Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
and Learning
Interactional, Institutional, and
Sociocultural Perspectives
A Volume in
Advances in Cultural Psychology:
Constructing Human Development
Series Editor
Jaan Valsiner
Niels Bohr Professor of Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University
Advances in Cultural Psychology:
Constructing Human Development
Jaan Valsiner, Series Editor
Memory Practices and Learning:
Interactional, Institutional, and Sociocultural Perspectives (2017)
edited by sa Mkitalo, Per Linell, and Roger Slj
Making of The Future:
The Trajectory Equifinality Approach in Cultural Psychology (2016)
edited by Tatsuya Sato, Naohisa Mori, and Jaan Valsiner
Cultural Psychology of Musical Experience (2016)
edited by Sven Hroar Klempe
Amerindian Paths: Guiding Dialogues With Psychology (2016)
edited by Danilo Silva Guimares
Psychology in Black and White:
The Project of a Theory-Driven Science (2015)
by Sergio Salvatore
Cultural Psychology of Recursive Processes (2015)
edited by Zachary Beckstead
Temporality: Culture in the Flow of Human Experience (2015)
edited by Lvia Mathias Simo,
Danilo Silva Guimares, and Jaan Valsiner
Making Our Ideas Clear: Pragmatism in Psychoanalysis (2015)
edited by Philip Rosenbaum
Biographical Ruptures and Their Repair:
Cultural Transitions in Development (2014)
by Amrei C. Joerchel and Gerhard Benetka
Culture and Political Psychology: A Societal Perspective (2014)
by Thalia Magioglou
Fooling Around: Creative Learning Pathways (2014)
edited by Lene Tanggaard
Cultural Psychology of Human Values (2012)
by Jaan Valsiner and Angela Uchoa Branco
Lives and Relationships: Culture in Transitions Between Social Roles (2013)
edited by Yasuhiro Omi,
Lilian Patricia Rodriguez, and Mara Claudia Peralta-Gmez
Dialogical Approaches to Trust in Communication (2013)
edited by Per Linell and Ivana Markov
Innovating Genesis:
Microgenesis and the Constructive Mind in Action (2008)
edited by Emily Abbey and Rainer Diriwchter
Trust and Distrust: Sociocultural Perspectives (2007)
edited by Ivana Markov and Alex Gillespie
Discovering Cultural Psychology:
A Profile and Selected Readings of Ernest E. Boesch (2007)
by Walter J. Lonner and Susanna A. Hayes
Semiotic Rotations: Modes of Meanings in Cultural Worlds (2007)
edited by SunHee Kim Gertz, Jaan Valsiner, and Jean-Paul Breaux
Otherness in Question: Development of the Self (2007)
edited by Lvia Mathias Simo and Jaan Valsiner
Becoming Other: From Social Interaction to Self-Reflection (2006)
edited by Alex Gillespie
Transitions: Symbolic Resources in Development (2006)
by Tania Zittoun
Memory Practices
and Learning
Interactional, Institutional, and
Sociocultural Perspectives
edited by
sa Mkitalo
Per Linell
and
Roger Slj
University of Gothenburg
Editors Preface........................................................................................... v
1. Introduction
Roger Slj.......................................................................................... 1
vii
viiiCONTENTS
Aalborg
Jaan Valsiner
February 2016
REFERENCES
Wagoner, B., Jensen, E., & Oldmeadow, J. (Eds.). (2012). Culture and social change:
The transformation of society through the power of ideas. Charlotte, NC: Informa-
tion Age Publishers.
EDITORS PREFACE
sa Mkitalo
Per Linell
Roger Slj
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Roger Slj
The conceptual problem we are facing here is that there are many dis-
courses about learning and memory. Furthermore, all of them make sense
in some context and are backed up by extensive scholarly work. This, in
turn, implies that we cannot appeal to unequivocal facts that will give
us the truth about what these phenomena are in some down to earth,
primary sense. For research, this implies that there will be a number of dif-
ferent objects of inquiry. In other words, scholars who claim to be studying
memory and learning operate at different levels, and they observe very
different phenomena. The shift from neurochemical processes to changes
in behaviors and cognitive processes, and further on to collective forms
4R. SLJ
[T]he word memory is used very loosely and covers a multitude of phenom-
ena, ranging from an acquired habit (which may not even be conscious) to an
explicit recall of a unique event. Neurophysiologists of memory trade on this
profound ambiguity. The slither from memory as you and I understand it (as
when I recall your smile last week at London Waterloo) to learning (as when
I get to acquire expertise or knowledge); from learning to altered behaviour
(as when a sea slug acquires a conditioned reflex); from altered behavior to
altered properties of the organism (as happens in the synapses of a sea slug
conditioned to withdraw into its shell when water is disturbed), and (Bingo!,
there we have it) the materialization of memory. (p. 131)
But this way of addressing memory and learning has not been without its
critics. Even within psychology and the behavioral sciences, dissatisfaction
with this Cartesian and heavily mentalistic model has been voiced by many
traditions and scholars over the years.
There are many ways to disagree with this modeling of cognitive systems
and its dualist premises. The arguments are theoretical, methodological,
and ontological. Henri Bergson (1912), the influential French philosopher,
argued, as others have done, that memory and remembering are funda-
mental constituents of existence and of the flow of consciousness. Memory
is always present and an element of whatever we engage in from perception
to reflective thought:
But, then, I cannot escape the objection that there is no state of mind, how-
ever simple, which does not change every moment, since there is no con-
8R. SLJ
mastering both intellectual and physical technologies; the artifacts are both
ideal and material, as Cole (1996, p. 117) puts it. Many of the technical
devices we carry with us in our pockets and bags serve memory functions of
daily significance: smartphones, tablets, diaries, notebooks, post-it notes,
navigators, and so on. We offload what we have to keep in mind to such
external memory systems, where metaphorically speakingmemories
are to be found in exograms rather than in Lashleyan engrams, to
use Donalds (2010) expression. And, in fact, in contemporary society we
cannot manage life without such devices; what we see are increasingly
sophisticated mergers and coalitions (Clark, 2003, p. 3) between minds
and artifacts in many activities.
Even though everyone realizes that learning and remembering take
place in coordination with artifacts, this has been hard to integrate into
research. The classicaland modernmemory experiment becomes
meaningless if people are allowed to make notes of what they are sup-
posed to remember. As soon as one would allow that, the whole edifice
of cognitive psychology would erode. The remembering will no longer
be pure in the Cartesian sense of reflecting capacities of an intracra-
nial cognitive system processing information on its own. In much research
there is an inherent resistance towards accepting an object of inquiry that
expands to include the artifacts andin Vygotskian languagecultural
tools that mediate our thinking and physical actions. The dualism of the
mental and the material is a fundamental assumption in our culture and a
taken-for-granted premise that survives and keeps popping up in spite of
attempts to avoid it. But all through history, people have been advancing
their intellectual skills by interacting with technologies (Malafouris, 2013).
Technologies, thus, are important mediators in processes of learning and
remembering (Musk & ekait, this volume; Melander & Aarsand, this
volume); they support our reasoning and remembering, but they also offer
hurdles that have to be overcome in order to master an activity. Learning
emerges through interaction with artifacts, all the way from the attempts to
master toys among toddlers to the kinds of learning that go on later in life
when we encounter a range of activities that require bodily and intellectual
adaptation (cf. Broth, Cromdal & Levin, this volume, for an illustration of
learning how to drive).
Thus, exploring phenomena such as memory/remembering and learn-
ing requires awareness of how objects of research are designed. In most
psychological inquiry with a focus on individuals, exact reproduction is
the criterion used for ascertaining memory functions (what Wertsch, 2009,
p. 122, refers to as the accuracy criterion). In many, if not most, con-
texts of remembering, collective as well as individual, approximation to
accurate representation (Wertsch, 2009, p. 123) at an exact level is not
relevant, nor expected. Stories of the past will generally be told differently
Introduction11
The chapters in this volume are organized into four different sections.
The first four chapters report studies of the dynamics of remembering in
conversationsthat is, the locus of the activities is in interactional prac-
tices. Brady Wagoner and Alex Gillespie return to Bartlett and his studies
of remembering. They do so in a literal sense, since their empirical study
utilizes the same famous story to be recalled that Bartlett used in his work
many decades ago. But remembering here takes place in a different social
situation in the sense that Wagoner and Gillespie had participants recall
the story in a conversation. Thus, the individual task was converted into
a collaborative task where two participants jointly recalled (in talk and
in writing) the story shortly after reading it and then again a week later.
The point of this design was to gain access to the processes of reconstruct-
ing the story as the participants interact to achieve a common end. In
Bartletts original study, he only had access to the product of remembering:
the version that the individual participants had produced. When we have
access to significant elements of the processes that generate outcomes, the
results show how remembering is a dynamic process in which elements
of dialogues such as questions, gestures, and other moves contribute to a
process of reproducing the story, its gist, and its parts. Thus, remembering
cannot be conceptualized as direct reproduction of what was the original
story. Rather, the collaborating parties trigger each other through sug-
gestions that they articulate and that their partner will use to go on by
agreeing, disagreeing, adding, and/or reframing. This social process of
talking a memory into being by means of suggestions and communica-
tive work applies to the individuals themselves as well, as they sometimes
respond to their own suggestions as they do to those of their partners. The
12R. SLJ
NOTE
REFERENCES
Baddeley, A., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. Bower (Ed.), The psychol-
ogy of learning and motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 4789). London, UK: Academic
Press.
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417423.
Baddeley, A., & Hitch, G. (1994). Developments in the concept of working memory.
Neuropsychology, 8(4), 485493.
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). Speech genres and other late essays (V. W. McGee, Trans.).
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bergson, H. (1912). An introduction to metaphysics. New York, NY: Putnam.
Boivin, N. (2008). Material cultures, material minds: The impact of things on human
thought, society and evolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bowker, G., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Boyer, P. (2009). What are memories for? Functions of recall in cognition and
culture. In P. Boyer & J. V. Wertsch (Eds.), Memory in mind and culture (pp.
328). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Bruner, J. S. (1996). The culture of education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the
structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Churchland, P. M. (1996). The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: A philosophical
journey into the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2003). Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human
intelligence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press.
Conway, M. (1995). Flashbulb memories. Hove, UK: Erlbaum.
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Boston, MA: D. C. Heath & Sons.
Donald, M. (2010). The exographic revolution: Neuropsychological sequelae. In
L. Malafouris & C. Renfrew (Eds.), The cognitive life of things. Recasting the
boundaries of mind (pp. 7180). Cambridge, UK: The McDonald Institute for
Archaelogical Resaerch, University of Cambridge.
Douglas, M. (1986). How institutions think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Draismaa, D. (2000). Metaphors of memory: A history of ideas about the mind. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). ber das Gedchtnis: Untersuchungen zur experimentellen
Psychologie [On memory: Studies in experimental psychology]. Leipzig, DE:
Duncker & Humblot.
Edwards, R., Raggatt, P., & Small, N. (2013). The learning society: Challenges and
trends. London, UK: Routledge.
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological
Review, 102(2), 211.
Introduction21
EMERGENCE IN
CONVERSATIONAL
REMEMBERING
Brady Wagoner and Alex Gillespie
INTRODUCTION
regulates their own conduct with the use of signs (Valsiner, 2007; Vygotsky
& Luria, 1994). Memory becomes a social and cultural process (instead of a
cognitive faculty or thing) that takes place with the use of cultural and semi-
otic tools in a context that is both physical and social (Bresc & Wagoner,
2015; Wertsch, this volume).
The main problem with conceptualizing remembering as a process is
that methodologically it is much easier to study it as a faculty, to monitor
inputs and outputs at various time points. Taking seriously remembering
as a process entails more subtle methodologies for unpacking the process
of remembering in real time (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010; Wagoner, 2009). In
the current chapter, we will use data from a replication of Bartletts (1932)
classic method of repeated reproduction with the Native American folktale
War of the Ghosts to explore remembering as emerging through genuinely
social processes. The method of repeated reproduction entails having an
individual remember the same stimulus at various time points such that the
decay and transformation can be systematically studied. Bartletts method,
however, only gave him access to snapshots of the process of remem-
bering: namely, the outputs at each time point. Thus he had to infer the
semiotic processes underlying the reconstruction (Wagoner & Gillespie,
2014).
Our methodological innovation is to have participants produce the
reproductions in pairs in order to make visible (or rather audible) the social
processes that construct remembering. When in dyads, the conversation
is naturalistic, and participants thoughts are easily externalized, which
provides us a window on the way in which the two participants thoughts
interact in the production of remembering. Our analysis focuses on how
participants creatively weave together diverse influences in the ongoing
process of remembering. We identify and elaborate two forms of emer-
gence, where memories and their meanings emerge through time in the
interaction between participants and cannot be said to belong to either
participant individually. The first is a form of social emergence, which
comes about through each speaker prompting the otherthe combination
of their responses becomes the remembering. The second describes how
material already remembered can take on new meaning by shifting the nar-
rative frame, thereby changing the significance of the parts. Both kinds of
emergence will be shown to be genuinely social and usually conversational
characteristics of remembering (Roth, this volume).
Our starting point for this chapter is the seminal work of Frederic Bartlett
(1932; see also Wagoner, 2016), who is credited for the insights that
Emergence in Conversational Remembering 27
tion next to the deleted portion. The conversation task taps into the
familiar, everyday activity of remembering an event and some material
together with others. As Middleton and Edwards (1990) earlier found,
participants in our experiment approached the task in a much freer and
jovial way than in an individual paper-and-pencil task, which tends to be
done as if it were a school exam. Even though we gave explicit instruc-
tions to write down the story you read as accurately as possible, the
participants could still be found to deviate from the task, making jokes
and associations to the story.
This methodology, tapping into spontaneous and everyday remembering,
thus allows us to unpack and illustrate the process by which transformations
and conventionalizations identified by Bartlett come about. In an earlier
article (Wagoner & Gillespie, 2014), we used this methodology to identify
several sociocultural mediators of remembering, including imagery, narra-
tive coherence, deduction, repetition, gesture, questioning, and the social
process of deferring to ones partner. In the present chapter we focus on
two mediators not covered in that article, which we will call social emer-
gence and frame shifting. Social emergence describes how remembering
is directed through the interplay between each participants suggestions for
giving form to a vague memory. Emergence through frame shifting identifies
where the parts remembered do not in themselves change but rather take
on new meaning as a result of being seen within a new gestalt, such as a
change in the recollection or an external narrative frame. The key to emer-
gence through frame shifting is that what has already been remembered is
reassessed from a new perspective.
SOCIAL EMERGENCE
In this section, we will explicate the first form of emergence with illustra-
tions of the process involved in key transformations earlier identified by
Bartlett (1932)for example, hunting seals to fishing, the change
and disappearance of foreign proper names, foggy and calm to sympa-
thetic weather, and so on. From our data we can see that transformations
are not entirely unwitting, as Bartlett implied, but can actually be cor-
rected through a process of self-suggestion and other-suggestion. Let us
begin with a simple example from participants we will call Bill and Henry.
Their interaction was somewhat short, yet they recalled slightly more than
average (compared with the sample of 10 dyads). Excerpt 1 shows how
initial conventionalization (i.e., the reworking of material into a famil-
iar framework) is overcome and the correct phrase is remembered. The
process is one of social emergence:
30 B. WAGONER and A. GILLESPIE
Excerpt 1
Participants dialogue:
3 Henry: Ok, so, there were two guys hunting
4 Bill: No, no, no. There were two guys looking for seals
5 Henry: They were hunting seals
6 Bill: Hunting seals. Two guys hunting seals
7 [writing]. Ok, so there are two guys
8 hun-
Excerpt 2
Participants dialogue:
1 Michael: Okay, begin. I dont remember the name of the first town.
2 Ingrid: Starts with an E
3 Michael: E, E
4 Ingrid: J
5 Michael: E Ebowler or something [laugh]
6 Ingrid: Ajew, e junar
7 Michael: Yeah E G U N A H, or something
8 Ingrid: E G U N A H ?
9 Michael: Yeah
10 Ingrid: What was the first sentence then?
11 Michael: Two men went down the river from [0.5] Ejunah to hunt seals.
has a slight [k] sound in it (lines 7 and 8), revealing the closer approxima-
tion. However, accuracy is not central to the point. The key point is that
the process of emergence is fundamentally social in the sense of emerging
through the process of interaction. We find a process of elaboration hap-
pening between the participants, where different versions are produced,
some incomplete, on the way to a final form.
In their conversation, Ingrid and Michaels proceed to touch on another
major transformation Bartlett earlier commented on: a feeling for the
vague atmosphere of the weather during recall. In Bartletts (1932) experi-
ment, only eight ever reproduced [foggy and calm], and five of these
speedily dropped it from their later versions (p. 80). However, he notes
his participants did tend to evoke a weather scheme which is consonant
with a given mood, but no detailed weather conditions (p. 80). As in our
experiment, descriptions such as dark, cold, misty, and hazy were
common. Let us consider how Ingrid and Michael arrive at foggy and
hazy.
Excerpt 3
Participants dialogue:
14 Michael: I remember the word hazy and foggy or foggy and dark,
15 and dark, it became foggy
16 Ingrid: I forgot all about that
17 Michael: Yeah.
18 Ingrid: Hazy rings a bell, erm
19 Michael: Definitely foggy
20 Ingrid: Definitely foggy and hazy.
21 Michael: Foggy and hazy.
22 Ingrid: Foggy and hazy?
23 Michael: Yeah
Excerpt 4
Participants dialogue:
93 Bill: He told his story and then became quiet. Right?
94 And then the sun sets [pause] or something
95 Henry: Well, he goes to sleep
96 Bill: It didnt say anything about sleep. In the
97 morning he stood up and died
98 Henry: Woke up and died
99 Bill: All right, so he became quiet after telling the story. Ahh, a
100 photographic memory would be awesome right now. Ok now
101 were to the point where he woke up. Did they say he woke up?
102 Henry: I dont think he stood up
103 Bill: I thought he
104 Henry: I dont think he stood up. I think he did wake up
105 Bill: Ok, so he woke up [writes]. Something black
106 Henry: Came out of his mouth
one of the words was correct, so they combine them. In other words, it is
more the result of a compromise in the interest of social equity than each
participants belief that the end result has the maximum truth-value. Like-
wise, in Excerpt 4, the written reproduction he woke up is the result of
each participant firmly rejecting one idea proposed by the other. We see
that this tacit agreement of creating equity of contribution in remember-
ing can create conditions for the process of social emergence, as can be
seen in the above cases. Thus, we should be careful not to strictly separate
cognition from the social practice in which it occurs (Middleton & Edwards,
1990).
Excerpt 5
reproduction. There were two reasons for this: First, the participants saw
it as implied rather than explicitly stated in the original story and second,
their conversation partner often did not validate the idea. Excerpt 6 is a
typical example of how the idea came up in the conversations. It is from the
pairs first reproduction and begins after they have remembered that the
people came down to the water and began to fight, and many were killed.
Excerpt 6
Participants dialogue:
97 Joan: So, at some point he thinks theyre ghosts;
98 he decides theyre ghosts
99 Emily: Well, I think he might be a ghost
100 Joan: Yeah, but in the story
101 Emily: But cause he has been referred to as an Indian, hes an Indian.
102 Hes the only person -
103 Joan: Yeah, they say the Indian has been shot -
104 Emily: - but I did not feel sick
Joan remembers that he thinks theyre ghosts (line 97), which leads
Emily to assert that he might be a ghost (line 99). This same pattern can
be seen in their second reproduction, where Joan comments, He realizes
that theyre ghost or he says theyre ghosts, which is followed by Emilys
statement that I think that the point is that he is a ghost. In both cases,
Joan afterwards refocuses the conversation on the task of recalling the
specific statement in the original story, which she does with the help of
Emilys insight that he has been referred to as an Indian (line 101). It is
interesting to note that Emily is at this point justifying why she thinks he is
a ghost but ends up triggering Joans recall of the target phrase that Emily
seamlessly completes.
Their conversation continues on this line, but later Emily tries two times
again to attribute ghost status to the Indian: first when they are recalling
when the protagonist conveys, I had been shot to the people and second
when recalling that something black comes out of his mouth. In both cases
Joan again puts the issue aside. The issue of the protagonist being a ghost
comes up when discussing in other conversations as well when the pair
38B. WAGONER and A. GILLESPIE
comes to the issues of him being shot but not feeling sick, his thought that
they are ghosts and the ending in which something black comes out of his
mouth and the line he was dead. These were all puzzling events for the
participants of this study that can partly be familiarized through the addi-
tion of the new idea.
In 2006, when this study was conducted, a common narrative template
(Wertsch, 2002) was being used by Hollywood films about ghosts. These
films, such as the Sixth Sense and The Others, involve a protagonist who
comes into contact with ghosts. There is then a surprise ending in these
films which we realize that the protagonist him- or herself has been a ghost
all along as well. This ending explains earlier events of the film and gives
the story narrative closure. When this narrative template is applied to War
of the Ghosts, some of the puzzling aspects just mentioned become intel-
ligible, though it does not necessarily change the manifest content. Thus,
it is our conjecture that over 80 years after Bartlett conducted his experi-
ment, we find participants using a new set of narrative frames to familiarize
it. So, although the outcome is different due to different cultural narratives
in circulation, the process is the same. Again, the finding affirms the need
to consider the wider social-cultural world to which participants belong to
understand their processes of remembering. The interesting thing about
this last case of frame shifting is that the emergence which occurs comes
not out of the interactional process per se, but from an interaction between
the narrative-to-be-remembered and the narrative templates circulating in
the wider cultural milieu.
DISCUSSION: REMEMBERING AS A
PROCESS OF SUGGESTION
That is to say, individual recollection is, we suggest, social in just the same
way, with suggestion and counter suggestion mediating the ongoing recon-
struction. In other words, individual recollection often exploits internal
dialogue (cf. Linell, 2009). The conversation task shifts the boundary
towards greater visibility of the mediation process for the researcher to
record and scrutinize. This is not to say that remembering in conversation
is the same as remembering by oneselfclearly, there are certain con-
ventions of talk, such as coming to consensus, that are not found on the
individual level. But the process of suggestion and counter-suggestion is
basic to the emergence of remembering at both intra- and inter-individual
levels (Billig, 1996).
One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt
seals, and while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard
war-cries, and they thought: Maybe this is a war-party. They escaped to
the shore and hid behind a log. Now canoes came up, and they heard the
noise of paddles and saw one canoe coming up to them. There were five
men in the canoe, and they said:
What do you think? We wish to take you along. We are going up the
river to make war on the people.
One of the young men said, I have no arrows.
Arrows are in the canoe, they said.
I will not go along. I might be killed. My relatives do not know where
I have gone. But you, he said, turning to the other, may go with them.
So one of the young men went, but the other returned home.
And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of
Kalama. The people came down to the water and they began to fight, and
many were killed. But presently the young man heard one of the warriors
say, Quick, let us go home: that Indian has been hit. Now he thought:
Oh, they are ghosts. He did not feel sick, but they said he had been shot.
So the canoes went back to Egulac and the young man went ashore to
his house and made a fire. And he told everybody and said: Behold, I
accompanied the ghosts, and we went to fight. Many of our fellows were
killed, and many of those who attacked us were killed. They said I was hit,
and I did not feel sick.
He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down.
Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The
people jumped up and cried.
He was dead.
42B. WAGONER and A. GILLESPIE
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44B. WAGONER and A. GILLESPIE
researchers have shown that language plays a pivotal role in the articulation
of otherness in ethnically diverse communities, whereby in the context of
social and linguistic hierarchies and hegemonic ideologies, immigrants
and other minorities may be marginalized and categorized as out-groups
(cf. Garci-Sanchez, 2014; Goodwin & Alim, 2010, for an overview). Little
is known, however, about childrens agency in social practices of othering
in terms of childrens ability to appropriate and negotiate as well as
perpetuate broader cultural frameworks of social and ethnical hierarchies
and inequalities in multiethnic settings.
Our foci of interest resonate here more generally with a sociocultural
view on collective remembering as organized within the appropriation,
use and creative production of culturally evolved resources (cf. Wertsch,
2002). In principle, we approach processes of collective remembering here
as synonymous with how children become familiar with and appropriate
group memberships and cultural distinctions within specific communities
of practice, to which they contribute continuously in their interactions with
others. For this purpose, we take as our starting point a discursive approach
to remembering as socially organized within communicative actions as ways
of accomplishing particular activities in the present by invoking the past
for certain practical purposes (cf. Edwards & Middleton, 1988; Middle-
ton & Brown, 2005). In order to account for how children make use of
membership categories and evaluative stances as discursive resources, we
also draw on inspiration from Halbwachs (1980, 1992) work on collec-
tive memory and his concern with language, especially proper names, as
devices for ordering and classifying images and ideas from the past that
are continously put to new use. As Middleton and Brown (2005, p. 56)
note, for Halbwach proper names constitute a form of social action that
reconstructs past event by evoking categories and relationships held in a
collective framework (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 56). From his perspec-
tive, collective memory consists of a series of images and meaningsthat
is, categories, qualities, evaluative criteriathat provide a common frame-
work around which recollections of the past emerge and are reviewed and
renewed in the present (Halbwachs, 1992). Seen in this way, the activity
of remembering is a dynamic and intersecting practice that draws on the
culturally evolved resources (i.e., images, categories, models, examples,
etc.) that become available when people (here children) place themselves
or are placed by others between sometimes competing prior frameworks,
and have to deal with the challenges of forming new collectivities.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and explore a number of catego-
rization practices and communicative resources that young children with
immigrant backgrounds draw upon as they deal with often heterogeneous
cultural experiences, while handling processes of social differentiation
and out-group memberships. We will, for example, demonstrate how the
Naming the Other 47
As Evaldsson and Corsaro (1998, p. 379) point out, children are in the
process of making it their own by actively reconfiguring, transforming,
and extending the cultural practices of their community, rather than
passively reproducing an already established social order. In this sense, a
peer language socialization approach shares with sociocultural perspectives
on collective remembering the idea that children become members of a
particular social group or culture through their appropriation and use
of the culturally evolved resources that have shaped and constitute that
culture. Seen in this way, remembering becomes more or less a routine
feature of childrens everyday language practices.
A peer language socialization approach opens up the possibility of doc-
umenting the interactional process through which children accomplish
membership in a particular social group or culture (Goodwin & Kyratzis,
2014). Several studies have shown how children in the midst of every-
day peer group interactions negotiate and appropriate the forms of social
categorizations, affect, and knowledge claims that are relevant to their
social group (see Goodwin & Kyratzis 2014 for an overview). In particular,
Goodwin (1990, 2006), in her ethnographic research on everyday interac-
tions in culturally diverse peer groups, demonstrates how girls make use of
a range of communicative modalities, including evaluative stances, insults,
and culturally specific categories to police their social landscape (see
also Evaldsson, 2007). Long-term ethnographic work showed a group of
middle-class girls agentive use of transmodal stylizations and embodied
category-bound activities indexing cultural representations tied to Ameri-
can White upper-middle-class statuses in the activity of co-constructing
an African American working-class girl as marginal (Goodwin & Alim,
2011, p 180). Garci-Sanchezs ethnographic work (2014) also details the
subtle exclusionary language practices through which native-speaking
Spanish children directly or indirectly negatively depict and sanction their
Moroccan-born peers. In contrast to explicit racist behaviors, the referred-
to exclusionary practices were not achieved through explicit labeling but
more subtly organized through the use of locally relevant, category-bound
activities and interactional alignments, strengthening social bonds and
indexing Otherness. Lewis (2004a, p. 4), in her ethnographic study in
three elementary schools in the United States, shows as well how children
learn about the rules of racial classifications and their own classification
and of their own racial identity through both explicit and implicit forms
of racial positioning. In addition, subsequent ethnographic research in
multiethnic suburban schools in Sweden demonstrates how children in
multiethnic peer group settings both invoke and play with features from
multiple languages in ways that challenge binary cultural representations
indexing social barriers between us and them (ekait & Evaldsson,
2008; Evaldsson, 2005; Evaldsson & Sahlstrm, 2014).
Naming the Other 49
The analysis is focused on a case study, targeting one girl, Sara, with an
immigrant background from Rwanda, in her everyday multiethnic peer
group participation, first in a Swedish-speaking preschool in Finland and
then as she moves to a school in Sweden located within a multiethnic sub-
urban area (Evaldsson & Sahlstrm, 2014). The case study draws from a
larger data set of childrens everyday peer group interactions in urban
school settings mainly in Finland, but also in Sweden, collected by the
second author and his research team. Compared to the Swedish school
system, which promotes immigrant childrens mastery of the one official
Swedish language, Finland has for a long time had a bilingual parallel
school system promoting the use of both official languages, Finnish and
Swedish. Although immigration during the last few years has increased
in Finland, it has not reached the level of cultural and language diver-
sity that characterizes Swedish society. Despite these and other cultural,
political, and historical differences, the contemporary discourse that has
dominated the political debates in the two countries, as well as in other
European countries, is that of a crisis of integration reflecting an increas-
ing segregation and a racialization directed especially towards Muslim and
African immigrants. Simultaneously, the educational practice in the two
settings at hand can best be seen as informed by a colorblind (Talmy,
2008) approach, which implies that children, independently of their cul-
tural, ethnic, and linguistic background, are supposed to learn the official
language(s) to become a member of the society. Thus, despite a growing
diversity, especially in Swedish society, the educational practices in both
Finland and Sweden can be seen to be about implicitly accentuated cul-
tural homogeneity in attitudes and values (ekait, 2012, p. 648; ekait
& Evaldsson, 2008).
We will now explore in greater detail how forms of stratified cultural
frameworks, associated with cultural homogeneity, racialization, and ethnic
otherness are also actively oriented to by children in multiethnic peer
50A.-C. EVALDSSON and F. SAHLSTRM
group settings as they organize peer group relations and position them-
selves vis--vis one another, strengthen in-group relations, and differentiate
themselves from certain groups of children.
Excerpt 1: Youre called big nose (words in bold are said in Finnish)
on the margin of the multiethnic peer group (Goodwin & Alim, 2010). As
demonstrated, the embodied category ascriptions serve both as discursive
resources for making references to personal experiences and for access-
ing common sense knowledge within the practical, local circumstances of
action (Bergmann, 1998).
The observations made so far bring into focus how the cultural references
that are being appropriated and co-constructed in the girls peer interac-
tions draw more or less upon common sense notions of homogeneous
cultural identities, thereby casting children with more complex cultural
backgrounds as the Other. For example, the teachers routinely organized
school activities in which all the children worked on specific assignments
where they discussed and envisioned their cultural background in relation
to homelands, national identities, and geographical locations. As Hall
(1994, p. 394) notes, such cultural images evoke almost an eternally fixed
essentialized past. Although anthropologists do not any longer consider
culture as homogeneous, bounded and static (Ochs & Schieffelin, 2014,
p. 8), such images, however, are passed on in educational settings including
the preschool setting at hand.
Despite their more fluid and complex cultural backgrounds, Sara and
her two friends in the multiethnic peer group had learned the centrality
of displaying a more stable culturally homogeneous identity localized to
a specific place. In what follows, we will demonstrate how the three girls
invoke cultural representations of national identities as they probe and test
their geographical expertise in respect to what counts as a country of birth
and a homeland (see Excerpt 2c).
The fact that Hanna in line 23 claims that Rwanda is in Africa provides
the basis for localizing homelands within continents. Sara can be seen
to confirm that Africa is her claimed national identity as she immedi-
ately responds with ah yes the country (line 27). As Billig (1995, p. 8)
notes, images of cultures as homogeneous evoke a form of nationalism that
typically comprises taken-for-granted notions of being situated within a
homeland, which itself is situated within the world of nations. However as
demonstrated in the girls unfolding interaction, cultural representations
of national identities do not privilege only those children whose identity
is tied to specific homelands (in this context native-speaking bilingual
Finnish-Swedish children). For example Sara not only identifies herself as
having a homeland, which is Africa, but also places the two other girls,
Naming the Other 57
In our last example (see below) from the Finnish school setting, the
two girls Sara and Hanna again bring up and renegotiate their cultural
backgrounds. Once again, the topic is set off by Sara, who now asks Hanna
about her reasons for not accompanying her on her trip with her family
to Africa (line 1). This time, the topic of talk shifts into a playful interac-
tion in which Sara and Hanna compare and negotiate different versions of
their family relations and at the same time make up the multiple locations
that these occupy. The topic of family relations is brought forward as Sara
offers Hanna to meet with her cousins in Africa (line 3) (see Excerpt 3a).
An imaginative and creative stance towards their respective family
backgrounds and their placement is taken as Sara and Hanna together
construct transnational family relations through playful improvisations.
This time Hannas humorous verbal response in line 6, ah I have someI
have super many cousins to Saras repeated questions shifts the activity
frame from a serious discussion into a playful comparison of the numbers
of cousins they have. The girls playful interaction entails various features
of verbal improvisation (Duranti & Black, 2014). Through a change in
footing into a joking relationship, Hanna aligns with Saras previous contri-
bution while shifting to a new and playful topic (here about the number of
cousins) that in turn evokes a different stance with respect to what was said.
Instead of responding to the propositional content of Saras proposal in
line 8, you have one Thailand-cousin, Hanna upgrades her playful argu-
mentative stance through a metacognitive formulation in line 9, I have
so many that Ithat I dont remember, thereby referring to the process
of remembering itself (Middleton & Edwards, 1990, pp. 1011). Hannas
claim of not remembering becomes here a way to distance herself from the
idea that the version presented of her past is not a direct recollection but
may contain details that are not really true.
Naming the Other 59
In what follows, the two girls shift in footing into a hypothetical and
imaginative framework in which Hannas family constellations become
playfully reinvented and transformable.
We will now demonstrate how Sara, as she moves with her family from
Finland to a multiethnic school setting in a suburban area in Sweden,
makes use of her hybrid and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic experi-
ences from immigration both from Rwanda and from Finland (Evaldsson
& Sahlstrm, 2014). At the time of the second data collection, Sara had
attended the school in Sweden for approximately three months. Compared
to the previous excerpts, one year after the first data collection period
Sara had grown, from being seven years old to being nine years old. In
the Swedish school setting, Sara attended a school class where most of
the immigrant children had in common that they had spent almost their
whole life in Sweden, except Sara who had recently moved from Finland
to Sweden. When socializing with her friends, Sara mainly spoke Swedish,
but also some Finnish with Finnish immigrant children. Several of the
immigrant children in her new school class had ethnic and linguistic back-
grounds from non-European settings (mainly families from the Middle
East and Somalia). In this suburban school setting, children from families
with an indigenous Swedish background were in the minority. Compared to
the Finnish school setting, in the Swedish school setting, Sara more easily
became a member of the multiethnic peer group. However, similarly as the
case was found to be in the Finnish school setting, visible bodily attributes
Naming the Other 61
such as dark skin color indexed a potentially problematic ethnic and racial
position in the multiethnic Swedish school context at hand.
In this first excerpt, we focus on how cultural images of otherness are
brought forward by one of the boys in class, through category ascriptions
differentiating Sara from the other children. When we meet Sara she is
participating with the other children in textile handicrafts. The transcript
begins with Sara and Johan comparing how far they have proceeded with
their knitting (lines 89). Johan claims to be ahead (line 8), while Sara
justifies her work in line 9 by claiming that Johan has begun before her.
Thereafter, there is a shift in topic as Johan in lines 1114 makes a dis-
claimer, starting off with depicting Sara as an immigrant from Finland,
which then immediately is expanded with a color category, but YOU: like
from (.) uh- Finland and like dark- (0.4).
We will now further explore how Sara and her new friends in the Swedish
multiethnic school setting co-construct shared cultural experiences and cat-
egory memberships, as they talk about and reflect upon their collective and
individual experiences of immigration. In Saras case, this means physically
Naming the Other 63
moving with her family, who have emigrated from Rwanda to Finland and
then to Sweden. In the previous excerpts, the girls playfully appropriated
and negotiated commonly held membership categories invoking homoge-
neous cultural images and collective frameworks mainly mediated through
the adults in school and at home. In what follows, we will show how the
girls reconstruct personal experiences through storytelling, in which they
engage in joint social actions of remembering (cf. Middleton & Edwards,
1990, p. 39; Middleton & Brown, 2009, p. 85). The ways in which the girls
co-tell narratives of peer group events and family scenarios and memories
strengthen social bonds and position them as agents and in control of their
narrated past (actual/imagined/projected).
In the ensuing excerpts, Sara socializes with Maria, a girl with her family
background from Somalia. The two girls are seated next to one another in
class and often hang around with one another both in and out of school.
The two girls families also have got to know one another recently. In what
follows, Marias question, Why did you move to Sweden (Excerpt 5a, line
4), brings up shared cultural references with respect to personal experi-
ences of immigration both in terms of how the girls make sense of their
family problems and expected language competencies. (see Excerpt 5a).
Sara responds in lines 89 to Marias question by providing her version
of her parents reasons for immigrating to Sweden, providing details both
of their economic situation and their lack of language competencies in
Finnish. The detailed account given by Sara demonstrates as well the agen-
tive side of how children make sense of and pick out certain elements in
regards to their family history in order to make sense of their present
situation (cf. Edwards & Middleton, 1988). Saras narrated family experi-
ences of immigration demonstrate how children appropriate and negotiate
recognizable types of elements from stories told by adult immigrants.
In this sense, the girls display their awareness of how broader collective
frameworks with respect to societal hierarchies and dominant language
ideologies may inevitably constrain personal experiences of immigration.
Jaffe (2009) calls such displays of positions, taken towards the assumed
connections between language and identity with respect to hierarchies and
ideologies, a meta-sociolinguistic stance. Such meta-sociolinguistic stances
are enacted by children in peer group interactions through the use of both
implicit and explicit forms of evaluations and social categorizations, affect,
knowledge, and agency as they orient to others and make claims regarding
particular sociolinguistic matters (Evaldsson & Sahlstrm, 2014).
The reference made to language proficiency in Finnish makes inferen-
tially available a more general reference to a common cultural framework
where knowing Swedish is important for people who immigrate to the
Swedish society, through which Marias subsequent question in line 11, do
they know Swedish can be understood. In the girls ensuing exchange in
64 A.-C. EVALDSSON and F. SAHLSTRM
The positive evaluative stance taken by the two girls towards their fami-
lies shared immigrant backgrounds in terms of how the girls give meaning
Naming the Other 65
In this last excerpt, following directly on Excerpt 5b, we will show how
elements related to immigration, linguistic competence, skin color, and
racial experiences at the childrens disposal in the cultural community
at hand provide powerful resources not only for evoking the past in the
present but also for reconstituting friendship bonds and strengthening
childrens own interactional histories. In what follows, Sara recycles her
prior narrated experiences about Maimounas conduct, providing more
details of the problematic nature of the two girls relationship (Excerpt 5c).
This time the negative person depiction of the absent girl shifts from color
Naming the Other 67
say that (lines 22, 24, 26, 28). To start with, Sara provides a warrant for
the girls negative category depiction of Maimouna through an account
that is sensitive to and renders detailed descriptions of the incident talked
about. The use of connectives such as she says and did she say that
charges the talk being quoted as belonging to Maimouna, the cited figure
(Goffman, 1981). The ways in which Sara enacts what Maimouna has said
demonstrates how the retelling provides opportunities for the girls (the
tellers) to comment on past events in present time. It also highlights the
intertextuality in terms of how voices of others become embedded within
ongoing talk in the present (Goodwin 1990). Through the use of quotes
and repetitions, the two girls align with each others versions of the extraor-
dinariness of Maimounas reported activities and builds them up into a
moment of climax. The use of repetitions such as did she say that high-
lights the key elements of their retelling. Moreover, it indicates the girls
preoccupation with an appropriate age- and gender-based membership,
did she say we believe ourselves teens, showing that the girls claims are
not mainly oriented to an understanding of what happened in the past.
Rather, the retelling provides an opportunity for the two girls to reinterpret
Maimonas identity claims and to distance themselves from her actions,
while policing the boundaries for what constitute common frameworks of
gender- and age-appropriate conduct in the peer group at hand.
The shifts made in the girls talk from ethnicity and race into age-
and gender-appropriate category memberships through the unfolding
interaction (Excerpts 5a5c) demonstrate the local interactional work
accomplished through the use of multiple and intersecting categories, as
the girls take up stances and position themselves towards self and other
in the midst of peer group interactions. In this way, the girls interactively
orient to the relevance of shifting and dynamic collective frameworks as
they co-construct complex forms of memberships (friendship, ethnicity,
age, gender, class, ethnolinguistic) and loyalties, towards informal friend-
ship groups, families, and the institutional settings at hand.
DISCUSSION
Our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even
though only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned. In real-
ity, we are never alone. Other men need not be physically present, since we always
carry with us and in us a number of distinct persons. (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 23)
Inspired by the ways in which Middleton and Brown (2005) use Halbwachs
work (1980, 1992) in their discursive approach to remembering, we have
tried to show how a girl with an immigrant background appropriates and
Naming the Other 69
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Naming the Other 73
TRANSCRIPTION KEY
:: prolonged syllable
[no] : overlapping utterances
(.) : micropause, i.e. shorter than (0.5)
(2) : pauses in seconds
YES : relatively high amplitude
X: inaudible word
(xx) : unsure transcription
what : translation into English
(()) : comments of the transcriber
?: rising terminal intonation
.: falling terminal intonation
CHAPTER 4
REMEMBERING AS
INSTRUCTIONAL WORK IN THE
SCIENCE CLASSROOM
Maria Andre, Per-Olof Wickman, and Lotta Lager-Nyqvist
BACKGROUND
METHODOLOGY
were given an inquiry task to do at home (on the topics of melting and
solubility).
Here, we analyze one particular episode from a teacher-led group
conversation where students report their inquiry homework on the water
solubility of different kinds of food. This episode is an example of a ped-
agogical arrangement with a purpose to make inquiry aspects (making
observations and drawing valid conclusions) of scientific literacy as well as
conceptual knowledge about solubility available to students, content that
is part of the curriculum for these classes. The participants in the episode
are the class teacher, four girls, and three boys. The participants are seated
around a round table in a small group-room close to the classroom. In this
particular episode one student, Jessica, reports her inquiry homework to
the group. The episode begins at 1:40 minutes into the lesson and is closed
after 5:55 minutes.
Data Analysis
Through the group work, the teacher and the students engage in a sort of
collaborative remembering. In research on storytelling in out-of-school set-
tings collaborative remembering has implied that two participants combine
their memories to complete a personal narrative (Norrick, 2005). In this
teacher-led small group work, students experiences of doing inquiry at
home are made available to the group and accessible for joint reflection.
In the joint construction of accounts of solubility, the teacher and the stu-
dents collaboratively build an understanding of solubility on the basis of
experiences made available in the group. The teacher and the students
struggle to find translations of solubility and solution that make sense to
them. Here, the focus is not whether the simplifications of these complex
concepts are correct or not, but rather on how memories are made avail-
able and shared.
In our analyses, we discern teacher strategies for organizing collabora-
tive remembering as part of an educational activity. The analytical units
are (1) utterances where references of the past are made explicit, and (2)
utterances calling for someone to share past experiences. These utter-
ances are conceptualized as constituents of collective classroom activity.
The analyses draw on the distinction made by Bruner (1996) between
narrative and paradigmatic rationality. The narrative rationality concerns
humans and their doings in particular situations, whereas the paradigmatic
rationality concerns the logical ordering of events and physical objects. The
rationalities have operating principles of their own and their own criteria
for well-formedness and verification. To illustrate how the teacher together
Remembering as Instructional Work in the Science Classroom 79
Defining concepts
Initiation-response-evaluation (I-R-E) patterns (formative assess-
ment)
Summing up conceptual key points
The episode began when the teacher introduced to the group that they
were about to take part in the story of Jessicas homework.
Excerpt 1
In turn 1, the teacher encouraged Jessica to tell the group about her
homework. In retrospect, the turn functions as a preface to the upcoming
story. According to much literature on conversational narratives, a story
must be defended as relevant and newsworthy, or tellable, in order to
evolve as a story, and this tellability usually appears in a preface (Norrick
2005; Sachs, 1992). In this episode, the tellability was justified by reference
to reporting homework. More specifically, the teacher encouraged Jessica
to tell the group how she did her homework at her home. The teacher
thereby located the story to Jessicas home and the particular time when
she did her inquiry homework on the solubility of food stuff. By means of
prefacing, the teacher positioned Jessica as the owner of first-hand infor-
mation of what went on in her home, which also added to the tellability
of the story.
Excerpt 2
how? Jessica, what, how did you think now. you were
to take out three things that do not dissolve
6 Jessica ja
yes
7 Teacher och tre saker som lser sig
yes
9 Teacher vilka valde du som inte lser sig? som
inte kommer... vad var lsning fr det
frsta? vi mste ju veta det... Erik?
that it disappeared
11 Teacher ja, s man inte sg nn skillnad, mellan de
hr tv fremlen. man sg ingen skillnad
alls, det frsvann det som man lste.
In turn 9, the teacher turned from the story of what went on in Jessicas
kitchen, to recall what had previously been agreed upon as the definition of
solubility in a prior lesson. In an educational context we may conceptualize
this as a teacher question (in other words, What is the proper definition
of solution?). However, as Goodwin (1987) has shown, expressions of inse-
curity, or displayed forgetfulness, are social phenomena, frequently used
in storytelling as means for marking a particular detail as problematic and
inviting participation (cf. Middleton, 1997). The teacher confirmed the
response given by Erik by an utterance in past tense (turn 11, one didnt
see any difference), and through this comment she confirmed solubility
as a shared past experience of the group. The question thus served to draw
the group of students into the narrative (cf. Norrick, 2005) and to ensure
the students understanding of solubility. Here, the displayed forgetfulness
could thus function as a means to establish continuity between the narrative
and paradigmatic rationality.
Excerpt 3
12 Jessica eh, s hr. en som inte lste sig var mjlk. jag
kom p jag tog ljummet vatten och la i mjlk och
d var det fortfarande vitt och blandade ordentligt
I stirred/mixed
17 Teacher ja, och d blev det, d blandade det sig?
yes
19 Teacher d lste det sig. d kallar man att det lser sig
om det blandar sig och man inte ser ngon skillnad
p... vattnet och mjlken. men sg du skillnad?
In turn 12, Jessica introduced a first example of what did not dissolve.
She concluded that milk did not dissolve because it was still white. In turn
13, the teacher recalled in past tense how the task was to be performed
(one was supposed to stir) and asked Jessica what happened then. Jessica
(turn 14) reformulated her previous observation stating that it didnt go
away. There is an implicit reference to the definition proposed by Erik and
confirmed by the teacher (turns 10 and 11) that something has dissolved if
it has disappeared. The teacher was not satisfied with the accounts given
by Jessica of milk as nonsoluble in water. In this sequence, the teacher
negotiated what experiences may qualify as examples of solubility. The
teacher attempted to translate nonsolubility of milk in water to the kitchen
setting in turns 15 and 19, thus establishing continuity between the par-
ticular event of dissolving milk in water and the paradigmatic concept of
solubility.
Remembering as Instructional Work in the Science Classroom 85
However, Jessica insisted that the milk was nonsoluble and referred
to her actions in the kitchen (I stirred, in Swedish jag blandade). In
Swedish, the verb blanda refers to stir or to mix and the noun blandning
refers to mixture. In the exchange Jessica referred to her stirring the milk
and water, whereas the teacher referred to the liquids becoming mixed.
In an attempt to close this part of the narration and proceed to the other
food that Jessica had investigated, the teacher concluded that the milk had
dissolved (turn 19). The definition of solubility referred to in turn 19 is that
one cannot see a difference between the liquids. When Jessica repeated her
objection (turn 20), the teacher closed by framing the objection as Jessicas
personal opinion (turn 21).
Creating Transitions
Excerpt 4
okay
27 Jessica och det r ktt, och is kunde ju
lsa sig, men det gr inte ktt
Excerpt 4
(nods)
32 Teacher okej, s du blandade runt och det lste sig inte,
nej. vad hade du mer d som inte lste sig?
Excerpt 5
Excerpt 6
Excerpt 6
40 Jessica det lste sig
it dissolved
41 Teacher och d blev det en blandning, en lsning. okej.
och den sista du tog... vilken var det?
and it worked
45 Leon varfr har du skrivit nnting p baksidan?
In turn 37, the teacher confirmed the choice of liquid and asked for
details about how Jessica tested if syrup was soluble in water. The teacher
then added to the telling by reformulating and suggesting what Jessica did
next at home (then you put in syrup and then you stirred with the spoon,
turn 39). In turn 41, the teacher confirmed that this memory qualified as
an example of a solution. In turns 43 and 46, the teacher energizes the
conversation by invoking expressions such as how fun! and thats great.
Aesthetic judgments like these are commonly used by teachers and students
in moments of fulfillment and closure to emphasize relevant distinctions
(Wickman, 2006). Here these expressions seem to operate as markers to
make Jessica appreciate what she saw and had done as legitimate and rel-
evant instances of solubility. In turn 46, the teacher confirmed the work of
Jessica with the utterance and it dissolved [sorted out] fine. This utter-
ance is ambiguous in Swedish, and may be understood either as it dissolved
fine, or as things sorted out well. The utterance might have functioned as
a closure had not Leon interrupted and queried about what Jessica had
written on the back of her worksheet. Jessica expressed that the table for
recording her observations was not functional (it wouldnt fit, turn 49).
In turn 50, the teacher ensured that Jessica had finished telling the story
of her inquiry homework and turned to prefacing the upcoming story of
Leon (turn 51).
DISCUSSION
When a human event is said not to make sense, it is usually not because a
person is unable to place it in the proper category. The difficulty stems, in-
stead, from a persons inability to integrate the event into a plot whereby it
becomes understandable in the context of what has happened. (p. 21)
students remember earlier uses of words as part of the plot, but different
from their paradigmatic use, necessitates that the teacher must also handle
the problem of placing words in the right category to help students make
sense of science.
For educational research, a scrutiny of shared remembering and how
shared remembering contributes to temporal cohesion (cf. Mercer, 2008)
contributes to an understanding of teaching and learning processes both
as situated and transcending specific practices. More empirical studies of
the significance of situative remembering and how teachers could handle
remembering as a pedagogical resource to provide access points to scien-
tific literacy are needed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
REFERENCES
Ausubel, D. P. (1968). Educational psychology: A cognitive view. New York, NY: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.
Bruner, J. (1996). The culture of education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1990). Stories of experience and narrative
inquiry. Educational Researcher, 19(5), 214.
Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and education. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Ekstrm, A. (2012). Instructional work in textile craft: Studies of interaction, embodiment
and the making of objects (Doctoral dissertation). Stockholm University, Stock-
holm, Sweden.
Goodwin, C. (1987). Forgetfulness as an interactive resource. Social Psychology Quar-
terly, 50(2), 115130.
Johnstone, B. (1987). He says... so I said: Verb tense alteration and narrative
depictions of authority in American English. Linguistics 25, 3352.
Melander, H. (2009). Trajectories of learning: Embodied interaction in change (Doctoral
dissertation). Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
Mercer, N. (2008). The seeds of time: Why classroom dialogue needs a temporal
analysis. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 17, 3359.
92M. ANDRE, P-O. WICKMAN, and L. LAGER-NYQVIST
INTRODUCTION
ANALYSIS
Preliminaries
The interview begins with CM, a principal investigator for the study, and
RS, a visiting scholar, asking Stephanie about what she recalled from the
previous session. The tenor of the activity, therefore, is that of a review of
past accomplishments, with Stephanie chiefly responsible for constructing
the account. CM, who had been the lead interviewer in a previous inter-
view, sits by.
Since the early days of the Kennilworth Study, the students had been
working on combinatorial problems, problems that involved working out
the number of unique combinations possible under specified conditions
96T. KOSCHMANN and S. DERRY
(Maher & Martino, 1996). For example, in the 3rd grade the students were
given the four-tall tower problem:
Your group has two colors of Unifix cubes. Work together and make as many
different towers four cubes tall as is possible when selecting from two colors.
See if you and your partner can find a way to convince yourself and others
that you have found all possible towers four cubes high. (Francisco & Maher,
2005, p. 363, FN1)
For the current interview, Unifix blocks of two colors, blue and green
are available on the table (see Figure 5.1). Utilizing the blocks, Stephanie
demonstrates for RS how they could be used to generate the combinations
for four-tall, select one. In this case, there are four unique towers that
she constructs and lays out on the table before her.
Figure 5.1. Using Unifix cubes to solve combinatorics problems (Interview #6).
The lighter colored blocks are green and the darker blocks blue.
of ordering the towers when she is generating new towers than when she
is checking to see if the set is complete [Interview #6, Clip 3 of 11, item
45].3 He asks, How would you organize the next row, so that it makes more
sense? [Interview #6, Clip 3 of 11, item 65]. The ability to reorganize the
towers at will is one of the advantages of using manipulatives like Unifix
blocks instead of paper-based representations. The towers are actually more
than a representational convenience, however. They are, for the students
adept at their use, a tool for both generation and justification. Stephanie
4
subsequently uses the towers to work out the combinations of r where r
could vary from 0 to 4. She demonstrates that there are 16 possibilities.
Stephanie then reports that she had learned in the previous session a
different way of determining the number of combinations. The alterna-
tive method utilizes a representation known as Pascals triangle (Speiser
& Maher, 1997). Figure 5.2 shows two versions of the triangle taken from
Stephanies notes from Interview #5. The version shown at the top of the
figure shows a simple table that represents a number series. The first entry
is [1], the second [1 1], the third [1 2 1], and so forth. Written in this way, the
array assumes the shape of a triangle because each successive row is longer
by one than the row before. Pascals triangle can be written in another way
that shows its relationship to combinatorial problems. As shown in Figure
5.3, also from Stephanies notes, each of the individual elements of the
triangle represents a specific combinatoric expression.4 So, having the tri-
angle in hand, it is possible to simply look up the number of combinations
4 4
for 2 or sum across a row to compute the combinations for r . Another
advantage is that Pascals triangle can be easily extended by adding the two
nearest numbers from the row above to form the new elements in a row (see
Figure 5.2, lower half). Stephanie demonstrates this by building the first
few rows of the triangle [Interview #6, Clip 3 of 11, item 10].
RS then asks Stephanie how Pascals triangle relates to the towers that
she had generated previously [Interview #6, Clip 3 of 11, item 25]. By
clustering the relevant towers for the two-tall problem, she shows how they
relate to the third row of Pascals triangle. She does the same showing the
connection between the three-tall problem and fourth row. They return to
the issue of how the towers are ordered for different purposes. When Steph-
anie is generating all combinations, the towers are ordered one way; when
asked to show their correspondence to the elements of the triangle, they
need to be organized in a different manner. CM asks Stephanie if there is a
single way of organizing the towers that will serve both purposes [Interview
#6, Clip 3 of 11, item 181]. Stephanie does not believe that there is.
At this point, Stephanie mentions that they had also worked with bino-
mial expansions in the prior interview [Interview #6, Clip 4 of 11, item 7],
and it is here that we begin a more detailed analysis.
98T. KOSCHMANN and S. DERRY
Figure 5.2. Pascals triangle in two forms: one the typical format showing the
series and the second showing how the elements of each row are related to the row
before (from Stephanies summary of Interview #5).
Figure 5.4. Stephanies homework from Interview #4, binomial expansions from
(A + B)0 to (A + B)6.
Her account to this point has largely been delivered in the first-person
plural (e.g., What did we do next? [Interview #6, Clip 2 of 11, item 2]),
but now she begins referencing CM in the third person (I think (0.3)
sh-she figured out the exponents? [lines 3637]), in effect placing herself
outside of the action. Her suggestion, so modalized, is formatted as a guess.
Thus begins a succession of gradually escalating appeals for assistance,
starting with a glance and progressing eventually to a direct inquiry, Is
that what you did? (l. 45) supplemented with a gesture of uncertainty. In
so doing, Stephanie issues an invitation to CM to join her in the work of
reconstructing what had occurred in their prior meeting.
CMs Question
Can you take each of those terms in that expansion A squared, two AB,
B squared and see any relationship to the towers? (lines 7475). When,
again, no response is heard, CM expands the range of possibilitiesOr
any of those lines of the triangle or any parts of the triangle, columns,
lines, diagonals, anything? (lines 7778). While the first question asks if
she can see a relationship between the equation and either the triangle or
the towers, the second inverts the disjunction.
Here the question is left to hang and, after a long, 6-second pause,
Stephanie finally ventures an answer. But her apparent befuddlement
continues and she begins to evidence some frustration (like I dont see
how). CM encourages her to say what she can see (l. 85). And now, finally,
Stephanie appears to see the light. She notes that the middle terms of the
expansion both include a single A and B (l. 86) and then points to the
towers with mixed-color blocks. CM presses her to be more specific (l. 91)
and Stephanie offers the proposal, If green was A and blue was B (lines
9293), an expression we have adopted as a working title for the chapter.
Stephanie notes that they have two towers with one A (green) and one B
(blue) (l. 95 and l. 98). She goes on to note that they have one tower with
all As (greens) and one with all Bs (blues). This might seem to create all the
necessary links, but something appears to still be missing.
We have evidence that Stephanie was confused from the outset regarding
what could be read off of Pascals triangle. Recounting CMs demonstration
in Interview #5, she wrote in her notes, Without even looking at my paper
Dr. Maher told me all of the exponents in one of the problems, using only
the numbers in the triangle [Interview #6, Student Work, p. 9, emphasis
added]. To understand, on a deep level, the relationship between Pascals
triangle and binomial expansions, she would have to see the terms of the
expansion as n-tall choose r expressions. In a sense, her failure to transfer
represents a problem of attending to the wrong aspect of the situationshe
is worrying about exponents when she should be focusing on coefficients.
We might say, following Marton (2006), that it is a perceptual or attentional
problem. She was able to overcome it, however, over the course of the
analyzed episode.
We might further say that the isomorphism between Pascals triangle
and the coefficients of a binomial expansion was the instructable (Zemel
& Koschmann, 2014) or instructed object (Koschmann & Zemel, 2014)
within the episode. It is something to be discovered by the participants,
contingently and for current purposes using the resources at hand.
Stephanie was obliged to interrogate the three items on the tablethe
expansion equation, the towers, and the triangleto see what relationship
might exist between them. Remember, the relationship between the
triangle and towers had already been worked out earlier in the interview
and, so, by including the towers as part of the puzzle, they offered a clue
as to the nature of the connection between the other two entities. The
towers, in this way, played an instrumental role in mediating the discovery,
but so did the representations on the worksheets, as did the participants
long-established routines of working through the mathematics together.
Stephanies discovery, then, can be seen to have built upon a shared history
of problem solving and was mediated through local tangible artifacts and
well-established forms of inscription.
To say that we find an instructional organization being enacted within
this episode is not to say that it was necessarily CSs purpose to instruct
Stephanie. Instructing, as we are discussing it here, gestures toward a much
broader set of concerns than how it is taken up in everyday parlance. We
are treating it as a ubiquitous phenomenon, as an omnipresent feature of
all social interaction (cf. Garfinkel [2002] on instructed action). Though
classroom teachers are often seen doing instruction, so too can students,
as can persons in all walks of life and in every setting. Indeed, in the ana-
lyzed episode it is easy to see both Stephanie and CS initiating sequences
of instructing.
What comes to the fore in an analysis like the one presented here is
how difficult it can sometimes be for learners to apply past learning. Close
108T. KOSCHMANN and S. DERRY
NOTES
REFERENCES
OConnor, M. C., & Michaels, S. (1993). Aligning academic task and participation
status through revoicing: Analysis of a classroom discourse strategy. Anthropol-
ogy and Education Quarterly, 24, 318335.
Royer, J. M., Mestre, J. P., & Dufresne, R. J. (2005). Framing the transfer problem.
In J. P. Mestre (Ed.), Transfer of learning from a modern multidisciplinary perspec-
tive (pp. vii-xxvi). Greenwich, CT: Infomation Age Publishing.
Schwartz, D. L., Bransford, J. D., & Sears, D. (2005). Efficiency and innovation in
transfer. In J. P. Mestre (Ed.), Transfer of learning from a modern multidisciplinary
perspective (pp. 151). Greenwich, CT: Infomation Age Publishing.
Speiser, R. (1997). Block towers and binomials. Journal of Mathematical Behavior,
16, 113124.
Speiser, R., & Maher, C. A. (1997). How far can you go with block towers. Journal
of Mathematical Behavior, 16, 125132.
Thorndike, E. L., & Woodworth, R. S. (1901). The influence of improvement in one
mental function upon the efficiency of other functions. Psychological Review,
8, 247261, 384395, 553564.
Tuomi-Grhn, T., & Engestrm, Y. (2003). Conceptualizing transfer: From standard
notions to developmental perspectives. In T. Tuomi-Grhn & Y. Engestrm
(Eds.), Between school and work: New perspectives on transfer and boundary-crossing
(pp. 1938). Amsterdam, NL: Pergamon.
Zemel, A., & Koschmann, T. (2014). Put your fingers right in here: Learn-
ability and instructed experience. Discourse Studies, 16, 163183. doi:
10.1177/1461445613515359
PART II
REMEMBERING, LEARNING AND COORDINATING
WITH TECHNOLOGIES
CHAPTER 6
INTRODUCTION
Whereas the stopping of the car is explicitly treated in this Excerpt (13
and 67), the starting procedure is not (45). In fact, this is the very first
time that the TD starts the car receiving neither instructions nor evalu-
ations of her starting performance from the DI; her competence in this
respect now is taken for granted. In the remainder of this chapter, we will
show just how the TD and DI arrive together at a beginning competence in
starting the car over the initial five trials.
The study is based on video recordings of a female teenager and her father
as they practice driving. Two cameras were used for the analysis, capturing
the interaction between DI and TD and relevant aspects of the inside of the
car (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The recordings document their very first driving
lesson, which takes place on a deserted airfield, thus in a vast flat area with
relatively few obstacles.
Figure 6.1. Front camera view Figure 6.2. Ceiling camera view
During slightly less than an hour, the TD makes the car move forward
more than 40 times. The analysis is narrowed down to the first five starts
and involves transcription of the participants embodied activity (talk,
gesture, gaze, handling of the car, etc.), to be able to attend to the unfold-
ing interaction at a level of detail that is not currently imaginable but
demonstrably relevant to the participants (cf. Sacks, 1984, p. 25). Five steps
crucial to the starting procedure are repeatedly practiced during this single
driving lesson: (1) pressing the brake pedal, (2) disengaging the clutch
by pressing the clutch pedal, (3) igniting/putting in a gear (not dealt with
here), (4) setting the gas by pressing the accelerator, and (5) engaging the
clutch by releasing the clutch pedal.1 Our analysis particularly focuses on
how the way to operate the pedals is instructed and learned just prior to
Starting Out as a Driver 117
and including the moment when the car starts to move. The five times
that the car is started thus form a collection of starting procedures, where,
each time, different pedal actions need to be carried out in identical order.
At a more encompassing level, these five sequences are also temporally
organized relative to each other, as the participants, demonstrably take
their shared recent history of previous trials into account when designing
and timing their current activity. In this way, we may also think about the
five starting occasions as constituting a small longitudinal data set. As we
will see, the participants actions change quite notably over the five trials.
We argue that this change is what manifestsfor participants and analysts
alikeprogression.
The skills that are crucially involved here directly relate to the pedals. In
all standard manual gearbox cars, the clutch pedal is on the left side, the
brake pedal in the middle, and the accelerator pedal to the right (Figure
6.3). The left foot should be used for the clutch, and the right foot for the
brake and the accelerator. However, the way that the TD actually handles
the pedals is not visible in any of the recordings. In fact, it is hardly ever
visibly available to the DI either. Instead, the DI, and we as analysts, needs
to reconstruct the TD pedal actions by observing their effect on the car.
The TDs pedal work is thus mediated through the car, and it is mainly
on this mediation that the DI acts in instructing the TD how to proceed.
The TDs pedal actions constitute one of the main loci for responding to
DI instructions.
118M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
The first start requires a great number of instructions of distinct steps of the
starting procedure. For clarity, we have divided it into five excerpts, and will
consider them in turn from the DIs first instructions to the moment when
the TD actually manages, for the first time, to make the car move forward.
Initially, the DI gives very detailed step-by-step instructions regarding
how the pedals should be handled:
The DIs instructive turn categorizes the next action as the beginning
of the (routine) procedure to start the car (1). This first step is told to be to
push down the brake pedal, and its location between the other two pedals
is also specified (24). Once the TD does this, the DI formulates the next
step, which is to disengage the clutch using her left foot (6). Maybe as a
response to insufficient pushing by the TD (or reflecting the lack of DI
inspectability), the DI specifies that it should be pushed all the way down
(8). Note that rather than just prompt the TD to brake or disengage the
clutch, both these instructions involve detailed descriptions, specifying
which pedal and which foot to use and how far to push the pedal. They
therefore demonstrate that the DI does not assume any knowledge of even
these very fundamental aspects of the pedal work in car driving by treating
Starting Out as a Driver 119
Initially, the TD tries to start the engine, but fails (30). Presumably,
this is because she has not yet performed the necessary preparatory steps;
importantly, she has not yet disengaged the clutch. Braking, disengaging
the clutch, and restarting the engine is then instructed and performed in
a rather efficient sequence of instructions and compliance that does not
involve any explanation of how to do these actions, just a specification that
this should be done (3135) (cf. Lindwall & Ekstrm, 2012, p. 31). We
argue that such truncated formatting of the instruction invokes informa-
tion specified in the previous attempts and thereby assigns a certain level
of competence on the part of the TD. Moreover, having started the engine,
the TD offers a description of what the next relevant step will be, displaying
an awareness of where she is in the procedure that she is now being taken
through for the second time.
As it happens, the TDs turn involves a lexical mistakegas instead
of brake, which is also picked up by the DI (3638). The repair of this
mistake (4042) temporarily halts the progression of a new explanatory
project, which however reappears as soon as the last of the second time
around instructions (to shift the right foot to the gas pedal, 43), has been
produced:
informs the TD about how to understand when the starting gas is properly
set. There is no need to look at the tachometer, he says, it should be just so
that you hear the engine working (60). The DIs turn verbally and gestur-
ally (61, Image 5.1) invokes the particular method of listening to the sound
of the engine for knowing when the gas is at the right level. After a pause,
the TD now begins to give gas again (6263). As the TD presses the pedal,
ever so lightly, the DI ongoingly and carefully monitors and assesses the
sound that the engine produces, telling her to give a bit more gas (64)
and soon states that she has reached an appropriate level of gas (s (.)
nnting., there sort of, 66), thereby closing this part of the sequence.
Beginning with a stressed boundary marker ( nu, and now, line 68
below) the DI instructs the TD to slowly release the clutch pedal:
The first instruction of how to release the clutch pedal focuses on the
fact that it has to be done very slowly. The instruction of the slowness of
the movement is embodied verbally, prosodically through slowed down
speech and by the use of a hand gesture in the shape of a palm slowly
raised backwards (6873, Images 6.16.2). We also note that the slowness
is carefully specified before the relevant object to be acted onthe pedal
is made explicit (73), which arguably serves as a precautionary measure
against premature and possibly dangerous TD action. Using his hand
rather than his foot to embody how the pedal should be lifted, the DI
displays his instruction in a way that is visually available to the TD (cf.
Goodwin, 2000). This instruction seems to be taken very seriously by the
TD, because at first literally nothing happens to the car (75). The DI says
that she could release it a bit quicker (77), and, as still nothing happens
(78), insists that the clutch pedal should be released (79). There is thus, up
to this point, a clear and oriented to problem of progressivity of the action
of engaging the clutch. Just as the car finally begins to move (82), the DI
warns the TD, as the sound of the engine is rising, not to give any more
gas, and soon acknowledges the TDs successful accomplishment of the
first start (81). After a brief calibrating instruction about the gas level (86),
the DI concludes the instructed starting procedure by acknowledging the
success again (japp, yup) and, in a way, also celebrates the fact that
the TD is indeed now driving (88).
At the end of this close analysis of the first start, some general obser-
vations can be made. First, in producing his instructions about the pedal
work, the DI mainly used talk and hand gestures, whereas the TD primarily
accomplished her instructed actions by physically acting on the car. The
Starting Out as a Driver 125
Starting Out as a Driver 129
Just like the second start, the third attempt to start the car begins by the
TD detailing and performing the procedure:
Beginning by saying that she should first of all brake, the TD soon adds a
qualifying expression, all the way (6). Already in the second start, she pro-
duced a qualifying utterance (Excerpt 7, line 3) regarding braking that was
at that time however not taken up by the DI. So, just how hard to brake has
not yet been dealt with explicitly, and by adding this specification after DIs
acceptance of the first item on the checklist, the TD exploits the sequential
organization to front the DI with this issue (cf. St. John & Cromdal, 2016).
This time around, the DI addresses it, explaining that there is no need to
brake very hard (812). To this, it is now the TD who verbally introduces
the hypothetical alternative of being parked in a slope (14) (treating this
telling/knowing as part of the procedure). As the conclusion is not produced
immediately (1415), her turn is collaboratively completed by the DI, who
embodies a claim, verbally and using alternating hand gestures to refer to
the foot pedal action, that she will feel if the car is moving or not (1618,
Image 10.1) and that she will instinctively brake harder if the car begins
to move (1921, Images 10.210.3). There is thus no need to discuss the
pedal pressure to be used any further. The DI ends with a conclusion that
opposes the TDs previous formulations (that she should brake fully in
Excerpt 7, and all the way in Excerpt 10), a conclusion that also involves
a gestural contrast between the dramatic forward gestural thrust that is
now produced with the just previous instructive gestures: there is no need
to press excessively hard (2425).
132M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
Following the discussion about how hard to brake, the TD gets through
the next few steps in a straightforward manner. Her performance, as well as
account, of the procedure is being approved by the DI, who confirms each
step of the TDs checklist (2829; 3235; 3739). The sequence continues:
The TD begins to describe the next step, but soon hesitates slightly, and
the DI instead inserts the formulation grundgas (starting gas, 42). The
TD repeats this term, then presses the accelerator, thereby displaying that
she understands what this means for all practical purposes, until the DI
states that the amount of gas is enough (48). The DI then moves on (49)
to instruct the TD about the next step, thereby choosing not to develop
details about setting the gas further at this point.
The step dealing with how to engage the clutch is now produced as a
single directive phrase ease off quickly at first an then slower an slower
(4952). This talk and the now familiar flexing gesture with the raised arm
index and refer to an action on the clutch pedal. For our purposes, we can
note that as the DI doesnt say this explicitly (here for the first time), he is
acting on the assumption that the TD knows the relevance of releasing the
clutch pedal to engage the clutch at this point in the overall procedure. Also
the two-step gesture and the action it indexes seem to be treated as known,
as the two distinct parts of the previous version of the gesture are now less
clearly and more quickly produced (5052, Images 12.112.2). This gives
it the character of a reminder rather than an original instruction. We can
thus, once again, see how the emergent competence of the TD and their
recent shared history materialize through the ways in which the procedure is
instructed, although the TD is clearly not yet able to perform the procedure
entirely by herself. Next, the TD approaches the biting point:
Beginning the fourth starting procedure, the first two steps (braking,
disengaging the clutch) are unproblematically described and produced
(48). However, the next step is mistakenly assumed by the TD to be
letting go of the brake pedal (9) so as to make the right foot available
for setting the gas. The step of getting the engine running is thereby
omitted. Following a sequence where this is corrected (1115), the DI
then recognizably reproduces the beginning of the starting procedure,
by detailing the first steps in quick succession: braking, disengaging the
clutch, and starting the engine (1719). The quick and efficient way in
which the first two steps are now delivered, in a rather seamless way
(arguably for the first time, as a single unit), further indexes them as
now known in common.
The next fragment shows the end of the fourth starting procedure. After
a sequence instructing the TD how to push the key (omitted for space and
clarity), the pedal procedure is resumed. It is again the DI who verbalizes
each step:
136M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
Here, the TD begins to set the starting gas well before the DI verbally
identifies this as the next relevant step and reaches a stable engine sound
just before the DIs instruction about the starting gas ends (2023). We then
get a 2-second pause in line (24). This pause constitutes a slot where, for
the first time in our series of starts, the TD is offered an opportunity to con-
tinue the procedure without instruction. This reveals the DIs expectation
that the TD may be capable working out the next step on her own. However,
as the TD takes no initiative, the DI then redoes the two part instruction
about just how to release the clutch pedal, using the now familiar first
quickly and then more slowly procedure (2528). This soon resultsa bit
more quickly than in previous trialsin the car moving forward. When
the car has just begun to move, the DI again directs the TDs attention to
feeling what is happening to the car at this precise moment, categorizing
this feeling as draglget (the biting point, 3032). The TD again agrees
with feeling the biting point, and the fourth start ends with a positive
assessment and an instruction to let go of the clutch pedal completely, then
to disengage fully again in preparation of the fifth start (3335).
The fifth time around, and for the first time, the footwork as such initially
receives little attention. Rather than starting with the checklist procedure,
the DI just gives his instruction through a reference to the previous trial,
and then goes on to specify where the TD will take the car once she has
started (45). The ability to start the car is more or less taken for granted
in the way the instruction is produced, as it is focusing on the outcome of the
start (to go somewhere) rather than on the procedure itself.
To a significant extent, the TD is also able to live up to the ascribed
competence, as she is demonstrably able to perform the first steps in an
autonomous manner: clearly and fully on her own, she performs the steps up
to beginning to set the gas (6). Interestingly, as the TD then ceases to press
the gas pedal, which brings the engine into idling again and practically halts
the begun procedure (8), the DI does not address this. He instead focuses
on releasing the clutch pedal (910), a step that is actually contingent
on the prior achievement of the starting gas for it to become relevant.
This instruction about a non-next but more future action trades on the DI
trusting that the TD knows that she needs to set the gas prior to engaging
the clutch and also that she is able to do this. Further, the instruction
138M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
about the two-step movement to engage the clutch is now done, for the
first time, without the accompanying gesture (see Image 16.1, showing
the DI with his arms folded), which reduces the qualitative density of
the instruction. During the second part of the two-step instruction, the
TD starts giving gas again (11). And then, just as the sound of the engine
stabilizes, the DI assesses it as a good starting gas (14). He thereby treats
the TDs pressing of the pedal as a competent and purposeful action and
in a way that is relevant to the current project of starting the car. Without
further instruction, the TD then engages the clutch and makes the car move
forward smoothly, and this fifth start ends in a closing assessment by the
DI (1517). And as the TD for the first time starts the car to go somewhere
(18), the analysis ends.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to address the issue of learning by examining the
very first steps in becoming a driverhow to set the car in motion. While
the literature offers numerous theoretical accounts of the mutual develop-
ment of action and skill, accounts of driving are scarce.
A compelling exception may be found in Leontyevs (2009; cf. Linell
& Mkitalo, this volume) work on activity and consciousness, in which he
makes a conceptual distinction between what he termed actions and opera-
tions. Actions, he proposed, have their own specific orientational basis,
while the term operations refers to the transformation that occurs when an
action is put in the service of another action. Using the example of driving,
Leontyev points out that for the early learner driver, shifting gears com-
prises an action with a goal in itself. With increased skill, however, shifting
gears loses its own rationale and becomes a means towards more complex
actions in driving, such as changing the speed of the car, jump-starting
the engine, or remaning stationary when parking in a hill. In Leontyevs
account, the action of shifting gears has now become an operation towards
some other action.
Another, somewhat related, conceptual pair was introduced in Ryles
(1949) work in the philosophy of mind, in which he explains the distinc-
tion between intelligent vs. habitual practices: It is of the essence of merely
habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its predecessors. It
is of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is modified
by its predecessors. The agent is still learning (p. 30).
Admittedly, our analysis of the interaction between the DI and TD has
not been overly informed by these concepts, as they seek to elaborate the
development of individual skills. In contrast, our focus remains in the
Starting Out as a Driver 139
intersubjective realm showing how teaching and learning how to start a car
are interactionally accomplished. The different orientations notwithstand-
ing, the theoretical concepts proposed by Leontyev as well as Ryle may
surely have a bearing on the phenomena that have caught our interest.
For not only would it seem reasonable to assume that the emerging pedal
skills we have examined will soon become a habitual practice (Ryle) and
serve as operations towards some other, broader as well as more complex,
projects in driving (Leontyev)this is precisely what is shown in Excerpt
1, where on the 22nd occasion of starting the car, we find that none of its
constituent steps is being attended to by the parties. Their focus is now on
the procedure involved in bringing the car to a smooth halt. In fact, one
could argue that there is evidence already in the fifth trial (Excerpt 16) that
the starting procedure is being transformed into a means to a larger goal.
The DIs instruction to start gently like you did before and then you drive
around (lines 45) and the responsive TD question where do you want
me to go now? (line 18) suggest that starting the car is no longer a goal
in its own rightit is a prerequisite to driving around. It seems that some
modest, yet nonetheless crucial, instructional distance towards the TDs
becoming a driver has already been covered by the two parties.
Seeking to demonstrate at some empirical detail just how they got there,
we have examined, over a series of five consecutive trials, how the TD acts
on the car control pedals, while being constantly monitored, assessed, and
corrected by the DI. Describing how the starting skill is gradually mas-
tered and recognized in subsequent instructions and feedback, the analysis
underscores the relevance of the relative order of trials, accountably pro-
duced as part of a lived history between the parties.
The pedal work examined here makes up a complex procedure of moves
that need to be performed not only in the correct order but also in skilled
ways sensitive to such features as amount of pressure, speed of movement
and coordination. We may roughly summarize the manifest progression of
the different parts in the following terms (start number in parentheses):
Brakinglocalizing the pedal (1), what foot to use (2), just how hard to
push (3), formulated as next step (4), not topicalized (5)
Disengaging the clutchwhat foot to use, pressing the pedal all the way
down (1); formulated as next step (24); not topicalized (5)
(Igniting not considered in the analysis)
Setting the gasshifting foot from brake to accelerator, calibrating
exact level of gas through listening (1); formulated as next step,
identification of good gas level (2); formulated as next step, calibration
and confirmation of good gas level (3); formulated as next step (4);
confirmation of good gas level (5)
140M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
know some of the things covered in the first trial. This history is manifest
in the quickly increasing indexicality and complexity of the instructions:
During the first start, the DIs instructions are very detailed, unpacking
each step of the starting procedure. But from the second trial, these basic
instructions are more indexical and glossing, as they assume that the
TD will understand them with reference to previous shared experience.
Instead, other features of the pedaling maneuvers are introduced, elabo-
rated and explained, enabling an increased skill in handling the pedals.
Later still, the instructions begin to take the how for granted, focusing
instead on what to do, and, eventually, where to go. In this way, progression
is built into the embodied design of instructions: just how instructions are
designed on a particular occasion registers and reflexively constitutes the
level of the TDs competence with regard to the procedure to be learned.
This, we propose, offers an empirically viable way of approaching progres-
sion as a members phenomenon.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the editors for their generous feedback on an earlier draft of this
chapter. The research presented here is part of a broader programme of
work on driver training funded by a grant from the Committee for Educa-
tional Sciences of the Swedish Research Council (grant #721-2012-5367).
NOTES
1. The clutch is a mechanism for engaging and disengaging the engine and
the transmission system in a vehicle. Since, in ordinary English, the noun
clutch can not only be used for referring to this mechanism but also serve as
a shorthand for referring to the clutch pedal by which the driver acts on the
clutch to engage with or disengage it from the engine, confusion may easily
arise. For clarity, we will therefore use the verb (dis)engage for referring to
the resulting action on the mechanism and its changing connection with the
engine, and spell out clutch pedal when referring to the object acted on by
the drivers foot, as in the wording here.
REFERENCES
Amerine, R., & Bilmes, J. (1988). Following instructions. Human Studies, 11, 327
339.
Broth, M., & Keevallik, L. (2014). Getting ready to move as a couple: Accomplishing
mobile formations in a dance class. Space and Culture, 17(2), 107121
Coulter, J. (1989). Mind in action. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
142M. BROTH, J. CROMDAL, and L. LEVIN
Verbal aspects of talk have been transcribed according to conventions developed by Gail
Jefferson (Jefferson, 2004; Melander and Aarsand, this volume). An indicative translation
is provided line per line, in italics. For transcribing multimodal details, the following
conventions, developed by Lorenza Mondada, were used:
& & delimit descriptions of one participants actions
+ + delimit descriptions of another participants actions
&--> action described continues across subsequent lines
-->& action described continues until the same symbol is reached
&-->> action described continues until and after the end of the excerpt
>>-- action described begins before the beginning of the excerpt
,,,, retraction of the action
ins participant doing the action is identified in small characters
im image; frame grab
# indicates the exact moment at which the frame grab was recorded
CHAPTER 7
MOBILIZING DISTRIBUTED
MEMORY RESOURCES IN
ENGLISH PROJECT WORK
Nigel Musk and Asta ekait
INTRODUCTION
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
going back to 1979 and 1981), which Melander (2012) glosses as a notion
that encompasses the public distribution and organization of knowledge
and the dynamic relationship between different participant positions
(p. 233). Moreover, Melander (2012) and Goodwin (2013) highlight the
laminated nature of epistemic ecologiesthat is, how a variety of semiotic
fields with quite different properties work co-operatively with each other
simultaneously to build evanescent actions that might endure for only a few
seconds (Goodwin, 2013, p. 12). Thus the laminated concept of epistemic
ecologies analytically frames how human bodies interact in a material
environment and build action in concert with each other through bring-
ing together resources of different kinds (Melander, 2012, p. 233). There
are obvious parallels here between the distributed layers or laminations
of knowledge and the ideas of distributed cognition, in that remember-
ing involves the retrieval, (re)assembling, and management of knowledge
available from different sources to meet the purposes of the current com-
municative project. For example, if one pupil initiates the need to make a
correction or revision, they may bring to mind, try out, and reject a number
or of solutions. If they cannot resolve the problem between them, they may
then refer to external resources (e.g., an online dictionary).
In order to clarify how epistemic ecologies are established and oriented
to in interaction, it is useful to refer to the three dimensions of epistemics
put forward by Heritage (2012) and by Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig
(2011) within a conversation analytic framework: epistemic access, epistemic
primacy, and epistemic responsibility (p. 9). Epistemic access refers to partici-
pants states of knowing/not knowing (K+ or K respectively; cf. Goodwin,
1981), as well as how certain they are of knowing/not knowing. In situated
projects of remembering, this would mean that the initiator might presup-
pose or ascertain the degree of epistemic access of others, while revealing
his/her own degree of access on an emergent turn-by-turn basis. Epistemic
primacy presupposes potential asymmetries of knowledge, to which inter-
actants orient themselves. More specifically, epistemic primacy means the
relative right to know something, the relative right to claim knowledge of
something and the relative authority of the knowledge itself (Goodwin,
1981 p. 9). Finally, epistemic responsibility refers to how interactants treat
each other as responsible for knowing what is in the common ground
(Clark, 1996; Enfield, 2006), and for retaining what they have come to
know (Goodwin, 1981, p. 18). As the word responsibility suggests, there
is an inherent moral dimension here with important implications for man-
aging social relationships (Stivers et al., 2011, p. 19) and social identities
(cf. Melander, 2012). Indeed, in their interaction participants are obliged
to manage any tensions between public remembering (or not remember-
ing/knowing) and contribute to solving any emergent problems, as well as
managing face and other aspects of their social identity (Goffman, 1967).
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources151
While some people just immediately remember the relevant material all by
themselves, others will ask for help, either relying entirely on their peers
or hoping to cross-cue each others recall; many will consult external aids,
whether general-purpose technologies or idiosyncratically-organized per-
sonal systems; in turn, others may not manage the task at all until they put
themselves back into the right context, or re-enact a certain procedure or
sequence of actions. In ordinary thinking about memory, the notion that the
processes of remembering can be thus hybrid, involving differently-balanced
deployments of internal and external resources, can seem unproblematic.
(p. 2)
Clearly then, remembering in the wild is a far cry from the socially
decontextualized memory experiments of the laboratory, where there are
no social stakes and where remembering serves very different purposes.
It is precisely such naturally occurring purposive practices of remember-
ing that come into focus below, in the case of this study as they emerge in
problem-solving language-related episodes of collaborative project work
where pupils make use of a range of memory resources and at the same
time hold each other morally accountable for solving their problems.
ANALYSES
The following excerpts and accompanying analyses take up three different
language-related episodes that arise in three different groups (one group of
three and two pairs). These episodes are occasioned by emergent language
problems, two of which are of a grammatical nature (excerpts 1 and 2) and
one of which is to do with vocabulary (excerpt 3). They also illustrate how
different memory resources are brought into play, either through co-option
or through recourse to external memory storages (ESS)/artificial memory
systems (AMS), most notably the use of online resources in excerpts 2 and 3.
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources153
comes up with a possible solution in line 31: theater was but then it should
be was cause, at which point Sara chimes in with: it was. It is also signifi-
cant here that in line 29 Anna refers to a remembered English grammar
rule (probably one of the most commonly cited ones) about the third person
singular -s (usually for the present simple), but it also happens to be relevant
here too (cf. was vs. were). Saras and Annas collaborative remembering
resources seem to contribute to the correct solution here by gradually, and
publicly, narrowing down the choice. In line 40, Anna verbalizes her writing
of the solution the theater was when she proceeds to write down her English
translation. This solution seems good enough for Anna, who turns down
Saras repeated initiations to fetch the English book (an epistemic authority;
cf. epistemic primacy in Stivers et al., 2011) in order to check the correct-
ness of the solution (lines 42 & 51).
Throughout the episode, the pupils collaboratively engage in problem
solving. An individual problem of recalling relevant linguistic information
is transformed into an episode of distributed cognition, where a range
of mnemonic/memory resources (prior knowledge of the conjugation I
was, you were and various language production modes) are deployed,
and where assistance is enlisted (cf. co-option) by invoking shared interac-
tional and referential history (testing and learning situations) (Clark, 1996;
Linell, 2009).
In the next case, the problem that arises is also a grammatical one,
ascertaining first whether he was grown up is grammatically correct and
then finally correcting it to he grew up. However, unlike the previous
case, these two pupils are unable to recall any rule to help them or even
use any sophisticated metalinguistic language to help identify the problem.
Also unlike the previous case, these two girls are writing their text together.
Furthermore, the pupil who is composing the text is not the one to identify
a trouble source; indeed, here we have an other-initiated correction. More-
over, because they do not initially agree whether there is a problem or then
how to solve the problem, the problem-solving trajectory ends up being
an extended one, whereby they also resort to using an online dictionary.
To pinpoint the probable source of the initial problem, we need to
examine where the troublesome item first arises. In the following excerpts
(2ac), Ebba and Tilde have started working on their project about Johnny
Depp, which is to be written with the help of the Internet. In the first source
they consult, the Swedish Wikipedia entry for Johnny Depp, Ebba (who
is in charge of the keyboard and mouse) translates the first sentence into
English, as we join their interactional exchange in line 1.
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources157
a case of interference (though this would not account for the inflected
proposition).
Ebba then proceeds to set up a Word document and she has started
typing the beginnings of a text when we join the pupils again two and a
half minutes later in excerpt 2b.
In lines 12, Tilde and Ebba suggest competing formulations for the
continuation of their text, which is resolved in line 4 by Ebba evoking the
epistemic authority of the instruction sheet. When she restarts her formula-
tion he was grown up at the beginning of line 4, it is already aligned with
Tildes previous correction from a couple of minutes earlier (excerpt 2a,
line 3). Both Ebba and Tilde then repeat this formulation as Ebba goes on
to type it. However, in line 13 Tilde changes her mind about her previously
corrected version and initiates a new correction, substituting the irregular
past participle grown up for a regular one growed up.6 Although the
modal particle ju projects preferred agreement (a little like the tag question
is it? with falling intonation), Ebba disaligns with Tildes second correc-
tion. Interestingly in doing so, she also produces an alternative Swedish
version (line 16), which actually mirrors the correct English construction:
Even so, Ebba does not appear to notice this, since she immediately
repeats the version they have both previously said and which she has also
written. After a noticeable pause during which Ebba turns to Tilde for
her response, Tilde delivers an account for her renewed correction (line
18). However, Ebba rejects Tildes translation of grown up in line 21, by
providing an alternative (both of which would actually be correct in differ-
ent contexts). Tilde does not let the matter rest, however, and initiates a
new correction sequence in line 23, which Ebba immediately responds to
by providing an alternative continuation (T: he was + E: growing up).
After weighing up the new alternative, Ebba rejects it outrightalbeit sotto
voce in line 28.7
What transpires next (in the intervening lines between excerpts 2b and
2c) is that Ebba searches for the English Wikipedia entry for Johnny Depp
by typing johnny depp wikipedia.com in the Google search engine.
160N. MUSK and A. EKAIT
When she is about to do this, Tilde suggests for the first time that she
should resort to the epistemic authority of tyda.se, a bilingual online dic-
tionary, but this suggestion is easily overridden, since Ebba is in charge
of the keyboard (which affords her greater rights to decide, cf. ekait,
2009). When they jointly find the right entry in the Google search list, Tilde
downgrades her claim to epistemic access, by saying ja vet inte du kanske
har rttI dont know you might be right. Despite concerted attempts to
identify the equivalent phrase to Depp r uppvxt i FloridaDepp grew up
in Floridafrom Swedish Wikipedia, they cannot find it. In fact, it is not
in the English version, the text of which is otherwise much more extensive.
Hence, after failing to solve their grammatical problem between them,
because they cannot agree on what is correct, the first of the two sug-
gestions to draw on external sources also fails to yield a solution. In the
following excerpt (2c), Tilde now relaunches her previous suggestion.
grow (see image in line 52). Whereas Ebbas ooh seems to signal dis-
appointment (line 53), Tilde takes this dictionary translation at face value
and suggests he grow up (line 55) embedded in a Swedish question with
a preferred positive response. In this case of using an online dictionary
(see also Antons initial problems in excerpt 3b, lines 2029), the need for
meta-knowledge and skills to use these external memory devices success-
fully comes to the fore.
After a long pause with no uptake from Ebba, Tilde then repeats her
suggestion backed by what she perceives as the greater epistemic primacy
of the online dictionary. All the same, this time Ebba rejects her sugges-
tion, replacing grow with grew, though the turn-final nj (no) reduces
the epistemic certainty of her correction (line 59). Ebba then produces
a meta-comment on why he grow up is not correct, by giving a direct
translation into Swedish, han vxa (he grow, i.e., the personal pronoun
plus the infinitive). By repeating the incorrect infinitive in the same turn,
she clarifies which element is the trouble source (line 61). At this point,
Ebba is prepared to give up and delete the troublesome part (which she
highlights in Word) and replace it with what she had read aloud from
Wikipedia between excerpts 2b and 2c. Tilde then repeats at a faster pace
Ebbas proposed replacement text, but adds and grew up in, which also
appropriates the form that Ebba produced in line 59 (line 66). Tildes
meta-comment in Swedish also makes a strong claim of epistemic access:
jag vet att det heter grew up (I know that its grew up). Ebba accepts Tildes
claim verbally (line 69) and proceeds to type the text that she suggested in
line 66, simply checking that she has got the first part right in line 73 and
the spelling of grew in line 77.
To summarize, what we find over the whole trajectory is the follow-
ing transformation to the verb forms (in boxes). The spoken versions are
written in ordinary script, but the typed versions are written in bold.
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources163
As is often the case when pupils are composing a text (especially for
joint purposes), Anton is verbalizing the text in the language in which he is
typing it (Cromdal, 2005). However, when he gets to the troublesome item,
kmpar p, he switches to Swedish after a brief pause (line 1) and even types
this phrasal verb in Swedish, only to delete it again after having repeated
the Swedish more quietly followed by a long silence (lines 25). This rep-
etition in both oral and written modalities seems to serve as an (albeit
unsuccessful) mnemonic device to jog Antons memory. As in excerpt 1,
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources165
the next strategy is to turn to his partner physically and co-opt him into
the project (line 7). Although John is busy with something else, Antons
question what do you say then? presupposes that John has been listening.
Antons question makes an answer conditionally relevant as well as imply-
ing an epistemic responsibility, which is played out by John suspending his
own activity for an extended period of about 10 seconds and assuming an
attentive and pensive poseor, in Goodwin and Goodwins words, a think-
ing face (1986, p. 57)with his chin cupped in his hand and looking at
Antons screen (see image in line 7), as well as by giving analbeit almost
whispered and unknowingresponse (line 8). Although John attempts
to resume his own activity, Anton does not let him off the hook; indeed,
he upgrades Johns epistemic responsibility by asserting that the English
translation is something they should both know. The upgrade is achieved
with the help of the Swedish modal particle ju (line 11), which is used to
show that this should be shared knowledge (Lindstrm, 2008). Since John
does not now offer this matter the same degree of attention as before (and
may even be ironizing Antons epistemic assumption slightly through his
quiet and muffled minimal response (fine) in line 12), Anton gives up
on John, finishing his turn with slight exasperation, indicated through an
extended outbreath (line 14).
After failing to enlist Johns help, Anton proceeds to solve what has
been treated as a memory problem, by resorting to alternative external
resourcesin this case, the online Swedish encyclopedia. This is shown in
excerpt 3b, which is the direct continuation from excerpt 3a.
Interestingly, even though John has already turned his attention back
to his own computer screen, Anton continues to verbalize what he is doing
(lines 17 & 19), which sustains the word search as a potentially joint project.
What ensues is that Anton types in his search word, which immediately
occasions a series of new problems. Firstly, by typing the conjugated form,
Kmpar (fights/struggles), instead of the infinitive kmpa, an extended
search is activated, which yields 133 hits. By selecting the translation button,
the hits are limited to the entries in the bilingual Swedish-English diction-
ary. Even so, the dictionary cannot locate the exact word because Anton has
not keyed in the infinitive. Instead a list of hyperlinked words appears (line
22), but Anton first selects the wrong one (krmpa/ailment) by mistake
(line 29) and has to return to the original list and make a new selection.
This highlights the need for meta-knowledgethat is, knowing how to
make productive use of the external memory systems available and how to
find, extract and transform the relevant information (Slj, 2012, p. 10).
When Anton makes a correct selection, two entries now appear: (1) the
verb kmpa and (2) the compound noun kmpagld (fighting spirit) (line
31), which entails searching through the different alternatives. Although
the cursor rests for just under 6 seconds by the item that Anton is looking
for, kmpa p (vidare) (rub along), he shows no signs of recognition or
uptake. Indeed, the translation offered here is hardly a high-frequency
lexical item and no doubt affords him no help in jogging his memory.
Instead, Anton continues to the second entry (indicated by the movement
of the cursor) and rejects his original formulation in Swedish in favor of a
new wording involving fighting spirit, which he then types into his docu-
ment: the fighting spirit is always whit [sic] them. In the following lines
(3239), Anton interrupts John again and enthusiastically informs him
168N. MUSK and A. EKAIT
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
NOTES
REFERENCES
Atkinson, J. M., & Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1984). Structures of social action: Studies in
conversation analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Billig, M. G. (1999). Freudian repression: Conversation creating the unconscious. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Mobilizing Distributed Memory Resources171
PRACTICES OF REMEMBERING
Organizing Math Activities in a
First Grade Classroom
upon the world. These encompass not only categorizations of the world
and relevant events, but also the bodies and relevant knowledge of others.
Goodwin (2013, p. 9) writes that [t]hrough the progressive development
of, and apprenticeship within, diverse epistemic ecologies, communities
invest their members with the resources required to understand each other
in just the ways that make possible the accomplishment of ongoing, situ-
ated action (see also Melander, 2012).
Connected to the understanding of math activities in the classroom as
social, material, and cultural achievements is the concept of participation
that theoretically and analytically frames how human bodies interact in
a sociocultural environment and build action in concert with each other
(Goodwin, 2000). Participation involves not only social interaction but
also interaction with artifacts and the material environment, in which
[p]articipants build actions by performing systematic operations on a
public substrate which provides many different kinds of resources that can
be reused, decomposed, and transformed (Goodwin, 2013, p. 8). Human
action has a combinatorial and cooperative structure that is recognized by
how it brings together actors and different types of artifacts within a social
and cultural environment (Goodwin, 2013). In face-to-face interactions,
participants thus put different multilayered contextual configurations
into play (Goodwin, 2000). From this perspective, actions are laminated
(Goodwin, 2013), meaning that they consist of layers of modalities such as
language, body (e.g., gaze, gestures, pointings), and material world (e.g.,
technologies/computers, texts, images) that are used by, in our case, the
children and their teacher when participating in math activities.
In sum, we conceptualize remembering as an activity where social, com-
municative, and material resources are combined in the accomplishment
of action. Central to how we understand processes of remembering is that
they are built through laminated actions where previous experiences are
made relevant in the social and material organization of the activity. We
will now continue by introducing the research setting in which fieldwork
was conducted and the video recordings of the math activities were done.
The data analyzed in this chapter originate from a study that was con-
ducted in a Swedish elementary school located on the countryside in the
vicinity of a medium-sized city. Two target children, a girl and a boy, and
their activities were video recorded during the course of one week, both at
school and at home. The target children participated in their first year of
elementary school. The class consisted of 19 students (8 girls and 11 boys),
one teacher, and one teacher assistant.1 The first graders were located in
180H. MELANDER and P. AARSAND
a building of their own. One of the reasons for choosing to conduct the
study at this particular school was that the teachers were actively working
to incorporate new technologies into their teaching practices and everyday
work in the classroom. In the back of the classroom, there were two com-
puters that were available to the children: one laptop and one desktop.2
We will analyze extracts from video recordings of a math lesson when the
participants are setting up the activities of the day as well as working with
a computer-mediated math task. In line with our theoretical perspective,
our analyses encompass the participants use of linguistic, embodied, and
material resources in situated interaction (e.g., Goodwin, 2000, 2013; Sche-
gloff, 1996). This framework puts special demands on the representation
of interaction. The sequences chosen for analysis have been transcribed
following conventions developed within CA (e.g., Jefferson, 2004; see
Appendix for symbols used here). Line drawings of video frames are
used in order to capture and highlight the analytically relevant embodied
actions and the participants orientations to the material environment. As
will be shown, the participants continuously analyze each others actions in
relation to an interactional context in which social and material aspects are
made relevant (Goodwin, 2000). Our analyses take their point of departure
in investigating how remembering is oriented to in different ways and how
it is constitutive of the organization of action in the analyzed activities. In
the analyses, we are particularly interested in the linguistic, communica-
tive, material, and cultural resources that the participants draw upon when
participating in acts of remembering. How does remembering figure into
the social organization of math activities? How does remembering work in
the interplay between artifacts, teachers, and students?
PRACTICES OF REMEMBERING IN
CLASSROOM MATHEMATICS
Mathematics in the studied classroom consists of several different tasks and
activities. We will begin by analyzing how a math lesson is organized and
framed in this classroom, and how remembering figures into this organiza-
tion. We will then continue by focusing on one of the math activities that the
children engage in: a computer-mediated math task that is of specific inter-
est in the exploration of practices of remembering within this classroom.
temporal order. This order extends beyond the present thus constituting
the lesson as one out of a number of math lessons.
In the beginning of the lesson the teacher introduces what they are
going to do: what artifacts (games, math cards, computers, etc.) will be
used and when, and how the activities will be done and with whom. Doing
mathematics is framed as a material as well as a social activity.
When the teacher Margareta has introduced that they are going to begin
with the games, she states that the games are exactly the same as yester-
day. She thus links the present to the past, what they did yesterday (precis
som i gr. just like yesterday 3 in line 4) with what they are going to do
today (which is moreover initiated with a contrastive men nu but now
). What will be new is, first, the friend you will work together with and,
second, the game that you will do.4 The teacher sets up a conditional in
that one can do the same games as before although it is more fun, and thus
normatively better, to do new games (lines 67). This is underscored by the
fact that the <in:te> not in line 8 is clearly emphasized both through
markedly slower speed than the surrounding talk as well as a stress on the
first syllable. The use of the epistemic particle (PRT) ju indicates that the
said is something that is or should be shared knowledge. The teachers
utterance man kan ju gra dom spelen som man har gjort (one can [PRT] do
the games that one has already done) opens up for the possibility that
there may be children who want to do the same games again and that this
also could be allowed. However, it is then followed by a second partfast
de e ju roligare om man hittar snna som bda <in:te> har gjort (although its
[PRT] more fun if you find some that both havent done)in spite of the
slightly hedged format, it is clear what the preferred choice is, and it is
moreover something that the children are supposed to recognize (a conse-
quence of the use of ju in this part of the utterance as well).
In overlap with the teacher, one of the children, Edvin, is talking to
another child. The teacher summons his name, points her right index
finger up in the air and then says that she will tell him who he is going to
work with (line 12). Through summoning Edvins name and producing the
utterance in a slightly quieter voice, we see that the turn is designed for
Edvin. However, as it is produced within the whole-class context, it also has
overhearers. Earlier, the teacher told the children that they would get a new
play friend (lines 45). In the interaction with Edvin, the teacher makes
explicit that she is the one who will decide who will work with whom and
she thus positions herself as the orchestrator of the social organization of
the math activities.
In line 14 the teacher says nu kommer ni ih:g (now you remember).
Through this discursive construction, the activity is resumed after the
inserted sequence with Edvin, reorienting the participants to the games.
The construction expects the children to indeed remember the games and
how to work with them. Moreover, through the use of the second person
plural ni (you) the children are addressed as a collective and they are
expected to remember something together. Several children acknowledge
that they remember through a rather quiet m. How the games are to be
done is treated as something that the children should know: s de e ju bara
h:mta h:r sen. spe:lpjs snt som man behver ha:. (so its [PRT] just to
Practices of Remembering 183
come and get (them) here later. pawns and things that one needs) (lines
1718). Again, the use of the epistemic particle ju presupposes that this is
a routine that the children should be used to; it is nothing new although it
reminds the children of what and how to do.
The activity now changes focus and becomes more future-oriented. The
teacher instructs the children that when they have done two games (indi-
cated by the teacher holding two fingers in the air during the part of the
turn represented in line 21), they should move on to a next task. This is
announced with a men sen frstr ni (but then you see) (line 20), indicat-
ing that they will then be doing something different. It turns out that
184H. MELANDER and P. AARSAND
they are going to work with math cards. What the cards are and how to
work with them is treated as knowledge-taken-for-granted; the cards are
not explained, just indicated through the teacher putting her hand on a
pile of cards, saying that they should do two. The teacher quickly moves
on to present the next task, and she also starts walking toward the back
of the room, when a child, Joel, interrupts to ask how many math cards
they were supposed to do (line 24). The child thus confirms that the math
cards are indeed shared knowledge and that the only instruction in need
of clarification is the number of cards to be done. The teacher answers tv
(two) as she again puts two fingers in the air, displaying the number two
with a handshape. As Goodwin (2000) writes, co-occurring gestures like this
one could wrongly be understood as semiotically redundant. However, the
gesture is organized with reference to a specific embodied configuration
that includes not only the speaker but also a specific addressee. The hand-
shape is positioned so that Joel can see it; the teacher opening up her body
and holding her hand in Joels gaze direction (see picture). In comparison
to talk that is ephemeral, immediately dissolves, and needs to be attended
to at the time it is created, a gesture can be seen for a longer time, thus
providing a visual representation of the number of times that the math task
should be accomplished that is more durable than the aural representation.
When the number of math cards to be done has been clarified, the
teacher recycles s (and then) (from line 23 and recycled in line 25),
saying that she will pick the children to work on a math quiz on the com-
puter. Through using temporal indicators such as men sen (but then)
(line 20) and s (and then) (lines 23 & 25), a future-oriented temporal
order is made relevant. The teacher positions herself as the one who will
be orchestrating not only the social organization of the activities, but also
how the children will move through the activities.
As the teacher is talking in line 25, she is moving through the classroom
to the bookshelf in the back where she is standing when telling the children
about the math quiz at the computers. That she is not standing in front of
the class when talking underscores the task as expected to be known to the
children, and the enthusiastic, overlapping yes (in English) also displays
that not only is this a known task but it is also appreciated. The teacher
leaves this without comment, but she has picked a pile of puzzles from
the bookshelf and starts walking back to the front of the classroom as she
announces that she has found something that is also quite fun to work with
(line 29). Talking about the puzzles in terms of fun positions them as the
same kind of activity as the computer-mediated task. However, it turns out
that the math puzzles are new to the children. This is displayed in how the
teacher in line 31 summons the children to come up to the desk to then
instruct them about how to work with the puzzles.
Practices of Remembering 185
The fact that the teacher is talking about math when she presents the
games is taken for granted in excerpts 1a and 1b. What the participants
focus on is rather the different artifacts that they will be working with. In
the next excerpt, the teacher switches from a focus on form to content
186H. MELANDER and P. AARSAND
be a risky activity in the sense that you may not remember at all, and
if you do remember, you may remember wrong or in a different way
compared to others. However, when answering, the children build upon
each others utterances. When Mia suggests sepptration, Leo follows
along the same line as Mia but recognizes that the notion is slightly wrong
and suggests subtraktion (subtraction), which is a correct mathematical
concept but not for adding two numbers. The teacher confirms that it is
a correct concept, but for minus (line 13). Then Joel suggests attrak tion
(attraction); the word is similar to the previous one in regards to what
it sounds like and it is indeed close to the correct label: addition. The
children use each others actions as resources, building upon each others
suggestions, modifying and changing parts of the concept, thus building
new action by selectively reusing resources provided by a prior action. In
line with Goodwins (2013) reasoning, the children build actions through
performing systematic operations on a public substrate which provides
different kinds of resources that are reused, decomposed, and transformed.
The teacher encourages the children in their collaborative exploration
of possible answers through responding with ne:::? (line 11) and n::j?
(line 13). The negative responses are prosodically produced in a way that
indicates that the answers are within the right domain but not entirely
correct and thus invite more tries. Remembering is hence constituted as
a joint action in which Mia, Leo, and Joel develop what they remember
with regard to the teachers question about arithmetic operations (lines 10,
12, 15), and the teacher encourages further attempts by avoiding to turn
down suggestions that are not quite accurate (lines 13, 16). In this process
they simultaneously preserve structure provided by the activities of earlier
actors while they systematically modify that structure to build something
new (Goodwin, 2013, p. 9).
Confirming the partial correctness of Joels answer, the teacher says that
it was almost right before she provides the correct answer, emphasizing the
part that was wrong in Joels answer and replacing it with the correct item
<ADDition.>. When the children do not remember correctly but have col-
laboratively produced several good candidates the teacher addresses the
whole group and requests that they say the word addition out loud (line
16). In overlap with the request, one of the children (probably Mia) says
jus::t de ja (thats it yes). This could be compared with the change-of-state
token oh that has been described by Heritage (1984) through which
participants display that they now know something that they did not pre-
viously know. However, through the utterance in line 17, the child claims
that she now remembers something that she did not previously remember.
In other words, the information is not new but the child is displaying that
she is reminded of something that she did know but was not able to recall
at the moment when the question about the arithmetic operation was pro-
Practices of Remembering 189
jttebra komma ihg (biggest first is very good to remember). The partici-
pants thus collaboratively invoke and remember a rule that they have been
talking about and establish it as something that should be remembered for
future math activities.
The teacher and the children together frame the activity as a math activ-
ity by using mathematical terminology. The children are held accountable
for remembering something that they have talked about before, and to be
able to use the correct mathematical terminology. All participants orient
to the knowing of the arithmetic operations in terms of something to be
remembered. Remembering is framed as related to participation in activi-
ties such as the one analyzed here.
In what follows, we will focus on one of the math activities that the par-
ticipants engage in and that is of specific interest for issues of remembering
in this classroom. It is a computer-mediated task in which the children
work with software called Matteknep (Math quiz). In the activity that we will
analyze, two of the children in the classSandra and Pelleare sitting
by the two computers working. Sandra sits by the desktop computer and
Pelle to her left by the laptop. The Matteknep is organized such that the
children choose a quiz, such as Tiokamrater (Friends of ten). In the quiz,
there are 30 problems that the children answer one at a time. The design
of the software is very similar to the organization of math books, where
each page contains a number of problems to be solved. One of the layers
of the software is thus the traditional math book, but the decisive differ-
ence is that the children receive immediate evaluative feedback from the
software. Examples of other layers are curricula (learning addition in terms
of friends of ten) and ideologies regarding the learning of math in terms
of, in this case, rote learning and repetition. The position of a teacher is
also present in the software, where IRE-sequences between student and
software/teacher are formed. In such ways, historically shaped structure
[is] instantiated in artifacts and the physical environment (Goodwin, 2000,
p. 1517). When we enter into the activity, Sandra is about to finish her math
quiz, whereas Pelle still has more than half the problems left.
Sandra summons Pelle by his name to attract his attention and then
announces that she is going to try and see the results (line 1). Through this
announcement she makes public that she has finished the task. She clicks
the result button on the screen and a page with her results appears. Pelle
does not respond and Sandra raises her arm to attract Margaretas atten-
tion. After 18.5 seconds, Sandra first again summons Pelle followed by a
rather quiet ja fick (I got-) and then with a louder voice she states that she
got zero mistakes (line 3). Keeping her arm raised, she leans toward Pelle,
Practices of Remembering 191
looking at his screen. She asks him in a very soft voice hur mnga fel, (how
many mistakes), but Pelle does not reply and is instead deeply engaged
in his math quiz. However, the screen makes publically visible his progress
through the quiz and although Pelle has not yet finished, Sandra spots that
he has (already) made two mistakes (line 6). The computer-mediated task
is included within the flow of activities in the classroom where the children
are working in pairs, but the computer-mediated task is an individual activ-
ity. The children, however, incorporate it into a social network through
looking at and commenting upon each others results and through talking
about the activity in terms of something that you play, thus reenacting pat-
terns from other game activities.
Pelle still does not reply, and Sandra sits back, keeping her arm raised
and waiting to attract the teachers attention. When Margareta does not
come, Sandra instead turns her attention toward Pelle. In a squeaky voice
she calls his name and then asks va gr du Pellis (what are you doing Pellis)
as she looks at him. Pelle is solving the arithmetic problems through count-
ing on his fingers, using the fingers as a mnemonic device that permits a
conceptual task to be implemented by a perceptual process (see picture).
Sandra orients to the use of fingers for counting as a dispreferred action,
that is, as an inappropriate way of doing the math quiz on the computer
(line 11). The diminutive form of his name PellePellisalso works to
belittle him, something that is underscored when another child with a voice
with laughter repeats the diminutive form of his name (line 12).
Eventually the teacher arrives at Sandras place. The first thing she does
is to look at the screen and to state that Sandra has finished du e klar d:r
(you have finished there). In other words, Margareta immediately orients
to a saving of the results, producing an online commentary following her
actions, ska vi spa:ra? (shall we save), as she without displaying an expec-
tancy that Sandra should answer either verbally or nonverbally instead
immediately stretches her hand toward the mouse and clicks save (lines
1314). To save the results is thus oriented to as a crucial aspect of the task
by the teacher, even more so than the result in itself, which is what Sandra
has hitherto primarily oriented to. Rather than instructing Sandra how to
save her results, the teacher, as we have seen, takes the mouse and clicks
the save button. She thus takes command over the activity in progress. An
intrinsic and crucial aspect of the computer-mediated math task that is
made relevant by the teacher is thus the possibility of saving the results
that have been accumulated in a here-and-now for a future. This is further
underlined by the fact that the children need to always change between the
Practices of Remembering 193
tasks and move along to a next one, and that there are no possibilities of
doing the math quiz over again at the present time.
When the saving is completed, the teacher orients to the amount of
points, saying hundranittisex pong (one hundred and ninety-six points)
(line 15). This number refers to what Sandra has left in order to get a medal.
The teacher also comments upon how many points Sandra has achieved
todayfyrahundratjufem den hr gngen (four hundred and twenty five)
(line 16)a much larger number than the missing 196, and thus there are
good chances that Sandra will get a medal next time. The primary orienta-
tion is to the accumulation of points (and knowledge) over time and how
this is projecting what will happen next. Sandra responds with noll fe:l
(and zero mistakes), thus orienting to another aspect of her accomplish-
ment of the task: that she has managed to finish the task with only correct
answers. However, the teacher does not respond to this but instead she
puts Sandras result in relation to a projected future diploma. As we have
seen, when the children have solved all the math problems, they arrive at
a result page. On this page they can see the result they have scored for the
particular quiz in question, where the answers are organized in two verti-
cal bars: one representing correct and another incorrect answers. At the
bottom of the first page, each answer is transformed into a bar where the
children get points not only for correct answers, but also for the amount
of time that they have used when answering. The quicker and the more
correct answers, the faster the child will get a medal. This means that chil-
dren who know the arithmetic problems well move quicker through the
tasks whereas children who take time and/or make many mistakes have to
do more quizzes in order to get the medals and diplomas. There are also
three horizontal bars, where the accumulated points from each quiz are
added. Each bar represents a medal, where they first get a bronze medal.
At the far right there is an image of a medal: the most highly valued medal
that the student has obtained so far.
The answers to the arithmetic problems that the children enter into the
software are thus gradually transformed into different kinds of graphic
representations forming chains of mediation, displaying a status as
hybridized text-objects (cf. Leander & Lovvorn, 2006). The way in which
the results are stored in the computer makes relevant the software and the
computer as mediating artifacts by means of which the past is rendered fit
for future remembering. The properties of remembering (and forgetting)
are thus transferred to a mediating artifact (cf. Middleton & Brown, 2005)
that functions as an external memory system (Slj, 2005).
Approaching levels that generate a diploma is an integrated part of the
task. Pelle now enters into the interaction asking what kind of diploma that
Sandra will get, something that is responded to by the teacher in terms of
what the software says: brons sger programmet frst, (bronze says the soft-
194H. MELANDER and P. AARSAND
ware first) (line 22), thus attributing agency to the software. Pelle says that
he got a bronze diploma already yesterday, and in other words he claims
that he has reached farther than Sandra. Initially the teacher acknowledges
this with a quiet ja::. (yes), whereas Sandra objects, saying that she has
not played the math quiz before. In other words, she talks about the
computer-mediated math quiz as something that you can play, thus allud-
ing to the math quiz as a kind of game, which could be contrasted with how
Margareta in excerpt 1a said that they were going to do games. The teacher
supports Sandra and coming in early, in overlap with the final parts of San-
dras turn, says nej. du har inte gjort s mnga gnger. (no you havent done
it so many times) (lines 2627) in a decided tone of voice as she turns her
head and looks at Sandra. The teacher thus aligns with Sandra and resists
the comparison between results that Pelle has made relevant.
The teacher orients to the results as an individual act with the computer
as a prosthetic device, accumulating the childrens individual results. The
design of the software as well as the computer affords a saving of results
over time, and it could even be understood as built around the concept of
accumulating results. When a certain number of points are achieved, the
child gains a medal that is transformed into a diploma. The final stage of
transformation in this particular math task is the diploma, where the results
that are saved and accumulated over time are fixed in the form of written
text on a paper. The childrens answers and results on the test thus move on
from and provide an account of them as students that is transformed into
further texts (e.g., the diploma). This represents a type of displacement in
that difficult to move objects are rendered mobile in texts, which function
to fix particular facts and forms of knowledge (Leander & Lovvorn, 2006,
p. 300). The symbolic value of the document is reinforced through writing
the students name on it together with the teachers signature. The diploma
incorporates processes of remembering; it simultaneously represents what
the child has hitherto achieved and constitutes a starting point for the next
time that the child will work with the math quiz on the computer.
In this chapter we have explored how remembering figures into the social
and material organization of math activities in a first-grade classroom. In the
analyzed examples, remembering is oriented to and drawn upon in various
ways. Through analyzing processes of remembering as communicative
action (Edwards, 1997; Middleton, 2002), we have shown how the
participants use different linguistic devices (e.g., now you remember)
but also engage in acts of remembering in which they draw upon not only
linguistic but also embodied, material, and cultural resources.
Practices of Remembering 195
APPENDIX
APPENDIX (continued)
NOTES
1. Informed consent was obtained from the students and their parents as well
as from the head teacher, class teachers, and the teacher assistant. All par-
ticipants have been given pseudonyms.
2. Fieldwork was conducted in 2008. Since then technological development has
obviously been substantial.
3. The participants are speaking Swedish, and translations into English are in-
cluded in the representations. The translations are done with the aim of stay-
ing as close as possible to the Swedish word order and ways of expression.
4. It is interesting how the teacher talks about doing rather than playing games.
Possibly this could be understood as a way of framing the games as school
tasks rather than leisure activities.
REFERENCES
STRUGGLING WITH
POWERFUL CONCEPTUAL
REIFICATIONS
Cognitive Socialization When Learning to
Reason as an Economist
they are manufactured in the process of goal directed human actions. They
are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation
in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they medi-
ate in the present. Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply
with equal force whether one is considering language/speech or the more
usually noted forms of artifacts such as tables and knives, which constitute
material culture. (p. 117)
The idea that the material form of concepts and artifacts emerges as a
function of the historical contexts in which such resources have been used
points to the importance of understanding their sociogenesis, and how
they have been integrated into, and simultaneously have contributed to
shaping, social and intellectual practices.
In this chapter we will use one example, namely the concept of GDP
(gross domestic product). This concept, with a long history in economics, is
usually defined as a measure of the value of what a nation produces during
one year. We will demonstrate some features of how this powerful cultural
tool is appropriated and the obstacles that learners struggle with. While the
meaning and use of GDP have shifted over time, and the term, thus, has
accumulated increasingly rich meaning potentials (Rommetveit, 1974), it is
usually stripped of most of these when introduced in economics education.
In its most common material appearance, Y=C+I+G+X-M, it presents
several challenges to students who try to make sense of GDP. Our ambition
is to point to the fundamentally social nature of human reasoningthat
is, how concepts and intellectual tools are anchored in, and contribute to
reproducing, what Goodman (1978) refers to as ways of world-making.
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 203
The formula of GDP, that is, its material-textual form as above, has
emerged as a result of a long and discontinuous trajectory, where several
institutional actors have taken active part. In order to understand current
learning and meaning-making among students as adaptations to institu-
tional modes of structuring the world and remembering, we will briefly
discuss some features of institutional as well as individual uses of texts as
sociocultural artifacts and memory devices.
As mentioned earlier, Sir William Petty (1664/1899) argued for the need
to calculate the value of what a country produced in order to estimate how
much to collect in taxes. Of course, at that point in time there were hardly
any statistics ready at hand. Pettys calculations were based on estimates,
some more reliable than others, of the various components included.
An important premise for Pettys calculations was that national income
should equal the expenses in line with already established practices of
accounting. His first calculations from the expenditure side concentrated
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 207
GDP from the production side. Their suggestion also implied estimating
the depreciation of fixed capitalthat is, how the value of the investment
in a machine decreases over time as it is used in the production process
(Marshall, 1890/1961). To calculate this implied a need to estimate the time
such an investment would last. If the depreciation of fixed capital value
were to be taken into account (i.e., subtracted) when calculating GDP, one
would come up with a more accurate measure defined as the net domestic
product (NDP).2 These deliberations of how to define a concept exem-
plify how distinctions become powerful elements of world-making, where
decisions about what to include and what to exclude will affect decision-
making and, in this case, public understanding of society and economic
development.
However, as is often the case when exploring how categories and mea-
surements are actually used in social and historical contexts pragmatic
concerns often prevail, since intellectual tools, like GDP, are needed for
different purposes. A shift from calculating NDP to GDP, for instance,
prevailed in the middle of the 20th century, and this shift has been inter-
preted as a consequence of the pragmatic need to politically get a grip on
the economy after the war, especially the production capacity on a short-
term basis (Sandelin, 2006). By this time, GDP had become a concern for
more than a few enthusiastic economic thinkers. In the middle of the 20th
century, it emerged as an established official measurement, an intellectual
tool used regularly by nations to describe their economic state and to follow
it over time. As such calculations were institutionalized and regularly made
by many countries at the national level, GDP was also increasingly recog-
nized as a handy tool for solving other kinds of problems. For instance,
it provided a solution to the pragmatic concern of calculating justifiable
fees for countries participating in a number of international organizations.
With the increasing influence of such international organizations, the ways
of calculating GDP have, in turn, been adjusted and standardized at the
international level. One important international organization at the time,
the League of Nations, quite early saw this potential use of GDP. In the doc-
umentation of the 1928 conference, the League members articulated the
need for achieving international comparability and urged the participat-
ing countries to develop their national statistics in order to meet this goal
(Sandelin, 2006). The idea of international comparability has since then
been a driving force for achieving common definitions and for establishing
systems of classifications. This means that the calculations of each country
have been standardized to enter into a system that is conceived as legiti-
mate for evaluating and comparing the economic development of several
nations. Agencies such as the United Nations, the European Union, OECD,
and the International Monetary Fund have been engaged in the establish-
ment and refinement of a common standard, and this contributes to the
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 209
Figure 9.1
Figure 9.2. A group of students are working together. The written assignment,
their own notes and the textbook of Economics are simultaneously used as resources
for meaning-making.
This paradox of, on the one hand, knowing how to proceed, but, on the
other hand, not understanding what conceptual assumptions underpin
what one is to do, is quite common among first-year students. Our brief
exploration of the sociogenesis of GDP as a measurement (its historical
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 213
Figure 9.3
214. MKITALO and R. SLJ
Figure 9.4
After the professor provided the students with updated figures from
the national statistics, GDP was calculated on the whiteboard, while the
students did the same in their notebooks. The professor stressed that the
methods he demonstrated should yield the same result, and that they
constitute different approaches or methods for calculating GDP from
different sides of the economy. He also explicitly pointed out that the
distinction between investments and intermediate consumption4 relies
on conventions. He told the students about the example we mentioned
above that Sweden used to have a three-year limit for what should count as
an investment, and as the European one-year rule was adopted, the GDP
of Sweden increased. In his capacity of being a professor of economics,
engaged in introducing students to GDP as the powerful measure it is, he
accordingly makes visible the legal instance (i.e., the principal in Goffmans
1981 terminology) of the new rule, as well as the consequence of its intro-
duction into the Swedish national accounts. That new conventions about
how to define items of this kind can affect the national accounts and the
GDP, however, cause considerable problems for the students.
In the following, we will scrutinize some excerpts in which students,
working in a group, discuss and try to make sense of GDP a few days after
this lecture. The students are preparing for the calculation exercise by
solving a particular task together. In order to solve it, the students need
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 215
1, Ida: how would the items, in calculating GDP from the expenditure
side and the production side respectively, be influenced if one
increases the limit between intermediate consumption and
investment? and how would the GDP level be influenced?
2, Anders: I dont know about that
3, Ida: no (.) thats a bit difficult () but if you have eh (.) its a
question about intermediate consumption and investment
4, Mike: what happens if you have a three-year rule rather than a one-year rule
5, Ida: [exactly]
6, Oscar: [nothing] because the others are-
7. Ida: but the question is from the expenditure side
and production side respectively
8 Oscar: on the production side nothing happens
9. Ida: no cause thats just value-added
What kinds of challenges emerge in this situation and how are they dealt
with by the students? Ida reads the question aloud (turn 1). After acknowl-
edging its difficulty, she starts to unpack the question she just read by
pointing to a central distinction (turn 3): its a question about intermedi-
ate consumption and investment. Mike quickly contributes by addressing
the increased limit mentioned in the question (turn 4): what happens if
you have a three-year rule rather than a one-year rule? (i.e., the problem
given by the professor in the task reverses the situation he described in
216. MKITALO and R. SLJ
the lecture when Sweden joined the EU). In this manner, Mike contributes
to their joint activity by translating relevant parts of the information that
their professor had mentioned during the introductory lecture about con-
ventions in terms of years. This reformulation establishes one of the basic
premises for solving the task, and it also seems to function as a reminder
for Ida, who, when responding, immediately recognizes it as relevant (turn
5). What we see here is an element of what in the literature on learning and
memory is described as transfer (Perkins & Salomon, 1994); the relevance
of an earlier event and concept is recognized as something to be taken into
account. However, in this case, this is not sufficient for the students in terms
of knowing how to proceed with the task.
As Oscar begins to answer the question (turns 6 and 8) by responding to
Mikes preceding turn (4), he claims that on the production side nothing
happens (turn 8)5. His answer is rapidly followed by an agreement and
an account from Ida: no cause thats just value-added (turn 9). This
illustrates an important aspect of how established and recognizable cat-
egories from earlier activities may become too handy devicesthey can be
easily invoked as if ready-made, and will start to function as tools for both
remembering and forgetting in talk. Abbreviations like value-added are
effective tools in the sense that their constitutive elements can be taken
for granted, even if they are not transparent to the userstudents learn
by picking up and beginning to use terms in this manner before they suf-
ficiently master them as inference-rich concepts. To paraphrase Wertsch
and Kazak (2011), students say more than they know, a position that this
kind of exercise often triggers.
Shortcuts like the term value-added play a role as access points to insti-
tutional forms of knowing. However, in order for students to master them
as established intellectual tools, their situated use needs to be challenged,
elaborated, and worked upon. As mentioned earlier, a first description of
GDP from the production side was introduced in the lecture as the sum
of value-added. Such a formulation can of course be readily adopted and
used by the students. However, it does not serve as a sufficient tool for
solving the task, since it does not specify what items are included when
calculating GDP from the production side. Here, intermediate consump-
tion is precisely the relevant item to attend to, which is not noted by the
students. In other words, the expression value-added is used as a reified
term. Since it is mistakenly agreed that GDP from the production side is not
relevant to attend to, the discussion now continues from the expenditure
side. As we enter the conversation, Oscar returns to his text book and finds
the formula (Y=C+I+G+XM), which he senses should be relevant here.
He points to the I which stands for investments.
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 217
10. Oscar: ((points out the I in the GDP formula)) from the expenditure
side it will- it increases with a one-year rule
11. Ida: so, it would decrease
12. Oscar: investments increase with a three-year rule
13. Ida: but but GDP decreases (.) if you have a three-year rule GDP decreases
14. Oscar: whys that?
15. Anders: No:::
16 Oscar: wha- its not- GDP is not influenced!
17. Ida: yes it is (.) cause thats what he said (.) as Sweden changed
to the one-year rule the GDP of Sweden increased
18. Karin: mm right, cause investments increase or
19. Oscar: no that was only if investments fell and consumption-
how the hell can GDP increase?
20. Ida: but thats what they said thats why
21. Oscar: how the hell can the GDP increase?
22. Ida: dont ask me but thats why-
23. Oscar: you cannot produce more all of sudden just because
you include it differently when calculating?
24 Ida: but GD- the GDP of Sweden increased
25 Oscar: No the change is not in GDP itself the change is between the C and the I
Oscar takes for granted that the value of GDP cannot be influenced
simply by a change of definition of what counts as investment and inter-
mediary consumption. To him this is an absurd claim, since you cannot
produce more all of sudden just because you include it differently when
calculating? (turn 23). In its situated sense, GDP is here drawn upon, by
Oscar, as a determinable and stable entity that can be measured in several
ways. His point of departure for discussing GDP seems to be grounded in
its original meaning and usea calculated and estimated value of what a
nation de facto produces in a year (i.e., the problem that Petty struggled
with). How these calculations are done, and more precisely what items are
included, accordingly, is not attended to as relevant. Also, the premise given
by the lecturer that all methods should yield identical results is temporarily
forgotten. Ida, however, stresses that GDP is influenced by this change of
rule. This claim, however, is not clearly grounded in an understanding of
how such definitions work; rather it refers directly back to her recollection:
but thats what they said thats why (20) the GDP of Sweden increased
(24). As a fact explicitly pointed to by an authority, her argument is that
this is something that has to be considered in the work.
218. MKITALO and R. SLJ
To back up his claim, Oscar now draws on the particular items that
constitute the GDP formula, arguing that the change occurs within the
model without influencing GDP as an outcome: the change is not in
GDP itself the change is between the C and the I (25). Here, it should be
noted that Oscar confuses intermediate consumption (which is an item
included in the value-added approach) with private consumption (which
the C stands for in the expenditure approach). Even though there is a
similarity at the term level, these two categories are distinctly different in
the genre of economics, and they are included in two different methods
of calculating GDP, something the students do not seem to realize. As
items, they are accordingly part of different lines of reasoning as mani-
fested by their occurrence in different approaches for calculating GDP.
Some items are included if we decide to calculate the GDP value from the
logic of measuring what we produce, and others will be included when
calculating GDP from the logic of measuring our expenses. In analytical
terms, you could say that to be knowledgeable within this argumentative
tradition, students need to be able to acknowledge these different ways of
proceeding, and they have to be able to draw on them in relevant ways
for accomplishing the task.
To Oscar and his fellow students, however, such inferences are not yet
available for use. His solution and explanation to the problem that some
change needs to be accounted for is to claim that a shift between inter-
mediary consumption (mistakenly understood as C) and investment (I)
takes place within the expenditure approach. This is an interpretation
occasioned by his attention to the visuographic form as an equation, and as
such it is compatible with his current understanding of GDP as a measure-
ment of concrete production values.
The disagreement about how to understand GDP continues for some
time. Ida objects to Oscars claim again and again by repeating that it did
differ, and that Swedens GDP increased when they adjusted to the Euro-
pean convention and shifted from a three-year limit to a one-year limit.
Oscar rejects this argument several times and argues that there is no real
differenceit is just a matter of how the items included in the calcula-
tion are distinguished from each other; that is, he maintains his previous
argumentative position. As Karin finally finds and reads the notes from
the relevant lecture, however, the significance of the material conditions
for remembering and learning becomes evident in the situation. From this
point on (turn 26, Excerpt 3), it is clear that it is impossible to reject Idas
claim that the GDP level is influenced, and this locally established fact
serves as a premise for the continued thinking.
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 219
26. Karin: ((finds the relevant page in her notebook)) here it is but it was
the other way around (.) like from three years to one
27. Oscar: yes?
28. Karin: fewer- fewer goods will count as intermediate consumption
29. Oscar: m-
30. Karin: so ((reads aloud from her notes:)) intermediate consumption decreased,
value-added increased, and GDP increased ((inaudible)) more eh eh
gross investment and less intermediate consumption gave Sweden
an increase in GDP after the shift from three years to one year
31. Ida: mm hm
32. Oscar: that seems completely illogical!
33. Ida: okay so it wasnt just me who wrote this
((laughing)) that was a relief oh God!
34. Anders: lets make a note of that somewhere at question A then (.) shall we?
35. Ida: yes certainly
36. Oscar: thats completely illogical but as soon as Bill stands
there and tells us well just say ahhhh Bill!
Through the lecture notes Karin is reading aloud, the students are con-
fronted with an institutional voice that they accept as something they have
to come to terms with. If their professor (here referred to by first name)
has said that the adjustment to the European convention resulted in an
increase of the GDP level, the students have to incorporate this in their
reasoning. In a Goffmans (1981) parlance, the instructor takes on an insti-
tutional voice animating a convention that the EU has authored. Even
though it seems completely illogical (32, 36) to Oscar, and probably hard to
grasp for the others, it has to be made sense of in order for them to be able
to solve the task in accountable ways. Accordingly, the notes force them to
make an effort to understand and make sense of GDP in some other way. In
a sociocultural perspective, the students here are clearly in what has been
called a zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978) as they realize
that something has to be explained, and they anticipate that Bill, when
he steps in to guide them, will contribute to an ahhhh feeling of finally
understanding what they are struggling with.
The students now start searching, on a more detailed level, for an
instance where such a difference in GDP level may occur. This means that
they need to start unpacking the different approaches in some detail. The
approaches will now gain instructive as well as directive functions for the
students activities in situ. They now change their point of departure to the
production side again, in order to make sense of the fact with which they
have been confronted. What is now being unpacked more thoroughly is thus
220. MKITALO and R. SLJ
Figure 9.5
37. Oscar: but in that case its its on the production side the change is?
38. Ida: yeah thats what we think
38. Oscar: since its value-added
((students start searching through their note books))
40. Karin: yeah the production side ((searches through her lectures notes))
41. Ida: yeah okay
42. Oscar: ((finds the relevant lecture in his notebook)) on the
production side- yeah okay I see that on the production
side intermediate consumption increases
43. Mike: but value-added has nothing to do with intermediate consumption or?
44. Ida: but- ahh hes right!
45. Oscar [yes if you calculate from the production side]
46. Karin: [as you sit there it is all so obvious that you ] dont write it all down
47. Ida: where is it ehh where did I write it?
Ida ((searches her notebook while the others continue discussing))
48. Ida: oh yes but its so obvious! the ingredients are not as many!!
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 221
Since Oscar still seems to assume that on the expenditure side the
change is merely a shift between the C (private consumption) and the
I (investment), the most obvious thing to do when searching for an
explanation to a change in GDP is to suggest it happens on the production
side: but in that case its its on the production side the change is? (37).
This time, however, Oscar notes that there is a change: okay I see that on
the production side intermediate consumption increases (42).
Ida now joins in to support Oscars contribution but- aah hes right!
(44). What Ida has found, and what makes sense to her, is the concrete
example in her notes that was given in the lecture: oh yes but its so
obvious! the ingredients are not as many!! (48). In the following sequence,
Ida tries to use the concrete bread example to make the task more compre-
hensible to her fellow students:
49. Ida: if we go back to the bread example well get it (.) that GDP
increases from the production side thats what you said eh?
50. Anders: say the bread example
51. Ida: what he ((the professor)) said was that: weve got one hundred and seventy
five kronor bread (.) minus one hundred kronor ingredients so the value-
added is seventy five kronor (.) but if you shift to the one year rule instead
of the three year rule more of the ingredients are suddenly investments (.)
so there are less ingredients like seventy five kronor ingredients seventy five
kronor which means that the value-added is one hundred and GDP increases
52. Karin: Mm
53. Ida: get it?
54. Oscar: yeah yeaah Ill have to think about it
55. Ida: yeah okay
56. ((continues talking))
57. Ida: ((laughs)) okay Ill write what happens in any case bread is
still one hundred but the ingredients are only sixty!
58. Anders: yeah but still, but still I dont get it
((all of them speak at once))
59. Ida: but this is the produ- produ- this is the production side this is the
production side so in other words it ends up like this GDP on the
expenditure side does not change but GDP from the production
side changes so you are probably right that this is-
60. Anders: yeah thats it (.) we changed side, so I was right but from the wrong side
(Excerpt continues on next page)
222. MKITALO and R. SLJ
Figure 9.6. The professor goes through the task in the calculation exercise on
the whiteboard. He uses the formulae of GDP from the production side (upper
row) and the expenditure side (below). He points out the items affected in both
methods of calculation and how GDP is affected.
that constitutes studying as an activity, and in that capacity they are key to
students progress in developing the specific kind of epistemic practices
that characterize hybrid minds engaged in economics scholarship.
The point of our analysis has been to illustrate the fundamental manner
in which learning and conceptual development are social processes where
students appropriate and struggle to use elements of the collective insights
that have emerged over time in society. In such an analysis, the tension
between primary and secondary genres is fundamental. As Bakhtin (1986)
notes, The very interrelations and the process of the historical formation
of the latter shed light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on
the complex problem of the interrelations among language, ideology and
world view) (p. 62).
The social nature of learning is apparent at several levels, both in terms
of what is appropriated and in terms of how the activities are organized
as individual, interactional, and institutional practices. Discussions and
argumentations over decades, if not centuries, in various institutional set-
tings produce conceptual distinctions and categories that label objects and
events in ways that are relevant for social activities. The prominence that
GDP is given as a measure in economics, and in contemporary society
more generally, positions the students in relation to powerful institutional
actors. Students know that this measure plays a central role in economic
discourse. This may explain their loyalty to pursuing the task at hand when
they attempt to make sense of it. When studying economics, the hurdle
presented by the concept of GDP, accordingly, is something they know they
have to overcome.
As a secondary genre, economics relies heavily on modeling, and models
reduce complexity and highlight relationships on the basis of set defini-
tions and rules. The students we have followed are struggling with how to
coordinate the specific conceptual elements of this secondary genre with
the world they are familiar with. In order to reason in relevant ways, they
must often refrain from using mundane interpretations of concepts such
as, for instance, consumption or investment. They must appropriate
the specific conventions that apply to describing transactions when viewing
them from the perspective of economics in order to engage in the expected
kind of instrumental act. An interesting conceptual tension that we fol-
lowed concerned how one of the members of the group (Oscar) forcefully
argued that just by changing a definition, the GDP could not change. His
argument was that you cannot produce more all of sudden just because you
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 225
NOTES
1. This is the case also today. The value of unpaid work, for instance, when dis-
cussing GDP is still a hot issue that teases out certain claims and arguments
(Sandelin, 2006).
2. In Sweden, similar definitions to NDP were regularly in use from 1861, and
up until 1930 such calculations were institutionalized (Lindahl, Dahlgren, &
Kock, 1937).
3. In terms of the estimated life of a good.
4. Note that investments, I, is an item included in the expenditure approach,
while intermediate consumption is included in the value-added approach.
Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 227
This is something the students fail to take note of in the discussions we are
to follow.
5. His response seems to rely on the idea that a new rule would have different
impact on the different sides of the economy, which is a problematic
assumption.
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Struggling With Powerful Conceptual Reifications 229
James V. Wertsch
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the U.S. and Europe found themselves in a surprisingly tense face-
off with Russia over events in Ukraine. As these events unfolded, it became
clear that what was involved went beyond the kind of realpolitik dispute
over resources or ideology that had long vexed the relationship between
Russia and the West. Instead, it seemed to involve something deeper and
more visceral, something that led many observers to acknowledge they
were at a loss to come up with an explanation for what they saw as aggres-
sive and dangerous moves by Russia. German Chancellor Angela Merkel
reportedly told U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, that Russian
President Vladimir Putin was not in touch with realitya sobering obser-
vation, given that she was the Western leader regarded as having the best
understanding of the Russian perspective.
Putins forceful, almost contemptuous dismissal of warnings from U.S.
and European leaders about the dangerous path he was pursuing led to
anxious speculation about what lay behind it. After years of pursuing a
pragmatic geopolitical game that was understandable, though not always
appreciated by the West, Putin seemed to be operating in a different world.
He had spent years courting acceptance in organizations like the G8, whose
meeting he had planned on hosting in the new Sochi Winter Olympics
setting, but in 2014 he seemed to be throwing everything away in pursuit
of some sort of mission that few in the West understood.
In Washington, DC, Politico Magazine devoted the cover story of its
March 13, 2014 issue to putting Putin on the Couch. Some two dozen
journalists, former diplomats, and other Russia watchers speculated on why
Putin blithely ignored the objections of the West and pursued a course of
action that was so baffling. One of the journalists wrote about being befud-
dled by Putins actions and called him crazy, calculating, and somehow
capricious all at the same time. Others attributed his behavior to a suscep-
tibility to conspiracy theories, a cold calculating personality, his pessimism,
paranoia, deep anger at the West, insecurity, hypersensitivity, and a tough
upbringing on the streets of Leningrad.
To be sure, Vladimir Putin brought personality quirks to this geopolitical
encounter, but in the end these were not the main drivers of his actions.
I shall argue instead that much of what he said during the tense standoff
with the West over Ukraine was a straightforward reflection of an underly-
ing national narrative that has been part of Russian culture for centuries.
Catherine the Great, who annexed Crimea to the Russian empire in 1783,
reportedly believed that the only way she could defend her country was
to expand its borders. This rationale continues to play a role in Russian
reasoning today, at the grassroots level as well as at the top. In order to
understand Putins stanceand why it is wildly popular with large segments
of the Russian population, it is crucial to understand the social language
(Wertsch, 2002, p. 64) that they share as members of a mnemonic com-
munity (Zerubavel, 2003). This is a social language built around a set of
narrative tools that shape the speaking and thinking about the past and
the present and that distinguish this mnemonic community from others.
To some degree, this line of reasoning is echoed in the ideas that guided
Vygotsky and his student and colleague Luria as they conducted their
empirical studies in central Asia in the 1920s. Employing oppositions that
echoed those between the syntactical and hypostatic tendencies of lan-
guage, they wrote of how theoretic and practical forms of thinking
differ and how higher forms of mental functioning emerge out of ele-
mentary processes. However, in contrast to Vygotsky, who emphasized that
the achievements of higher mental functioning can be distinguished from
elementary forms, Cassirer focused on how even the most advanced forms
of abstract thinking retains elements of what Langer called the sphere of
mythic and emotive thoughts.
Taken together, the ideas of Vygotsky and Cassirer suggest a world
in which speaking and thinking are fundamentally shaped by the sym-
bolic mediation, or cultural tools provided by historical, institutional, and
cultural contexts. It is a world in which human mental and social life is
socioculturally situated because of its reliance on these tools, including
narratives, and these tools shape our thinking and speaking in multiple
complex ways. And in this context, the double nature of language as an
instrument plays a complicating role in shaping narratives and memory.
On the one hand, what Langer called the syntactic tendencies inject an
element of logic into our understanding of the past, but on the other, these
same narrative tools pull us back to hypostatic ways of thinking associ-
ated with myth.
It is worth noting that in this approach cultural tools do not mechanisti-
cally determine human discourse and thinking. Instead, the very notion
of a tool implies an active user and suggests an element of variability and
freedom stemming from the unique contexts of performance. Bakhtin
(1986) made this point in his account of the speech utterance or text. For
him, any text involves a tension between two poles: a preexisting language
system that provides the repeatable moment of an utterance, on the one
hand, and a particular instance of speaking in a unique setting, which pro-
vides the nonrepeatable moment, on the other. All utterances reflect the
238J. V. WERTSCH
influence of these two poles, but their relative weighting can vary widely.
For example, a military command relies heavily on a language system and
leaves little room for spontaneity, whereas informal discourse in everyday
life relies more heavily on the unrepeatable, spontaneous pole.
NARRATIVE TOOLS OF
THE RUSSIAN MNEMONIC COMMUNITY
Returning to Putins stance on the 2014 events in Ukraine, the first point
to recognize is that what he said was fundamentally shaped by the narrative
tools of his mnemonic community, and as such, it makes sense to include
the power of these tools into our analytic effort. The fact that his speech
after the annexation of Crimea was wildly popular with large segments of
the Russian population provides a reminder of the common narrative tools
that bound him and this population togetherand also set them apart
from members of other communities. So, what kinds of narrative tools are
involved, and why do they have such power?
One of the most important shared narratives that binds the Russian
mnemonic community together concerns repeated invasions by foreign
enemies. In such accounts, the enemies inflict great suffering and humil-
iation but are eventually defeated by the valiant efforts of the Russian
people bound together by a distinctive spiritual heritage. The whole world
saw how this narrative played out in the heroic Soviet defense against
Hitler, but for Russians this is just one iteration of an endlessly repeating
narrative template. For them, the same story has been played out with dif-
ferent characters for centuries, including with the Mongols (13th century),
the Germans (Teutonic knights) from the same period, the Poles (16th
century), the Swedes (18th century), the French (19th century), and the
Germans again (20th century).
This national memory has encouraged Russians to develop habits of
emplotment, or narrative templates (Wertsch, 2002), that lead them to
interpret many events in similar waynamely, as threats; this is the case
even when others see the events as obvious cases of aggressive Russian
expansionism. The long list of traumatic experiences Russia has had with
the Mongols, the French, the Germans, and so forth provides ample reason
for developing these habits, so my point is not that the resulting view of
the past is without grounds or simply a figment of imagination. Russia has
suffered repeated invasions, to be sure. But the way these events have been
interpreted in countless retellings over several centuries has engendered
a more general, schematic narrative template that is widely and automati-
cally employed by members of this mnemonic community. Based on an
Narrative Tools, Truth, and Fast Thinking in National Memory 239
This underlying code has been used repeatedly by the Russian mne-
monic community to make sense of events from the past, and it is also
employed when interpreting current events such as those in Crimea in
2014. Rather than seeing their action as aggressive expansionism and
annexation of others territory, Putin and probably the majority of Russians
took Russian action in Crimea to be a reasonable response to an external
threat. From their perspective, European and American actors were clearly
encouraging Ukrainian nationalist groups to break away from Russia, and
the resulting outcome would be having NATO, or at least NATO-friendly
forces, at the border of yet another part of Russia. Similar interpretations
prevailed in Russia in interpreting its war with Georgia in 2008. It was
not Georgia itself that was at issue from the Russian perspective; instead,
Georgia was taken to be just the point of a NATO spear pointed at Russias
southern flank.
Experienced diplomats and leaders understand this reasoning and
the need to take it into account when dealing with Russia. Even the savvy
Angela Merkel, however, had a hard time keeping this in mind when it
came to Russias actions in Crimea. She was used to a Russia that saw
enemies where others did not, but she was also used to dealing with Russian
leaders who could recognize other perspectives and rationally weigh the
consequences of taking a course of action that might be popular at home
but costly in terms of international relations. In this case, however, Putin
seemed to be locked into a perspective that was impervious to input from
all others, and the result was a tense standoff.
What is it about national narratives as symbolic mediation that contrib-
utes to such situations? How do they allow, even encourage, experienced
leaders and the lay public to become so locked into their own perspective
that they are sealed off from understanding others and lose sight of their
240J. V. WERTSCH
own broader interests?3 Two important factors that seem to be at issue are
truth claims and fast thinking.
Tense interpretive standoffs such as the one in 2014 over Ukraine and
Crimea are typically grounded in assumptions about the truth of what
really happened. These mnemonic standoffs (Wertsch, 2009) about
events in the near or distant past are different from other sorts of disputes.
In contrast to confrontations over ideology or opinion, the participants in
mnemonic standoffs all too easily get locked into opposing views about
truth, and these are positions that are very hard to get out of. Instead of
responses such as, Well, I guess we just disagree on what we value or I
happen not to share your opinion on that, we find ourselves saying things
like, I cant believe you really think that is what happened! or You must
be brainwashed! And if we find ourselves saying, You are just lying!, the
conversation is bound to be over.
Such discussions can become heated and even dangerous, especially
when they involve state officials. Speakers in such settings must take
responsibility for their own actions, but at least part of the reason they
find themselves in frustrating standoffs can be traced to the narrative tools
they employ, and this, in turn, can be traced to the ways that two kinds of
truth operateand are often conflated. First, the sentences that make up
a narrative can be assessed for what I term their propositional truth. For
example, Crimea became part of Russia in 2014 is true, whereas Crimea
became part of Russia in 2013 is false, and we have fairly straightforward
means for assessing the truth of such propositions (archives, eye witness
reports, etc.).
But narratives involve more than a simple collection of propositions;
they grasp together (Mink, 1970, p. 547) events at another level or orga-
nization by placing them in a plot or what the Russian formalist Victor
Shklovsky (1965) called syuzhet. The operation of plot in narrative is
perhaps most evidently manifested in the fact that the sense of an ending
(Kermode, 1967) is an essential part of the text that allows us to give
meaning to events and characters that came before it. This narrative logic
assumes that the ending of the story is what gives meaning to all the events
leading up to it. As formulated by Peter Brooks, It is in the peculiar nature
of narrative as a sense-making system that clues are revealing, that prior
events are prior, and that causes are causal only retrospectively, in a reading
back from the end (2012, p. 47).
When thinking and speaking about Crimea, Putin was not simply
listing a series of facts or observations; he was organizing them in line with
Narrative Tools, Truth, and Fast Thinking in National Memory 241
narrative tools of his mnemonic community, and this required the events
to be grasped together into a familiar plot. In his view, Russians were living
through a set of events that had a familiar storyline, namely the series of
events starting with a threat to Russia that could result in great damage
if alien enemies are not repelled. For him and his Russian audience, the
events at hand were events for which they had a shared means for reading
back from the end even before they knew what the precise end would be.
In the case of the Crimean dispute, Putin was able to grasp things
together along the lines of what Frederic Bartlett (1932) might have called
a specifically Russian effort after meaning based on the narrative tem-
plate noted above. His tendencies toward doing this were so strong that for
him the events unfolding there were obviously part of yet another threat by
an alien invader. In a speech on March 18, 2014, he asserted that the new
government in Ukraine was the result of a coup carried out by national-
ists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites,4 and from his perspective
these unsavory actors were clearly urged on by NATO and other Western
agents. While not invokingor even being consciously aware ofthe
Russian narrative template I have outlined, Putin seems to be reading
straight from it in such comments.
It is worth noting that in this case the threat was not at the borders of
Russia as they existed at that time. Rather, the threat was to compatriots
(i.e., ethnic Russians) in what was then Ukraine. From his perspective,
they were being subjected to psychological and cultural, if not physical
violence: Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians
of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to
forced assimilation. As some observers have noted, this sets a dangerous
precedent of using imagined national borders, as opposed to internation-
ally agreed upon state borders, but Russia leaders and the Russian public
more generally were so locked into their sealed narrative (de Waal, 2003,
p. 140) that they ran roughshod over such distinctions.
In making his case for why his Russian compatriots were in danger from
nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites, Putin pointed
to news reports in the Russian media that documented the statements of
right-wing, strongly nationalist Ukrainian groups like the political party
Svoboda. In terms of propositional truth, it is accurate that some members
of Svoboda were involved in events in Ukraine leading up to the overthrow
of the government in early 2014, and it is also accurate to say that some
Svoboda members have been so strongly nationalist in their statements as
to suggest a kind of fascism. But it is also true that most participants in the
events were not Svoboda members and that Svoboda has disavowed fascism
and anti-Semitism.
Hence, there are many propositional truths swirling around these events,
and the problem is how they are to be emplotted into a story of what really
242J. V. WERTSCH
The central role of fast thinking and the associated tendency to jump to
conclusions about the truth of ones account of the past mean that mne-
monic standoffs such as that between Russians and the West over Ukraine
may be expected to be the rule rather than the exception. The psycho-
logical processes involved are powerful and lead to overconfidence in our
account in part because they operate below our level of conscious reflec-
tion. The combination of narrative tools and the nonconscious habits of
thought associated with them is so powerful that we can find ourselves
taken by surprise when someone comes up with a completely different
Narrative Tools, Truth, and Fast Thinking in National Memory 245
countries (para. 4). The upshot is that we cant allow anyone to impose a
sense of guilt on us (para. 4). To be sure, Cheney and Putin may provide
particularly blatant examples of efforts to present patriotic history, but
the spirit that motivates them can be found behind much of the history
instruction everywhere in the world as well, and this begs the question of
how a steady diet of being exposed to such tightly scripted accounts of the
past might give rise to the mental habits associated with national narrative
templates.
A second point to consider when trying to account for the genesis of
narrative templates is that research in the psychology of memory suggests
that the first exposure to information or the first discussion or rehearsal
of an event after it happens can have a profound effect on what is remem-
bered. This can be so profound that people sometimes report still having
a memory of an event even though they have information that convinces
them that this memory is inaccurate. Is something like this behind the fact
that we appear to be so locked into stories about past events that we have an
extraordinarily hard time seeing anothers perspective? Indeed, it is even
possible that one can enter formal schooling with an unofficial memory
of the past that is so well established that it overpowers the states efforts to
inculcate an official history? Tulviste and Wertsch (1994) suggest that this
is precisely what happened in the Soviet era in places like Estonia.
My comments at this point are highly speculative, but they may point to
a fruitful place for collaborative investigations that would bring together
scholars from a wide range of disciplines to address some of the most
mysterious and dangerous phenomena we see at work in international
relations today. To be sure, the conflicts that exist between national com-
munities cannot, should not be reduced to issues of mental habits, but too
many discussions among opposing parties are short-circuited because we
dont recognize the power of these habits and the narrative templates that
give rise to them.
NOTES
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Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
CHAPTER 11
COLLECTIVE MEMORY
IN DYNAMICS OF
ETHNOPOLITICAL
MOBILIZATION
The Karabakh Conflict
Rauf R. Garagozov
INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION
Certain ideas and categories created within the sociocultural approach are
indispensable for the collective memory model, which is suggested in this
chapter. This approach looks at collective memory as a phenomenon shaped
by all types of narratives, but historical narratives in particular (Wertsch,
2002). Historical narratives (annals, chronicles, history textbooks, etc.) are
considered as cultural tools employed to promote collective remembering.
Certain properties of narratives affect the collective remembering process
in a very specific way. James Wertsch (2002, cf. Wertsch, this volume)
identified an abstract and generalized form of narrative as one such
property, which underlies numerous narratives and which he called as
the schematic narrative template (SNT). These SNTs differ from one
cultural setting to another, require special reflection to be identified, and
are used to mold stories about key historic events, even in cases where
historical events do not fit the specific templates. By way of illustration,
the author gives an example of the Russian schematic narrative template,
which he titles as Expulsion-of-Alien-Enemies (Wertsch, this volume).
Collective Memory251
In order to explain how collective memory can play a particular role in the
emergence of ethnic mobilization, I would like to propose the following
mechanism outlined below.
The initial stage deals with what I would call the activation of collective
memory patterns. This activation may take place via the appearance of nar-
ratives that interpret certain events of the present in a specific way. It is well
known that propaganda is most effective in two cases: when it corresponds
to the attitudes of audience, or when it links the new idea with existing atti-
tudes of the audience (Kinder & Sears, 1985). In this connection, the most
powerful in terms of influence are the narratives that follow the schematic
narrative templates peculiar for a given culture since they correspond
well with the already existing pattern of collective memory. Due to this
correspondence, these narratives gain such a power to impact the minds
and feelings of members of ethnic or national groups that never ceases to
amaze outside observers and scholars of ethnic conflicts. In a sense, coming
out of such type of specific narratives in public discourse and mass media
can be a harbinger of future conflicts. There might be different reasons
and forces interested in the emergence of such types of narratives and their
wide dissemination and circulation in public discourse. One of the major
reasons/forces, without doubt, is the turbulent surge of nationalism, which
has a particular interest in such oversimplified historical accounts that
resemble almost a myth. A surge of nationalism is often observed in societ-
ies that have just acquired a freedom of the press and only begin to take the
path of democratization of their communities (Snyder & Ballentine, 2000).
254R. R. GARAGOZOV
In this connection, the territory of the former Soviet Union or the former
Yugoslavia should be mentioned as recent places for surges of nationalism.
Careful observation of the events in the territories of the former Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union shows us that ethnic conflicts were invariably
preceded by the coming out and broad circulation in the mass media of spe-
cific historical narratives. Thus, by way of one example, I can point to the
appearance in the press, in 1986, of a specific victim narrative that antici-
pated the future conflict in Yugoslaviaa memorandum of the genocide
of the Serbs in Kosovo, which was signed by many members of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences (Gagnon, 2000; Snyder & Ballentine, 2000). Political
elites in the former Yugoslavia, via creation, publication, and dissemination
of this memorandum and other kindred narratives (especially popular at
that time were narratives about Serbian defeat in battle in Kosovo in 1389),
obviously reminded their people about the past grievances, atrocities, and
humiliation and certainly stimulated the process of Serbian ethnopolitical
mobilization which eventually resulted in ethnic war. Analyzing the process
of ethnopolitical mobilization, Stuart Kaufman (2001) suggests the notion
of symbolic politics, which is in his view mostly about manipulating
peoples emotions, and symbols provide the tool for such manipulation
(p. 29). In a sense, the specific narratives mentioned above can be con-
sidered as symbols (in terms of Kaufman) that provide powerful tools
for manipulation. To put it briefly, via symbolic politics political elites
can activate collective memory patterns which in turn can yield negative
emotions3 and attitudes with concomitant consequences such as political
mobilization of a population along ethnic divisions. In this connection, I
assume that calls for national action are more likely to resonate among
people if they follow their national narrative, to their schematic narra-
tive templates. I support this thesis by considering the initial stage of the
ArmeniaAzerbaijan Nagorno Karabakh conflict. But before looking into
this conflict, it seems reasonable to describe some major features of Arme-
nian and Azerbaijani collective memory, which, as I shall show, have further
significantly contributed to the emergence of this conflict.
janis was played by the dastans,4 by folklore, folk songs, tales, and legends
that enjoyed exceptional popularity among the people (Altstadt, 1992;
Paksoy, 1989; Shaffer, 2002), which, in the words of the researcher, served
to develop the national tradition of epic account (Niabiyev, 1985). An
important role in the process of collective remembering is played first and
foremost by works of the epic genredastans. These epic stories, which
extolled primarily individual heroism or selfless devotion, even though
they might reflect certain historical events, often rather remote ones, on
the whole did not contain elaborated, fully developed historical interpreta-
tions or what might be called strong ethnohistories (Smith, 1995). This,
in turn, gave rise to significant gaps in Azerbaijani collective representa-
tions about their historical past and opened a broad way for various sorts of
historical reconstructions in accordance with the ideological purposes of
the Soviet regime that was established in Azerbaijan in 1920. However, not
only the lack of an established national historiographical tradition but also
openly anti-Islamic orientation of the official Soviet ideology and its fear
of Pan-Turkism forced historians to resort to such projects of identity
that might have very little in common with the real history of shaping the
Azerbaijani nation (Shnirelman, 2003). Therefore, it is not accidental that
the Azerbaijani historiography was indeed one of the most fabricated his-
toriographies in the Soviet period. To summarize, the formal history that
was presented in Soviet textbooks on the history of Azerbaijan and that was
underpinning Azerbaijani collective memory and identity was constructed
strictly in accordance with the ethnoterritorial principle suggested by the
communist idelogists. In this regard, one historian notes:
in the home (collective memory); and the history of the Armenians as it was
developed in Western historiographical science. At the same time, as Ferro
goes on to point out, even though the history told in the Soviet Armenian
textbook differed from that told in the home (in particular, the official Soviet
history, in keeping with the atheistic orientation of Soviet ideology, ignored
the role of the Armenian Church), on the whole, both histories were in the
Armenian historical tradition which, as we recall, is characterized by the
content of the Armenian schematic narrative template. Thus, Shnirelman
(2003) characterizes the Armenian Soviet history textbooks as following:
The course on the history of the Armenian people was included into the pro-
gram of general schools in Armenia at the end of the 1930s; ... One of the
peculiarities of the Armenian textbooks was the usage of term the Greater
Armenia.... Armenian textbooks in the Soviet era diligently avoided men-
tioning any religious issue;... the textbooks emphasised more the antiquity
of the Armenian people.... No less important were storylines describing the
Armenian peoples age-old national liberation struggle against various for-
eign invaders. These stories taught that the continuous struggle for freedom
sooner or later yielded its fruits despite of sacrifices that they had to bear on
that road. (p. 76)
Figure 11.1. Map of Greater Armenia from the Armenian history textbook for
secondary schools 8th grade.
KARABAKH CONFLICT:
ETHNOPOLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF ARMENIANS
Of the data reported in the press, seven episodes of the events of 1988 are
known,7 which totally characterize the pace, scale, and dynamics of the
ethnopolitical mobilization of the Armenians that took place.
What brought tens of thousands of Armenians out into the streets of Step-
anakert and Erevan? After all, it was not just the desire for territorial uni-
fication with Armenia alone that brought tens of thousands of Armenians
Collective Memory261
out into the streets of Stepanakert. What brought them out was, first and
foremost, dissatisfaction with shortcomings in the socioeconomic develop-
ment of NKAO and infringements on national and other rights. (Arakelian,
Kadymbekov & Ovcharenko, 1988, pp. A1A2)
No matter how unpleasant it was for many observers to concede, the mean-
ing of the conflict in Nagornyi Karabakh can only become more clear if we
acknowledge that the actions of hundreds of thousands of Armenians and
Azerbaijanis were heated up by deeply rooted ideas regarding history, iden-
tity, and rights. And the fact that these ideas were dangerous and illusory to
a substantial extent in no way means that people did not believe them in all
sincerity. They blossomed in an ideological vacuum that emerged at the end
of the existence of the Soviet Union, and they gained new impetus during
the war. The darkest manifestation of these views consisted of stories of
hatred, which put down roots such deep that as long as they exist nothing
will be able to change in Armenia and Azerbaijan. (de Waal, 2003, p. 361)
20th century), and without this it is hard to understand why the present
conflict is of such a ferocious character.9 Second, many peoples have bad
histories with each other, but they do not start conflicts. It is likely that
specific bad histories, and also specific conditions, are necessary to start a
conflict, and they must be identified. Third, the stories of hatred de Waal
mentions in his work did not emerge in the final years of the existence of
the Soviet Union, as he asserts, but much earlier. They existed long before
the Soviet Union emerged, or the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs.
As the preceding analysis reveals, stories of hatred represent a con-
tinuation of the old Armenian historiographical tradition that preserves
and reproduces the specifically Armenian schematic narrative template (a
faithful people although surrounded and tormented by enemies), which
has its roots in the Middle Ages. I believe that the existence of this specific
pattern of the Armenian collective memory was an important factor that
led to the start of the Karabakh conflict. Below, I briefly present a few argu-
ments in support of this thesis.
After the acts of protest in Karabakh, Soviet Armenia was swept with a wave
of mass street demonstrations. And even though Armenia was one of the
most homogeneous republics of the Soviet Union, in ethnic terms, no one,
including the leaders of these demonstrations, could predict what a powerful
charge of energy would break to the surface. It appeared that the question of
Nagornyi Karabakhs fate was capable of touching the most sensitive strings
in the heart of every Armenian.... Even those who knew nothing about the
sociopolitical situation in Nagornyi Karabakh empathized emotionally with
Armenians who lived surrounded by Turks (in common Armenian speech,
this word is used to designate both Turks and Azeris). (p. 44)
People said Karabakh, but they really meant was genocide. Karabakh
had the right mix to become a grievance: it was an isolated Armenian com-
munity, separated from the rest of the nation, at the mercy of Turks (as
the Armenians often refer to the Azeris), unarmed, and weak. (Karny, 2000,
p. 389)
000, and during the day a half of million. On November 28 control was
tightened. Baku was closed to traffic from other cities. Central mass media
reported that the demonstration remained peacefulness.The final blow
came on December 3, when military authorities published a demand for
Lenin Square to be cleared because weapons were reported being stockpiled
there. During the night of December 4, demonstrators who remained on
the square were rounded up and jailed. Some of those taken into custody
were transferred to local prisons. The next day there were strikes and
demonstrations throughout the republic. (Altstadt, 1992, pp. 200202
Figure 11.3. Protest rally against the events in Karabakh, November 17, 1988,
Lenin Square (now Azadlig), Baku, Azerbaijan.
That the Armenian claims ... to rule over the region from Erevan would gen-
erate such a strong reaction among Azerbajanis can be explained by several
reasons. First, Azerbaijanis were taught to think about their nation in ter-
ritorial terms. It could be perceived by Azerbaijanis as the utter insult, if the
Soviet leaders order them to transfer the territory which they considered as
their inherent riches.... Second, they could not accept Armenian claims as
legitimate whether they are based on history, statistics or politics. Third, they
believed that the outside world taking Armenian viewpoint ... regarded their
refusal to cede the territory as a provocation. Fourth ... the crisis in Nagorno
Karabakh is considered as an instrument of manipulation by certain Russian
groups aimed to reestablish their hegemony in the region. (Dragadze, 1996,
p. 282)
Among the four reasons mentioned, the first reason deserves special
attention. To accept that Azerbaijanis were taught to think about their
nation in territorial terms, then, indeed, Azerbaijanis would perceive
Armenian territorial claims as a real threat to their territorial integrity.
Such a perception could be one of the factors essentially contributing to
270R. R. GARAGOZOV
IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION
The conflict that began with a small rally of Karabakh Armenians on Lenin
Square in Stepanakert, on February 13, 1988, turned into a full-scale war
between the newly independent republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with
many tragic consequences for both sides. Collective memories peculiar to
parties at conflict in certain ways contributed to the flare up of this con-
flict. The case of ArmeniaAzerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh
illustrates well that groups are best reminded by specific types of narratives
that activate their patterns of collective memory that lead to the rise of
negative collective emotions. On the Armenian side, it was relatively easy
to get people mobilized through specific narratives as they already had a
correspondent pattern of collective memory grounded in the specifically
Armenian schematic narrative template. It was more difficult to mobi-
lize Azerbaijanis since they had not developed collective memory pattern
similar to that of so many Armenians. But even in the Azerbaijani case,
the type of narrative was found that appealed to their collective memory
and eventually stimulated Azerbaijanis mobilization. In this regard, one
final note: Taking into account the essential role of collective memory in
the conflicts in the South Caucasus,16 any type of peace and reconciliation
projects in this region should include a special program of narrative inter-
vention aimed to manage and neutralize the dangerous memories with
their destructive consequences.
NOTES
that had become activized over the span of a number of preceding years
(de Waal, 2003). At the same time, during that period these underground
or semi-underground organizations were not yet able to wield the powerful
organized, administrative, or information capabilities that were necessary
for such intensive mobilization of the population in such a short time. Ac-
cording to another version, these demonstrations were specially organized
by Armenian authorities, including the KGB (Committee for State Security),
which were trying in this way to neutralize the threat that loomed over the
old political elitesthe threat of losing their positions of powerwhich was
occasioned by the policy of perestroika initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev,
the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Grigorian, 1989). In that case, of course, it would be
possible to activate much larger administrative, organizational, or financial
resources. But even if we accept this version of a subtle game played by
the republics leadership, it still remained unclear what heartstrings of the
population might be touched in order to prompt such mass demonstrations.
9. This context is well presented in J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy (1989), which
is devoted entirely to the question of TurkishArmenian relations.
10. As is emphasized by one of the Armenian respondents in an interview with
Thomas de Waal: The fear of being annihilatedand not annihilated as an
individual, not individually, but as a nation, the fear of genocidelurks in
the soul of every Armenian (de Waal, 2003, p. 117).
11. It is not my goal to examine the degree of correctness or erroneousness of
the arguments presented in this work. Probably the only thing that needs to
be noted here is that since the works objective is to substantiate the claims
of one side to Nagornyi Karabakh, like any such work, it is characterized
by one-sidedness, oversimplification, tendentiousness, and selectivity in pre-
senting the material and interpreting the events.
12. The only table in the work has the caption Size and National Composition
of the Population of NKAO (Galoian & Hudaverdian, 1988, p. 47).
13. Examples of the crude and straightforward reproduction of the template can
be seen, for example, in a book by Armenian journalist Z. Balaian, Hearth
[Ochag], reminding Armenians about their enemies the Turks; it was pub-
lished in 1984 in Erevan; also, 10,000 leaflets were handed out directly on
the eve of the rallies (February 1213, 1988) in Stepanakert (see de Waal,
2003).
14. It is notable that even the November 17 events on Lenin Square in Baku
were first reported in a short paragraph in a local Communist newspaper
only three days later, on November 20, 1988. (Sovet mtbuat meydan hrkat
bard nlr yazrd? 2012)
15. There is also another indication to the involvement of memory perspec-
tive in the conflict. Thus, Azerbaijanis perceived the Topkhana forest not
only just a part of their territory but as a national shrine due to the fact
that a battle against Iranian forces had taken place there in the eighteenth
century (Shaffer, 2002).
16. Though in this chapter we have discussed the role of collective memory re-
garding only one of the several conflicts in the South Caucasus, there is
Collective Memory273
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wbespm040
CHAPTER 12
BACKGROUND
culture, and economy (Smith, 1991). Others, like Ruth Wodak, say that
national identity is merely a construction that is discursively produced and
dismantled (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999). Jrgen Habermas
(1990) contends that, historically, scholars conceived of national identity
and citizenship (i.e., political participation) as separate entities. Thus,
many scholars concede that the conversations and definitions for national
identity are varied, to say the least.
Social identity theory, however, provides useful grounding for these
conversations. Tajfel (1981) argues that a social identity is an awareness of
ones membership within a group, partnered with a psychological sense
of attachment to that group. Huddy and Khatib (2007) take this a step
further and define national identity as a subjective or internalized sense of
belonging to the nation (p. 65). The researchers used surveys from three
subject pools in the United States to test how different kinds of national
attachment affected political involvement.
The forms of national attachment they tested were: national iden-
tity (using the definition above), symbolic patriotism (a love of national
symbols), constructive patriotism (a willingness to constructively criticize
ones nation), and uncritical patriotism (an unwillingness to criticize ones
nation). To illustrate, for national identity, they asked participants ques-
tions like, How well does the term American describe you? and asked
participants to rate their answers on a scale. For symbolic patriotism, they
asked questions like, How good does it make you feel when you see an
American flag? For constructive patriotism, the researchers asked people
to rate their level of agreement with statements like, If I criticize the
United States, I do so out of love of country. For uncritical patriotism,
they asked for level of agreement with statements like, The United States
is virtually always right. To measure political involvement, they tested
participants knowledge of electoral politics and current events, and asked
about voter turnout. They used a self-reporting measure for voter turnout.
Their experimental results showed that out of all of the measures, national
identity (a sense of belonging to the national group) was the best predictor
of political involvement (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Particularly because of its
apparent role in encouraging civic activity, they found that identification
with the national group may be a better explanation for what politicians
and other political actors seek to engender. Such findings correspond with
work on issues such as belonging and place (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005;
Davidson, 2000; Malkki, 1995).
We now know how some scholars define national identity. We also now
have a useful and tested definition for national identity: feelings of belong-
ing to a national group. However, how does this feeling of belonging form
in the first place? Predominant theories from collective memory and
nationalism studies argue that elites or government officials are the ones
280G. K. ONYENEHO
generally argues for the centrality of textual media and elite involvement
in the formation of modern nation-states.
Nigerian Data
1. The death of a journalist named Dele Giwa who was bomb blasted
2. 1993 June 12 Abiola died the day he was to be declared governor
of Lagos State [note: Moshood Abiola actually ran for president of
Nigeria not governor of Lagos State]
3. 117 people died on plane crash in Ogun state on 27th Oct. 2005
4. Engineer Funsho Williams, the PDP constant for Lagos state gover-
norship, was assassinated on 27th July 2001
5. The deaths of corpers on Election Day through bomb blast that
claimed lives [corpers are Nigerian young adult members of the
National Youth Service Corps, a required national guard program
for recent college graduates.]
The respondent chose 1993 June 12 Abiola died the day he was to be
declared governor of Lagos State as the most important event in Nigerian
history. She explained, writing, Abiola died on 1993 June 12. The day he
died was a memorable day. People were harassed, raped, and killed. Lives/
souls were lost who would have change the future of this corrupt country,
but now souls are been destroyed for just a man. Peoples source of income
were destroyed. This day was a memorable day of the people of Nigeria
till today.
Another respondent listed:
1. Slave trade
2. Colonial rule
3. Independence
4. Assassination of Gen. Murtala Muhammaed
5. The June 12 election of the best (which arein the country) that
was cancelled
collectively imagine the nation, and their attachment to it, through a variety
of mechanisms, again such as music, dance, or food. In Nigeria, I argue
that it is not through reading, hearing, or otherwise consuming a grand,
national narrative that people identify with their nation, but through the
cultural and distinctive act of lamenting the governments failure to live
up to independence-era expectations of democratic and fair governance
and also through distinctive Nigerian jokes and storytelling about mythic
government corruption.
I hypothesize that corruption lament is a cultural tool that Nigerians
use to gain a sense of belonging in a Nigerian nation. This lament may
not be enforced or even necessarily manufactured by national elites, since
it takes aim at elites. However, as a form of speech, Nigerians may choose
to participate in corruption lament due to grassroots pressure to fit in with
people around them, and not necessarily due to pressure from generally
uninterested elites. As mentioned earlier, such pressure is classic of what is
described in sociolinguistics and ethnomethodologythe pressure of fol-
lowing social norms. If corruption complaint is used widely to experience
national identity, it is an unexpected but ingenious invention to solve a
basic human desire for belonging. I also posit that in many cases, instead
of placing moral valence on an amoral entity, a country, some Nigerians use
corrupt in a different sensethat the country has been corrupted by politi-
cians or is in a state of decay due to the neglect of national leaders. Finally,
going back to the nonconvergence of the survey responses, it may be that
in other countries with limited government management, one would see
similar survey results to those I found in Nigeria. This is also a point for
further research.
More recent interview data seems to support the idea that Nigerians
rather tend to identify as citizens of their nation through corruption com-
plaint than through knowledge of national history or pro-elite nationalistic
narratives. During fieldwork in Nigeria during 2014, the countrys 100th
anniversary, while conducting interviews specifically about Nigerian history,
many individuals quickly reverted to complaints about modern-day Nige-
rian problems, particularly about members of government. For example,
after asking certain individuals to tell me their versions of Nigerian history,
these are the responses I immediately received. A higher-income mother
residing in my urban site who identifies as Igbo said:
My version? Thats what I want to say. Because one thing one thing with me
is that, as a person, I dont always like to, you know, have much to do with,
Nigeria did this, Nigeria did that, you know, because of what is happen-
ing. In fact, personally, I dont know much about Nigeria. If you ask me why,
I will tell you that it is because of the attitude of our administratorsin fact,
generally what is happening in the country. So, itssomehow one can say
Memory and National Identity in a Modern State 287
that, personally Ive lost interest.... We are not happy about it, anyway, but
all the same....
From my experience, what I know is things are getting worse. So things are
getting worse now, both the suffering, the killing, so we areI dont know
whether we have a government in Nigeria now because they are not doing
their duties. They cannot protect us, even our property. So you cant go
now to church and worship. We dont have, let me say, freedom of worship
or communicating or movement, so we need help. I dont know what else I
can say.
After I asked for his version of Nigerian history, the beginning of a con-
versation with an unemployed young man from my rural site who identifies
as Igbo went like this:
Haha, well, Nigeria is a country I dont know much about it, butthey
are good people. Apart from political problems, you know terrorism,
Boko Haram, militants, like I said. Let me say, bad economics, mhmm.
I dont think they have much problem, so, they are good people (long
pause) So, thats all I can say.
I then asked him, OK. How about the past of Nigeria, tell me about the
history of Nigeria. So the beginning of Nigerian history until now.
The beginning of Nigerian history? he asked.
Yes, so what were doing now is Nigerian history.
Well, I dont do history. Do you think at my age I can know all thatif I
dont read it?
Particularly given that such answers were often the first responses to a
question about Nigerian history, not modern-day Nigerian national affairs,
these data seem to support findings by earlier scholars pointing to the
prevalence of Nigerian corruption complaint. Its prevalence, coupled with
the fact that such complaint typically appears when Nigeria is the subject
matter and that Nigerians tend to speak in this way with one another,
indicates that it may be a way in which Nigerians experience a Nigerian
national identity or belonging.
Jokes about Nigerian corruption also played an important role in inter-
views. Obadare has described the importance of humor in the development
of Nigerian civil society (Obadare, 2009). For example, one of my infor-
mants told me this joke and story at the end of his interview:
He said when God created the world, he now summoned the whole nations
for a meeting to share his wealth. There [were] some countries he gave
white vegetation, yellow vegetation, black vegetation, green vegetation. And
vegetation means rich in agriculture. So, he gave Nigeria green vegeta-
tion. There are countries he gave snow. Snow may fall three months in a
year, and if snow is falling, there wont be any grass to grow. He didnt give
Nigeria that type of weather. He gave us seasonal weatherdry season, rainy
season, which is another blessing. Then, he was sharing his minerals. He
gave Nigeria all mineralsgold, aluminum, silvername it. And in Gods
classification, according to the journalist, he said government is the last to
share. Green vegetation was third to the last, oil was the second to the last,
and government was the last. So, when he was doing that, reaching the third,
he gave Nigeria green vegetation, and the other nations started to grudge,
After giving them gold, mineral, aluminum mineral, ore, zinc, youre still
giving them green vegetation?
According to the write-up, God didnt mind their grudges. So, now on
the second one, to share petroleumcrude oil, he gave Nigeria this crude
oil, and the nations around him revolted against God, that they cant have
it. He [had] given Nigeria so many things that, Ah! how can he give them
oil again? Crude oil to add to the blessings he has already. The man
said God called them backthat they shouldnt revolt, that they shouldnt
grudge, he is God, and he distributes his resources according to his will
that they should wait and see the type of government he will give Nigeria.
So, the writer stopped there. And our problem today is the type of govern-
ment we have. Thats the only problem that Nigeria has.
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Memory and National Identity in a Modern State 291
CONNECTING DOTS
Family Reminiscence
INTRODUCTION
family members recall the past, unknown to the younger generation, and
how the younger generation members display their understanding and
engage in the intergenerational communication as memory practice. To
begin with, present with a review of the relevant literature, namely on family
reminiscence. We eclectically draw on the traditions including discursive
psychology and sociocultural theory to analyze the materials gathered as
an exploratory case study of a British three-generational family engaged
in reminiscence talk. Our analysis will focus on what has been talked about
and how the family members pasts were handled in the talk-in-interaction.
Lastly, we address theoretical and practice implications of family reminis-
cence in terms of human development as the ornamental world.
Reminiscence Revisited
Reminiscence is ubiquitous in peoples lives. Reminiscence research
has continued to attract researchers and practitioners in a range of fields
including therapy, education, and psychology, among others (Webster et
al., 2010). Yet reminiscence research tends to focus on the elderly and the
296K. MURAKAMI and R. L. JACOBS
events (Mercer, 2000), some of which are difficult to deal with emotionally.
Rather than assuming that there is a pre-established family membership,
our analysis is aimed at showing how family membership is made salient in
reminiscence talk (Buchanan & Middleton, 1995), while processing some-
times difficult emotions.
An increased self-understanding and stronger sense of well-being are
claimed to be a benefit and value of family reminiscence. We emphasize
the significance of this when intergenerational families reminisce. Younger
family members learn about the time before they were even born from
older family members, as the older members speak about their life in child-
hood and youth either in well-constructed stories or fragmented accounts
of past events. These stories and accounts produced in the social interac-
tion of the family represent knowledge of the past. Such knowledge of
the familys past is very different from that resulting from a pure recall
task in the experimental situation. The reminiscence talk-in-interaction
within the family would reveal a dynamic, interpretive nature of knowledge
production of family history. It is a discursive forum of family members
striving to understand the past unknown, or, in Butlers sense, life review
and joint interpretation of the past that becomes available to the interlocu-
tors (members taking part in the reminiscence).
Reminiscence is an active meaning-making process, meaning that con-
tinuity is a dynamic process requiring the listener to focus on what is being
conveyed and retain it for future recall. This requires an active engagement
with spoken information in order to learn. Active learning is supported by
Freire (1970), who argues that much learning is ineffective, as it is banked
for future retrieval only in particular situations. He argues for an alterna-
tive form of education that encourages individuals to actively participate in
order to experience social transformation. Although Freire is primarily con-
cerned with formal education, the ideas are applicable to reminiscence. It is
crucial for participants, adult and children alike, to avoid passive listening
during reminiscence in order to maximize their learning potential. This is
essential for continuity to be achieved, as children need to be engaged with
the task in order to learn and form connections between the situated self
and others (Cryer McKay, 1993). This can be observed language, which is
a constructive medium that achieves various functions that will be analyzed
throughout this research (Buchanan & Middleton, 1994).
Reviewing Life
ANALYSIS
Topical Prevalence
In order to gain a grasp of what has been reminisced amongst the family
members, we generated a list of topical prevalence. The time frame ranges
from childhood, school days, and work, to young adulthood, including
marriage and having a family. In Session 1, the participants largely focused
around topics such as Christmas and presents, then money, family life,
health, work, jobs, and arts and crafts. Session 2 started with the older
generation members reminiscing on school, school subjects, Brownies,
work, and then again money, followed by transport, hobbies, food, war, and
rations. Session 3s starting point was the question of how the grandparents
met, their wedding, then on to their first house, sport, and having family
and jobs. Topical prevalence was evidenced in the participants constant
reference to money (or not having money in many conversations) and the
scarcity of materials while living in 1940s Britain, the war and post war
300K. MURAKAMI and R. L. JACOBS
years. Not having money or food and not having access to education seem
to be strong undercurrents, symbolizing the financial hardship and lack
of material wealtha theme that runs through two of the three sessions.2
15 B: [Usually was
experience, posing questions to the grandmother and the great aunt who
are in the know.
The turn-taking sequence in the reminiscence talk is invariably jointly
performed by M (question)=>G=>B (or B=>G) and then a number of
overlaps are used to jointly complete the utterance or often to elaborate
on the utterance made for further details. The use of tag questions by G
and B is a recurrent discursive strategy, which works as a tying mechanism
to create a continuous flow of talk, each taking turn, nominating/signaling
the other to take a turn and to finish each others utterance. The shared
nature of a past experience such as the family Christmas is discursively
displayed and achieved. This type of joint construction of the past may
be termed as cumulative talk (Mercer, 2000) in which interlocutors jointly
engage in recalling an event or a film they watched, as in the conversational
remembering experiment undertaken by Middleton and Edwards (1990).
Another formulation frequently emerging across the reminiscence talk
is a rhetorical contrast in the prevalent topics of money, issues of finan-
cial hardship and the lack of material wealth resulting from not having
much money. Here the joint storytelling on the grandmother and great
aunts long gone youth is characterized by they never had much money
(T.9), collocated with lovely Christmas as a rhetorical contrast. The contrast
enhances the latter despite the negative aspect, the financial hardship.
The older generation members financially not-well-off days was brought
up as a way of enhancing a point that one can spend lovely time over
Christmas, even with limited means, such as using pillowcase for the
Christmas stocking.
Jointly remembering salient issues such as never had money in the
formulation of we never had X is evident across the three sessions of
reminiscence. Traces of issues of money (or rather, the lack of) can be seen
continually throughout the talk, and mapping its path reveals its indexi-
cal function (Turnbull, 2003). Perhaps it is not immediately obvious, but
this rhetorically contrasted formulation is something that can be easily
remembered. Over time, the hearer may recall this message and come to
regard it as a lesson to be learned. You can have Christmas without too
much money. You can get by spending Christmas without money. Inven-
tiveness was positively emphasized by implication. During this exchange,
the rhetorical contrast, which communicates the value of money, creates
an educational narrative.
Money
different ways. This extract is taken from the beginning of Session 2, where
discussions are in transition between schooling and jobs. In the extract, B
talks of her days as being an employee in wartime Britain. B is positioning
herself not only as a wage earner, but as a sister, mother, wife, and many
other positions relevant to the framework of the reminiscence talk. What
is important is that it is through the talk that these different roles, which B
and G lived in the past, are revealed.
Extract 2:
1 B: Well I-I-I left in the July and I was fourteen in the August
2 G: Yea
3 B: and I started work in the September ((cough)) a bit before the September
actually
4 G: and how much did you earn ((in a laughing voice))
5 B: Twelve and ((cough)) twelve and six pence (1.0) sixty five pence ((laugh))
6 M: ((Gasp of breath))
7 G: ((laughs)) and do you know
8 M: a week
9 B: a week
cence talk examined here is inundated with. The participants use them in
retelling the story. They are used to inflect on the same story in different
ways. Throughout all recordings, laughter is expressed by all involved. This
kind of laughter communicates a mutual understanding of the cheerful
atmosphere, the singling affective atmosphere (Anderson, 2009). From
a conversation analytic perspective, laughter has been studied as being
highly organized in social interaction and is the product of an ordering
that provides for all social interaction (Holt, 2012). Note that in Extract
2, G->B->M->G sequence, G and Bs utterances are tied with laughter.
G and B are jointly producing an explanation of the particular currencys
equivalent in the discussion of weekly wages, marked by laughter. In this
case, shared laughter indicates who is in the know, jointly creating an atmo-
sphere. Along with the cheerful atmosphere, Silverman (1998), drawing
on Sacks, suggests that laughter can work as a way of attuning someone to
know how to hear someones story. The cheerful atmosphere is achieved
interactionally with an attention to recipient design (how to hear the story)
marked by joint laughter and other paraverbal features.
Art of Continuity
Extract 3:
1 G: yeah I was but you see I had left school at 16 because (2) I was you see we werent
encouraged to carry on really and the last, on my last report (.) the headmistress said
I had done very well and it was a shame that I wasnt interested in (.) in taking it
further but wed not been encouraged to and I mean (.) dont know if I would have
wanted to have left home but then, wed had no suggestion of what we could do
see
2 M: no
3 B: we didnt have career talks [or anything like that
4 G: [No no
5 B: nothing like [that
6 G: [No nothing like that at all
7 B: it was all so different
8 G: mm (.) mm
Learning by Participation
ask questions. Extract 4 captures the moment when she asked a question
to the grandmother after G and B jointly construct an account of their
work after leaving school and the wage that both sisters were paid. The
granddaughter-researcher (RJ) as a grandchild joins in the conversation
in Extract 4.
Extract 4:
1 G: And out of that, I think you always used to give me six pence
2 B: I dont remember that
3 G: Yea
4 B: I dont remember that
5 RJ: Was that a good pay for then? Or was it, was it average
or was it [low?
6 G: [Well it was
7 B: [It was only average
8 G: [Yes yea
Extract 5:
1 B: you see all the history and geography lessons are different today they do
entirely different things
2 G&B: ((Inaudible))
3 RH: (2) yea
4 B: the subjects dont they
5 G: when Harriet said she was doing geography and when she said, I said thats
not geography ((laughs))
6 M: thats human geography
7 RJ: yea its human geography there is a lot more focus on that now
8 B: see you cant really compare it with teaching today can you
9 G: no n-o it was just the three Rs with us wasnt it?
DISCUSSION
The present research set out to address the questions: What do family
members do in reminiscence talk? What discursive devices are used to posi-
tion family members in the collective understanding and making of family
history? For the first question, in the family reminiscence talk, they formu-
late the sense of the past, weaving stories together while creating continuity,
using a discursive category, money, putting together fragments of stories
of individual experiences. The younger member of the family became
increasingly engaged and actively contributed to the ongoing storytelling
as the sessions progressed, moving from the peripheral to the core in the
discursive frame. Furthermore, they seem to have developed a sense of
family continuity by positioning themselves in different times and places in
joint storytelling. Laughter and other paraverbals are a notable discursive
feature of the family reminiscence, a way of managing the talk by warding
off any potential troubles and difficulties that might arise from stories told.
It is potentially due to the art of attunement, a way of attuning someone
to know how to hear someones story that the family reminiscence such
as this resulted in a positive experience for all who took part. The family
membership is not simply given; it is built upon by taking turns, and jointly
constructed (and reinforced) in talk in interaction as part of discursive
accomplishment.
What are the implications of these social interactions of family reminis-
cence? As shown in the analysis, reminiscence talk-in-interaction is a critical
process that goes beyond simply discussing past events and objects (Fivush,
2008). As there are many additional dimensions to the talk, it could be
argued that reminiscence even transcends discourse in terms of spoken lan-
guage and talk-in-interaction in situ. Through reminiscence, we tell stories
about events to help adolescent develop sense of self-understanding
(Fivush, 2008, p. 54). In the telling of these stories, we place ourselves
in the event, recalling not only the details, but the desires, thoughts, and
experiences, adding an emotional dimension to the talk. It is important
Connecting Dots309
IMPLICATIONS
NOTES
1. Please be reminded that this research was undertaken under the auspices of
the University of Bath, with which both authors were then affiliated.
2. Please note that this is not the same as family being poor. It was constructed
as not having money consistently throughout the reminiscence talk.
REFERENCES
INDIVIDUAL REMEMBERING AS
INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT
Reminiscing in Collective Interviewing
Wolff-Michael Roth
There is here, as it were, a fundamental position of time and also the most profound
paradox of memory: The past is contemporaneous with the present that it has been.
(Deleuze, 1966/2004, p. 54)
Fragment 1
present tense in turns 219 and 221 as the reference to present actions,
such as Im listening and I remember), and, therefore, co-exist with
the present in the present, we observe a transition from not remembering
to remembering, that is, evidence of the temporality of memory in the
course of the present interview. The process of the interview, the returning
of memory and memories, and the remembered events all unfold together
with the interview talk. The space-times of the past and present lives come
to be intertwined and constituted simultaneously.
The study of memory has a long history in philosophy from Plato (e.g.,
the Phaedrus) and Aristotle (Physics) to more recent times (Bergson, 1929;
Derrida, 1972) and in literature (e.g., Proust, 1919), but it also constitutes
an important feature of everyday life.3 In mundane professional settings,
memory frequently is treated as something like a storehouse (e.g., long-
term memory) from which some homunculus pulls representations of the
past into working memory (e.g., Slj, 2002). This storehouse image of
(long-term) memory is fraught with many logical problems and incon-
sistencies (Changeux & Ricur, 2000; Ricur, 2000, 2005). The special
feature of humans is their ability to regulate the functioning of their brain
by means of signs from without, which means, that rather than focusing on
the structures of the brain we can focus on those collective practices that are
used to control the brain, for example, allowing us to remember (Vygotskij,
2005). Narratives are structured sign complexes that organize and provide
resources to memory. This is why Bakhtin (1981), as Ricur (1984, 1985,
1988), is in a position to suggest that the objective forms of culture, which
include the forms of written language and spoken speech, constitute that
which can be handed on (events of the past) rather than individual subjec-
tive memory or some kind of collective psyche. Although Bakhtin says little
about the relation between memory and narrative in his chapter, Forms of
Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, and even though he downplays
the mnemonic function of certain literary forms, I employ the chronotope
as an analytic category to exhibit the complex layering of temporal forms
and relationsas per the introductory quotation by Deleuzein situations
where groups produce narrative accounts of what has happened some time
past. The collective work by means of which such narrative accounts are
produced is reminiscing, which is
storiesone of a child left in the forest as his parents abandoned him, the
other an autobiographical account of a boy exploring an abandoned house.
His feelings of abandonment cannot be reduced to some raw capacity of
the child, but in the childs relation to the parents. Halbwachs suggests
that both began to view their situations through their relations with their
parents. That is, even though these two boys were completely alone and in
the absence of their parents, what they experienced and how they behaved
was mediated by the relations that they have had with their parents, made
present again in the situation of the experience.
The [interviews] went very well, we found that having Frances there, who
knows nothing about the project, was really useful, as it draws peoples sto-
ries out, whereas with me, well I know what we did. It was good to have me
there, because as they told the story, I could prompt and probe them, draw
more detail out.
she remembered an event because she just about fell in [the creek] high-
lights the fact that dramatic (aspects of) events are more easily remembered
than others. Precisely the features that make certain genres remarkable and
interesting, such as drama or the comical, also contribute to making them
memorable. Central to the philosophical discussions of memory are nar-
ratives, which are marked by specific characters (hero(in)es, antihero(in)
es) and plots. Plots and anti/heroes evolve together and stand in mutually
constitutive relations. The emplotment makes use of specific spaces/places
and times, chronotopes (Bakhtin, 1981) that create the genre-typical effect.
Memory is mediated by the intensity of the effect, for example, the unfold-
ing drama. In the present interview, Michelle introduced an event in which
there was a falling tree that scared her.
Despite the remarkable nature of the event, the initial account produced
was rather short but contained characters and a plot. As she talks about col-
lecting dirt samples, measuring moisture levels, and figuring out the plants
growing in the area, she notes that the tree fell on us just about (turn 8).
Fragment 2
8 M: And like the dirt samples and sand and figured out how moist it was, and
the plants around it and the tree fell on us just about ((laughs)).
12 M: I was hiding behind big, big trees. If it falls on me, its falling on the tree
first.
13 ((Everyone laughs))
creek was so deep that it almost reached the rim of Michelles riding
boots (the second highest boots of all), and when she (the antihero-
ine) all about but fell in, and where Lisa (another antiheroine) got her
boots filled with water. This constituted a special effect of this rendering,
as shown by the fact that all laughed once Michelle was done talking
(turn 13). Such laughter is typical of slapstick movies, where something
happens to the otherwise sympathetic antihero. Such points stand out
when the three participants in the curriculum attempt to think about
what else they remember. Thus, a relevant turn sequence begins with
Stuarts statement that he is trying to think of other thingsthose that
Frances might want to ask them aboutbut that he cant really think of
(i.e., remember) anything (turn 192).
Fragment 3
192 S: Do you have any other questions, Frances? Im trying to think. But I
cant really think of anything.
194 S: Yea.
195 M: I just remember the tree falling, just about falling in, and all of the
coliform.
Fragment 4
283 S: I just remember you guys scrambling around. Well, I remember a lot of
things
284 F: But you didnt remember the tree falling.
285 S: Well once she told me it, how could I forget.
286 ((Everyone laughs.))
287 F: That was one of the highlights.
The participants then further elaborated the story and, thereby, con-
stituted the context within which the plot unfolded. Michelle states that it
had been a windy day (turn 288), and Stuarts comment, which included an
onomatopoeia that recreated the sound of a strong wind among the trees
(turn 289), confirmed the presence of wind on that day. The wind was so
strong that Michelle suggests having said, a tree is going to fall down,
which, in fact, occurred about five minutes later. She reiterates that the
falling tree had made her sufficiently scared to run and hide behind a tree.
She was actually so scared that she almost jumped out of her pants (turn
290). But the story does not end there, for Jennifer adds that they were
then running out of that place, allowing Michelle to add another dramatic
element: they had to jump over a barbed wire, which was falling in, and
that this made her just about fall into a pothole (turn 292).
Fragment 5
The fact that something after the fact is marked as having been fun, and,
therefore, as having stood out of the more ordinary parts of a day, does not
guarantee it being actively remembered.
Individual Remembering as Interactive Achievement 329
Fragment 6
87 S: It kept getting caught up in grass and stuff cause there wasnt much
water.
88 J: Yea, and there was like clay or something like that around there; it felt
like it.
89 S: Yea.
90 J: I was throwing it on the road.
91 S: It was very clay=ee.
Fragment 7
The accounts generally were tied to specific places where an event had
taken place, or where they had done something specific: on the property
of the lady who got upset, in Centennial Park, on the site near Malcolm
Road, or the open-house event where Michelle had presented the results
of her groups project.5 Frequently there were dramatic elements attached
to the places, such as when Michelle got scared when they were in a place
without trails where a tree was falling; Jennifer crossed the creek on trees,
something they were not allowed to do (Stuart forbid it); she climbed a
tree hanging over the water; Michelle almost fell into the creek and Laura,
the third member of the group not present during the interview, actu-
ally fell in; they went through the culvert repeatedly (4 or 5 times) after
Stuart had given in, and this was so important that Michelle had forgotten
whether they actually tested the water in the culvert; they always appeared
to miss the access to their research Site #1; they plowed through the fern
(Stuart); and they jumped the barbed wire and Michelle almost fell into
the pothole.
Even though some aspect of the past events might not be present to
an individual, the articulation of the slightest aspect may unleash a sub-
stantial account of what had happened at a particular day and time. It is
as if a single note or chord sets off (triggers) an entire (kinetic) melody
that unfolds correctly in time even though it had not been present (Luria,
1973; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011). It has been suggested that the function
of language is to let a phenomenon show itself from itself (Heidegger,
Individual Remembering as Interactive Achievement 331
Fragment 8
126 S: So you guys also wanted to, do you remember, one day you wanted to do, I
think was it, bird songs or something? You brought your ghetto blaster.
127 M: Oh yea. But that really didnt work. There were no birds that day.
128 J: Right.
129 M: There were no birds that day. The week, like the time we went before,
there were so many birds. There were like barely any birds that day. We
didnt get any.
130 S: And did you, oh, you took your cameras that one time.
131 M: Yea. I took my camera.
132 J: Did that ever work?
133 S: There was a problem with the film wasnt there?
134 M: Yea my film didnt catch like always so I got a new camera the other week,
a couple of weeks ago.
135 J: Thats too bad though because well we did have a few pictures like Mrs.
Roche got some.
136 S: Yea.
137 M: But yea like my film when we went to Mexico, it didnt catch.
138 S: Oh geez
Fragment 9
Fragment 10
The turn What was that about? (turn 63) not merely asks about the
incident that the girls appear to be referring to, but also marks the ques-
tioners ignorance concerning its nature. That is, Stuart thereby also states
that he does not know what the girls are referring to, and, with it, that
what they have said so far is insufficient for him to remember, if indeed he
could do so. In her reply, Michelle states that the instant pertained to the
moisture and depth of the water (turn 64), which appears to be sufficient to
allow Stuart to remember, as indicated by the surprise-marking interjection
Oh, followed by the repeated affirmation Yea (turn 65). Jennifer also
connotes remembering, using the same interjection and adverb combina-
tion, and beginning a statement about seeing how much plant life there
was in a certain amount of area (turns 66 & 68)though the formulation
or whatever marks the plant life part as uncertain. Stuart states not only
that he remembers what has been said but also the fact that it is coming
back to him, thereby pointing to the emergent aspect of memory. It is not
Stuart who actively remembers, but there is an aspect of passivity in that the
memories (it) themselves return to him, who is but a host to them. The
interviewer formulates what has happened as being good memory for this
[curriculum unit], especially given the fact that what they had done spe-
cifically and the events sketched generally happened last year (turn 70).
Forgetting and remembering as topics may appear in ways that it are
not immediately evident if something had been forgotten or not. In the
334W.-M. ROTH
Fragment 11
Here, the sequence from turns 37 to the beginning of turn 39, when
Stuart said Good and We did that, which would be the evaluative turn,
does indeedwithout any additional information about intonation, body
position, gestures, facial expressions, and so onmark that an evaluative
turn has followed the initiation (turn 37) and the reply (turn 38). But then
Stuart adds, I remember that (turn 39), in which the preceding reply was
marked as something that had been remembered rather than constituting
a normative item already present in his mind and against which he evalu-
ated the students replies. That is, whereas the first part of turn 39 allows
hearing it as an evaluative statement pertaining to the correctness of the
reply with respect to the turn-sequence initiating query, the latter part
makes it an instance of a remembered item.
Fragment 12, Stuart asks the two girls to remember that they had been
to the little swamps and the pond areas (turn 118), but then adds with
a hedge that he thinks the teacher had driven them there, followed by
another hedge may be that renders uncertain whether it in fact had been
the teacher. The next turn confirms and therefore increases certainty that
the events had been as described, introduced by a marker that that aspect
has just been remembered (oh) and repeated markers of affirmation
(right, yea, turn 119).
Fragment 12
118 S: Just up in the little swamps and the pond areas. Remember we visited that
one day. I think Laurie drove us up there that, maybe.
119 J: Oh, right, yea. Yea.
Fragment 13
So you guys also wanted to, do you remember, one day you wanted to do, I
126 S:
think was it, bird songs or something? You brought your ghetto blaster.
Fragment 14
246 S: It was like three months or something like when did we start? In February
or January?
247 M: I think it was in January.
248 J: Yea, in January. Well like
249 M: Through till like March or April or something like that.
250 J: It was like the end of the year when were out there like we were out there
on the last two weeks of school.
251 M: Yea, so till June.
252 S: Yea, cause when was the open house. The open house was on May twenty-
nine.
253 M: Thats five months.
254 S: Yea, I guess so.
336W.-M. ROTH
In Fragment 13, there are two hedges, the I think preceding the uncer-
tain memory whether bird songs had been the topic of the day, followed by
an or something (turn 126). Another expression marking a certain level
of uncertainty about the contents of memory is or something like that.
The hedges allow the formulation of a specific fact or date as a tentative
one, without loss of face when the statement turns out to be incorrect. In
Fragment 14, more specific dates for the beginning, end, and length of
the curriculum then emerge in and from multiple statements all marked
by hedges (see underlined parts).
The dialectic of forgetting and remembering may play out in the very
instant that the speaker is attempting to express or question something that
s/he turns out to have difficulties in making present. In Fragment 15, Stuart
will have begun something that anticipated the coming of a questionin
the grammatical structure of the did you...but then articulates trying to
remember what he keeps mentioning and that the question presumably is
to be about (turn 146). He says out loud an internal dialogue that features
several voices trying to remember. That is, the content is both absent, so
that Stuart marks it as trying to remember it, and sufficiently present, in
that Stuart knows there to be something to be remembered but that he
does not do right now.
Fragment 15
146 S: So did you guys learn anything- one thing that I am trying to remember
that I kept mentioning what was it now? Ummm learn anything about the
landscape and the environment like the relationship?
147 M: Oh yea, there were lots of differences like in Centennial ((Park)), there
was a big hill that was coming down. And by the roads it was more flat but
by the road there were a lot more farms and stuff, so it was really gross.
conduct their investigation. The point of the story is that the lady was angry
about someone on her property even though she had previously given
permission for the school students to conduct research from her property.
Stuart initially says that he has forgotten about that incident, but then asks
whether he had been with the party at the time (turn 179). Michelle affirms
negatively (turn 181), and Jennifer does so with a hedge (I dont think so
turn 180). Also using a hedge (I think) Stuart then suggests that he would
have remembered that (i.e., the incident)even though the case parallels
the one with the falling tree. In saying this, Stuart also affirms the plot line
as something sufficiently remarkable so that it would have stayed in his
memoryas the falling tree should have beenrather than forgotten, as
he initially assumes.
Fragment 16a
177 J: Well she knew we were there oh that was with Mrs. Roche cause she
knew we were there. She came out. She thought we were like
178 M: She was like What are you doing there? We were like Ahhh, you gave
us permission, Oh yea, go ahead.
179 S: I had forgotten about that. Was I there at that time?
180 J: I dont think so.
181 M: No.
182 S: I think I would have remembered that.
183 M: Yea she came out and went, What are you doing here? and her dog was
behind her.
184 S: Who, where was that?
185 J: Mount Newton Crossroad, or something like that.
186 S: Oh, I know who that is. Oh, that happened, oh, I wasnt there, good
thing.
187 ((Jennifer & Michelle laugh))
followed by Michelle, who comments that she would not have known
leaving unspecific the bullrushes or the not very exciting nature of the
daybecause she had not been present on that day (i.e., not attended
school).
The subsequent turns then further elaborated the event in a way that
its nature as a sufficiently dramatic event to be remembered stood out. In
fact, although Stuart had not been there, it turns out that he knows the
lady from having done some work with another school and having had
problems with her at that time. Perhaps even more interestingly, although
his not remembering comes to be attributed to his nonparticipation on that
day, Stuart subsequently remarks that he actually knows about the event:
he had heard a different version of that story without the you said we
could be here part (turn 190). That is, Stuart apparently is cognizant of
the event, in some form, notes that he could not have known about it, but
then acknowledges to know about it through hearsay.
Fragment 16b
188 S: I know exactly who that is. So what were, you guys, you guys were
wandering around in the creek area?
189 M: Yea and she comes out and shes like, What are you doing here? Ummm,
and then we just kinda all looked at Mrs. Roche. You said we could.
190 S: Oh really thats interesting. Thats very interesting. I heard a different
version of that story without the you said we could be here part.
191 M: ((Laughs)) Yea when she came out.
192 S: Yea pretty upset. Yea we are trying to do some things around the creek in
Saanichton School this year. A teacher asked me if I would do some stuff.
So she is the mum of one of the kids in the class and she wants him not
even involved with the whole thing at all.
Fragment 17
283 S: I just remember you guys scrambling around. Well, I remember a lot of
things
288 M: Well, that was like a really windy day and I had seen
289 S: I know all of the trees were ((whooshing sounds))
place lends itself to unforeseen events and happenings to which the (auto/
biographical) tragicomical heroes were subjected. The temporality of the
situation was one of urgency, requiring quick action on the part of Michelle,
and a hurried retreat over difficult-to-manage terrain. The hurried retreat
involved having to jump a barbed-wire fence, which then led to a near fall
into a pothole. Readers familiar with slap-stick movies easily recognize
the pattern in the way this plot unfolds with its (stereo)typical slot for the
antihero.
In another situation, Michelle, Jennifer, and the remainder of the group
found themselves together with the teacher (Mrs. Roche) on the property
of a woman who initially appeared in the account in a witch-type fashion,
angry about the intruders, and a (menacing?) dog being behind her. Tres-
passing here is opposed to the recalled antecedent permission to do some
environmental research from the property. The moral of that story was
the contradiction in which the lady was shown to be, initially having given
permission for accessing her property and then insinuating an improper
trespassing. The situation was overturned when the angry person appar-
ently reverted in her position and recognizes her own fault (a typical
bad-person reversal story).
In reminiscing work, the biographical and autobiographical are blurred,
as one speaker may appear in the narrative account articulated by another,
who also is talking about herself. In the present instance, the purpose of
the meeting is not to re/constitute the entire life of the two main actors, to
whom Stuart is joined because he had shared in the experiences, but to (re)
constitute key moments that are representative of their experience within
this particular science-as-activism curriculum unit. The literary resources
for autobiography and biography are the same in the two cases, for every
literary discourse more or less sharply senses its own listener, reader, critic,
and reflects in itself their anticipated objections, evaluations, points of
view (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 196). That is, the logic internal to the two forms
is identical. The two forms differ as to the author. Not only Bakhtin but
also more recent sociological theories are adamant about not confusing the
two or about the fact that actors themselves have no better way of capturing
what has happened than outside observers (Bourdieu, 1980). Any narra-
tive, also, is in the form of a language that has come from the other and is
destined for the other, even if it is the other in the self. The sole difference
between the two literary forms lies in the author, who is present at the level
of the second chronotope, the one in which the text is constituted. The two,
the author as she figures in the text and the author configuring the text,
must not be confused, because the former is subject to the narrative forms
and associated chronotopes, whereas the second is subject to a different
chronotope. Bakhtin (1981) therefore distinguishes the two chronotopes:
the one that is internal to the narrative producedthe time space internal
342W.-M. ROTH
to the represented lifeand the one external to it, that is, the chronotope
of the actual telling of the auto/biography. In the case of a written novel, for
example, the external chronotope is made to all but disappear. In the col-
lective reminiscing, however, the external chronotope is one of the features
that is maintained in and with the same talk that also sustains the narrative
and represented chronotope. With respect to memory in memoires and
autobiography, Bakhtin suggests that it is of a special type: memory of
ones own contemporaneity and of ones own self (1981, p. 24). Without
further explanation, he describes it as a de-heroizing form of memory,
with some mechanical, mere transcriptional, pattern that lacks a historical
chronological pattern.
The present analyses show how collective memory of events and individ-
ual memories are intertwined, a relation that had been suggested to exist
between autobiographical memories and historical memory (Halbwachs,
1950). In the present studyfocusing as it does on inherently collective
reminiscing practicesthe jointly achieved account of past events can
be considered the pertinent collective and historical dimension. In the
fragments mobilized here, we observe that collective memory has its own
dynamics, though based on and enveloping individual memory. Specif-
ically, a participant might initially suggest not remembering or having
forgotten, and then actively contribute to the elaborative accounting of an
episode. That is, the ultimate account is not simply the sum total of what
individuals remember. As a narrative unfolds, new aspects of events are
remembered and affirmed by others. As a result, the account has emergent
qualities, where previous aspects can trigger the contingent elicitation of
other aspects. The emergent account, unpredictable in its form or content,
stimulates individuals recall of past events. Especially pertinent to the
present chapter, Halbwachs also shows that those remembrances that we
have most difficulty to recall are those that we have been the only witness
thereof, but, as they have escaped others, all the more they have escaped
ourselves. Even memories of this latter kind still involve others, often gen-
eralized rather than specific others, who are more removed and more
intermittent. This description allows us to relate reminiscing practices to
societal-historical approaches in psychology.
Societal relations between people are the locus of all higher psychologi-
cal functions; it is in and especially as societal relation that psychological
functions first appear (Vygotskij, 2005). In the fragments presented above,
reminiscing is a collective relation first before there are individual mem-
Individual Remembering as Interactive Achievement 343
NOTES
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of things past/In search of lost time: Swanns way]. Paris, FR: Gallimard.
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Press.
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Essays in hermeneutics, II). Paris, FR: ditions du Seuil.
Ricur, P. (1988). Time and narrative (Vol. 3). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Ricur, P. (1990). Soi-mme comme un autre [Oneself as another]. Paris, FR: ditions
du Seuil.
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FR: Seuil.
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ment]. Moscow, RUS: Eksmo.
CHAPTER 15
MAKING HISTORY
Apprehending Future While
Reconstructing the Past
membranes as concrete structures that both separate and link cells, organ-
isms could not exist. Likewise, the making (and unmaking) of border zones
and boundary conditions (constraintsValsiner, 1998) is the prerequisite
for psychological development.
The border isin its minimal casea zone that separates the dis-
tinguished fields (as in Figure 15.1). The border zone may remain
unstructuredspace (or time) in-between distinguished objects A and B.
Or it can become structuredby barriers and barrier-crossing features
being built in between (Figure 15.2).
What we see in Figure 15.2 is a door between an office and a public
corridor in a building. The glass door (=transparency between inside and
outside) is locked (no immediate access for outsidersefforts to immedi-
ately open the door fail, as it is locked). The insiders going out can open
the locked door without any problem. This arrangement negates the first
equality of the inside<>outside positions (created by transparency) and
replaces it with inequality (insiders>outsiders in the border crossing). The
inequality is further accentuated by the no smoking sign as the blocker
of transparency on the glass door.
The equality of opportunity for border crossinggoing from outside
inside and inside outsidebecomes restored by the system of door
opening. On the wall next to the dooron the outsideis a knob, the
pressing of which opens the locked door to any visitor (at least under ordi-
nary daytime working conditions). The instructions for crossing the border
are clearly marked on the door and on the wall (see arrows in Figure 15.2).
Making History349
The example in Figure 15.2 has generalization embedded into it. There
are many doors in the worldsome can be opened by keys, plastic cards, or
passwordsall demonstrating the fate-controlled nature of the autonomy
of the agent who enters. The owner can take back the keys (or change the
lock), the administrator of the card can annul it by few finger movements
on the computer keyboard. Passwords can be forgotten or mixed up. A
person can open the door to let in a prospective friend, or close the
door when the relationship goes astray. Any relationship is a constant
negotiation about the openings and closings of the borders between the
related agents (Simmel, 1994).
The door example is illustrative of how memory is constructed on the
border of human relating with the world. Given the open-systemic nature
of all human existence, memory can only be constructed through the
events on the border. On both sides of the unequal arrangement of the
insider<>outsider difference there exist modifications to the conditions of
boundary crossing. Ritualization of door opening (and closing) maintains
the memory of the events involvedranging from a daily search for ones
keys to open ones home door to ceremonial door openings at religious
buildings after years (e.g., Porta Sancta in San Pietro in Rome). Memories
of significant personal life events are made possible through marking of
border crossings by retained objects that carry the meanings of these events
into the future of ones life course. The making of pictures of children (and
insistent showing them to others), retaining wedding photographs (and
dresses), bringing back trivial objects from far-away places as meaningful
souvenirs, and retaining the birthday or Christmas cards received over
yearsare all examples of memory-making on the borders of human relat-
ing with the world.
Borders both connect and divide at the same time. They are the result of
the highly sophisticated human capability to make distinctions in order to
regulate the fluid dynamicity of the ambiguous environments. The border
construction is based on three subprocesses: meaning-making, distinction-
making, and value-adding. Through this three-phase psychological system,
individuals try to lessen the ambiguity articulating, differentiating, and
hierarchically organizing the relationship with the others and the environ-
ments. Once the borders are constructed, they are projected in the social
settings guiding the functioning of the human psyche (Valsiner, 1999, 2007,
2014b). So the same people who built the borders are engaged in a process
of border-maintaining and the borders themselves are naturalized
Making History351
MARKING OF DISTINCTIONS:
BORDERS THAT ACQUIRE HISTORY
Figure 15.3. Symbolic marker of the former barrier (the Berlin Wall).
for the immediate future. When we lose our external memory (cell phone)
and need to remember the phone number of the person we want to call,
it is for the immediate future of making the phone call. When a child is
remembering something during an exam, it is for getting a mark. When
a government erects a monument to a general (or tears down another of
another general who is a deposed leader of the losing country in a war),
it is all about the anticipated future, and so on. Memory serves the future,
and the future is ambiguous.
persons who are usually furnished with many personal things in the grave
(for their daily routines2) but it is placed somewhere far from the homes of
those still living. So, a cemetery, at same time, keeps the distance and makes
links between life and death, which is exactly what borders doseparate
by unifying (Simmel, 1994). So do the ruins.
In every single moment of life we are those who must die, and each moment
would be different if this were not in effect our predetermined condition.
Just as we are hardly already present at the moment of our birth, but rather
something is continuously being born from us, so too do we hardly die only
in our last moment. Death limits, that is, it gives form to life, not just in
the hour of death, but also continuously colouring all lifes contents. (p. 74)
There are daily and weekly time limits in all these places (the schools
are generally open only some hours during the days and closed at night;
cemeteries are open on the weekend until sunset, etc.). There are also some
restrictions for people entering: anybody has free access to the cemetery;
anybody has access to the museum, but in general only after buying a ticket;
but not anybody can enter the school. The openness/closeness dynamic
is what makes the institutional borders more or less permeable, and they
strongly guide the crossing of boundaries between inside/outside these
contexts (Marsico, 2013). The high fluidity in accessing Assistens Kirkegrd
in Copenhagen seems to contrast with the common way the students enter
the school each morning. A recent, still ongoing, study (Marsico, Dazzani,
Ristum, & Bastos, 2015) on the morning entrance routine at primary
school in Italy and Brazil documents the rules and the social devices that
regulate the access, showing the rigidity of the borders control (Figures
15.8 and 15.9).
Making History359
The parallel, yellow strips in Figure 15.8 in the Italian primary school
courtyard are not for parking the cars but for grouping the students of each
class before entering the school. In Figure 15.9, instead, the small window
in the outer wall of the Brazilian primary school is the cabin for the guard-
ian who checks and regulates the inside/outside transit when the main door
of the school is locked after starting the lessons.
360G. MARSICO and J. VALSINER
The daily entrance (and exit) routine from the school, as shown in the
figures, is strongly regulated. It follows specific institutional rules that make
the borders very rigid and the school sometimes inaccessible from the exte-
rior. It is similar to what occurs in other social settings like hospital wards,
prisons, and military zones (barracks for the army, etc.).
Figure 15.10. Etruscan tombs in the school garden (Pontecagnano, SA, Italy).
At a more general level of analysis, we can say that different places of social
encountersschool, cemetery, and museumprovide the individual with
a set of experiences that take place in a present time dealing with both
the past and the future. Learning processes as well as the entire human
development link the past (the memory practices) with the future in the
present, making the boundary between present (including elements from
the past) and the future the real space for becoming (Marsico, 2015).
Developmental psychology needs to understand the ever-liminal position
of the developing personin order to exit from its own borderline location
among different sciences.
A developing process links the past with the future in the present,
making the boundary between present (including elements from the past)
and future the real space where novelty can emerge. The irreversibility of
time comes together with the idea that novelty is a main feature of human
life, and therefore, the futureas well as the present and the pastplays
a central role in the temporality of human experiences. This view on time
is that of an irreversible flow that entails the continuity of the change from
the infinitive past towards the infinitive future. This is the axiomatic foun-
dation for the idea that memory largely concerns the future-orientation.
362G. MARSICO and J. VALSINER
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTES
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CHAPTER 16
CLOCKING NATURE
AND SOCIETY
Geoffrey C. Bowker
INTRODUCTION
In the beginning, there was one apotheosis among many others over the
past several millennia. Teilhardt de Chardin dreamed in the 1950s of a
numinous noosphere as the endpoint of human evolutionwe move from
individual to social to planetary consciousness as stages in our collective
journey (de Chardin, 1955). Appositely, de Chardin was a Jesuita society
that, it is claimed, was the worlds first multinational (Feingold, 2003). Not
only would the noosphere emerge as a natural result of pan-evolution,
but it would also be created through the work of the Society of Jesus as an
order that would extend itself throughout the world.1 In the beginning,
as Hesiod reminds us in the Theogony, the world was without formas it
gains form through universal evolution, the laws of nature become reliable
habits2 and consciousness creatively unfurls.
And then there were two. The singular Singularity shibboleth is that we
can merge into a global cybernetic machine whereinas with de Chardin
we can collectively become much greater than the sum of the individuals
who are its parts. There was an exquisite nightmare of a book written in
1971 entitled As Man Becomes Machine (Rorvick, 1971). It heralded a world
ment by the human race as a whole; in the transference tale, its about the
ability of humans to purge themselves of all that is natural (our genetic
code, our microbiome); for the traces, its about a management vision that
defines human consciousness as epiphenomenal and nature as a service:
which which collapses both nature and culture into a self-organizing infra-
structure. I shall concentrate in this chapter on this last apotheosis since
it gives analytic purchase on the state of our multiple natures and cultures
today.
In tracking traces, I shall situate this chapter within the period when
data management became a core economic, governmental, and scientific
activity: the period since the late 18th century. A full justification for this
periodizing is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in brief, it is
the epoch of the rise of statistics (and thereby governmentality), of the
creation of massive data collection efforts about the natural world (from
natural resources to flora and fauna), and the epoch when historically the
world moved from being seen as an infinite resource to being finite and
manageablewith the latter impulsion becoming stronger and stronger
over the past 30 years with assorted single-number concerns such as the
size of the holes in the ozone layer or the average global temperature or the
rate of species loss. (Single numbers are nice since they collapse a multiple
reality onto a single, manipulable statistic.)
great causes that flung rocks hundreds of miles (leaving the makings of
Stonehenge) appropriate to past epochs. At the end of each cycle of the
clock, nothing had changedthe universe was back in place, we had the
same amount of land and sea. Lyell devoted a few hundred pages to the
argument that any changes humans wrought on the natural world (notably
through breeding animals and spreading flora and fauna) was at the end of
the day temporaryonly unchanging history would prevail.4 At the apogee
of Victorian certainty, Matthew Fontaine Maury imagined our knowledge
of the ocean reaching such a state of perfection that we could discern the
underlying metronomic reality beneath the churning of the seas by the
mid-19th centuryhe spoke of a clockwork ocean with waves and cycles
of salinity as balance wheels (Burnett, 2003). This is a clock of isotropic
timethe histories of the earth and the solar system could be told in the
same way if the clock were running backwards or forwards.
Human history since the Enlightenment has until the current period
generally been conceived as progressivethough it should be noted that at
both ends of the 19th century there was an argument that we had reached
the end to fundamental progressive change: astronomy and physics had
discovered all that could possibly be known. We had achieved timelessness.
Thus in the early part of the century, Comte argued that we could not
possibly know more astronomically, since Newton had given us the final
word on the rotation of planets, and all we could learn about distance stars
was what came to us in the form of lighta phenomenon we had already
exhausted (Comte, 1832). Similarly, the trinity of naturalist Buffon, geolo-
gist Lyell, and polymath Charles Babbage averred that we were at the end
of the period of basic discoveries (Babbage, 1830; Buffon, 18351836;
Lyell, 1831). At the end of the century, Poincar (1952) and Michelson
(see Medawar, 1988, p. 90) argued that the future task for scientists was to
build onnot transformour fundamental insights. The same epoch that
gave us anisotropic time (through Sadi Carnot and then the second law of
thermodynamics for physics, Hegel for history, and Darwin for biology)
maintained a strong discourse of the eternal changeless. The historical
movement should not be seen as progress succeeding over the unchang-
ing, but the two being in constant, fertile tension across the board in the
sciences and the humanities.
Even today, when the catastrophists have arguably again come to the
fore in geologytheir secular changes are often lodged in unchanging
cycles (the Milankovitch cycle of 21,000 years of climate change based
on astronomical precession; the movement of the solar system regularly
through meteor clouds causing catastrophes during the galactic year of
about 250 million years) (Ager, 1973). Or again in evolation (the progres-
sive memory of species), there are arguments that time was diffferent
and fundamentally progrgressive then (as in Goulds theory of the lock-in
Clocking Nature and Society 369
of body types after the Camrbian radion: see for example, Gould, 1989))
or by denials of the unidirectional mutation clock as governing evolution
deriving from biogeographical analysis that associates new orders with
geological change (the orogeny leading the Rockies, say, cancelling out the
normal beat of regular change by altering the conditions that needed to
be kept constant for them to occur).5 Basically, if the world keeps changing
the rules for species, then progressive adaption becomes less of a driving
forceits more a matter of which species happen to be equipped to survive
massive secular change. Biogeography is particularly interesting here in
its entry into the flow of timethere is no possible stable earthly chro-
nology against which historical, evolutionary change can be described,
since biological and geological times are deeply interactive. Recent talk
of naming the current geological era the Anthropocene (the cadence of
earth movement through dredging, landfill, agricultural practices is cur-
rently quantitatively trumping background geological change, despite
Lyells asseverations; see Klingan, Sepahvand, Rosol, & Scherer, 2014)
is complicating this picture by bringing to the fore human management
of the earths natural resources (animate and inaminate) so that a single
timehuman timepredominates. But then again, this human time is
today not progressivewe talk about preserving species and conserv-
ing the environmentnot about preserving mechanisms for growth and
change. Indeed, the current goal for many worried about climate change
is to keep our climate the same as in the eternal present we conceptu-
ally inhabit. Again we see a tension between progress and stasisnot the
triumph of one or the other.
A further feature of this spreading of flat, nonprogressive clock time was
the organization of world history onto a single timeline. By tying every-
thing to this universal, synchronized timeline, historical change could be
measured. Thus the recent attempt by Microsoft to create a single univer-
sal infrastructure for modeling the history of everything (Chronozoom)
corrals cosmological, biological, and human events into an infinitely gra-
dated timeline.6 We need the regularity of the beating of clock in order to
make sense of the stories that we tell, in order to remember them. Thus
we have developed the mitochondrial clock, whose regular pulses would
allow us to synchronize chronologies of speciation and systems (Laurasian
and Gondwanan) back 60,000 years through the power of the clock of
mutation.7 These are not separate, chance occurrences of a single thematic
across divergent domains: they are unified precisely in an underlying dis-
course of dispositifs techniques through which we order the social and
natural world.8 There is always a sense in which clockwork time needs the
background condition of all other things being equalthere is a back-
ground timelessness against which clock time can be measured.
370G. C. BOWKER
phors of the metronome and the tree. The metronome giving regularity
and the tree a form of change with both regular time in its development
and an apogee which is outside of timean eternal present: this political
form with these species present. (The unit of preservation of much biodi-
versity policy is the current species, not the possibility of speciationthe
end to human history and the end to evolution resonate.)
need gave another computer processor. (There are two other stories one
could tell hereabout Norbert Wiener, cybernetics, and anti-aircraft guns;
or about Alan Turing and codebreakingwhich would complicate the
picture in interesting ways.) The lesson to be drawn from this is that if one
looks at computers and society as separate and separable things, then
one immediately gets drawn into some kind of determinism. With the
fundamental cognitive tools of our time, we are dealing simultaneously
with industry, organization, and scienceand while we might not have a
good word for that which is developing and subtends all three, we need
the concept if we are to make sense of the question of digital technology
and epistemology.
Further, we need to understand that the digital occurred before the
advent of binary computing per se (indeed, one filiation goes back to the
I Ching by way of Leibnitz [1994]). So occurrences of new digital episte-
mology and ontology can be traced back to earlier branches of the Tree of
Knowledgethey certainly predate the Apple. I am making a double point
here. First is that we know about the world today through binary logicbut
this does not mean that this logic is derived from computing: rather the
computers were built that reflected the binary logic of empire. Second, we
describe our world as made up of binary entities (for example in the tree of
lifeits always a single branching point of this and not that)and again,
this binary division is a management logic and neither a fact about the
world nor a consequence of the computing technology we have developed.
Core here is that when you make the sociotechnical move to dealing
with classes of things rather than the thing itself, you unleash a particular
kind of temporal potential. One intimately related to the power of
commodification: When in the latter 19th century a bag of corn became
less a singular product from a farm in Illinois and more a class of corn,
bundled with its own temporality, the American state became more densely
interconnectedessentially through moving from a sequence of handoffs
of a bag of corn bundled with its own history (so that the grower would
get his cut of the final market price) to being a class of corn existing in
a timeless present (and the strongest indicator of the timeless present is
the development of the Futures market, which relied on stateless entities
floating in non-historical time) (Cronon, 1991). The same dispositifs
techniques that have worked so well in the social and business worlds have
been deployed for our understanding of nature. From the late 19th century,
natural history surveys have drawn up lists of flora and fauna not by listing
individuals but by describing classes. As we have increasingly recognized
that nature needs to be managedjust like people and commoditiesit is
unsurprising that we use the same underlying techniques. Surveillance and
monitoring techniques work for both human and natural populations, as
do stock-taking techniques such as barcoding.
374G. C. BOWKER
CLOCKS RAMPANT
The Human Memome Project14 aims to accomplish for memetics what the
Human Genome Project, 1000 Genomes and the Human Variome projects
have done for genetics. By sequencing the memes from 100 of the great-
est achievers in the world, they will correlate success, impact, health and
wellbeing with memes for thought-leaders and world-change. Though
many will trace the concept of the meme to Richard Dawkins and The Selfish
Gene (1976), it is also useful to go back to Gabrielle Tarde (Candea, 2010).
For Tarde, the great and good had their ideas copied through imitation,
so that the city, which had the greatest number of interconnections, would
serve best to rapidly spread memes for the betterment of all. Equally,
for him, developed nations would spread ideas through imitation to the
underdeveloped. The temporality of Tarde and the Human Memome is
that ultimately, courtesy of an ever greater density of connections and ever
faster information and communication networks, we would all be dancing
to the same enlightened tune at the same time. Synchronicitybringing
us all into an ever faster, ever more synchronized beat. Napoleons vision
of the schoolchildren across the French Empire reading the same page of
the same book at the same time of day writ even larger.
Clocking Nature and Society 375
Learning
This does open the question of the locus and nature of learning in our
emergent society. The Enlightenment system of knowledge was highly
rooted in the tree ontologylearning was imagined to be about acquiring
first principles that could then be used to generate new knowledge within
Clocking Nature and Society 377
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as History and Theory as All
Together Now: Synchronization, Speed and the Failure of Narrativity in
History and Theory, 53(4), 563576, December 2014.
NOTES
1. See Latour (2010) on factish/fetish for this ddoublement.
2. This resonant phrase is from Lee Smolin, Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Phys-
ics to the Future of the Universe (2013).
378G. C. BOWKER
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CHAPTER 17
EPILOGUE
Memory Practices Writ Large and Small
As pointed out already in the introduction (Slj, this volume), many present-
day theories of perception, cognition, memory, learning, understanding,
and sense-making tend to be based on theories of the neurobiology of the
brain and central nervous system. Such neurological processes belong to
individual organisms. Hence, the focus on natural-science perspectives
and in particular on brain processing reinforces individualism in the realm
of higher mental functions. This fits the general idea, also prevalent in
many psychological and social sciences, that only individuals exist. Accord-
ing to this view, groups are only constellations of individuals. After all, it is
argued, only individuals can be measured, tested, interviewed, and so on.
Such a methodological individualism is easily transferred to ontologythat
is, people believe that memory and learning are individual phenomena.
Memory and learning studies must then deal exclusively with individuals
sidered to carry a historical import. These are related to the triplet of past,
present and future.
Despite the focus on external objects, the study of the three environ-
ments provides ample opportunities for developing a number of other
abstract and significant concepts. One is the importance of boundaries and
borders that set up meaning separations between areas with different func-
tions and accessibility for different kinds of people: borders both connect
and divide (Marsico & Valsiner, this volume). For example, the cemetery
keeps the distance and makes links between life and death (Marsico &
Valsiner, this volume). Liminal spaces, which are often made physically
salient, and are encumbered with signs and devices explaining and rein-
forcing boundary conditions, demand particular actions from visitors, thus
creating equality or inequality (asymmetries) between people. Borders and
boundaries do not occur only in space, but also in time; people become
individual persons, with different rights and obligations, as they pass
through symbolic transitions in life.
When we deal with materialities versus abstract ideas, it also becomes
relevant to study how they are taught and learned. Both Broth et al. and
Koschmann and Derry (this volume) deal with instruction and learning in
direct interaction with others and with material objects. In the study by
Broth et al., we look at a teenagers very first attempt to learn to drive a car.
The focus is on how to start the engine and get moving. In the instructional
activities, the teachers verbal instructions are intertwined with the novices
attempts to carry out bodily actions with the car through its pedals. By
using the body for pedal work as an instance of both action and instruc-
tion, the student acquires an ability to sense what giving ground gas may
mean.
The overall activity is the horizon of the local constitutive operations
and actions, which are being analyzed. A separate action, such as pushing
a pedal, is transformed, in the course of learning, to a means for a larger
activity goal, which simultaneously means that (what was first) separate
actions are transformed into operations in Leontievs (1979) terminology.
However, for good methodological reasons, this remains peripheral in the
chapter of Broth et al.
Koschmann and Derry analyze how a student of math is struggling to
become aware of the possible connections, the isomorphy relations and
possible transfer effects between quite abstract (but different) representa-
tions of mathematical content, namely, algebraic (binomial) expressions
and the structure of the so-called Pascals triangle. (They also bring in
concrete objects to illustrate some relations.) The teacher provides certain
hints continuously on how to think. For the student to get the hang of it,
it is a question of becoming able to translate from one representation to
another, on the road towards recognizing mathematical truths. There are
392P. LINELL and . MKITALO
If the social is intertwined with the individual and sense-making with bodily
and material aspects, the same holds for the past- and future-orientation
of memory practices. The analyses by Marsico and Valsiner demonstrate
that memory is not just about the past (the events we remember), but also
about conceiving these past happenings for the purposes and needs of the
present and the future. A task for remembering something is oriented
towards the future, a task of recalling something (here and now) is about
some function of it for the immediate future (this volume). Marsico and
Valsiner discuss the relations between there and then (the past) and here
394P. LINELL and . MKITALO
and now (present and future), particularly in their account of the functions
and forms of cemeteries.
That remembering constantly invokes all the three of past, present, and
future is pointed out in many other chapters, including those of Wertsch,
Murakami and Jacobs; Andre et al.; Musk and ekait; Roth; and Evalds-
son and Sahlstrm. For educational arrangements, this is a necessary
element of instruction and interaction. Andre et al. point precisely to
the importance of narrative forms of interaction for sustaining whole-class
instruction over time and space. In line with Mercer (2008), they argue
for a temporal analysis that can demonstrate how teachers and students
together, by invoking earlier events and actions, co-construct, maintain,
and develop joint classroom action and reflection over time. Murakami
and Jacobs show that family reminiscence is redundantly patterned and
highly repetitive, thereby allowing new generations to shape the family
history trajectory. This form of continuity over time and space is achieved
through discourse. Different discursive devices are used to position family
members in the collective family history, and by locating family members
in the context of certain historical events, differences in perspectives of now
and then are topicalized as part of a wider societal context.
Studies of other kinds of situated languaging, mainly within the lan-
guage sciences, support the insight that the present is both past- and
future-oriented. In situated languaging, we use verbs in the present tense
or linguistic items meaning (or originally meaning) now in quite flexible
ways as regards scope and function (Hilmisdottir, 2010). The temporal
adverb now often has backwards- and forward-pointing (past or future) ref-
erences far beyond the immediate present moment. In addition, the adverb
often loses the feature of temporality in the history of different languages,
and it develops into a discourse-structuring marker, but still with responsive
and anticipatory relations in the discourse (Auer & Maschler, 2016). As a
unit loses its referential meaning, it acquires metatextual meaning; there is
a shift from the world being talked about to the speakers organization
of that world in the act of speaking (Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 40)that
is, a shift in the weightings of the two chronotopes as discussed by Roth
(this volume).
which the remembering is brought about). The narrated event (the excur-
sion) and the actual telling in the interview are the two interpenetrating
chronotopes. Apart from the interpenetration, the concept of chronotope
also implies other fundamental assumptions. One is of course the insepa-
rability between space (Greek: topos) and time (Gr. chronos); in general, we
cannot imagine and recall a certain point or period in time, say, the year
1975, without associating it with where we lived or traveled that year or
important happenings from then. The concept of chronotope is such
an elastic category that it can be made to do duty in a variety of different
roles (Vice, 1997, p. 207),2 but the case of joint reminiscing of own past
experiences is a particularly straightforward example. One might say that
remembering is intrinsically chronotopic.
In reminiscing, the past (here: the excursion events) is relived by the
conversationalists evoking it together in the present moment (here: the
interview). Through the intertwinement of two chronotopes, the past and
the present are made contemporaneous in memory (Roth, this volume).3
As Roth points out, the latter does not disappear in collective reminiscing,
as it often does in, for example, novels.
Another pertinent domain of application for chronotopes is the analysis
of symbol-saturated settings, which are typically built, and other physical
surroundings in which people honor specific cultural conventions for what
counts as appropriate or permitted conduct. Such settings can be under-
stood as generalized chronotopes; there are countless examples, including
marketplaces, streets, parks, beaches, pubs, churches and mosques, the-
atres, seminar-rooms, drawing-rooms, kitchens, (othersor ones own)
bedrooms, and many others. These provide a rich data basis for cultural
psychology (Valsiner, 2014); the examples of the cemeteries, museums, and
schools of Marsico and Valsiner (this volume) belong here.
We will now move on to the most global (largest) facets of the con-
textuality of memory processes. Different chapters use a variety of terms
and concepts for structures that are extended in space, time, and mode.
Wertsch studies national narratives that are based on history and memory.
Such narratives serve as memory templates, operating over very long
time-scales. Long-lived narratives can be used to explain both the past
history and the present events, for example, in a nation like Russia, which
is Wertschs main case. The Russian nation has for long believed (or been
made to believe) in the template of Russia as being constantly attacked by
vicious enemies. (Other nations similarly have national narratives, usually
ascribing to ones own nation a higher moral status.). In recent years the
particular Russian narrative has been revived in Putins perspective on the
events in and around Ukraine. What the individual (here: Putin) does here
is to bring back to life a cultural stereotype, showing how individuals have
been socialized into a particular cultural and historical order.
Epilogue397
CODA
The chapters in this book provide extensive evidence for the fruitfulness of
a dialogical approach to human sense-making in all its variegated domains.
For example, learning is not primarily a set of particular processes in indi-
viduals brains and bodies, but it is typically an integrated dimension in
peoples striving towards participation in social practices. Remembering
and learning are social processes; they involve joint practices in cultural
contexts (institutions, organizations, built environments) with long social
histories. They are not only symbolic and cognitive in nature, but also
embodied and shot through by emotions. Memory is not just about the
past, but just as much about the present and the future. And so on: Learn-
ing and remembering are deeply embedded in human life in the world and
must be scientifically described as such.
A discursive thread running right through this book is the contention
that memory and learning practices must be writ both large and small.
Such an endeavor cannot be achieved with exclusively formal or natural-
science-based means.
Epilogue399
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTES
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
403
404ABOUT the AUTHORS
411
412SUBJECT INDEX
transfer 13, 93, 94, 216, 238 Vygotsky, L. 219, 225, 235, 342,
transformation of signs, schemas, 351
tools etc. 236
transformation of social Wiener, N. 361
boundaries 45 word search activities as projects of
truncated sequence of instruction remembering 149
125 world history, story timeline of
trust 388 369, 371, 376
Turing, A. 373
Zone of proximal development
Ukraine 233, 238ff 219, 223, 226, 351