Nicomachean Ethics

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TheNicomacheanEthics(/nkomkin/Greek:)isthenamenormallygiven
toAristotle'sbestknownworkonethics.Thework,whichplaysapreeminentroleindefiningAristotelian
ethics,consistsoftenbooks,originallyseparatescrolls,andisunderstoodtobebasedonnotesfromhis
lecturesattheLyceum.ThetitleisoftenassumedtorefertohissonNicomachus,towhomtheworkwas
dedicatedorwhomayhaveeditedit(althoughhisyoungagemakesthislesslikely).Alternatively,thework
mayhavebeendedicatedtohisfather,whowasalsocalledNicomachus.
ThethemeoftheworkisaSocraticquestionpreviouslyexploredintheworksofPlato,Aristotle'sfriendand
teacher,ofhowmenshouldbestlive.InhisMetaphysics,AristotledescribedhowSocrates,thefriendand
teacherofPlato,hadturnedphilosophytohumanquestions,whereasPreSocraticphilosophyhadonlybeen
theoretical.Ethics,asnowseparatedoutfordiscussionbyAristotle,ispracticalratherthantheoretical,inthe
originalAristoteliansensesoftheseterms.[1]Inotherwords,itisnotonlyacontemplationaboutgoodliving,
becauseitalsoaimstocreategoodliving.ItisthereforeconnectedtoAristotle'sotherpracticalwork,
thePolitics,whichsimilarlyaimsatpeoplebecominggood.Ethicsisabouthowindividualsshouldbestlive,
whilethestudyofpoliticsisfromtheperspectiveofalawgiver,lookingatthegoodofawholecommunity.
TheNicomacheanEthicsiswidelyconsideredoneofthemostimportanthistoricalphilosophicalworks,and
hadanimportantimpactupontheEuropeanMiddleAges,becomingoneofthecoreworksofmedieval
philosophy.Itthereforeindirectlybecamecriticalinthedevelopmentofallmodernphilosophyaswellas
Europeanlawandtheology.ManypartsoftheNicomacheanEthicsarewellknownintheirownright,within
differentfields.IntheMiddleAges,asynthesisbetweenAristotelianethicsandChristiantheologybecame
widespread,inEuropeasintroducedbyAlbertusMagnus.Whilevariousphilosophershadinfluenced
Christendomsinceitsearliesttimes,inWesternEuropeAristotlebecame"thePhilosopher",partlyinspiredby
theSpanishMuslimphilosopherAverroes.ThemostimportantversionofthissynthesiswasthatofThomas
Aquinas.Othermore"Averroist"AristotelianssuchasMarsiliusofPaduawerecontroversialbutalsoinfluential.
(MarsiliusisforexamplesometimessaidtohaveinfluencedthecontroversialEnglishpolitical
reformerThomasCromwell.)Acriticalperiodinthehistoryofthiswork'sinfluenceisattheendoftheMiddle
Ages,andbeginningofmodernity,whenseveralauthorssuchasFrancisBaconandThomasHobbes,argued
forcefullyandlargelysuccessfullythatthemedievalAristoteliantraditioninpracticalthinkinghadbecomea
greatimpedimenttophilosophyintheirtime.[2]However,inmorerecentgenerations,Aristotle'soriginalworks
(ifnotthoseofhismedievalfollowers)haveonceagainbecomeanimportantsource.Morerecentauthors
influencedbythisworkincludeAlasdairMacIntyre,HansGeorgGadamer,MarthaNussbaumandAvital
Ronell.
Contents[hide]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics 1/26
1 Titleandabbreviations
2 Synopsis
3 BookI
3.1 Whoshouldstudyethics,andhow
3.2 Defining"happiness"(eudaimonia)andtheaimoftheEthics
3.3 Questionsthatmightberaisedaboutthedefinition
3.4 Fromdefininghappinesstodiscussionofvirtue:introductiontotherestoftheEthics
4 BooksIIV:Concerningexcellenceofcharacterormoralvirtue
4.1 BookII:Thatvirtuesofcharactercanbedescribedasmeans
4.2 BookIII.Chapters15:Moralvirtueasconsciouschoice
4.3 BookIII.Chapters612,Firstexamplesofmoralvirtues
4.3.1 Courage
4.3.2 Temperance(sphrosun)
4.4 BookIV.Thesecondsetofexamplesofmoralvirtues
4.4.1 Liberalityorgenerosity(eleutheriots)
4.4.2 Magnificence
Firstpageofa1566editionof
4.4.3 Magnanimityor"greatnessofsoul"
theNicomacheanEthicsinGreekand
4.4.4 Abalancedambitiousnessconcerningsmallerhonors Latin.
4.4.5 Gentleness(prats)concerninganger
4.4.6 Somethinglikefriendship,betweenbeingobsequiousandsurly
4.4.7 Honestyaboutoneself:thevirtuebetweenboastingandselfdeprecation
4.4.8 Beingwittyorcharming
4.4.9 Senseofshame(notavirtue)
4.5 BookV:Justiceandfairness:amoralvirtueneedingspecialdiscussion
5 BookVI:Intellectualvirtue
6 BookVII.Impedimentstovirtue
6.1 BookVII.Chapters110:Selfmastery
6.2 BookVII.Chapters1114:Pleasureassomethingtoavoid
7 BooksVIIIandIX:Friendshipandpartnership
8 BookX:Pleasure,happiness,andupbringing
8.1 BookX.Chapters15:Thetheoryofpleasure
8.2 BookX.Chapters68:Happiness
8.3 BookX.Chapter9:Theneedforeducation,habituationandgoodlaws
9 Seealso
10 Footnotes
11 Furtherreading
11.1 Translations
12 Externallinks
Titleandabbreviations [ edit ]
TheEnglishversionofthetitlederivesfromGreek,transliteratedEthikaNikomacheia,which
issometimesalsogiveninthegenitiveformas,EthiknNikomachein.TheLatin,which
isalsocommonlyused,canbeEthicaNicomacheaor,DeMoribusadNicomachum.
TheNicomacheanEthicsisveryoftenabbreviated"NE",or"EN",andbooksandchaptersaregenerally
referredtobyRomanandArabicnumerals,respectively,alongwithcorrespondingBekkernumbers.(Thus,
"NEII.2,1103b1"means"NicomacheanEthics,bookII,chapter2,Bekkerpage1103,Bekkercolumnb,line
number1".)InmanywaysthisworkparallelsthesimilarEudemianEthics,whichhasonlyeightbooks,andthe
twoworkscanbefruitfullycompared.BooksV,VI,andVIIoftheNicomacheanEthicsareidenticaltoBooksIV,
V,andVIoftheEudemianEthics.Opinionsabouttherelationshipbetweenthetwoworksforexample,which
waswrittenfirst,andwhichoriginallycontainedthethreecommonbooks,aredivided.
Synopsis [ edit ]
Thefirstphilosophertowriteethicaltreatises,Aristotlearguesthatthecorrectapproachforstudyingsuch
controversialsubjectsasEthicsorPolitics,whichinvolvediscussingwhatisbeautifulorjust,istostartwith
whatwouldberoughlyagreedtobetruebypeopleofgoodupbringingandexperienceinlife,andtowork
fromtheretoahigherunderstanding.[3][4]
Takingthisapproach,Aristotlebeginsbysayingthatthehighestgoodforhumans,thehighestaimofall
humanpracticalthinking,iseudaimonia,aGreekwordoftentranslatedaswellbeingorhappiness.Aristotlein
turnarguesthathappinessisproperlyunderstoodasanongoingandstabledynamic,awayofbeinginaction
(energeia),specificallyappropriatetothehuman"soul"(psuch),atitsmost"excellent"orvirtuous(virtue
translatesaretinGreek).Ifthereareseveralvirtuesthenthebestandmostcompleteorperfectofthemwill
bethehappiestone.Anexcellenthumanwillbeapersongoodatlivinglife,whodoesitwellandbeautifully
(kalos).Aristotlesaysthatsuchapersonwouldalsobeaserious(spoudaios)humanbeing,inthesamesense
of"serious"thatonecontrastsseriousharpistswithotherharpists.Healsoassertsaspartofthisstartingpoint
thatvirtueforahumanmustinvolvereasoninthoughtandspeech(logos),asthisisanaspect(anergon,
literallymeaningataskorwork)ofhumanliving.[5]
Fromthisstartingpoint,Aristotlegoesintodiscussionofwhatethics,atermAristotlehelpeddevelop,
means.AristotelianEthicsisaboutwhatmakesavirtuouscharacter(ethikaret)possible,whichisinturn
necessaryifhappinessistobepossible.Hedescribesasequenceofnecessarystepstoachievethis:First,
righteousactions,oftendoneundertheinfluenceofteachers,allowthedevelopmentoftherighthabits.These
inturncanallowthedevelopmentofagoodstablecharacterinwhichthehabitsarevoluntary,andthisinturn
givesachanceofachievingeudaimonia.[6]CharacterheretranslatesthosinGreek,relatedtomodernwords
suchasethics,ethicalandethos.Aristotledoesnothoweverequatecharacterwithhabit(ethosinGreek,with
ashort"e")becauserealcharacterinvolvesconsciouschoice,unlikehabit.Insteadofbeinghabit,characteris
ahexislikehealthorknowledge,meaningitisastabledispositionthatmustbepursuedandmaintainedwith
someeffort.However,goodhabitsaredescribedasapreconditionforgoodcharacter.[7]
Aristotlethenturnstoexamples,reviewingsomeofthespecificwaysthatpeoplearethoughtworthyofblame
orpraise.Asheproceeds,hedescribeshowthehighesttypesofpraise,sothehighesttypesofvirtue,imply
havingallthevirtuesofcharacteratonce,andtheseinturnimplynotjustgoodcharacter,butakindof
wisdom.[8]Thefourvirtuesthathesaysrequirethepossessionofalltheethicalvirtuestogetherare:
Beingof"greatsoul"(magnanimity),thevirtuewheresomeonewouldbetrulydeservingofthehighest
praiseandhaveacorrectattitudetowardsthehonorthismayinvolve.Thisisthefirstcasementioned,and
itismentionedwithintheinitialdiscussionofpracticalexamplesofvirtuesandvicesat1123bBookIV.[9]
Thetypeofjusticeorfairnessofagoodrulerinagoodcommunityisthengivenasimilardescription,
duringthespecialdiscussionofthevirtue(orvirtues)ofjusticeat1129binBookV.[10]
Phronesisorpracticaljudgmentasshownbygoodleadersisthenexttobementionedinthiswayat1144b
inBookVI.[11]
Thevirtueofbeingatrulygoodfriendisthefinalexampleat1157ainBookVIII.[12]
(IntheEudemianEthics(BookVIII,chapter3)Aristotlealsousestheword"kalokagathia",thenobilityofa
gentleman(kalokagathos),todescribethissameconceptofavirtuecontainingallthemoralvirtues.)
Thisstyleofbuildingupapicturewhereinitbecomesclearthatpraiseworthyvirtuesintheirhighestform,even
virtueslikecourage,seemtorequireintellectualvirtue,isathemeofdiscussionAristotlechoosestoassociate
intheNicomacheanEthicswithSocrates,andindeeditisanapproachwefindportrayedintheSocratic
dialoguesofPlato.[13]Aristotlealsodoesthishimself,andthoughheprofessestoworkdifferentlyfromPlatoby
tryingtostartwithwhatwellbroughtupmenwouldagreewith,bybookVIIAristotleeventuallycomestoargue
thatthehighestofallhumanvirtuesisitselfnotpractical,beingcontemplativewisdom(theria1177a).But
achievingthissupremeconditionisinseparablefromachievingallthevirtuesofcharacter,or"moral
virtues".[14]
ThewayAristotlesketchesthehighestgoodformanasinvolvingbothapracticalandtheoreticalside,withthe
twosidesnecessaryforeachother,isalsointhetraditionofSocratesandPlatoasopposedtopreSocratic
philosophy.AsBurger(2008)pointsout(p.212):"TheEthicsdoesnotendatitsapparentpeak,identifying
perfecthappinesswiththelifedevotedtotheriainsteaditgoesontointroducetheneedforastudy
oflegislation,onthegroundsthatitisnotsufficientonlytoknowaboutvirtue,butoneshouldtrytoputthat
knowledgetouse."Attheendofthebook,accordingtoBurger,thethoughtfulreaderisledtounderstandthat
"theendweareseekingiswhatwehavebeendoing"whileengagingwiththeEthics(p.215).
BookI [ edit ]
BookIattemptstobothdefinethesubjectmatteritselfandjustifythemethodthathasbeenchosen(in
chapters3,4,6and7).Aspartofthis,Aristotleconsiderscommonopinionsalongwiththeopinionsofpoets
andphilosophers.
Whoshouldstudyethics,andhow [ edit ]
Concerningaccuracyandwhetherethicscanbetreatedinanobjectiveway,Aristotlepointsoutthatthe"things
thatarebeautifulandjust,aboutwhichpoliticsinvestigates,involvegreatdisagreementandinconsistency,so
thattheyarethoughttobelongonlytoconventionandnottonature".ForthisreasonAristotleclaimsitis
importantnottodemandtoomuchprecision,likethedemonstrationswewoulddemandfromamathematician,
butrathertotreatthebeautifulandthejustas"thingsthataresoforthemostpart."Wecandothisbecause
peoplearegoodjudgesofwhattheyareacquaintedwith,butthisinturnimpliesthattheyoung(inageorin
character),beinginexperienced,arenotsuitableforstudyofthistypeofpoliticalsubject.[15]
Chapter6containsafamousdigressioninwhichAristotleappearstoquestionhis"friends"who"introducedthe
forms".ThisisunderstoodtobereferringtoPlatoandhisschool,famousforwhatisnowknownastheTheory
ofForms.Aristotlesaysthatwhileboth"thetruthandone'sfriends"areloved,"itisasacredthingtogivethe
highesthonortothetruth".ThesectionisyetanotherexplanationofwhytheEthicswillnotstartfromfirst
principles,whichwouldmeanstartingoutbytryingtodiscuss"TheGood"asauniversalthingthatallthings
calledgoodhaveincommon.Aristotlesaysthatwhileallthedifferentthingscalledgooddonotseemtohave
thesamenamebychance,itisperhapsbetterto"letgofornow"becausethisattemptatprecision"wouldbe
moreathomeinanothertypeofphilosophicinquiry",andwouldnotseemtobehelpfulfordiscussinghow
particularhumansshouldact,inthesamewaythatdoctorsdonotneedtophilosophizeoverthedefinitionof
healthinordertotreateachcase.[16]Inotherwords,Aristotleisinsistingontheimportanceofhisdistinction
betweentheoreticalandpracticalphilosophy,andtheNicomacheanEthicsispractical.
Defining"happiness"(eudaimonia)andtheaimoftheEthics [ edit ]
ThemainstreamofdiscussionstartstheopeningofChapter1,withtheassertionthatalltechnicalarts,all
investigations(everymethodos,includingtheEthicsitself),indeedalldeliberateactionsandchoice,allaimat
somegoodapartfromthemselves.Aristotlepointstothefactthatmanyaimsarereallyonlyintermediateaims,
andaredesiredonlybecausetheymaketheachievementofhigheraimspossible.[17]
Inchapter2,Aristotleassertsthatthereisonehighestaim,eudaimonia(traditionallytranslatedas
"happiness"),anditmustbethesameastheaimpoliticsshouldhave,becausewhatisbestforanindividualis
lessbeautiful(kalos)anddivine(theios)thanwhatisgoodforapeople(ethnos)orcity(polis).Politicsrules
overpracticallifesotheproperaimofpoliticsshouldincludetheproperaimofallotherpursuits,sothat"this
endwouldbethehumangood(tanthrpinonagathon)".Thehumangoodisapracticaltarget,andcontrasts
withPlato'sreferencesto"theGooditself".HeconcludeswhatisnowknownasChapter2ofBook1bystating
thatethics("ourinvestigation"ormethodos)is"inacertainwaypolitical".[18]
Chapter3goesontoelaborateonexactness.Ethics,unlikesomeothertypesofphilosophy,isinexactand
uncertain.Aristotlesaysthatitwouldbeunreasonabletoexpectstrictmathematicalstyledemonstrations,but
"eachmanjudgescorrectlythosematterswithwhichheisacquainted".[19]
Chapter4statesthatwhilemostwouldagreetocallthehighestaimofhumanity(eudaimonia),andalsoto
equatethiswithbothlivingwellanddoingthingswell,thereisdisputebetweenpeople,andbetweenthe
majority(hoipolloi)and"thewise".[20]Chapter5distinguishesthreedistinctwaysoflifethatdifferentpeople
associatewithhappiness.[21]
Theslavishwayofpleasure,whichisthewaythemajorityofpeoplethinkofhappiness.
Therefinedandactivewayofpolitics,whichaimsathonor,(honoritselfimplyingthehigherdivinityofthose
whoarewiseandknowandjudge,andpotentiallyhonor,politicalpeople).
Thewayofcontemplation.
Aristotlealsomentionstwootherpossibilitiesthathearguescanbeputaside:
Havingvirtuebutbeinginactive,evensufferingevilsandmisfortunes,whichAristotlesaysnoonewould
considerunlesstheyweredefendingahypothesis.(AsSachspointsout,thisisindeedwhatPlato
depictsSocratesdoinginhisGorgias.)
Moneymaking,whichAristotleassertstobealifebasedonaimingatwhatispursuedbynecessityinorder
toachievehighergoals,anintermediategood.
Eachofthesethreecommonlyproposedhappywaysofliferepresentstargetsthatsomepeopleaimatfor
theirownsake,justliketheyaimathappinessitselfforitsownsake.Concerninghonor,pleasure,and
intelligence(nous)andalsoeveryvirtue,thoughtheyleadtohappiness,eveniftheydidnotwewouldstill
pursuethem.
Happinessinlifethen,includesthevirtues,andAristotleaddsthatitwouldincludeselfsufficiency(autarkeia),
nottheselfsufficiencyofahermit,butofsomeonewithafamily,friendsandcommunity.Byitselfthiswould
makelifechoiceworthyandlackingnothing.Todescribemoreclearlywhathappinessislike,Aristotlenextasks
whatthework(ergon)ofahumanis.Alllivingthingshavenutritionandgrowthasawork,allanimals
(accordingtothedefinitionofanimalAristotleused)wouldhaveperceivingaspartoftheirwork,butwhatis
moreparticularlyhuman?TheansweraccordingtoAristotleisthatitmustinvolvearticulatespeech(logos),
includingbothbeingopentopersuasionbyreasoning,andthinkingthingsthrough.Notonlywillhuman
happinessinvolvereason,butitwillalsobeanactivebeingatwork(energeia),notjustpotentialhappiness.
Anditwillbeoveralifetime,because"oneswallowdoesnotmakeaspring".Thedefinitiongivenistherefore:
TheGoodofmanistheactiveexerciseofhissoul'sfacultiesinconformitywithexcellenceor
virtue,oriftherebeseveralhumanexcellencesorvirtues,inconformitywiththebestandmost
perfectamongthem.Moreover,tobehappytakesacompletelifetimeforoneswallowdoesnot
makeaspring.
RackhamtranslationofI.7.1098a.[22]
Andbecausehappinessisbeingdescribedasaworkorfunctionofhumans,wecansaythatjustaswe
contrastharpistswithseriousharpists,thepersonwholiveswellandbeautifullyinthisactivelyrationaland
virtuouswaywillbea"serious"(spoudaios)human.[23][24]
Asanexampleofpopularopinionsabouthappiness,Aristotlecitesan"ancientoneandagreedtobythe
philosophers".Accordingtothisopinion,whichhesaysisright,thegoodthingsassociatedwiththesoulare
mostgoverningandespeciallygood,whencomparedtothegoodthingsofthebody,orgoodexternalthings.
Aristotlesaysthatvirtue,practicaljudgmentandwisdom,andalsopleasure,allassociatedwithhappiness,and
indeedanassociationwithexternalabundance,areallconsistentwiththisdefinition.
Ifhappinessisvirtue,oracertainvirtue,thenitmustnotjustbeaconditionofbeingvirtuous,potentially,but
anactualwayofvirtuously"beingatwork"asahuman.ForasintheAncientOlympicGames,"itisnotthe
mostbeautifulorthestrongestwhoarecrowned,butthosewhocompete".Andsuchvirtuewillbegood,
beautifulandpleasant,indeedAristotleassertsthatinmostpeopledifferentpleasuresareinconflictwitheach
otherwhile"thethingsthatarepleasanttothosewhoarepassionatelydevotedtowhatisbeautifularethe
thingsthatarepleasantbynatureandofthissortareactionsinaccordancewithvirtue".Externalgoodsare
alsonecessaryinsuchavirtuouslife,becauseapersonwholacksthingssuchasgoodfamilyandfriends
mightfinditdifficulttobehappy.[25]
Questionsthatmightberaisedaboutthedefinition [ edit ]
Inchapters912,Aristotleaddressessomeobjectionsorquestionsthatmightberaisedagainsthisdefinitionof
happinessthusfar.
FirstheconsidersthedefinitionofhappinessincontrasttoanoldSocraticquestion(foundforexample
inPlato'sMeno)ofwhetherhappinessmightbearesultoflearningorhabitortraining,orperhapsdivine
lotorevenchance.Aristotlesaysthatitadmitsofbeingsharedbysomesortoflearningandtakingpains.
Butdespitethis,evenifnotdivine,itisoneofthemostdivinethings,and"forwhatisgreatestandmost
beautifultobelefttochancewouldbetoodiscordant".[26]
Aristotlejustifiessayingthathappinessmustbeconsideredovera
wholelifetimebecauseotherwisePriam,forexample,wouldbedefined
asunhappyonlybecauseofhisunhappyoldage.[27]
Concerningtheimportanceofchancetohappiness,Aristotleargues
thatahappypersonatworkinaccordancewithvirtue"willbearwhat
misfortunebringsmostbeautifullyandincompleteharmonyinevery
instance".Onlymanygreatmisfortuneswilllimithowblessedsucha NeoptolemuskillingPriam.
lifecanbe,but"eveninthesecircumstancessomethingbeautiful Aristotleacceptedthatitwouldbe
wrongtocallPriamunhappyonly
shinesthrough".[28]
becausehislastyearswere
Addressinganopinionthatheexpectedamongsthiscontemporaries unhappy.
abouthappiness,Aristotlesaysthatit"seemstoounfeelingand
contrarytopeople'sopinions"toclaimthat"thefortunesofone's
descendantsandallone'sfriendshavenoinfluenceatall".Buthesaysthatitseemsthatifanythingatall
getsthroughtothedeceased,whethergoodorthereverse,itwouldbesomethingfaintandsmall".[29]
OnceagainturningtothedivinityofhappinessAristotledistinguishesvirtueandhappinesssayingthat
virtue,throughwhichpeople"becomeaptatperformingbeautifulactions"ispraiseworthy,whilehappiness
issomethingmoreimportant,likegod,"sinceeveryoneofusdoeseverythingelseforthesakeofthis,and
wesetdownthesourceandcauseofgoodthingsassomethinghonoredanddivine".[30]
Fromdefininghappinesstodiscussionofvirtue:introductiontotherestoftheEthics
[ edit ]
Aristotleassertsthatwecanusefullyacceptsomethingssaidaboutthesoul(clearlyacrossreferencetoPlato
again),includingthedivisionofthesoulintorationalandirrationalparts,andthefurtherdivisionofthe
irrationalpartsintotwopartsalso:
Oneirrationalpartofthehumansoulis"nothuman"but"vegetative"andatmostworkduringsleep,when
virtueisleastobvious.
Asecondirrationalpartofthehumansoulishoweverabletoshareinreasoninsomeway.Weseethis
becauseweknowthereissomething"desiringandgenerallyappetitive"inthesoulthatcan,ondifferent
occasionsindifferentpeople,eitheropposereason,orobeyitthusbeingrationaljustaswewouldbe
rationalwhenwelistentoafatherbeingrational.
Thevirtuesthenaresimilarlydivided,intointellectual(dianoetic)virtues,andthevirtuesofcharacter(ethicalor
moralvirtues)pertainingtotheirrationalpartofthesoul,whichcantakepartinreason.[31]
Thesevirtuesofcharacter,or"moralvirtues"astheyareoftentranslated,becomethecentraltopicinBookII.
TheintellectualaspectofvirtuewillbediscussedinBookVI.
BooksIIV:Concerningexcellenceofcharacterormoralvirtue [ edit ]
BookII:Thatvirtuesofcharactercanbedescribedasmeans [ edit ]
Aristotlesaysthatwhereasvirtueofthinkingneedsteaching,experienceandtime,virtueofcharacter(moral
virtue)comesaboutasaconsequenceoffollowingtherighthabits.AccordingtoAristotlethepotentialforthis
virtueisbynatureinhumans,butwhethervirtuescometobepresentornotisnotdeterminedbyhuman
nature.[32]
Tryingtofollowthemethodofstartingwithapproximatethingsgentlemencanagreeon,andlookingatall
circumstances,Aristotlesaysthatwecandescribevirtuesasthingsthataredestroyedbydeficiencyorexcess.
Someonewhorunsawaybecomesacoward,whilesomeonewhofearsnothingisrash.Inthiswaythevirtue
"bravery"canbeseenasdependingupona"mean"betweentwoextremes.(Forthisreason,Aristotleis
sometimesconsideredaproponentofadoctrineofagoldenmean.[33])Peoplebecomehabituatedwellbyfirst
performingactionsthatarevirtuous,possiblybecauseoftheguidanceofteachersorexperience,andinturn
thesehabitualactionsthenbecomerealvirtuewherewechoosegoodactionsdeliberately.[34]
AccordingtoAristotle,characterproperlyunderstood(i.e.one'svirtueorvice),isnotjustanytendencyorhabit
butsomethingthataffectswhenwefeelpleasureorpain.Avirtuouspersonfeelspleasurewhensheperforms
themostbeautifulornoble(kalos)actions.Apersonwhoisnotvirtuouswilloftenfindhisorherperceptionsof
whatismostpleasanttobemisleading.Forthisreason,anyconcernwithvirtueorpoliticsrequires
considerationofpleasureandpain.[35]Whenapersondoesvirtuousactions,forexamplebychance,orunder
advice,theyarenotyetnecessarilyavirtuousperson.Itisnotlikeintheproductivearts,wherethethingbeing
madeiswhatisjudgedaswellmadeornot.Totrulybeavirtuousperson,one'svirtuousactionsmustmeet
threeconditions:(a)theyaredoneknowingly,(b)theyarechosenfortheirownsakes,and(c)theyarechosen
accordingtoastabledisposition(notatawhim,orinanywaythattheactingpersonmighteasilychangehis
choiceabout).Andjustknowingwhatwouldbevirtuousisnotenough.[36]AccordingtoAristotle'sanalysis,
threekindsofthingscometobepresentinthesoulthatvirtueis:afeeling(pathos),aninbornpredispositionor
capacity(dunamis),orastabledispositionthathasbeenacquired(hexis).[37]Infact,ithasalreadybeen
mentionedthatvirtueismadeupofhexeis,butonthisoccasionthecontrastwithfeelingsandcapacitiesis
madeclearerneitherischosen,andneitherispraiseworthyinthewaythatvirtueis.[38]
Comparingvirtuetoproductivearts(technai)aswitharts,virtueofcharactermustnotonlybethemakingofa
goodhuman,butalsothewayhumansdotheirownworkwell.Beingskilledinanartcanalsobedescribedas
ameanbetweenexcessanddeficiency:whentheyarewelldonewesaythatwewouldnotwanttotakeaway
oraddanythingfromthem.ButAristotlepointstoasimplificationinthisideaofhittingamean.Intermsofwhat
isbest,weaimatanextreme,notamean,andintermsofwhatisbase,theopposite.[39]
Chapter7turnsfromgeneralcommentstospecifics.Aristotlegivesalistofcharactervirtuesandvicesthathe
laterdiscussesinBooksIIandIII.AsSachspointsout,(2002,p.30)itappearsthelistisnotespeciallyfixed,
becauseitdiffersbetweentheNicomacheanandEudemianEthics,andalsobecauseAristotlerepeatsseveral
timesthatthisisaroughoutline.[40]
Aristotlealsomentionssome"meanconditions"involvingfeelings:asenseofshameissometimespraised,or
saidtobeinexcessordeficiency.Righteousindignation(Greek:nemesis)isasortofmeanbetweenjoyatthe
misfortunesofothersandenvy.Aristotlesaysthatsuchcaseswillneedtobediscussedlater,beforethe
discussionofJusticeinBookV,whichwillalsorequirespecialdiscussion.ButtheNicomacheanEthicsonly
discussesthesenseofshameatthatpoint,andnotrighteousindignation(whichishoweverdiscussedin
theEudemianEthicsBookVIII).
InpracticeAristotleexplainsthatpeopletendmorebynaturetowardspleasures,andthereforeseevirtuesas
beingrelativelyclosertothelessobviouslypleasantextremes.Whileeverycasecanbedifferent,giventhe
difficultyofgettingthemeanperfectlyrightitisindeedoftenmostimportanttoguardagainstgoingthe
pleasantandeasyway.[41]HoweverthisruleofthumbisshowninlaterpartsoftheEthicstoapplymainlyto
somebodilypleasures,andisshowntobewrongasanaccurategeneralruleinBookX.
BookIII.Chapters15:Moralvirtueasconsciouschoice [ edit ]
Chapter1distinguishesactionschosenasrelevanttovirtue,andwhetheractionsaretobeblamed,forgiven,
orevenpitied.[42]
Aristotledividesactionsintothreecategoriesinsteadoftwo:
Voluntary(ekousion)acts.
Involuntaryorunwilling(akousion)acts,whichisthesimplestcasewherepeopledonotpraiseorblame.In
suchcasesapersondoesnotchoosethewrongthing,forexampleifthewindcarriesapersonoff,orifa
personhasawrongunderstandingoftheparticularfactsofasituation.Notethatignoranceofwhataims
aregoodandbad,suchaspeopleofbadcharacteralwayshave,isnotsomethingpeopletypicallyexcuse
asignoranceinthissense."Actingonaccountofignoranceseemsdifferentfromactingwhilebeing
ignorant".
"Nonvoluntary"or"nonwilling"actions(oukekousion)thatarebadactionsdonebychoice,ormore
generally(asinthecaseofanimalsandchildrenwhendesireorspiritcausesanaction)whenever"the
sourceofthemovingofthepartsthatareinstrumentalinsuchactionsisinoneself"andanything"upto
oneselfeithertodoornot".However,theseactionsarenottakenbecausetheyarepreferredintheirown
right,butratherbecausealloptionsavailableareworse.
Itisconcerningthisthirdclassofactionsthatthereisdoubtaboutwhethertheyshouldbepraisedorblamed
orcondonedindifferentcases.
Severalmorecriticaltermsaredefinedanddiscussed:
Deliberatechoice(proairesis),"seemstodetermineone'scharactermorethanone'sactionsdo".Things
doneonthespurofthemoment,andthingsdonebyanimalsandchildrencanbewilling,butdrivenby
desireandspiritandnotwhatwewouldnormallycalltruechoice.Choiceisrational,andaccordingtothe
understandingofAristotle,choicecanbeinoppositiontodesire.Choiceisalsonotwishingforthingsone
doesnotbelievecanbeachieved,suchasimmortality,butratheralwaysconcerningrealisticaims.Choice
isalsonotsimplytodowithopinion,becauseourchoicesmakeusthetypeofpersonweare,andarenot
simplytrueorfalse.Whatdistinguisheschoiceisthatbeforeachoiceismadethereisa
rationaldeliberationorthinkingthingsthrough.[43]
Deliberation(bouleusis),atleastforsanepeople,doesnotincludetheoreticalcontemplationabout
universalandeverlastingthings,noraboutthingsthatmightbefaraway,noraboutthingswecanknow
precisely,suchasletters."Wedeliberateaboutthingsthatareuptousandaremattersofaction"and
concerningthingswhereitisunclearhowtheywillturnout.Deliberationisthereforenothowwereason
aboutendswepursue,healthforexample,buthowwethinkthroughthewayswecantrytoachievethem.
Choicethenisdecidedbybothdesireanddeliberation.[44]
Wishing(boulsis)isnotdeliberation.Wecannotsaythatwhatpeoplewishforisgoodbydefinition,and
althoughwecouldsaythatwhatiswishedforisalwayswhatappearsgood,thiswillstillbeveryvariable.
Mostimportantlywecouldsaythataworthy(spoudaios)manwillwishforwhatis"truly"good.Mostpeople
aremisledbypleasure,"foritseemstothemtobeagood,thoughitisnot".[45]
Chapter5considerschoice,willingnessanddeliberationincasesthatexemplifynotonlyvirtue,butvice.Virtue
andviceaccordingtoAristotleare"uptous".Thismeansthatalthoughnooneiswillinglyunhappy,viceby
definitionalwaysinvolvesactionsdecidedonwillingly.(Asdiscussedearlier,vicecomesfrombadhabitsand
aimingatthewrongthings,notdeliberatelyaimingtobeunhappy.)Lawmakersalsoworkinthisway,tryingto
encourageanddiscouragetherightvoluntaryactions,butdon'tconcernthemselveswithinvoluntaryactions.
Theyalsotendnottobelenienttopeopleforanythingtheycouldhavechosentoavoid,suchasbeingdrunk,
orbeingignorantofthingseasytoknow,orevenofhavingallowedthemselvestodevelopbadhabitsanda
badcharacter.Concerningthispoint,Aristotleassertsthateventhoughpeoplewithabadcharactermaybe
ignorantandevenseemunabletochoosetherightthings,thisconditionstemsfromdecisionsthatwere
originallyvoluntary,thesameaspoorhealthcandevelopfrompastchoicesand,"Whilenooneblamesthose
whoareillformedbynature,peopledocensurethosewhoarethatwaythroughlackofexerciseandneglect."
Thevicesthen,arevoluntaryjustasthevirtuesare.Hestatesthatpeoplewouldhavetobeunconsciousnot
torealizetheimportanceofallowingthemselvestolivebadly,andhedismissesanyideathatdifferentpeople
havedifferentinnatevisionsofwhatisgood.[46]
BookIII.Chapters612,Firstexamplesofmoralvirtues [ edit ]
Aristotlenowdealsseparatelywithsomeofthespecificcharactervirtues,inaformsimilartothelistingatthe
endofBookII,startingwithcourageandtemperance.
Courage [ edit ]
Concerned
Mean Excess Deficiency
with
FirstType.Foolhardyorexcessive
fear
Courage(andreia): fearlessnessisonewhooverindulgesin Cowardly(deilos):exceeds
(phobos)
meaninfearand fearfulactivities. infearandisdeficientin
confidence confidence SecondType.Rash(thrasus):exceeds confidence
(thrasos) inconfidence
Couragemeansholdingameanpositioninone'sfeelingsofconfidenceandfear.Courage,however,isnot
thoughttorelatetofearofevilthingsitisrighttofear,likedisgraceandcourageisnotthewordforaman
whodoesnotfeardangertohiswifeandchildren,orpunishmentforbreakingthelaw.Insteadcourageusually
referstoconfidenceandfearconcerningthemostfearfulthing,death,andspecificallythemostpotentially
beautifulformofdeath,deathinbattle.[47]
Thecourageousman,saysAristotle,sometimesfearseventerrorsthatnoteveryonefeelstheneedtofear,
butheenduresfearsandfeelsconfidentinarationalway,forthesakeofwhatisbeautiful(kalos)because
thisiswhatvirtueaimsat.Beautifulactioncomesfromabeautifulcharacterandaimsatbeauty.Thevices
opposedtocouragewerediscussedattheendofBookII.Althoughthereisnospecialnameforit,peoplewho
haveexcessivefearlessnesswouldbemad,whichAristotleremarksthatsomedescribeCeltsasbeinginhis
time.Aristotlealsoremarksthat"rash"people(thrasus),thosewithexcessiveconfidence,aregenerally
cowardsputtingonabraveface.[48]
Apartfromthecorrectusageabove,thewordcourageisappliedtofiveothertypesofcharacteraccordingto
Aristotle:[49]
Thecourageofcitizensoldiers.Aristotlesaysthisislargelyaresultof
penaltiesforcowardiceandhonorsforbravery,butthatitistheclosest
typeofseemingcouragetorealcourage,isveryimportantformaking
anarmyfightasifbrave,butitisdifferentfromtruecouragebecause
notbasedonvoluntaryactionsaimedatbeingbeautifulintheirown
right.AristotleperhapssurprisinglynotesthattheHomericheroessuch
asHectorhadthistypeofcourage.
Peopleexperiencedinsomeparticulardangeroftenseem
courageous.Thisissomethingthatmightbeseenamongst
professionalsoldiers,whodonotpanicatfalsealarms.Inanother
perhapssurprisingremarkAristotlespecificallynotesthatsuchmen
Hektor,theTrojanhero.Aristotle
mightbebetterinawarthaneventrulycourageouspeople.However,
questionshiscourage.
healsonotesthatwhentheoddschangesuchsoldiersrun.
Spiritoranger(thumos)oftenlookslikecourage.Suchpeoplecanbe
blindtothedangerstheyrunintothough,meaningevenanimalscanbebraveinthisway,andunliketruly
courageouspeopletheyarenotaimingatbeautifulacts.Thistypeofbraveryisthesameasthatofamule
riskingpunishmenttokeepgrazing,oranadulterertakingrisks.Aristotlehowevernotesthatthistypeof
spiritshowsanaffinitytotruecourageandcombinedwithdeliberatechoiceandpurposeitseemstobe
truecourage.
Theboldnessofsomeonewhofeelsconfidentbasedonmanypastvictoriesisnottruecourage.Likea
personwhoisoverconfidentwhendrunk,thisapparentcourageisbasedonalackoffear,andwill
disappearifcircumstanceschange.Atrulycourageouspersonisnotcertainofvictoryanddoesendure
fear.
Similarly,therearepeoplewhoareoverconfidentsimplyduetoignorance.Anoverconfidentpersonmight
standawhilewhenthingsdonotturnoutasexpected,butapersonconfidentoutofignoranceislikelyto
runatthefirstsignsofsuchthings.
Chapter9.AsdiscussedinBookIIalready,couragemightbedescribedasachievingameaninconfidence
andfear,butwemustrememberthatthesemeansarenotnormallyinthemiddlebetweenthetwoextremes.
Avoidingfearismoreimportantinaimingatcouragethanavoidingoverconfidence.Asintheexamplesabove,
overconfidentpeoplearelikelytobecalledcourageous,orconsideredclosetocourageous.Aristotlesaidin
BookIIthatwiththemoralvirtuessuchascouragetheextremeone'snormaldesirestendawayfromare
themostimportanttoaimtowards.
Whenitcomestocourage,itheadspeopletowardspaininsomecircumstances,andthereforeawayfrom
whattheywouldotherwisedesire.Menaresometimesevencalledcourageousjustforenduringpain.There
canbeapleasantendofcourageousactionsbutitisobscuredbythecircumstances.Deathis,bydefinition,
alwaysapossibilitysothisisoneexampleofavirtuethatdoesnotbringapleasantresult.[50]
Aristotle'streatmentofthesubjectisoftencomparedtoPlato's.CouragewasdealtwithbyPlatoinhisSocratic
dialoguenamedtheLaches.
Temperance(sphrosun) [ edit ]
Concernedwith Mean Excess Deficiency

Profligacy,
pleasure(hdon) scarcelyoccurs,butwemaycall
Temperance(sphrosun) dissipation,etc.
andpain(lup) itInsensible(anaisthtos)
(akolasia)
Temperance(sphrosun,alsotranslatedassoundnessofmind,moderation,discretion)isameanwith
regardstopleasure.Headdsthatitisonlyconcernedwithpainsinalesseranddifferentway.Thevicethat
occursmostofteninthesamesituationsisexcesswithregardstopleasure(akolasia,translated
licentiousness,intemperance,profligacy,dissipationetc.).Pleasurescanbedividedintothoseofthesouland
ofthebody.Butthosewhoareconcernedwithpleasuresofthesoul,honor,learning,forexample,oreven
excessivepleasureintalking,arenotusuallyreferredtoastheobjectsofbeingtemperateordissipate.Also,
notallbodilypleasuresarerelevant,forexampledelightinginsightsorsoundsorsmellsarenotthingsweare
temperateorprofligateabout,unlessitisthesmelloffoodorperfumethattriggersanotheryearning.
Temperanceanddissipationconcerntheanimallike,Aphrodisiac,pleasuresoftouchandtaste,andindeed
especiallyacertaintypeoftouch,becausedissipatedpeopledonotdelightinrefineddistinguishingofflavors,
andnorindeeddotheydelightinfeelingsonegetsduringaworkoutormassageinagymnasium.[51]
Chapter11.Somedesireslikethatoffoodanddrink,andindeedsex,aresharedbyeveryoneinacertainway.
Butnoteveryonehasthesameparticularmanifestationsofthesedesires.Inthe"naturaldesires"says
Aristotle,fewpeoplegowrong,andthennormallyinonedirection,towardstoomuch.Whatisjusttofulfill
one'sneed,whereaspeopleerrbyeitherdesiringbeyondthisneed,orelsedesiringwhattheyoughtnot
desire.Butregardingpains,temperanceisdifferentfromcourage.Atemperatepersondoesnotneedto
endurepains,butrathertheintemperatepersonfeelspainevenwithhispleasures,butalsobyhisexcess
longing.
Theoppositeisrare,andthereforethereisnospecialnameforapersoninsensitivetopleasuresanddelight.
Thetemperatepersondesiresthethingsthatarenotimpedimentstohealth,norcontrarytowhatisbeautiful,
norbeyondthatperson'sresources.Suchapersonjudgesaccordingtorightreason(orthoslogos).[52]
Chapter12.Intemperanceisamorewillinglychosenvicethancowardice,becauseitpositivelyseekspleasure,
whilecowardiceavoidspain,andpaincanderangeaperson'schoice.Sowereproachintemperancemore,
becauseitiseasiertohabituateoneselfsoastoavoidthisproblem.Thewaychildrenactalsohassome
likenesstotheviceofakolasia.Justasachildneedstolivebyinstructions,thedesiringpartofthehumansoul
mustbeinharmonywiththerationalpart.Desirewithoutunderstandingcanbecomeinsatiable,andcaneven
impairreason.[53]
Plato'streatmentofthesamesubjectisonceagainfrequentlycomparedtoAristotle's,aswasapparently
Aristotle'sintention(seeBookI,asexplainedabove):
Everyvirtue,asitcomesunderexaminationinthePlatonicdialogues,expandsfarbeyondthe
boundsofitsordinaryunderstanding:butsphrosunundergoes,inPlato'sCharmides,an
especiallyexplosiveexpansionfromtheefirstdefinitionproposedaquiettemperament(159b),
to"theknowledgeofitselfandotherknowledges"(166e).
Burger(2008)p.80
AristotlediscussesthissubjectfurtherinBookVII.
BookIV.Thesecondsetofexamplesofmoralvirtues [ edit ]
Thesetofmoralvirtuesdiscussedhereinvolvesgettingthebalanceofone'sbehaviorrightinsocialorpolitical
situations,leadingtothemesthatbecomecriticaltothedevelopmentofsomeofthemostimportantthemes.
BookIVissometimesdescribedasbeingveryboundtothenormsofanAtheniangentlemaninAristotle'stime.
WhilethisisconsistentwiththeapproachAristotlesaidhewouldtakeinBookI,incontrasttotheapproachof
Plato,thereislongrunningdisagreementconcerningwhetherthisimmersionwithintheviewpointofhis
probableintendedreadershipisjustastartingpointtobuilduptomoregeneralconclusions,forexamplein
BookVI,orelseshowsthatAristotlefailedtosuccessfullygeneralize,andthathisethicalthinkingwastruly
baseduponthebeliefsofaGreekgentlemanofhistime.
Liberalityorgenerosity(eleutheriots) [ edit ]

prodigality meanness
givingandgetting
liberality(Rackham),generosity(Sachs) (Rackham), (Rackham),
(smalleramountsof)
(eleutheriots) wastefulness stinginess(Sachs)
money
(Sachs)(astia) (aneleutheria)
Thisisavirtueweobservewhenweseehowpeopleactwithregardstogivingmoney,andthingswhoseworth
isthoughtofintermsofmoney.Thetwounvirtuousextremesarewastefulnessandstinginess(ormeanness).
Stinginessismostobviouslytakingmoneytooseriously,butwastefulness,lessstrictlyspeaking,isnotalways
theopposite(anunderestimationoftheimportanceofmoney)becauseitisalsooftencausedbybeing
unrestrained.Awastefulpersonisdestroyedbytheirownacts,andhasmanyvicesatonce.Aristotle's
approachtodefiningthecorrectbalanceistotreatmoneylikeanyotherusefulthing,andsaythatthevirtueis
toknowhowtousemoney:givingtotherightpeople,therightamountattherighttime.Also,aswitheachof
theethicalvirtues,Aristotleemphasizesthatsuchapersongetspleasuresandpainsatdoingthevirtuousand
beautifulthing.Aristotlegoesslightlyoutofhiswaytoemphasizethatgenerosityisnotavirtueassociatedwith
makingmoney,because,hepointsout,avirtuouspersonisnormallysomeonewhocausesbeautifulthings,
ratherthanjustbeingarecipient.Aristotlealsopointsoutthatwedonotgivemuchgratitudeandpraiseatall
tosomeonesimplyfornottaking(whichmighthoweverearnpraiseforbeingjust).Aristotlealsopointsoutthat
"generouspeoplearelovedpracticallythemostofthosewhoarerecognizedforvirtue,sincetheyconfer
benefits,andthisconsistsingiving"andhedoesnotdenythatgenerouspeopleoftenwon'tbegoodat
maintainingtheirwealth,andareofteneasytocheat.Aristotlegoesfurtherinthisdirectionbysayingthatit
mightseemthatitisbettertobewastefulthantobestingy:awastefulpersoniscuredbyage,andbyrunning
outofresources,andiftheyarenotmerelyunrestrainedpeoplethentheyarefoolishratherthanviciousand
badlybroughtup.Also,awastefulpersonatleastbenefitssomeone.Aristotlepointsoutalsothataperson
withthisvirtuewouldnotgetmoneyfromsomeoneheshouldnotgetit,inordertogive"foradecentsortof
takinggoesalongwithadecentsortofgiving."Havingsaidthishowever,mostpeoplewecallwastefularenot
onlywastefulinthesenseopposedtobeinggenerous,butalsoactuallyunrestrainedandhavemanyvicesat
once.Suchpeopleareactuallyoftenwastefulandstingyatthesametime,andwhentryingtobegenerous
theyoftentakefromsourceswhencetheyshouldnot(forexamplepimps,loansharks,gamblers,thieves),and
theygivetothewrongpeople.Suchpeoplecanbehelpedbyguidance,unlikestingypeople,andmostpeople
aresomewhatstingy.Infact,endsAristotle,stinginessisreasonablycalledtheoppositeofgenerosity,"both
becauseitisagreaterevilthanwastefulness,andbecausepeoplegowrongmoreoftenwithitthanfromthe
sortofwastefulnessdescribed".[54]
Magnificence [ edit ]

Tastelessness Paltriness(Rackham),
givingandgetting
Magnificence(megaloprepeia) (apeirokalia)or Chintziness(Sachs)
greaterthings
Vulgarity(banausia) (mikroprepeia)
Magnificenceisdescribedasavirtuesimilartogenerosityexceptthatitdealswithspendinglargeamountsof
wealth.Aristotlesaysthatwhile"themagnificentmanisliberal,theliberalmanisnotnecessarilymagnificent".
Theimmoderatevicesinthiscasewouldbeconcerning"makingagreatdisplayonthewrongoccasionsandin
thewrongway".Theextremestobeavoidedinordertoachievethisvirtuearepaltriness(Rackham)or
chintziness(Sachs)ontheonehandandtastelessnessorvulgarityontheother.Aristotleremindsusherethat
hehasalreadysaidthatmoraldispositions(hexeis)arecausedbytheactivities(energeia)weperform,
meaningthatamagnificentperson'svirtuecanbeseenfromthewayhechoosesthecorrectmagnificentacts
attherighttimes.Theaimofmagnificence,likeanyvirtue,isbeautifulaction,notforthemagnificentman
himselfbutonpublicthings,suchthatevenhisprivategiftshavesomeresemblancetovotiveofferings.
Becauseheisaimingataspectacle,apersonwiththisvirtuewillnotbefocusingondoingthingscheaply,
whichwouldbepetty,andheorshemaywelloverspend.Soaswithliberality,Aristotleseesapotentialconflict
betweensomevirtues,andbeinggoodwithmoney.Buthedoessaythatmagnificencerequiresspending
accordingtomeans,atleastinthesensethatpoormancannotbemagnificent.Thevicesofpaltrinessand
vulgarchintziness"donotbringseriousdiscredit,sincetheyarenotinjurioustoothers,norarethey
excessivelyunseemly".[55]
Magnanimityor"greatnessofsoul" [ edit ]

GreatnessofSoul(megalopsuchia)
greathonor(tim)and Vanity SmallnessofSoul
(Traditionaltranslation"magnanimity".
dishonor (chaunots) (mikropsuchia)
Sometimes"pride".)
BookIV,Chapter3.MagnanimityisalatinizationoftheoriginalGreekusedhere,whichwasmegalopsuchia,
whichmeansgreatnessofsoul.AlthoughthewordmagnanimityhasatraditionalconnectiontoAristotelian
philosophy,italsohasitsowntraditioninEnglish,whichnowcausessomeconfusion.[56]Thisiswhysome
moderntranslationsreferliterallytogreatnessofsoul.Inparticular,thetermimpliednotjustgreatness,buta
personwhothoughtofthemselvesworthyofgreatthing,orinotherwordsasortofpride.(MichaelDavis
translatesitaspride.[57])Althoughthetermcouldimplyanegativeinsinuationofloftypride,Aristotleasusual
triestodefinewhatthewordshouldmeanasavirtue.Hesaysthat"noteverybodywhoclaimsmorethanhe
deservesisvain"andindeed"mostsmallsouledofallwouldseemtobethemanwhoclaimslessthanhe
deserveswhenhisdesertsaregreat".Beingvain,orbeingsmallsouled,arethetwoextremesthatfailto
achievethemeanofthevirtueofmagnanimity.[58]Thesmallsouledperson,accordingtoAristotle,"seemsto
havesomethingbadabouthim".[59]
Tohavethevirtueofgreatnessofsoul,andbeworthyofwhatisgreatest,onemustbegoodinatruesense,
andpossesswhatisgreatinallvirtues.AsSachspointsout:"Greatnessofsoulisthefirstoffourvirtuesthat
Aristotlewillfindtorequirethepresenceofallthevirtuesofcharacter."[8]Theothersareatypeofjustice
(1129binBookV),phronesisorpracticaljudgmentasshownbygoodleaders(1144binBookVI),andtruly
goodfriends(1157ainBookVIII).Aristotleviewsmagnanimityas"asortofadornmentofthemoralvirtuesfor
itmakesthemgreater,anditdoesnotarisewithoutthem."[60]
Aristotlealsofocusesonthequestionofwhatthegreatestthingsonemaybeworthyof.Atfirsthesaysthisis
spokenofintermsofexternalgoods,butheobservesthatthegreatestofthesemustbehonor,becausethis
iswhatweassigntogods,andthisiswhatpeopleofthehigheststandingaimat.Buthequalifiesthisbysaying
thatactuallygreatsouledpeoplewillholdthemselvesmoderatelytowardeverytypeofgoodorbadfortune,
evenhonor.Itisbeinggood,andbeingworthyofhonorthatismoreimportant.(Thedisdainofagreatsouled
persontowardsallkindsofnonhumangoodthingscanmakegreatsouledpeopleseemarrogant,likeanun
deservingvainperson.)[61]LeoStraussnotesthat"thereisaclosekinshipbetweenAristotle'sjusticeand
biblicaljustice,butAristotle'smagnanimity,whichmeansaman'shabitualclaimingforhimselfgreathonors
whilehedeservesthesehonors,isalientotheBible".StraussdescribestheBibleasrejectingtheconceptofa
gentleman,andthatthisdisplaysadifferentapproachtotheproblemofdivinelawinGreekandBiblical
civilization.[62]Seealsobelowconcerningthesenseofshame.
Aristotlelistssometypicalcharacteristicsofgreatsouledpeople:[63]
Theydonottakesmallrisks,andarenotdevotedtorisktaking,buttheywilltakebigrisks,withoutregard
fortheirlife,becauseaworselifeisworthlessthanagreatlife.Indeed,theydofewthings,andareslowto
startonthings,unlessthereisgreathonorinvolved.
Theydonotesteemwhatispopularlyesteemed,norwhatothersaregoodat.Theytakefewthings
seriously,andarenotanxious.
Theygladlydofavorsbutareashamedtoreceivethem,beingapttoforgetafavorfromanother,ortodoa
greateroneinreturn.Theyarepleasedtoheardiscussionaboutthefavorstheyhavedoneforothers,but
notaboutfavorsdoneforthem.
Theyareapttoactmorehighhandedlytoapersonofhighstationthanapersonofmiddleorlowstanding,
whichwouldbebelowthem.
Theyarefrankinexpressingopinionsandopenaboutwhattheyhateandlove.Nottobesowouldbedue
tofear,ortheesteemonehasofother'sopinionsoveryourown.
Theyleadlifeastheychooseandnotassuitsothers,whichwouldbeslavelike.
Theyarenotgiventowonder,fornothingseemsgreattothem.
Becausetheyexpectotherstobelesser,andarenotoverlyconcernedwiththeirpraise,theyarenotaptto
beargrudges,theyarenotapttogossip,andtheyarenoteveninterestedinspeakingillofenemies,
excepttoinsultthem.
Theyarenotapttocomplainaboutnecessitiesorsmallmatters,nortoaskforhelp,notwantingtoimply
thatsuchthingsareimportanttothem.
Theytendtopossessbeautifulanduselessthings,ratherthanproductiveones.
Theytendtomoveslowlyandspeakwithadeepsteadyvoice,ratherthanbeinghastyorshrill,which
wouldbeduetoanxiety.
Abalancedambitiousnessconcerningsmallerhonors [ edit ]

lesserhonor(tim) nospecialterminancientGreekforthe (Over)ambitiousness lackofambition
anddishonor rightamountofambition (philotimos) (aphilotimos)
BookIV,Chapter4.[64]Inparallelwiththedistinctionofscalealreadymadebetweennormal
generosityandmagnificence,Aristotleproposesthattherearetwotypesofvirtueassociatedwithhonors,one
concernedwithgreathonors,Magnanimityor"greatnessofsoul"andonewithmorenormalhonors.Thislatter
virtueisakindofcorrectrespectforhonor,whichAristotlehadnoGreekwordfor,butwhichhesaidis
betweenbeingambitious(philotimoshonorloving)andunambitious(aphilotimosnothonorloving)withrespect
tohonor.Itcouldincludeanobleandmanlypersonwithappropriateambition,oralessambitiouspersonwho
ismoderateandtemperate.(Inotherwords,Aristotlemakesitclearthathedoesnotthinkbeing
morephilotimosthanaverageisnecessarilyinappropriate.)Tohavethecorrectbalanceinthisvirtuemeans
pursuingtherighttypesofhonorfromtherighttypesofsourceofhonor.Incontrast,theambitiousmanwould
getthisbalancewrongbyseekingexcesshonorfromtheinappropriatesources,andtheunambitiousman
wouldnotdesireappropriatelytobehonoredfornoblereasons.
Gentleness(prats)concerninganger [ edit ]
Concerned
with
Irascibility(Rackham),Irritability(Sachs) Spiritlessness
anger(org) Gentleness(praots)
(orgilots) (aorgsia)
BookIVChapter5.[65]Thevirtueofpratsisthecorrectmeanconcerninganger.Incontrast,anexcessive
tendencyorviceconcerningangerwouldbeirascibilityorquicknesstoanger.Suchapersonwouldbeunfair
inresponses,angryatwrongpeople,andsoon.Thedeficientvicewouldbefoundinpeoplewhowon'tdefend
themselves.Theywouldlackspirit,andbeconsideredfoolishandservile.Aristotledoesnotdenyangera
placeinthebehaviorofagoodperson,butsaysitshouldbe"ontherightgroundsandagainsttheright
persons,andalsointherightmannerandattherightmomentandfortherightlengthoftime".[66]Peoplecan
getthiswronginnumerousways,andAristotlesaysitisnoteasytogetright.Sointhiscaseaswithseveral
othersseveraldistincttypesofexcessivevicepossible.Oneoftheworsttypesamongsttheseisthetypethat
remainsangryfortoolong.
AccordingtoAristotle,thevirtuewithregardstoangerwouldnotbeledbytheemotions(pathoi),butbyreason
(logos).SoaccordingtoAristotle,angercanbevirtuousandrationalintherightcircumstances,andheeven
saysthatasmallamountofexcessisnotsomethingworthblamingeither,andmightevenbepraisedasmanly
andfitforcommand.Thepersonwiththisvirtuewillhowevertendtoerronthesideofforgivenessratherthan
anger,andthepersonwithadeficiencyinthisvirtue,despiteseemingfoolishandservile,willbeclosertothe
virtuethansomeonewhogetsangrytooeasily.
Somethinglikefriendship,betweenbeingobsequiousandsurly [ edit ]

FirstType.obsequious
general
Friendliness(something (areskos),iffornopurpose quarrelsome(duseris)and
pleasantnessin
likephilia) Secondtype.flatterer(kolax), surly(duskolos)
life
ifforownadvantage
BookIVChapter6.[67]Thesecharacteristicsconcerntheattitudepeoplehavetowardswhethertheycause
paintoothers.Theobsequious(areskos)personisoverconcernedwiththepaintheycauseothers,backing
downtooeasily,evenwhenitisdishonorableorharmfultodoso,whileasurly(duskolos)orquarrelsome
(dusteris)personobjectstoeverythinganddoesnotcarewhatpaintheycauseothers,nevercompromising.
OnceagainAristotlesayshehasnospecificGreekwordtogivetothecorrectvirtuousmeanthatavoidsthe
vices,butsaysitresemblesfriendship(philia).Thedifferenceisthatthisfriendlyvirtueconcernsbehavior
towardsfriendsandstrangersalike,anddoesnotinvolvethespecialemotionalbondthatfriendshave.
ConcerningtruefriendshipseebooksVIIIandIX.
AccordingtoAristotle,gettingthisvirtuerightalsoinvolves:
Dealingdifferentlywithdifferenttypesofpeople,forexamplepeopleinahigherpositionthanoneself,
peoplemoreorlessfamiliartoyou,andsoon.
Sometimesbeingabletoshareinthepleasureofone'scompanionsatsomeexpensetooneself,ifthis
pleasurenotbeharmfulordishonorable.
Beingwillingtoexperiencepainintheshorttermforlongerrunpleasureofagreaterscale.
Apartfromtheviceofobsequiousness,thereisalsoflattery,whichisthethirdvicewherebysomeoneactsin
anobsequiouswaytotrytogainsomeadvantagetothemselves.
Honestyaboutoneself:thevirtuebetweenboastingandselfdeprecation [ edit ]
Concerned
with
Selfdeprecation:pretenseas
truth Boastfulness:pretenseas
Truthfulness(altheia) understatement(eironia,samewordas
(alths) exaggeration(alazoneia)
"irony")
BookIVChapter7.[68]IntranslationssuchasRackham'stheviceatissuehereissometimesreferredtoin
Englishasboastfulness(Greekalazoneia)andthisiscontrastedtoavirtueconcerningtruthfulness.The
reasonisthatAristotledescribestwokindsofuntruthfulpretensevicesonethatexaggeratesthings,
boastfulness,andonethatunderstatesthings.Aristotlepointsoutthatthisisaveryspecificrealmofhonesty,
thatwhichconcernsoneself.Othertypesofdishonestycouldinvolveothervirtuesandvices,suchasjustice
andinjustice.
Thisisasimilarsubjecttothelastonediscussedconcerningsurlinessandobsequiousness,inthatitconcerns
howtointeractsociallyinacommunity.Inthatdiscussion,thequestionwashowmuchtocompromisewith
othersifitwouldbepainful,harmfulordishonorable.Nowthediscussionturnstohowfrankoneshouldbe
concerningone'sownqualities.Andjustasinthepreviouscaseconcerningflattery,vicesthatgotoofarornot
farenoughmightbepartofone'scharacter,ortheymightbeperformedasiftheywereincharacter,with
someulteriormotive.Suchdishonestycouldinvolvevicesofdishonestyotherthanboastfulnessorself
deprecationofcourse,buttheloveroftruth,whoistruthfulevenwhennothingdependsonit,willbepraised
andexpectedtoavoidbeingdishonestwhenitismostdisgraceful.
Onceagain,AristotlesaidthathehadnoconvenientGreekwordtogiveto
thevirtuousandhonestmeaninthiscase,butapersonwhoboasts
claimsqualitiesinappropriately,whileapersonwhoselfdeprecates
excessivelymakesnoclaimtoqualitiestheyhave,orevendisparages
himself.Aristotlethereforenamesthevirtuousmanasapersonwho
claimsthegoodqualitieshehaswithoutexaggerationorunderstatement.
Asinmanyoftheseexamples,Aristotlesaystheexcess(boastfulness)is
moreblameworthythanthedeficiency(beingselfdisparaging).
Unlikethetreatmentofflattery,describedsimplyasavice,Aristotle
describeswaysinwhichapersonmightberelativelyblamelessifthey
wereoccasionallydishonestabouttheirownqualities,aslongasthisdoes
notbecomeafixeddispositiontoboast.Specifically,accordingtoAristotle
boastingwouldnotbeverymuchblamediftheaimishonororglory,butit
Socratesusedirony,which
wouldbeblameworthyiftheaimismoney. Aristotleconsidersanacceptable
typeofdishonesty.Butmany
Partsofthissectionareremarkablebecauseoftheimplicationsforthe
philosopherscangetawaywith
practiceofphilosophy.AtonepointAristotlesaysthatexamplesofareas dishonestbragging,whichisworse.
wheredishonestboastingforgainmightgoundetected,andbevery
blameworthy,wouldbeprophecy,philosophy,ormedicine,allofwhich
havebothpretenseandbragging.Thisappearstobeacriticismofcontemporarysophists.Butevenmore
remarkableisthefactthatoneofthevicesunderdiscussion,selfdeprecation(Greekeirneiafromwhich
modernEnglish"irony")isanadjectivethatwasandisoftenusedtodescribeSocrates.Aristotleeven
specificallymentionsSocratesasanexample,butatthesametimementions(continuingthetheme)thatthe
lessexcessiveviceisoftenlessblameworthy.
Beingwittyorcharming [ edit ]

pleasantnessandsocial Wittiness(Rackham)Charming(Sachs) Buffoonery Boorishness
amusement (eutrapelos) (bmolochia) (bmolochos)
BookIVChapter8.Thesubjectmatterofthisdiscussionisavirtueofbeingwitty,charmingandtactful,and
generallysayingtherightthingswhenspeakingplayfully,atourleisure,whichAristotlesaysisanecessarypart
oflife.[69]Incontrastabuffooncanneverresistmakinganyjoke,andthedeficientviceinthiscaseisan
uncultivatedpersonwhodoesnotgetjokes,andisuselessinplayfulconversation.Itishardtosetfixedrules
aboutwhatisfunnyandwhatisappropriate,soapersonwiththisvirtuewilltendtobelikealawmakermaking
suitablelawsforthemselves.
Senseofshame(notavirtue) [ edit ]
Chapter9.Thesenseofshameisnotavirtue,butmorelikeafeelingthanastablecharactertrait(hexis).Itis
afear,anditisonlyfittingintheyoung,wholivebyfeeling,butareheldbackbythefeelingofshame.We
wouldnotpraiseolderpeopleforsuchasenseofshameaccordingtoAristotle,sinceshameshouldconcern
actsdonevoluntarily,andadecentpersonwouldnotvoluntarilydosomethingshameful.Aristotlementions
herethatselfrestraintisalsonotavirtue,butrefersustoalaterpartofthebook(BookVII)fordiscussionof
this.[70]
LeoStraussnotesthatthisapproach,aswellasAristotle'sdiscussionofmagnanimity(above),areincontrast
totheapproachoftheBible.[71]
BookV:Justiceandfairness:amoralvirtueneedingspecialdiscussion [ edit ]
BookVisthesameasBookIVoftheEudemianEthics,thefirstofthreebookscommontobothworks.It
representsthespecialdiscussiononjustice(dikaiosun)alreadyforeseeninearlierbooks,whichcoverssome
ofthesamematerialasPlato'sRepublic,thoughinastrikinglydifferentway.
Burger(2008)pointsthatalthoughthechapternominallyfollowsthesamepath(methodos)asprevious
chapters"itisfarfromobvioushowjusticeistobeunderstoodasadispositioninrelationtoapassion:the
proposedcandidate,greed(pleonexia),wouldseemtorefer,rather,totheviceofinjusticeandthesingle
oppositeofthevirtue."Inotherwords,itisnotdescribedasameanbetweentwoextremes.Indeed,asBurger
pointout,theapproachisalsoquitedifferentfrompreviouschaptersinthewayitcategorizesintermsof
generalprinciples,ratherthanbuildingupfromcommonlyacceptedopinions.
AsAristotlepointsout,hisapproachispartlybecausepeoplemeansomanydifferentthingswhentheyusethe
wordjustice.Theprimarydivisionheobservesinwhatkindofpersonwouldbecalledjustisthat,ontheone
hand,itcouldmean"lawabiding"orlawful(nominos),andontheother,itcouldmeanequitableorfair(isos).
Aristotlepointsoutthat,"Whateverisunfairislawless,butnoteverythinglawlessisunfair,"and,"Itwouldseem
thattobeagoodmanisnotineverycasethesamethingastobeagoodcitizen."Thesetwocommon
meaningsofjusticecoincide,totheextentthatanysetoflawsisitselfgood,somethingonlylawmakerscan
affect,andthisallencompassingmeaningequatestothejusticeofagoodlawmaker,whichbecomes
Aristotle'spointofreferenceforfurtherdiscussion.Justiceinsuchasimpleandcompleteandeffectivesense
wouldaccordingtoAristotlebethesameashavingacompleteethicalvirtue,aperfectionofcharacter,
becausethiswouldbesomeonewhoisnotjustvirtuous,butalsowillingandabletoputvirtuetouseamongst
theirfriendsandintheircommunity.AccordingtoAristotle,"therearemanywhocanpractisevirtueintheirown
privateaffairsbutcannotdosointheirrelationswithanother".[72]
Aristotle,however,saysthatapartfromthecompletevirtuethatwouldencompassnotonlyalltypesof
justice,butalltypesofexcellenceofcharacterthereisapartialvirtuethatgetscalledjustice,whichisclearly
distinctfromothercharacterflaws.Cowardiceforexample,mightspecificallycauseasoldiertothrowawayhis
shieldandrun.However,noteveryonewhorunsfromabattledoessofromcowardice.Often,Aristotle
observes,theseactsarecausedbyoverreachingorgreed(pleonexia)andareascribedtoinjustice.Unlike
thevirtuesdiscussedsofar,anunjustpersondoesnotnecessarilydesirewhatisbadforhimselforherselfas
anindividual,nordoesheorsheevennecessarilydesiretoomuchofthings,iftoomuchwouldbebadforhim
orher.Such"particularinjustice"isalwaysgreedaimedatparticulargoodthingssuchashonorormoneyor
security.[73]
Tounderstandhowjusticeaimsatwhatisgood,itisnecessarytolookbeyondparticulargoodorbadthings
wemightwantornotwantashareofasindividuals,andthisincludesconsideringtheviewpointofa
community(thesubjectofAristotle'sPolitics).Aloneofthevirtues,saysAristotle,justicelookslike"someone
else'sgood",anargumentalsoconfrontedbyPlatoinhisRepublic.
Particularjusticeishoweverthesubjectofthisbook,andithasalreadybeendividedintothelawfulandthe
fair,whicharetwodifferentaspectsofuniversaljusticeorcompletevirtue.Concerningareaswherebeinglaw
abidingmightnotbethesameasbeingfair,Aristotlesaysthatthisshouldbediscussedundertheheadingof
Politics.[74]Hethendividesparticularjusticefurtherintotwoparts:distributionofdivisiblegoodsand
rectificationinprivatetransactions.Thefirstpartrelatestomembersofacommunityinwhichitispossiblefor
onepersontohavemoreorlessofagoodthananotherperson.Thesecondpartofparticularjusticedeals
withrectificationintransactionsandthispartisitselfdividedintotwoparts:voluntaryandinvoluntary,andthe
involuntaryaredividedfurtherintofurtiveandviolentdivisions.[75]Thefollowingchartshowingdivisionswith
Aristotle'sdiscussionofJusticeinBookV,basedonBurger(2008)Appendix3.
JusticeintheSoul
Justicein
contrastV.11.1138b513and
theCity
Plato'sRepublicIV.443bd
GeneralSense
Thejust=the
lawful
V.1.1129b1214:
Particular
allthelawful
Sense
thingsareina
Thejust=the
sensethejust
equal
things
V.2.1130b30
V.9.1137a1112:
1131a1
Thelawfulthings
areonlyby
accidentthejust
things
Distributive
Justice
Geometric
CorrectiveJustice
proportion:
Arithmeticproportion:
*equalsharesfor
subtractunjustgainof
equals
onepartytomakeupfor
*unequalfor
lossbytheotherparty
unequals
*differentin
differentregimes
Voluntary Involuntarytransactions
transactions V.2.1131a29
selling Furtive Byforce

buying theft assault
lendingat adultery imprisonment
interest poisoning murder
givingsecurity (pharmakeia) seizure,rape
foraloan procuring maiming
investing (proaggeia) verbalabuse
depositing enticementof slanderousinsult
renting slaves
assassinationby
treachery
falsewitness
Intryingtodescribejusticeasamean,aswiththeotherethicalvirtues,Aristotlesaysthatjusticeinvolves"at
leastfourterms,namely,twopersonsforwhomitisjustandtwoshareswhicharejust."(1131a)Thejustmust
fallbetweenwhatistoomuchandwhatistoolittleandthejustrequiresthedistributiontobemadebetween
peopleofequalstature.
Butinmanycases,howtojudgewhatisameanisnotclear,becauseasAristotlepointsout,"ifthepersons
arenotequal,theywillnothaveequalsharesitiswhenequalspossessorareallottedunequalshares,or
personsnotequalequalshares,thatquarrelsandcomplaintsarise."(1131a2324).Whatisjustindistribution
mustalsotakeintoaccountsomesortofworth.Thepartiesinvolvedwillbedifferentconcerningwhatthey
deserve,andtheimportanceofthisisakeydifferencebetweendistributivejusticeandrectificatoryjustice
becausedistributioncanonlytakeplaceamongequals.Aristotledoesnotstatehowtodecidewhodeserves
more,implyingthatthisdependsontheprinciplesacceptedineachtypeofcommunity,butratherhestatesit
issomesortofproportioninwhichthejustisanintermediatebetweenallfourelements(2forthegoodsand2
forthepeople).AfinalpointthatAristotlemakesinhisdiscussionofdistributivejusticeisthatwhentwoevils
mustbedistributed,thelesseroftheevilsisthemorechoiceworthyandassuchisthegreatergood
(1131b2125).
Thesecondpartofparticularjusticeisrectificatoryanditconsistsofthevoluntaryandinvoluntary.Thissortof
justicedealswithtransactionsbetweenpeoplewhoarenotequalsandlooksonlyattheharmorsuffering
causedtoanindividual.Thisisasortofblindjusticesinceittreatsbothpartiesasiftheywereequalregardless
oftheiractualworth:"Itmakesnodifferencewhetheragoodmanhasdefraudedabadmanorabadonea
goodone".Onceagaintryingtodescribejusticeasamean,hesaysthat"menrequireajudgetobeamiddle
termormediumindeedinsomeplacesjudgesarecalledmediators,fortheythinkthatiftheygetthemean
theywillgetwhatisjust.Thusthejustisasortofmean,inasmuchasthejudgeisamediumbetweenthe
litigants".Torestorebothpartiestoequality,ajudgemusttaketheamountthatisgreaterthantheequalthat
theoffenderpossessesandgivethatparttothevictimsothatbothhavenomoreandnolessthantheequal.
Thisruleshouldbeappliedtorectifybothvoluntaryandinvoluntarytransactions.[76]
Finally,Aristotleturnstotheideathatreciprocity("aneyeforaneye")isjustice,anideaheassociateswith
thePythagoreans.[77]Theproblemwiththisapproachtojustice,althoughitisnormalinpoliticsandlaw
making,isthatitignoresthedifferencebetweendifferentreasonsfordoingacrime.Forexample,itcouldhave
beendoneoutofpassionorignorance,andthismakesacriticaldifferencewhenitcomestodeterminingwhat
isthejustreaction.ThisinturnreturnsAristotletomentionthefactthatlawsarenotnormallyexactlythesame
aswhatisjust:"PoliticalJusticeisoftwokinds,onenatural,theotherconventional."[78]Inafamousstatement,
Aristotlemakesapointthat,likemanypointsinBook5,isthoughttoreferustoconsiderationof
Plato'sRepublic."Somepeoplethinkthatallrulesofjusticearemerelyconventional,becausewhereasalaw
ofnatureisimmutableandhasthesamevalidityeverywhere,asfireburnsbothhereandinPersia,rulesof
justiceareseentovary."[79]Aristotleinsiststhatjusticeisbothfixedinnatureinasense,butalsovariableina
specificway:"therulesofjusticeordainednotbynaturebutbymanarenotthesameinallplaces,sinceforms
ofgovernmentarenotthesame,thoughinallplacesthereisonlyoneformofgovernmentthatisnatural,
namely,thebestform."[80]Hebelievedpeoplecangenerallyseewhichtypesofrulesareconventional,and
whichbynatureandhefeltthatmostimportantwhentryingtojudgewhethersomeonewasjustorunjustwas
determiningwhethersomeonedidsomethingvoluntarilyornot.Somepeoplecommitcrimesbyaccidentor
duetovicesotherthangreedorinjustice.
BookVI:Intellectualvirtue [ edit ]
BookVIoftheNicomacheanEthicsisidenticaltoBookVoftheEudemianEthics.Earlierinbothworks,both
theNicomacheanEthicsBookIV,andtheequivalentbookintheEudemianEthics(BookIII),thoughdifferent,
endedbystatingthatthenextstepwastodiscussjustice.Indeed,inBookIAristotlesetouthisjustificationfor
beginningwithparticularsandbuildinguptothehighestthings.Charactervirtues(apartfromjusticeperhaps)
werealreadydiscussedinanapproximateway,aslikeachievingamiddlepointbetweentwoextremeoptions,
butthisnowraisesthequestionofhowweknowandrecognizethethingsweaimatoravoid.Recognizingthe
meanmeansrecognizingthecorrectboundarymarker(horos)whichdefinesthefrontierofthemean.Andso
practicalethics,havingagoodcharacter,requiresknowledge.
NeartheendofBookIAristotlesaidthatwemayfollowothersinconsideringthesoul(psuch)tobedivided
intoaparthavingreasonandapartwithoutit.Untilnow,hesays,discussionhasbeenaboutonetypeofvirtue
orexcellence(aret)ofthesoulthatofthecharacter(thos,thevirtueofwhichisthikaret,moral
virtue).Nowhewilldiscusstheothertype:thatofthought(dianoia).
Thepartofthesoulwithreasonisdividedintotwoparts:
Onewherebywecontemplateorobservethethingswithinvariablecauses
Onewherebywecontemplatethevariablethingsthepartwithwhichwedeliberateconcerningactions
Aristotlestatesthatifrecognitiondependsuponlikenessandkinshipbetweenthethingsbeingrecognizedand
thepartsofthesouldoingtherecognizing,thenthesoulgrowsnaturallyintotwoparts,specialisedinthese
twotypesofcause.[81]
Aristotleenumeratesfivetypesofhexis(stabledispositions)thatthesoulcanhave,andwhichcandisclose
truth:[82]
1.Art(Techne).Thisisrational,becauseitinvolvesmakingthingsdeliberately,inawaythatcanbe
explained.(Makingthingsinawaythatcouldnotbeexplainedwouldnotbetechne.)Itconcerns
variablethings,butspecificallyitconcernsintermediateaims.Ahouseisbuiltnotforitsownsake,but
tohaveaplacetolive,andsoon.
2.Knowledge(Episteme)."Weallassumethatwhatweknowisnotcapableofbeingotherwise."And"it
escapesournoticewhentheyareornot"."Also,allknowledgeseemstobeteachable,andwhatis
knownislearnable."[83]
3.PracticalJudgement(Phronesis).Thisisthejudgementusedindecidingwelluponoverallactions,not
specificactsofmakingasintechne.Whiletruthintechnewouldconcernmakingsomethingneededfor
somehigherpurpose,phronesisjudgesthingsaccordingtotheaimoflivingwelloverall.This,
unliketechneandepisteme,isanimportantvirtue,whichwillrequirefurtherdiscussion.Aristotle
associatesthisvirtuewiththepoliticalart.Aristotledistinguishesskilleddeliberationfromknowledge,
becausewedonotneedtodeliberateaboutthingswealreadyknow.Itisalsodistinctfrombeinggood
atguessing,orbeinggoodatlearning,becausetrueconsiderationisalwaysatypeofinquiryand
reasoning.
4.Wisdom(Sophia).Becausewisdombelongstothewise,whoareunusual,itcannotbethatwhichgets
holdofthetruth.Thisislefttonous,andAristotledescribeswisdomasacombination
ofnousandepisteme("knowledgewithitsheadon").
5.Intellect(Nous).Isthecapacitywedevelopwithexperience,tograspthesourcesofknowledgeand
truth,ourimportantandfundamentalassumptions.Unlikeknowledge(episteme),itdealswith
unarticulatedtruths.[84]Bothphronsisandnousaredirectedatlimitsorextremities,andhencethe
mean,butnousisnotatypeofreasoning,ratheritisaperceptionoftheuniversalsthatcanbederived
fromparticularcases,includingtheaimsofpracticalactions.Nousthereforesuppliesphronsiswithits
aims,withoutwhichphronsiswouldjustbethe"naturalvirtue"(aretphusik)calledcleverness
(deinots).[85]
Inthelastchaptersofthisbook(12and13)Aristotlecomparestheimportanceofpracticalwisdom(phronesis)
andwisdom(sophia).AlthoughAristotledescribessophiaasmoreseriousthanpracticaljudgement,becauseit
isconcernedwithhigherthings,hementionstheearlierphilosophers,AnaxagorasandThales,asexamples
provingthatonecanbewise,havingbothknowledgeandintellect,andyetdevoidofpracticaljudgement.The
dependencyofsophiauponphronesisisdescribedasbeinglikethedependencyofhealthuponmedical
knowledge.Wisdomisaimedatforitsownsake,likehealth,beingacomponentofthatmostcompletevirtue
thatmakeshappiness.
Aristotleclosesbyarguingthatinanycase,whenoneconsidersthevirtuesintheirhighestform,theywouldall
existtogether.
BookVII.Impedimentstovirtue [ edit ]
ThisbookisthelastofthreebooksthatareidenticalinboththeNicomacheanEthicsandtheEudemianEthics.
ItisBookVIinthelatter.Itextendspreviouslydevelopeddiscussions,especiallyfromtheendofBookII,in
relationtoviceakolasiaandthevirtueofsophrosune.
Aristotlenamesthreethingshumansshouldavoidthathavetodowithcharacter:
Evilsorvices(kakia),theoppositesofvirtues.ThesehavebeendiscussedalreadyinBookIIbecause,like
thevirtues,vicesarestabledispositions(hexeis),"knowinglyanddeliberatelychosen"(Sachsp.119).
Incontinence(akrasia),theoppositeofselfrestraint.Unliketruevices,theseareweaknesseswhere
someonepassivelyfollowsanurgeratherthanadeliberatechoice.
Beingbeastlike,orbrutish(thoriots),theoppositeofsomethingmorethanhuman,somethingheroicor
godlikesuchasHomerattributestoHector.(Aristotlenotesthatthesetermsbeastlikeandgodlikeare
strictlyspeakingonlyforhumans,becauserealbeastsorgodswouldnothavevirtueorvice.)[86]
Becausevice(abadequivalenttovirtue)hasalreadybeendiscussedinBooksIIV,inBookVIIthen,
firstakrasia,andthenbestialityarediscussed.
BookVII.Chapters110:Selfmastery [ edit ]
AccordingtoAristotle,akrasiaandselfrestraint,arenotto"beconceivedasidenticalwithVirtueandVice,nor
yetasdifferentinkindfromthem".[87]Aristotlearguesthatasimpleequationshouldnotbemadebetweenthe
virtueoftemperance,andselfrestraint,becauseselfrestraintmightrestraingooddesires,orweak
unremarkableones.Furthermore,atrulytemperatepersonwouldnotevenhavebaddesirestorestrain.
Aristotlereviewsvariousopinionsheldaboutselfmastery,mostimportantlyoneheassociateswithSocrates.
AccordingtoAristotle,Socratesarguedthatallunrestrainedbehaviormustbearesultofignorance,whereasit
iscommonlythoughtthattheunrestrainedpersondoesthingsthattheyknowtobeevil,puttingasidetheirown
calculationsandknowledgeundertheinfluenceofpassion.AristotlebeginsbysuggestingSocratesmustbe
wrong,butcomestoconcludeattheendofChapter3that"whatSocrateswaslookingforturnsouttobethe
case".[88]HiswayofaccommodatingSocratesreliesonthedistinctionbetweenknowledgethatisactivatedor
not,forexampleinsomeonedrunkorenraged.Peopleinsuchastatemaysoundliketheyhaveknowledge,
likeanactororstudentrecitingalessoncan.
Inchapter4Aristotlespecifiesthatwhenwecallsomeoneunrestrained,itisincases(justinthecaseswhere
wesaysomeonehastheviceofakolasiainBookII)wherebodilypleasureorpain,suchasthoseassociated
withfoodandsex,hascausedsomeonetoactinashamefulwayagainsttheirownchoiceandreason.Other
typesoffailuretomasteroneselfareakrasiaonlyinaqualifiedsense,forexampleakrasia"inanger"or"inthe
pursuitofhonor".Thesehediscussesnext,undertendenciesthatareneithervicenorakrasia,butmore
animallike.[89]
Aristotlemakesanatureandnurturedistinctionbetweendifferentcausesofbestialbehaviorhesaysoccurs"in
somecasesfromnaturaldisposition,andinothersfromhabit,aswiththosewhohavebeenabusedfrom
childhood."Hereferstotheseasanimallikeanddiseaselikeconditions.[90]Aristotlesaysthat"everysortof
senselessnessorcowardiceordissipationorharshnessthatgoestoexcessiseitheranimallikeordisease
like".[91]
ForAristotle,akrasia,"unrestraint",isdistinctfromanimallikebehaviorbecauseitisspecifictohumansand
involvesconsciousrationalthinkingaboutwhattodo,eventhoughtheconclusionsofthisthinkingarenotput
intopractice.Whensomeonebehavesinapurelyanimallikeway,thenforbetterorworsetheyarenotacting
baseduponanyconsciouschoice.
Returningtothequestionofangerorspiritedness(thumos)then,Aristotledistinguishesitfromdesires
becausehesaysitlistenstoreason,butoftenhearswrong,likeahastyservantoraguarddog.Hecontrasts
thiswithdesire,whichhesaysdoesnotobeyreason,althoughitisfrequentlyresponsiblefortheweavingof
unjustplots.[92]Healsosaysthatabadtemperismorenaturalandlessblamablethandesireforexcessive
unnecessarypleasure.[93]Andheclaimsthatactsofhubrisneverresultfromanger,butalwayshavea
connectiontopleasureseeking,whereasangrypeopleactfrompain,andoftenregretit.[94]
Sotherearetwowaysthatpeoplelosemasteryoftheirownactionsanddonotactaccordingtotheirown
deliberations.Oneisthroughexcitability,whereapersondoesnotwaitforreasonbutfollowstheimagination,
oftenhavingnotbeenpreparedforevents.Theother,worseandlesscurablecase,isthatofaweakperson
whohasthoughtthingsthrough,butfailstodoasdeliberatedbecausetheyarecarriedinanotherdirectionby
apassion.[95]Nevertheless,itisbettertohaveakrasiathanthetrueviceofakolasia,whereintemperate
choicesaredeliberatelychosenfortheirownsake.Suchpeopledonotevenknowtheyarewrong,andfeelno
regrets.Theseareevenlesscurable.[96]
FinallyAristotleaddressesafewquestionsraisedearlier,onthebasisofwhathehasexplained:
Noteveryonewhostandsfirmonthebasisofarationalandevencorrectdecisionhasselfmastery.
Stubbornpeopleareactuallymorelikeapersonwithoutselfmastery,becausetheyarepartlyledbythe
pleasurecomingfromvictory.
Noteveryonewhofailstostandfirmonthebasisofhisbestdeliberationshasatruelackofselfmastery.
AsanexamplehegivesthecaseofNeoptolemus(inSophocles'Philoctetes)refusingtoliedespitebeing
partofaplanheagreedwith.[97]
Apersonwithpracticaljudgment(phronesis)cannothaveakrasia.Insteaditmightsometimesseemso,
becausemereclevernesscansometimesrecitewordsthatmightmakethemsoundwise,likeanactorora
drunkpersonrecitingpoetry.Asdiscussedabove,apersonlackingselfmasterycanhaveknowledge,but
notanactiveknowledgethattheyarepayingattentionto.[98]
BookVII.Chapters1114:Pleasureassomethingtoavoid [ edit ]
AristotlediscussespleasureintwoseparatepartsoftheNicomacheanEthics(book7chapters1114andbook
10chapters15).Platohaddiscussedsimilarthemesinseveraldialogues,includingtheRepublicand
thePhilebusandGorgias.
Inchapter11Aristotlegoesthroughsomeofthethingssaidaboutpleasureandparticularlywhyitmightbe
bad.Butinchapter12hesaysthatnoneofthesethingsshowthatpleasureisnotgood,noreventhebest
thing.First,whatisgoodorbadneednotbegoodorbadsimply,butcanbegoodorbadforacertainperson
atacertaintime.Secondly,accordingtoAristotle'swayofanalyzingcausation,agoodorbadthingcaneither
beanactivity("beingatwork",energeia),orelseastabledisposition(hexis).Thepleasuresfrombeing
restoredintoanaturalhexisareaccidentalandnotnatural,forexamplethetemporarypleasurethatcancome
fromabittertaste.Thingsthatarepleasantbynatureareactivitiesthatarepleasantinthemselvesandinvolve
nopainordesire.TheexampleAristotlegivesofthisiscontemplation.Thirdly,suchpleasuresarewaysof
beingatwork,endsthemselves,notjustaprocessofcomingintobeingaimedatsomehigherend.Evenifa
temperatepersonavoidsexcessesofsomepleasures,theystillhavepleasures.[99]
Chapter13startsfrompain,sayingitisclearlybad,eitherinasimplesenseorasanimpedimenttothings.He
arguesthatthismakesitclearthatpleasureisgood.HerejectstheargumentofSpeusippusthatpleasureand
painareonlydifferentindegreebecausethiswouldstillnotmakepleasure,bad,norstopit,oratleastsome
pleasure,evenfrombeingthebestthing.Aristotlefocusesfromthisontotheideathatpleasureisunimpeded,
andthatwhileitwouldmakeacertainsenseforhappiness(eudaimonia)tobeabeingatworkthatis
unimpededinsomeway,beingimpededcanhardlybegood.Aristotleappealstopopularopinionthatpleasure
ofsometypeiswhatpeopleaimat,andsuggeststhatbodilypleasure,whileitmightbethemostobvioustype
ofpleasure,isnottheonlytypeofpleasure.Hepointsoutthatifpleasureisnotgoodthenahappypersonwill
nothaveamorepleasantlifethananother,andwouldhavenoreasontoavoidpain.[100]
Chapter14firstpointsoutthatanylevelofpainisbad,whileconcerningpleasureitisonlyexcessivebodily
pleasuresthatarebad.Finally,heaskswhypeoplearesoattractedtobodilypleasures.Apartfromnatural
depravitiesandcaseswhereabodilypleasurecomesfrombeingrestoredtohealthAristotleassertsamore
complexmetaphysicalreason,whichisthatforhumanschangeissweet,butonlybecauseofsomebadnessin
us,whichisthatpartofeveryhumanhasaperishablenature,and"anaturethatneedschange[..]isnot
simplenorgood".God,incontrast,"enjoysasinglesimplepleasureperpetually".[101]
BooksVIIIandIX:Friendshipandpartnership [ edit ]
BookIIChapter6discussedavirtuelikefriendship.Aristotlenowsaysthatfriendship(philia)itselfisavirtue,
orinvolvesvirtue.Itisnotonlyimportantforlivingwell,asameans,butisalsoanobleorbeautifulendinitself
thatreceivespraiseinitsownright,andbeingagoodfriendissometimesthoughttobelinkedtobeingagood
person.[102]
ThetreatmentoffriendshipintheNicomacheanEthicsislongerthanthatofanyothertopic,and
comesjustbeforetheconclusionofthewholeinquiry.BooksVIIIandIXarecontinuous,butthe
breakmakesthefirstbookfocusonfriendshipasasmallversionofthepoliticalcommunity,in
whichabondstrongerthanjusticeholdspeopletogether,whilethesecondtreatsitasan
expansionoftheself,throughwhichallone'spowerscanapproachtheirhighestdevelopment.
Friendshipthusprovidesabridgebetweenthevirtuesofcharacterandthoseofintellect.
Sachs(2002)p.209
Aristotlesaysspeculations(forexampleaboutwhetherlovecomesfromattractionsbetweenlikethings)are
notgermanetothisdiscussion,andhedividesaimsoffriendshipsorloveintothreetypeseachgiving
feelingsofgoodwillthatgointwodirections:
Utilityorusefulness
Pleasure
Thepursuitofgood
Twoareinferiortotheotherbecauseofthemotive:friendshipsofutilityandpleasuredonotregardfriendsas
people,butforwhattheycangiveinreturn.[103]
Friendshipsofutilityarerelationshipsformedwithoutregardtotheotherpersonatall.Withthesefriendships
areclassedfamilytiesofhospitalitywithforeigners,typesoffriendshipsAristotleassociateswitholderpeople.
Suchfriendsareoftennotveryinterestedinbeingtogether,andtherelationshipsareeasilybrokenoffwhen
theyceasetobeuseful.[104]
Atthenextlevel,friendshipsofpleasurearebasedonfleetingemotionsandareassociatedwithyoungpeople.
However,whilesuchfriendsdoliketobetogether,suchfriendshipsalsoendeasilywheneverpeoplenolonger
enjoythesharedactivity,orcannolongerparticipateinittogether.[104]
Friendshipsbaseduponwhatisgoodaretheperfectformoffriendship,wherebothfriendsenjoyeachother's
virtue.Aslongasbothfriendskeepsimilarlyvirtuouscharacters,therelationshipwillendureandbepleasant
andusefulandgoodforbothparties,sincethemotivebehinditiscareforthefriendthemselves,andnot
somethingelse.Suchrelationshipsarerare,becausegoodpeoplearerare,andbadpeopledonottake
pleasureineachother.[105]
Aristotlesuggeststhatalthoughthewordfriendisusedinthesedifferentways,itisperhapsbesttosaythat
friendshipsofpleasureandusefulnessareonlyanalogoustorealfriendships.Itissometimespossiblethatat
leastinthecaseofpeoplewhoarefriendsforpleasurefamiliaritywillleadtoabettertypeoffriendship,asthe
friendslearntoadmireeachother'scharacters.[106]
BookIXandthelastsectionsofBookVIIIturntothequestionofhowfriendsandpartnersgenerallyshould
rewardeachotherandtreateachother,whetheritbeinmoneyorhonororpleasure.Thiscansometimesbe
complexbecausepartiesmaynotbeequals.Aristotlenotesthatthetypeoffriendshipmostlikelytobehurtby
complaintsofunfairnessisthatofutilityandremindsthat"theobjectsandthepersonalrelationshipswithwhich
friendshipisconcernedappear[...]tobethesameasthosewhicharethesphereofjustice."[107]Anditisthe
transactionsoffriendsbyutilitythatsometimesrequiretheuseofwrittenlaws.[108]Furthermore,all
associationsandfriendshipsarepartofthegreatercommunity,thepolis,[109]anddifferentrelationshipscanbe
comparedtothedifferenttypesofconstitution,accordingtothesameclassificationsystemAristotleexplainsin
hisPolitics(Monarchy,Tyranny,Aristocracy,Oligarchy,Timocracy,andDemocracy).[110]
BookX:Pleasure,happiness,andupbringing [ edit ]
BookX.Chapters15:Thetheoryofpleasure [ edit ]
PleasureisdiscussedthroughoutthewholeEthics,butisgivenafinalmorefocusedandtheoreticaltreatment
inBookX.Aristotlestartsbyquestioningtheruleofthumbacceptedinthemoreapproximateearlysections,
wherebypeoplethinkpleasureshouldbeavoidedifnotbecauseitisbadsimply,thenbecausepeopletend
toomuchtowardspleasureseeking.Hearguesthatpeople'sactionsshowthatthisisnotreallywhatthey
believe.Hereviewssomeargumentsofpreviousphilosophers,includingfirstEudoxusandPlato,toarguethat
pleasureisclearlyagoodpursuedforitsownsakeevenifitisnotTheGood,orinotherwordsthatwhichall
goodthingshaveincommon.
Inchapter3Aristotleappliestopleasurehistheoryofmotion(kinsis)asanenergeiaasexplainedin
hisPhysicsandMetaphysics.Intermsofthisapproach,pleasureisnotamovementor(kinsis)because
unlikethemovementofwalkingacrossaspecificroom,orofbuildingahouse,orapartofahouse,ithasno
endpointwhenwecansayitiscompleted.Itismorelikeseeingwhichiseitherhappeninginacompleteway
ornothappening."Eachmomentofpleasurableconsciousnessisaperfectwhole."[111]
Asenseperceptionlikesightisinperfectactivity(teleiaenergeia)whenitisinitsbestconditionsanddirected
atthebestobjects.Andwhenanysenseisinsuchperfectactivity,thenthereispleasure,andsimilarlythinking
(dianoia)andcontemplation(theria)haveassociatedpleasures.Butseeing,forexampleisawhole,asisthe
associatedpleasure.Pleasuredoesnotcompletetheseeingorthinking,butisanextraactivity,justasa
healthypersoncanhaveanextragood"bloomofwellbeing".[112]
Thisraisesthequestionofwhypleasuredoesnotlast,butseemtofadeasifwegettired.Aristotleproposes
asasolutiontothisthatpleasureispursuedbecauseofdesiretolive.Lifeisanactivity(energeia)madeupof
manyactivitiessuchasmusic,thinkingandcontemplation,andpleasurebringstheabovementionedextra
completiontoeachofthese,bringingfulfillmentandmakinglifeworthyofchoice.Aristotlesayswecandismiss
thequestionofwhetherweliveforpleasureorchoosepleasureforthesakeofliving,forthetwoactivities
seemincapableofbeingseparated.[113]
Differentactivitiesinlife,thedifferentsenseperceptions,thinking,contemplating,bringdifferentpleasures,and
thesepleasuresmaketheactivitiesgrow,forexampleafluteplayergetsbetteratitastheyalsogetmore
pleasurefromit.Butthesepleasuresandtheirassociatedactivitiesalsoimpedewitheachotherjustasaflute
playercannotparticipateinanargumentwhileplaying.Thisraisesthequestionofwhichpleasuresaremoreto
bepursued.Somepleasuresaremorebeautifulandsomearemorebaseorcorrupt.Aristotlerankssomeof
themasfollows:[114]
1.thinking
2.sight
3.hearingandsmell
4.taste
Aristotlealsoarguesthateachtypeofanimalhaspleasuresappropriatetoit,andinthesamewaytherecan
bedifferencesbetweenpeopleinwhatpleasuresaremostsuitabletothem.Aristotleproposesthatitwouldbe
mostbeautifultosaythatthepersonofseriousmoralstatureistheappropriatestandard,withwhateverthings
theyenjoybeingthethingsmostpleasant.[115]
BookX.Chapters68:Happiness [ edit ]
Turningtohappinessthen,theaimofthewholeEthicsaccordingtotheoriginaldefinitionofBookIitisthe
activityorbeingatworkchosenforitsownsakebyamorallyseriousandvirtuousperson.Thisraisesthe
questionofwhyplayandbodilypleasurescannotbehappiness,becauseforexampletyrantssometimes
choosesuchlifestyles.ButAristotlecomparestyrantstochildren,andarguesthatplayandrelaxationarebest
seennotasendsinthemselves,butasactivitiesforthesakeofmoreseriousliving.Anyrandompersoncan
enjoybodilypleasures,includingaslave,andnoonewouldwanttobeaslave.[116]
Aristotlesaysthatifperfecthappinessisactivityinaccordancewiththehighestvirtue,thenthishighestvirtue
mustbethevirtueofthehighestpart,andAristotlesaysthismustbetheintellect(nous)"orwhateverelseitbe
thatisthoughttoruleandleadusbynature,andtohavecognizanceofwhatisnobleanddivine".Thishighest
activity,Aristotlesays,mustbecontemplationorspeculativethinking(energeia...thertik).Thisisalsothe
mostsustainable,pleasant,selfsufficientactivitysomethingaimedatforitsownsake.(Incontrasttopolitics
andwarfareitdoesnotinvolvedoingthingswe'drathernotdo,butrathersomethingwedoatourleisure.)
However,Aristotlesaysthisaimisnotstrictlyhuman,andthattoachieveitmeanstoliveinaccordancenot
withourmortalthoughtsbutwithsomethingimmortalanddivinewhichiswithinhumans.AccordingtoAristotle,
contemplationistheonlytypeofhappyactivityitwouldnotberidiculoustoimaginethegodshaving.The
intellectisindeedeachperson'strueself,andthistypeofhappinesswouldbethehappinessmostsuitedto
humans,withbothhappiness(eudaimonia)andtheintellect(nous)beingthingsotheranimalsdonothave.
Aristotlealsoclaimsthatcomparedtoothervirtues,contemplationrequirestheleastintermsofpossessions
andallowsthemostselfreliance,"thoughitistruethat,beingamanandlivinginthesocietyofothers,he
choosestoengageinvirtuousaction,andsowillneedexternalgoodstocarryonhislifeasahuman
being".[117]
BookX.Chapter9:Theneedforeducation,habituationandgoodlaws [ edit ]
Finally,AristotlerepeatsthatthediscussionoftheEthicshasnot
reacheditsaimifithasnoeffectinpractice.Theoriesarenotenough.
However,thepracticeofvirtuerequiresgoodeducationand
habituationfromanearlyageinthecommunity.Youngpeople
otherwisedonotevergettoexperiencethehighestformsofpleasure
andaredistractedbytheeasiestones.Whileparentsoftenattemptto
dothis,itiscriticalthattherearealsogoodlawsinthecommunity.But
concerningthisneedforgoodlawsandeducationAristotlesaysthat YoungSpartans
therehasalwaysbeenaproblem,whichheisnowseekingtoaddress: ExercisingbyEdgarDegas(1834
unlikeinthecaseofmedicalscience,theoreticiansofhappinessand 1917).Aristotleapprovedof
howSpartanlawfocuseduponup
teachersofvirtuesuchassophistsneverhavepracticalexperience
bringing.
themselves,whereasgoodparentsandlawmakershavenever
theorizedanddevelopedascientificapproachtoanalyzingwhatthe
bestlawsare.Furthermore,veryfewlawmakers,perhapsonlytheSpartans,havemadeeducationthefocus
oflawmaking,astheyshould.Educationneedstobemorelikemedicine,withbothpracticeandtheory,and
thisrequiresanewapproachtostudyingpolitics.Suchstudyshould,hesays,evenhelpincommunitieswhere
thelawsarenotgoodandtheparentsneedtotrytocreatetherighthabitsinyoungpeoplethemselveswithout
therighthelpfromlawmakers.
AristotleclosestheNicomacheanEthicsthereforebyannouncingaprogrammeofstudyinpolitics,including
thecollectingofstudiesofdifferentconstitutions,andtheresultsofthisprogrammearegenerallyassumedto
becontainedintheworkthatexiststodayandisknownasthePolitics.[118]

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