Left and Right in Comparative Politics

Detlef Jahn
University of Greifswald

Abstract
This paper takes advantage of the fact that party manifesto data are freely available. The reliable and
transparent coding of party manifestos allows for the testing of theories and hypotheses. In this paper I
focus on the left-right index which is important in many areas of political science. Although the RILE,
developed by the Comparative Party Manifest Group in the early 1990s, has been successfully applied to
many research questions, I suggest an alternative left-right index which is more flexible in identifying
country and time specific changes in the left-right discourse. This index consists of a left-right core index
which is closely related to a parsimonious concept of left and right deduced from political theory, on the
one hand. On the other hand, the index is open to other issues which align with the core left-right
statements and which change over time and space. These two elements of the left-right index make it
possible to analyze changes in the left-right semantic, a factor which has been emphasized in historical
and theoretical works.

However, I also demonstrate that the left-right index developed in this paper is able to address additional
research questions which are essential in comparative politics. Two further examples are provided: one
examines the importance of the left-right dimension over time and in specific countries and the other
introduces an index for ideological party cohesion. In particular, the latter index is seriously needed in
order to test and work with elaborated spatial theories.

Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts, May 15-
16, 2014 at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, room A 300, organized by MARPOR Manifesto
Research on Political Representation. Most of the data discussed in this paper can be downloaded at:
http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/.

1
There are not many data sets like that of the party manifesto project, recently termed MARPOR project.
It is unique in that it covers the analysis of party manifestos from most democratic countries from 1945
until the most recent elections. For the scientific community it is of great value that the data is free for
everybody to use and that the process of data collection is transparent and responsive to the needs of
the scientific community. The quality of the data is continuously improving and the methodology of using
the manifesto data has become increasingly elaborate over the years. All of this makes the party
manifesto data an invaluable tool for researchers and enables the scientific community to address new
research questions and to test established theories by using data for many parties and countries over a
long time period. In In previous work drawing on the MARPOR project and its predecessors, the data has
been presented for established Western democracies (Budge et al. 2001) and for the newly emerging
democracies in Central Eastern Europe (Klingemann et al. 2006). Some of the most recent work applying
this data set addresses fundamental statistical challenges and provides solutions for a better use of the
manifesto data (Volkens et al. 2013).

In this context it needs to be emphasized that suggestions for alternative concepts and methodologies
are only possible because the MARPOR project shares its findings with the scientific community. This
enables discussions about the most suitable ways of addressing pressing questions in political science.
One such question focused upon in this paper is concerned with the aggregation of party positions in
ideological dimensions. In comparative politics the left-right dimension has strong explanatory power
(McDonald and Budge 2005). Therefore, one major achievement of the MARPOR project is that it offers
a right-left (RILE) scale which places the parties on a left-right continuum. The above mentioned
publications therefore focus on the left-right position of the political parties in Eastern Europe, the
European Union and the OECD countries.
Since the positions of parties on the left-right dimension are of paramount importance for comparative
politics, I will address the issue of how to use this dimension in empirical studies. The left-right
dimension emerged from political discourses relevant in the 19th and early 20th century and has been
implied in the writings of Marx and Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Disraeli, Green, Spencers and many others.
Even more importantly, the left-right dimension is grounded in elaborated theoretical and even
philosophical debates (Lukes 1990; 2003; Bobbio 1996). For conceptual and analytical reasons it is
therefore essential to align empirical analysis with the theoretical studies in the field (Biezen and Saward
2008).
Although this index has been very successful in many areas of research (see for instance: Klingemann et
al. 1994; McDonald and Budge 2005) there are some issues which should be addressed when using the
RILE. Some authors see the difficulties implied in the construction of the RILE as a reason to offer
alternative indices (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Gabel and Huber 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Keman
2007). The author of this paper shares the concerns of the above mentioned authors that the RILE may
not be the best index when comparing many countries with different traditions and histories over a long
period of time. In order to offer a solution to the challenges of the RILE, I have constructed an alternative
left-right score (LR) (Jahn 2011) which may, in some cases, be more suitable and offers more analytical
options for party ideological analysis with party manifesto data (Jahn 2010; 2014; Jahn and Oberst 2012).

2
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. First, I summarize the rationale of the RILE
as it was presented in the original article by Laver and Budge. At the end of this section, I summarize
some of the shortcomings of this index which I wish to overcome with my own left-right (LR) index. Next,
I present the rationale of my alternative left-right index in section 2. In the third section, I present some
concepts and examples relating to how to use the LR and other ideological indices developed in the same
fashion. The indices developed in this paper are not only available for individual parties but also for veto
players (Jahn 2010) (http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/).1

The Right-Left (RILE) Index for Party Manifesto Data of the Party Manifesto Group
In a recent publication, Ian Budge and Thomas Meyer (2013: 105) are surprised that I assess the RILE as
inductive and that I would go with that against all the documentation from its first emergence
onwards. In order to justify my judgment I wish to summarize my reading of the history of constructing
and legitimizing the statements included in the RILE. I see clearly a trend from inductive procedures to
ever stronger deductive claims in the publications concerning the RILE. However, before I start this
analysis a remark on inductive and deductive research is in order.
I wish to emphasize that deductive reasoning is not at all superior to inductive inferences. However,
deductive and inductive approaches certainly have different advantages and shortcomings. Deductive
approaches allow for theory testing but are not as well tailored to fit empirical data. In fact it is exactly
the point that data might not fit the theory which determines the essence of the deductive approach.
Therefore, a deductive index of left and right asks whether the left-right dimension is still a valid tool to
analyze programmatic preferences in modern societies. A precondition for such an analysis is, of course,
that left and right are clearly defined. Conversely, an inductive approach starts out from empirical
observations. By summarizing the observable manifestations of left-right criteria, one looks for patterns
in the data and asks if there could be an underlying dimension which may be classified as left-right. The
obtained left-right dimension is then defined by the patterns of data which emerge from the analysis.
The advantage of an inductive approach is that it fits the index to the data whereas the disadvantage is
that it is more vulnerable to validity threats. However, most left-right indices use a combination of
deductive and inductive reasoning though with a different emphasis on one approach or the other. This
is certainly also true for RILE and the index introduced in this paper.

The original purpose of the analysis conducted by the party manifesto group was to test between spatial
models and a saliency theory. In the latter, political parties strive to increase the saliency of their favored
issues. In this view, issue ownership is the center of interest rather than maximizing votes based on left-
right position (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987). Since the coding scheme is built in this way, some
scholars question if it is even possible to retrospectively create a left-right index from the party
manifesto data (Harmel, Janda, and Tan 1995; Laver and Garry 2000). However, Laver and Budge (1992)
later constructed a Right-Left Index (RILE) from the PMG data.

1
There will also soon be an extensive documentation of the indices discussed in this paper for party and government positions
and veto players.
3
Starting out from 54 statements which were developed as a result of extensive experimentation and
discussion in the research group Laver and Budge (1992: 21) first collapsed categories that seemed to
be closely related to each other. Even if later it was proclaimed that the RILE was based on deductive
considerations and deduced from the writings of Marx and Burke (Klingemann et al. 2006: 6), this is not
really accurate as the seven subcategories were created in the following way:

The rationale behind the grouping of coding categories was based largely on the lessons learned
from original analysis. Certain theoretical distinctions between categories persistently forced
coders into awkward decisions, so these were combined. In addition, we did a large number of
exploratory factor analyses to search for combinations of variables that persistently loaded
together over a wide range of systems. (Laver and Budge 1992: 23)

That means that the seven subcategories were not constructed having different ideologies in mind (that
is, that they were not deduced in a systematic fashion from a theory of left and right) but rather that
some issue areas were grouped in a more or less inductive or intuitive manner. The seven subcategories
and the thirteen individual issues that were used for further analysis are summarized in Table 1.

The subcategories and remaining issues constituted 20 policy categories that were used in factor
analyses in order to establish a left and right dimension (first factor). 2 The factor analysis was conducted
for each of the eleven countries in the study.3 It turned out that the subcategories State Intervention
and Peace and Co-Operation loaded on the left, and Capitalist Economy and Social Conservatism
loaded on the right. Some items which also loaded more or less consistently either Left or Right in
the individual countries were included in the common left-right scale. So in the end, the left-hand end of
the scale was constructed by combining items of the subcategories State Intervention and Peace and
Co-Operation in addition to the single items of Democracy, Welfare State Expansion: positive,
Education: positive, and Labour Groups: positive. The right-hand end of the scale was constructed as
the sum of the frequency counts for Freedom and Human Rights and Military: positive in addition to
the items of the subcategories Capitalist Economy and Social Conservatism. The final scale was then
calculated by subtracting the frequencies of the thirteen left items from the thirteen right items.

2
En passant and without further specification Laver and Budge (1992: 25) tell us that certain coding categories were
excluded from subsequent analysis because they were very little referred to or because of their inherent theoretical ambiguity.
The excluded statements were: per101 (Foreign Special Relationship: positive), per102 (Foreign Special Relationship: negative),
per109 (Internationalism: negative), per302 (Centralization: positive), per304 (Political Corruption: negative), per405
(Corporatism: positive), per408 (Economic Goals), per409 (Keynesian Demand Management: positive), per415 (Marxist Analysis:
positive), per507 (Education Limitation: positive), per602 (National Way of Life: negative), per604 (Traditional Morality:
negative), per607 Multiculturalism: positive), per608 (Multiculturalism: negative), per702 (Labour Group: negative), and per704
(Middle Class and Professional Groups: positive). Underlined statements must have been dismissed because of theoretical
reasons since they are as frequently mentioned than included issues.
3
It is not clear what are these eleven countries. Only ten of them are mentioned in Laver and Budge (1992: 27):
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden. Also the time period of the
factor analysis is unclear. Later it was said that the data were investigated through factor analysis of the then existing MRG
data up to broadly 1983. (Klingemann et al. 2006: 6)
4
Table 1: Individual Categories of the RILE
New Category
State intervention
Quality of life
Peace and co-operation
Anti-establishment views
Capitalist economics
Social conservatism
Productivity and technology
Coding categories retained intact
104 Military: positive
108 European Community: positive
110 European Community: negative
201 Freedom and domestic human rights
202 Democracy
301 Decentralization
303 Government efficiency
503 Social justice
504 Social services expansion: positive
506 Education: positive
701 Labour groups
703 Agriculture and farmers
705 Underprivileged minorities
Source: Laver and Budge 1992: 24.
The inductive method of constructing the RILE in combination with the addition of statements which are
not theoretically connected to a left-right ideology makes the index ambiguous. In the way that half of
the statements coded in the PMG-dataset refer in one way or another to the left and right makes it very
difficult to interpret why some parties behave peculiarly (Pelizzo 2003). Others also saw some
Old categories
403 Regulation of capitalism
404 Economic planning
406 Protectionism: positive
412 Controlled economy
413 Nationalisation
501 Environmental protection
502 Art, sport, leisure and media
103 Decolonisation
105 Military: negative
106 Peace
107 Internationalism: positive
204 Constitutionalism: negative
304 Government corruption
602 Defense of national way of life: negative
604 Traditional morality: negative
401 Free enterprise
402 Incentives
407 Protectionism: negative
414 Economic, orthodoxy and efficiency
505 Social services expansion: negative
203 Constitutionalism: positive
305 Government effectiveness and authority
601 National way of life: positive
603 Traditional morality: positive
605 Law and order
606 National effort, social harmony
410 Productivity
411 Technology and infrastructure
5
inconsistencies in the RILE. Keman (2007: 79) concludes that the inclusion of aspects like military,
constitutionalism, morality, law and order, democracy, and so on in a left-right scale is not only
confusing, but also wrong. Including other matters of serious dispute that divide political parties and
their constituencies is certainly relevant for understanding electoral politics and party systems, as well as
policy-making by government. Yet, reducing these complex differences into one dimension or using
simple dichotomies is bad for comparability and conceptual clarity.4 In addition Keman points out that a
one-dimensional analysis would probably not be appropriate for most Western societies.

As I stressed before, the major problem of the RILE is its emphasis on inductive identification of a left-
right dimension (Jahn 2011). Of course, an inductive approach fits the scores to the data set, so that we
find a basic dimension in any case. However, what this dimension then means is less clear. This has also
been admitted by the researchers of the MARPOR project. Referring to their left items Klingemann et al.
(2006: 5-6) state: There is after all no logical or inherent reason why support for peace should be
associated with government interventionism However, a theory does exactly that: it combines
various issues with an inherent and logical reasoning. According to Klingemann et al. the association of
the statements is only justified because these statements are mentioned together by political parties:
The fact remains however that party ideologies do put them together. (Emphasis in original). Gabel
and Huber (2000: 95) even question the possibility to develop and defend arguments about inclusion,
exclusion, and relative importance of specific issues in order to construct a left-right scale
deductively. However, a deductive scale would make interpretation much easier. It could also answer the
question of whether what we conceptualize as left and right has still a meaning in practical politics today.

It is therefore a bit perplexing that in later publications - step by step - ever greater deductive claims
were raised concerning the RILE. Although it was stated that a priori theoretical coherence was the
prime consideration (Budge et al. 2001: 26) no reference whatsoever was made to any theory in the
first publications concerned with the construction of the RILE. Laver and Budge (1992) article was
technical in nature and theoretical claims were not made at all. In Budge et al. (2001: 21/22) it was said
that the left items refer to unspecified Marx writings and the right items are familiar from the
writings and speeches of exponents like Reagan and Thatcher. Since the latter personalities are
certainly not political theorists, in later writings right positions refer to Edmund Burke (Klingemann et al.
2006: 6). So far, the climax of the ex post theoretical underpinnings has been expressed by Budge (2013;
see also Budge and Meyer 2013: 88-90), who claimed that the left items refer to Marx, Engels and
Lenins writings and the right items are connected with the work of Disraeli, Green, and Spencer. Were
that mentioned in the original text during the construction of the RILE and if clearly identifiable
arguments of the mentioned authors would be consistent with the 26 items dealing with right and left,
the RILE would have been deductive. However, when we look at the history of the construction of the
RILE, one can only conclude that inductive motives of finding issues which parties link together (Budge et
al. 2001: 21) have been the major interest.

4
As an alternative Keman (2007) suggests a left-right index which includes only socio-economic topics (see also Bartolini and
Mair (1990) for a similar approach).
6
The RILE has other shortcomings which disturb the construction of a valid left-right index and limit its use
for addressing other important questions of party ideology. One major problem is that the RILE treats
each statement included in the RILE as equal. That means, for example, that the claim of nationalizing
the industry weights as strongly left as demanding the expansion of education. Although it has often
been claimed that the degree of rightness and leftness is important and that there is indeed a hierarchy
of right and left statements 5, the RILE makes no distinction of how strong different left and right
statements are. That can lead to the result that some mild left statements and one strong right
statement makes a party radically left although there are good reasons to assume the opposite.

An issue in the research of political ideologies is also whether political ideologies change over time or
differ in various national contexts. The RILE treats left and right as constant over time and across
countries. However, it has often been claimed that the semantic of left and right has changed over time
and is dependent on country specific conditions (Bartolini 2000; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). As
Benoit and Laver (2006: 202) demonstrate, the left-right semantic has a specific meaning for everybody;
suggesting that correlating left-right positions with other policy issues in order to specify what is left and
right shows that left and right means something very different in the countries under investigation. That
is, the meaning of the left-right dimension is not the same across different national contexts. And even
more so Benoit and Laver (2006: 203) conclude: we might extend this conclusion to speculate that the
substantive meaning of left and right might also change over time, with equally deep implications for the
interpretation of times series of party positions, even in one country, on some common left-right scale.
Furthermore, there are some voices which doubt that the left-right dimension is still as dominant as
some decades ago and that other political dimensions have increased in importance or modify the left-
right dimension substantially (Kitschelt 1984; Giddens 1994). It would therefore be essential to have a
left-right index which could identify the core of the left right ideology and the special features of left and
right in specific countries and periods. With such an index one could also answer questions of whether
the left-right semantic is in decline or if it is able to renew itself by aligning with new issues (according to
the saying that there is life in the old dog yet).
Having an index which identifies changes in left and right could also focus on questions relating to which
parties are left or right and why. The left-right ideology is plagued by the fact that everybody has an
intuitive feeling about which party is left or right. However, often these deeply rooted feelings are based
on inflexible presumptions which are not open to ideological shifts in reality. This in turn often leads to
the conclusion that indices are perceived as wrong when they do not match held assumptions. More
importantly, such a perspective neglects subtle and substantial shifts of party positions.

Another point to mention is that party ideology is not only the position of a party on a continuum from
left to right. In party research, political ideology also has other important aspects. One neglected aspect
in empirical studies which obtains high importance in analytical terms is ideological party cohesion. Most
scholars strongly agree that political parties as collective actors are by definition not unitary actors and
that party cohesion is an important analytical and substantive issue with fundamental consequences for

5
Advocating public ownership of industries puts one far to the left; desires to have government closely regulated privately
owned firms are not quite as far left. (McDonald, Mendes, and Kim 2007, 3).
7
theoretical modeling and empirical analysis, as well as with practical implications. Therefore, it would be
an advantage if a left-right index is able to grasp other important aspects of party ideology beyond
position such as the concept of party cohesion. As I will show in this paper, the LR-index can address thi
question in contrast to the RILE.

Finally, there are also some methodological concerns which apply to the RILE. In general one can
question if factor analysis is appropriate for the number of observations and the character of the data. In
particular, the second aspect raises concern. The party manifesto data are certainly not normally
distributed. The RILE scores are based on counting the frequency of various statements. Such a variable
is a typical case of a count variable, which normally has no normal distribution. An inspection of the
party manifesto data shows that most statements are highly skewed. In this case, it is not appropriate to
use a linear factor analysis but rather a nonlinear factor-analytic model based on latent class analysis
(Vermunt and Magidson 2005) or alternative techniques (see below).

How to Grasp the Changing Meaning of Left and Right: Towards a Country and Time Specific Left-Right
Index
In order to construct a left-right index which addresses the issues mentioned above, I analyze the 56
statements of the party manifesto coding by distinguishing between a core of left and right which have
been systematically deduced from political theory and additional statements which are country and time
specific. In order to estimate the degree of leftness and rightness, I use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)
for each statement which has been included in the LR index. That means that my index consists of three
elements: a left-right core (LR_core), additional left-right issues (LR_plus), and the estimation of the
degree of leftness and rightness of each issue included in the index. My starting point is the theory of left
and right developed by Noberto Bobbio (1996). My approach can be briefly summarized in the following
way (for details see Jahn 2011):

P1: Bobbio defines the political left as linked to equality and the political right as legitimizing inequality.

P2: A set of positional issues is identified as being linked to equality and inequality.

C1: This set of issues is the core of left or right.

P3: Not all issues are equally radical.

C2: The radicalism of issues can be estimated by the use of these issues by political parties (MDS).

P4: Left and right are defined in national and temporal contexts.

C3: Issues which correlate significantly with the core left-right issues are country and/or period specific issues.

P5: Not all of the country and time specific issues are equally radical.

C4: The radicalism of issues can be estimated by the use of these issues by political parties (MDS).

8
The LR_core is deductive in that it uses ten left-right issues from the party manifesto data set which are
found in Bobbios theory of left and right. I made a systematic content analysis of Bobbios book and
deduced which items of the party manifesto data fit his argument. Propositions P1, P2 and the empirical
conclusion C1 are therefore purely deductive and set the groundwork for further analysis.

The LR_core is a universal (across countries and time) left-right index. That is, it is stable and has no
context specific elements. The core issues are specific features of left and right. Without referring to
these issues as left and right, a left-right index would be meaningless. Therefore, they are in fact left-
right issues over all countries and time periods. In a second step, I estimate the radicalism of each issue
(P3 and C2). Although it makes sense to claim that the demand for nationalization is more radical left
than the demand of market regulation, it is not possible to determine theoretically the degree to which
these two issues are differentially radical. I therefore use an inductive approach to determine the degree
of radicalism.
Table 2 summarizes the statements that I use for further analysis of the left-right dimension of political
parties in highly developed democratic industrial societies. The table ranks these statements according
to their correspondence to the core of the three classical ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth
century. The theoretical reasons for using just these statements is extensively given in another
publication (Jahn 2011):

Table 2: Core Left/Right Statements

LEFT
Scientific Socialism
Nationalization (per413)
Controlled Economy (per412)
Economic Planning (per404)
Market Regulation (per403)
RIGHT
Liberal
Welfare State Limitation (per505)
Free Enterprise (per401)
Economic Orthodoxy (per414)
Conservative
Traditional Morality (per603)
Social Harmony (per606)
National Way of Life (per601)

Explanations: Numbers refer to the statements of the PMG data. Statements of each dimension are shown from up to down in
order of degree.

We can derive the following assumptions from the theoretical analysis. First, as pointed out above, there
may be a hierarchy of importance of the party manifesto data according to their association with the
concept of equality or inequality. Second, if the analytical conclusion that the left has a one-dimensional
claim while the right is divided into Conservatives and Liberals is correct, the results should reflect this
triangular constellation. However, this would also mean that the very concept of left and right is not one-
dimensional but refers to at least two dimensions which are made up of the three ideologies. If that is so,
the endeavor of constructing a one-dimensional left-right scale can only exhibit limited success. I chose
not to elaborate on this point in this article in order to keep the presentation short (for a discussion and
empirical analysis of the dimensionality of left and right see for instance Marks et al. 2002; Benoit and
Laver 2006).
In order to construct a new index that meets all the criteria mentioned above I apply a three step
approach. First, I construct a general index deduced from political philosophy which is generalizable over
countries and over time (the core of left and right). Second, I use regression analysis in order to identify
9
country and time specific components of left and right. Finally, I sum up both components in a new left-
right index.

For the first step, I apply the multidimensional scaling technique. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a set
of data analysis techniques that display the structure of distance-like data as a geometrical picture
(Coxon 1982; Cox and Cox 2001). An advantage of MDS over factor analysis is that it can be applied to
count variables.
For the analysis, the choice of time periods and countries is highly relevant. The RILE is based on an
analysis of ten or eleven countries for the period between the second half of the 1940s until around
1983. A reason for this selection other than data availability has not been provided. I decided to use the
Post-Second World War data until the oil crisis in 1973 (the cut-off date is October 1, 1973). The oil crisis
represents a date when the continuity of post war development was questioned to a significant degree
for the first time. After this date, some countries (above all Norway and Denmark) experienced major
changes in their party systems (although because of the issue of European integration). Deciding on this
time period excludes the new European democracies Greece, Spain, and Portugal from the calculation of
the core left-right statements. 6
With respect to the selection of countries, I include all established and democratic OECD countries in
order to identify a left-right dimension. I experimented with different samples. For instance, it could be
argued that the left-right semantic is mainly a European issue and is less relevant to the new world
countries and Japan. However, this hypothesis is not convincing since left and right also have different
meanings among European states (Bartolini 2000). 7 Figure 1 shows the plot of the derived stimulus
configuration of the above introduced core statements for left, liberal, and conservative ideologies,
respectively. The analysis is based on a two dimensional solution.

6
Further analysis with different time periods shows that the results are robust. However, in order to anchor the left-right scale I
had to decide for a cut-off point that makes sense analytically. Determining the cut-off point was guided by substantial and
methodological considerations. Substantially one could also have used 1968 as cut-off point since the left-right discourse was
severely altered because of the intervention of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia (emergence of Euro-Communism). Another
cut-off point could have been 1980 since in the early 1980s a left libertarian discourse gained momentum (Kitschelt 1994).
Furthermore, liberal discourse was radicalized by the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. From a methodological
standpoint, the shorter the core time period, the better one can identify changes in the meaning of left and right over time. On
the other hand, a short time period contains too few observations to make meaningful data analysis possible. A compromise
between these two claims had to be found. This is not relevant for the analysis of the core statements which we debate here
but this period determines the number of observations (a party at an election) in the following analysis of the extra-statements
which is based on country analysis. Since that analysis is conducted as moving election periods the core period determines the
length (or, better, the number of elections) for further analysis. From this perspective, a period from the 1940s until 1980 seems
too long. On the other hand, the country with the lowest number of observations influences the regressions. That is the case for
the USA which has only two observations (Democrats and Republicans) for each election. The elections from 1948 until 1972
lead to N = 14, which is still very low but acceptable in a bivariate regression. It would be 10 if 1968 was the cut-off point and 16
if 1980 was used.
7
After careful consideration I have decided that it is not appropriate to exclude the USA, Japan or other non-European countries
in order to avoid ethnocentrism. I have included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States. Results with subsets, however, have always arrived at the same triangle results between left and
conservative/liberal.
10
Figure 1: Derived Stimulus Configuration Plot (Euclidean Distance Model) for the Left-Right Dimension
2

per601

1
per603

per606

per404
0 per401
per413 per403 per414

per412
-1

per505

-2

-2 -1 0 1 2
Left vs. Right

Explanation: Nationalization (per413),Controlled Economy (per412), Economic Planning (per404), Market Regulation (per403),
Welfare State Limitation (per505), Free Enterprise (per401), Economic Orthodoxy (per414), National Way of Life (per601),
Traditional Morality (per603), Social Harmony (per606). Number of observations = 745. The number of the per refers to the
statements as mentioned in Budge et al. 2001 and Klingemann et al. 2006.

The plot clearly shows a triangle, demonstrating that the right is divided in a conservative and liberal
camp.8 In general, all ideological statements group into the hypothesized categories. The plot shows
strikingly that Controlled Economy, Economic Planning and to a very impressive degree
Nationalization are the most radical left statements. Market Regulation is a more moderate left
statement. In the liberal ideology, limiting the welfare state and the claim for Free Enterprise are, as
predicted, the most radical right statements. The three conservative statements all fall perfectly
together. The plot also demonstrates that the conservative statements constitute their own dimension
and are isolated from the liberal-right statements. In terms of left and right the reference to Traditional
Morality is the most radical conservative statement and Social Harmony the least radical. The analysis
also shows that left items are more in opposition with the liberal than with the conservative items.

Overall, the data align themselves impressively with the theoretically deducted positions, supporting the
chosen deductive approach. In the next step, I will use the empirical findings from the theoretical
statements for a left-right score of political parties in highly industrialized democracies. In order to
construct a left-right scale of the core statements, I weight the frequency of each statement with the
stimulus coordinates of the first (left-right) dimension.9 This index is called LR_core.

8
The model needs five iterations. After this the S-stress improvement is less than 0.001. The final matrix stress value is 0.10. An
RSQ of 0.94 shows that 94 percent of the variance in the MDS space is accounted for by the input data. If I force the analysis on
one dimension, I need eight iterations and the matrix stress value increases to 0.23 (RSQ = .82). Generally, a value lower than .1
is excellent while a value between .1 and .2 is acceptable.
9
The stimulus coordinates scores for each statement are: Nationalization 2.06; Controlled Economy 1.55; Economic Planning
1.27; Market Regulation 0.38; National Way of Life -0.53; Traditional Morality -1.09; Social Harmony -0.28; Free Enterprise -1.09;
11
LR_core = (per413p * Sper413) + (per412p * Sper412) + (per404p * Sper404) + (1)
(per403p * Sper403) + (per505p * Sper505) + (per401p * Sper401) +
(per414p * Sper414) + (per603p * Sper603) + (per606p * Sper606) +
(per601p * Sper601)
Explanation: p = percentage of statement; S = stimulus coordinate scores of the first dimension of each statement (per).

In the third step, I test for additional issues which are aligned with the LR_core. The assumption here is
that the left-right dimension changes and is context specific (time and country) as suggested by Bartolini,
and Benoit and Laver (P4). However, in order to be labeled left or right it needs to correlate with the
LR_core (C3).
In order to identify the extra-statements I use the core left-right score, as developed above, as an
independent variable for each statement not included in the core left-right index. If the absolute value of
the z-value (coefficient divided by standard error) is greater +/-2, I include the statement as an extra left-
right issue (LR_plus).10 Otherwise, I do not use it as a component of the left-right index. In order to
obtain country and time-specific scores, I use moving time periods in each country, starting from the
period of the first post-war election until the last election before October 1, 1973. Then I use the period
from the second post-war election until the first election after October 1973 and so on until I reach to
the last election in the MARPOR data for each country.

In order to account for the non-normal distribution, I apply three different regression models: a normal
OLS-regression model, a Poisson regression model, and a negative binomial regression model (Cameron
and Trivedi 1998; Hilbe 2007). In some instances, count variables approximate a normal distribution. In
this case a linear regression is acceptable (Hoffmann 2004: 101). More often, however, the statements'
frequencies have a rapidly descending tail. This means that the appearance of these statements is a rare
event. Therefore, the variables' distribution often peaks at one or two (or the respective percentage
value) and then becomes much rarer at higher values. Count variables, especially when they gauge rare
events, often follow a Poisson distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). However, Poisson regression
models are only appropriate in cases of rare events and granted that the variance more or less equals
the mean. Closer inspection of the statements shows that this is not true in most cases for party
manifesto data. If the variance is much larger than the mean, there is an issue of overdispersed variables.
Given that the dependent variable is overdispersed, an alternative approach for rare events has to be
used: the negative binomial regression (NB) model. As a rule, I used the threshold of the overdispersion
parameter alpha = 1 until I switched from Poisson models to NB. In the rare cases where the dependent
variable approximated a normal distribution, I used linear OLS. In addition to relying on statistical
parameters, I further inspected all variables and bivariate correlations visually (histograms and scatter
plots) in order to judge the appropriate model. This is also important because sometimes there are too

Economic Orthodoxy -0.79; Limited Welfare State -1.47. In order to make our LR index comparable with the other indices we
changed the sign by multiplying the stimulus coordinate scores with -1.
10
I use z-values instead of significance levels since we do not work with a sample but the universe of policy statements at
elections (King 1986).
12
few positive observations in order to conduct reliable calculations. In this case, statements have not
been considered for the indices.11

The statements that have been identified as extra-statements by the regression analyses have been
entered in a new MDS-analysis for the respective time periods in the countries. Their stimulus scores on
the first dimension12 of these extra-statements (LR_plus) have been added to the stimulus scores of the
core left-right statements (LR_core) in order to get the final Left-Right (LR) score.
LR_plus = (LRXper * LRXS) (2)

Explanations: LRX = extra-statements identified through regression analysis; per = percentage of the is statements; S = stimulus
coordinate score of the is statement.

LR = LR_core + LR_plus (3)

Extending the Analysis of Left and Right

In this part of the paper I will give some examples of how the LR index extends the party ideological
analysis and addresses important questions in current comparative politics. The issues are the different
meanings of left and right in countries and over time, the relevance of the left-right dimension in various
countries and periods of time, and finally the measurement of ideological party cohesion.

Changing Meaning of Left and Right in Space and Time

The RILE is a left-right score that contains almost half of all statements (pers) used in the party manifesto
coding. This large number of items guarantees that the left-right scale has enough issues to reach a
result. The disadvantage is that one is not sure which of the many included items make up the left-right
position for a specific party in a specific period of time. This is a general conceptual problem which has
already been addressed above by constructing an alternative LR-index. More specific is the question
relating to how far the left-right dimension has to be modified because new issues arise or align with the
left-right dimension. Volkens et al. (2013: 5) state: Helpful suggestions are often made about updating
the scale to conform to the way issues are grouped now (at any rate in electoral surveys) adding green
issues to the left for example or opposition to the EU on the right. The response to this request is
negative because such suggestions run up against the consideration of continuity and cross-national
comparison because: what substantive research implications can one draw from left-right
movement involving different issues at different times? (ibid.).

11
This ends up in around 1.400 regressions (3 regression models * ten time periods * 46 statements) for each country (in total
around 30.000 regressions). There are on average 10 time periods for each country. For the USA there are for instance 9 time
periods: 1948-1972, 1952-1976, 1956-1980, 1960-1984, 1964-1988, 1965-1992, 1972-1996, 1976-2000, and 1980-2004, (N=14).
12
In some instances, I used the second dimension or changed the sign. In order to estimate which sign and dimension should be
used I used the core items, especially Nationalization and Limited Welfare State as orientation. In the case of Japan it was often
difficult to determine which dimension should be used. This is, of course, a clear indicator that the classical left-right items are
not clear demarcation items and that therefore the left-right dimension is not very clear in Japan. The left-right dimension was
sometimes second in Canada, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. However, in these cases it was clearly identifiable.
13
Addressing the latter question first: does the RILE really allow for the identification of an unambiguous
identification of the left-right dimension? Since the RILE contains so many issues, one simply does not
know what makes the left-right position in country i at time t. It could be that it was military negative
and peace and nationalization in country k at time x, but democracy, education, and
internationalism in country k at time y, and another combination in country m at time x and again
another at time y. The different issue bias is also implicitly given in the RILE. Only it is hopelessly
hidden and implicit in the lavishly constructed RILE.

However, lets turn to the empirical question. Are green and EU issues part of the left-right dimension?
In the LR-index these issues are not included in the LR_core. In this way, the RILE and LR index agree.
However, the LR index also contains extra-statements and therefore the question is whether the green
and EU issues are taken on board in the LR index.
Concerning environmentalism I use per416 (Anti-Growth Economy: positive) and per501 (Environmental
Protection: positive). Using these two variables as independent variables and LR_core as dependent
variable gives this assumption some support. In most countries green issues are becoming part of the left
ideology. This is so, for example, in Australia since 1996, Austria since 1994, Germany since 1987, Italy
since 1992, New Zealand since 1999, Sweden since 1991, and Switzerland since 1983. In other countries
green issues are aligned to the left over the whole period of analysis (Canada, the Netherlands, and
Norway). However, there are exceptions. In Belgium and France green issues belong to the ideological
right and for Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States green issues do
not belong to the left-right dimension at all.

I obtain an even more diverse picture when looking at EU membership (per108 and per110 that is
European Integration: positive and negative). For most countries the pro-EU position is aligned with the
right and anti-EU sentiments align with the left. First of all, this is contrary to the assumption expressed
above by Volkens et al. However, in Belgium it was vice versa from 1946 to 1974 and the left only
integrated an anti-EU stand starting in 1987. In Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland,
European integration is not an issue of the left-right dimension at all. In the Netherlands, EU
membership was neutral until the last two elections (2006 and 2010) when anti-EU positions have gone
together with the right ideology. Even if pro- or anti-EU positions were engaged, it was so seldom that
the EU issue divided the left and right in a way that both ideologies aligned with different positions
simultaneously. However, this was the case in Belgium from 1946-1974, in Denmark 1979-87, in France
in 1978, in Italy in 1979 and in 1992, in Luxembourg 1999-2009, in Portugal for the whole period, in Spain
since 2008, and in Sweden since 1998.

The example of Sweden in Table 3 shows how extra-statements are aligned to the left-right dimension
over time.

14
Table 3: LR_Plus Statements in Sweden in the Elections from 1982 to 2010

per* Variable Name** 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
per101 foreign special + Right Right
per102 foreign special -
per103 anti-imperialism +
per104 military + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per105 military - Left Left Left Left Left Left Left
per106 peace + Left Left Left Left Left
per107 internat + Left
per108 europe + Right Right Right Right Right Right
per109 internat -
per110 europe - Left Left Left Left
per201 freedom-hum rights + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per202 democracy + Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left
per203 constitut +
per204 constitut -
per301 decentral +
per302 central +
per303 gov-admin efficiency + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per304 pol corruption -
per305 pol authority +
per402 incentives + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per405 corporatism +
per406 protectionism + Left Left Left Left Left Left
per407 protectionism -
per408 economic goals Left Left
per409 keynesian demand +
per410 productivity + Left
per411 infrastructure +
per415 marxist analysis +
per416 anti-growth econ +
per501 environmental protection + Left Left Left Left Left Left
per502 culture +
per503 social justice + Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left
per504 welfare + Right Left Left Left Left Left Left Left
per506 education + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per507 education -
per602 nat way life -
per604 trad moral -
per605 law and order + Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
per607 multicult +
per608 multicult -
per701 labour + Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left Left
per702 labour -
per703 farmers + Right Right Right
per704 middle class +
per705 minority groups + Left Left Left
per706 non-economic groups + Left Left Left Left Left

Explanations: * per refers to the items of the CMP; ** refers to the variable labels of the CMP (see Budge et al. 2001;
Klingemann et al. 2006).

15
This analysis shows that the left-right dimension is a living dimension and that it continually integrates
new issues. This integration is not uniform in all the countries or over time. However, this finding is not
new. Bartolini (2000) has shown how left and right were expressed differently in different countries and
over time and the classic example is probably the debate about mass strikes between Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Kausky in the German labor movement which spread with different emphasis all over Europe
and beyond.

The Relevance of the Left-Right Dimension over Time and Space

Identifying the relevance or importance of an ideological dimension is essential for many party
ideological analyses such as in spatial analysis (Benoit and Laver 2006; Warwick 2006; Tsebelis 2002).
However, in order to measure the importance of the left-right dimension, it is also essential to estimate
the meaning of left and right in a society and period of time. There is an easy way of identifying the
importance of the left-right dimension in countries over time. This can be done by summing up the
percentage score of the left and right statements and dividing this number by all statements mentioned.
In this way I get a simple percentage value for the left-right dimension (LR_imp). This index shows the
strength of the affinity of the left-right dimension over time and in different countries. This score can be
compared to the importance of the core left-right statements (LR_core_imp) and the importance of the
extra-statements (LR_plus_imp). Comparing both importance scores gives us further insight into the
changing meaning of left and right across time and space.

Table 4: The Importance of Core and Additional Left-Right Issues over Time and Countries

1945-1969 1970-1989 1990-2011

LR LR_core LR_plus LR LR_core LR_plus LR LR_core LR_plus
Australia 60.44 26.16 34.28 52.34 21.22 31.12 56.82 17.27 39.55
Austria 41.74 21.30 20.44 37.53 15.80 21.73 62.20 13.24 48.96
Belgium 63.93 15.62 48.30 54.27 12.42 41.85 55.82 10.42 45.41
Canada 48.07 11.75 36.33 44.64 13.71 30.94 58.39 13.02 45.37
Denmark 59.35 26.39 32.96 61.66 24.64 37.02 57.83 15.91 41.92
Finland 29.93 20.24 9.69 45.06 21.99 23.07 41.84 15.77 26.07
France 68.74 14.29 54.44 67.32 19.80 47.52 51.66 13.74 37.92
Germany 37.31 17.29 20.03 41.06 11.82 29.24 65.98 12.16 53.83
Iceland 41.01 17.71 23.30 38.48 14.93 23.55 40.16 12.83 27.33
Ireland 31.24 18.20 13.04 23.80 11.96 11.84 42.64 12.59 30.05
Italy 56.78 17.18 39.60 41.49 10.86 30.63 55.35 13.97 41.39
Japan 45.37 10.27 35.10 41.56 11.38 30.18 29.64 10.50 19.14
Luxembourg 30.09 15.89 14.20 34.70 12.92 21.77 54.97 10.18 44.79
Netherlands 73.67 21.50 52.17 65.89 11.77 54.13 57.28 12.76 44.52
New Zealand 70.66 23.82 46.85 57.23 12.13 45.10 48.99 17.80 31.20
Norway 56.03 17.72 38.30 69.83 15.57 54.26 69.71 13.04 56.67
Sweden 66.59 26.11 40.48 63.62 19.20 44.42 78.94 15.91 63.03
Switzerland 53.14 20.71 32.43 52.25 19.83 32.42 60.36 25.54 34.82
United Kingdom 41.68 20.29 21.39 42.55 17.69 24.86 36.27 9.43 26.84
United States 36.85 14.96 21.89 32.58 11.61 20.97 38.00 15.30 22.70
Total 52.16 19.52 32.64 51.21 16.47 34.74 54.12 14.30 39.82

16
For all countries with an uninterrupted time-series from around 1950-2011 the LR_core declines in
importance when parties refer to the left-right dimension. Exceptions are only Japan, Canada and the
United States, all of which increased the LR_core issues on a low level in addition to Switzerland where
LR_core issues increased substantially in the last time period analyzed. Although the index of
importance is rather stable for the LR, the additional issues have been more frequently mentioned over
time. This is especially notable for Austria, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden. It is also interesting that
the left-right issues increased in the last period. Data shown online demonstrate that the LR increased to
a record high of almost 60 percent in the period after the start of the economic crisis in 2008. However,
even in this period the core left-right issues increased only slightly to 14.55 percent.

Three conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the core issues are less relevant in recent
years. Second, parties are able to modernize the left-right semantic by integrating new issues into their
ideology. Third, the modernized left-right dimension is still a relevant policy dimension in modern
Western societies, particularly during periods of economic hardship.

Ideological Party Cohesion

In order to construct an index of party cohesion from party manifesto data, I make use of the various
degrees of leftness and rightness of the pers included in a party manifesto (for details see Jahn and
Oberst 2012). The degrees of radicalism of the statements have been derived from stimulus scores of a
multi-dimensional scaling analysis. From these scores, I calculate the weighted average deviation of the
left-right statements used by a party at a specific election. The unit of analysis is the stimulus score of the
left-right statement at the time of a particular election. In order to calculate the average deviation, I use
the weighted average absolute deviation. It is also called the mean absolute deviation (ad). This
measure of statistical dispersion is more robust than the standard deviation. This is necessary because
the data contains many outliers. As a robust measure of dispersion, it is well-suited for an analysis with a
large N. I weight the ad with the frequency of use of a specific ideological statement in the CMP data as
shown in Formula 1:

| |

In the formula, adw is the weighted average deviation. The term wi is the weight for the ith observation,
which is the frequency of use of a specific statement (this is called per in the CMP data set). The
stimulus score in the ith statement is xi, while b calculates the arithmetic mean of all stimulus scores.
Another aspect of party cohesion, particularly in a multi-dimensional context, is the importance of an
ideological dimension. It is of immense relevance whether a party is incohesive with regard to a central
or a peripheral ideological dimension. The Index of Party Cohesion (IPC) in a uni-dimensional space is the
product of the standardized adw (multiplied by 100 for cosmetic reasons) and the square root of the

17
standardized importance (also multiplied by 100). I used the square root of standardized importance in
order to control for outliers. In addition, I have reduced the impact of the importance scores in relation
to the adw, which is analytically justifiable because the importance is not as central to the concept of
party cohesion as ideological variance.

By combining ideological variance and importance, I am able to analyze multi-dimensional ideological

cohesion. However, a multi-dimensional analysis of party cohesion has to include the relevant ideological
dimensions in a country or a party. For instance, in some countries or parties ethnic, regional and
religious aspects are relevant. In other countries or parties conflicts about ecological priorities, European
integration and globalization are more acute. A precondition to conduct an analysis of multi-dimensional
party cohesion is to identify and operationalize the various country-specific ideological cleavages. In
order to remain focused on the principal purpose of the IPC in theoretical and methodological terms, and
to keep the presentation transparent, I limit myself to the left-right dimension. As an example, I present
the data for the various party families. In another article (Jahn and Oberst 2012) I traced the party
cohesion in the left-right dimension back in time (1945-2010) for the social democratic parties in the
established OECD countries.
Table 5 shows the ideological party cohesion in the left-right dimension grouped according to party
families in 23 OECD countries from 1950 to 2010. According to the IPC ecological, regional, and agrarian
parties are most cohesive in the left-right dimension. Large parties (Christian democrats, conservatives
and liberal parties) which may have a catch all ideology are those with the highest IPC. The low score of
the social democratic parties may come as a surprise but the range shows that social democratic parties
differ substantially (Jahn and Oberst 2012). For instance, the social democratic party in Luxemburg
(18.28) and Sweden (21.8) are very united in contrast to social democratic parties in France (41.12),
United Kingdom (41.25), and Switzerland (41.66). That said, it is also important that party cohesion
varies over time. The British Labour Party for instance had a record high IPC score in the first 1974
election (74.03) but came close to average under the leadership of Tony Blair (30.98).

Table 5: Ideological Party Cohesion in the Left-Right Dimension and Party Families
LR Cohesion
Mean Min Max SD
Ecology party 21.78 4.08 64.26 10.59
Communist 32.08 0 116.3 14.55
Social Democratic 26.70 0 74.03 10.78
Liberal 30.10 5.42 63.11 10.79
Christian Democratic 31.03 0 62.23 10.28
Conservative 31.07 0 66.50 11.21
Nationalist 31.56 0.85 70.13 11.37
Agrarian 26.44 0 57.04 11.95
Ethnic and Regional 24.25 0.67 42.64 8.16
Special Issue 35.37 7.05 71.31 15.61
No information 27.66 13.50 100 23.93
Total 29.08 0 116.3 11.86

18
Not surprisingly communist parties are much divided in the left-right dimension. On average they are
actually the party family with the highest IPC scores (together with special issue parties).

When considering party cohesion on the country level we see a high degree of diversity. Overall, the
elections in the post-World War II period and over all parties included in the party manifesto data set,
party cohesion in the left-right dimension is high in Luxemburg, Ireland, Iceland, and the United States. In
some of these countries party cohesion is high because parties are united in their left-right stand but in
others (above all Ireland and the US), the left-right dimension is not highly relevant.

Table 6: Ideological Party Cohesion in the Left-Right Dimension in 23 OECD Countries

23 OECD States LR Cohesion

Country Mean Min Max SD

Australia 24.90 7.87 46.91 7.07

Austria 27.62 6.70 62.18 8.96
Belgium 27.73 6.99 63.11 9.51
Canada 30.73 6.79 62.51 11.10
Denmark 41.47 0 91.00 14.85
Finland 25.26 0 59.86 13.17
France 36.64 13.26 61.21 9.12
Germany 25.51 0.67 43.21 9.13
Greece 30.57 17.49 52.54 9.75
Iceland 23.82 0 48.35 9.75
Ireland 21.89 0 116.30 12.10
Italy 24.20 0 49.84 8.17
Japan 26.09 0 59.70 11.76
Luxembourg 18.96 0 49.77 7.85
Netherlands 34.42 7.05 62.23 11.84
New Zealand 33.30 2.75 71.31 10.68
Norway 29.49 14.69 52.14 8.90
Portugal 28.67 4.08 64.26 8.63
Spain 25.55 13.50 41.19 6.09
Sweden 32.77 7.99 68.43 12.70
Switzerland 32.98 9.44 71.50 11.65
Great Britain 30.62 11.80 74.03 9.40
USA 22.80 10.84 40.84 6.54
Total 29.08 0 116.30 11.86

Countries where the left-right cleavage leads to intra-party conflict are the Netherlands, France and,
above all, Denmark. However, as the statistics show there is high variation between parties and over
time in many countries.

Even if I could only give a descriptive account of an index of ideological party cohesion here, the value of
this index is mainly for analytical studies. Analytically, there is very little disagreement that party
cohesion is important. In the context of US politics, Cox and McCubbins (2005) demonstrate that party
cohesion increases (positive) agenda setting power and in Tsebelis (2002: 45-51) veto player theory,
party cohesion is a crucial analytical variable. Also for spatial analysis, cohesion is an important analytical
variable which could often not have been taken into account because of a lack of available data.
19
Conclusion

In this paper I present a LR-index which overcomes some problems of the RILE and which is more flexible
to address other questions concerning party ideology than just placing party on a left-right scale. The
major deficiencies of the RILE is its strong reliance on an inductive approach of identifying left and right
statements. Closely connected to this is the fact that the RILE includes too many statements for a specific
analysis about the meaning of left and right (almost half of all pers). Furthermore, the RILE does not
distinguish the degree of being left and right for each statement. All statements weigh equally although
it is obvious that they conform differently to the left-right dimension. Finally, the RILE perceives the left-
right dimension as constant over space and time. While this may be so for the core of the left-right
dimension, left and right are constantly up-dated in the political discourse and this takes different forms
in specific contexts. I therefore introduce a LR-index which addresses these issues.

First of all the LR-index discussed in this paper is appropriate for analyzing changes of left and right in
time and space. By combining a theoretically deduced index of the core left-right dimension which is
stable over space and time, on the one hand, and the statements which align to these core statements,
on the other hand, I am able to demonstrate the changes in left and right with a varying index without
losing the ability to identify the meaning of left and right. Additionally, I show in this paper that this index
is able to analyze new aspects of left and right which are highly relevant in comparative politics and
which have been discussed in political theory and in analytical modelling.
Three examples have been given in this paper. First, I have shown how the core of left and right is
aligned to new issues. In particular, I analyzed how green issues and the EU is related to a left-right
dimension. The results show that the alignment of these issues is highly time and country specific. In
most countries green issues have been aligned to the left-right dimensions in recent years. However,
there are important exceptions. The European integration issue is less easily put into a left-right
dimension. Countries vary much more and change positions over time.
By looking at the importance of the left-right dimension over time and in specific countries it became
clear that the core left-right statements lose importance and that the left-right sematic is altered over
time. However, it could also be shown that in the face of economic hardship the left-right dimension is
revived again. Even if the left-right dimension has been relevant over the entirety of the post war period,
it has increased in importance in recent years since the economic crisis after 2008.
Finally, I showed that the LR index introduced in this paper (see also Jahn 2011) can be used to estimate
the ideological cohesion of political parties. Introducing an index for ideological party cohesion is
seriously needed in order to test and work with elaborated spatial theories. The paper offers a
suggestion on how to deal with this issue with a time and party specific index that is suitable for
sophisticated analysis which pools unit of analysis and periods of time.

None of these analyses would be possible if the MARPOR project and its predecessors had not been so
generously open and responsive to the needs of the scientific community. I therefore wish to end with a
deep thank you and I hope that researchers of the MARPOR project do not feel frustrated by the
20
expressed criticism of some aspects of the RILE. This was only possible because of the transparence and
openness of the MARPOR.

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