CASE 1
LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with treason during the Japanese
occupation. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason
since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at
that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were
against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by
the Republic.
ISSUE: W/N absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during
Japanese occupation?
HELD/RATIO:
Laurel was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and
permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No
transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed
that the Philippine government still had the power.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se
wasnt suspended; rather, it was th e exercise of
sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no
suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of
government, there is no such change since the sovereign
the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a
mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth
to the Republic of the Philippines.
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the
political laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus,
treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be
punishable where the laws of the land are momentarily
halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that
the Philippines werent sovereign at the time of the
Commonwealth since it was under the United States.
Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the
new Republic where the Philippines are now indeed
sovereign.
CASE 2
U.S. VS LAGNASON
3 PHIL 495
1
FACTS:
Dalmacio Lagnason lead a band of armed men in the
province of Occidental Negros campaigning through its
Northern part against the United States Government. He
was captures in a fight. 20 of his men died. He and some of
his men were captured. Rifles, bolos, daggers were
confiscated from them. They wore black shirts, white
pantaloons and black caps.
ISSUE: W/N the crime was treason?
HELD:
YES. Engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort
amounts to a levying of war within the meaning of section
1 of Act No. 292, no matter how vain and futile the
attempt. The crime of rebellion and insurrection constitute
treason, but when the treason consists in engaging in an
insurrection or rebellion it is to be punished in accordance
with section 3 of Act No. 292.
DISSENTING:
The crime of treason and the crime of rebellion are distinct
and separate offenses; they are crimes of the same class,
but differ in magnitude and gravity. If the intention is to
utterly overthrow the Government the offense is treason,
but if it is simply to obstruct and resist the authority of the
United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands"
the offense is rebellion or insurrection.
CASE 3
PEOPLE VS. PEREZ
83 PHIL 314
FACTS:
Seven counts of treason were filed against Susano Perez
aka Kid Perez, the accused, for recruiting, apprehending,
and commandeering women (Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda
Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, and Flaviana Bonalos) against
their will to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire
of Colonel Mini, and other Japanese of Officers.
ISSUE: W/N furnishing of woman for immoral purpose to enemy
was treason?
HELD:
 NO. The act of the accused of providing the enemies with
women and entertainment, boosting their (the enemies)
morale and making their lives more pleasant, is not
treason. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did
not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts
or weaken the power of the government. Any favourable
effect toward the Japanese that the accused might have
made was trivial, imperceptible and unintentional. Intent of
disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which
in the absence of admission may be gathered from the
nature and circumstances of each case. In this particular
case, it was not evident that the intent of the accused in
providing the enemies with women was to help them
overthrow the government.
CASE 4
PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO
78 PHIL 560
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
Allegedly appellant was a member of the Makapili group
during World War 2.The Makapili is an armed group of
Filipinos which sided with the Japanese and committed
hostilities against their fellow countrymen. After the war,
the Peoples Court convicted the appellant for treason.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the appellant for treason
the Peoples Court made was correct.
Held:
No. Absent two witnesses to testify this claim of treason in
which the law strictly applies, the appellant was acquitted.
CASE 5
PEOPLE VS. ROBLE
G.R. NO. L-433
TUASON, J:
FACTS:
Roble did allegedly 3 acts which justified his conviction in
the lower court for complex crime of treason with murder.
Lead a group of Pro Japanese Filipinos and killed a guerrilla
supporter. Lead a group to torture a guerrilla supporter
which led to the latters death. Detained and killed an
alleged member if the guerrilla
2
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of complex crime of treason
with murder is correct.
Held:
No. It is not correct for murder is absorbed in the crime if
treason.Thus the court modifies this as treason with
aggravating circumstance of ignominy.
CASE 6
People vs. Alvero
G.R. L-820
EN BANC
Facts:
Alvero on counts of Political, Economic, and Military
collaboration allegedly supported the Japanese campaign
in the Philippines. Alvero supplied motor and automobile
equipments to the Japanese. Alvero adhered to the
advocacy of the Japanese and even called himself their
servant. Alvero was a major figurehead in the Makapili
group. He was convicted of treason by the Peoples Court.
Issue: Whether or not to affirm the conviction.
Held:
Yes as his diary and sales of equipment and among others
heavily shows his guilt and his adherence to the
Japanese.His denial holds no weight since it was
unsubstantiated. The decision is affirmed.
CASE 8
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE Luis GODINEZ
[No. L895. December 81, 1947]
FACTS:
1. Jose Godinez was a shipmaster in the Philippine
coastwise trade before the Pacific War.
2. He rendered service to the Japanese Navy as their
Pilor in bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise
performing work connected with navigation. He was paid
monthly salaries.
3. The prosecution said that such acts gave aid and
comfort to the enemies, but Godinez denied the allegation
stating that he was threaten by the Japanese that if he do
not render his service he or his family could be killed.
4. The prosecution, on the other hand, said that there
was no imminent danger to his life because some of other
 merchant officer succeeded in evading service to the
Japanese and were not molested.
5. Moreover, he was accused of helping to the
Japanese together with criminal intention" to betray render
him guilty of treason.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution is correct in asserting that Jose
Godinez did commit the crime of treason by rendering his
service to the Japanese.
RULING:
No. It was not demonstrated, however, that the other
seamen were surrounded by the same circumstances of
herein indictee, as to family members, means of evasion,
personal relations or conditions, etc., all of which
necessarily affected any decision to serve or not to serve.
It may be that such marine officers were not pressed by
the Japanese precisely because the herein accused and
others (Eduardo Gonzales, Marcelo Ayesa) had consented
to render pilotage service.
Those who refused to cooperate, in the face of
danger, were patriotic citizens; but it does not follow that
the faintheart, who gave in, were traitors. Moreover, Mere
governmental work under the Japanese regimeand
pilotage service may be considered in the same lightdoes
not constitute per se indictable disloyalty. Lastly, it is hard
to believe appellant wished the defeat of our allies,
because he had two sons in the guerrilla forces.
CASE 9
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO PRIETO (alias
EDDIE VALENCIA)
JANUARY 29, 1948
FACTS:
1. Eduardo Prieto pleaded guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, and 7
among the 7 counts of treason that was filed against him in
the Peoples Court.
2. The lower court convicted him of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries, with
aggravating circumstances.
3. On counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 it was shown that Prieto aided
the Japanese soldiers when he acted as the Japanese
soldiers informer and agent, when he accompanied them
in apprehending different guerrillas and when he
participated in torturing and killing the guerilla.
3
4. Prieto tortured and killed guerrilla in the following manner:
(1) he tied the hands of Abraham Puno then gave him fist
blows and placed a red hot iron on his body; (2) he also
gave fist blows on the face and other parts of the body to
Mariano Ponce; (3) he also tied the hands of Damian Alilin
and Santiago Alilin with rope, tortured and detained them,
and thereafter he killed them with a bayonet; and (4) he
tortured Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for
guerrilla activities.
ISSUE: WON the lower court is correct is convicting Eduardo Prieto
of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical
injuries, with aggravating circumstances.
HELD:
No. The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects
mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical
injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United
States continuation defining treason, after which the
former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort one without
the other does not make treason.
Where murder or physical injuries are charged as
an element of treason, they become identified with the
latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
government should elect to prosecute the culprit
specifically for those crimes instead of relying on them as
an element of treason. It is where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they
cannot be regarded separately under their general
denomination.
The use of torture and other atrocities on the vic-
tims instead of the usual and less painful method of
execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty
under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the
Revised Penal Code. However, there being an aggravating
circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, the penalty to
be imposed is reclusin perpetua.
CASE 10
PEOPLE VS LABRA
FACTS: The evidence has conclusively shown that appellant Pablo
Labra, being a Filipino citizen, in biolagion of his allegiance
to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, adhered to the
empire of Japan and gave it aid and comfort by acting as
an agent of the Kempei Tai, the Japanese Military Police. His
main activity was arresting, investigating and torturing
guerillas. He took part in the arrest of one Tomas Abella, a
guerilla suspect who was later beheaded and one Nicolas
Tudtud who was found dead in a seashore.
The lower court found appellant guilty of treason and of the
murder of Tomas Abella.
Issue: whether or not appellant was guilty of murder
Held: No. The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of the
murder of Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas
Abella is alleged in court three of the information, as one of
the elements of the crime of treason for which appellant is
prosecuted. Such element constitutes a part of the legal
basis upon which appellant stands convicted of treason.
The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal
ground for convicting appellant of any crime other than
treason.
CASE 11
PEOPLE VS ALBANO
Facts: Benjamin Albano, at that time a sergeant in the Bureau of
Constabulary of the puppet government, was charged with
treason. There is enough evidence, in accordance with the
two-witness rule that the accused together with his men,
arrested some suspects of being involve in the guerillas.
The suspects denied such allegations but the accused was
charged with treason but he contended that he was merely
following orders and that the prosecution failed to establish
adherence to the enemy and rendering of aid and comfort.
Issue: whether or not Albano is guilty of treason
Held: Yes. The contention of Albano is without merit because the
words and deeds of appellant clearly eXhibit such
adherence and assistance to the toe. Possibly, under
certain circumstances, members of the police force during
the occupation who merely urged guerillas to keep the
peace and stop their activities did not commit treason; but
4
when it is shown by evidence that said officer were not
content to render lip service to the enemy in making pleas
for public orders, but went further and torture their own
countrymen who were guerillas, a verdict of guilt must
inevitably be returned.
CASE NO. 14
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELIPE REYES
No. L-1624 January 18, 1950
REYES, J.
FACTS:
December 1, 1944, in the different barrios of the
Municipality of Taguig, Rizal the accused, acting as
informer or agent of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines,
for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and/or comfort to the enemy, with the aid of a group of
armed men and Japanese soldiers who afforded him (them)
impunity, guided and accompanied a group of armed men
and Japanese soldiers in the 'zonification' of the different
barrios in search of guerilla suspects. The accused and his
companions arrested about 267 male residents, suspected
of being guerrillas, and herded them together in a place
which was afterwards surrounded by armed men and
Japanese soldiers, and having thus confined the 267
guerrilla suspects and illegally and arbitrarily having
deprived them of their freedom, carried out the purpose
and plans of the enemy.
The only question of fact presented in the appeal is the
participation of the appellants in the "zoning" above
described.
As to the participation of Leon Gutierrez the witness Julita
Gregorio testified that she saw the said appellant between
6 and 7 o'clock in the morning of December 1, 1944,
arresting and driving the male residents towards Tipas and
that he was among those who went to her store that
morning and took her husband along. No one, however,
corroborated this testimony.
The same defect is to be noted in the testimony of the
witnesses against the appellant Felipe. Maria Umali Ramos
testified that this appellant was one of those who took her
 husband from their house. But no one corroborated her on
this point.
ISSUE: Whether of not the accused should be convicted of treason
absent the corroboration to a witness testimony
HELD:
No. The rule is that every act, movement, deed and word
of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be
supported by the testimony of two witnesses. The two-
witness rule must be adhered to as to each and every one
of all the external manifestations of the overt act in issue
and each of the two- witnesses must testify to the whole of
the overt act; or if it is. Separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act.
CASE NO. 15
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIBURCIO ALITAGTAG
NO. L-924. AUGUST 30, 1947
FACTS:
Tiburcio Alitagtag was prosecuted in the People's Court
charged with treason on three counts. Briefly it is alleged
(1) that on February 4, 1945, in Santa Rosa, Laguna, the
accused participated in the arrest and execution of
Augusto Ramirez, a guerrilla suspect; (2) that on the same
day the accused took part in the arrest of one Canuto
Velandres and two others who are still unknown; and (3)
that in the month of December, 1944, the accused enlisted
and served as a member of the Makapilis and retreated
with Japanese troops upon the approach of the American
and guerrilla forces.
The Peoples Court declared that the overt acts described
in counts 2 and 3 had not been duly proven. However, the
court considered the evidence adduced on the third count
that the defendant was a Makapiliproof of adherence to
the enemy.
(There is clear evidence that the defendant's associates
were Makapilis, and two witnesses, Dichoso and Perez,
swore that the accused was also a Makapili. Although the
statements of these witnesses do not tally as to the
occasion when they saw the defendant render service or
5
perform duties as a Makapili, and though the statements
do not meet the two-witness requirement as proof of giving
aid and comfort to the enemy, they nevertheless are
competent and sufficient proofs of adherence.
Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the
oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may
be gathered from the testimony of one witness, or from the
nature of the act or from the circumstances surrounding
the act. )
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant could be convicted absent
the two witness testimony regarding his adherence to give
aid to the enemy.
HELD:
Yes. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by
the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge
may be gathered from the testimony of one witness, or
from the nature of the act or from the circumstances
surrounding the act.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MAKAPILI ORGANIZATION AND ITS
PURPOSES.Judicial notice may be taken of the existence
and purposes of the Makapili organization as matters of
public notoriety and interest and as part of contemporary
history. The courts knew as historical facts that the
Makapili association was organized under the sponsorship.
direction and supervision of the Japanese army; that its
aims were as stated in the preamble and purposes of its
by-laws, Exhibit A-1; that it was a body of men recruited
and armed chiefly for the purpose of warfare and placed
itself at the disposal of the enemy; that it received military
training and instruction from Japanese military personnel
and was equipped by the invaders for- combat; that
Filipinos joined that association and rendered service in
furtherance of the above objectives, fighting side by side
with the Japanese, commandeering supplies for the latter,
and in many instances excelling their overlords in the
commission of atrocities against their own countrymen in a
campaign to suppress what they and the Japanese
regarded as subversive acts.
APPOINTMENT OR ENLISTMENT IN MAKAPILI
ORGANIZATION, How PROVED.Appointment or enlistment
in that organization need not be established by direct
 testimony. It may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. A person who acted as and was actually
engaged in the work of a Makapili, bearing arm, wearing
Makapili or Japanese uniform, drilling under Japanese
military officers, taking part in the rounding up and
execution of guerrillas, joining the Japanese in their retreat,
and the like, such person is presumed to have been
regularly inducted. It is presumed that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.
CASE NO. 16
PEOPLE VS. ROSAS
NO. L-2958
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
1 Patricio Rosas was found guilty for 3counts of treason for
which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
2 Counts 1 and 3 are general allegations of the same overt
acts averred in count 5, except as to the charge of looting
and arson, which is laid in count 3 but not in count 5,
hence, these three counts may still be reduced to one.
3 Two witnesses, Dionisia Igamin and Maria Empalmado,
testified count 5, the rest of the prosecution witnesses'
testimony having reference to counts 1 and 3.
Issue: Whether or not the two-witness rule has been complied
with in this case?
Ruling:
No. The evidence on the charge that the appellant was a
Makapili has not been proved by the requisite two-
witnesses rule. The witnesses have corroborated each
other on the material points of this feature of the
accusation. The trial judge himself states that the evidence
presented to show that the defendant joined and enlisted
in the Makapili organization "falls short, strictly speaking,
of the necessary legal requirement." Nevertheless, the
testimony is valid and sufficient proof of adherence to the
enemy.
CASE NO. 17
US VS FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET.AL.
NOV. 3, 1906
CARSON, J.:
6
Facts:
1 Francisco Bautista, Aniceto de Guzman, and Toms Puzon
were convicted of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow,
put down, and destroy the government.
2 Evidence shows that a junta was organized and a
conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos for the
purpose of overthrowing the government by force of arms
and establishing Repblica Universal Democrtica Filipina.
3 Francisco Bautista is an intimate friend of Artemio Ricarte,
the chief of the military forces to be organized; that Ricarte
wrote and notified Bautista of his coming in Manila; and
that Bautista took part and was present in several
meetingswhereat the plans of the conspirators were
discussed.
4 Tomas Puzon had an agency with the prime leader of the
movement; that Puzon held several conferences with such
prime leader; that Puzon accepted the commission and
voluntarily united himself and undertook to do his part in
organizing.
Issue: Whether or not Bautista, de Guzman, and Puzon is in
conspiracy to overthrow the government?
Ruling:
No. The fact that the accused accepted the appointment is
taken into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal
relations with the conspirators. In the first of these cases
the United States vs. De los Reyes the accused was
charged with treason, and the court found that the mere
acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else
being done either by himself or by his companions, was not
an "overt act" of treason within the meaning of the law.
CASE 18
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO AND SARAW
Facts:
Two boats left Matuta and Peta, a dutch possession. On
their way, their boat has been surrounded by six vintas
manned by 24 moros all armed. They get all the cargos in
the boats and attach some of the men and brutally violated
the women by methods too horrible to describe. The moros
including Lol-lo and Saraw take the women who were
brutally violated. Upon arriving at their destination, the
 women were able to escape. When Lol-lo and Saraw
returned home, they were arrested and charged with the
crime of piracy.
Issue: Whether or not Lol-lo and Saraw were guilty as charged
Held:
Yes, Lol-lo and Saraw are guilty as charged. The proven
facts cannot be disputed. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
defredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furendi and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility. In the given case, the crime of piracy us
proven. Hence, death penalty was imposed to Lol-lo for
the crime committed with aggravating circumstance and
life imprisonment is sentenced to Saraw.
CASE 19
SANTOS VS. MISA
GR NO. L-319, MARCH 28, 1946
Facts:
The petitioner Go Tian Tek Santos, is a Chinese citizen who
was apprehended by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the
US Army and was turned over to the Commonwealth
Government and was thereafter, detained. He is claiming
that such detention was illegal as he owes allegiance
neither to the United States nor to the Commonwealth
Government of the Philippines. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: whether or not Go Tian Tek Santos is guilty of the crime
espionage
Held:
Yes. Go Tian Sek Santos is guilty of the crime espionage. As
the record states, the petitioner must be deemed a
Chinese subject. The Commitment Order No. 291 issued by
the US Army authorities describes him as such. But he is
not entitled to liberty now. His foreign state does not
exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the said law. As
stated by the OSG, he might be prosecuted for espionage,
a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender
and considered as an offense against national security.
CASE 24
People vs. Rolando Delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes
GR. No. 174774
August 31, 2011
7
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
Facts:
1 February 17, 2000 - Accused appellants, Rolando Botong
delos Reyes, Raymundo Mac-Mac Reyes, Emmanuel Cocoy
de Claro, Mary Jane Lantion-Tom, were all arrested for illegal
possession, sale, delivery, distribution and transportation of
shabu.
2 The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) found probable cause to
indict appellants.
3 March 7, 2000- Insisting on their innocence, delos Reyes, de
Claro and Lantion-Tom moved for reinvestigation of the case
which the trial court granted.
4 After reinvestigation, OCP recommended that the RTC proceed
with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and de Claro
and dismiss the charges against delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom.
5 Charges against Lantion-Tom was dismissed.
6 These were the versions presented during the preliminary
investigation and reinvestigation.
Arresting Officers
On February 17, 2000, a confidential informant called up
relative to a drug deal to commence at the parking area of
Shangrila hotel. At 2pm, they met with the confidential
informant and positioned themselves at the area. At 10pm,
Reyes and delos Reyes arrived separately (on board different
cars) and subsequently went inside Whistletop Bar and
Restaurant. Delos Reyes was calling de Claros cellular phone.
Delos Reyes and De Claro went to the latters car where
Lantion-Tom was waiting. A transparent plastic bag was taken
and handed over to delos Reyes and in turn handed it to Reyes.
The officers accosted the accused respondents. According to
the officers, the accused respondents have admitted that in
their possession was illegal drugs.
Rolando delos Reyes (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
On February 17, 2000, he went to Buenas Market,
Manggahan Pasig with his neighbor, Marlon David, to talk to
Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness. While in
the parking space, several armed men suddenly appeared and
shouting at them to open the door of the vehicle. He and his
neighbor were forced out of the vehicle with one of the armed
men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of SM and asking
them where the bag did, containing shabu came from. When
he answered hindi ko alam they were blind folded and
 forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and continuously asked
who the source of shabu was. When delos Reyes blindfold was
removed he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa.
He claims that he was arrested in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City and not in the Whistletop Restaurant and Bar. Emmanuel
de Claro presented a blotter from the barangay containing the
incident report made by delos Reyes wife that her husband
and her nephew went missing on February 17, 2000 and were
arrested by unknown armed men in Buenas Market,
Manggahan, Pasig City.
Emmanuel de Claro and his common-law-wife Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom (Counter Affidavit)
They claim that they were at the Whistletop to talk to
Lantion-Toms accountant regarding the business permit. They
were with Emmanuels brother, Roberto and a friend James
who were waiting for them outside.Lantion-Tom went to
accompany the accountant while Emmanuel was left inside the
restaurant.When the accountant left, Lantion-Tom was
suddenly surrounded by armed men who introduced
themselves as police officers and were arresting them for being
the source of shabu drug deal. Roberto and James were
likewise arrested but released on the following day.
7 Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting
officers as to the circumstances on the alleged drug deal
leading to their arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.
8 April 4, 2000 - RTC: Probable cause exists not only against
Reyes and de Claro but with delos Reyes as well.
9 The prosecution presented the testimonies of the members of
the Regional Mobile Group of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) NCR Police office and the forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
P03 Santiago
Their team leader sensed that the drug deal had already
been consummated so the police team immediately effected the
arrest of the suspected drug dealers. On cross-examination PO3
Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the
plastic bag and that he did not even see delos Reyes hand over
such plastic bag to Reyes. From his position, he could not conclude
that the suspects were committing and illegal drug deal as he has
no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag and that he and
the other arresting officers just relied on the information relayed by
the confidential informant.
8
SPO1 Lectura
Upon meeting with the confidential informant, he
conducted a short briefing and then positioned his team within
the vicinity. When he sensed that the drug deal had been
consummated, he decided to arrest the suspects. He arrested
Reyes from whom he seized white plastic bag. During cross
examination he denied that Marlon David was with Rolando when the
latter was arrested but he later admitted that the police also
arrested Marlon David. He acknowledged that his team heavily
relied on the information given by the confidential informant in
identifying the suspects in the illegal drug deal.
PO3 Yumul
He narrated same version of events as that of PO3
Santiago and SPO1 Lectura
SPO1 David (investigator at the intelligence and investigation
section)
He received a plastic bag containing a box with sachets of
suspected shabu. He was told by Lectura that the articles were
seized from the suspected drug dealers. He said that he prepared the
affidavit of arrest of the arresting officers.
P/Insp. Cruto (forensic chemist)
He conducted physical examination of the seized sachets.
All tested positive for shabu.
10 RTC: accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced life
imprisonment.
11 Emmanuel asked the RTC to review its judgment of conviction.
He contended that the accusations that he was engaging in
illegal drug deal was suspicious, if not credible. He argued that
that the prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi
so they could attend to several documents pertaining to a
business permit. He insisted that the RTC should have highly
regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony
which directly contradicted the police officers.
12 RTC acquitted de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly
admitted that it erred.
13 There were pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants of
which records of the case were forwarded to the Supreme
Court. Case was forwarded by the SC to the Court of Appeals
for proper action and disposition.
14 CA sustained conviction of appellants including de Claro.
Merely modified the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua. According to the CA, the police officers testimonies
deserve credence than accused appellants defenses of denial
 and alibi. There was no evidence to rebut the presumption that
the police officers regularly performed their official duties.
15 The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for final review.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure made by the officers
without a warrant is valid
Ruling: No. It is invalid. The Supreme Court grant the appeal and
reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations.
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made - the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless
arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners).
It is evident that the police officers arrested accused-appellants
and searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing delos
Reyes and de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and
witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being
passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes.
These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts
indicative of a felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and
9
PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they
completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the
suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that
box.
There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself
knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to
confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton
inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained
shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as
officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de
Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are
ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they are being
lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 25
Milo vs. Salanga
20 July 1987
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
1. An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat in the Court
of First Instance.
2. Tuvera, Sr., who is a barangay captain, with the aid of some
other private persons, maltreated one Armando Valdez by
hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows without legal
grounds.
3. Tuvera Sr., with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are
members of the police force helped one another and
feloniously locked Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail for
about 11 hours.
4. Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that
 the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information.
5. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an
opposition thereto.
6. Respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to
quash on finding that Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who
can be charged with Arbitrary Detention.
7. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must vested
with authority to detain or order the detention of persons
accused of crime. Such public officers are the policemen and
other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
8. Respondent Judge did not consider private Tuvera as public
officer.
Issue:
Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, is a public officer who
can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention
Ruling:
Yes. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who,
without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of this crime
are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now
barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority.
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised
Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include
the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the
barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal
councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties
in such barrio; to look after the general welfare of the barrio; to
enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the
barrio; and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever
the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and
order within the barrio.
10
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that
in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having
the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and
are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is
the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that
with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have
led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like
private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary
Detention.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal
Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to
the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 26
United States vs. Samonte
6 September 1910
Trent, J.:
Facts:
1. Isaac Samonte was tried in the Court of First Instance on a charge
of criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities.
2. One night, Samonte and Rabe were together in one house in the
barrio of Macalalong in the province of Tayabas. When they left the
house and met shortly afterwards in Verdades Street in the said
barrio, later they became engaged in a quarrel. Rabe called
Police! Police!.
3. Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman being on patrol duty that
night heard the priest call for help. He arrived at the scene just as
when Rabe was getting up
 4. Glindo attempted to arrest Samonte saying to him In the name of
the United States do not move. Samonte replied Dont come
near, because I will take your life.
5. Glindo continued toward Samonte until the former was strucked by
the latter with a knife.
Issue: Whether or not Gregorio Glindo has the authority to arrest
Samonte even without a warrant
Ruling: Yes. Any officer charged with the preservation of the public
peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or
has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence.
In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had
authority to arrest the defendant at the time, but it was his duty to do
so, he having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the
scene before the disturbance had finally ended.
Fallo:
The penalty imposed by the court below being in accordance with the
law and the proofs presented, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the Appellant. So ordered.
Due to the resistance of Samonte, Glindo could not arrest him. Glindo
immediately went to the house of councilman and reported the matter.
The councilman ordered him to arrest Samonte.
When Samonte was found, the policeman attempted to hold him but
he resisted striking at the policeman again with his knife. The
councilman ordered Samonte to submit himself but the latter resisted
and also struck the councilman with a knife.
The arrest did not took place that night on account of his resistance.
CASE 27
SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA
80 Phil 859
12 May 1948
FERIA,J.:
Facts:
1. A complaint was filed by one Bernardino Malinao against the
petitioners for the crime of robbery.
2. A policeman of City of Manila, Benjamin Dumlao arrested the
petitioners on April 2, 1948 and presented a complaint against
them with the fiscals office of Manila.
3. April 7, 1948 Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus for
they were still detained and the city fiscal has not yet released
11
them or filed an information against them with the proper
courts of justice.
4. Until May 12, 1948 (the writing of the Supreme Court Decision),
the Court still does not have the information with regard to the
action taken by the office of the fiscal on the complaint filed by
Dumlao against petitioners.
5. Regardless of what action might have been taken already by
the office of the fiscal, if there was any, the court shall decide
this case to rule on the question involved and for the
information and guidance of officers concerned.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the peace officer has authority to arrest without
a warrant
2. Whether or not the city fiscal of Manila is a judicial authority
within the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
Ruling:
1. No except in authorized cases. A peace officer has no power or
authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint
of the offended party or any other person authorized by law.
What the complainant may do in such a case is to file a
complaint with the city fiscal of Manila or directly with the
justice of peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the city fiscal of has no authority, and he has
not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having
committed a public offense even if he finds, after due
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori, a police
officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged
with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
2. No. The judicial authority within the meaning of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code must be a judge who has authority to
issue a written warrant of commitment or release containing
the ground on which it is based. Judicial authorities mean the
courts of justice or judges of said courts vested with judicial
power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a
person charged with having committed a public offense, that
is, the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law. It cannot be construed to include the fiscal
of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot
issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
detention of a person arrested without warrant.
 Fallo:
In view of all the foregoing, without making any
pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman
Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut
ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six
hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have
ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained
when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the
city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained
of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are
now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
CASE 28
People vs. Rogelio Mengote
22 June 1992
Cruz, J.,:
Facts:
1 A stolen pistol was found in possession of Rogelio Mengote at
the moment of his warrantless arrest and was convicted of
illegal possession of firearms.
2 He pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and was
therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.
3 The government insists that the revolver was validly received
in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was
incidental to a lawful arrest even if admittedly without warrant.
4 The incident occurred when an informer called the police and
informed them that there were three-suspicious-looking
persons in Tondo, Manila.A surveillance team was dispatched
to the place.
5 At the trial, patrolmen said that they saw 2 men looking from
side to side one of whom was holding his abdomen. When
they were approached and the patrolmen identified themselves
as policemen, the 2 run away but were unable to escape. The
suspects were then searched.
12
6 One of the suspects was Mengote. In his possession is a
revolver with 6 live bullets.
7 Rigoberto Danganan, a prosecution witnesses identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during
the robbery in his house in Malabon. He pointed out that
Mengote was one of the robbers.
8 Petitioners contention: The revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant
was previously obtained neither could it have been seized as
an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony
regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial
court.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful.
Ruling:
No. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace
officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person; (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In
cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar.
At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an
offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced
in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense?
What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking
 from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not
exactly forsaken?
Mengote was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded
street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion.
He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of
day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at
that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
The policemen admitted that they were dispatched in that place
after a receiving a telephone call from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit
a robbery without the caller explaining why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.There
was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen.
The police officers did not know then what offense, if at all, had
been committed and neither were they aware of the participation
therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery
in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein.
The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the
said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released
immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 29
People vs. Burgos
Facts:
Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion and found guilty by the RTC of Digos,
Davao del Sur. From the information given by Masamlok, allegedly
a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities
arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently,
certain NPA-related documents and a firearm are confiscated.
13
Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and
claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of
subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have
been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person
and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done
without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the
search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial
court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of PD 9.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants arrest, the search of his home,
and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-
related documents are lawful.
Ruling:
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6
of the RoC:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said
warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At
the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of
any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any
subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An
essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or
actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a
crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds
no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first
go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed
they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
 apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the
accused were unknown.
CASE 31
People vs Sucro
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo
to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was
reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and
exchanged things three times. These activities are reported
through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie
Macabante. Macabante was intercepted and admitted that he
bought marijuana from Sucro. The police team intercepted and
arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
Issue:
1 Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Ruling:
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v.
Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as
PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were
the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in performance of their duties.
CASE 32
Go vs CA
Facts:
14
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-
way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from
his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioners car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San
Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted
by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police
forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the
lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation.
Issue:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Ruling:
No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after
the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans
cars plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioners
wifes name. That information did not, however, constitute
personal knowledge.
CASE 33
People vs Tangliben
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting
surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around
9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him,
inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The
accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art.
2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search
warrant.
Ruling:
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person
may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person
to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been
committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched
lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this
15
case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It
was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the
policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure
a search warrant.
CASE 34
PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
GR No. 91107 June 19, 1991
PADILLA, J.
Facts:
1 Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national visiting the
Philippines, was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act after an inspection conducted by NARCOM
Officers in Cordillera.
2 During the inspection of the bus where Malmstedt was on-
board, NARCOM officers noticed something bulging from
his waist and asked him to produce the same for inspection
but Malmstedt refused.
3 The bulging object turned out to be a pouch containing
marijuana, thus the officers asked him to alight and his
belongings searched wherein 2 teddy bears were found
containing marijuana inside.
4 During the arraignment, Malmstedt raised as defense the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects maintaining
that such cannot be admissible as evidence against him
5 The trial court found him guilty, thus this petition.
Issue: WON the search made was illegal as it is without a
warrant.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search
was made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by
a peace officer or a private person: (a) when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
 is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
A crime was actually being committed by the accused
when he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under (a) which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, the officers having
sufficient probable cause to believe that said accused was then
and there committing a crime.
CASE NO. 39
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO vs. JUSTO LUKBAN
Malcom, J.,
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, with
the intention to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by
the police. The city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters
Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
guard of soldiers.
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant
to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon
the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station
for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a lif e in Mindanao.
The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers
with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25. The vessels reached
their destination at Davao on October 29.
The women were landed and receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The
16
governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties
in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila. The further happenings to these women and the
serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of
public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of
this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine
relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return
to Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the women were illegally restrained of their
liberty by forcibly changing their domicile
HELD:
Yes. RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY.A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited
them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived this right.
No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality.
CASE 41
REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT
LIM V. PONCE DE LEON
MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya of Brookes Point, Palawan a motor
launch named M/L SAN RAFAEL. A year later or on
April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his
capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding
information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon
Persons against Jikil Taha.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon
being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander in
Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his
request to the Provincial Commander to impound the
motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third
party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the
court from taking custody of the same.
So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial
Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the
motor launch SAN RAFAEL from plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor
launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on
September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel
made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to
return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the
ground that the same was the subject of a criminal
offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught,
plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November
19, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a
complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal
17
Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging
that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises
of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there
took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent;
that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de
Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested
with authority to order the seizure of a private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the Marine Vessell be
effected without search warrant
HELD:
NO. Requisites for issuance of valid search warrant.A
search and seizure to be reasonable, must be effected by
means of a valid search warrant. And for a search warrant
to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in
the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
Seizure of personal property; Prohibition against seizure of
personal property, even if property the corpus delicti of a
crime, without search warrant.Under Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which complement the
constitutional provision, two principles are made clear,
namely: (1) that in the seizure of a stolen property search
warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in issuing a search
warrant the judge alone determines whether or not there is
a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of
a crime does not justify its seizure without a warrant.
CASE 45
Quintero vs. NBI
162 SCRA 467
June 23, 1988
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
 1. May 19, 1972 Petitioner Eduardo Quintero was a delegate
of the 1st District of Leyte in the 1971 ConCon
2. He disclosed in his speech that certain persons had
distributed money to some delegates to influence them in
the discharge of their functions.
3. Quintero delivered to the Concon the payola he himself
received, for Concons action. However, he did not reveal
the names of those who gave him money.
4. Eventually, he was pressured to name them so he released
a sworn statement addressed to the Concon, mentioning
the names of the persons who gave him the payola.
5. In his statement, it appeared that varying amounts of
money were being handed to him by different people from
different offices, some from other delegates, from wives of
representatives.
6. The then First Lady Imelda Marcos was among those
implicated in Quinteros expose.
7. Due to this, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos denounced Quintero
and made a statement sayng that he will uncover the
people behind this act making Quintero as a tool.
8. That same day/evening, NBI agents raided the house of
Quintero on the basis of a search warrant issued by the CFI
Manila Judge Asuncion. NBI claimed to have found bundles
of money in Quinteros residence.
9. NBI filed a criminal complaint for direct bribery against
Quintero with the court issuing a TRO enjoining the use in
any proceeding of the objects seized by NBI from his
residence.
10. The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the
searched premises was issued in connection with the
offense of grave threats and not direct bribery which
was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero.
11. The 1935 Constitution was enforced at that time of the
issuance of the search warrant which was being
questioned.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned search warrant issued by the
judge is null and void for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court
Ruling: YES. The Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned
search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
No relation at all can be established between the crime
supposedly committed and the evidence ordered to be seized.
There was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to
18
claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient
for him to believe that the crime being charged had been
committed.
Statements of applicant and complainant did not provide
sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause.
The respondent judge should have known that an
application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot justify
the issuance of a search warrant, before he issued the questioned
search warrant.
The search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents
who raided the house of petitioner pursuant to the questioned
search warrant was highly irregular as no members of the
household were in a position to watch them, thus they conducted
the search on their own. This procedure is held to be violative of
both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that no
search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made,
except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident
of the neighborhood.
Requirements of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
were not complied with. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on
whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of
any person, must in the presence of one witness, leave a receipt in
the place in which he found the seized property. In the case at
bar, the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was
himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the
questioned warrant , and the actual manner in which the search
was conducted, strongly suggest that the entire procedure ws an
orchestrated movement designed to destroy Quinteros public
image with incriminating evidence and that the evidence
allegedly seized from his residence was planted by the very
raiding party that was commanded to seize such.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by
respondent Judge is declared NULL and VOID and of no force and
effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 6
June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT. The amount of
P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the house of petitioner
Quintero, now in the possession of the Central Bank, and already
 demonetized, is left with Central Bank, to be disposed of, as such, aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victims that can be
in accordance with the law and the regulations. considered as offending to the NPA.

SO ORDERED. Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the

N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable
upon him.
CASE 46
People vs. Lovedioro
250 SCRA 389 Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The
29November1995 attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of
any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the
Rebellion -- Art.134 of the Revised Penal Code
crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
FACTS: Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
1. Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty
Lucilo while Lucilo was walking. of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by
2. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. law.
3. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the
crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty.
4. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of
murder instead of rebellion. FALLO
5. It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that
Lovedioro was a member of the New Peoples Army.

ISSUE WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision

dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
murder, instead of rebellion?
SO ORDERED.
RULING

Yes. Overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime
of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of
rebellion does not exist. CASE 47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 112984 November 14, 1996
Political motive should be established before a person charged with
a common crime, alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible
imposable penalty, could benefit from the laws relatively benign FRANCISCO, J.:
attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is
established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion.

In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere FACTS:

membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice. 1. In an Information dated April 10, 1992, the brothers Cresencio
De Gracia, Dalmacio de Gracia and Bonifacio de Gracia were
The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, charged with the crime of murder, the accusatory pleading
offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPAs subversive
averring substantially as follows:
19
That on or about the 19th day of February 1992, in the Municipality
of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Viscaya, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with a bladed weapon with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
their superior strength, conspiring, confederating and helping with
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously attack assault, stab and hack one Crispin Almazan
hitting his throat and face, thereby inflicting upon him multiple
hack-stab wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.
2. Upon arraignment, the accused, with the exception of Dalmacio
de Gracia who is at large, pleaded not guilty and the case
accordingly proceeded to trial.
3. Thereafter, judgment was rendered finding Cresencio and
Bonifacio de Gracia guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
4. Accused-appellants now seek the reversal of their conviction
based on the following assignment of errors:
ISSUES
Whether or not:
I The witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS CRESENCIO DE GRACIA AND BONIFACIO DE
GRACIA, JR. ON THE BASIS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
INCONSISTENT AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY
WEIGHT ON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IMPUTATION OF MOTIVE
UPON THE VICTIM AND THE LATTERS RELATIVES WHO
TESTIFIED FOR THE PROSECUTION.
III
20
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE AND
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BONIFACIO DE GRACIA, JR. WITH THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN NOT APPLYING THE BENEFITS OF THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE
PENALTY.[4]
RULING
Appellants lay stress on the apparent contradiction between
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as to the location of the
incident and the weapons used on the assault. Prosecution
witnesses viewed the incident from different locations and angles,
hence the variation in their perceptions. The discrepancy as to the
place where the appellants met the victim is negligible considering
that the yard was part of the rice field. Similarly, the disparity as to
the kind of the weapon used is insignificant as both a spear and a
bolo fall under the description pointed sharp edged instrument.
In the whole, the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential.
consistent in every detail as differences in recollection or
viewpoints or impressions are inevitable. Total recall or perfect
symmetry is not required for as long as the witnesses concur on
material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the
details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their testimony.
[8]
Indeed, if rights were to be lost merely because witnesses, while
agreeing on the essential fact, fail to testify harmoniously to all the
particulars, in a very large proportion of cases involving wrongs to
be redressed the law would fail to furnish a remedy. Hence,
variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same side in
respect of minor, collateral, or incidental matters do not usually
impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts.
[9]
 Next, appellants invoke self-defense and defense of relative.
It is a settled rule that when an accused invokes self-defense,
the burden is on him to establish by clear and convincing evidence
his justification for the killing. [10] He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
prosecution. For self-defense to prevail, three (3) requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
[11]
Upon minute examination of the evidence on record, we find
that appellants have failed to discharge this burden. The first and
crucial element for self-defense to prosper is wanting in this case.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude exhibited in the
alleged shouting incident between Crispin and the brothers is not
sufficient.[12] Thus, as correctly observed by the trial court:
Considering the fact that not all the essential elements of self-
defense as mentioned above were present, this Court is brushing
aside the self-defense theory of accused Bonifacio (Jr.) De Gracia.
His evidence is not sufficient to sustain self-defense. [13]
Another factor which militates against the appellants claim of
self-defense and defense of a relative is the physical evidence on
record. Crispin suffered no less than five (5) stab wounds on
different parts of his body and a compound fracture on the nasal
bone. Just as the presence and severity of a large number of
wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, [14] so do
they belie the claim of defense of a relative and indicate not the
desire to defend ones relative but a determined effort to kill.
In the final analysis, appellants first three assignment of errors
hinge on the trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility.
Factual findings of the lower court especially on the credibility of
the witnesses is generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal.[15] In this case, the trial court considered the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses as natural, probable, straightforward, and
credible.[16] We find no cogent reason to hold otherwise as the trial
21
court is in the best position to make an honest determination of the
witnesses deportation during trial.[17]
Lastly, appellant Bonifacio claims the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. We note that Bonifacio
surrendered and was in fact accompanied by his uncle to the police
station, albeit he remained silent. Nonetheless, we cannot take
Bonifacios silence against him. What matters is that Bonifacio,
spontaneously, voluntarily and unconditionally placed himself at
the disposal of the authorities.[18] This act of repentance and
respect for the law indicates a moral disposition favorable to his
reform.[19]
The applicable penalty for murder prior to the enactment of
the Death Penalty Law is reclusion temporal maximum to death.
There being no aggravating circumstance but with one mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on
Bonifacio in accordance with Art. 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
should be the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
entitled to a minimum penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium, being the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.[20] The same mitigating circumstance, however, cannot favor
Cresencio as he did not surrender. Cresencio was thus correctly
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant
Bonifacio is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty years (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and
the P50,000.00 award for moral damages should be denominated
as indemnity. Cresencios sentence of reclusion perpetua and the
award for actual damages are likewise AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 48
People of the Philippines vs. Dasig
G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.
FACTS:
1. In the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto
Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were
tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the
traffic.
2. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc.
Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as
back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
3. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Catamora noticed
eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin
Nuez, acting suspiciously.
4. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the
men to approach Manatad.
5. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being
followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the
road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle.
6. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group
and thereafter saw Manatad sprawled on the ground.
7. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Catamora
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw
two (2) persons take Manatad's gun and again fired at him
to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group
including Nues acted as back up.
8. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle
and fled from the scene of the shooting.
9. On a surveillance days after, on a suspected safehouse
of members of the sparrow unit, the group saw Rodrigo
Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape.
10. Nues and wounded Dasig were captured and
ammunitions were confiscated.
22
11. Dasig extrajudicially confessed that he and the group
of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted
that he and Nues were members of the sparrow unit and
the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
12. However, upon arraignment, Dasig and Edwin Nues
entered a plea of "not guilty."
13. After the prosecution had presented its first witness,
accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."
While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
14. In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the
procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken
was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional
rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in
the killing of Manatad, he should be convicted at most of
simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Dasigs extra-judicial confession is
admissible in Court
2. Whether or not Dasig was accorded his constitutional
rights as an accused
3. Whether or not he committed murder with direct assault
Ruling
1. Yes. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a
confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-
judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should
not have beenadmitted and considered by the trial judge.
This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge
for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police
authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by
him during the investigation. Indubitably established and
now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was
assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's
sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that
before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was
first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty.
Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally,
the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving
testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is
another naive effort of appellant to back track from his
prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of
his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and
legality.
2. Yes. Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel
he must provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant
case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the
accused throughout the entire proceedings of the
investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its
veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators.
He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not
his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."
23
3. Yes, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting
he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of
simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of
murder with direct assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on
this point as manifested in the People's brief, which We
quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower
court erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault
Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised
Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed
voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also
his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the
afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the
sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of
rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in
authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and
plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is
a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done
in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of
a separate charge.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of
rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of
 the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at
bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig
headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was
not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person
giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc.
Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he
should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death,
appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial
court that the extra-judicial confession was legally
obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member
of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New
People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly
constituted government, the crime committed is simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of
participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable
doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to
pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 49
UMIL VS. RAMOS
187 SCRA 312
24
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of
issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set
at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
1 On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to
the St. Agnes Hospital, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to
the said hospital with a gunshot wound.
2 The wounded man in the said hospital was among the five
(5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile
patrols the day before, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before
a road hump along a street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City.
3 The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," however it was
disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man
was Rolando Dural.
4 In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred
to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
5 For reference, the consolidated cases include the following
facts :
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was
an NPA courier.
In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live
ammunition were found at the timeof her arrest, and she admitted
to owning such documents.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple, agents frisked
them and found subversivedocuments & loaded guns without
permits.
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a
search warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were found
in her car.
In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil
Regala as the latters companion in killing Romulo Bunye II.
The release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu,
who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
Issue: Whether or not Rolando Dural and other petitioners were
lawfully arrested
Ruling:
YES. The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the
parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons
detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of
their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
25
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an
offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens
of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed,
had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were
clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid informations filed against them in court.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's 7 Defense contends that there is no complex crime in the
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to crime of rebellion.
P10,000.00. No costs.

Issue:
SO ORDERED.

Whether or not the crime committed by petitioner was

rebellion complexed with crime murders, arson & robbery, and
should be punished with life imprisonment, thus bail should not be
CASE NO. 50 granted
People vs Hernandez
L-6025-26 / July 18, 1956
Concepcion, J:
Ruling:
Facts:

1 Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member of Congress of

Labor Organizations, an affiliate of Hukbong Magpalayang
Bayan (Hukbalahaps), a known group performing rebellious
activities. The Supreme Court ruled that rebellion cannot be
complexed with other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion
2 Hukbalahaps have risen publicly and taken arms to remove in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus granting
the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance of the the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent
government, making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, and concomitant when rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in
attacks against police, constabulary and army
the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that there
detachments as well as innocent civilians.
is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court
3 On about March 15, 1945, Hernandez and other appellants cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple
were accused of cooperates and synchronizes its activities rebellion although they killed several persons.
with the Huks by actively engaging in its armed rebellion
against the government of the Philippines. Thus, motion for bail was granted.
4 They were charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robbery and were
sentenced with life imprisonment.
The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
5 Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with
and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
the court where his case was pending, but was denied on
the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime was either separately there from. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or
complexed, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment
imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the Supreme Court. graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put
together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
6 Prosecution argued that the gravity of the crime committed such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have
required the denial of the bail and it maintained that had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
capital punishment may be imposed for the crime
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
Hernandez was convicted of.
26
 The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act,
the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him
for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense.
CASE NO. 51
Ponce Enrile vs Amin
G.R. No. 93335 / September 13, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J:
Facts:
1 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged of having committed
rebellion complexed with murder with RTC of Quezon City.
2 He was also charged with violation of Pres. Decree 1829 with
RTC of Makati City because he allegedly harbored and
concealed in his house Ex. Lt. Gregorio Gringo Honasan, who
was suspected of having committed a crime.
Allegations:
a Rebellion Case:
In the evening of Dec.1, 1989, fugitive Honasan and
some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and
birthday party held at the residence of Sen. Enrile.
Honasan conferred with Sen. Enrile accompanied by
about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white
armed patches.
These facts led the prosecution to conclude that Enrile
and Honasan were co-conspirators in the failed Dec.
coup.
b Violation of PD 1829 Case:
Sen. Enrile entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasanby giving him food and comfort on Dec.1,
1989 in his house.
27
3 Omnibus Motion filed by Sen. Enrile:
a To hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest
pending personal determination by the court of
probable cause
b To dismiss the case and expunge the information from
the record
4 The court denied the omnibus motion. Sen. Enrile filed Motion
for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss but was also denied.
5 Enriles arguments on his appeal to the Supreme Court on
certiorari:
The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of
Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on Dec.1, 1989 is
ABSORBED in, or is a COMPONENT ELEMENT of, the
complexed rebellion presently charged against Sen.
Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the
basis of the same meeting on Dec.1 1989.
The orderly administration of Justice requires that there
be only one prosecution for all the component acts of
rebellion.
6 Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner
on the theory that the former involves a special law while the
latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sen. Enrile could be separately charged of
violation of PD 1829 nothwithstanding the rebellion case earlier
filed against him
RULING:
No. The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against
splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions. The Hernandez case remains a binding doctrine
to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its
commission or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.
 Sen. Enriles act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is a
mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion, it cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
Thus: This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. Sen. Enrile cannot be tried
separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecute din the
rebellion case.
CASE NO. 52
Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163 / June 5, 1990
Narvasa, J.:
Facts:
1 In February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led
by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103.
2 He was charged together with Mr. and Mrs. Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly committed
during their failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
3 Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant. Then, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City on the following day.
4 Later on the same day, Enrile filed a petition for habeas
corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights. The following are his arguments:
28
That the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent.
That he was charged with a criminaloffense in an
information for which no complaint was initially
filed or preliminary investigation was conducted,
hence was denied due process;
That he has been denied with his right to bail
That he was arrested and detained on the strength
of a warrant issued without thejudge who issued it
first having personally determined the existence
of probable cause
5 Solicitor Generals answer: the case does not fall within the
Hernandez ruling sincethe in Hernandez, the information
charged murders and other common crimes committed as
a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion whereas in Enriles case, murder and frustrated
murder charged against Enrile were committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Issues:
1 Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes
(delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code
2 Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez
ruling
Ruling:
Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail
although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail.
The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed
with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the
prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to
make the penalty thereof in the maximum. There is one other
reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal
Code cannot be applied in this case. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately, then
the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
 temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.
The Hernandez ruling is still valid. Hernandez doctrine
remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. All other
crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed.
The Court reiterates that based on the this doctrine, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile
and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, since there is no such crime as
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. These other
crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the
commission of rebellion is absorbed hence petitioners should be
entitiled for bail, before final conviction.
CASE NO. 53
People vs Pimentel
G.R. No. 100210 / April 1, 1998
Martinez, J:
Facts:
1 In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged
with subversion under Republic Act 1700 (the Anti-
Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC of Manila. A
warrant of arrest was issued but was not served due to his
disappearance.
2 Seven years later, Tujan was arrested on the basis of the
warrant of arrest in the subversion case, and was also
found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver
and six rounds of live ammunition.
3 Due to this, he was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion
under PD 1866 before the RTC in Makati City.
4 Tujan filed a motion to quash the illegal possession case on
the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of
29
being convicted for subversion. He contended that
common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in
subversion. And since the present case is the twin
prosecution of the earlier subversion case, he is entitled to
invoke constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
5 Opposing the Tujans motion to quash, the State contended
that he does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a
second time because:
he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case
the previous offense charged against him is for
Subversion, punishable under RA 1700, while the
present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion, punishable
under PD 1866, a different law
Issue:
Whether or not Tujan was placed in double jeopardy with
the filing of the second information for illegal possession of firearm
& ammunition in furtherance of subversion
Ruling:
No. Sec. 21 of Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur,
acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have
occurred. In the present case, Tujans motion to quash filed in the
trial court did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply
because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private
respondent has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action
for subversion. Besides, the two criminal charges against private
respondent are not of the same offense as required by Section 21,
Article III of the Constitution.
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under
RA1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as
amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of of RA 7636
on Sept. 22, 1992, totally repealing RA 1700, as amended, has
substantially changed the complexion of the present case,
inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable to the accused-
private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be
given retroactive effect.
 With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of
subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more
legal basis and should be dismissed. As regards the other charge of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by
subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition since subversion is no
longer a crime. It would be illogical for the trial courts to try and
sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no
longer exists. Subversion charge against Tujan was dismissed,
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion against the same accused is deemed amended.
Accused was ordered to be released immediately from detention,
since he was already detained for 7years, whereas the amended
charge has a penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.
CASE NO. 54
Ocampo vs Abando
G.R. No. 176830 / February 11, 2014
Sereno, J:
Facts:
1 A mass grave site was discovered at Sitio Sapang Daco,
Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the 43 rd Infantry
Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to
be victims of Operation Venereal Disease (VD). Said
Operation VD was launched by the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines to purge their ranks of
suspected military informers.
2 PNP SOCO conducted a forensic crime analysis to identify
the bodies by way of SNA sample, however, the Initial
Specialist Report remained inconclusive as to the identities
of the skeletal remains and the leght of time that they had
been buried.
3 In a Special Report, 10 possible victims were named after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of
relatives and witnesses.
4 Believing that their relatives remains were among those
discovered at the mass grave site,12 complaint-affidavits
were filed by the relatives of the alleged victims of
Operation VD. They swore that their relatives had been
abducted or last seen wit members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
30
5 Also, 4 former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP filed their
affidavits alleging that petitioners Ocampo, Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad, being members of CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central Committee, ordered the Operation VD in 1985. On
the basis of these affidavits, petitioners were charged with
murder.
6 In a resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing
of anInformation for 15 counts of multiple murders against
54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein. The said 4 former members of
CPP/NPA/NDFP were dropped as respondents and were
considered state witnesses.
7 On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding
probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail
for their temporary liberty.
8 Petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition:
seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order
of Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero.
praying for his unconditional release from PNP
custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the conduct of further proceedings during
the pendency of the petition
9 Ocampos arguments:
A rebellion case against him & 44 others was then
pending before the RTC of Makati City.
Common crimes, such as murder, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means, in connection
with and in furtherance of rebellion.
Issues:
1 Whether or not petitioners were denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant
of arrests
2 Whether or not the murder charges against petitioners
should be dismissed under the political offense doctrine
Ruling:
1 Yes, petitioners were accorded due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant
of arrests. A preliminary investigation is not a casual
affair.It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents
at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they
were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
As to the issuance of warrant of arrest, Ocampos
allegation that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners have no merit.
2 Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has
been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested." In this case, the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of
Judge Abando as the trial judge.
The political offense doctrine is NOT a ground to dismiss
the charge against petitioners prior to a determination by
the trial court that the murders were committed in
furtherance of rebellion. Under the political offense
doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as
common offenses and assume the political complexion of
the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.
31
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and
must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense
in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of
the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Petitioners aver
that the records show that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion,
and that the political motivation behind the alleged
murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the
alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as coconspirators.
The court ruled that the burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since
motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.
The proof showing political motivation is adduced during
trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this
Court to determine this factual matter in the instant
petitions.
Case No. 55
People vs. Umali
FACTS:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al
were found guilty was said to have been committed during
the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between
8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by
armed men. The raid resulted in the burning down and
complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial
Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the
house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house
of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan
and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the
wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the
raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two
Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed
and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers
stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
 After trial, the court found Umali et.al, found guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated
murder, arson and robbery.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go
into the political situation in Tiaong. Narciso Umali and Marcial
Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political
faction. However, these friendly relations between the two did not
endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as
Congressman regarded himself as the political head and leader in
that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his
(Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong
who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance,
leadership, and favors. Then the elections of 1951 (November 13)
approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to
clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for
continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio
Pasumbal, his trusted leader. The result of the elections plainly
showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in
Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221
votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed,
and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to
frustrate Punzalan's victory.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the crime
committed is rebellion.
Ruling:
Yes. The court is convinced that the principal and main, tho not
necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was not
rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and
the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not
exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the
things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under
rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat
of local Government. Rather, the object swas to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate
or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely,
Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same
Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition.
Case No. 56
League Jose vs. People
FACTS:
32
Case No. 57
People vs Cabrera
FACTS:
The Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a
rough relationship with each other. The constabulary force
had grudges against the Police force of Manila because of
the incident wherein a Manila police arrested a woman who
is a member of the household of a constabulary soldier and
was allegedly abused by the said policeman. More so, a
day after one Macasinag was shot by a Manila police, a
rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who
shot himwas back to his original duties while Macasinag
was declared dead. There were also rumors that the said
shooting was ordered. As a result, some members of the
Constabulary,with rifles and ammunitions, escaped their
barracks through a window and went to attack the Police
force, killing and wounding several policemen and civilians.
After trial, the court convicted Graciano Cabrera at. with
the crime of sedition.
Issue;
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Graciano
Cabrera et.al with the crime of sedition.
Ruling:
No.
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine
law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of
sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of any official or
agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or
Municipal Government.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a
violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is
and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen
and the offended party a public functionary, and that what
really happened in this instance was a fight between two
armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely
without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the
Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between
 the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a
fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the
actions of the accused.
Case No. 58
U.S. vs Lapus
FACTS:
A complaint for sedition was filed alleging that on the night
of June 3, 1902, a band composed of about four hundred
men, among whom were the accused Mateo Lapus et.al.,
armed with guns, revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs,
raided the town of Cabiao.
They went through the streets of the town firing shots,
yelling, and frightening the inhabitants thereof.
Some of said band went to the house of the municipal
president, while others raided several houses, taking
captive sixty or seventy of the inhabitants.
They roamed about the streets of the town threatening and
intimidating the people.
Some members of the band, among them the chief,
Domingo Cunanan, told the prisoners that the latter were
often found in the justice court, and that they were loaning
money at usurious terms to their farm laborers, and when
the latter were unable to pay the loan they compelled their
children to work for them as servants; that if the wealthy
landowners continued oppressing the poor they would not
stop disturbing the towns, because the law must be equally
applied to rich and poor.
These acts were said to be in compliance with the orders of
Felipe Salvador, chief of the association called "Santa
Iglesia", to which they belonged.
33
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of sedition was committed.
Ruling:
Yes. The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition
provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 5 and
punished by section 6 of Act No. 292 of the Civil
Commission. The appellants were members of an illegal
association and had publicly and tumultuously attacked the
town of Cabiao and roamed over its streets, firing shots,
yelling, and threatening the residents with death, and
thereby frightening them. They performed acts of violence
on the persons of the president and other residents of the
town, against the law and the supreme authority and with
political-social purposes. For these reasons the acts
performed by the defendants constitute sedition as defined
by the aforesaid sections of Act No. 292. The crime of
sedition was consummated, even though the object of the
defendants was not realized.
Case No. 59
US vs Apurado
Facts:
Filomeno Apurado et.al.were convicted of the crime of
sedition as defined in section 5 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission
Before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental
Negros, entered upon its regular morning sessions, some
500 residents assembled near the municipal building and
demanded the dismissal from office of the treasurer,
secretary, and the chief of police, and the substitution in
their places of new officials whose names were suggested
by the spokesman of the party;
They wanted the council to accede to their wishes and
drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its
action.
The persons who took part in the movement were wholly
unarmed except that a few carried canes.
The crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so
far as their pressing into the council chamber during a
session of that body can be called disorder and
misbehavior; and that the movement had its origin in
religious differences between the residents of the
municipality.
The petitioners desired the dismissal of the officials
because they believed that they should not be permitted to
hold office in the municipality on account of their
outspoken allegiance to one of the factions into which the
town was at that time divided.
Issue:
Whether or not Filomeno Apurado et.al were guilty of
sedition.
Ruling:
No.The provisions of Section 5 of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of speech" or
"the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the Government for redress or grievances" guaranteed by
the express provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine bill.
Not only were the individual members of the crowd wholly
unarmed, but they were manifestly desirous that fact
should be known, for it appears that two American officials
having asked what the purpose of the gathering was, were
assured that the assembly merely desired to petition for
the removal of several municipal officials; and in proof of
the fact that they had no intention of committing a breach
of the peace, the members of the crowd raised their
jackets and camisas to prove that they were carrying no
concealed weapons.
34
The prosecution emphasizes unduly the fact that a few of
those who took in the demonstration carried canes, but
there is nothing in the record to indicate that any usual
number of sticks were in the hands of the petitioners, or
that they had been brought to the meeting for the purpose
of using them as weapons of assault.
CASE 61
G.R. No. L-21049
December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE VS. ISAAC PEREZ,
MALCOLM, J.:
Facts:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and
Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992. Upon
meeting, they became engaged in a discussion regarding
the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos,
for he has killed our independence." With that act, he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with
contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority. Upon conviction of such charge, Perez then
appealed the case to this court.
Issue: whether or not Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime
Sedition
Held:
Yes, Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime Sedition. In criminal
law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed
primarily against individuals, but rather against the
existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or
the general public peace. The offenses created and defined
in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them
is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate
authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a
violation of the public peace or at least such a course of
measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at
direct and open violence against the laws, or the
subversion of the Constitution.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like
the Presidency of the United States and other high offices,
under a democratic form of government, instead, of
affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems
rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the
attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds
of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency
in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection
among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with
a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by
the President of the United States by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds
in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic
Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-
General to be exercised in accordance with law. The
Governor-General is the representative of executive civil
authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on
the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599;
U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as
amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on
the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This
section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches,
or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or against the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print,
write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or
do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or
which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together
for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites
rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil
35
practices from the constituted authorities, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars
United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words.
He has made a statement and done an act which tended to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to disturb the
peace of the community and the safety or order of the
Government. All of these various tendencies can be
ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized
as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
CASE 62
G.R. No. L-1451
March 6, 1906
THE UNITED STATE vs. AURELIO TOLENTINO
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
On May 14, 1903, Aurelio Tolentino utter seditious words
and speeches and did write, publish, and circulate
scurrilous libels in Tagalog language in a theatrical work
written by accused-appellant and which was presented by
him and others on the May 14, 1903 at the "Teatro
Libertad," in the city of Manila entitled 'Kahapon gayon at
Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow) which is
against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to
obstruct the lawful officers, instigate others to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest
and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, tend to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the
peace of the community and the safety and order of the
Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Issue:
whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the
accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission
 Held:
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same
offense are define in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of
seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of
the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating
of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others
to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6)
or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly
concealing such evil practices.
In accordance with the principles laid down in the
preceding paragraph the judgment of conviction in this
case must be sustained, if it appears from the evidence in
the record that the accused was guilty as charged of any
one of those offenses. We are all agreed that the
publication and presentation of the drama directly and
necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of
the community and the safety and order of the
Government.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view
of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to
inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
American people and the Government of the United States
in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal
object and intent of its author was to incite the people of
the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the
constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire
together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be
used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government and setting up
another in its stead.
CASE 64
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
36
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in
the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y
Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as
if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended from the limb of the tree, when in truth and
in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel.
After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of
general circulation not only in the Province of Bohol but
also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he
made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife. The note contains statements of
dismay with the administration of President Roxas,
pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte,
and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the
Philippines the government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis, and to teach their children to
burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across
one.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note
or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the
Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdang
and other local periodicals and that he had
impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said
pseudonymous nam in said note or letter and posed
himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein
he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a
limb of a tree."
Issue: Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art.
142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?
Held: Yes.
The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.1 It calls
our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty)
infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators. And the
communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction
or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to
the government.2
 Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of
the govemment or to weaken the oonfidence of the people in
the government are against the public peace, and are criminal
not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace
but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very
government itself.
The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir
up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses or to
induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress
the evils which press upon their minds.
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks
and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists
i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government.
Any citizen may criticize his government and government
officials and submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas."
However, such criticism should be specific and therefore
constructive specifying particular objectionable actuations of
the government; it must be reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to
disloyalty to the government. In the article now under
examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation
of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it
is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions
are set forth. Instead the article drips with maleviolence and
hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse
animosity towards all public servants headed by President
Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would
teach the younger generation to destroy.
CASE 66
People vs. Dasig
G.R. No. 100231.
April 28, 1993.
Facts:
At about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora
noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as
Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them
giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were
37
being followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle
of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle.
At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from
the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled
on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own
life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office
from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatads
gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead
while the rest of the group including Nuez acted as back
up.
Thereafter, the Nuez group commandeered a vehicle and
fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora
testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nuez
because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left
eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3
meters in front of him together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were
tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of
members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu
City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig
and Edwin Nuez trying to escape. The team of Capt.
Antonio Gorre captured Nuez and confiscated a .45
caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while
the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw
a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper
arm and subsequently apprehended.
Issue
Whether or not he committed murder with direct assault or
simple rebellion.
Held
Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised
Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed
voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also
his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the
afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the
sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New Peoples
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
 as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of
rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in
authority.8
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and
plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion.9 The act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is
a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done
in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of
a separate charge.
CASE 67
Gelig vs. People
G.R. No. 173150
July 28, 2010
Facts:
Lydia Gelig and private complainant Gemma B.
Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at
the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo,
Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma at the time material to this case.
Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in
class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and
pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent assault,
Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary
area, as shown by a medical certificate5 issued by
a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However,
Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains
and started bleeding two days after the incident.
On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the
Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to
her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Issue
Whether or not Lydia Gelig is liable for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.
Held
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct
assault is an offense against public order that may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
38
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the
more common form of assault. Its elements are:
1.That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs
force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
serious resistance.
2.That the person assaulted is a person in authority or
his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority
or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the
past performance of official duties.
4.That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is
a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties.
5.That there is no public uprising.15
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was
engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is,
she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking
after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the
classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already
angry when she entered the classroom and accused
Gemma of calling her son a sissy. Lydia refused to be
pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated
a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then
proceeded towards the principals office but Lydia followed
and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing
her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in
Gemmas fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class
of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent
portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
AuthorityWho shall be deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this
Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
 colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority.
(As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved
June 12, 1985).
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and
confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August
28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981
incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that
the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a
direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal
pain two days after the said incident were not
substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is
not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of
other factors.
(Guilty of Direct Assault, but NO unintentional abortion)
CASE 69
69. THE UNITED STATES vs. NICOMEDES GUMBAN
GR NO. 13658
November 9, 1918
Avancea, J.
FACTS:
Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo, was in
the barrio of Pavia of the said municipality, inspecting the
quarantine of animals.
He was getting some information from a councilor,
Magdaleno Suliano, regarding the condition of the animals
in his barrio, when Gregorio Ismaa, a tenant of Magdaleno
Suliano, arrived to report the fact that he had surprised a
carabao belonging to Policarpio Gumban, destroying a
planted area belonging to the said Magdaleno Suliano, and
that, having seized the carabao, he brought the same to
the police station at Pavia, which is within the zone
affected by the quarantine.
Then Epifanio Gumban and the accused Nicomedes
Gumban, brothers of Policarpio Gumban, the owner of the
carabao, arrived there and protested to the president that
CASE 70
39
their brother's carabao was taken to Pavia which is within
the zone affected by the quarantine.
The president, upon hearing said protest, said that it was
his opinion that Gregorio Ismaa was right in taking the
carabao to the police station at Pavia.
However he promised to intervene in the matter and to
telephone to the man in charge of the quarantine to find
out whether, on the following day, the said carabao could
not be withdrawn from the zone affected by the quarantine
and upon hearing this statement of the president, the
accused insulted the said president and gave him a slap on
the face which struck his left ear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of assault upon an
agent of authority
HELD:
Yes. The information qualifies the crime charged as an
assault upon an agent of authority. Inasmuch as the
offended party, as municipal president, is a person in
authority and not a mere agent of authority, the
designation of the crime given by the fiscal is erroneous.
But, as has been decided by this court in many cases, this
mistake does not affect the information, because the
qualification which the fiscal makes is not what constitutes
the crime but the f acts stated in the information. In
relating the facts constituting the alleged crime, the fiscal
further says that the offended party was a municipal
president and therefore an agent of authority. This,
however, is nothing but a mere conclusion of law which can
be considered discarded from the information. The
allegation made that the offended party was a municipal
president is sufficient to make one understand that the
crime charged in the information is that of assault upon a
person in authority. For this reason, we believe that, in
accordance with the information filed in this case, the
accused can be found guilty of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX BENITEZ
GR No. 48396
September 11, 1942
Moran, J.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 28, 1939, while D'Artagnan
Williams, Division Superintendent of Schools for Negros
Occidental, was working in his office, defendant Felix Beni-
tez, special agent in the office of the Provincial Governor,
gave the former a fist blow causing him a contusion over
the mastoid bone on the left ear.
The assault appeared to have been prompted by the
defendant's desire to avenge a supposed affront to the
Provincial Governor by the Division Superintendent in
connection with the appointment of teachers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is a
person in authority within the meaning of article 148, in
connection with article 152, of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Yes, since under the law (section 917 of the Revised
Administrative Code), a division superintendent of schools
is given the power of general superintendence over schools
and school interests in his division, with the right to
appoint municipal school teachers and to fix their salaries,
and further, since education is a state function and public
policy demands an adequate protection of those engaged
in the performance of this commission, we believe and so
hold that a division superintendent of schools should be
regarded as a person in authority.
CASE 71
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TIBURCIO BALBAR
GR Nos. L20216 and L20217
November 29, 1967
Makalintal, J.
40
FACTS:
Tiburcio Balbar entered the room where schoolteacher
Ester Gonzales was conducting her classes.
Without warning and right after complainant had finished
writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye.
Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee.
Defendant allegedly brought out his daga (a local
dagger) and pursued complainant, catching up with her
before she was able to get out of the room and defendant
embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his
daga.
They both fell to the floor, as a result of which complainant
sustained slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quashing the information for Direct Assault
should be set aside by reason of absence of knowledge of
the accused that the victim is a person in authority.
HELD:
NO. The lower courts dismissal of the information on the
ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had
knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority is clearly erroneous.
Where an information for direct assault upon a person in
authority sufficiently alleges that the accused knew the
complainant was a school teacher, was in her classroom
and engaged in the performance of her duties when she
was assaulted, it is error to quash the same upon the
ground of absence of express allegation that accused had
knowledge that she was a person in authority, and the case
should be remanded for trial on the merits, for it matters
not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly
alleged. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is
not expressly alleged, complainants status as a person in
authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
 whereof could not excuse noncompliance on his part (Art.
3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal, and whether substantive or
remedial, for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
CASE 72
U.S. v. GUMBAN,
SUPRA
FACTS:
The warrant for the arrest of Tabiana and his herdsman was
placed in the hands of two policemen, Emiliano Callado and
Baltazar Cabilitasan. Tabiana told the policemen that he
would come in later and report at the municipal building
with his herdsman. At 6. p.m., the Tabiana not having
appeared at the municipal building, the policemen were
directed by the chief to find him and have him come to the
municipal building in obedience to the warrant
In passing near the market place Tabiana detached himself
from the custody of the policemen without their consent
and entered the market. The policemen, instead of
following Tabiana into the market, they waited about half
an hour, at the end of which time they went into the
market and found Tabiana with some of his friends. Tabiana
asked for the warrant. Callado drew the warrant from his
pocket; and as he showed it to the Tabiana who took it,
looked at it, and put it into his pocket. After that he said,
"Come along" and gave the policeman a push, as did also
more than one other of Tabiana's friends.
They went to the municipal building but as it was getting
late, the chief of police and other officials were gone.
Tabiana and his friends left the municipal building, saying
that they were going to find the justice of the peace (the
justice of the peace lived with Tabiana) Presently, however,
the chief of police arrived at the municipal building, and
learning what had taken place, he dispatched the two
policemen to go after Tabiana and procure the return of the
warrant of arrest and to insist that Tabiana should come
down at once so that the matter could be finished.
When the policemen arrived they found Tabiana, he was
requested to give up the warrant and go to the police
station he denied having taken the warrant. Tabiana then
approached the policeman, Callado, and hit him in the
breast with his hand or fist, at which instant the policeman
seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased. As the
41
policeman started to carry the prisoner away two
bystanders interfered and took him away from the
policeman.
By this time Julian Canillas, the justice of the peace, had
arrived on the scene and being evidently excited, he hit
Callado on the back, when he too was stopped by another
policeman. Julian Canillas directing himself to the
policeman said, "Go back to the municipal building and to-
morrow you will take those clothes off," referring to the
uniforms worn by the policemen. The policemen then went
away, which may be attributed not only to the command of
the justice of the peace but also to the fact that some of
Tabiana's friends indicated a determination to fight if the
policemen should persist in their purpose of arresting
Tabiana.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tabiana resisted the persons in authority.
HELD:
YES. Tabiana guilty of resistance and serious disobedience
to public authority. Resistance is impossible without the
employment of some force. A man may abscond or evade
or elude arrest, or may disobey the commands of an officer
without using force but he cannot resist without using force
of some kind or in some degree. If at the ultimate moment
no force is employed to resist, there is not resistance but
submission; and if it had been intended that every
manifestation of force, however slight, against the
authorities, and their agents should bring the case under
article 249, Reasonably interpreted they appear to have
reference to something more dangerous to civil society
than a simple blow with the hands at the moment a party
is taken into custody by a policeman.
Julian Canillas is found to participated in the offense
committed on the occasion, knowing that Tabiana was
liable to arrest under the warrant issued by himself; and he
is therefore punishable in the same manner.
CASE 73
PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ
59 PHIL 343
FACTS:
Amador E. Gomez, as provincial sheriff of Camarines Norte,
appeared at the house of the defendant, Gabriel
Hernandez, to proceed with the attachment of the personal
 property belonging to the latter and his wife, by virtue of a
writ of execution issued by the court in civil case No. 775,
entitled The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Gabriel
Hernandez, the said defendant Gabriel Hernandez, who
was then governor of Camarines Norte, and Marcos
Panotes, who was chief of police of the municipality of
Daet, taking advantage of their respective public positions
and abusing the same, voluntarily, illegally and criminally,
without any legal motive or right whatsoever, detained,
locked up and deprived the said offended party of his
liberty against his will, for a period of time less than three
days.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RESISTANCE TO AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY;
FALSE IMPRISONMENT; ARBITRARY DETENTION;
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF. The alleged offense of resistance
to an agent of a person in authority, with which the
GABRIEL HERNANDEZ is charged, consisted in his having
prevented the provincial sheriff from carrying away his
piano and chairs from his house by holding him by the arm
with hand while with the other he wrested the chair which
the said sheriff was trying to hand over to one of the
several laborers standing by for his orders below or at the
foot of the stairs of the appellants house. The alleged
offense of arbitrary detention with which he was also
charged consisted in his having ordered the chief of police
to arrest said sheriff, depriving him of his liberty at least
from 6 to 8.45 oclock in the evening.
CASE 74
PEOPLE VS RILLORTA
180 SCRA 102
FACTS:
Romy Ramos, a thresher operator, recounted that while
they were threshing the palay stock near the premises of
the of Barangay Captain Emiliano Doton. Pascual Baylon
Rillorta accosted Ramos and threatened him with a gun
saying "Damn you, you better go home or I'll kill you here"
Rillorta resented the threshing of palay in his barrio by the
Ramos' threshing party, whom he regarded as outsiders,
because he wanted the palay stocks in his barrio to be
threshed in his own thresher.
42
On their way home, Calapugan, Ramos and his
companions, Romy Elizaga and Ceferino Facon, aboard
their thresher, were stopped by the three accused. Pascual
Rillorta, who was armed with a bolo, warned them not to
return to thresh palay in barrio Barangobong. Barangay
Captain Doton, who was following behind Ramos' group,
advised Pascual Rillorta to let the threshing party pass. The
three PASCUAL, WESLEY and WILSON RILLORTA chased
Barangay Captain Doton. Upon overtaking him, they
surrounded him and pushed him toward the creek. Pascual
Rillorta hacked him with a bolo while his sons (Wesley and
Wilson) held Barangay Captain Doton 's hands. Barangay
Captain Doton yelled "I'm going to die, they are going to
kill me."
Pascual Rillorta denied having killed Barangay Captain
Doton. He alleged that Barangay Captain Doton attacked
him. For his part, Wesley alleged that he simply defended
his father who was attacked by Doton.
ISSUE:
W/N Barangay Captain Doton was performing his official
duties as barangay captain when attacked.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code and P.D.
299, a barangay captain (formerly a "barrio lieutenant") is
a person in authority. When Doton intervened to prevent a
violent encounter between the Pascual Rillorta and Ramos'
group, he was discharging his duty as barangay captain to
protect life and property and enforce law and order in his
barrio.
CASE 75
U.S. VS. BALUYOT
40 PHIL 385
FACTS:
Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the Province of
Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was,
Jose I. Baluyot. He was then commissioned as captain of
the National Guard. pendency of the accusation
for estafa and its damaging effects upon his reputation, he
had been asked to resign from the position; and although
he had not resigned when the act which gave occasion to
this prosecution occurred, he had apparently been
temporarily relieved from duty with that organization
pending investigation.

He was to deliver a piano owned by his wife to the
provincial building and inquired for the governor upon the
pretext that he desired a friendly interview.
Baluyot had been called into the office upon the
governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for a few
moments to permit another person to have an interview
was also calculated to put the governor off his guard at the
moment Baluyot re-entered the office. The unarmed
governor could make no effectual defence against a person
armed with such a deadly weapon as a revolver. It is
obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately
selected by Baluyot were intended to insure the execution
of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the
defence which the governor could make.
The governor tried to make an escape but was fired the
second and third shot.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the crime was committed whilst the
governor was in the performance of his duty.
HELD:
Yes. A complex crime of murder and assault upon a person
in authority during the performance of his duty. The
provincial governor was killed within his office in the
provincial building whilst performing his duty.
CASE 76
Severino Justo vs CA
GR No. L-8611
REYES J.B.L.,J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals from
Court of First Instance Ilocos Norte.
There were two public teachers who are complainant
and defendant in this case.Justo asked De la Cuesta if it
is possible to have a certain Ms. Racela as teacher in her
district. De la Cuesta said no but maybe a "shop teacher.
Insulted and his feelings hurt,the complainant
lashed out and said in these exact words Shet, you are a
double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise., and
then challenged De la Cuesta to a fist fight outside office
43
premises. Complainant grabbed a lead paper weight. The
two went out the room and then stopped at a certain Mr.
Bueno's office table; Bueno was there apparently. De la
Cuesta said that Justo should drop the lead paper weight.
Defendant put grabbed the neck and collar of Justo.
Bueno broke up the fight, but before that defendant
threw punches at complainant. Justo was found
guilty of assault. Justo claims both parties mutually
agreed to fight, both disrobed themselves as teachers.
Issues:
Whether or not there was mutual agreement to fight
Whether or not mutual agreement to fight disrobes public
duty as teachers
Held:
1. No, there was never a mutual agreement to fight.
Complainant never agreed. It appears that when the two
left the room. Justo was following the complainant.
2. No, being a public official, the duty is attached to their
personality until such person ceases to hold office. No
mutual agreement to fight can disrobe that.
The Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs
against Appellant.
CASE 77
US vs. Prudencio Garcia
G.R. No. 6820
Arellano, C.J.,
FACTS
This is appeal for the crime of attempt against an
authority in which the defendant was found guilty.
There was a case involving Carmen Pascual. The decision
of the case was announced. Apparently, Garcia was
outraged by the decision and blurted, "We dont agree
to the decision!". The justice of the peace, whose name is
not present in the Supreme Court resolution, said that if he
does not agree he could post bail Garcia replied with
outrageous and vexing remarks. The judge rhetorically
 asked what involvement does he have with the case when
he is not even a party to it. The judge told him to get
out as Garcia was making a disturbance. Garcia
made an implied threatening remark just before he
left. When the Justice of the peace was about to go home,
apparently Garcia was waiting in the shadows, like a thief
in the night or a lion pouncing on his prey. Garcia then
attacked the said justice with a cane and slapped
the face of the justice. The defendant denies that he
attacked the justice and states that the latter provoked
him and admits to slapping.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant did assualt the justice
of the peace
Held: Yes, the facts were presented in the lower court with
5 witness claiming what is stated in the facts is true.
Further, Garcia's statements of provocation are
unsubstantiated.
The judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
upon the Appellant.
CASE 78
People vs.JESUS HECTO, PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO,
accused, PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO
G.R. No. L-52787
EN BANC
FACTS:
CFI LEYTE finds herein accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of murder with assault upon a
person in authority and sentencing them to DEATH.
Appellants slaughtered a carabao but did not pay
slaughter fee. Barangay Captain Catalino Pedrosa asked
the appellants to pay but latter said they already did paid
however it was apparently a lie. Catalino confronted the
appellants and a heated exchange happened which lead to
fists being thrown by appellants but the wife of the Captain
was there to pull him out of the fight. Later the Captain
while escorting his nephew to the latters parents house,
he was attacked. A gunshot was heard which prompted the
Captain's wife to go outside their house but she was halted
by appellant who aimed their guns at her. More shots were
fired to the body of the Captain who was lying on the
44
ground and then not satisfied the appellants sadistically
stabbed the captain. The defense of appellant was denial
and that they were somewhere else when the incident
happened.
Issue: Whether or not appellants' guilt should be affirmed.
Held: Yes, although some of the evidence is hearsay. The
testimony of the Captain's wife and Mario Cadayong
corroborated with the facts. The fact that appellants went
into hiding after the incident is evidence of guilt. The
decision is modified as the trial court erred in convicting
them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon a
person in authority.Barangay Captain was in his official
capacity when the accused killed him,the CFI erred in not
ruling this.The penalty is modified to Reclusion Perpetua.
CASE 79
Hilarion Sarcepuedes vs People of the PHilippines
G.R. No. L-3857
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court
of Appeals convicting the appellant of direct assault upon a
person in authority.
Lucrecia Bustamante is a teacher-nurse who ordered the
closing of a pathway in her land which led to the premis of
the school she was working. Hilarion did not like this act.
Hilarion went straight to the school to confront her. A
heated exchange brewed up and Hilarion pushed Lucrecia
to the window and hit her with a raincoat twice. Hilarion
pleads that Lucrecia on that day was not in her official
capacity.
Issue: whether or not to affirm the decision.
Held Yes, the defendant's statement is unfounded. She is a
person in authority within the meaning of the law at the
time of the assault she was piercing the earlobe of a
student which was part of her function. Finding no legal
error in the affirmed decision, The Supreme Court affirms
the decision, with costs against the appellant.
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