ARTICLE VIII

Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Jurisdiction power to hear and decide a case
The second clause of Section 1, Article VIII effectively limits the political question area, heretofore,
was forbidden territory for the courts.
In Tocao vs Court of Appeals, the Court held that the inherent powers of the Court to amend and
control its processes and orders to as to make them conformable with law and justice includes the
right to reverse itself, especially when, in its honest opinion, it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.
In De Leon vs Court of Appeals, it said that the Court is not precluded from examining its own ruling
and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality.

CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO INSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature.
2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction: appellate
jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence.
4. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel,
5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.
7. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
 8. Salaries of judges may not be reduces; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the judiciary contemplates guarantee of full flexibility to allocate
and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by
them in the course of the discharge of functions.
9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.
11. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.

CASES DOCTRINE/ DIGESTS:

a) Santiago vs Bautista

NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER; WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS

FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his
parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against
the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD
claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become
academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of
the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions,
under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function

DOCTRINE:
i. NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER
In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following
circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons
or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations; (2) the tribunal, board or officer before
whom the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end; (3) the tribunal. board, or
 officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the legislative or
executive department.
Judicial action- is the adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought
before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is
rendered. The character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial,
ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as
in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec.
337,338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S.E/
836-837)
The exercise of Judicial Function is to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whether the officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
Judicial power- has been variously defines as the authority to determine the rights of persons or
property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party
thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the
declaration of what the law is and the construction so far as it is written law; the authority vested
in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and
determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication.
Judicial power implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the
power to hear and determine BUT not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power.
NOTE: Not necessarily include the power to hear and determine and determine a matter if not
in the nature of a suit or action between the parties
Judicial Function does not solely depend upon the operation of which it is performed or the
information of the act in solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the
state and the division of power of government.
It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought and
judgment. It must be the exercise of the discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the
sovereign power of which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the
legislature or executive department.
ii. WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS
 It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than the office, board, or body which performs
it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before
the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what the law is there
and parties.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in
the performance of its assigned task.
It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is
brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine.

b) Limkaichong vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for,
be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born
citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the
election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest
votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because
her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for
the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over
the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC
underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

c) Daza vs Singson
FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties
represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP,
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA
by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his
seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction,
SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent.
He claimed that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in
nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

d) PACU vs Secretary of Education

PROPER PARTY; JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act
No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be
secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a
private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must
be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain
textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law
and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or
the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted
to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

DOCTRINE:
PROPER PARTY
A private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action
and is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive and legislative action must show that he has sustained or his
interest common to all members of the public.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation.
 The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of
litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient.
Bona fide suit limited to the decision of actual case and controversies. The authority to pass
on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims
under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are
raised.
JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY
Brought for a positive purpose, nay , to obtain actual and positive relief
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest herein
however intellectually solid the problem may be.

e) Mariano Jr. vs COMELEC

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.

DOCTRINE:
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
The requisites before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are:
i. There must be an actual controversy;
ii. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
iii. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
iv. The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
f) David vs Arroyo

FACTS:

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their
rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected
rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP.
It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and
at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of
the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum
of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And
such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6
of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled
that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in
the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.

g) Pormento vs Estrada
ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE
EXISTENCE OF AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
FACTS:
Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned according to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office
and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May
10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters
disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2 nd Division. His motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court,
the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered
the second highest number of votes.

DOCTRINE:
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
 An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

h) Macasiano vs National Housing Authority

REQUISITES OF JUDICAIL INQUIRY

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of RA 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locus standi on his
being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy
on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain and his being
a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 contain the seeds of a ripening
controversy that serve as drawback to his tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures,
because of the said sections, he is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he
assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past. As a taxpayer, he alleges that he has a direct interest in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed.

On May 14, 1993, the SG filed his comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is
devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases
involving the constitutionality of the law. He contends that there is no actual controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property being
squatted upon and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota
presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
DOCTRINE:
REQUISITES OF JUDICAIL INQUIRY
i. There must be an actual controversy;
ii. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
iii. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
iv. The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.

i) Joya vs PCGG

LEGAL STANDING

FACTS:

On August 15,1990, Chairman Caparas of the PCGG, signed the Consignment Agreement with the
authority given by the President Aquino on August 14,1990, through former Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., allowing Christie's of New York to auction off (82) Old Masters Paintings seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and the (71) cartons of antique silverware in the
custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified
by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement which were alleged
to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies for and in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines scheduled January 11,1991.
On October 26,1990, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo of COA submitted to President Aquino the audit
result on the Consignment Agreement that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter
into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to
the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the
assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was
prohibited by law. Then the new PCGG Chairman David M. Castro, defended the contract made and
refuting the allegations of Chairman Domingo on November 15,1990. On that same date , Director of
National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment
Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically
qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence the petition was filed on January 7,1991.

DOCTRINE:
LEGAL STANDING
NO question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the court UNLESS there is compliance with the legal requisites of judicial inquiry.
The first two(2) requisites are the most important among the four
One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
plaintiff in an action,
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party
who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
Legal Standing a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Interest material interest, an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involve, or mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the
party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
os f some third and unrelated party.

j) Legaspi vs Civil Service Commission

FACTS:

Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the civil service
eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Commission rejected the
request, asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information. Legaspi instituted an action for
mandamus from the Court to require that the information be provided.
HELD:

The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions
recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that
information shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided by law. While the Solicitor General
interposed a procedural objection challenging the requesters standing in this petition for mandamus, the
Court ruled that, in this case, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the requester, as
a citizen interested in the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the
result.

Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to information of public concern, a recognition
of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. That is, the government agency
denying information access has the burden to show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is
of public concern, that the information has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.

Here, the information was of a public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons, and the
Civil Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requesters right to know. Thus, the Court
ordered the Civil Service Commission to provide the information.

k) Dumlao vs COMELEC
FACTS:

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and
he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.
 Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from
public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class
legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been
merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question
be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.
 The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,
while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not
be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It
may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local
official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

l) Bugnay Construction & Devt Corp. vs Laron

FACTS:
A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot
called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the
failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution
granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay
Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the
validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in
the earlier case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

HELD: No. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no
disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund
the planned construction of the market building.

m) Kilosbayan, Inc. vs Guingona

FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of
Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the
on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral
and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment
Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are
beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.

HELD: YES. As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view
of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the
ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts,
decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
n) Philconsa vs Enriquez
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the
Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.

HELD: Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,
and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be
made.

o) Tatad vs Garcia, Jr.

FACTS:

In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made
but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT
Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An agreement was then made
between the government, through the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and
EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by
law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities,
i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the
DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that
the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the
facilities to the government for $1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation
of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized
under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because
this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his
capacity as DOTC Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium, under the
agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public utility hence, the question of its nationality
is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT
Consortium will be owning are the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no
prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said
that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate
the railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from
the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to
do is to build the facilities and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years it will
not operate the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of
building a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment for
determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any
other form of authorization for that purpose.
p) Oposa vs Factoran

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network Incorporated (PENI) together
with the minors Oposa and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they
have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys rainforests.
They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action.

HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The
right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also
the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses
may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

q) Kilosbayan vs Morato

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased
online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at
least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8
years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease,
PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA
invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It
violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no
bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a
legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing.

HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded
as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be
drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But
the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from
the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is
whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

r) Lozada vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
 NOTE: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular
election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.

COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they
are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.

HELD: No. The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters decision,
orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by
this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only
known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist,
would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to
play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would
seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies
would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the
legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is
more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in
the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

CASE DOCTRINES:
a) Mantruste Systems Inc vs CA
FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it
would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to
MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and was
consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it
was terminating the interim lease agreement to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the
President of MSI's condition an extension of 30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview
Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more
than 1 year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the
property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel
operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but MSI
did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property
as the highest bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the
property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being
violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining
order or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the
Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that it
continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It
also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent and its
only property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a
separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against
APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable
and enforceable right of retention over the said property.

DOCTRINE:
THE CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO DEFINE THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE
The power to define, prescribe, prescribe and appropriation of the venue court belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not be deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of
separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches
and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of WON there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction I the exercise of their
authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks.
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the
discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decision in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency,
except when it violates a citizens constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or
acts in excess of or without jurisdiction.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.

CASE DOCTRINE:
a) Bengzon vs Drilon
FACTS:

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed
during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits
to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore
these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the
court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera.
Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed.
The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in
the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is
the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed
when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
 This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.

DOCTRINE:
THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT CANNOT B EEXERCISED TO DEPRIVE THE SUPREME COURTOF ITS
FISCAL AUTHORITY
The fiscal authority enjoyed by the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit,
the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require.
It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and play plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by
them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
Interference with this fiscal autonomy is not only a violation of a mandate of the Constitution but
as well as the principle of Separation of Powers upon which the entire fabric of the constitutional
system is based.

NO ART.8 SEC. 4-7 DONNA

SEC 8-13 ROY

SEC. 14-MAGGIE