Generator Protection:

The Value of Periodic Settings

Review

Robert D. Pettigrew, PE
SGS Witter Inc.

Presented to the

59th Annual Conference

For Protective Relay Engineers

Texas A&M University

April 4-6, 2006

1424400430/06/$20.002006IEEE 1 59thAnnualConferenceforProtectiveRelayEngineers
Abstract: This paper reviews several reasons that generator protection relays should
have periodic settings reviews. There are a variety of things that can precipitate a need to
change the relay settings. Several examples are presented that indicate the types of
situations that have been uncovered during settings reviews. Often problems are
uncovered that were a part of the original installation.

Introduction: The protective relays at generating plants should not be considered as

Set & Forget devices. In todays deregulated environment the generating plants may
not have the support from the system protection groups that has been traditionally
available. Unless there is a problem, spending money on the protection equipment is not
considered a high priority. Typically the relays are scheduled for periodic testing and
recalibration to ensure they are operating within their specifications. However, these
periodic tests do not verify settings calculations or review applicability of the settings.
Things can change in the system that effect the settings of generator protection relays.
Mistakes from the past, documentation errors, bad design practices may not be caught in
these periodic testing programs. This paper reviews some problems that might be lurking
in the protection equipment based on actual cases. Periodic settings review can be used
as a tool to uncover these problems. This process is also a good training exercise for
protection engineers that are not routinely involved in generator protection.

Items That May Effect Relay Settings

o Transmission System Impedance/Configuration

o Reliability Standards
o Equipment Changes
o New Information (i.e. ref. #1)
o Unrecognized Past Errors

A. Transmission system changes, new lines or removal of lines, in the vicinity of a

power plant may require adjustment of settings on system backup protection, out
of step protection and loss of field protection. The effect of in-feed on distance
relay reach can be changed significantly if a source is added or removed. Changes
in system impedance also affect the transient stability of the unit which will affect
the settings of out of step relays.

B. Changes to reliability standards, for example WECC Must Operate Frequency

Limits, can require new over/under frequency relay settings to ensure the units
hang on to the system long enough for the system load shedding relays to operate.
The proposed NERC PRC-025 Generation Protection Requirements during
abnormal system voltage and frequency may also affect the settings of system
backup relays.

C. Replacement of the excitation equipment should prompt a review of the settings

of the Minimum Excitation Limiter (MEL), the Over Excitation Limiter, versus
the generator capability curve (GCC) and the steady state stability limit (SSSL).
Replacement of the protective relays with the latest technology would be another

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 obvious reason to review the settings and also calculate settings for the various
relay elements that will be included in the digital multifunction relays. Protective
relay elements that were missing from the original protection can now be applied.

D. New published reports, such as reference 1, Performance of Generator Protection

During major System Disturbances, may stimulate a change in setting philosophy
that would be implemented during a periodic review program.

E. In some cases a review of the relay setting calculations will uncover problems that
are left over from the past.

Effects on Specific Relays

1. Loss of Field Relay: The Loss of Field relay, when set using the method typically
associated with the KLF relay recommendations, will be offset into the +X direction by
the reactance of the generator step-up transformer (GSU) and system equivalent
impedance. Figure 1 shows the relay characteristics in the R-X plane while Figure 2
represents the same relay characteristics plotted in the P-Q plane. The relay characteristic
should be coordinated with the GCC, the MEL and the SSSL of the unit. Changes in the
system impedance will affect the forward reach setting. The system impedance used for
this setting will be established as a maximum expected impedance, with the strongest
source removed.

Loss of Field Coordination

R-X Plane

15

10

R(Ohms)
0
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25
Gen CC

Dir El
-30 LOF

SSSL

X(Ohms) -35 MEL

-40

3
 Figure 1
Loss of Field Coordination
P-Q Plane

P (MW)
0
-50 -30 -10 10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150

-20

GCC 30
-40
SSSL

Q (MVAR) LOF1

LOF11

MEL
-60

Figure 2

The condition of steady state stability is determined by the steady state stability limits
(SSSL) of the machine when delivering power into the system with the above stated
maximum system impedance condition. With proper coordination the unit is can deliver
the rated unit power into the system and remain stable on a steady state basis. The Loss of
Field relay will not interfere with this power flow. In addition the MEL, a part of the
excitation system, should limit the voltage regulators ability to reduce the excitation
current in order to prevent the unit from operating beyond the underexcited GCC limits.
This protects the machine and prevents the Loss of Field relay operation during periods
of high system voltage.

Changes to the system impedance will affect the coordination of the SSSL and the loss of
field relay. The review process will determine if any changes to the relay settings are
warranted.

2. System Backup Protection: Impedance relays are used on large units to provide
backup to relays on the generator, GSU and on the transmission system outside the plant.
Modifications to the transmission system should be reviewed for the impact on the
plants backup protection. Figure 3 shows the phase distance relay and the connected
transmission system. Depending on the system configuration the relay is set to detect
uncleared phase faults in the transmission system. In order to see faults at the end of the
longest line the reach may interfere with the machines loadability. Due to in feed effects
the reach of the distance relay is often unable to reach the end of the longest line.
Changes in the system will directly effect the settings calculations for these relays.

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 Generator Longest Line

Power System
Other
Sources

21
Short Line

Unit Connected Generator

System Backup Relay
Figure 3

To ensure the distance relay does not affect normal machine operation, the distance
relays characteristic is compared to 150 200% of the units capability at the rated
power factor. This comparison can be done graphically as shown in Figure 4.

Phase Dist. Coordination

vs. (200% GCC)
20

15

10

R(Ohms)

0
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

-5
Gen CC
MSA
P Dist
X(Ohms) Gen CC-
+0.9 PF
-0.9 pf
-10

Figure 4

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Reliability Standards: The WECC has published must operate frequency ranges for
generating plants in its jurisdiction. The requirements are shown in Table 1. The over
and under frequency relay settings for all affected units should be compared to these
limits for compliance. In addition turbines also have operational frequency limits that
specify ranges of frequency where they should not be operated for extended periods of
time. The IEEE has published IEEE Standard C37.106 Guide for Abnormal Frequency
Protection of Power Generating Plants (ref. 3) that reviews this subject in detail. The
relay engineer needs to set the over and under frequency protection to allow the unit to
operate for the minimum times specified in Table 1 but not to exceed the limits of the
turbine. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.

Table 1 WECC Must Operate Frequency Requirements

Recommended Abnormal Frequency Protection

4 Step 81O/U
10000

Prohibited Prohibited
Operation Operation
1000

WSCC Low
WSCC High
Nominal F
N-
Time(sec)

N+
100
LS1
Continuous LS2
Operation LS3
LS4
LS5
ST High
10 WECC WECC ST Low
Must Must Tie Trip
Trip High
Operate Operate
Trip Low

Tie
Trip
1

WECC
Load Shedding
0.1
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

Frequency(Hz)
Figure 5

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With a two step over and two step under frequency relay the settings are at best a
compromise between the WECC requirements and the machine capability.

Unrecognized Past Errors: How often do we hear If it aint broke dont fix it! As
well meaning as this old saying may be, one might counter with, If you never look, how
do you know it aint broke? Relays that trip will get lots of attention, those that never
trip are usually considered good. This may not always be the case.

Documentation Error: The following is an example found of a documentation error that

resulted in a Loss of Field relay that was incorrectly set. Two identical gas turbine units
in a CCCT facility were protected with the KLF single zone Loss of Field relays. The
KLF requires six screw tap settings in order to be set for the desired mho diameter and
offset (SA, TA, MA, SC, TC, MC). With identical generating units, transformers, and
connections to the system, the relays should be set with identical settings. However, due
to a documentation error the SA tap value in Unit 1 was set at 1 and on Unit 2 tap SA was
set to 2. The resulting mho characteristics were as shown in Figures 6 and 7.

With the incorrect SA=1 Tap Setting on GT1, the LOF relay is not set as recommended
for a single zone LOF application. The unit will go out of step prior to the LOF relay
tripping, as indicated by the SSSL.

During this review, another issue was found with a companion unit at the same facility.
This units MEL characteristic is slightly outside the GCC and would allow the unit to
operate in the under excited mode beyond the capability of the machine. The operators
confirmed that at night the excitation would go in the tank trying to keep the system
voltage from rising to high.

Therefore a brief review of the LOF relay settings has uncovered two potential issues. A
simple tap change will solve the LOF relay setting problem at the gas turbine. An
adjustment of the MEL will resolve the issue at the companion unit and result in a
machine with properly coordinated LOF, MEL, GCC and SSSL.

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 Loss of Field Coordination GT#1
R-X Plane (Existing )

15

10

R(Ohms)
0
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25
Gen CC

Dir El
-30
LOF

SSSL
X(Ohms)-35 MEL

-40

Figure 6

Loss of Field Coordination GT#2

R-X Plane (Existing )

10

0
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25
R(Ohms)
-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

Gen CC
-30
Dir El

LOF
-35
X(Ohms) SSSL

MEL
-40

Figure 7

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The other issue with these units is the proximity of the SSSL with the GCC. These
curves need to be reviewed over the years as system configurations change. Changes in
the transmission system or new generating units can modify the system impedance
significantly and make things better or worse.

Retrofit Gone Bad: An aging plant had been recently updated with modern digital
multifunction generator protection relays. During a settings review the following design
issue was uncovered. The protection for the entire plant, primary and backup was being
powered on one set of DC fuses as shown in Figure 8. A simple blown fuse will disable
all of the protection for the generator and GSU. The Loss of DC alarm will alert
operators. However, the plant is unprotected until the fuse problem is resolved.

Figure 8

A second issue with the retrofit involved the Output contact programming. As is
common in digital relays the various protection functions are connected to outputs via a
software map. The facility used 3 lockout relays as follows:

o 86G generator protection relays

o 86BU loss of field, negative sequence overcurrent
o 86U Unit differential, phase distance backup (transformer backup)

In the contact programming for the generator protection relays the outputs for tripping
86BU and 86U are reversed. Therefore a negative sequence trip and loss of field trip will
completely shut down the unit. However, a phase distance trip, which could be due to a
fault in the GSU, will only open the unit breaker and not remove the fault. This clearly is
not the intended result.

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CT Polarity Mix-up: Unit differential relays often encompass switchgear CTs on the
secondary of the unit auxiliary transformer. Figure 9 shows the problem.

2IS
CB
87U

I1

UAT
IS

GS

I1

IS
Figure 9

The differential connection normally used utilizes CTs with polarity dots facing away
from the protected zone. However, the switchgear load CTs have polarity dots opposite
of this convention. The relay doesnt trip due to the small MVA rating of the UAT vs.
the generator. At full load on the UAT the differential current contribution is only 0.25
amps. However, if there is a fault in the plant auxiliaries there will be enough current to
operate the 87U relay. Tripping the plant due to a plant feeder fault is not what is
intended.

Delta Wye Distance Compensation Settings: Phase distance backup relays use generator
terminal voltages and currents to sense faults in the transmission system. Unit connected
plants have a Delta/Wye GSU. Setting a phase distance function that needs to look
through the Delta/Wye GSU requires some phasor manipulation. When Open-Delta VTs
are used on the generator terminals another phase shift is introduced. Digital relays have
algorithms that compensate for this configuration. However, not all manufacturers use
the same algorithm. This can lead to confusion in setting calculations. The following
table shows how two different manufacturers handle the impedance calculations for an A-
B fault on the system.

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 MFG A MFG B

L-L VTs L-L VTs

Z = VBC-VAB/3*IB
Z = VBC-VAB/IB

Using MFG Bs relay, a setting of 3 times the expected setting will need to be put into the
unit.

This difference in methodology is an obvious source of settings errors that was found in a
recent review. A relay with a desired reach of 1.5 ohms was actually set to reach 0.5
ohms. (It was set for 1.5 ohms but the factor of three was overlooked).

The requirement for the factor of three is illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. In order to
properly measure the impedance to the phase to phase fault in the transmission system the
relay, measuring voltage and current on the generator terminals, must compensate for the
effects of the transformer. The relays use IB and VBC-VAB to find the proper phase
relationship. The Delta connected VTs introduce a second square root of 3 magnitude
factor that results in the factor of 3 in the impedance scaling.

21 Relay Scaling
Phase - Phase Fault in System

ZL+ZT
A A'
I IA'
Fault
IB'
B B'
ZL+ZT
IB = 2*IA 2*I

C C'
I IC' = 0

Open
Delta
VT's

VBC VAB

VCA

Normal Reach Setting Z= VA/I A

Delta VT's Give V AB, VBC, VCA
Relay Uses V BC - VAB to shift phase
Results in Z relay = 3*Z

Z = 2(ZL + ZT)

Figure 10

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 GSU Phasing
Delta VT's

A A'

A A'

B B'

C C'

C-A C'-G

C-G

(B-C)-(A-B)
B-G

B-C A-G B'-G

A-B A'-G

13.8kV 69kV

Figure 11

Application consideration: The Zone 1 Loss of Field relay (refer to Figure 7) is applied
with a time delay of approximately 0.5 seconds to ensure the relay does not trip due to
stable swings. A large plant was recently found to have the KLF loss of field relay
applied without the time delay. The relay would trip within 0.06 seconds for any swing
that entered the characteristic. Stability studies modeled several potential swings. These
studies did not indicate the swings would enter the characteristic. However, the stability
studies do not test every possible case. Therefore, the suggested time delay was
recommended for reasons of security.

Conclusion: Periodic reviews of relay settings at generating plants have many benefits.
The primary benefit may be the training that is derived from reviewing the relay
applications and setting calculations. A thorough review process will require the
engineer to research basic machine and system parameters and redo the relay calculations
from these basic parameters. Protection engineers in todays utility companies may not
have experience in setting generator protection relays and this process can maintain the
expertise that will be needed when one of these relays operates

System modifications will have some effect on the performance of the relays in
generating plants. A periodic review process can be used to evaluate the effect of these
changes on the operation of generating plant relays.

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The discovery of existing problems may be a very beneficial part of this review process.
There are often unexpected surprises waiting to be uncovered

There are also regulatory organizations, such as NERC, that may periodically require
changes in the setting philosophy of the generating plant relays in order to reduce the
chance of tripping unnecessarily during system emergencies.

References:
1. IEEE PSRC WG Report Performance of Generator Protection During Major
System Disturbances, available from the IEEE PSRC Web Site: www.pes-
psrc.org
2. IEEE C37.102, Guide for AC Generator Protection
3. IEEE C37.106, Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection of Generating Plants

Bob Pettigrew is a Senior Consulting Engineer for SGS Witter, Inc. working out of the Albuquerque
office, but domiciled in Asheville, North Carolina. He received his BSEE degree with honors in 1969 from
the University of Florida and his MSEE degree in 1980 from the University of South Florida. He spent
eight years at Honeywell Inc. working in the Aerospace Industry. He also has spent 22 years as an
Engineer and Executive at the Beckwith Electric Company working in the fields of Generation Control and
Protection, Load Tapchanger controls and Capacitor controls. He has written and presented several papers
on protection and motor bus transfer in power plants. He is presently active in the IEEE Power Systems
Relaying Committee and is a past Chairman of the Rotating Machinery Protection Subcommittee. Bob is a
licensed professional engineer in Florida, Wisconsin, Washington, and North Carolina.

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