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RULE 13 SEC 10

Land Bank v. Heirs of Alsua

Cleotilde et al are the heirs of the late Fernando Alsua, who was the registered
owner of various parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of
approximately 50 hectares situated in Albay.

When the Department of Agrarian Reform initiated proceedings to acquire


Alsuas properties via the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Land Bank filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation before the RTC- sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court however this was dismissed for failure to prosecute within reasonable
length of time. A copy of the order of dismissal was sent via registered mail and
actually delivered to Land Banks counsel on 12 December 2002.

Land Banks counsel sought reconsideration of the order of dismissal the trial
court denied the same because it was filed one day late and lacked merit.

LBP then elevated to the Court of Appeals the issue of the timeliness of the filing
of its motion for reconsideration, insisting that the copy of the order of dismissal
should be deemed received upon delivery to petitioners counsel on 12 December
2002 and not upon receipt by petitioners guard on duty on 11 December 2002
citing the case of Lawin Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC, where the Court
declared invalid the service of the resolution on the security guard of the building
where counsel for the respondent was holding office. In said case, the Court held
that service of papers should be delivered personally to the attorney or by leaving
[them] at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof.

Court of Appeals disregarded LBPs proposition citing Rule 13, Section 8[6] and
Section 10[7] of the Rules of Court stating that the fifteen-day period for filing the
motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from its counsels actual receipt of
the order of dismissal. It explained that the purpose of this rule on service by
registered mail is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and
processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his
pleasure.

Issue: When is the order of dismissal deemed received?

Ruling: The receipt by the security guard of the order of dismissal should be
deemed receipt by petitioners counsel as well since all that the rules of
procedure require in regard to service by registered mail is to have the
postmaster deliver the same to the addressee himself or to a person of
sufficient discretion to receive the same- person who would be able to
appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to him.
In this case, the security guard who received the copy of the order of dismissal
had been accustomed to the responsibility of receiving papers on behalf of Land
Bank and of actually delivering them to the intended recipient. Noteworthy also is
the fact that the security guard did not delay in handing over the order of
dismissal and immediately forwarded the same to petitioners counsel the
following day.

Land Bank had only itself to blame for its failure to inquire exactly when the order
was received or to assume that service of the same was effected on the day it
was handed over to petitioners counsel.

RULE 14 SEC 11
Paramount Insurance v. Ordonez
Paramount Insurance Corp.(PIC) is the subrogee of Maximo Mata, the
registered owner of a Honda City sedan involved in a vehicular accident with a
truck mixer owned by A.C. ORDONEZ CORPORATION(ACOC) and driven by
respondent Franklin A. Suspine.

PIC filed before the MTC of Makati City, a complaint for damages against ACOC.
Based on the Sheriffs Return of Service, summons remained unserved on
respondent Suspine, while it was served on ACOC and received by Samuel D.
Marcoleta of its Receiving Section on April 3, 2000.

PIC filed a Motion to Declare ACOC & Suspine in Default; however, on June 28,
2000, ACOC filed an Omnibus Motion and Opposition alleging that summons
was improperly served upon it because it was made to a secretarial staff who
was unfamiliar with court processes; and that the summons was received by Mr.
Armando C. Ordoez, President and General Manager of respondent corporation
only on June 24, 2000.

ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON AC


ORDONEZ CORPORATION.

RULING: Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.

Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can
receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone
other than the corporations president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.

The new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is
restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction
that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with


Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is required.

Thus, the service of summons to ACOC Receiving Section through Samuel D.


Marcoleta is defective and not binding to said corporation.

RULE 15 SEC 2
Gonzales v. Balikatan

On scheduled hearing, Gonzales appeared but because they failed to file their
answer to the complaint, the court declared them in default and thereafter
allowed the presentation of Balikatans evidence ex-parte.

Gonzales appealed to the Regional Trial Court, contending that the court a quo
erred when it declared them in default as they were not notified of the Balikatans
motion to declare them in default.

Gonzales further contend that when the respondent orally move in open court for
the declaration of default due to petitioners failure to file an answer to the
complaint despite their appearance in court, they were not notified thereof in
contravention of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which states that [i]f the
defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of
such failure, declare the defending party in default.

ISSUE: WON notice of motions made in open court is still required

RULING: NO. The motion to declare Gonzales in default was, to reiterate, made
in open court and in their presence. By their presence, notice to them is fairly
constituted.

Rule 15, Section 2, which provides that [a]ll motions shall be in writing except
those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. As a general rule,
a notice is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
motion. Principles of natural justice demand that his right should not be affected
without an opportunity to be heard.

Rule 18 Sec 1
BPI v. Spouses Genuino

Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed a Complaint for Sum of


Money/Judgment on the Deficiency against the Spouses Genuino before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati when Sps Genuino defaulted in the installment
payments of their loans and credit accommodations.

On December 2, 2009, BPI received a copy of the Answer and opted not to file
any Reply.

The Regional Trial Court, in its Order dated May 17, 2010, dismissed the case
without prejudice for lack of interest to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court.

BPI explained that the case folder was misplaced in the office bodega together
with the records of terminated cases. The assigned secretary of counsel had
already left the firm, and the bank could no longer seek an explanation for the
misfiling of the case after it had been unloaded by previous counsel.

The bank argued for the application of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC and submits that
with the issuance of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, "it is no longer proper to dismiss a
case for failure to prosecute starting August 16, 2004 due to the non-filing
by the plaintiff of a Motion to Set Case for Pre Trial Conference but instead
the Clerk of Court should issue an Order setting the case for Pre Trial
Conference." It quotes Espiritu, et al. v. Lazaro, et al. that clarified the application
of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC to cases filed after its effectivity on August 16, 2004.

The Spouses Genuino on the other hand submit that "notwithstanding A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC it is the duty of the plaintiff to prosecute its action within a reasonable
length of time and the failure to do so would justify the dismissal of the case."

ISSUE: WON the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case without prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute when BPI failed to
file a motion to set case for pre-trial conference.

RULING: NO. Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3
and Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court accommodates the outright
dismissal of a complaint upon plaintiff's failure to show justifiable reason for
not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided by the Rules.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed


by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures took effect on August 16, 2004. This provides
that:

Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must
promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch
COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.

Nevertheless, nowhere in the text of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does it remove the
plaintiff's duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to set the case for
pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. Nowhere does it repeal
Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that allows dismissals due to plaintiff's
fault, including plaintiff's failure to comply with the Rules for no justifiable cause.
Nowhere does it impose a sole burden on the trial court to set the case for pre-
trial.

Rule 19 Sec 2
ASSOCIATED BANK V. SPOUSES PRONSTROLLER

The controversy stems from the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Spouses
Vaca who owned a foreclosed property and the bidding of which was
subsequently won by the Associated Bank. The latter then sold the property to
spouses Pronstroller.
Pronstrollers requested that the balance be payable upon service on them
of a final decision affirming Associated's right to possess the property,
however this was denied by the board of Associated.

After the Associated Banks right to posses the subject property was upheld by
the court in the case commenced by the spouses Vaca, the Pronstrollers filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance before the RTC and they likewise
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the petitioners title.
While the case was pending, the Associated Bank sold the subject property
back to the spouses Vaca. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the
Pronstrollers. Hence, this petition for Reconsideration by the Associated
Bank and Motion for Leave to Intervene by the spouses Vaca who alleged
that they are the registered owners of the subject property and are thus
real parties-in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Vaca shoul be allowed to intervene.

HELD:

No, the motion for leave to intervene before this Court was belatedly filed in
view of Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which provides;

SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at


any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of
the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served
on the original parties.

The SC then reiterated the ruling in Santiago Land Development Corporation v.


Court of Appeals, as cited in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals case which
ruled that:
A transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation does not
have a right to intervene. We held that a transferee stands
exactly in the shoes of his predecessor-in-interest, bound by the
proceedings and judgment in the case before the rights were
assigned to him. It is not legally tenable for a transferee pendente
lite to still intervene. Essentially, the law already considers the
transferee joined or substituted in the/ pending action,
commencing at the exact moment when the transfer of interest is
perfected between the original party-transferor and the
transferee pendente lite.
Therefore, even if the motion for leave to intervene was timely filed, Sps Vaca
being a transferee penedente lite still has no right to intervene.