Prevent them from doing activities that will distract work stoppage.

If
they do this during certain periods such as a fun run which was in fact
anyway an activity of civil service, that is not distracting the work and
therefore it is a valid expression. The other one prior strength was the
requirement on survey. Lets say a request of a certain person to
conduct surveys. They were arguing that the survey firms being
required to disclose, upon publication, those who pay for the survey,
were actually, the subjects of a regulation that violated their
constitutional right. According to the Supreme Court, there is no prior
strength here because the requirement for survey firms to actually
report those who pay for the survey is usually done upon publication, it
is not before they publish the results of the survey, so there could not
have been prior strength here. It is also part of the function of the
COMELEC to regulate.

The other one is freedom of religion. You remember the case of

Estrada v Escritor. That one is a leading case; it is a very long case. But
there is another one related to the matter of religion. This time, it
involved a judge where at one time he had declared in a document
that the child she had was legitimate when in fact the child was
illegitimate. And she was proceeded against on the matter of having
put into the document, a public document that particular information
so administrative proceedings were taken against her and she invoked
this time that under religious affiliation or the sensitivities of her
religion that it would not have been perhaps good to be seen as having
sired on the legitimate child. The Supreme Court said, you dont take
into account religion or moral grounds for purposes being proceeded
against administratively, the conduct itself is separate from the matter
of religious belief in that regard. This was in the supreme court.

Now this one is Sereno, probably the husband of the chief justice (yata)
because he belonged in the petrochemical industry. There was a
complaint here by Mr. Sereno, concerning an executive order that lifted
the suspension of tariff reduction on petrochemical residue and he
decided to seek information in fact a request or requested for the
minutes of meetings and other documents, records that pertained to
the drafting and eventual issuance of the executive order. I think they
were affected because they were in the petrochemical industry, so he
said, give us all the documents. So in the matter of fact the
information as you know, the right to information has a long series of
case law. While that is true, that it is a self-executing right that may be
demanded and the proper subject of mandamus because it is a self-
executing right. There are still limitations in that regard. So what the
Supreme Court said is that u also have to remember that there are
certain standards that may still be followed despite the very
overwhelming jurisprudence that allowed the right of every citizen to
seek information on matters regarding public concern, so we have to
establish that it is not privilege it is a matter of public interest. The
Supreme Court said, there remains certain information that will
require confidentiality because on the matter of having to draft certain
documents for issuances, you still have to allow free freedom of
intercourse, intellectual intercourse between the government officials
and this is why such document that should remain confidential in the
process of having to produce this issuance, so there are still limitations.
So Serenos request here was denied.

But you will look at the series of case law there, I want you to be
particularly conscious about the standards that have been made on
privileged communication also in relation to the various executive
privilege issues because there is almost a synergy between those
types of information that are requested.

Now NPC, eminent domain well the only recent decision that I just want
to highlight here is the standard of compensation. On the matter of
inflationary rate, when you want to do justice to the standard of
compensation, an owner who has been for a long time waiting for
compensation, must be duly compensated and you have to take into
account the inflationary rate. As you know, government takes a long
time to pay property owners especially in expropriation cases so
Supreme Court has affirmed that inflation rate is a valid consideration
for purposes of determining just compensation.

Non-impairment, you know in impairment clauses, I need not belabor

this but when it comes to impairment clauses there has really been a
lot of leeway given to government on account of police power. Theres
almost always little case when it comes to government exercising
certain rights or laws that will pursue the rights on behalf of the
citizens on the ground of police power, so impairment has almost
always given a way to protection of citizens rights under police power.

This one is let me just go through the facts. Goldenway executed a real
estate mortgage in 1985 in favor of equitable bank to secure a loan.
Goldenway failed to settle the loan; obligation and the properties were
sold. Goldenways counsel offered to redeem the properties but was
informed that it is no longer possible because Republic Act 8791
applied and therefore barred redemption; Goldenway argued that Act
Number 3135 should instead apply which allowed a 1-year period of
redemption and not a shorter term of 8791 otherwise it would impair
its obligation.
Was the right of Goldenway violated when the amendatory rule was in
effect when the mortgage was foreclosed?
Supreme Court said there is no impairment of the obligation of
contracts. Section 47 of 8791 did not divert juridical persons of the
right did not deprive juridical persons of the right to redeem
foreclosed properties but only modify the time and see the period that
is consistent with previous rulings, does not deprive you of your right
but maybe of postponement or probably shortening does not
necessarily resolve to a substantive violation. Now there is likewise no
retroactive application of the new redemption period because it
exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its
effectivity and whose owners pertain redemption rights under 3135, so
there were two points to consider there: the time and the non
retroactivity issue.

Bail.
Enrile, that is the only eyesore right now because it is Enrile, no, its
because but because he is sick, but he can be very happy after being
released, right?

But he became very happy after being released right? Sabi niya kasi
gusto ko happy kayo, diba? Pati siya, happy. Well sometimes you begin
to wonder how some decisions are arrived at, no? Uh, social and
political standing probably were taken into account, but on the matter
of flight risk. See in bail, the issue is flight risk. Was he a flight risk. Was
he in a very fragile health condition? And the Supreme Court said
probably he will not. Too late in the day that he will do such things so
they allowed him even if it was really non-bailable. But let me call your
attention to some, uh, cases of interest in peace negotiations. There
were people there who were in Oslo, how many were with us in Oslo,
22. Released, detained political or at least they call themselves
political prisoners, no? But some have really been in detention and
were charged or convicted no charged with crimes that are not really
bailable but they were released on a cash bond and subject to
participation in the ongoing peace negotiations. That was something I
have never seen that in any jurisprudence, no? For as long as they
continue to participate in the peace negotiations. Of course we don't
have control if they are there in Oslo and they don't come back, well
the government of course will take the necessary measure on this. But
that was one particular decision. Those were trial court determinations,
but the Supreme Court had taken note of that in Satur Ocampo versus
Hon. Judge Abando where Satur Ocampo, Vic Ladlad (?), Raphael
Baylosis (?) and Randall Echaniss(?) were given similar releases,
hundred thousand cash bond, plus the condition to attend the peace
negotiations so Satur ocampo was with us during the first round. He
was a co-operator in the committee on political and constitutional
reform. Thats something no? Thats If I were the examiner thats
something to consider. There's no answer at the moment, no? But look
Enrile, right to bail. Don't forget in right to bail that also is available
now in extradition cases. There is a series of case law in extradition.
The right to bail is also available also in extradition cases. That is the
standing rule now on bail in extradition cases. Let's go to citizenship,
no? There was one case here Makiling (?) versus COMELEC.
Respondent Amad Arnado (?) was a natural born Filipino citizen and
acquired American citizenship by naturalization. he later on reacquired
Filipino citizenship by taking a oath of allegiance to the Philippines and
renounced his American citizenship. Later Arnado used his US passport
at least four times. Petitioner contends that Arnado should be deemed
to have been disqualified to run for public office even as he has already
finished his term of office in May 2010 under the local government
code. Whether or not Arnado is qualified to run for public office, the
respondent is disqualified. Now look at the ruling hear this was before
the Grace Poe ruling came about. The act of using a foreign passport
does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However by representing himself as a foreign citizen he
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive. It took place the instant
when he represented himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign
passport. Another point is that dual citizens by naturalization are
required to take not only the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order
to qualify as a candidate for public office. He was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of a foreigner and as a Filipino. He
was qualified to vote but by the express disqualification of the local
government code he was not qualified to run for local public office.
Anyway this one is David (?) versus Albay (?) another 2015 decision in
March. In 1974 petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement petitioner and wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600
m lot along the beach in Tambong, Mindoro, where they constructed a
residential house however in 2004 they came to know the portion
where they built the house is public and part of the salvage dump (?).
So petitioner filed a lease application over the land where with the
DENR. And, in the application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. A complaint was filed for falsification of public documents.
Now, meanwhile, petitioner reacquired Filipino citizenship under 9225.
So he wanted to invoke the fact that the deficiency was cured by
having acquired Filipino citizenship. Is the petitioner disqualified to own
land? Supreme Court said petitioner maybe proceeded against for
violation of the revised Penal Code based on misrepresentation.
Because at the time he actually filled out the form the public
document, he was then not a Filipino citizen. The mere fact that he
reacquired could not have cured the lack of the required qualifications
to apply for this.

This one is interesting it's also good for article 12. On former Filipino
citizens. Well of course you know Poe, I don't have to discuss Poe
anymore she did not win anyway, no? After all this effort, no? But
what's interesting here: foundlings. So now in the case of foundling,
and following the Poe case, but you have to remember here is the test
applied by the Supreme Court. How did they arrive at this? They went
through all the relevant International instruments. Human rights,
statelessness great scrutiny on all the international related instruments
pertaining to citizenship only to find out that that is really a matter on
the part of the municipal law of a state. So it is dependent on the
municipal law of the state. In our constitution, there was really nothing
about from foundlings right? But the Supreme Court applied the
probability test that for probably 99% when Grace Poe was born in
where was she born Iloilo? Jaro? In that particular part of the Ilo-ilo,
there could not have been 99% an alien. And it could only have been
Filipinos at that time in that place. Imagine probability? I remember
when I was going over the case law here the only time they applied the
probability test was on the matter of Bagabuyo v. COMELEC. It Had
something to do with legislative districts, apportionment. Now they
applied it, no? Where statistics have applied here particularly on
citizenship the probability test. 99% that was the formula proposed by
the solicitor General...

the probability test. 99%. That was the formula proposed by the
Solicitor General. They did a statistical survey or analysis that during
that period in the census the problem was that the census did not
probably exhaust all the people in the vicinity. It would not have been
99% only. But only based on record that was reported. What about the
unreported? Right? But, anyway you know that for a fact that
foundlings now in the case of Justice Leonen concerning this. They said
this is not probably true for all foundlings now. Dont get it wrong ah. It
is not true for all foundlings. The situation is unique. You still have to
prove. That was a matter of proof. There is a burden here and the
Supreme Court took note of the fact that the Solicitor General actually
took extra effort to actually prove using the probability test. So, it is
not true for every foundling. This case is unique. Thats the opening
paragraphs of Justice Leonen in that case. There are foundling can now
be a natural born citizen.
Biometrics in Kabataan Party List vs. Comelec. You remember this was
one of the issues before the 2016 elections when voters were being
asked to undergo biometrics. And if you dont do that, you will be
denied, what do we call this, you will not be allowed to vote. The
Supreme Court said, biometrics does not actually violate your
substantive right to suffrage. It is procedural in character. It is a mere
regulation that is intended in fact also to protect the integrity of the
voters list. And. also to facilitate the voting process. So thats not a
violation of their substantive right to suffrage. Thats the Kabataan
Party List vs. Comelec. Its a December 2015 decision. It might be good
for comelec rules. Giraogo, you already know Giraogo, noh? Uhm, Its
2010 but what I continue to emphasis here is the fact that it violated
the equal protection clause when it was intended to actually
investigate the violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of
only one administration. It has to be passed. Whats good here to
remember is that the power of the executive to create a Philippine
Truth Commission is still good. It is well within the power of the
executive to undertake that. And it is in part a very relevant issue now
especially on matters that pertain to transitional issues on
government. W hen you have changes of government and you would
want to establish accountability, Truth Commissions have become very
helpful in trying to lay down parameters for a possible smooth
transition to new and emerging governments and societies. But that
violated the equal protection.
Doitchbank (?) this one is good for tax law and in relation also to undue
delegation of legislative authority. The Doitchbank (?) decision has
been also reiterated in CBK, a 2015 decision. What happened here was
that there was an existing tax treaty between Germany and the
Philippines. But the BIR decided to impose a regulation that practically
denied somebody who would have been able to avail of what we call a
preferential rate of 10%. This is concerning the branch profit and
remittance tax preferential rate of 10%. This was provided under a
treaty and the BIR decided to impose a requirement that prior to the
availment of this, you would have to acquire apply. You have to apply. If
you do not do that then you can be denied availment of such privilege
under the tax treaty. The Supreme Court said that it is a mere
regulation. A regulation cannot go higher than a tax treaty. A tax treaty
is supposed to have a force and effect of law. If the treaty allows you,
the regulation should not be able to deprive you of such benefit under
the tax treaty. Okay? So thats reiterated.
Aquino vs. Comelec on legislative district. You remember that this was
the creation of a district that favored one of the presidents son at that
time. GMA datu arroyo was the beneficiary of this particular law
Republic Act 9716. What happened here is that there was a
reapportionment of the composition of the first and second legislative
districts in the province of Camarines Sur and created a new legislative
district. So, what happened here Cam Sur had a population of 1.6
million with 4 legislative districts. The new district became the second
legislative district. It was carved out of the first legislative district
composing of 5 towns and the former second district composing of 2
towns. Of course the argument there was gerrymandering. This was
the, I mean, the most recent case that pertain to gerrymandering and
the result is that the first district had a population of only 176 000
while the new district had 250 000 and the rest of the districts have
more than 250 000 population. The issue was whether or not 9716
violated the requirement under article 6 section 5 on the Constitution.
Uhm, that was on the 250 000 population requirement. The Supreme
Court held it as valid that the 250 000 population requirement does not
apply into the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Take note of
that. This only applies to the creation of a legislative district in a city. I
think this is what most important to remember. The distinction
between city and a province insofar as the 250 000 population
requirement is concerned. Okay? So, there is no fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts. This is not merely
apportionment according to the Supreme Court. There were several
factors. I put here a summary of series of case law on reapportionment
in relation to legislative districts and creation of legislative districts. So,
its up to you to please go through these. This are very good
summaries of the series of case law leading up to Aquino vs. Comelec.
(girls chattering, hard to understand what the speaker and the
girls are saying)
Party list, remember Atong Paglaum, okay? Its still, of course, the
leading case when it comes to party list and what you have to
remember here, of course, is the set of standards, what are the
parameters laid down here for purposes of participating in the party
list. Just memorize this. They are only 8. So, I think insofar as party list
is concerned, this somehow enfleshed already the rather confusing
series of party list law jurisprudence.

So, you have seen some party list representatives who come from
sometimes the traditional political parties. Practically every traditional
political party NPC, Liberal, Nationalista, PDP, they have almost an
equivalent of a party list. So it became confusing. So now SC clarified
in the 8 standards or 8 parameters. So three different groups may
participate in the party list system, national parties/organizations,
regional parties/organizations, and sectoral parties/organizations.
National and Reginal parties/org do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Poli parties can participate in party lsit
elections provided they register under the party list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party
whether major or not that fields candidates in legislative elections can
participate ONLY through its sectoral wing. So that is how they have
made distinction with regard to traditional political parties. There is a
sectoral wing that they have to identify that they have to separately
register under a party list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party and is linked with a political party through a
collision(coalition?). Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginzalized and under represented or lacking in well defined political
constitutencies. It is not enough that their political advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sector that are
marginzalid and underrepresented include the following Article 13
social justice and human rights. Many of these are really covered by
that. Labor peasants fisherfolk urban poor indigenous peoples
handicapped veterans overseas. The sectors that lack well defined
political constituencies include professionals, elderlies, women. 6 lang
pala. Mas konti pala. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent marginalized or underrepresented
mustbelong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector that they
represent. Similarly a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
org that lack well defined poli constituencies must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties that represent the
marginalized or underrepresented represent those who lack well
defined political constituencies either must belong to their respective
sectors or must have a track record of advocacu or their respective
sectors. And nominees of national or reginal parties must be bona fide
members of such parties. Finally national, regional, or sectoral parties
will not be dq if some of their nominees are dq provided they have one
nominee that remains valid.

In a recent decisions a 2015 decision. Lico vs Comelec. It looked into

the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intramurals that have been wthin
the party list system. In the party list system they haven ominees
right. SO the first nominee whenever dq later on or ousted will be
replaced by another nominee from the party and the supreme court in
the 2015 ruling of Lico vs COmelec said that intramurals in the party
list which resulted in the ouster of the first nominee is actually within
the power of the SC to look at in terms of the struggle for leadership.
But the power to expel per se a nominee is better left to the house of
representatives so it distinguishes skirmishes or intramurals in the
leadership. When it results to the expulsion of the nominee thats
another, that pertains now to qualification and therefore you leave it to
the HoR. Take note of that distinction. I think its wrothy in terms of
election law.

Now Ampatuan, you have had a series of declarations, proclamations.

Remember that under the commander in chief powers of the president,
the Commander in chief has 3 powers. Call out the armed forces,
Suspend the priviliege of the writ. Always say suspend the privilege not
the writ. The writ is never suspended its the privilege of the writ that
is suspended. And finally to declare Martial Law. The (something) in bar
questions have been related to declaration of a state of calamity, who
actually has such power, proclamation of a state of emergency. Theres
a very tricky set of privisions that I often call students attention to
Article 6 Section 23 paragraph 2 that in times of war or other national
emergencies. President may be given actual legislative powers by
congress for (something). Now are these instances like rebellion,
invasion, are these not also emergency situations? Thats when the
problem can really be very tricky as to what are the limits to the power
of the pres under those isntances, under the calling out powers. It
seems that right now, in which I think is true, the president does not
even have to declare martial law or suspend the privilege the writ of
habeas corpus if he calls out the armed forces to do ertain things. It
tends to be very broad enough for him to be able to undertake certain
matters in relation to the security of the state. In the case of ampatuan
PGMA issued a proclamation placing the provinceso f maguindanao and
sultan kudarat and the city of cotabato udner a state of emergency
after the maguindanao massacre. Directing the AFP and PNP to
undertake measures which may be allowed by constitution to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. 3 days later AO 273 transferring
supervision of ARMM from the OP to the DILG was undertaken and this
was amended by another AO 273-A delegating supervision of ARMM to
the DILG. Question was twofold 1.) Proclamation of 1946 consists of the
emergency and the AOs. The SC said those acts were valid. The DILG
need not exercise control. The vice governor adiong assumed the
vacated post of ampatuan based on succession pursuant to the ARMM
law. PGMA only exrrcised calling out power which did not require
congressional authority and the SC nonetheless may inquire into the
factual basis of the proclamation. Now a declaration of a state of
rebellion for instance or in case of calling out the armed forces are
really superfluities. The pres may actually call out the AFP with that so
what does proclamation or declaration really serve? But I think from
previous cases, SANLAKAS they were mere superfluities. If you need to
address the situation on the ground like invasion or rebellion you can
actually do so and call out the armed forces for this purpose. Can you
declare martial law on just the portion of the Phils? Yes that can be
done not just the entire country but one portion that can be done. But
of course subject to the restrictions of Aritcle 7 secion 19. Look at the
comparison between calling out the armed forces in relation to
suspension of the privilege of the writ and declaration of martial law in
terms of the availablitly of courts the duty of the citizens or the right of
the citizens to question.

Araullo, from PDAF to DAP. Now there were two decisions. The first was
July 1 and the 2nd was Feb 2015. Well within your coverage. In the
disbursement allocation program I think this ones a little more difficult
than the belgica case. But what was the violation here under Sec 25
paragraph 5 of Article 6? Open the provision and you will see that the
violation was cleared and there are standards by which the president
may only transfer certain funds within the department. Those are the
standards that need to be complied with and the violations were quite
clear as far as DAP is concerned. Now what is DAP all about? What
happened in DAP was that it (scores) funds from unreleased
appropriations under personal services unprogrammed funds carried
over appropriations unreleased from previous years. And budgets from
slow moving items and projects that have been realized which support
faster disbursing projects. If we have the constitution Id like you to
look at Article 6 Section 25 (5) so that you know very clearly the
standards. The constitution is very short. If I were the examiner Id
expect you to memorize the major provisions here. Like this one. The
only way you can really impress upon the examiner is to be able to lay
the standars under the law. Theres no substitute to memorizing the
standard. No law shall be passed authorizing the transfer of
appropriations. However and look at the enumeration of people,
president, speaker of the house, Senate president