Stefano Pilotto

No. 94 JANUARY 2012

Europe and United Kingdom of Great Britain Abstract
and Northern Ireland: a peculiar relationship
Undoubtedly, integrated Europe and the
United Kingdom have a curious and
strange relationship. Since the very
beginning of the European integration
process the UK showed skepticism
and, often, annoyance. The reasons for
On the 9th of December, 2011, the Council of Europe at Brussels sealed such a feeling can be identified in the
the renewed break between Great Britain and the rest of the European peculiar history of the British people:
Union in relation to the definition of a new agreement on budgetary local conflicts led to stabilization,
discipline by the governments of the member countries. The very recent growth and imperial splendor.
visit to London by the Italian Premier Mario Monti voiced the intention,
on the part of the Italian government, to mend the rupture of last 9 The end of the Second World War,
December, without, however, being quite successful. On the eve of new nevertheless, introduced a new era of
decisions soon to be made at the EU level, what is the real position of international dialogue, mutual respect
Great Britain in a continental context? How sustainable will be from a and led almost inevitably to the
political perspective an eternal privilege linked to the opting out decolonization process. The resistance
clause, concerning integration policies to be followed in the future, to European integration process, both
which are today expressly encouraged by the emergency triggered by from outside and inside, may express
the global economic crisis? Let us try to backtrack and follow the main the British wish to refuse to accept the
stages in the historical relationship between London and Europe, in todays world evolution, hoping that,
order to come to an understanding of the real nature of this peculiar beyond the possible concrete financial
relationship made of likes and dislikes, cooperation and obstacles, advantages, the solution of an
integrated and partly protected
geographical propensity and genetic isolationism that exists between
European market would not
Great Britain and the rest of Europe. This reflexion seems appropriate
compromise the traditional prestige of
in order to understand which direction the EU will have to take to British world policy. London seems to
normalize its future relations with Great Britain. reject the European spirit, the financial
The first question to be answered is assuredly the one asked by some rules and the cultural background that
observers little inclined to a cordial relationship with London, i.e.: Is come with it, which tend to privilege
Great Britain Europe, or is it not? If from a geographical standpoint the continental solidarity. Such a crucial
British Isles are not a part of the continental block, the history of British approach might seriously compromise
the future relations between the 26 EU
people has shown throughout the centuries the existence of a
countries and the UK in the next
relationship and a destiny clearly shared with other European peoples. decades.
British policy, however, has always sought to emphasize the right to a
profound diversity of ideas and administration, though it influenced
considerably European thought through the impact of its philosophers, Before the next EU summit in Brussels
the EU countries are considering new
legal experts, and economists. Should one neglect the fact that modern
proposals to reintroduce effectively the
political theory, constitutionalism, the science of the foundation of
UK in the EU executive policy, but they
legitimate power, Common Law, liberalism, were born in England in the need an indication of good will from
time of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith? But today the London.
crucial issue is the real identification of British culture; of the
components, that is, that the British themselves attribute to their
European identity or to their British specificity. In other words how
deep is that narrow sea strait that is today called The Channel?
Stefano Pilotto, teaches at MIB School of
Throughout history, from Roman to modern times, the fate of the British Management (Trieste) and is ISPI Visiting
people has been studded with struggles for autonomy and with internal Professor.
conflicts that resulted in the consolidation of a modern monarchy, which
under the Tudors and the Stuarts slowly led the country to basic
stabilization and increasing imperial splendor. Even today British (*) The opinions expressed herein are
schools proudly recall that at the pinnacle of its colonial era two-fifths of strictly personal and do not
the mainland belonged to British empire. After the centuries of Chaucer necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.
and Shakespeare, Cromwell and Nelson, the nineteenth century
2 ISPI - Analysis

marked Englands further growth in the time of Queen Victoria. It was the time of imperialism, managed by the
clever diplomacy of Palmerton, Gladstone and Disraeli; a time sustained by the inspiring writings of Rudyard
Kipling and ennobled by the Romantic poetry of Lord Byron. This was the time of Splendid Isolation, when the
steady political stance of England towards the rest of Europe became consolidated: as little involvement as
possible in European affairs until a loss of balance on the Continent to the advantage of a given European power
necessitated involvement on the part of London to favour the re-establishment of political balance. It must be
noted, however, that within a framework of protection of British interests no European power could, or had to
surpass English power, particularly as regards maritime supremacy. If in the early nineteenth century France
under Napoleon Bonaparte had been a threat to European balance, in the early twentieth century Germany
under Wilhelm II and eventually Hitler were to be in English eyes a new, intolerable threat, under which it was
not only apposite, but even necessary and desirable, to let go of isolationism. In every such case the English
intervened to re-establish political balance in Europe. They succeeded, overcoming at times serious difficulties.
They did not achieve territorial expansion, but preserved their colonial influence in strategic areas both in the
Mediterranean and in the Middle East. On the other hand, World War II was a crucial moment in the history of
Great Britain, for it made it possible to London to consolidate her special relationship with the United States of
America in view of their common victory. Such a privileged relationship with Washington was to characterize and
condition, even today, British foreign policy throughout the period subsequent to World War II. In the
reconstruction period, amidst the rubble still present in many cities of the Continent, the option for Western
European integration began to take shape as a real and valuable solution, and it was precisely Winston Churchill
who encouraged European reconstruction (Let Europe arise!), specifying that France and Germany should
assume leadership of the new, post-World War II Europe, while Great Britain, Commonwealth, America and Soviet
Russia should simply be friends and supporters (sponsors) of such a plan. Thus, from that very moment on, the
English stance was not one of full participation in the European project. Certainly, Churchills speech intervened on
19 September 1946, when the European Community was not yet in sight; there was, instead, the hypothesis of a
Council of Europe to protect common concerns of the new Europe, not excluding a federal-political unification plan
for the Continent. Churchill himself alluded to the United States of Europe, but it is generally thought that he did
not intend to include Great Britain.

Genesis of European integration and British hostility (1948-1961)

British foreign policy was in the 50s a prudent one, desirous to safeguard the prestige derived from victory in World
War II and also to preserve the privileged relationship with Washington. Attlees Labour government turned to
Europe through the Bevin Plan for security reasons rather than for reasons of economic integration: the
Dunkerque agreement with France in 1947, extended in 1948 to the three Benelux countries, set as its goal to
assure a European alliance against Germany in order to prevent the resurgence of new expansionist aims in
Germany. Great Britain was amazed at this development and resented the fact that Italy under De Gasperi had
kindly declined the invitation to join the Bevin Plan, and neglected the sense of responsibility on the part of the
Italian government that, before the elections on 18 April 1948, did not deem to be sufficiently legitimated to embark
on an agreement for a new alliance after the experience of the Pact of Steel in 1939. But after the elections on 18
April 1948, Italy felt definitely free to discuss and vote on its own participation; not in the Bevin Plan, which Italy
deemed no longer relevant given the evolution of the cold war (the new threat came from the Soviet Union, not
from Western Germany), but in the Atlantic Pact, which was studied, negotiated, and signed in the time frame
between summer 1948 and 4 April 1949. Certainly, the creation of the Atlantic Alliance motivated to a greater
extent Great Britain first under Attlee, then under Churchill and Eden to uphold its importance and its
authoritative character through a policy of close cooperation with the United States, which would have made
possible to London also to acquire the instruments and knowledge necessary to have nuclear weapons in the early
50s. When the first European Community (CECA, the European Coal and Steel Community) was born in 1950-
1951, Londons position was characterized by expectation and reserve. Though explicitly invited through the
Schuman Plan, Great Britain stepped discreetly aside, out of fear of losing some of her privileges if she had to
share them with the other members of the fledgling integrated Europe. London did not countenance with unlimited
pleasure the proposals made by the French, which involved in the forefront Western Germany under Adenauer,
and left to the other European countries apparently subordinate roles. Nor was London exceedingly sorry when in
1954, after a nearly 4-year gestation, the second European plan for integration failed that Pleven Plan which
would have made possible to the six CECA countries to achieve an integrated defence community. And such lack
of sadness on Londons part was even clearer when, a few months after the collapse of the CED, the Bevin Plan
was taken up again and expanded to Italy and Western Germany for the purpose of establishing a Union of
Western Europe (UEO) that would have remedied the CED failure and offered to its seven member countries a
new form of cooperation and coordination in matters related to defence. But the European integration project did
not stop with the CED failure; quite the opposite.
 ISPI - Analysis 3

With a new proposal promoted by Italy at Taormina in 1955 came the great success of the Rome Treaties in 1957
and the further achievement of communitarian integration through the expansion of the Common Market to all
goods and services, including nuclear energy. The new, conservative Macmillan government first reacted with a
certain disappointment to that communitarian success and favoured the alternative and competitive creation of the
European Free Trade Association, involving nearly all other countries in Western Europe. Great Britain under
Macmillan reasserted what was to become a constant element of English economic diplomacy, to wit support for
liberalism against any form of protectionism, in order to meet, among other things, demands linked to trade
relations with other countries worldwide, particularly those of the Commonwealth and the United States. But early
in the 60s Macmillans position changed.

Great Britains rapprochement to the three European Communities and de Gaulles resistance
When the Macmillan government became aware that the benefits deriving from the creation of the European Free
Trade Association were inferior to the benefits to be derived from the possible participation of London in the three
European Communities, British government drew closer to communitarian Europe. That was the time when the
many tensions felt in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland moved the government to petition
for participation in the three European communities. Which tensions? They were at least three: the decolonisation
process with the decline of the imperial vision; economic development; internal centrifugal forces. As regards the
decolonization process and the decline of imperial vision, London suffered all the consequences related to the new
principles sealed by the Charter of the United Nations, and with these the renewed affirmation of the right of
peoples to self-determination. Between 1947 and 1961 several countries that had belonged to the British Empire
obtained their independence and the Suez crisis in 1956 signalled the decline of prestige and colonial or post-
colonial influence of France and Great Britain. Next, economic development, often threatened by strikes and social
conflicts, demanded that close trade relations be maintained with the three most important European countries, i.e.
France, Western Germany, and Italy. Furthermore, internal centrifugal forces from Scotland to Northern Ireland,
set London before the prospect of releasing internal tension through a rapprochement to a super-national
community that would have reduced the weight of national boundaries and weakened independentist elements.
But the rapprochement of Great Britain to the three European communities was blocked by the French policy of de
Gaulle who, having returned to power in 1958 subsequent to the Algerian crisis, had consolidated his own internal
authority by adopting the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic. De Gaulle could not remain insensitive to the
support he had received, precisely from the English, at a time most dramatic for France during World War II. But
de Gaulle was also the expression of a conservative French nationalism that aimed at endowing ones own
country with a clear European prestige. De Gaulle also wanted nuclear arms for France, and he obtained them
early in the 1960s without, however, the British help he had hoped for. Yet, at the root of the repeated veto by de
Gaulle concerning the participation of Great Britain in the European communities, there was the awareness of the
failed moral participation on Londons part in the European project launched by the founding fathers. In fact, the
attitude of the British government was quite ambiguous in French eyes, and never reassuring as to goals and
objectives. The Elyse thought that London wanted to enter the three European communities not because it
shared in the spirit of a Europe united by culture, history, and traditions, but for a mere question linked to interests
generated by the capitalist model: a marriage of convenience, then, not one of the heart. In addition there was, on
the part of de Gaulle, the desire to further draw London into a European context also in the area of defence, thus
weakening the privileged relationship between Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, in the negotiations
for participation the British government tried to modify the working mechanism of the Common Agricultural Policy,
that is to say of the substantial financial and administrative support that had been established, beginning in the
early 60s, in order to arrest the decline of the agricultural sector in Europe. Since it did not have an important
agricultural sector, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland never shared in the efforts made to
protect the agricultural sector and was inclined to reconsider the general financial issues, in order to re-establish
the balance of agricultural ties existing between Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries. After as many as
two French vetoes, in 1963 and 1967, against the participation of London in the Rome Treaties, Great Britain was
not to succeed in entering the European Community until the demise of de Gaulle.

Great Britain in the European communities from 1973 to the present time: Euro-scepticism as a factor
preventing the development of integration
Great Britain, along with Denmark and Ireland, became a member of the three European communities only in
1973: negotiations for participation were slow and hindered by the British desire to modify the rules for a common
European agricultural policy and the general financial sharing (British contribution to the European Economic
Community), as well as by Londons reluctance to consider a reform of the role played by the British pound on the
global currency market. But with the entrance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the three European
4 ISPI - Analysis

communities, the British people had to accept the unavoidable modification of their countrys role and prestige:
participation in the European Economic Community, in particular, involved the acceptance of a partial loss of
sovereignty and its transfer to a supranational organization, managed at the time by nine countries. A sizable part
of the Conservative Party and a minority of the Labour Party (356 favourable, 244 contrary) contributed to the
approval of Great Britains entrance into the three European communities; the voters were attracted by the
prospects of economic development at a continental level rather than by the failed preservation of the imperial
heritage. The awareness reached by British society on the historical evolution in the latter half of the twentieth
century was at the root of an important diplomatic step such as that taken by joining communitarian Europe. If, on
the one hand, the conservatives had been at the root of such a policy, on the other hand the labourists had not
given up serious consideration of such a proposal, offering their contribution at the appropriate time. In this
respect, one of the most interesting moments came on the occasion of the test of strength between the United
States and the EU on matters concerning liberalization of world trade in the autumn 1992, after the sanctions
decided by Washington against the subsidy of European products under the Common Agricultural Policy. In order
to negotiate solutions acceptable to the United States, the EU entrusted the matter to Leon Brittan (UK),
Commissary for External Affairs, who protected the affairs of the EU against the measures proposed under the
administration of George Bush Sr. and dialogued with the US representative Mickey Kantor in view of the Blair
House Agreement. Such agreement did not satisfy the majority of public opinion in the EU, but Europe had
confided in Great Britain to obtain something from the United States, supporting Londons aim to play a special
and privileged role in the dialogue with Washington. Several decisions made by the United Kingdom, however,
were telltale of a clear scepticism as regards the European integration process; it will be well to recall among
these, prior to the present grand refusal of the agreement proposed on 9 December 2011: opposition to the
European Monetary System, opposition to Common Agricultural Policy with demands for refunds, opposition to the
Schengen Convention, opposition to the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. to the euro, the common currency).

No to the European Monetary System

In the intervening years, however, European solidarity was tried more than once by British choices and stances
often contrasting with the desired progress towards integration and consolidation of the institutions. The difficulties
of the 70s, caused by the end of the Bretton Woods System (stability of the dollar), by the Middle East crisis, by an
increase in prices of raw materials, by inflation, and by economic recession, in 1979 moved European countries to
create an European monetary system in order to contain the de- and re-evaluation of communitarian currencies.
London did not deem appropriate to participate in such a system, in order to safeguard its own freedom of action in
regard to its own currency, according to interests determined, among other things, by the balance between internal
production and external demand on the world market, first and foremost that offered by trade relations with the
United States and the countries that formerly belonged to the British Empire. Many European observers saw in
such decision the desire on the part of Downing Street to preserve the British pounds supremacy and prestige.
Great Britain was to enter the European Monetary System only in 1990 and to leave it definitely in 1992, on the
occasion of the strong de-evaluation of the British currency.

No to the Common Agricultural Policy without an exclusive and privileged refund (British Rebate).
During eleven years of conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, Great Britain became involved on
several parallel fronts: industrial crisis and the declining importance of coal, conflict in Northern Ireland, Falklands
War, strikes, tension within the European Community, particularly in the Economic European Community. With
strength and determination the British Prime Minister confronted all obstacles and faced communitarian Europe
with a mixture of cynicism and pragmatism: according to London, suffering was caused by agricultural and
financial issues. Great Britain was a net contributor to the Economic European Community inasmuch as the funds
transferred by the British government to the Commission were far superior to those that the Commission
transferred to the government or the citizens of the United Kingdom. Since over 50% of the resources of the
European Community went to the Common Agricultural Policy, and since Great Britain did not possess an
important agricultural sector such as that of France or Italy or Germany, the English government demanded
through Prime Minister Thatchers outburst (I want my money back!) a form of reimbursement, the so-called
British Rebate. Based on the 1984 agreement, Great Britain was to receive a reimbursement equal to two-thirds of
the difference between the money received from the Economic European Community and the money disbursed to
the latter. It was a success for Margaret Thatcher. Between 1997 and 2007 Great Britain under Tony Blair
continued to uphold the legitimacy of the British rebate, though it was obliged to accept a reduction of the latter by
about 20% for the years 2007-2013. Thus, from 1984 and definitely until 2013, Great Britain has obtained and
shall obtain from Brussels a special rebate, the equivalent of several billions British pounds. Now Great Britain
receives a rebate in the amount of about 3 billion pounds (3,5 billion Euros) yearly from the European Union and
 ISPI - Analysis 5

contributes to the Union budget with a percentage equal to 14,82% of the total. In 2011 the EU budget reached
about 143 billion Euros. Thus, Great Britain still is a net contributor who offers more than it receives, and this fact
does not breed love for the EU on the part of a significant percentage of British people.

No to the Schengen Convention

From 1985 on the ideal of Europe as a space open to free circulation of citizens took hold and found its
embodiment in the adoption of the Schengen Convention (1990), whereby member countries were to
progressively eliminate any control of documents at the common borders, and to increase control at the outer
borders of the Schengen area. Once again, Great Britain decided not to participate, deeming that both her own
security and her relations with other Anglo-Saxon countries required the exclusive protection of the British
Parliament. But such decision would impair the ideal of social Europe that the new Labour government of Tony
Blair was to seek and pursue with renewed attention in the intervening years. On the other hand, the Schengen
Convention would also entail cooperation among participating states by police and intelligence systems, thus
initiating another form of cooperation among member states. Furthermore, it is undeniable that failed participation
in the Schengen Convention would have a negative effect on the volume of European tourism to Great Britain, as
well as on trade agreements directed towards the island.

No to the Single European Currency

In the era that saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the political and economic transition of central and eastern European
countries towards democracy and a market economy, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, of the Soviet Union and of
Czechoslovakia, communitarian Europe made an important decision to further implement integration and to solve
the legal problems related to risks in currency exchange, to the free export of capitals, and to the reform of national
monetary policies. Indeed, while waiting for the new expansion stage to include central and eastern European
countries, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) offered the possibility of outlining the contours of the path towards the
adoption of a single currency within the EU: the euro, which was to mark a further step towards fuller integration.
But on that occasion, too, the United Kingdom under the leadership of John Major kindly declined the invitation
and, through the opting out clause, obtained to adopt neither the new single European currency nor the new
worker-related disciplines. That was a further step in a direction opposite to the one chosen by the majority of
European countries. Nor could Great Britain under the Labour Blair (1997-2007) modify substantially Londons
position, notwithstanding the intentions of the new Prime Minister, who had given the impression that he wanted to
uphold an European policy, highly sensitive to the social dimension and open to the evaluation of the possible
adoption of the single currency. But these political ideals slowly died out, knowing that the majority of British public
opinion would not support such an option. Moreover, Blairs foreign policy choices in the years subsequent to 2001
led London to recognize the special relationship with the United States through support of the war in Iraq and fight
against international terrorism: in fact, every propension towards a privileged relationship on the other side of the
Atlantic always results in the cooling down of any warmth in the relationship with Europe. Finally, Great Britain
under Gordon Brown, overpowered by the global economic crisis, did not make a possible rapprochement towards
the euro one of her priorities, before giving way to the new conservative government of David Cameron.

Conclusions
The British move on 9 December 2011 continues to raise questions and perplexities on both sides of the Channel.
At a time when the seriousness of the financial and economic crisis moves European countries to draft a new
treaty to regulate budgetary discipline through new systems for control of financial management and new taxation
systems of financial transactions, the government in London chooses the hard way of separation and isolation
from the other 26 European countries in order not to compromise the interests of British financial institutions. If, on
the one hand, it is possible to understand the reasons of some financial operators in the City, on the other it is
necessary to develop different considerations on the topic.
In the first place, Great Britain fears regulations tighter than the present ones and thinks that a greater control by
the EU may compromise not only the volume of its own financial transactions, but also the very freedom of
operators, often indulgent towards a too liberal, and perhaps scarcely moral, interpretation of modern capitalism.
With this gesture, however, the British government and the majority of the people behind it, clearly show a
propension to individualism with a materialistic background, to the detriment of a communion of intent and shared
principles with the other countries on the Continent. In the second place, the measures envisioned at Brussels on
the last 9th of December still respond to the necessity of reacting to the crisis that has befallen the Western world in
particular, and continues to strike the economy of the European countries. The idea of discipline joins that of
6 ISPI - Analysis

ethics and becomes joined to the reality of that European spirit that has been
La ricerca ISPI analizza le
evoked many times to motivate the genesis of future proposals. That
dinamiche politiche,
European spirit is directly linked to European culture the culture whose
strategiche ed economiche
representation was attempted in the preamble to the European constitution,
del sistema internazionale
made to sink in 2005.
con il duplice obiettivo di
The basic concept of continental solidarity is present in European culture, in informare e di orientare le
spite of countless conflicts that have torn European peoples: a solidarity that scelte di policy.
emerges in the most difficult moments and becomes joined to moral
uprightness, to the integrity of governments and operators beyond any I risultati della ricerca
specific material interest. Closing the door to the treaty on budgetary vengono divulgati attraverso
discipline, Cameron has perhaps fulfilled the hopes of Londons City, but has pubblicazioni ed eventi,
certainly frustrated the expectations of several hundred millions Europeans focalizzati su tematiche di
who await common answers, commensurate to the difficulties that their particolare interesse per
respective societies must face. Furthermore, the British government has lItalia e le sue relazioni
caused three very serious effects. On the one hand, many Europeans have internazionali e articolati in:
the impression that the Channel has grown even deeper, that the bridge Programma Africa
thrown with the French-British tunnel in the 80s is deceptive and that it is not Programma Caucaso e
possible to trust English friendship, inasmuch as their presence in Europe Asia Centrale
seems justified only by the gratification of interests tied to money. These are Programma Europa
the Europeans who, at this time, also unearth colourful expressions from the Programma Mediterraneo
past (perfidious Albion, may God curse the English again and again ....) and e Medio Oriente
may counteract the sentiments of respect, affection, and admiration that Programma Russia e
many other Europeans feel towards the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Vicini Orientali
Northern Ireland. Programma Sicurezza e
On the other hand, many political and economic operators take advantage of Studi Strategici
this small but revealing crisis between the EU and Great Britain in order to Progetto Argentina
hinder the renewal of the British rebate in view of the negotiations linked to Progetto Asia Meridionale
the communitarian budget for the next seven years (2014-2020). Finally, Progetto Cina e Asia
internal cohesion in the United Kingdom seems to be further compromised Orientale
by disagreements within the alliance of liberals and conservatives (the Progetto Diritti Umani
liberals took exception to Camerons position on past 9 December), as well Progetto Disarmo
as by the independence movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Progetto Internazionaliz-
Ireland, which take advantage of the consequences of Camerons behaviour zazione della Pubblica
in Brussels to promote once more their own claims to independence. Amministrazione
In the proximity of the next summit meetings at Brussels scheduled in the Le pubblicazioni online
next weeks, member countries, besides continuing to define the new dellISPI sono realizzate
agreement on budgetary discipline, will have to think of ways to recover the anche grazie al sostegno
active presence of the United Kingdom within the EU, and also of measures della Fondazione Cariplo.
likely to increase the attachment of the English people to Europe; measures
useful to them not only to identify the best sites where to spend their SPI
vacations, but also to help them understand that ambitions of a post-imperial Palazzo Clerici
nature cannot be the same as in centuries gone by, and that the present Via Clerici, 5
challenges require that close cooperation which nature itself assigned to I - 20121 Milano
mankind; unless the insular idea really cannot be uprooted in the United www.ispionline.it
Kingdom and the proverbial British stubbornness moves the country to
ISPI 2012
objectively self-defeating choices. In this sense, a proposal that the EU could
make to London is one linked to an interesting reversal of trend, which could
prelude to a positive, not a negative attitude, as compared to what happened in the past. Instead of offering the
usual opting out clause, the 26 European countries could offer to London the opting in clause, thus allowing the
United Kingdom ample time to make an unpressured decision and leaving the door open to future British
participation in the new agreement. Recovery is a necessity and Westminster must not sink into the Thames.