Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS:
ISSUES:
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is
that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged.
It is made clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a
legitimate grievance.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED, nullifying and setting
aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July
3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder.
FACTS:
On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land. The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer,
raising by way of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient cause of action and
prescription.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1,
with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of Feliciano.
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was
filed by eighty-six (86) settlers. On January 25, 1971, the court a
quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the
intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their evidence
while plaintiff (Feliciano), as well as the Republic of the Philippines, could
present additional evidence.
The interveners did not appear on the day scheduled for the presentation of
evidence and submitted a motion for postponement instead which was
denied. Feliciano, on the other hand presented additional evidence.
Thereafter the case was submitted for decision and the court ruled in favor of
Feliciano.
The interveners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of
the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of
a parcel of land
A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
state has consented to be sued, either expressly of by implication through
the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but
must be construed in
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority. The Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an
act of the legislative body
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that
the informacionposesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of
Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office
(Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof
that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the
original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity
and validity of the "informacionposesoria" relied upon by respondent
Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," 11 whereas
the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares,
later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting
"possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish
titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
Judgment was rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the
order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, DISMISSING the complaint
filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines.
TOPIC: Sovereign Immunity
FACTS:
1 Whether or not the funds are public in character, thus immune from
suit
FACTS:
Petitioner DOA and Sultan Security Agency and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services to be provided to the said
government entity. In September 13, 1990, several security guards of the
Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DOA and
the Sultan Security Agency before the Regional Arbitration Branch in
Cagayan De Oro City.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DOA jointly and severally
liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal
the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor
Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency.
NLRC dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of basis. The writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu
thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2)
months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner [DOA] charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It
argued that money claims against the Department falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner
asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has
impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with
Sultan Security Agency.
NLRC, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the Department of Agriculture can be sued
The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be
sued without its consent reflects nothing less than recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten
rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly
phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its
consent;" its clear import then is that the State may be sued at times. The
States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other
hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters in to business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character.
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville",
sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and
was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of
the Bureau of Customs handling arrastre operations. The Customs Arrastre
Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the
shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau
of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of
P18,493.37 plus other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be
sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the
complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the
Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of
dismissal.
ISSUES:
The order of dismissal appealed from was affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
FACTS:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224,
which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the
said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation
was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil
Aeronautics Administration was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine
airlines, Inc. paid the National Airports Corporation P65, 245 as fees for
landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and
including July 31, 1948.
These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision,
Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as
airport, and the owner commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc. In 1951 to recover the
above amount, The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party
complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had
been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
ISSUES:
The petition was denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to
quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The Philippine
National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its
branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It
contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of
the court contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as
amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be
served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any
person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes
of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the
Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio
Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that
the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order.
The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since
June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this
law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio
Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the
authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area
encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area
of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in
nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to
the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the
award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been
dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970.
There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case.
[Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is
denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within
5
five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution
dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Ruling: No
Rationale:
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar
as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental
concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from
garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez
in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of
a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued.
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of
the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N.
Firme in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs.
MacarioNieveras, et al.", decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages
consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees
and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of
MacarioNieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without
prejudice to another motion which was then pending. Motion was first
denied. Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3,
1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to
pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be
elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this
petition.
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Issues:
In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-
suability of the State until trial.
However, the judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial
and then rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The
judge did not commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of
non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he held the
municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
t has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and
gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official
duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office. We already stressed in the case of
Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which
the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's
dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to
grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it
ruled on the issue of liability.
FACTS:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck
the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the
plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same
place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and
he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more
fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered
material injury.
Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very
weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head
revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves.
The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this
work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.
ISSUE:
1 Whether or not the Government is legally liable for the damages
incurred by the plaintiff
RULING:
It is quite clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Governments liability to any cause not previously recognized.
According to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical
office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make
itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with
the Legislature and not with the courts.
TOPIC: Sovereign Immunity
Facts:
The private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them
for contracts for barber services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its
contracting officer, James F. Shaw. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon,
over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made
a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not
included in the invitation to bid.
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow
the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating the concessions pending litigation.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to
the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in
effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its
non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air
Force, were also immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to
dismiss, holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the
Court's attention is called by the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as
the defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the bidding or
solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as
well as the defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said
contract of concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US
Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the
employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers themselves
of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the
stipulated percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange. The
same circumstance would become in effect when the Philippine Area
Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the questioned barber shop
concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has
been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be
entered between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.
Issues:
1 Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the
RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance if
their official duties
A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute
and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
The rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which
clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special
law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 16,
2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66894 entitledThe Republic of Indonesia, His
Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counselor AzhariKasim v.
Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 145, Makati City, and
James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and
Services.
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said
agreement, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement
shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, who
allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian
Embassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim that they had earlier
verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was
arbitrary and unlawful.
The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to the Court
of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The said petition alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and
voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts
and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
waived their immunity from suit.
Issues:
RULING:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 66894 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioners is DISMISSED.
TOPIC: Sovereign Immunity
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States. US invited the submission of bids for
Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman &
Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the
requests based on the letters received from the U.S.
A letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co in June 1972 indicating
that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in
Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs.
James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the
work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no
longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given
her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
The petition was granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are
set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.
TOPIC: Sovereign Immunity
FACTS:
On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by
Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel. The defendant filed its answer denying the right of
Froilan to the possession of the said vessel. After the leave of the lower court
had been obtained, the intervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic f
the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to
pay the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the
vessel in question.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor
government of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the
counterclaim of the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
The lower court erred as the intervenor had not made any claim against the
defendant, the latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in
intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in question from the
plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse to the position assumed by the
defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the plaintiff who
alleges in his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from the
defendant. At any rate a counterclaim should be judged by its own
allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse party. It should be
recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his
rights under the contract with the Shipping Administration and that, on the
other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter contract executed in its
favor by the intervenor which is bound to protect the defendant in its
possession of the vessel. In other words, the counterclaim calls for specific
performance on the part of the intervenor. As to whether this counterclaim is
meritorious is another question which is not now before us.
The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed for the reason that the State is
immune from suit. This is untenable, because by filing its complaint in
intervention the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the
different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defenses he might have against the state. The United
States Supreme Court thus explains:
"No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an
action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a
party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to
deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn
him around to an application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any
waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in
intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated,
the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's
claim over the possession of the vessel in question. The appealed order was
reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. So ordered, without costs.
TOPIC: Sovereign Immunity
FACTS:
The appellant herein, Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of Lot No.
639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. At the back of her Transfer Certificate
of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any
right or interest in the property.
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by
the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who
disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said
indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the
President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which
was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against
the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in
the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages
in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the
costs of the suit.
On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original
nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money
claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had
long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint
was dismissed.
ISSUES:
The plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. The government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
FACTS:
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary
Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum
order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses
(OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000
hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies
available (No)
RULING:
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated
May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more
than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to
the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant
any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964
while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue
license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6,
1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right
is acquired by the licensee.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.