1. Amputan v.

De Lima re: separation of powers, power of the executive to investigate

Facts: This case deals with the state prosecutors admission of several accused in the Ampatuan
murder case as state witnesses. GAD is being alleged as to this.

Doctrine: The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government
whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion the
discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against
a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal
cases should be filed in court.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and
to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly
established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."

Court: For as long as the state witness falls within the requirements under the law, who may be
selected as a state witness is a matter of sound discretion of the trial court, and especially that of
the public prosecutor. The reason for this is simplethe trial court is in the best position to
determine who is qualified to be a state witness. (here, the requirements were all met: absolute
necessity, no other DE, TTY can be substantially corroborated in its material points, does not
appear to be most guilty, and no other conviction for crime involving moral turpitude).

2. Rule on Transfer of Employees, per Republic v Bayao

Facts: EO 304 passed, designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of
SOCKSARGEN, which also provied that all departments, bureaus and offices of the national
government in that regional shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal. This was
later suspended except as to the DTI, DOT and DOLE. The other departments also want to hold
the same in abeyance.
Doctrine: While the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. This is found in the Consti
and in the LGC. One of the related powers it the power to regional center (Chiongbian v Orbos).
As such the question of designation of regional center is a matter of wisdom, not legality. This is
a political question that simply cannot be questioned.

Court: Petition denied. Question of wisdom.

3. Powers of the BOC under the Pimentel case (Pimentel didnt agree with re-canvassing
of the BOC in Maguindanaoelection case; denominated as preproclamation controversy)

- Powers re PPC: In sum, in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules,
there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest
errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as
provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
o These are the issues that may be raised in such PPCs:
Illegal composition or proceedings of BOC
The canvassed election returns/certificates of canvass are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns/certificates or in the other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236
of the Omnibus Election Code;
election returns/certificates of canvass were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic;
When substitute or fraudulent election return/certificates of canvass were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
- Powers of National Board of Canvassers: Boards of canvassers are ad hoc bodies that
exist only for the interim task of canvassing election returns. They do not have the
facilities, the time and even the competence to hear, examine and decide on alleged
election irregularities, unlike regular courts or the COMELEC itself or the electoral
tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House), which are regular agencies of government
tasked and equipped for the purpose. While this Court has time and again expressed its
abhorrence of the nefarious "grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" strategy of
some candidates, nonetheless, it recognizes the very limited jurisdiction of MBOCs and
PBOCs. Unless Pimentel is able to show cogently and clearly his entitlement to the
 summary exclusion of clearly unacceptable certificates of canvass, this Court must
uphold the constitutional and legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions and authenticity of official documents.

As already declared by this Court, the NBC has the duty to determine the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four
criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369. It has not been established to the satisfaction of this Court that the NBC failed
to comply with its duty under said provision.

As for local boards of canvassers, in elections for Senators, they only need to determine
the authenticity and due execution of the election returns or certificates of canvass on the
face thereof. As for the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass shall be limited only to those
submitted before it by the local boards of canvassers and in accordance with the criteria
provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
The limitations on the powers and duties of the boards of canvassers are meant to avoid
any delay in the proclamation of the elected official. Issues whose resolution would
require the presentation and examination of witnesses are more properly raised in a
regular election protest.
- DP, EP: There is no right violated wrt to ones taking the lead at some point in the
elections. The property right attaches when one wins and takes office.

JCOC case (for BOC in Presidential elections): The Congress is a continuing body and must
fulfil its constitutional mandate to conduct the presidential canvass of votes even it if is in recess.
The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the
elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, this body does
not meet for purposes of considering bills (Lopez v Senate).

4. Belgica v Ochoa re: delegation of powers (Presidential pork barrel)

Doctrine: While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive
either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making. (RULE MAKING MUST EITHER (A) FILL UP
DETAILS OR (B) ASCERTAIN FACTS)

There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate.

On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that
a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

Court: The Malampaya one constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Ejusdem
generis cannot be applied because of three reasons: (1) the phrase "energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class
and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited, (2) the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government, and (3) the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government. The phrase
should be struck down as it did not pass the standard test.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of
PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on
the same. Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. A similar
problem exists in Sec. 12 PD 1869, as amended, in the phrase 'to finance the priority
infrastructure dev't projects' as infrastructure is a very broad classification.

Effect: Said provisions are severed from the rest of the laws for being unconstitutional.

[Congressional pork barrel also problematic due to the use of post-enactment congressional
measures outside of scrutiny and investigationhere, there is an effective legislative veto and
amendment power the program menu is not merely recommendatory (reference to the
Philconsa ruling), but an effective amendment/veto]

[Pork barrel: collective body of rules and principles that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participation of the Legislative and Executive, including its members;; it may be Congressional,
where legislators can ultimately control utilization through post-enactment measures and/or
practices, or Presidential, where the President may determine the manner of its utilization.]

5. Tanada v Angara; Re WTO

- Declaration of Principles (economic nationalism): In spite of the Manila Prince Hotel ruling,
Art. II and some parts of Art. XII are not self-executing, and are mainly guidelines for
legislation. They cannot be the basis for a cause of action. However, the cited Art. XII articles on
economic nationalism can be considered self-executing, but they have to be read alongside other
constitutional principleswhile it has preference for qualified Filipinos in developing the
national economy and patrimony, it recognizes a general welfare-focused trade policy. [the
Filipino first policy is S-ex more towards rights re: national economy and patrimony]

- Effect of WTO: Moreover, the WTO recognizes the need to protect weak economies, hence the
existence of provisos to that effect. For example, there is preferential treatment as to developing
countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and period for spreading out that reduction.

- This self-reliance does not rule out foreign competition. It is not meant for an isolationist
policy. At any rate, the Constitution considered future events and contingencies, and is meant to
adapt.

- Legislative Power and Judicial Power (how WTO affects legislation): Sovereignty is
necessarily limited by entry into treaties. States enter into treaties because that limitation on
sovereignty should result in benefits. At any rate, it is GP/L (incorporated in our laws) for there
to be a policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

- Final Act: The final act, or protocol de clture, is a winding up instrument which is a summary of
proceedings agreed upon in diplomatic, etc. conferences. It is not the treaty itself. Agreement
with the scope of the WTO is based on the included documents, which did not include the WTO
final act.

6. Saguisag v Ochoa (EDCA)

Judicial review argument: Transcendental importance may be based on possible violation of the
Constitution; in this case, Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 on the allowance of foreign military bases, etc.
This is a matter of paramount importance that allows for invocation of judicial review.

Non-submission to Senate argument: The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence because it is in the form of an executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into agreements on foreign military bases,
troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such and
(2) if it merely aims to implement an existing agreement or treaty. EDCA is primarily an
adjustment/implementation of the MDT and VFA, prior treaties that were indeed transmitted to
senate.

Effect on Territory: When the Republic, via EDCA designates, Assigned Areas for the exclusive
use and special rights for the visiting forces, it does so as the owner of the lands, which is an
adjunct of sovereignty.
7. Bayan Muna v Romulo (submission for ratification) Re: Non-surrender agreement
as an Executive Agreement; Argued as invalid due to being EA and not being transmitted
to Congress for concurrence

As to form of agreement: Executive agreements are an accepted form of international agreement.

It is akin to a private law contract, and is availed of for the speedy procedure, and sometimes, to
avoid the process of legislative approval.

As to need for Senate concurrence: Senate concurrence is not required for executive agreements.
Although it is seen as a treaty under IL, it is an executive agreement under ML. It is recognized
that international agreements may be in the form of EAs, which do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than
treaties. There are no hard and fast rules as to which form may be usedit is a question of
wisdom, except when foreign military bases are involved under Art. XVIII, Sec. 25.

8. Abakada v Purisima (attrition incentive system for BOC and BIR officers; also
created Joint Congressional Oversight Committee)

Accountability: The argument that the officers will become bounty hunters is purely speculative.
While public service is its own reward, an incentive system is not anathema to public
accountabilitythe law explicitly allows reward systems for exemplary performance, and it is
understandable why, for it recognizes and reinforces dedication to service, etc. Moreover, the RA
in question has standards to prevent bounty hunting, such as liability rules for irregularities
made.

Equal protection: Test is: substantial distinctions germane to purpose of the law, not limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Law itself limited
its scope to the BOC and BIR for revenue-generation purposes (which IS their main purpose).

Undue delegation: Section 2 thereof declaredas a State policy the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BOC and BIR.

o Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest,"

"justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy
and welfare." The declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

Section 4"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to
the President to fix revenue targets:

o by stating that the Fund will be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the
BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by
the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC).
 o by defining revenue targetsas the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress.

o Clearly, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President
as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

Section 7 specified the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5% may be removed from the service, with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collectionxxx subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process. No violation of
security of tenure.

Separation of powers (now moot; it was made only to make the IRR for the law; however, it
cited the Macalintal case where the joint oversight committee was found to have infringed on the
power of COMELEC as it could even amend the IRR they passed)

Levels of oversight: The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:

a. to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives,

b. to determine whether agencies are properly administered,

c. to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,

d. to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and

e. to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government.

o Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check
the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch.

o Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.

Categories of congressional oversight functions:

a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of
the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.

b. Congressional investigation -While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive

process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation
involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation
is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI.

c. Legislative supervision -The third and most encompassing form by which Congress
exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.

While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past
executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency
the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require
the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which
retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.

o Supporters of legislative veto: It offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast

power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. This arrangement promotes democratic
accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected
administrative agencies.

o Opponents of legislative veto: It is an undue encroachment upon the

executive prerogatives. Any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any
measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither

necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws
 nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power
in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the

legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress:

o It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.

o And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited

to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:

1. Scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and

2. Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form
of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other
than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by
law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
 Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect.Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution.

CAB: In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a

determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of R.A. No.
9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested
in this Court by the Constitution.

Attrition rule: Yardstick of removal (<7.5% revenue collection, factoring in all

relevant considerations); did not violate security of tenure as it only prevents
dismissal without causehere, it sets a yardstick for removal, that is a dismissal with
cause further, it is to be read alongside substantive and procedural DP rules

9. Bureau of Customs v Tevez (merit fitness rule); follow up to Abakada re: RA 9335

Due process: Essence is opportunity to be heard and explain ones side. The Ee is not
merely given the targetit requires consideration of other factors, which the Ee may
refute, etc.
Equal protection: Consider specific functions of the BIR and BOC as primary
source of revenue for government. essentially, taxation as purpose
Security of tenure: See notes on attrition rule in (8)
Undue delegation: Already ruled upon in Abakada. Completeness and sufficient
standard tests are met. Standards that may be considered include public interest,
justice and equity, public convenience and welfare, etc.
Bill of attainder: bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a
legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty the
deprivation of life or liberty or property not by the ordinary processes of judicial
trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of
attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is
in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of
persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand,
without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the
civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it. Not BOA
because the law only provides for standards and possible penalties for failing to meet
the to-be-imposed standardsit does not automatically penalize.
10. Pichay v Presidential Anti-graft Commission; Banda v Ermita

Pichay: EO 12 and 13 re: PAGC abolishment and transfer of functions to the

Office of the Deputy Exec. Secretary for Legal Affairs
o This does not defeat the legislatives power to create a public office. It is
part of the delegated legislative authority of the President to reorganize his
own office pursuant to EO 292.
o Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to
transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President
to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.
o Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with
the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him
to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units,
apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from
one unit to another.
o In effect, this was a transfer of functions within units within the
Presidents office.
o Good faith: no usurpation of other functions
o Not really adjudicatory: actual authority is more investigative, not the
power to hear and decide cases more or less faithful execution of laws
Banda: Loss of exclusive printing jurisdiction of NPO as to printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities
o NPO is part of Office of Press Secretary, which is part of OP; there was no
actual transfer of functions in this case as all that happened was to remove
its exclusivityit remains the main printing arm;; consider: residual
functions and provisions in general appropriations laws, see also Buklod
casewhich deactivated an entire unit
o In the Tondo Medical v CA case, there was even a structural and
functional reorg of the DOH under an EO, and that was upheld.
o Was not shown that this will effect security of tenure; in fact, good faith
reorg would allow abolition of positions which does affect SoT

11. Advisory v contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ; Doctrine in Reparations cases

Contrasting the two types of jurisdiction:

- Contentious jurisdiction refers to the ICJs capacity to decide disputes between states
(UN members are parties to the ICJ statute as it is part of the UN Charter; non-members
may become parties upon conditions determined UNGA as recommended by UNSC).
Here, jurisdiction must be proven and agreed upon (ergo, admissibility). When a decision
is made, it becomes res judicata as against the parties to the dispute.
 o Includes cases referred to between parties (36.1) and interpretation of treaties,
answering of Q of IL, existence of facts that would lead to breach of obligation,
and extent of reparations for breach of IO (36.2)
o Sources of Law: Conventions, Customs, GP/L, Treatises etc.
- Advisory jurisdiction refers to the ICJs capacity to give opinions on matters when
requested to do so by particular qualified entities. At best, it offers legal advice (a
balanced opinion)therefore, NOT binding, though the procedure is ultimately similar
to contentious cases.

Reparations case doctrine: The United Nations may be a party to cases, such as in this case for
advisory opinion, due to its international capacity under the UNCH. Here, the court recognized
that the UN may bring suit in behalf of its agents who were injured in service to it.

12. Frivaldo v COMELEC and Maquiling v COMELEC re: effect of repatriation on

citizenship status

Repatriation under PD 725 retroacts and restores the citizenship of the person affected. Not only
does it restore the person to Filipino citizenship, but it restores him to whatever status he had
prior to whatever changes in citizenship (repatriation is usually done for changes in citizenship
done for political reasons), such that he may be restored to natural-born status.

However, certain acts may run counter to repatriation/dual citizenship (Maquiling case), such as
the use of a foreign passport. Such acts act counter to the renunciation of any foreign link, and
reverts him to a non-full Filipino/dual citizen. This DISQUALIFIES the candidate, and allows
for the then-second placer (in such a case) to win as election requires a winning qualified
candidate.

13. Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board re: power of Bureau of Immigration to issue
warrants of arrest

(note that the Qua Chee Gan case was under the 1935 Constitution, but cases citing QCG exist
within the framework of the 1987 Constitution) The power to issue warrants of arrest is lodged
with the judges EXCEPT for the carrying out of a final deportation order. The Constitutional
provision will trump laws and administrative regulations that allow for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.

14. UNCLOS Maritime Zones (delineation, rights that may be exercised per zone,
obligations to be respected per zone)

Zone Threshold Rights and Obligations

Internal Waters Landward of baseline from Treat as if part of land area
which territorial see is (note that archipelagic waters
measured are also treated as if internal
waters EXCEPT subject to

Territorial Sea 12nm from baseline; for
archipelagic straights, us
archipelagic baseline
Contiguous Zone 24nm from baseline
Continental shelf Seabed and subsoil of
submarine areas from
territorial sea throughout
naturl prolongation of land
territory to outer edge of
continental margin, or 200 nm
from baselines from which the
TS is measured where outer
edge of continental margin
does not extend up to that
distance
EEZ 12nm-200nm max. (EEZs
may intersect, so treaties may
be concluded to delineate the
extent of ones EEZ)
High Seas 200 nm from shore
right of innocent passage of
merchant vessels)
Part of sovereign territory,
including criminal jurisdiction
over foreign merchant vessels;
subject to innocent passage
and involuntary entrance if
there is real distress on the
vessel
Customs jurisdiction
extension
Right of exploitation of oil
deposits and other resources
(sovereign rights).
Sovereign rights for purposes
of exploring and exploiting,
conserving an managing
natural resources of the
seabed, subsoil and
superjacent waters. Must
respect freedom of navigation,
overflight, laying of
submarine cables and pipes,
and other lawful uses.
Open and freely available to
everyone, particularly:
navigation, overflight, laying
of cables and pipelines,
artificial islands and
installations, fishing, marine
scientific research
Innocent passage - Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention
and with other rules of international law. Recognizes the TS claim of the coastal state.

Navigation- ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer interference from other
states. Contest the claim of that state.

Overflight counterpart of innocent passage/navigation for aircraft

15. Power to create ad hoc courts prior to ICC

Prior to the establishment of the ICC, several ad hoc courts were created, such as the Nuremberg,
Yugoslavia and Rwanda courts. These generally focused on war crimes and crimes against
humanity. These were created through UNSC Security Resolutions. They are independent bodies,
though they may share staff/judges. However, these are now phased out in favor of the ICCthe
UNSC, instead of issuing resolutions to create ad hoc tribunals, may refer cases to the ICC
instead (although note that the ICC is NOT part of the UN).

16. Republic v Batugas (2013) re: naturalization, qualifications for naturalized citizens
(lucrative profession rule)

For naturalization, a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could not have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the
members of the family. Thus, the alien wife would share in the citizenship of the Filipino
husband. Even without this, the wife in this case fell under the qualifications required by the
naturalization lawhere, it was considered enough that the wifes teaching job, along with the
husbands work, was able to raise and produce five professionals.

Only in certain instances may the wife be refusedwhich is if she suffers from some
disqualification under the law.

(Note that this case was one of judicial naturalization, having failed the administrative route due
to the CID not being convinced of the Filipino citizenship of the husband)

17. DOJ Secretary v Pinese

18. Poe v COMELEC

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates

Held: No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies
one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept
the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935
Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.

19. Lambino v COMELEC and Santiago v COMELEC re: amendment process;

amendment vs revision (qualitative and quantitative tests); insufficiency of RA 6735
peoples initiative for Constitutional amendment

Santiago ruling on insufficiency of RA 6735 to effect the peoples initiative for Constitutional
amendment: The Constitutional provision on peoples initiative is not self-executory (as may be
provided by law), which was noted to have been the intent of the ConComm. The problem
with the law is that there is no specific section pertaining to Constitutional amendment. Given
this, any IRRs that attempt to implement Constitutional amendment via peoples initiative would
be ultra vires for being invalid exercise of delegated power.

Lambino rulings:

a. It was intended by the ConComm that when it comes to initiatives, the document to be
shown to the people for ratification should have the full text of the amendments to be
made. If this is not shown, the petition is clearly defective. This is especially so if the
changes to be made are so vast that they change the entire system of government from a
bilateral-Presidential government to a unilateral-parliamentary one. (In Lambino, most of
the sig sheets did not show the full text; all it said isdo you want to shift to a
parliamentary system more or less; there are several fine print provisions that go
beyond this shift)
b. Only amendments are intended to be done via peoples initiative. There is a reason to
have ConAss/ConCon (w/ vote) for revisionsthe scope of the changes are such that
there needs to be a deliberatively body that can iron out the possible conflicts that may
arise.
c. To determine if a change is an amendment/revision, consider
a. Qualitative test effect of changes so as to cause an overhaul of government, as
in a change in separation of powers
b. Quantitative test number of provisions to be changed

20. Relative constitutionality and relative due process (see Central Bank EA v BSP)

Facts: Central Bank Act created a new BSP. A clause in the act is being challenged for being
violative of EP: The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or
those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and
(2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage
of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class
legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely
on the SG of the BSP personnels position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.

Doctrine: The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere

comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.

Court: Similar case was on debt moratorium re pre-war obligations by people who would later
suffer from the war: continued enforcement of the debt moratorium would have been oppressive
to creditors due to their need to wait at least 12 more years in order to account for debts since
1941 (DM case decided in 1953). It places them at the mercy of the debtors.

Same case here. While there was a previous valid classification, later on, other agencies similarly
situated had similar provisions which have blanket exemptions, not the distinctions under the
CBA. The previous valid classification had become unconstitutional.

21. Territoriality rule with respect to embassies

Under VCDR: Considered part of the territory of the nation they represent, but they are not fully
extraterritorial and are not sovereign territory of the represented state. They are under the
jurisdiction of the host state BUT have special privileges of extraterritoriality, such as exemption
from certain laws. (the exemption is from certain processes, police interference, and other
measures of constraint)

22. Immunity from jurisdiction re: ADB vis--vis official functions rule (Liang case)::
oral defamation case against an ADB economist who verbally abused clerical staff

The immunity pertaining to ADB personnel refers to acts committed in an official capacity. It
cannot be said that slander is an act committed in an official capacity. However, this fact only
pertains to whether the court has jurisdiction, and cannot serve to prejudge the offender.

23. Sps. Tecson v Secretary of Public Works (property taken without expropriation
proceedings; for highways; there was a previous case)
 - Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating
the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner,
with due consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
More, the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner
alone. Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.
- Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that the owner's loss is not only his property
but also its income-generating potential.17 Thus, when property is taken, full
compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the
property and the potential income lost.18 Accordingly, in Apo, we held that the rationale
for imposing the interest is to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.
- Such is a forebearance that also includes the payment of interest.
- Damages are allowed if the taking was done without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings; however, the taking may still be held valid if the public use for taking is
proven.
- Note that the value shall be based on the time of taking. The value must be paid upon
filing the expro complaint and giving due notice.
- (previous case: Laches and estoppel may attach; in previous case, these were invoked
against the taking per se, hence the only issue being the amount of just compensation;
interest runs from time of taking)

24. Power to enact laws; Legislative power

- It is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws, and is lodged with Congress,
except for the extend reserved to the people for initiative and referendum. When local
governments exercise a limited legislative power, it is because it was delegated to them.
- The congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to amend the
Constitution is not included. It is within the constituent power of the people which has
been duly delegated to Congress when it convenes itself as a constituent assembly.
Congress continues to exercise its legislative body even it has already been convened as a
constituent assembly. (Gonzales v COMELEC)
- Legislative power includes those powers necessary and explicitly related.

25. Precautionary principle (re: BT Talong case)

- the principle that the introduction of a new product or process whose ultimate effects are
disputed or unknown should be resisted. It has mainly been used to prohibit the
importation of genetically modified organisms and food. This was applied by the Court in
the BT talong case, and is part of the rules for environmental cases. It is meant to give the
benefit of the doubt to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
 - Moreover, it was found in that case that a preponderance of evidence was present to show
that the field test and introduction of the BT Talong would damage the ecosystem and
health of the people.

26. Atong Paglaum on rules on partylist organizations

The ConComm, when it drafted the provisions on party-list organizations especially on the
referral to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, refer not only to the economically
marginalized, as was once considered in the Bagong Bayani ruling, but those who are politically
marginalized, such as political parties that do not have as great a clout in the regular elections.
Under this ruling:

1. Three different parties may run in the PLE: national, regional, and sectoral.
2. National and regional P/O need not represent a sectoral line.
3. Political parties can participate provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in the regular elections. They may also field candidates under
a sectoral wing registered separately under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is
treated as a separate party.
4. Sectoral parties may either be marginalized and underrepresented OR lacking in well-
defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy be that
M/U.
a. A majority of the members must belong to that sector.
b. Nominees must either belong to that sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for those sectors. In either case, they must be bona fide members of
the party/organization.
5. The organization shall not be DQd if a nominee is DQd for as long as they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.

27. Rules on discipline in Congress (speech and debate clause; discipline clause)

Art. VI. Sec. 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Sec 16: (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

- for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators/Representatives shall not be

questioned in any other place. This means that while immune from outside suit, they may
be questioned in Congress itself. This is recognized under Rule XVII, Sec. 7 of the Rules
of House. (Osmena v Pendatun) >> this however means it is an internal matter that
 cannot be simply questioned by Court, even if it VERY insulting to say.. the Supreme
Court (Pobre v Santiago)
o Contrast: Jimenez v Cabangbang: open letter done when Congress was not in
session, published in N-GC

28. Cudia case (PMA; relativity of due process)

- Due process (was argued that in PMA, its not necessary): On this, the SC held that such
argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution
he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.
However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life,
liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even
as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned
in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may
be inquired upon by the courts.
- In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudias Honor
Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity
to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed
after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct
the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge
against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side,
confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from
the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and
to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG
(Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General
Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally,
he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by
these bodies. (relative because DP in its core simply requires that one be heard; different
bodies may have different means on how to be heard)
 - Not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
This requires a reasonable degree of flexibility in the applying procedural due process.
This does not apply to substantive due process. [Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (2000)]

29. Warrantless searches and arrests; plain view doctrine vis--vis right to privacy in
public places

REQUISITES FOR VALID SEARCH WARRANT AND WARRANT OF ARREST

(1)Existence of probable cause

Probable cause - such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that (a) an offense has been committed and that (b) the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [Burgos v. Chief of
Staff (1984)]

For Warrant of Arrest: Such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that (a) a crime has been committed and (b) the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof. [Allado v. Diokno (1994)]

(2) Determination of probable cause personally by the judge.

On determining probable cause: The judge must make an exhaustive and probing examination of
witnesses and applicant and not merely routine or pro forma examination [Nala v. Barroso, Jr.
(2003)] Note: There is no need for the personal appearance of the complainant and the
witnesses.

(3)After personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.

How it is done: In the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
[Rule 126, Sec. 6,Rules of Court]

(4) On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts they are testifying to. [Nala v. Barroso,
Jr. (2003); Burgos v. AFP (1984); Roan v. Gonzales (1986); People v. Malmstead (1991)]

The purpose of having personal knowledge by the complainant and witnesses and the sufficiency
of the warrant is to convince the magistrate seeking the issuance of the warrant that there is
probable cause.

(5) The warrant must describe particularly the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

GENERAL RULE: FOR THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH TO BE SUSTAINED,

PROBABLE CAUSE MUST BE ESTABLISHED.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In these cases, probable cause (warrantless searches) must
be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed. [People v. Aruta (1998)]

REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST (RULE 113, SEC. 5, RULES ON

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)

(1)In flagrante delicto: When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense

(2)Hot Pursuit: When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

(3) Escaped Prisoners: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

(4) When the right is voluntarily waived (estoppel).

(5) Violent insanity

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES RECOGNIZED BY JURISPRUDENCE

(1) Search incidental to a lawful arrest (ROC Rule 113, Sec. 5)

(2) Plain view doctrine

(3) Search of a moving vehicle

(4) Consented warrantless search (waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures)
(5) Customs search

(6) Stop and frisk

(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances

(8) Visual search at checkpoints

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE: THINGS SEIZED ARE WITHIN PLAIN VIEW OF A

SEARCHING PARTY

Requisites:

1. Prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties

2. Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are

3. Evidence must be immediately apparent

4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search [People v. Aruta,
supra]

30. Aquino v. Muncipality re: quasi-judicial powers of mayors (Closure and demolition
of West Cove Hotel)

- Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to
order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as
earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under
Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that
the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of
the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue
on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of
ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this
as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this
debaclecompliance.
 - Reason: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless
such a thing is a nuisance per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle
Properties Corp:
o We agree with petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined
and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to
the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
o Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still
find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.19c
o One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and
to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec.
444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and
removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
permits >> this is why his power extends to nuisance per accidens

31. Qualifications to run for Congress (Consti.)

- Limited to what is provided under the Constitution; legislation or IRRs cannot add any more

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

32. Miranda rights; exclusionary rule; fruit of poisonous tree doctrine

REQUISITES OF MIRANDA RIGHTS

The person under custodial investigation must be informed that:
(1) He has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence
against him;
(2) He has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained (of his own choice) or appointed
(if he cannot afford one);
(3) He has a right to be informed of the first two rights; and
(4) Waiver of his two rights must be made in the presence of counsel and must be in writing.

C. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: Violations of the Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during the custodial investigation. The admissibility
of other evidence is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of the custodial
investigation. [People v. Malimit(1996)]

Fruit of poisonous tree: any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It
ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly
infringed upon and are upheld.

33. Jurisdiction of the PET, HRET, SET

PET: sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. It shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall be its chairman

- Similar provisions for HRET and SET; note however that for HRET and SET: The Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (ERQ!)

34. Geneva Convention of 1949; International Humanitarian Law

The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of international
humanitarian law, the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and
seeks to limit its effects. They specifically protect people who are not taking part in the
hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating
in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers and prisoners of war. The
Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all
breaches. They contain stringent rules to deal with what are known as "grave breaches". Those
responsible for grave breaches must be sought, tried or extradited, whatever nationality they may
hold.

Coverage:

- 1: wounded and sick soldiers on land during war

- 2: wounded and shipwrecked at sea during war
- 3: prisoners of war
- 4: protection of civilians, including in occupied territory
- Common: Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, marked a
breakthrough, as it covered, for the first time, situations of non-international
armed conflicts. These types of conflicts vary greatly. They include traditional
civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal
conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside
the government. Common Article 3 establishes fundamental rules from which
no derogation is permitted. It is like a mini-Convention within the Conventions
as it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed
format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an international
character:
- It requires humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse
distinction. It specifically prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and
degrading treatment, the taking of hostages and unfair trial.
- It requires that the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be collected and cared for.
- It grants the ICRC the right to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
- It calls on the parties to the conflict to bring all or parts of the Geneva Conventions into
force through so-called special agreements.
- It recognizes that the application of these rules does not affect the legal status of the
parties to the conflict.
- Given that most armed conflicts today are non-international, applying Common Article 3
is of the utmost importance. Its full respect is required.
Additional Protocols: In the two decades that followed the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions, the world witnessed an increase in the number of non-international armed conflicts
and wars of national liberation. In response, two Protocols Additional to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions were adopted in 1977. They strengthen the protection of victims of international
(Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflicts and place limits on the way wars
are fought. Protocol II was the first-ever international treaty devoted exclusively to situations of
non-international armed conflicts.

In 2005, a third Additional Protocol was adopted creating an additional emblem, the Red Crystal,
which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.

35. Stare decisis as NOT a general principle of international law

Note that in international courts (at least the ICJ), stare decisis is EXPLICITLY not recognized.
The ICJ statute, for example, provides that the binding force of the decision is only with respect
to the parties to that decision. Although the ICJ may cite a previous case in a later decision, it
does not do so via stare decisis, only as part of their reasoning (e.g. analogy), and also in order to
ensure uniformity in their decisions.

36. Relationship of ICC jurisdiction to domestic criminal courts

Art. 1 of the Rome Statute itself recognizes that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible of international crimes. This refers to a
complementary relationship as far as the ICC is concerned. This relationship is strengthened by
the ne bis in idem clause under Art. 20 which stops the ICC from taking jurisdiction if another
court is trying the same conduct.

However, ICC jurisdiction may be directly resorted to if it can be shown that it would be highly
unlikely to avail of the local remedies (e.g. in the present ICC cases against Duterte, et al.)

It should also be noted that as to the Philippines, it is now a signatory to the Rome Statute AND
has incorporated its provisions via local legislation.

37. Requisites of judicial review; specifically, prematurity

- Requisites: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

- Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
 governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Not necessarily the same as
the rule on RPI in civil cases; there are cases where no actual injury is present, but the
case is heard anyway (citizens suits for potential injury to rights, taxpayers suits for
disbursements, legislators suits for acts that may infringe on their power, transcendental
importance suits for certain cases of high importance)
- (for case or controversy) Ripeness and prematurity: held that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.[96] Only then may
the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
- Lis mota: the constitutional issue should be the primary and sole issue. The Courts, if
they see another issue that may be the basis of its ruling, will rule based on those other
issues.

38. Qualified political agency

The acts of the heads of the various executive departments in the regular course of business are
presumed that of the Chief Executive, UNLESS disapproved or reprobated. (X: where it is the
CEx himself who is required to perform the action).

39. Fortun and Sanlakas cases

Fortun case:

- Facts:
o Ampatuan massacre; PP was issued declaring ML, and suspending the writ of
habeas corpus on the affected area. After submitting her report to Congress later
on, another PP was issued lifting ML and the S-WHC.
o Petitions were filed post facto, questioning the validity of ML.
- Court
o Questioning now moot; note that the state of ML was withdrawn 8 days after its
issuance and before Congress could review
o Under the Constitution, the limitations to the declaration of ML are as follows:
The proclamation may only last up to 60 days.
After 48 hours from proclamation, this must be reported in writing to
Congress.
Both houses of Congress, if not in session, must jointly convene within 24
hours of proclamation/suspension to begin review of validity
Joint vote for revocation or affirmation; may allow the effectivity to lapse
 o President and Congress act not only sequentially, but also jointly; President
initiates, Congress maintains; SCs review power must respect Congress right to
review first; only when Congress defaults in its duty should the SC step in
o This does not effectively pre-empt the Court (due to 30d period to review)the
procedure for declaration and review is meant to be swift; at any rate, if that 30d
period to review lapses, it does not serve to divest the SC of jurisdiction
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated

Sanlakas case:

- Facts:
o Oakwood mutiny; PP and GO issued declaring state of rebellion and calling out
the AFP to suppress the rebellion. When negotiations ceased and the mutineers
returned to barracks, the state and call-out orders were recalled. Post facto, these
were question as being violative of Congress power under Art. VI.23.2 or being
an undue exercise of executive power under Art. VII.18.
- Court:
o The President is the Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, along with
being tasked with the faithful execution of the laws.
o The power to declare the state of rebellion and order the calling-out is part of
those powers. This is also granted under the RAC. At any rate, in calling out the
armed forces, the declaration of state of rebellion is a mere superfluity. It gives
notice that the rebellion exists and that the AFP may be called to stop it.
o Both of these do not suspend constitutional rights (consider esp. that the
declaration of ML/suspension of WHC does not do the same).
o This is not ML; no powers attributable to ML have been exercisedno military
tribunals that replaced civil courts, no curtailment of rights, and no exercise of
powers beyond EX/CIC. (likewise, there is no violation of Congress power re:
state of emergency)

40. Francisco v HRET on Impeachment (first to file rule)

In constitutional interpretation, the three main canons to follow are: verba legis, ratio legis, and
ut magis valeat quam pereat. The first consideration is verba legisthe ordinary meaning of the
words used. It is resorted to because the Constitution is not a lawyers document. Only when
there are ambiguities/technical terms should ratio legis be considered. In any case, the
Constitution should be interpreted such that the provisions exist harmoniously.

To initiate a complaint is literally thatto file the complaint. When the house rules at the time
meant this to mean the acceptance of a verified complaint, they violated the clear text of the
Constitution, which uses the ordinary word initiate (in fact, this was intended by the framers
they need not have resorted to ratio legis, but they did so to strengthen the intent that the framers
really meant initiate in its ordinary meaning).
The HOR holds the impeachment proceedings as its procedures are essentially to verify the
complaint, and vote for it in order to send the same to the Senate for trial. It is the Senate that
handles the impeachment case as a Court. The HOR rules also violate the Constitution as it
abrogates the Senates power to try impeachment cases.