Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Malabang vs Benito In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color of authority to the
validity of the existence of the municpality of Balabagan when EO 386 was later
FACTS: Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang on invalidated. Hence, such municipality is not a de factor corporation.
before it was created into a separate municipality thru an executive order.
The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for
having been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent 2. Bergeron v Hobbs See Campos pages 94-98
municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective offices.
Topic and Relevant Provision: Formation and Organization of Corporations
Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of the Substantial or Colorable Compliance
Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section 10 (1) FACTS
of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local The defendants, under the name of Bayfield Agricultural Association, employed
governments to mere supervision. several persons to perform labor in improving their grounds, and in erecting
fences and buildings. Time checks given by the defendants to such laborers, for
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, such labor, were assigned to the plaintiff, who brings this action to recover their
must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in amount, alleging that the defendants were a partnership. Defendants alleged
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory that they were members of a corporation, and denied that they were co-partners,
enactment. The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. or liable as such.
of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation for having been organized under
color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having It appeared upon trial that the articles of organization of the defendants as the
been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged Bayfield County Agricultural Association, and a certificate showing the election of
its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this officers, had been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Bayfield, but
action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be were not on file there. The same had been deposited, with instruction to record
collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo and return them, which had been complied with. Lower court held for plaintiff,
warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner hence this appeal.
Balindong.
ISSUE
1. WON the mere recording of the articles of incorporation, with the certificate of
The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the election of officers, without the intention or fact or the papers themselves,
the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding. But the remaining in the office, a sufficient compliance with the statute, so that the
rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is organization of the corporation became complete, as upon a proper filing of the
at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de papers themselves.
facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or
2. WON if issue #1 is in the negative, the defendants can be considered as
directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are
corporation de facto, or are they acting as a partnership.
affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they
are estopped by their conduct from doing so. HELD
1. NO. The same is not sufficient compliance.
ISSUE: W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
2. NO. They are not a corporation de facto.
RULING: No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to
its creation when EO 386 was subsequently declared as unconstitutional. Dispositive: Decision affirmed.
4. Hall v Piccio Second, this is not a suit in which the corporation is a party. This is a litigation
between stockholders of the alleged corporation for the purpose of obtaining its
Post under case digests, Commercial Law at Tuesday, February 07, 2012 Posted dissolution. Even the existence of a de jure corporation may be terminated in a
by Schizophrenic Mind private suit for its dissolution between stockholders, without the intervention of
the state.
Facts: Petitioners Arnold Hall, Bradley Hall and Private Respondents Fred Brown,
Emma Brown, Hipolita Chapman and Ceferino Abella signed and acknowledged (2) NO. The Browns are not estopped. Because the SEC has not yet issued the
the articles of incorporation of the Far Eastern Lumber and Commercial Co., Inc. corresponding certificate of incorporation, all of them know or ought to know that
organized to engage in a general lumber business to carry on as general the personality of a corporation begins to exist only from the moment such
contractors, operators and managers. Attached to the articles was an affidavit of certificate is issued and not before.
the treasurer stating that 23, 428 shares of stock had been subscribed and fully
paid with certain properties transferred to the corporation. The complaining associates have not represented to the others that they were
incorporated any more than the latter had made similar representations to them.
Immediately after the execution of the articles of incorporation, the corporation
proceeded to do business with the adoption of by-laws and the election of its And as nobody was led to believe anything to his prejudice and damage, the
officers. principle of estoppel does not apply. This is not an instance requiring the
enforcement of contracts with the corporation through the rule of estoppel.
Then, the articles of incorporation were filed in SEC for the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of incorporation.
5. Empire Manufacturing Company v Stuart see Campos, pages 108-
Pending action on the articles of incorporation, Fred Brown, Emma Brown, Hipolita 109
Chapman and Ceferino Abella filed a civil case against the Halls alleging among
other things that Far Eastern Lumber and Commercial Co, was an unregistered EMPIRE vs. STUART (46 Mich. 482, 9 N.W. 527; 1881)
partnership and that they wished to have it dissolved because of bitter dissension
among the members, mismanagement and fraud by the managers and heavy Company was sued on a promissory note. Its defense was that at the
financial losses. time of its issuance, it was defectively organized and therefore could not be sued
as such.
The Halls filed a Motion to Dismiss contesting the courts jurisdiction and the
sufficiency of the cause of action but Judge Piccio ordered the dissolution of the The Corporation cannot repudiate the transaction or evade responsibility
company and appointed a receiver. when sued thereon by setting up its own mistake affecting the original
organization.
Issues:
6. Lowell-Woodward Hardware Company v Woods, et al Campos, pp At the trial of the case the plaintiff failed to prove affirmatively the corporate
109-112 existence of the parties and the appellant insists that under these circumstances
the court erred in finding that the parties were corporations with juridical
LOWELL-WOODWARD vs. WOODS (104 Kan. 729; 1919) personality and assigns same as reversible error.
Corporation sued a partnership on a promissory note. The latter as There is no merit whatever in the appellant's contention. The general rule is that
defense alleged that the plaintiff was not a corporation. in the absence of fraud a person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with an
association in such a way as to recognize and in effect admit its legal existence
One who enters into a contract with a party described therein as a as a corporate body is thereby estopped to deny its corporate existence in any
corporation is precluded, in an action brought thereon by such party under the action leading out of or involving such contract or dealing, unless its existence is
same designation, from denying its corporate existence. attacked for cause which have arisen since making the contract or other dealing
relied on as an estoppel and this applies to foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. (14 C. J., 227; Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua Te Ching, 14
7. Asia Banking v Standard Products, GR 22106, 11 Sept 1924, 46 Phil Phil., 222.)
145 FULL TEXT
The defendant having recognized the corporate existence of the plaintiff by
OSTRAND, J.: making a promissory note in its favor and making partial payments on the same
is therefore estopped to deny said plaintiff's corporate existence. It is, of course,
also estopped from denying its own corporate existence. Under these
This action is brought to recover the sum of P24,736.47, the balance due on the
circumstances it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to present other evidence of
following promissory note:
the corporate existence of either of the parties. It may be noted that there is no
evidence showing circumstances taking the case out of the rules stated.
P37,757.22
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
MANILA, P. I., Nov. 28, 1921.
By President under PFPC). Refuerzo moved for reconsideration on the ground that he should
not be held personally liable because he merely signed the lease contract in his
official capacity as president of PFPC. Garlitos granted Refuerzos motion.
The court below rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
demanded in the complaint, with interest on the sum of P24,147.34 from
November 1, 1923, at the rate of 10 per cent per annum, and the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appeals to this court.
Segundino Q. Refuerzo, for accounting, rescission and damages. The lower Court
Manuela assailed the decision of the judge on the ground that she sued PFPC
rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. No appeal therefrom having been
without impleading Refuerzo because she initially believed that PFPC was a perfected within the reglementary period, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff,
issued a writ of execution, in virtue of which the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte caused
legitimate corporation. However, during trial, she found out that PFPC was not
the attachment of 3 parcels of land registered in the name of Segundino
actually registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) hence Refuerzo. Defendant filed a motion claiming that the decision rendered in said
Civil Case was null and void with respect to him, there being no allegation in the
Refuerzo should be personally liable.
complaint pointing to his personal liability for while it was stated therein that he
was a signatory to the lease contract, he did so in his capacity as president of the
corporation and thus prayed that an order be issued limiting such liability to
defendant Corporation. The Court a quo then granted the same and ordered the
Provincial Sheriff of Leyte to release all properties belonging to the movant that
ISSUE: Whether or not Manuela is correct. might have already been attached. As plaintiff's petition for relief from said order
was denied, hence this instant action of Manuela asserting that the trial Judge in
issuing the order complained of acted with grave abuse of discretion and prayed
that same be declared a nullity. She contended that her failure to specify
defendant's personal liability was due to the fact that all the time she was under
the impression that the Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc., represented by
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a general rule, the corporation has a personality
Refuerzo was a duly registered corporation as appearing in the contract, but a
separate and distinct from its incorporators and as such the incorporators cannot subsequent inquiry from the SEC yielded otherwise.
be held personally liable for the obligations of the corporation. However, this
ISSUE: Whether or not Segundino Q. Refuerzo in his capacity as president of the
doctrine is not applicable to unincorporated associations. The reason behind this corporation shall be personally liable for the contract of lease entered into.
doctrine is obvious-since an organization which before the law is non-existent has
no personality and would be incompetent to act and appropriate for itself the RULING: While as a general rule a person who has contracted or dealt with an
association in such a way as to recognize its existence as a corporate body is
powers and attribute of a corporation as provided by law; it cannot create agents estopped from denying the same in an action arising out of such transaction or
or confer authority on another to act in its behalf; thus, those who act or purport dealing, yet this doctrine may not be held to be applicable where fraud takes a
part in the said transaction. In the instant case, on plaintiff's charge that she was
to act as its representatives or agents do so without authority and at their own unaware of the fact that the Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc., had no juridical
risk. In this case, Refuerzo was the moving spirit behind PFPC. As such, his personality, defendant Refuerzo gave no confirmation or denial and the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract lead to the inescapable
liability cannot be limited or restricted that imposed upon [would-be] corporate conclusion that plaintiff Manuela T. Vda. de Salvatierra was really made to believe
shareholders. In acting on behalf of a corporation which he knew to be that such corporation was duly organized in accordance with law.