelevant details. Complainant
was consistent in her narration in her sworn statement as well as during her direct examination
and even in the cross-examination regarding the roles played by the three accused in the
commission of the crime.
A Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a short narrative subscribed to by
the complainant in question and answer form. Thus, it is only to be expected that it is not as
exhaustive as ones testimony in open court. The contradictions, if any, may be explained by
the fact that an affidavit can not possibly disclose the details in their entirety, and may
inaccurately describe, without deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. Being
taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from
partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has thus
been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations
because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford her a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind
because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs
them after the same have been read to her.[21]
In People v. Mangat,[22] this Court has reiterated the doctrine that discrepancies between
sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the
witness.Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not
in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus
testimonial evidence carries more weight than statements/affidavits.
Third, accused-appellant alleges that complainant failed to offer any resistance prior to or
even during her alleged rape thereby concluding that it could have been consensual. She did
not ask for help when the alleged rape took place in a populated area. She likewise did not try
to escape when she had the opportunity to do so.
This Court finds the above argument specious and unmeritorious. It should be noted that
accused-appellant was brandishing an icepick which clearly showed his readiness to use the
same by hitting complainant with it. Besides, she testified that she was already weak and tired
to be able to do anything against three malefactors who were stronger than her. It would have
been foolhardy for complainant to resist the accused considering her weakened condition. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react
differently - some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility
while others may openly welcome the intrusion. In any case, the law does not impose upon a
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to
the rapists lust because of fear for life and personal safety. [23]
Lastly, complainant positively pointed at accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. Accused-appellant could not show any reason why complainant would point him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an
accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [24]
10 | P a g e
 The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay complainant moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00. This award must be reduced to P50,000.00. The purpose of this
award is not to enrich the victim but to compensate her for injuries to her feelings. Moreover,
moral damages for rape is fixed at P50,000.00. [25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138, finding accused-appellant Lope Liwanag guilty of violating P.D. No. 532 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Corazon
Hernandez P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorneys fees and to return the P60.00 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages is reduced to
P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Sec 14-5 - Enrile v. Salazar
Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of
the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48
said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
11 | P a g e
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right
to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond
flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
Sec 14-6 to10- Garcia v. Domingo
hey requested to held the trial even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The
petitioner granted the request.(as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases
scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).On
appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner judge order should
be reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
Held:
Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties
need be shown. There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of
the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public
morals."
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted.
Sec 15-1to3- In re Salibo v. Walden
Datukan Malang Salibo vs Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex
Case Digest GR 197597 April 8 2015
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant
of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang
Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the
police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to
prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He questioned the
legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that
he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the
judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibos petition and
ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming
Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may
be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash
information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision before
the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the
Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should
have been appealed directly before the SC.
Hide
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
12 | P a g e
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences
presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang.
Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly
arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not an escape
prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore,
Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Hide
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in
cases where a person with a mistaken identity is detained
No, the CAs contention is not correct. Salibos proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to Datukan Malang Salibo will not cure the lack of
preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for reinvestigation will not cure the
defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
Hide
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA
Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before CA
or any of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC
or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or
person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the
court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower
court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the
lower court acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas
corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
Sec 15-4 - Mison v. Gallegos
Mison v Gallegos On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in
the location nand deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money
allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Hence, asked Hon. Siegfred Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku
to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-
Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.
BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section,
arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Kus passport
. Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge
Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also, Judge Gallegos
issued the first
assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Kus custody to the
Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the
Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and
his immediate family
Held: Writ of Amparo not proper.Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) 39
provides: SECTION 1.Petition.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power
to promulgate rules to protect our people s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.
13 | P a g e
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v.
Pardico enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that
he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of ther eason for hi
s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest anddetention,46 the
arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Kus arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him
of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa. More importantly, there was no
attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among
which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long
period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases
against him to hold him under detention. The allegations of Ku,t hough, are specious. It is to be
noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial
evidence. t is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject
of a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Kus proper recourse is with
the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.
Sec 15-5 - Vivares v. St. Theresa's College
Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Right to Privacy Online Privacy (Social
Media)
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Writ of Habeas Data
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos
and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
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They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in
the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the
habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in
the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as
Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users posts on his wall
(profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than Public. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come
most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it
was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures.
Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they
have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and
their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children
there).
Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this case:
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1. United States v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to customize their privacy settings, but
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or protect a users information, these privacy settings are not fool proof.
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
May 6, 2017
2. United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy
Sec 16 - Lopez v. Ombudsman
one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail Sec 17 - United States v. Ong Sia Hong
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy. Sec 18 - Political Prisoners and Involuntary Servitude
Sec 19 - People v. Echegaray
3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): The law has to take into account the Sec 20 - Lozano v. Martinez
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the Sec 21-1to2- People v. Espinosa
Sec 21-3to4 - People v. Sandiganbayan and Velasco
eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing Sec 22 - Melo v. People
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom. Sec 23 - People v. Ferrer

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