158.)Belyca Corp. vs.

Calleja
168 SCRA 184

Doctrine:
Factors to consider to determine an appropriate bargaining unit:
(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees

Facts:
In the instant case, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP,
seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA
Corporation engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the planting of agricultural
crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables. Private respondents in their
petition allege the following:
(1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the
respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate labor
unions;
(2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of
the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit;
(3) that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file
employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one hundred thirty-eight
(138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with
the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and authorization to
the filing of the petition; and
(4) that in response to petitioner union's two letters to the proprietor/General
Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986 and May 8, 1986,
requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has locked out 119 of its rank-
and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the
local union president, vice-president and three other active members of the
local unions for which an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union
against respondent employer.

Belyca, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper the following:
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are
permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees;
(2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and
supported the filing of the petition: (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3,
1986; (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986; (c) 6 withdrew their membership from
petitioner union; (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986; (e) 12 were dismissed
due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and; (f) 100
simply abandoned their work or stopped working;
(3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for those who
have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and
(4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not
been complied with by the union. The petitioner contends that the bargaining
unit must include all the workers in its integrated business concerns ranging
from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not to split an
otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.

Issue:
WON the proposed bargaining unit by Belyca is an appropriate bargaining unit.

Held:
No.According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group
of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.

This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the
proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. Among the factors
considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103
Phil 1103[1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal
and probationary employees".

Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the
fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of
casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees should
be treated separately from permanent employees. But more importantly, this
Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality
of interest.

It is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those performed by
employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference
are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. To lump all the employees
of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious
bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of
interest.
159.)Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Calleja
169 SCRA 491

Doctrine:
The requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining
unit applies for certification election only, and not to motions for intervention.
The reason behind the 20% requirement is to ensure that the petitioning union
has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings and that a
considerable number of workers desire their representation by the said
petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes.

Facts:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the
Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) by respondent Samahan. A motion to intervene, accompanied
by the written consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees
of the said corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the
Katipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to
intervene on 1 June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of
the employer's workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved
for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion,
Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying
KAMAPI's motion for intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the
certification election. On 17 June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's
order to the respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order.
Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to participate in a certification
election thru a motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has the
required support expressed in the written consent of at least twenty (20%)
percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit.

Held:
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification
election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the
written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the
bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order the conduct of a certification election.

Considering the above provisions of law, the respondent Director did not abuse
her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from the said
provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in
the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only, and not
to motions for intervention. Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it
appear that a motion for intervention in a certification election must be
accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules
of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously,
the percentage requirement pertains only to the petition for certification
election, and nothing else.

In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the

certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to settle once and
for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them.

160.)PT&T vs. Laguesma

223 SCRA 452

Doctrine:
supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees."

Facts:
On October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-
APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a petition before the Industrial Relations
Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding
of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T, for brevity), and alleging
that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing roughly 100
supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit
sought to be established. PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification
election on the ground that UNION members were performing managerial
functions and thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T
alleged that a certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file
employees which barred the filing of the petition.

On 11 December 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that
"a certification election . . . (be) conducted among the supervisory personnel of
the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T)."

Petitioner PT&T appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment and

submitting, among others, copies of the job descriptions and employment
service records of these supervisory employees, including samples of
memoranda and notices they made which purportedly illustrate their exercise
of management prerogatives.

Both the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves R. Confesor denied
petitioner's appeal (for lack of merit) and Undersecretary of Labor and
Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied reconsideration of the resolution.

Issue:
Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory employees of an
unorganized establishment one without a certified bargaining agent be
dismissed on the ground that these employees are actually performing
managerial functions?

Held:
NO. Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that (Petitions in unorganized
establishments) In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining
agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-
Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization. The
supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to
represent them at the time the UNION, thus, PT&T may be deemed an
unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already represented by
a certified bargaining agent does not make PT&T an organized establishment
vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are
"not . . . eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees."

Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file a motion to
dismiss the petition for certification election even if based on the ground that
its supervisory employees are in reality managerial employees. It is well-settled
that an employer has no standing to question a certification election since this
is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception to this rule is where the
employer has to file the petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art.
258 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. But,
other that this instance, the choice of a collective bargaining agent is purely
the internal affair of labor.

At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to

sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who sought to be included in
the bargaining unit were in fact performing managerial functions. On the
contrary, while these supervisory employees did exercise independent
judgment which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their authority was merely
recommendatory in character. In all instances, they were still accountable for
their actions to a superior officer, i.e., their respective superintendents.
161.)Celine Marketing Corp. vs. Laguesma
205 SCRA 849

Doctrine:
The consent of the rank-and-file employees is not necessary when the
bargaining unit the union seeks to represent is still unorganized.

Facts:
DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma ordered the holding of a certification election
among its rank-and-file employees, as prayed for in a petition filed by the
Confederation of Filipino Workers. Such petition was amended to include all the
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner in its outlets at Landmark-Makati;
Shoppesville-Greenhills; SM-North, etc. comprising more or less 100
employees.

Celine Mktg. moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the CFW had
not been authorized by a majority of the rank-and file employees, and that it
failed to submit a copy of the charter certificate issued to the local union. At
the hearing before the Labor Arbiter, CFW submitted a xerox copy of the
charter certificate issued to its local union.

The petitioner moved to strike it from the records for non-production of the
original and for lack of proof that the organizational documents of the union
had been filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on those grounds.

The union appealed the order to the DOLE Sec which was granted.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements in Sec 3, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules of Labor Code

Held:
No. While it may be true that the petition for certification election did not carry
the authorization of a majority of the rank-and file employees of the petitioner,
their consent is not necessary when the bargaining unit that the union seeks to
represent, is still unorganized. The petition for certification election may be
filed by any union, not by the employees. Reasoning Thus, Art 257 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides: In any establishment where there is
no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be
conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.

The law assumes that the union is the real party in interest in a petition for
certification election. Anyway, the certification election itself is the appropriate
forum for the employees to express their choice of a bargaining representative
or none at all.

162.)Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. vs. Torres

211 SCRA 95

Doctrine:
Employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present,
unabandoned right
right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections. Thus, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar
whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the
employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
Facts:
A certification of election was held for the selection of PFVIs employees
exclusive bargaining representative. Out of the 291 votes cast in the election,
168 were challenged votes - i.e. their voters still had an illegal dismissal or ULP
case against the Company. The 60 yes votes failed obtain the majority of the
votes cast in the certification election, hence, the necessity of opening the 168
challenged votes to determine the true will of the employees. Company
opposed the opening of the yes votes and their inclusion in the tally since said
voters are not regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly
rendered work for less than 180 days. The Med-Arbiter ordered the opening of
said 168 challenged votes upon his observation that said employees were
illegally dismissed in accordance with the decision of Labor Arbiter, 165 of the
challenged voted were yes votes, increasing the number of yes votes to 225.
The Court dismissed the Companys petition, and ruled in favor of the Union.

Issue:
Whether non-regular seasonal workers who have long been separated from
employment prior to the filling of the petition for certification election would be
allowed to vote and participate in a certification election.

Held:
Yes. It is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but
who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment,
are eligible to vote in certification elections. 10 Thus, and to repeat, if the
dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal
dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could
still qualify to vote in the elections. 11

And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule which it has
consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a certification election is
the sole concern of the workers and the employer is regarded as nothing more
than a bystander with no right to interfere at all in the election. The only
exception here is where the employer has to file a petition for certification
election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to
bargain collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander Rule", the
instant petition would have been dismissed outright.

314.)Lexal Laboratories vs. National Chemical Industries Workers

Union
25 SCRA 668

Doctrine:
Per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers
and employees when the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.

Facts:
CIR ruled in its order of February 16, 1965 that Ponseca was entitled to back
wages from November 5, 1958 when he ceased reporting for work, to
November 24, 1963 a day prior to his reinstatement on November 25, 1963;
and that for the number of days that he was supposed to be in Manila, he was
to earn P4.50 a day, and during the periods when he should have been in the
provinces, P4.50 a day plus a per diem of P4.00 or a total of P8.50 daily. This
order was subsequently modified by CIR's resolution of May 22, 1965 which
directed the deduction of P5,000.00 previously paid Ponseca under the
judgment and P610.00 which Ponseca earned from other sources during his lay-
off.

Petitioners vigorously objected to the inclusion of the P4.00 per diem in the
computation of Ponseca's back wages because the latter "did not actually
spend for his meals and lodgings for he was all the time in Manila, his station."
CIR brushed this contention aside. Whereupon, petitioners appealed to this
Court from the order of February 16, 1965 and the resolution of May 22, 1965.

Issue:
Whether or not per diems are included in backpay.

Held:
No. Per diem, the dictionary definition tells us, is "a daily allowance" given "for
each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his home base".3 It would
seem to us that per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and
subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of
their permanent station.4 Lexal concedes that whenever its employee,
Guillermo Ponseca, was out of Manila, he was allowed a per diem of P4.00
broken down as follows: P1.00 for breakfast; P1.00 for lunch; P1.00 for dinner;
and P1.00 for lodging. Ponseca during the period involved did not leave
Manila. Therefore, he spent nothing for meals and lodging outside of Manila.
Because he spent nothing, there is nothing to be reimbursed. Since per diems
are in the nature of reimbursement, Ponseca should not be entitled to per
diems.

Besides, back wages are what an employee has lost "in the way of wages" due
to his dismissal. So that, because Ponseca earned P4.50 a day, "then that is the
amount which he lost daily by reason of his dismissal, nothing more nothing
less.
315.)Capital Garments Corp. vs. Ople
117 SCRA 145

Doctrine:
The general principle is that an employee is entitled to receive as backwages
all the amounts he may have lost starting from the date of his dismissal up to
the nine of his reinstatement.

Facts:
Petitioner applied for clearance with the Ministry of Labor to dismiss forty-one
(41) employees (28 of whom are now the private respondents in the instant
case) for alleged inefficiency and tardiness, docketed as Case No. R04-STF-303-
77. The application for clearance was denied, and petitioner was ordered to
immediately reinstate the 41 employees to their former positions with full back
wages and without loss of seniority rights and benefits.

On November 2, 1978, petitioner reinstated only 32 of the 41 employees. The

rest either failed to report for work or tendered their resignation or went on
maternity leave. After having worked for two days, or on November 4, 1978, 28
of the reinstated employees did not report for work.

On November 15, 1978, the petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a
clearance application to terminate the herein 28 private respondents effective
November 29, 1979 for violation of company rules and abandonment of work.
On the same date, November 15, 1978, the employees through their lawyer
informed the petitioner that their failure to work does not constitute
abandonment "since their refusal is based on your unjustified conduct." In the
same letter, the employees apprised the corporation that they are "preparing a
complaint for unfair labor practice.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions with full
backwages.

Held:
No. Since there was no abandonment of work, private respondents are entitled
to full backwages without deductions or qualifications. Petitioner however,
submits that since private respondents have found employment elsewhere,
their earnings in the interim should be deducted, citing East Asiatic Company,
Ltd. vs. CIR, 6 and Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo Itogon Workers' Union. 7

The general principle is that an employee is entitled to receive as backwages

all the amounts he may have lost starting from the date of his dismissal up to
the nine of his reinstatement. In Itogon Suyoc case, and the cases cited therein,
this Court, in granting backwages with deductions of the earnings elsewhere
was guided by the principle that no one should enrich himself at the expense of
another. Consequently, where deductions are to be made from the backwages,
the records of the cases are returned to the then existing Court of Industrial
Relations to ascertain the amount of backwages due, but inevitably there was
the attendant delay in the awarding of backwages because of the extended
hearings to prove the earnings elsewhere of each and every employee. For this
reason in Mercury Drug Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 this Court
adopted the new policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just and
reasonable level without qualification or deduction. The principle is justified "as
a realistic, reasonable and mutually beneficial solution for it relieves the
employees from proving their earnings during their layoffs and the employer
from submitting counterproofs, and thus obviates the twin evils of Idleness on
the part of the employees and attrition and undue delay in satisfying the award
or. the part of the employer. 9 The new formula was applied in subsequent
cases, the latest of which is the case of Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes vs. Camara Shoes.
316.)Flexo Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC
135 SCRA 145

Doctrine:
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment,
there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact
that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. Since there was no
abandonment of work, private respondent is entitled to reinstatement with
backwages.

Facts:
On April 18, 1977, private respondent failed to report for work having been
stricken with influenza. He requested Cristeno Magrata, a fellow worker, to
deliver his handwritten note to the management informing them of his inability
to report for work due to illness. The letter was given by Magrata to Armando
Buenaventura, the foreman of private respondent, in the morning of April 18,
1977 and even before the start of work of the night shift workers to which
private respondent belonged. 1

On April 25, 1977, private respondent went to Flexo to report for work, bringing
with him a medical certificate issued by Dr. Josefina Merano of the Caloocan
Health Department certifying to the effect that private respondent Mantes was
under her medical treatment for influenza during the period from April 18, 1977
to April 23, 1977. 2 As it was the procedure of Flexo Manufacturing Corporation
that before an employee who was absent could be actually allowed to work, he
must first secure a sort of an excuse slip from both the Personnel and
Production Managers, private respondent Mantes presented the medical
certificate to Mr. Robert Chan, the Production Manager and Mr. Norberto Enciso,
the Personnel Manager, both of whom refused to give the required excuse slip
despite private respondent's plea that he be allowed to report back for work. 3
Since then, private respondent was not allowed to work.

Then, sometime on the third week of May 1977, private respondent received
thru the mail, a xerox copy of a clearance application 4 filed by petitioner,
stating therein that private respondent was terminated effective May 20, 1977
on the ground of abandonment, in that he was absent from April 19, 1977 and
reported for work only on May 10, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed from employment
and is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.

Held:
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment,
there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact
that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 18 Such a situation
does not obtain in the case at bar. On the contrary, the evidence on record
conclusively shows that private respondent reported for work on April 25, 1977,
but was not allowed to work until he received a copy of petitioner's clearance
application for his dismissal.

Besides, private respondent immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,

seeking his reinstatement, on May 25, 1977, soon after he received a xerox
copy of petitioner's clearance application. It has been held that "it would be
illogical for the private respondent to abandon his work and then immediately
file an action seeking his reinstatement." 19

Since there was no abandonment of work, private respondent is entitled to

reinstatement with backwages.
317.)Free Telephone Workers Union vs. PLDT
160 SCRA 43

Doctrine:
To rule that such demand for damages is to be pass upon by the regular courts
of justice, instead of leaving the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations,
'would be to sanction split jurisdiction

Facts:
On complaint of PLDT, the Manila Court of First Instance rendered judgment
condemning the labor organization representing the company's employees, the
Free Telephone Workers Union, to pay actual damages amounting to
P95,925.00, with 6% interest thereon from March 5, 1963. The Court found that
the union had declared a strike in violation of a so-called "no-strike clause" in
the parties collective bargaining agreement then in force, to the effect that
"there shall be no strikes, walkout, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts,
secondary boycotts x x during the term of the agreement"; and that the strike
had caused injury to the employer.
The Court of Industrial Relations, on the other hand, had assumed jurisdiction
of the strike-allegedly staged in protest against unfair labor practices of the
company (in relation more particularly to the disciplinary suspension of a
member of the Union's Board of Directors)- and had directed the strikers to
return to work pending final resolution of the controversy.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Manila Court of First
Instance. Invoking PAFLU v. Tan 1 it overruled the Union's objections to the
Lower Court's jurisdiction, declaring that actions for recovery of damages for
breach of contract were not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations but of the civil courts, even those growing out of a labor dispute. It
also rejected the Union's argument that since its officers had been cleared of
responsibility by the Trial Court, "exemption from liability of ordinary members
and the union follows necessarily," the officers having been exempted from
personal liability upon a finding that they had merely acted in the union's
behalf. The Appellate Court finally turned down the claim that "acceptance (by
the management) of the strikers ... to their former positions ... renders the
question of strike legality moot and academic," the claim having been asserted
for the first time only on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CFI erred in holding the UNION liable for damages, because
the applicable law, R.A. 875, limits penalty for illegal strikes.

Ruling:
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations in disputesof this
character was upheld. "To hold otherwise," as succinctly stated by the ponente,
Justice Sanchez, "is to on split jurisdiction-which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice." Then in Progressive Labor Association v. Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation, decided three years later,
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, stressed that to rule that such
demand for damages is to be pass upon by the regular courts of justice,
instead of leaving the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations, 'would be to
sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of
justice.' Thereafter, this Court, in the case of Leoquenio v. Canada Dry Bottling
Co. and Associated Labor Union v. Cruz, with the opinions coming from the
same distinguished jurist, adhered to such a doctrine the latest case in point,
as noted at the outset, is the Goodrich Employees Association decision

It thus appears that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint for damages filed with it by the PLDT, and that
court's judgment was on that account a nullity. Its judgment will therefore have
to be invalidated and set aside, as also that of the Court of Appeals upholding
it. The judgment being void and inexistent, there is no need to consider and
determine the correctness of the other arguments asserted against it.
318.)Santos Juat vs.CIR
15 SCRA 391

Doctrine:
A closed shop proviso of a CBA entered into between an employer and duly
authorized labor union is applicable not only to employees that are employed
after the collective bargaining agreement had been entered into but also to old
employees who are not members of any labor union at the time. Old
employees who are not members of any labor union prior to the CBA with the
closed shop proviso can be obliged by his employer to join the labor union
which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provides for a
closed-shop as a condition for his continuance in his employment, otherwise his
refusal to join the contracting labor union would constitute a justifiable basis for
his dismissal.

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision made by the Court of
Industrial Relations regarding charges of unfair labor practice. On December 1,
1959, a collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the
Bulaklak Publications and the BUSOCOPE LABOR UNION, to remain in effect for
3 years, and renewable for another term of 3 years. Section 4 of said
agreement contains a closed shop proviso. On December 27, 1960, said
Section 4 of said agreement was amended to read as follows: "All employees
and/or workers who on January 1, 1960 are members of the Union in good
standing in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws and all members who
become members after that date shall, as a condition of employment, maintain
their membership in the Union for the duration of this Agreement. All
employees and/or workers who on January 1, 1961 are not yet members of the
Union shall, as a condition of maintaining their employment, become members
of such union." In sum, the closed shop provision of the CBA between Bulaklak
Publications and Busocope Labor Union required Juat to become a member the
said union. However, Juat refused to become a member. Evangelista, the
executive officer of Bulaklak, suspended Juat for 15 days. After the expiration of
the suspension of Juat, Mr. Evangelista wrote a letter to Juat ordering him to
report back for duty. Juat did not report for work and was dropped from service
of the company. It was later learned that Juat did not return because he has his
own business Juat Printing Press Co. Inc. The CIR found that Juats refusal to
become a member of Busocope Labor Union and refusal to report back to work
when ordered by his superior were deemed inimical to the interest of his
employer and thus his dismissal was valid.

Issue:
Whether or not the closed shop proviso should apply to Juat? YES. Whether or
not CIR erred in holding that Bulaklak Publications did not commit ULP when it
dismissed Juat for his refusal to join the Union.

Held:
No. The contentions of the petitioner are without merit. The closed shop proviso
applies to Juat and the company is justified in dismissing Juat for refusing to
join the Union. A closed-shop proviso in a collective bargaining agreement
between employer and employee is sanctioned by law. Under the Industrial
Peace Act, Sec. 4, nothing precludes an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. A
closed-shop agreement has been considered as one form of union security
whereby only union members can be hired and workers must remain union
members as a condition of continued employment. The requirement for
employees or workers to become members of a union as a condition for
employment redounds to the benefit and advantage of said employees
because by holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the
closed-shop the union wields group solidarity. In fact, it is said that "the closed-
shop contract is the most prized achievement of unionism. The closed shop
proviso of the CBA between Bulaklak Publications and Busocope Labor Union
provides that, All employees and/or workers who on January 1, 1961 are not
yet members of the Union shall, as condition of maintaining their employment,
become members of such Union." Juat contends that such proviso cannot and
should not apply to him since he is an old employee of Bulaklak Publications
since 1953 and such CBA with the closed shop proviso was only entered into in
1959 and modified in 1960. It was established however that Juat was NOT a
member of any labor union when the CBA was entered into and has never been
a member of any labor union. According to jurisprudence (Freeman Shirt
Manufacturing v. CIR), a closed-shop proviso of a collective bargaining
agreement entered into between an employer and a duly authorized labor
union is applicable not only to the employees or laborers that are employed
after the collective bargaining agreement had been entered into but also to old
employees who are not members of any labor union at the time the said
collective bargaining agreement was entered into. In other words, if an
employee or laborer is already a member of a labor union different from the
union that entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the employer
providing for a closed-shop, said employee or worker cannot be obliged to
become a member of that union which had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer as a condition for his continued employment. The
case of Findlay Miller Timber Co. vs. PLASLU also established that old
employees or workers can be obliged by his employer to join the labor union
which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provides for a
closed-shop as a condition for his continuance in his employment, otherwise his
refusal to join the contracting labor union would constitute a justifiable basis for
his dismissal. In this case, it was established by evidence that Juat, although an
old employee of Bulaklak, was never a member of any labor union at the time
the CBA was entered into. Thus, he was validly obliged to become a member of
Busocope Union. His refusal to join the Union justified his dismissal.
(Additionally, his dismissal was also justified by the fact that he refused to
report back to work after his suspension expired.)

447.)PLDT vs. Voluntary Arbitration

190 SCRA 424

Doctrine:
Decisions of voluntary arbitrators are given the Highest respect and accorded a
certain measure of finality, this does not preclude the exercise of judicial review
over such decisions.
Facts:
Arbitrator Montemayor made a finding that private respondents Totesora and
Marcos did violate company regulations consisting of their acts of passing free
calls. A finding was also made of private respondent Macabenta being a regular
employee. We are inclined not to disturb these findings which are
uncontroverted and supported by the evidence on record. Basic is the rule that
judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or its
determination but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of public respondent is, first and foremost,
subject to judicial review.

Held:
Apropos of the power of judicial review, while decisions of voluntary arbitrators
are given the Highest respect and accorded a certain measure of finality, this
does not preclude the exercise of judicial review over such decisions. A
voluntary arbitrator, by the nature of his functions, acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. There is no reason why his decisions involving interpretations of law
should be beyond the Supreme Court's review. Administrative officials are
presumed to act in accordance with law and yet the Court does not hesitate to
pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where there is a
showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts.

In the case at bar, we hold that the voluntary arbitrator gravely abused his
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents Totesora and
Marcos. Petitioner was legally justified in dismissing the latter. Private
respondents' conduct rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded of them by their employer. Considering that an employer is entitled
to terminate the services of employees for just cause and acts of dishonesty
have been held to be sufficient grounds for dismissal, private respondents
Totesora and Marcos did not have any right to be reinstated. The employer's
obligation to give his workers just compensation and treatment carries with it
the corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work, diligence and
good conduct.

448.)Social Security System Employees Assn. vs. Court of Appeals

 175 SCRA 686

Doctrine:
By reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of
the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions
in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government,

Facts:
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging
that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal
strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.
Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

Issue:
Whether or not employees of the SSS have the right to strike.

Ruling:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the
Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code,
P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other
labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,

either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not
fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate
action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs
and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under
Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right
of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof."
449.)Rep. of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 428

Doctrine:
Employees covered by the Civil Service Law are allowed under the 1987
Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law
permitting them to strike.

Facts:
The Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees
holding supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized
and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206. Two collective bargaining agreements were
entered into between National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) and
NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter
No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.These unions staged
a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling
at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. NPDC filed in the
Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the union to
declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being
government employees, have no right to strike although they may form a
union.

Issue:
Whether or not National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the
right of its employees to strike.

Ruling:
Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service
rules and regulations
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize
and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike.
In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section
15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public
Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and
Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower
court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the
members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and
Employment.