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FURTUITOUS EVENT tenetur ed impossibilia.

The respondent central not being entitled to


demand from the petitioners the performance of the latters part of the
VICTORIAS PLANTERS ASS., INC., ET AL. VS. VICTORIAS contracts under those circumstances cannot later on demand its
MILLING CO., INC. G.R. No. L-6648 July 25, 1955 fulfillment. The performance of what the law has written off cannot be
FACTS: demanded and required. The prayer that the petitioners be compelled
to deliver sugar cannot for six years more to make up for what they
The petitioners Victorias Planters Association, Inc. and North failed to deliver, the fulfillment of which was impossible, of granted,
Negros Planters Association, Inc. and the respondent Victorias Milling would in effect be an extension of the terms of the contracts entered
Co., Inc entered into a milling contract whereby they stipulated a 30- into by and between the parties.
year period within which the sugar cane produced by the petitioner
would be milled by the respondent central. The parties also stipulated PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
that in the event of force majuere, the contract shall be deemed PETITIONER, v. GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (FORMERLY AND
suspended during this period. The petitioner failed to deliver the sugar GLOBE MCKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION),
cane during the four years of the Japanese occupation and the two RESPONDENTS.
years after liberation when the mill was being rebuilt or a total of six GLOBE TELECOM, INC., PETITIONER, v. PHILIPPINE
years. COMMUNICATION SATELLITE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
ISSUE: G.R. No. 147324 and G.R. No. 147334, May 25, 2004
Can the petitioners be compelled to deliver sugar cane for six Facts:
more years after the expiration of the 30-year period to make up for
what they failed to deliver to the respondent? For several years prior to 1991, Globe Mckay Cable and Radio
Corporation, now Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe), had been engaged in
RULING: the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for
No. Fortuitous event relieves the obligor from fulfilling the the military bases of the United States of America (US) in Clark Air
contractual obligation under Article 1174 of the Civil Code. The Base, Angeles, Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point,
stipulation in the contract that in the event of force majeure the Zambales. The said communication facilities were installed and
contract shall be deemed suspended during the said period does not configured for the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications
mean that the happening of any of those events stops the running of Agency (USDCA), and for security reasons, were operated only by its
the period agreed upon. It only relieves the parties from the fulfillment personnel or those of American companies contracted by it to operate
of their respective obligations during that timethe petitioner from said facilities. The USDCA contracted with said American companies,
delivering the sugar cane and the respondent central from milling. In and the latter, in turn, contracted with Globe for the use of the
order that the respondent central may be entitled to demand from the communication facilities. Globe, on the other hand, contracted with
petitioner the fulfillment of their part in the contracts, the latter must local service providers such as the Philippine Communications
have been able to perform it but failed or refused to do so and not Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) for the provision of the
when they were prevented by force majeure such as war. To require communication facilities.
the petitioners to On 07 May 1991, Philcomsat and Globe entered into an
deliver the sugar cane which they failed to deliver during the six years Agreement whereby Philcomsat obligated itself to establish, operate
is to demand from them the fulfillment of an obligation, which was and provide an IBS Standard B earth station (earth station) within
impossible of performance during the time it became due. Nemo Cubi Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA. The term of the
contract was for 60 months, or five (5) years. In turn, Globe promised November 08, 1992. Philcomsat referred to Section 7 of the
to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved. Agreement.
At the time of the execution of the Agreement, both parties The trial court rendered its Decision ordering the defendant to
knew that the Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the pay the plaintiff the amount of $92,238.00 or its equivalent Philippine
Philippines and the US (RP-US Military Bases Agreement), which was currency, P300,00.00 for attorneys fees and the dismissal of
the basis for the occupancy of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval defendants counterclaim of lack of merit.
Base in Cubi Point, was to expire in 1991. Under Section 25, Article
Both parties appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, foreign military bases, troops or
Philcomsats appeal for lack of merit and affirming the trial courts
facilities, which include those located at the US Naval Facility in Cubi
finding the certain events consituting force majeure under Sec 8 of the
Point, shall not be allowed in the Philippines unless a new treaty is
agreement occurred and justified the non-payment by Globe of rentals
duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes
for the remainder of the Term of the Agreement.
cast by the people in a national referendum when the Congress so
requires, and such new treaty is recognized as such by the US Issue:
Government. Subsequently, Philcomsat installed and established the
earth station at Cubi Point and the USDCA made use of the same. On 1. Whether or not the non-ratification by the Senate of the Treaty
16 September 1991, the Senate passed and adopted Senate of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and its Supplementary
Resolution No. 141, expressing its decision not to concur in the Agreements constitutes force majeure which exempts Globe from
ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and complying with its obligations under the Agreement;
its Supplementary Agreements that was supposed to extend the term 2. Whether Globe is not liable to pay the rentals for the
of the use by the US of Subic Naval Base, among others. remainder of the term of the Agreement
On 31 December 1991, the Philippine Government sent a Held:
Note Verbale to the US Government through the US Embassy,
notifying it of the Philippines termination of the RP-US Military Bases 1. Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account
Agreement. The Note Verbale stated that since the RPUS Military of fortuitous events or force majeure, refers not only to events that are
Bases Agreement, as amended, shall terminate on 31 December unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but inevitable:
1992, the withdrawal of all US military forces from Subic Naval Base
A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be an "act of
should be completed by said date.
God," or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons,24 or an "act
In a letter dated 06 August 1992, Globe notified Philcomsat of of man," such as riots, strikes or wars.
its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station effective 08
Philcomsat and Globe agreed in Section 8 of the Agreement
November 1992 in view of the withdrawal of US military personnel
that the following events shall be deemed events constituting force
from Subic Naval Base after the termination of the RP-US Military
majeure:
Bases Agreement. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination
Section 8 (Default) of the Agreement. 1. Any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Philippine
Government;
Philcomsat sent a reply letter dated 10 August 1992 to Globe,
stating that we expect [Globe] to know its commitment to pay the 2. Strikes or other labor difficulties;
stipulated rentals for the remaining terms of the Agreement even after
[Globe] shall have discontinue[d] the use of the earth station after 3. Insurrection;
4. Riots; trial courts ruling that Globe is liable for payment of rentals until
December 1992. Neither did the appellate court commit any error in
5. National emergencies; holding that Philcomsat is not entitled to attorneys fees and
6. War; exemplary damages. The award of attorneys fees is the exception
rather than the rule, and must be supported by factual, legal and
7. Acts of public enemies; equitable justifications.
8. Fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophes or acts of God; PEDRO D. DIOQUINO VS. LAUREANO
9. Other circumstances beyond the control of the parties. G.R. No. L-25906 May 28, 1970
Clearly, the foregoing are either unforeseeable, or foreseeable FACTS:
but beyond the control of the parties. There is nothing in the
enumeration that runs contrary to, or expands, the concept of a Attorney Pedro Dioquino is the owner of a car. He went to the
fortuitous event under Article 1174. The aforementioned events made office of the MVO, Masbate, to register the same where he met the
impossible the continuation of the Agreement until the end of its five- defendant Federico Laureano, a patrol officer of said MVO office.
year term without fault on the part of either party. The Court of Dioquino requested Laureano to introduce him to one of the clerks in
Appeals was thus correct in ruling that the happening of such the MVO Office, who could facilitate the registration of his car and the
fortuitous events rendered Globe exempt from payment of rentals for request was attended to. Laureano rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino
the remainder of the term of the Agreement. on his way to the P.C. Barracks at Masbate. While about to reach their
destination, the car driven by plaintiff's driver and with Laureano as
Moreover, it would be unjust to require Globe to continue the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,' and its
paying rentals even though Philcomsat cannot be compelled to windshield was broken. Laureano chased the boys and he was able to
perform its corresponding obligation under the Agreement. catch one of them. The plaintiff and Laureano with the boy returned to
2. With respect to the issue of whether Globe is liable for the P.C. barracks and the father of the boy was called, but no
payment of rentals for the month of December 1992, the Court satisfactory arrangements were made about the damage to the
likewise affirms the appellate courts ruling that Globe should pay the windshield. It was likewise noted in the decision now on appeal: "The
same. defendant Federico Laureano refused to file any charges against the
boy and his parents because he hought that the stone-throwing was
Although Globe alleged that it terminated the Agreement with merely accidental and that it was due to force majeure. So he did not
Philcomsat effective 08 November 1992 pursuant to the formal order want to take any action and after delaying the settlement, after
issued by Cdr. Corliss of the US Navy, the date when they actually perhaps consulting a lawyer, the defendant Federico Laureano
ceased using the earth station subject of the Agreement was not refused to pay the windshield himself and challenged that the case be
established during the trial. However, the trial court found that the US brought to court for judicial adjudication. There is no question that the
military forces and personnel completely withdrew from Cubi Point plaintiff tried to convince the defendant Federico Laureano just to pay
only on 31 December 1992. Thus, until that date, the USDCA had the value of the windshield and he even came to the extent of asking
control over the earth station and had the option of using the same. the wife to convince her husband to settle the matter amicably but the
Furthermore, Philcomsat could not have removed or rendered defendant Federico Laureano refused to make any settlement,
ineffective said communication facility until after 31 December 1992 clinging [to] the belief that he could not be held liable because a minor
because Cubi Point was accessible only to US naval personnel up to child threw a stone accidentally on the windshield and therefore, the
that time. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed the same was due to force majeure."
ISSUE: wording of the law dispels any doubt that what is therein contemplated
is the resulting liability even if caused by a fortuitous event where the
Is Federico Laureano liable for the payment of the windshield party charged may be considered as having assumed the risk incident
of Atty Dioquino? in the nature of the obligation to be performed. It would be an affront,
not only to the logic but to the realities of the situation, if in the light of
what transpired, as found by the lower court, defendant Federico
RULING: Laureano could be held as bound to assume a risk of this nature.
No. The law being what it is, such a belief on the part of There was no such obligation on his part. The decision of the lower
defendant Federico Laureano was justified. The express language of court of November 2, 1965
Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code which is a restatement of Art. 1105 insofar as it orders defendant Federico Laureano to pay plaintiff the
of the Old Civil Code, except for the addition of the nature of an amount of P30,000.00 as damages plus the payment of costs, is
obligation requiring the assumption of risk, compels such a hereby reversed. It is affirmed insofar as it dismissed the case against
conclusion. It reads thus: "Except in cases expressly specified by the the other two defendants, Juanita Laureano and Aida de Laureano,
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature and declared that no moral damages should be awarded the parties.
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be, foreseen, or which, GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
though foreseen were inevitable." Even under the old Civil Code then, (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G. ABAD,
as stressed by us in the first decision dating back to 1908, in an respondents.
opinion by Justice Mapa, the rule was well-settled that in the absence
G.R. No. L-29640 June 10, 1971
of a legal provision or an express covenant, "no one should be held to
account for fortuitous cases." Its basis, as Justice Moreland stressed, FACTS:
is the Roman law principle major casus est, cui humana infirmitas
resistere non potest. Authorities of repute are in agreement, more In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad
specifically concerning an obligation arising from contract "that some acknowledged having received from Guillermo Austria one (1)
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on
his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito." If it could commission basis or to be returned on demand. On 1 February 1961,
be shown that such indeed was the case, liability is ruled out. There is however, while walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal,
no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom hit
can provide." her on the face, while the other snatched her purse containing jewelry
and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry allegedly taken
The error committed by the lower court in holding defendant by the robbers was the consigned pendant.
Federico Laureano liable appears to be thus obvious. Its own findings
of fact repel the motion that he should be made to respond in As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value
damages to the plaintiff for the broken windshield. What happened notwithstanding demands, Austria brought in the Court of First
was clearly unforeseen. It was a fortuitous event resulting in a loss Instance of Manila an action against her and her husband for recovery
which must be borne by the owner of the car. It was misled, of the pendant or of its value, and damages. Answering the
apparently, by the inclusion of the exemption from the operation of allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense
such a provision of a party assuming the risk, considering the nature that the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.
of the obligation undertaken. A more careful analysis would have led
the lower court to a different and correct interpretation. The very
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in
plaintiff, and ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay the City of Manila and its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes
to the former the sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus against persons and property that renders travel after nightfall a
the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs. It matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and
was held that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning
indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty of alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable
negligence when she went home without any companion, although it value would be negligent per se and would not exempt her from
was already getting dark and she was carrying a large amount of cash responsibility in the case of a robbery.
and valuables on the day in question, and such negligence did not
free her from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry. JIMMY CO, doing business under the name & style DRAGON
METAL MANUFACTURING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUE: and BROADWAY MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, respondents.
Whether or not robbery can be categorized as a fortuitous event G.R. No. 124922 June 22, 1998
RULING: FACTS:
It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso On July 18, 1990, petitioner entrusted his Nissan pick-up car
fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary 1988 model to private respondent which is engaged in the sale,
that (1) the event must be independent of the human will (or rather, of distribution and repair of motor vehicles for job repair services and
the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must render it impossible supply of parts.
for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3)
the obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of the injury Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21,
to the creditor. A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by 1990 fully serviced and supplied in accordance with the job contract.
nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, After petitioner paid in full the repair bill in the amount of P1,397.00
such as war, attack by bandits, robbery, etc., provided that the event private respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the
has all the characteristics enumerated above. vehicle on said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter could not
release the vehicle as its battery was weak and was not yet replaced.
It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were Left with no option, petitioner himself bought a new battery nearby
indeed the victim of robbery, and if it were really true that the pendant, and delivered it to private respondent for installation on the same day.
which she was obliged either to sell on commission or to return to However, the battery was not installed and the delivery of the car was
petitioner, were taken during the robbery, then the occurrence of that rescheduled to July 24, 1990 or three (3) days later. When petitioner
fortuitous event would have extinguished her liability. The point at sought to reclaim his car in the afternoon of July 24, 1990, he was told
issue in this proceeding is how the fact of robbery is to be established that it was carnapped earlier that morning while being road-tested by
in order that a person may avail of the exempting provision of Article private respondent's employee along Pedro Gil and Perez Streets in
1174 of the new Civil Code, which reads as follows: Paco, Manila. Private respondent said that the incident was reported
to the police.
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be value thereof, petitioner filed a suit for damages against private
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, respondent anchoring his claim on the latter's alleged negligence. For
though foreseen, were inevitable.
its part, private respondent contended that it has no liability because involve privilege or impeaching matter, is inapplicable to this case.
the car was lost as result of a fortuitous event the carnapping. The question of delay, though not specifically mentioned as an issue
at the pre-trial may be tackled by the court considering that it is
During pre-trial, the parties agreed that: necessarily intertwined and intimately connected with the principal
(T)he cost of the Nissan Pick-up four (4) door when the plaintiff issue agreed upon by the parties, i.e., who will bear the loss and
purchased it from the defendent is P332,500.00 excluding whether there was negligence. Petitioner's imputation of negligence to
accessories which were installed in the vehicle by the plaintiff private respondent is premised on delay which is the very basis of the
consisting of four (4) brand new tires, magwheels, stereo speaker, former's complaint. Thus, it was unavoidable for the court to resolve
amplifier which amount all to P20,000.00. It is agreed that the vehicle the case, particularly the question of negligence without considering
was lost on July 24, 1990 "approximately two (2) years and five (5) whether private respondent was guilty of delay in the performance of
months from the date of the purchase." It was agreed that the plaintiff its obligation.
paid the defendant the cost of service and repairs as early as July 21, On the merits. It is a not defense for a repair shop of motor
1990 in the amount of P1,397.00 which amount was received and vehicles to escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a
duly receipted by the defendant company. It was also agreed that the thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping.
present value of a brand new vehicle of the same type at this time is Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The
P425,000.00 without accessories. fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another's
They likewise agreed that the sole issue for trial was who rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically
between the parties shall bear the loss of the vehicle which give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping
necessitates the resolution of whether private respondent was indeed entails more than the mere forceful taking of another's property. It
negligent. After trial, the court a quo found private respondent guilty of must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or
delay in the performance of its obligation and held it liable to petitioner was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the
for the value of the lost vehicle and its accessories plus interest and person alleged to be negligent has any participation. In accordance
attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the with the Rules of evidence, the burden of proving that the loss was
ruling of the lower court and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it which in this
damage suit. The CA ruled that: (1) the trial court was limited to case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report
resolving the issue of negligence as agreed during pre-trial; hence it of the alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented
cannot pass on the issue of delay; and (2) the vehicle was lost due to by private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its
a fortuitous event. fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only private
respondent is privy, does not suffice to establish the carnapping.
ISSUE Neither does it prove that there was no fault on the part of private
Whether or not carnapping can be considered as a fortuitous respondent notwithstanding the parties' agreement at the pre-trial that
event. the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the pissibility
of fault or negligence on the part of private respondent.
RULING
The Court resolves the query in favor of the customer. First, on
the technical aspect involved. Contrary to the CA' s pronouncement,
the rule that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars Lea Mer Industries, Inc v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc
the consideration of other issues on appeal, except those that may G.r. NO. 161745, September 30, 2005
Facts: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
Mer Industries, Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have
valued at P565,000. Consigned to Vulcan Industrial and Mining been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the
Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila. caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to
barge leased by Lea Mer. During the voyage, the vessel sank, render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal
resulting in the loss of the cargo. manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any
participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value [29]
of the lost cargo. To recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its
right of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the
Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on loss.[30] Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent
September 4, 1992, for the collection of P565,000 representing the or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the
amount that respondent had paid Vulcan. fortuitous event.

On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint,


upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event. The Sicam v. Jorge
RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad weather G.r. NO. 159617, August 8. 2007
condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that
petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and FACTS:
that the vessel had been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to On different dates from September to October 1987, Lulu V.
travel from Palawan to Manila. Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam
located at No. 17 Aguirre Ave., BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila,
CA reversed the decision of the RTC, and held that the vessel to secure a loan in the total amount of P59, 500.00. On October 19,
was not seaworthy and the loss of the cargo was because of fault and 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever
not by fortuitous event. cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. Petitioner
Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19, 1987 informing
Issue: her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the
Whether or not that the loss of the cargo subject of this case pawnshop. On November 2, 1987, respondent Lulu then wrote a letter
was caused by fortuitous event for which herein petitioner could not to petitioner Sicam expressing disbelief stating that when the robbery
be held liable. happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank
near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they
Held: could withdraw, advance notice must be given to the pawnshop so it
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent Lulu then
responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Thus, if the loss or damage withdrawal on November 6, 1987 but petitioner Sicam failed to return
was due to such an event, a common carrier is exempted from the jewelry.
liability.
On September 28, 1988, respondent Lulu joined by her husband,
Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against petitioner Sicam with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of Police Station on the robbery committed based on the report of
pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral and exemplary petitioners' employees is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such
damages as well as attorney's fees. However, petitioner Sicam report also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. Also, the
contends that he is not the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already
incorporated on April 20, 1987 and known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they
Inc; that petitioner corporation had exercised due care and diligence wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Thus,
in the safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could not be petitioners are negligent in securing their pawnshop.
made liable for an event that is fortuitous. After trial ,the RTC rendered
its Decision dismissing respondents complaint as well as petitioners
counterclaim. The RTC held that robbery is a fortuitous event which PHILIPPINE REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs LEY
exempts the victim from liability for the loss and under Art. 1174 of the CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G. R.
Civil Code. It further held that the corresponding diligence required of No. 165548, June 13, 2011
a pawnshop is that it should take steps to secure and protect the
pledged items and should take steps to insure itself against the loss of FACTS:
articles which are entrusted to its custody as it derives earnings from Sometime between April 1988 and October 1989, the two
the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do and that robberies corporations entered into four major construction projects, as
and hold-ups are foreseeable risks in that those engaged in the evidenced by four duly notarized "construction agreements." These
pawnshop business are expected to foresee. were the four construction projects the parties entered into involving a
Project 1, Project 2, Project 3 (all of which involve the Alexandra
ISSUE: buildings) and a Tektite Building. LCDC committed itself to the
Whether petitioners are liable for the loss of the pawned articles construction of the buildings needed by PRHC, which in turn
in their possession. committed itself to pay the contract price agreed upon. Both parties
agreed to enter into another agreement. Abcede asked LCDC to
RULING: advance the amount necessary to complete construction. Its president
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not acceded, on the absolute condition that it be allowed to escalate the
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event contract price. Abcede replied that he would take this matter up with
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly the board of directors of PRHC. The board of directors turned down
believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The the request for an escalation agreement. However, On 9 August 1991
mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee Abcede sent a formal letter to LCDC, asking for its conformity, to the
the same. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements effect that should it infuse P36 million into the project, a contract price
must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected escalation for the same amount would be granted in its favor by
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations PRHC.
must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be ISSUE:
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a Whether or not there is a fortuitous event in the case at bar.
normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. HELD:
YES. Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of
does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein God" or force majeure, the following must concur:(a) the cause of the
petitioners. The presentation of the police report of the Paraaque breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill ISSUE:
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from
from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. liability parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?
The shortage in supplies and cement may be characterized as force
majeure. In the present case, hardware stores did not have enough HELD:
cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of the Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor
construction in the 1990s. Likewise, typhoons, power failures and are liable for damages should the building collapse within 15 years
interruptions of water supply all clearly fall under force majeure. Since from completion.
LCDC could not possibly continue constructing the building under the Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be
circumstances prevailing, it cannot be held liable for any delay that responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt
resulted from the causes aforementioned. from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986 3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor
JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL vs THE COURT to fulfill the obligation
OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN 4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the
J. CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION industry to the creditor.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused
FACTS: by the earthquake which was an act of God, the defects in the
Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a construction, as well as the deviations in the specifications and plans
non-profit organization formed under the corporation law decided to aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive measures that
put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the the building would otherwise have had.
specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United
Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by
the Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals
The building was completed in 1966. GR No. L-42926, September 13, 1985
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which
caused the building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt Facts:
forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises. United MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for
Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
Cebu. Its officers were aware of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is
already building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but
United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, signals on their route, they proceeded with their voyage. When they
alleging defects in the plans and specifications. reached the island of Romblon, the captain decided not to seek
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a shelter since the weather was still good. They continued their journey
court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the until the vessel reached the island of Tanguingui, while passing
building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition through the island the weather suddenly changed and heavy rains fell.
after the building suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous Fearing that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the
earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were deviations in captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that they
the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of could weather out the typhoon by facing the strong winds and waves.
the building. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef near Malapascua Island, it
sustained a leak and eventually sunk. The parents of the passengers was P16,802,037.32, to be paid as follows: (1) 30% less the
who were lost due to that incident filed an action against Filipinas reservation fee of P100,000, or P4,940,611.19, by postdated check
Pioneer Lines for damages. The defendant pleaded force majeure but payable on July 14, 1995; (2) P9,241,120.50 through 30 equal
the Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of monthly installments of P308,037.35 from August 14, 1995 to
Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower stating that the incident January 14, 1998; and (3) the balance of P2,520,305.63 on
was a force majeure and absolved the defendants from liability. October 31, 1998, the stipulated delivery date of the unit;
provided that if the construction is completed earlier, Tanseco
Issue: would pay the balance within seven days from receipt of a notice of
Whether or not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages turnover. Section 4 of the Contract to Buy and Sell provided that the
and presumed to be at fault for the death of its passenger? project must be completed and delivered not later than October
31, 1998 with additional grace period of six (6) months within
Held: which to complete the Project and the unit/s, barring delays due
The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to to fire, earthquakes, the elements, acts of God, war, civil
observe that extraordinary diligence required of them by law for disturbances, strikes or other labor disturbances, government and
the safety of the passengers transported by them with due regard for economic controls making it, among others, impossible or difficult to
all necessary circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to obtain the necessary materials, acts of third person, or any other
tragic mishap. Despite knowledge of the fact that there was a cause or conditions beyond the control of the SELLER. Herein
typhoon, they still proceeded with their voyage relying only on the respondent paid all installments except for the balance of
forecast that the typhoon would weaken upon crossing the island of P2,520,305.63 pending delivery of the unit. Megaworld, however, was
Samar. The defense of caso fortuito isuntenable. To constitute caso only able to deliver the unit to Tanseco on April 22, 2002 which is way
fortuito to exempt a person from liability it necessary that the event past the due date and the grace period. Tanseco then replied through
must be independent from human will, the occurrence must render it counsel that in view of Megaworlds failure to deliver the said unit on
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, time, she was demanding the return of P14,281,731.70 representing
the obligor must be free from any participation or aggravation to the the total installment payment she had made, with interest at 12% per
injury of the creditor. Filipina Pioneer Lines failed to overcome that annum from April 30, 1999, the expiration of the six-month grace
presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or period. Tanseco pointed out that none of the excepted causes of
injuries to passengers. delay existed. Megaworld averred that the delay was caused by the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which was favored by the Housing
Arbiter. Tanseco, then, filed a petition for review at the Court of
Appeals which ruled in her favor and reversed all previous rulings.
Megaworld Globus Asia Inc. V. Tanseco
GR No. 181206, October 9, 2009 ISSUE:
Whether or not Tanseco is entitled to damages.
Facts:
HELD:
On July 7, 1995, petitioner Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc.
(Megaworld) and respondent Mila S. Tanseco (Tanseco) entered into Yes. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA that judicial
a Contract to Buy and Sell a 224 square-meter (more or less) or extrajudicial demand by Tanseco was not necessary to put the
condominium unit at a pre-selling project, "The Salcedo Park," located obligor in default if the contract states the date in which the obligation
along Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City. The purchase price must be performed as provided in Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
There being no force majeure to warrant the application of the directly affecting the business of Metro Concast and eventually
alternative date of April 30, 1999 and that the alleged delay due to the leading to its cessation.
recession being invalid, the damages must be rightfully awarded to Hence, in order to settle their debts with Allied Bank,
Tanseco. The SC, however, modified the dispositive portion of the petitioners offered the sale of Metro Concasts remaining assets,
decision which cancelled the contract. Furthermore, petitioner, consisting of machineries and equipment, to Allied Bank, however it
Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc., is directed to pay respondent, Mila S. refused. Instead, it advised them to sell the equipment and apply the
Tanseco, the amount of P14,281,731.70, to bear 6% interest per proceeds of the sale to their outstanding obligations.
Accordingly, petitioners offered the equipment for sale, but
annum starting May 6, 2002 and 12% interest per annum from the
since there were no takers, the equipment was reduced into ferro
time the judgment becomes final and executory; and to pay P200,000
scrap or scrap metal over the years.
attorneys fees, P100,000 exemplary damages, and costs of suit In 2002, Peakstar Oil Corporation (Peakstar), expressed
interest in buying the scrap metal. During the negotiations with
METRO CONCAST STEEL CORP, SPOUSES JOSE S. et al v.
Peakstar, petitioners claimed that Atty. Peter Saw (Atty. Saw), a
ALLIED BANK
member of Allied Banks legal department, acted as the latters agent.
Eventually, with the alleged conformity of Allied Bank, through Atty.
Facts:
Saw, a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 8, 2002 (MoA)
was drawn between Metro Concast, represented by petitioner Jose
Metro Concast, a corporation duly engaged in manufacturing
Dychiao, and Peakstar, through Camiling, under which Peakstar
steel, through its officers, the individual petitioners, obtained several
obligated itself to purchase the scrap metal for a total consideration of
loans from Allied Ban which were covered by a promissory note and
P34,000,000.00, payable as follows:
separate letters of credit/trust receipts.
(a) P4,000,000.00 by way of earnest money P2,000,000.00
to be paid in cash and the other P2,000,000.00 to be paid in two (2)
The interest rate under Promissory Note No. 96-21301
post-dated checks of P1,000,000.00 each; and
(2Million) was pegged at 15.25% per annum (p.a.),with penalty charge
(b) the balance of P30,000,000.00 to be paid in ten (10)
of 3% per month in case of default; while the twelve (12) trust receipts
monthly installments of P3,000,000.00, secured by bank guarantees
uniformly provided for an interest rate of 14% p.a. and 1% penalty
from Bankwise, Inc. (Bankwise) in the form of separate post-dated
charge. By way of security, the individual petitioners executed several
checks.
Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreements in favor of
Allied Bank.
Unfortunately, Peakstar defaulted on all its obligations under
Metro Concast failed to settle their obligations so Allied Bank,
the MoA. In this regard, petitioners asseverated that:
through counsel, sent them demand letters, all dated December 10,
(a) their failure to pay their outstanding loan obligations to Allied Bank
1998, seeking payment of the total amount of P51,064,093.62, but to
must be considered as force majeure ; and
no avail. Thus, Allied Bank was prompted to file a complaint for
(b) since Allied Bank was the party that accepted the terms and
collection of sum of money (subject complaint) against petitioners
conditions of payment proposed by Peakstar, petitioners must
before the RTC.
therefore be deemed to have settled their obligations to Allied Bank.
In their second Amended Answer, Metro Concast admitted
To bolster their defense, petitioner Jose Dychiao (Jose Dychiao)
their indebtedness to Allied Bank but denied liability for the interests
testified during trial that it was Atty. Saw himself who drafted the MoA
and penalties charged, claiming to have paid the total sum of
and subsequently received the P2,000,000.00 cash and the two (2)
P65,073,055.73 by way of interest charges for the period covering
Bankwise post-dated checks worth P1,000,000.00 each from
1992 to 1997.
Camiling. However, Atty. Saw turned over only the two (2) checks and
They also alleged that the economic reverses suffered by the
P1,500,000.00 in cash to the wife of Jose Dychiao.
Philippine economy in 1998 and the devaluation of the peso against
the US dollar contributed greatly to the downfall of the steel industry,
Issue:
Whether or not the loan obligations incurred by the petitioners Fortuitous events are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
under the subject promissory note and various trust receipts have avoidable. It must beimpossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
already been extinguished difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same.
Ruling: To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must
concur:
No. The petitioners loan obligations to Allied Bank remain (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
subsisting because Metro Concast, et al have not been able to prove failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of
that they had already been paid or extinguished. Petitioners liability, human will;
as adjudged by the CA, must necessarily stand. Considering, (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso
however, that Allied Banks extra-judicial demand on petitioners fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
appears to have been made only on December 10, 1998, the (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
computation of the applicable interests and penalty charges should be debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and
reckoned only from such date. (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury or loss
Article 1231 of the Civil Code states that obligations are
extinguished either by payment or performance, the loss of the While it may be argued that Peakstars breach of the MoA was
thing due, the condonation or remission of the debt, the unforseen by petitioners, the same us clearly not "impossible" to
confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, foresee or even an event which is independent of human will." Neither
compensation or novation. has it been shown that said occurrence rendered it impossible for
petitioners to pay their loan obligations to Allied Bank and thus,
The MoA would not have any relevance to the performance of negates the formers force majeure theory altogether. In any case, the
petitioners obligations to Allied Bank. The MoA is a sale of assets performance or breach of the MoA bears no relation to the
contract, while petitioners obligations to Allied Bank arose from performance or breach of the subject loan transactions, they being
various loan transactions. Absent any showing that the terms and separate and distinct sources of obligations.
conditions of the Allied Bank transactions have been, in any way,
modified or novated by the terms and conditions in the MoA, said
contracts should be treated separately and distinctly from each MARITO T. BERNALES v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES
other, such that the existence, performance or breach of one would G.R. No. 182395, October 05, 2015
not depend on the existence, performance or breach of the other. The
issue on whether or not Allied Bank expressed its conformity to the Facts:
assets sale transaction between Metro Concast and Peakstar (as
evidenced by the MoA) is actually irrelevant to the issues related to Marito T. Bernales is a lawyer, a university dean, and a
petitioners loan obligations to the bank. Besides, as the CA pointed Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur Board Member. On
out, the fact of Allied Banks representation has not been proven in October 1, 2002, he and several other prominent personalities from
this case and cannot be deemed as a sustainable defense to Bicol were on their way to Honolulu, Hawaii, as delegates of a trade
exculpate petitioners from their loan obligations to Allied Bank. Now, and tourism mission for the province. They were economy class
anent petitioners reliance on force majeure, suffice it to state that passengers of Northwest Airlines Flight No. 10 from Manila to
Peakstars breach of its obligations to Metro Concast arising Honolulu via Narita, Japan.
from the MoA cannot be classified as a fortuitous event under
jurisprudential formulation. As discussed in Sicam v. Jorge:
They arrived at Narita International Airport (NRT) at 11:00 a.m.
Their connecting flight was at 8:40 p.m. At around 6:00 p.m., a Because of the incident, the other delegates refused to board
typhoon hit Japan, which canceled most flights, including NWA Flight the airplane unless the petitioner was physically brought to them at
No. 10. However, NWA did not cancel Flight No. 22, also bound for the tarmac. After a stalemate between the delegates and the airline's
Honolulu later that night, to minimize delays and to accommodate employees, the petitioner was transported by shuttle to the aircraft to
stranded passengers in case the typhoon would subside. rejoin his group.

Under NWA policy, affected passengers are protected in their NWA narrates in its narration of events, that Ohashi politely
booking for the next available flight in case of cancellations. This approached the petitioner in the shuttle bus and informed him that
means that if there are available seats in the next flight, the delayed they needed to accommodate two original priority passengers who
passengers would be accommodated with priority given to first class arrived. Ohashi politely asked the petitioner to alight. Ohashi assured
and business class passengers. If only limited seats are available, the the petitioner that he would look for a volunteer passenger who would
delayed passengers are wait-listed according to their priority level and give up his seat to accommodate the petitioner and asked him to wait
in the sequence of their check-in. In all cases, the original passengers inside the terminal. NWA alleges that the petitioner gracefully
of the next flight are prioritized over the delayed passengers. complied without objections. Ohashi found a volunteer passenger
within ten minutes. NWA immediately transported the petitioner to the
At around 9:00 p.m., the storm subsided and the airport airplane for the flight.
resumed its operations. On this day, the NRT extended the airplane
curfew to 1:00 a.m., which usually is 11pm, to accommodate the NWA maintains that Ohashi has an impeccable service record
delayed flights and to make up for lost time. The delegates opted to in customer relations and has received multiple commendations.
be wait-listed for Flight No. 22. The petitioner was placed last in the
wait-list as he was the last economy class passenger to check in for In either case, the petitioner was given a dummy boarding
Flight No. 10. To ensure departure before the 1:00 a.m. curfew, NWA pass for Seat No. 35 in the name of "Eddie Tanno." The dummy
gave out "dummy" boarding passes to the wait-listed passengers boarding pass was issued out of necessity due to the lack of time to
even before the priority passengers boarded the plane. issue a new one. The petitioner, however, thought it was a real
boarding pass. He proceeded to Seat No. 35-H and found it occupied
The passengers of Flight 22 were called for boarding at by Eddie Tanno. He showed the dummy boarding pass to Tanno who,
around 11:00 p.m. and the delegates boarded the shuttle taking them noticing his name irately asked, "Can't you read? " An attendant
to the airplane. But before the shuttle bus could leave, NWA Customer noticed the commotion and immediately escorted the petitioner to
Service Agent Tsuruki Ohashi entered the shuttle and informed the Seat No. 15-H, his allotted vacant seat.
petitioner that he could not take Flight 22 as no available seat was left
for him. Unfortunately, Flight No. 22 failed to depart in time to beat the
Narita curfew. The passengers of Flight No. 22 were returned to the
According to the petitioner's version of events, Ohashi barged terminal where they had to wait with 1,500 other stranded
into the bus and shouted "Marito, Marito Bernales, where are you?" passengers. All the nearby hotels were fully booked from the many
When the petitioner identified himself, Ohashi allegedly yelled, flight cancellations. Because it was already late, NWA failed to find
"Bullshit, Marito Bernales, you are not included in the manifest. Get billeting for the stranded Flight No. 22 passengers and they had to
out! Get out!" Ohashi allegedly took the petitioner's boarding pass and spend the night at the airport; they were given blankets, pillows,
grabbed him by the arm before ejecting him from the shuttle. The snacks, water, and food coupons. The petitioner claims that he was
shuttle bus carrying his hand-carried bag left the petitioner alone made to sleep on the terminal floor "akin to the beggars of Quiapo
outside the terminal without his money, passport, and other travel and Baclaran" and had to suffer the discomfort of using the public
documents. toilets.
The next morning, NWA gave the delegates two options: (1) Ruling:
take a direct flight to Honolulu scheduled for 3 October 2002; or (2)
take a 3:35 p.m. flight later that day to Los Angeles, California, with an Moral damages predicated upon a breach of a carriage
immediate connecting flight to Honolulu. The delegates chose the contract is only recoverable in instances where the mishap results
second option so they could leave immediately. The delegates arrived in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud
at Honolulu on 2 October 2002 between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., Honolulu or bad faith. Bad faith is not simple negligence or bad judgment; it
time. But they had already missed the courtesy calls they were to involves ill intentions and a conscious design to do a wrongful
make on the governor and the mayor, which were scheduled for act for a dishonest purpose.
earlier that day.
The arrival of Typhoon Higos was an extraordinary and
On 12 February 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint for moral unavoidable event. Its occurrence made it impossible for NWA to bring
and exemplary damages against the respondent NWA for breach of the petitioner to Honolulu in time for his commitments. The Court
their contract of carriage. The petitioner alleged that Ohashi's rude cannot hold the respondent liable for a breach of contract resulting
treatment, his ejection from the shuttle bus, the resulting missed from a fortuitous event. Moreover, the Court finds that NWA did not act
obligations due to the flight's delay, and the humiliation from the in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or oppressive
ordeal caused him immense mental anguish and moral shock. manner. On the contrary, it exerted its best efforts to accommodate
the petitioner on Flight No. 22 and to lessen the petitioner's discomfort
On 30 April 2003, NWA filed its answer denying that Ohashi, or when he and the other passengers were left to pass the night at the
any of its employees, forcibly ejected the petitioner or treated him terminal.
rudely. NWA insisted that it acted in good faith and never in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The primary cause of NWA's delay in the fulfillment of its
obligation was the unusually strong typhoon that struck Japan that
On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the evening. We take notice that this was Typhoon Higos, one of the most
complaint. The CA held that: powerful typhoons to hit Japan as of that date.19 Typhoon Higos
(1) moral damages cannot be awarded in breaches of contracts of resulted in the cancellation of more than 200 flights.20
carriage except in cases of the death of a passenger or when the
common carrier acted in bad faith; From this perspective, the Court does not attribute bad faith or
(2) the typhoon was the real and proximate cause of the cancellation ill motives on NWA for cancelling Flight No. 10. Pushing through
of flights and NWA's failure to bring the petitioner to Honolulu in time; would have recklessly endangered the lives of the passengers and
(3) the petitioner's accusation that Mr. Ohashi verbally abused him is the crew. Evidently, the real and proximate cause of NWA's breach of
not believable and contrary to ordinary human experience; contract was a fortuitous event.
(4) the airline cannot be responsible for the remarks of Eddie Tanno, a
fellow passenger; and Moreover, NWA demonstrated good faith when it exerted its
(5) 1,500 other passengers similarly experienced the discomfort of best efforts to accommodate the delayed Flight No. 10 passengers on
spending the night at the airport, and NWA did not maliciously single Flight No. 22. While Flight No. 22 also failed to leave, the failure was
him out. caused by the 1:00 p.m. Narita curfew. Again, we cannot attribute
malice on NWA for the cancellation of Flight No. 22.
Issue:
When are moral damages established upon breach of a Moreover, the Court finds it hard to believe that neither the
carriage contract recoverable? petitioner nor the other delegates protested on the spot against the
Was the typhoon a fortuitous event? Why?
alleged abusive treatment. As the CA observed, this version of events
is contrary to ordinary human experience. Finally, the court also cannot impute bad faith on NWA's failure
to house the passengers in any nearby hotels. Flight No. 22 was
Moreover, Ohashi has a good track record in customer service cancelled at around 1 a.m. Considering the number of flights
and was the recipient of several commendation letters that were cancelled earlier that evening, it is understandable that hotel rooms
presented in court. Ohashi's track record contradicts the petitioner's had already been booked by the other airlines also billeting their
portrayal of him as an unreasonably rude person. passengers.

On the insulting remark from Eddie Tanno, the Court cannot


possibly hold NWA responsible for the actions of the other
passengers.

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