Ethics and the Limits of Scientific Freedom

Author(s): Peter Singer

Source: The Monist, Vol. 79, No. 2, Forbidden Knowledge (APRIL 1996), pp. 218-229
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903475
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 Ethics and the Limits of Scientific Freedom

1. Introduction

At least since the Nuremberg trial of Nazi doctors, it has been im

possible to take seriously the idea that freedom of scientific inquiry should
be completely unfettered. But even if freedom of scientific inquiry cannot
be absolute, how strong a principle is it? What ethical limits should we
impose on science?
I shall discuss two kinds of limit. The first kind I shall consider is that
which applies to the nature of the research itself, that is, to what the
process of research does to others. Here it is relatively straightforward to
show that there are ethical limits to scientific inquiry, and the question is
merely where the boundary is to be drawn. Nevertheless, the wide accep
tance of such limits tells us something about the relationship between
ethics and science. This in turn will serve as a basis for a discussion of the
second kind of limit, namely limits that derive from the nature of the
knowledge that it is sought to gain. Are there some kinds of knowledge
that it is unethical to possess, or to want to possess? This is a much more
controversial area, and my views will accordingly be more tentative.

2. Limits to the Research Process

i. Research on Humans
The most obvious limit to the freedom of scientific research has
already been mentioned: the rights of the human subject of research mean
that there are things we cannot do to nonconsenting human beings, no
matter how scientifically valid or socially useful the research may be.
There are many notorious cases in which science is generally regarded as
having gone beyond this limit. In the name of research, Nazi doctors
inflicted painful and violent deaths on many human beings.1 These ex
periments were condemned in the Nuremberg Code, which emerged from

"Ethics and the Limits of Scientific Freedom" by Peter Singer,

The Monist, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 218-229. Copyright? 1996, THE MONIST, La Salle, Illinois 61301.

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 219

the trial of these doctors, and has formed the basis of subsequent discus
sions of the ethics of research on human beings. The Nuremburg Code
specified that in scientific inquiry, the informed consent of the human
subject of research is essential. This principle was stated in an unqualified
form, which was perhaps too restrictive. It has subsequently been mod
ified in various other codes and declarations, and might now be better put
as the principle that human beings must not be coerced or deceived into
taking part in research that is not for their benefit, and could cause them
harm.
Many further serious breaches of these accepted principles have
come to light. Among them was the Tuskegee syphilis study, in which four
hundred poor black American men were diagnosed with syphilis, but were
not told of the diagnosis, or given treatment. Instead, they were merely
observed, over a period from 1932 until the mid-1960s.2 More recently, at
the National Women's Hospital in Auckland, New Zealand, patients with
carcinoma in situ, an abnormal development of the cells of cervix
generally regarded as a precursor to cancer, were given no treatment, in
order to test one doctor's view that these cells did not develop into cancer.
They were not told that they were part of an experiment, and several
women subsequently developed cancer and died.3 Such cases show the
need for continuing ethical oversight of scientific research. Nevertheless,
it is not my aim to discuss the central cases, about which we are all agreed
on the need for a limit to how far scientists may go. Rather I want to ask
two questions about this limit: what does our acceptance of it indicate, and
why should the boundary be drawn where it is now drawn?
The answer to the first question is simply that to accept this limit is
to recognize that scientific inquiry is not above ethics, but is subject to it.
We value knowledge, but we do not value it so highly that we are prepared
to support the acquisition of knowledge at the cost of violating other
ethical principles that we consider important. We seem to be prepared to
accept indefinite delay in acquiring information about important diseases,
if the only way to avoid that delay would be to experiment on non-con
senting human subjects. (For example, to inflict the diseases on prisoners,
and then test experimental cures on them.) The protection of fundamental
human rights, in other words, takes precedence over the freedom of
science and over the benefits that promising scientific research projects
may bring.

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220 PETER SINGER

Where is the boundary to be drawn? In most developed countries this

recognition that scientific research is subject to ethics has now been insti
tutionalized in the shape of human experimentation ethics committees,
under various titles, to which proposals for research involving human
beings must be submitted. In Australia, where I live, these committees
now regulate all research involving human subjects conducted by any
member of any institution that receives any government research funding.
That includes, of course, all the research done at all the universities and
major research institutions in the country. This is a huge investment of
time and money in the ethical oversight of scientific research.4 Nor do the
committees look only at proposed experiments that carry the risk of
serious harm to the subjects of research. In my own experience, it is not
unusual for a committee to spend half an hour cross-examining a re
searcher who proposes to do nothing more than mail a questionnaire to a
random sample of citizens, who will of course be free to throw it in the
nearest waste-paper basket if they find it not to their liking. Nor is it
unusual for such questionnaires to be referred back to the researcher for
amendment.
Ethical control over science is therefore not limited to making sure
that we do not violate the most central rights of research subjects. Ethical
control has now gone considerably further, and this is in itself a source of
ethical controversy. Is there a point at which ethics committees may go too
far? For example, had Stanley Milgram applied to one of today's ethics
committees to do the fascinating and much-quoted experiments he
describes in his book Obedience to Authority, he would have stood
virtually no chance of getting approval, because the experiments involved
deceiving his subjects in a way that risked causing them psychological
harm. (Some of these subjects were led to believe that, in obedience to the
instructions of someone in a white coat, they were inflicting extremely
painful electric shocks on other experimental subjects who failed to give
correct answers to questions.5) For Milgram not to have been able to do
his research would have deprived us of a clear illustration of just how
pervasive obedience to authority can be, even in a supposedly liberal
society like the U.S.A. Maybe this was a price that we should be prepared
to pay, to ensure that research subjects are not harmed. The Milgram ex
periments seem to me close to the boundary of acceptable research, but on
which side they fall is not easy to say.

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 221

As this example shows, it is not easy to specify in advance when the

boundary of ethically acceptable research with human beings has been
reached. Even a questionnaire may be harmful?for example, one that
asks probing and disturbing questions of people who are psychologically
vulnerable, or one that seeks sensitive information from patients who
will feel under pressure to give it, and then fails to protect the confiden
tiality of the information obtained. So we cannot simply exempt broad
categories of research, like social science research. A responsible ethics
committee system is time-consuming, and will sometimes reach the
wrong conclusion, but it is difficult to think of a better way of drawing the
line.6
Building on the recognition that scientists are properly limited in
regard to what they may do to the human subjects of their research, we
must now ask: why should the boundary of the human species also be the
boundary of the sphere of beings who are protected from harmful experi
mentation?

ii. Research on Nonhuman Animals

Some countries have not only human experimentation ethics com

mittees, but also animal experimentation ethics committees. In some of
these countries there is debate over whether the interests of nonhuman
animals are considered sufficiently important to serve as a limit to scien
tific inquiry. In Australia, as in a number of other countries, Animal
Experimentation Ethics Committees operate on the basis that some forms
of research are ethically unacceptable because of the pain or suffering
they inflict on non-human animals. In some other countries, however, the
committees operate only to ensure that there is no "unnecessary" animal
suffering, the assumption being that if there is no way of achieving the
goal of the research without inflicting suffering, then that suffering is
"necessary" and the research may go ahead. In the United States, for
example, it is significant that the committees are not referred to as ethics
committees, but as "Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees."
Moreover when the Animal Welfare Act was in Congress, the relevant
Congressional committee specifically stated that the act was passed:

... to provide protection for the researcher in this matter by exempting from
regulations all animals during actual research or experimentation_It is not

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222 PETER SINGER

the intention of the committee to interfere in any way with research or ex

perimentation.7

Members of this committee of the U.S. Congress apparently placed

freedom of scientific inquiry below the rights of human subjects, but
above the interests of nonhuman subjects. This is, of course, a possible
position; but is it an ethically justifiable one? Since I have written on this
topic at considerable length, I shall here restrict myself to some brief
comments.8
If a being has interests, we are not entitled to disregard the interests
of that being, or give them less weight, merely because the being is not a
member of a group to which we ourselves belong. In particular, we should
not disregard or discount the interests of a being because that being is not
a member of our own race, gender or species. The logic of opposition to
speciesism is entirely parallel to that of opposition to other forms of dis
crimination. Like racism and sexism, "speciesism" is based on a form of
arbitrary discrimination. If membership of our race is not, in itself,
morally significant, why should membership of our species be, in itself,
any different?
Isaac Bashevis Singer, the Nobel Prize winning Jewish author, un
derstood this parallel between the way we treat animals, and the way in
which the Nazis treated their victims. In his story "The Letter Writer" one
of his characters addresses a mouse in the following words:

What do they know, all these scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders
of the world?about such as you? They have convinced themselves that man,
the worst transgressor of all the species, is the crown of creation. All other
creatures were created merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be
tormented, exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the
animals it is an eternal Treblinka.

I do not claim, of course, that all animals, human and nonhuman, have the
same interests, only that interests are not to be discounted merely on the
grounds of species. The interests of beings with different mental capaci
ties will vary, and these variations will be morally significant. If we are
forced to choose between saving the life of a being who understands that
he or she exists over time, has plans for the future and wants to go on
living, and a being who is not capable of having desires for the future
because its mental capacities do not enable it to grasp that it is a "self," a
mental entity existing over time, then it is entirely justifiable to choose in

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 223

favour of the being who wants to go on living. This is a choice based on

mental capacity, and not on species membership (as we can see by the fact
that the former may be a chimpanzee, and the latter a human with
profound brain damage).
This example shows that it will not do to say that speciesism is
different from racism because all humans have similar powers of
reasoning, or abilities to use language, or whatever else it might be,
whereas members of different species do not. In respect of any mental ca
pacities we care to mention, there is an overlap between members of
different species. Why, then, should we stringently protect the interests of
all humans, while neglecting those of nonhuman animals?
Thus science must be subject to ethical limits that are wider than the
protection of human subjects. The interests of nonhuman animals are also
entitled to equal consideration, and this requires a further set of ethical re
strictions on science. Again, exactly where the line should be drawn is not
easy to specify. At present, because we have so little regard for the
interests of nonhuman animals, we are far too permissive in what we
allow. In the world of experimentation on animals, we are, as Isaac
Bashevis Singer suggests, still at the Nazi stage, and atrocities are taking
place on a daily basis in the laboratories of the so-called civilised world.
In that context, it is tempting to say that the correct answer is the total
abolition of experiments on animals. I would prefer to say, that the prin
ciples by which we decide to accept or reject scientific research should not
discriminate between humans or nonhumans at a similar mental level. In
other words, we should not treat nonhuman animals any differently from
the way in which we treat human beings incapable of giving their consent.
This will not exclude all research on nonhuman animals, because we do
allow some research on human beings who are not capable of consenting.
But it is only research that carries virtually no risk of significant harm to
the research subjects.

3. Limits to Scientific Knowledge: Are there some things that we should

not know?

I now turn to the question of whether there are ethical limits to the
content of scientific knowledge, as well as to the process by which that
knowledge is gained. In contrast to the area we have been considering so
far, there are no widely accepted principles here.

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224 PETER SINGER

The most ominous knowledge yet discovered by science is the way

in which the forces that bind together the atom can be unleashed in an
explosion of a magnitude that far surpasses any explosive device previ
ously created by human beings. This knowledge was the deliberate
outcome of the Manhattan Project, on which many of the leading nuclear
scientists in America collaborated. The very existence of the project owed
much to the fact that these and other scientists, among them Albert
Einstein, urged President Roosevelt to build the atom-bomb. Their reason
for doing so was the fear that Hitler might otherwise get the bomb first.
After the war, it became clear that the German nuclear research effort had
made slower progress than the American scientists had feared; neverthe
less, at the time, the belief that the Germans would develop nuclear
weapons before the allies could defeat them was not unreasonable. It is
terrible to think what the consequences of this might have been.
The precise historical circumstances that led to the development of
the first nuclear weapons were unique, but the underlying factor?inter
national scientific competition, in various forms?is universal. Science is
not the property of any person or nation. The knowledge that science gains
is in principle open to anyone to discover, and if scientists from one nation
eschew an area of research, it is likely that scientists from another nation
will take it up. We have seen this quite recently in the case of research on
human embryos. After the success of Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe
in fertilising a human embryo outside the human body, the United States
government, influenced by religious and anti-abortion groups, placed a
moratorium on any government funding of research on human embryos.
This moratorium remains in effect, and President Clinton has recently
refused to end it. All that this has meant, however, is that the United States
has not taken as prominent a place in human embryo research as it usually
does in new areas of medical research. The work itself has not stopped.
Instead, a number of other nations, including Britain, Australia, and Italy,
have done the pioneering work in this area.
Some of the most controversial areas of scientific research are those
that relate to minority ethnic groups. Claims about race and IQ have led
to the condemnation of entire areas of research. In 1969 Arthur Jensen
published a long article in the Harvard Educational Review entitled "How
Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" One short section
of the article raised the question why, on average, African Americans do

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 225

not score as well as most other Americans in standard IQ tests. In this

section Jensen said that:

the preponderance of evidence is, in my opinion, less consistent with a

strictly environmental hypothesis than with a genetic hypothesis, which, of
course, does not exclude the influence of environment or its interaction with
genetic factors.

After this remark was widely publicised, Jensen was accused of racism. His
lectures were shouted down and students demanded that he be dismissed
from his university post. H. J. Eysenck, a British professor of psychology
who supported Jensen's theories received similar treatment. Research on
the topics that Jensen has proposed?the relationship between the various
factors influencing differences between races in standard IQ tests?was
not actively pursued over the next quarter-century.9
The opposition to genetic explanations of alleged racial differences
in intelligence is only one manifestation of a more general opposition to
genetic explanations in other socially sensitive areas. For example, a con
ference on "Genetic Factors in Crime: Findings, Uses and Implications,"
planned to have been held at the University of Maryland in October 1992,
was abruptly cancelled after a storm of criticism which led the National
Institutes of Health to freeze funding for the conference. This was despite
a report from the N.I.H.'s own review group which concluded that the
conference's organisers had done a "superb job of assessing the underly
ing scientific, legal, ethical and public policy issues and organizing them
in a thoughtful fashion."10
It is therefore not surprising that there has been opposition to the
largest-ever inquiry into our genetic constitution, the Human Genome
Project. The undertaking to map and sequence the entire human genome
has now been underway for several years, and is advancing at a faster pace
than anyone predicted even five years ago. As a result, we are gaining
detailed knowledge about the basic building blocks of human inheritance.
The Project has been referred to as "the biological sciences equivalent of
sending a human being to the moon," but in view of its potentially
explosive social implications, it could more tellingly be described as the
biological equivalent of building the atom bomb. Like the Manhattan
Project, it raises in an acute form the question of whether there is some
knowledge that it would be better not to have. This time there is no

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 226 PETER SINGER

immediate war-time threat of a Hitler-like enemy getting the information

before we do.
The Human Genome Project will have diverse implications. It may
make it possible to use gene therapy to tackle the causes of many diseases
in which, so far, we have only been able to try to deal with the symptoms.
In addition, though, it will also provide the basis for genetic screening of
a much more sophisticated and detailed kind than we have had up to now.
We can already perform a genetic test on entirely healthy young people,
and be in a position to tell those who test positive that they will, in middle
age, gradually lose their intellectual capacities, become bedridden, unre
sponding, fail to recognize anyone, and will die. I am referring to our
ability to test for Huntington^ disease. That is a devastating diagnosis,
one so terrible that many people who know that they are at risk for the
disease do not want to be tested for it. The existence of the test is certainly
no unmitigated benefit.
Probably more significant than our ability to make definite diagnoses
for rare diseases, however, is our rapidly increasing ability to make pre
dictions that yield only a statistical probability that a person will develop
a specific disease. Examples of diseases of which this can sometimes now
be said are diabetes, arthritis, and some forms of heart disease. This list
will expand dramatically over the next decade, and will then include
several forms of cancer as well as many other conditions. Is this knowl
edge that we want to have?
Some psychological traits will also be shown to have a genetic basis.
The possibility of a genetic basis for violent crime has already been
mentioned. Genetics would presumably only be part of a complex inter
action between genes and environmental factors, but it could be a highly
significant part. As we have seen, there is already evidence to suggest a
link between genes and IQ, although exactly what IQ measures, beyond
an ability to answer a particular set of questions, remains controversial.
The Human Genome Project may give us the means to settle the extent to
which IQ is under genetic control, and may even identify the genes
involved. Should we obtain this kind of information? Is it responsible to
do so, without considering what will be done with it?
Proponents of the Human Genome Project believe, obviously, that
we should obtain the information that the Project will gain. But it is sig
nificant that they do not argue this case on the simple basis that more

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 227

knowledge is always desirable. Instead, they acknowledge their responsi

bility to consider the ethical, legal and social implications of the
knowledge they are gaining. Accordingly, the United States National In
stitutes of Health have allocated 3% of the funds that are provided to the
Human Genome Project specifically for the investigation of these impli
cations. Although this is a small fraction of the total budget, because the
Project is so large and costly, even 3% is a considerable sum of money.
The problem is, of course, that while the Project has made very rapid
progress in solving the technical problems of mapping and sequencing
genes, no quick technical fix is going to help us find a sound and univer
sally acceptable way of resolving the ethical, legal and social implications
of the new knowledge. Hence allocating a proportion of the budget for
considering ethical, legal and social implications, while the scientific
work continues, may not be enough. It is at least arguable that the only
way to take these ethical, legal and social implications seriously, would
have been to put the rest of the Human Genome Project on hold until the
ethical, legal and social implications have been resolved. But this has not
happened, and is certainly not likely to happen now.

4. Conclusion: Ethics and Science

Science is subject to ethics. We see this most uncontroversially in the

restrictions we place on the search for knowledge in order to protect both
human and animal subjects of research. The ready acceptance of these re
strictions makes it clear that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is not an
absolute or overriding value.
If this is so?if the pursuit of scientific knowledge can properly be
restricted in order to protect the interests even of a mouse?it becomes
difficult to argue in principle that scientists have an absolute right to seek
knowledge in any field, irrespective of the social consequences that
gaining that knowledge will have. At least, this argument cannot be based
on some inherent right of free inquiry that trumps other right or interests
of society or of individuals. Nevertheless, there are very strong pragmatic
arguments against saying that there are some things which we should not
seek to know. I shall mention three.
The first argument has already been mentioned. In a world of many
independent nations, if research offers any kind of competitive edge for
one nation, it will be very difficult to stop it being pursued somewhere in

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228 PETER SINGER

the world. This was, as we saw, the argument for gaining the knowledge
needed to build nuclear weapons. The same can be said for the techniques
that make genetic engineering possible. Here it is not a question of
military uses of this knowledge, although even that could come, but com
petitiveness in biotechnology, with all that means for agriculture and for
biological manufacturing processes, as well as for human health. Any
nation that refuses to take part in these areas of research will be left
behind. Of course, a nation could simply refuse to take part in the in
creasingly global economy fostered by the major trading powers. There
may be good reasons for taking this decision; but it will not stop the
knowledge emerging somewhere in the world. To do that, an internation
al convention would be required. While this may be desirable, at this stage
the promised benefits of genetic engineering are so enticing that it is
difficult to imagine that any such convention would attract the unanimous,
or near-unanimous, support that would be required. A second argument
applies especially to attempts to stop research that it is feared may
produce results useful to harmful elements in society, for example, racists.
Research on the genetic basis of IQ scores, or of violent crime, falls into
this category. Here, while the objective of avoiding anything that may
lend support to racism is laudatory, prohibition is not a suitable means of
achieving that end. On the contrary, to prohibit research will only produce
an air of suspicion, and of a conspiracy to cover up the truth. Today, with
the mass media on the look-out for sensation, and communication
becoming cheaper, quicker and easier, attempts to suppress ideas almost
always backfire. The third and perhaps most important reason why we
should not deliberately eschew knowledge in certain areas is that to do so
is to handicap ourselves in solving problems. For example, we may think
that it is better not to carry out research into a possible genetic basis for
violent crime, since if such a basis is found, it will lead to the branding of
certain people as potential criminals on the basis of their genes alone?
even though they may never have committed a violent crime, and perhaps
in a favourable environment, never would do so. That this danger exists is
undeniable. But if we suppose that there is some genetic predisposition
that can explain the behaviour of at least some violent criminals, then we
have to ask ourselves whether we stand a better chance of solving the
problem of violent crime while we remain ignorant of this explanation, or
when we are aware of it. The answer must surely be that the better our un
derstanding of the kind of behaviour we are trying to prevent, the better

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 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 229

our chances of success. Otherwise we may spend huge sums on attempts

to control crime and cannot succeed. (This is, I stress, only a hypothetical
example; we do not at present know whether genetic factors play any role
in violent crime.)
I conclude that science is properly regarded as subordinate to ethics,
and the protection of both human and animal subjects of research should
take priority over the desires of scientists to perform particular kinds of
research. But we should distinguish between preventing scientists from
carrying out particular experiments that harm the subjects of the experi
ment, and blocking whole areas of scientific research on the grounds that
to investigate them?by any means at all?will have harmful social con
sequences. In general, the social consequence of attempting to put some
areas of knowledge beyond reach will be worse than the consequences of
gaining the knowledge, and doing our best to see that it is used responsibly.

Peter Singer

NOTES
1. R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
2. J. H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: The Free
Press, 1981).
3. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Allegations Concerning the Treatment
of Cervical Cancer at National Women's Hospital and Related Matters (Auckland, New
Zealand: Government Printing Office, 1988).
4. See Paul McNeill, The Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
5. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (London: Tavistock, 1974).
6. See also Philip Pettit, "Instituting a Research Ethic: Chilling and Cautionary Tales,"
Bioethics, 6:2 (1992) pp. 89-112.
7. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Alternatives to Animal Use in
Research, Testing and Education (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986) p.
277.
8. See my Animal Liberation, 2nd ed'n. (New York: New York Review, 1990).
9. See A. R. Jensen, Genetics and Education (London, 1972) and Educability and
Group Differences (London, 1973); H. J. Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and Education
(London, 1971). For a more recent survey of the literature, see Richard J. Herrnstein and
Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (Free Press, 1994) and for a critique of this work, see
Charles Lane, 'The Tainted Sources of 'The Bell Curve'," New York Review of Books,
December 1, 1994.
10. Daniel Goleman, "New Storm Brews on Whether Crime Has Roots in Genes," New
York Times (September 15, 1992), p. Cl; David Wheeler, "University of Maryland Con
ference that Critics Charge Might Foster Racism Loses N.I.H. Support," The Chronicle of
Higher Education (September 2, 1992), p. A7.

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