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Basic Summary: Kant, unlike Mill, believed that certain types of actions
(including murder, theft, and lying) were absolutely prohibited, even in
cases where the action would bring about more happiness than the
alternative. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask
ourselves whenever we decide to act: (i) Can I rationally will
that everyone act as I propose to act? If the answer is no, then we must
not perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human
beings rather than merely using them for my own purposes? Again, if the
answer is no, then we must not perform the action. (Kant believed that
these questions were equivalent).
b) Basic idea: The command states, crudely, that you are not
allowed to do anything yourself that you would not be willing to
allow everyone else to do as well. You are not allowed to make
exceptions for yourself. For example, if you expect other
people to keep their promises, then you are obligated to keep
your own promises.
The Moral Worth of Persons: Kant also has something to say about what
makes someone a good person. Keep in mind that Kant intends this to go
along with the rest of his theory, and what one's duty is would be
determined by the categorical imperative. However, one can treat this as a
separate theory to some extent, and consider that one's duty is determined
by some other standard. Keep in mind that what is said below has to do
with how one evaluates people, not actions. A person's actions are right or
wrong, a person is morally worthy or lacks moral worth (i.e., is morally
base). A person's actions determine her moral worth, but there is more to
this than merely seeing if the actions are right or wrong.
end of excerpt...
(1) We should do only those actions that conform to rules that we could will
be adopted universally.
(3) This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-
defeating: people would stop believing one another, and then it would do
no good to lie.
(4) Therefore, we should not lie.
The problem with this argument is that we can lie without simply
following the rule It is permissible to lie. Instead, we might be following a
rule that pertains only to specific circumstances, like It is permissible to lie
when doing so will save a life. This rule can be made a universal law
without contradiction. After all, it is not as though people would stop
believing each other simply because it is known that people lie when doing
so will save lives. For one thing, that situation rarely comes uppeople
could still be telling the truth almost all of the time. Even the taking of
human life could be justified under certain circumstances. Take self-
defense, for example. There appears to be nothing problematic with the
rule It is permissible to kill when doing so is the only available means of
defense against an attacker.
Example:
I am to lie on a loan application when I am in severe financial difficulty and
there is no other way to obtain funds, in order to ease the strain on my
finances.
Two questions:
Q1: Could I rationally act on my maxim in the PSW?
This is the Contradiction in Conception Test
Q2: Could I rationally choose the PSW as one in which I would be a member?
This is the Contradiction in the Will Test
The second part of the test is the "contradiction in the will test." It
catches those maxims whose existence as a universal law of nature
is conceivable without contradiction, but which cannot be willed to be
such without contradiction. The next example is supposed to illustrate
a failure of this test.
However, according to Kant the second part of the test fails: I could
not rationally choose the PSW, because "a will which resolved itself
in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often
arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of
others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature
springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself
(423)." That is, according to Kant it is not rational to choose a world in
which you would not be helped if you were in need and no one was in
a position to gain by helping you.
]
If a maxim flunks Q2 (see above) but not Q1, then we have an imperfect
duty to refrain from acting on that maxim.
-Our Perfect duties (duties of justice) are negative in that they require
that we never perform certain types of actions, and can only be
fulfilled in very specific ways.
Examples:
To Self no suicide or
develop talents
other forms of self-destruction
Sensat
[
Kantian analysis
To run this case through the CI procedure, we first need to identify Martha's
maxim. To do this, we look at the description of the situation and see if we
can determine which sort of principle Martha would sincerely formulate as
justification of her action. Recall that all maxims can be put into the form:
Figure out the PSW: In the PSW, it will be common knowledge that people
break deathbed promises whenever they think they can do much more
good for humanity
First question: Would it be rational to adopt and act on my maxim in the
PSW? No, because in the PSW no one would ask for deathbed promises,
because everyone would know that they are not genuine
commitments. The maxim would not be an effective policy for promoting
human welfare.
Since the answer to the first question is "No," Martha should not act on her
maxim, since it fails the "contradiction in conception" test.
Utilitarian analysis
Utility (impact on
Option Consequences Probability
human welfare)
SPACE gets the money and spends
Keep promise Certainty Low
it on its own programs
HTF uses money to feed many
High Very high
Give money hungry people
to HTF Somewhat lower
Action is discovered Low
than
We can use the information in this table to identify the best prospect. Since
keeping the promise is certain to have only a small impact on human
welfare, whereas giving the money to HTF is very likely to have a much
bigger impact, with only a small chance of producing an outcome that is
only somewhat worse than the certain outcome of keeping the promise,
giving the money to HTF is the best prospect. Consequently it is the option
that utilitarianism recommends.
]
So far, we have been discussing CI1. Now, we will briefly turn our attention
to CI2.
But in cases of promise breaking, deception, and coercion (to name a few)
people act wrongly in using each other as mere means. For example: if
George makes a promise to Joanne with the intention of breaking it, and
Joanne accepts, then Joanne has been deceived as to Georges true
maxim. Joanne cannot in principle consent to his scheme of action since
she doesnt even know what it is. She is being used as a mere
means. Likewise, one cannot consent to coercion because consent
requires having a choice.
To treat someone as an end requires that one not use him or her as mere
means. Beyond that, we have a duty to promote others plans and maxims
by sharing some of their ends, thus respecting others ends in the fullest
way. But peoples wants are many, diverse and often incompatible, so we
cannot help everyone.
Thus, we have two main duties that derive from the CI2:
(1) the perfect duty to act on no maxims that use people as mere means.
(2) the imperfect duty to act on some maxims that foster peoples ends.
Kant believed CI1 and CI2 to be equivalent; he thought that each implied
exactly the same duties. We wont concern ourselves with whether this is
true (though it is plausible that they would have the same implications for
the cases we have examined).