A.M. No.
3216 March 16, 1992 conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein
DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO,
petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSEPHINE
PALOGAN EDUARTE, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for the disbarment
of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-
Eduarte originally filed with this Court
on April 18, 1988. On August 10, 1989,
the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
to which the case was referred for
investigation, submitted a report
confirming in substance the charge of
violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
and part of the Oath of Office of a
lawyer and recommending the
suspension of herein respondent.
The evidence discloses that on July 18,
1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the
RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela,
Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a
document (known as Affidavit of
Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo
Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against
her children. The case was handled by
Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein
respondent's husband, until his
appointment as RTC judge on October
26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine
Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August
22, 1985, decision in Civil Case No.
391 was rendered in favor of Antonia
Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-
Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia
Ulibari and complainant in the instant
case, the rest of the defendants did
not appeal. On June 13, 1987, while
Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal
in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari
conveyed some parcels of her land to
her children in the form of deeds of
absolute sale, prepared and notarized
by herein respondent. Significantly, on
the same day, Antonia Ulibari also
respondent and her husband as their
Attorney's fees for legal services
rendered. All the titles of the lands
subject of the deeds of absolute sale
and the deed of conveyance however
remained in the name of Antonia
Ulibari.
On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-
Ordonio filed this complaint for
disbarment against herein respondent
on the basis of an affidavit executed
by her mother Antonia Ulibari on
March 2, 1988 stating that affiant
never conveyed the subject parcel of
land to respondent as her attorney's
fees and that the deeds of absolute
sale executed in favor of her children
were not known to her (and that she
received no consideration therefor).
On August 10, 1989, the Investigation
Commissioner submitted a report
finding the charges to be true and
recommending a one-year suspension
of the respondent from the practice of
law.
The first issue to be resolved is
whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded
into signing the Deed of Conveyance
transferring to her lawyer (herein
respondent) the subject parcel of land
containing 298,420 square meters as
the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear
from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and
deposition that she never conveyed
the said land to her lawyer as
attorney's fees. Even granting for the
sake argument that Antonia Ulibari
knowingly and voluntarily conveyed
the subject property in favor of the
respondent and her husband, the
respondent, in causing the execution
of the Deed of Conveyance during the
pendency of the appeal of the case
involving the said property, has
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
which prohibits lawyers from
"acquiring by assignment property and
rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession."
In the case at bar, the property (which
includes the more than 20 hectares of
land allegedly conveyed to the
respondent) was already in actual
litigation first in the lower court and
then in the Court of Appeals. Whether
the deed of conveyance was executed
at the instance of the client driven by
financial necessity or of the lawyers is
of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E.
Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an
attorney occupies a vantage position
to press upon or dictate his terms to a
harrased client, in breach of the rule
so amply protective of the confidential
relations, which must necessarily exist
between attorney and client, and of
the rights of both." The act constitutes
malpractice, even if the lawyer had
purchased the property in litigation.
(Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775;
In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree
with the Investigating Commissioner's
opinion that the prohibition applies
when the lawyer has not paid money
for it and the property was merely
assigned to him in consideration of
legal services rendered at a time when
the property is still the subject of a
pending case. For having improperly
acquired the subject property, under
the foregoing circumstances,
respondent has violated not only Art.
1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10
of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that "the lawyer should
not purchase any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting."
The last issue to be resolved is
whether respondent violated any law
in preparing and notarizing the deeds
of absolute sale in making it appear
that there were considerations
therefor, when in truth there were
none so received by the seller. In her
answer, respondent admitted that
Antonia Ulibari did not actually sell the
parcels of land to her children for the
considerations stated in the deeds of
sale and that she (respondent)
"utilized the form of deed of sale as
the most convenient and appropriate
document to effect the transfer of the
parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's
children in accordance with her wish
that said parcels of land be given to
them.
In so doing, respondent has manifestly
violated that part of her oath as a
lawyer that she shall not do any
falsehood. Not only that. In preparing
the documents which do not reflect
the true transaction, respondent has
likewise violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule
10.01. A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall be mislead or
allow the court to be mislead by any
artifice.
ACCORDINGLY, for having violated
Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
respondent is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, and, for
having stated falsehoods in the four
(4) deeds of absolute sale she
prepared and notarized, in violation of
the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent is also
ordered suspended from the practice
or law for a period of another six (6)
months, resulting in a total period on
one year, effective from the date this
judgment becomes final. SUSPENSION
ORDERED.
Cantiller vs Potenciano
In 1987, the sisters Ma. Libertad Cantiller
and Peregrina Cantiller lost an ejectment
case. The two were later introduced by a
friend to Atty. Humberto Potenciano.
Potenciano said he can help the sisters
because the judge handling the case was
his close friend. Potenciano, with the little
time he got, immediately filed a petition to
counter the order to vacate issued against
the sisters. He asked for P1,000.00 for his
fees from the sisters.
But later on, the judge handling the case
asked Potenciano to inhibit because of the
fact that they are friends. Potenciano then
asked an additional P2,000.00 from the
sisters. He said he needs to find another
judge who can rule in their favor. He also
asked another P10,000.00 from the
sisters. He said this amount is needed in
order for them to re-acquire their
apartment. On top of the P10k, he also
asked for another P1k for additional
expenses. The sisters were able to pool
resources from friends just to raise the
amount asked for by Potenciano.
It turned out however that the court never
asked P10k from the parties nor was the
additional P1k asked by the court. Worse,
said amount (P11k) was never deposited
in court. The sisters demanded
Potenciano to return the said amount but
he failed to do so hence they filed an
administrative case against him. In his
defense, Potenciano claimed that the
sister were merely harassing him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Potenciano
should be subjected to disciplinary
actions.
HELD: Yes. From the records, it appears
that Potenciano haphazardly prepared the
pleadings he wrote for the sisters. In fact,
the cases he filed for the sisters were all
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Worse, he got P11k from the sisters but
never used the same for the case instead
he pocketed it for himself. When he
contracted the sisters, Potenciano, as a
lawyer, bound himself to undertake his
legal services with maximum effort until
the conclusion of the case. The failure to
exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a clients cause makes
such lawyer unworthy of the trust which
the client had reposed on him.
It is also of no moment that Potenciano
had little time to prepare for the pleading.
When he accepted the case, his clients
reposed full faith in him. But he never
complemented the trust and faith reposed
in him. He even bragged his closeness
with the judge and even intimated the
need to buy another judge. Such actions
are reprehensible.
Potenciano was suspended indefinitely
until he can show to the court that he is fit
to practice law.
Santiago vs Fojas
FACTS:
An expulsion case was faced by the
complainants contending that they have
illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The
lower court resolved in favor of Salvador
and ordered the complainants to pay,
jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The
case was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals. The complainants lost in their
petition at the Court of Appeals due to
abandonment, failure to act accordingly,
or serious neglect of their counsel, Atty.
Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an
expulsion case. Atty. Fojas assured them
that everything was in order and he had
already answered the complaint. However,
the appellants soon discovered that he
never answered it after all because,
according to him, he was a very busy
man. Atty. Fojas admitted his mistake in
failing to file an answer for the expulsion
case, but he alleges that it was cured by
his filing of a motion for reconsideration.
However, such motion for reconsideration
was denied. Atty. Fojas defended his
negligence with the reason that the case
was a losing cause after all. Atty. Fojas
also asserts that he was about to appeal
the said decision to this Court, but his
services as counsel for the complainants
and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant.
Complainants then filed for a disbarment
case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed
culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. This
means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of
the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. In
his motion for reconsideration of the
default order, the respondent explained
his non-filing of the required answer by
impliedly invoking forgetfulness
occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his
Comment in this case he attributes it to
honest mistake and excusable neglect due
to his overzealousness to question the
denial order of the trial court. Whether it
be the first or the second ground, the fact
remains that the respondent did not
comply with his duty to file an answer.
Pressure and large volume of legal work
provide no excuse for the respondents
inability to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which requires him to serve his clients,
the complainants herein, with diligence
and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof
which provides: A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by
his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
was in fact a losing cause. The Supreme
Court held that he should have seasonably
informed the complainants thereof. Rule
15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly
provides: A lawyer, when advising his
client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results
of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED
Stemmerik v. Mas
FACTS
Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark.
In one of his trips in the Philippines, he met Atty.
Mas. Since he was marveled at the beauty of the
country, he wanted to buy a real property and
consulted Atty. Mas. The latter told Stemmerik
that he could legally acquire a real property in
the Phils. and even suggested a 86K hectare
land in Subic, Zambales. Atty. Mas, as the atty.-
in-fact of Stemmerik bought the property from a
certain Bonifacio de Mesa. The contract to sell
provided that De Mesa sold the property to Ailyn
Gonzales for 3.8M. Then, in another notarized
deed made by Atty. Mas, it was stated that
Gonzales received the funds from Stemmerik. In
preparing all these documents, Atty. Mas
received 400K fee from Stemmerik. The latter
also gave Atty. Mas, the 3.8M purchase price to
which the latter issued a receipt.
Suddenly, Atty. Mas become scarce and no
longer answer the calls of Stemmerik. When
Stemmerik visited the Phils, he engaged the
service of the Fernandez Law Office and found
out the subject property is inalienable, being
located in the former U.S. military reservation.
Also, he was apprised that aliens cannot own
real properties in the Phils.
Meanwhile, Atty. Mas had already abandoned his
office and his whereabouts is unknown.
Stemmerik filed an action for disbarment against
Atty. Mas before the Commission on Bar
Discipline but Atty. Mas never appeared.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Mas should be disbarred?
HELD:
YES!!! Lawyers, as members of a noble profession,
have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women
entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law
functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument
of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting
standards of the legal profession and has been found
wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his
oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal
profession.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell
the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made
the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he
falsified public documents and knowingly violated the
Anti-Dummy Law.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution,
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.21 That oath
is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It
is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times.22
Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their
master. They should not simply obey the laws, they
should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto
by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed,
that is the first precept of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Islas vs Platon
It appears from the record that in December, 1920,
the herein petitioners filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance under section 38 of the Land
Registration Act for the review of a decree in a land
registration case. On March 23, 1921, the court
denied the petition for review without permitting the
petitioners to present their evidence. Upon appeal to
this court the order denying the petition was
reversed and the record remanded to the court below
for the reception of evidence. 1 chanrobles virtual law
library
The evidence having been received, the Court of First
Instance on April 16, 1924, again denied the petition
for a review and on May 5, 1924, the petitioners
herein filed a motion for a new trial. The motion was
heard and denied on the 17th of the same month and
two days later due notice of the denial was sent to
the attorney for the petitioners at his office address
in Manila. The letter containing the notification was
returned to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the
latter part of June, 1924, marked "unclaimed." On
August 26, 1924, the petitioners presented their
exception to the order of May 17th denying the
petition for a new trial and announced their intention
to appeal to this court. A bill of exception was filed on
August 29, 1924, but the trial court refused to
approve and certify it on the ground that the time for
presenting it had then
expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
On September 2, 1924, an order was entered
declaring the decision in the land registration case
final, and on the 24th of the same month a writ of
possession was issued directing the sheriff of the
province to place the applicant for registration, the
herein respondent, Filomena Ona, in possession of
the land. The petitioners thereupon brought the
present action for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance to
approve and certify the bill of exceptions filed on
August 29,
1924.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Counsel for the petitioners argues that under section
26 of Act No. 2347 an appellant in a land registration
case has thirty days from the date upon which he
receives a copy of the decision within which to
present his bill of exceptions; that the order from
which his clients desire to appeal must be considered
a "decision" within the meaning of said section; that
as he never received a copy of the order, the thirty
days period had not begun to run at the time the bill
of exceptions here in question was
presented.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It may well be doubted whether section 26 of Act No.
2347 is applicable to appeals from orders relating to
petitions for review, but assuming that such is the
case, the respondent judge was nevertheless, in our
opinion, fully justified in declining to certify the bill of
exceptions in the present case. The bill was not
presented until over three months after the notice of
the order from which the petitioners desire to appeal
should have reached their counsel in the ordinary
course of the mails. The notice was duly sent by
registered letter to counsel at his address in the City
of Manila and it is not intimated that the address was
erroneous. There is nothing in the record to show
that the postal authorities did not properly perform
their duty and we must presume that the usual
notice of the arrival of the letter at the Manila post
office was delivered at the office of said counsel. He
failed to claim the letter and it was returned to the
Court of First Instance marked "unclaimed ." His
failure to receive a copy of the order in question was
therefore entirely due to his own negligence of which
he cannot now be allowed to take advantage. As a
practicing lawyer it was his duty to so arrange
matters that official communications sent by mail
would reach him promptly. Having failed to do so, he
and his clients must suffer the consequences of his
negligence. That he may have been absent from his
office at the time the notification here in question
arrived is no
excuse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with
the costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
LEGARDA VS CA
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the
owner of a parcel of land and the
improvements located at 123 West
Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a
complaint against the petitioner for
specific performance with preliminary
injunction and damages in RTC alleging
that petitioner entered into a lease
agreement with the private respondent
through its representative, Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of
petitioner. Respondent drew up the written
contract and sent it to petitioner, that
petitioner failed and refused to execute
and sign the same despite demands of
respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel
to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion for
extension of time to file the answer within
ten (10) days from February 26, 1985.
However, said counsel failed to file the
answer within the extended period prayed
for. Counsel for private respondent filed an
ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in
default. This was granted by the trial court
on March 25, 1985 and private respondent
was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial
court rendered its decision.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy
of the judgment but took no steps to have
the same set aside or to appeal therefrom.
Thus, the judgment became final and
executory. The property of petitioner was
sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment in favor of private respondent.
The property was sold to Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr., representative of private
respondent, and a certificate of sale was
issued in his favor. The redemption period
expired after one year so a final deed of
sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of
Cabrera, who in turn appears to have
transferred the same to private
respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was
abroad. When, upon her return, she
learned, to her great shock, what
happened to her case and property, she
nevertheless did not lose faith in her
counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to
take such appropriate action possible
under the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a
petition for annulment of judgment and its
amendment in the Court of Appeals. But
that was all he did. After an adverse
judgment was rendered against petitioner,
of which counsel was duly notified, said
counsel did not inform the petitioner about
it. He did not even ask for a
reconsideration thereof, or file a petition
for review before this Court. Thus, the
judgment became final. It was only upon
repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner
that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that had
unfortunately become final.
HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law.
He should present every remedy or
defense authorized by the law in support
of his client's cause, regardless of his own
personal views. In the full discharge of his
duties to his client, the lawyer should not
be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.
12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in
this case, he has miserably failed in his
duty to exercise his utmost learning and
ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13
It is not only a case of simple negligence
as found by the appellate court, but of
reckless and gross negligence, so much so
that his client was deprived of her
property without due process of law.
The Court finds that the negligence of
counsel in this case appears to be so gross
and inexcusable. This was compounded by
the fact, that after petitioner gave said
counsel another chance to make up for his
omissions by asking him to file a petition
for annulment of the judgment in the
appellate court, again counsel abandoned
the case of petitioner in that after he
received a copy of the adverse judgment
of the appellate court, he did not do
anything to save the situation or inform
his client of the judgment. He allowed the
judgment to lapse and become final. Such
reckless and gross negligence should not
be allowed to bind the petitioner.
Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived
of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to
enforce an alleged lease agreement of the
property of petitioner, private respondent
went to court, and that because of the
gross negligence of the counsel for the
petitioner, she lost the case as well as the
title and ownership of the property, which
is worth millions. The mere lessee then
now became the owner of the property. Its
true owner then, the petitioner, now is
consigned to penury all because her
lawyer appear.
NATIVIDAD UY vs. ATTY.
In the case of
BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN, A.C. No. 8252 , July
21, 2009, where the respondent Atty. Braulio RG
Tansinsin was suspended for three months by the
Philippine Supreme Court, the following doctrines
were pronounced by the Court:
1. Verily, respondents failure to file the required
pleadings and to inform his client about the
developments in her case fall below the standard
exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment
to their clients cause.
2. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
of its importance, and whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free. A lawyer should serve his client in a
conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he
should provide a quality of service at least equal to
that which he, himself, would expect of a competent
lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his
clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise
ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
and skill demanded by the character of the business
he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests
and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor;
and his client may reasonably expect him to
discharge his obligations diligently.
3. It must be recalled that the MeTC (in the ejectment
case) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. However, respondent did not bother
to do so, in total disregard of the court order. In
addition, respondent failed to file the memorandum
on appeal this time with the RTC where complainants
appeal was then pending. Civil Case No. C-20717
was, therefore, dismissed on that ground alone.
4. The importance of filing a memorandum on appeal
cannot be gainsaid. Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
x x x x.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall
be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors
imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be
furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the appellants
Memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
By express mandate of the said Rule, the appellant is
duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal.
Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his
part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to
perform this duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his
appeal.
5. Respondents failure to file the required pleadings
is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Resposibility which states:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
6. Aside from failing to file the required pleadings,
respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his
client, as he omitted to apprise complainant of the
status of her ejectment case.
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is
one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for
the client to be adequately and fully informed about
the developments in his case. A client should never
be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to
destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in
the lawyer so retained in particular and in the legal
profession in general. Respondents act
demonstrates utter disregard of Rule 18.04, Canon
18, Code of Professional Resposibility, which states:
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
7. All told, we rule and so hold that on account of
respondents failure to protect the interest of
complainant, respondent indeed violated Rules 18.03
and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the
practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.
8. The appropriate sanction is within the sound
discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the
penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a
reprimand or a fine of five hundred pesos with
warning, suspension of three months or six months,
and even disbarment in aggravated cases.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the
instant case, a three-month suspension from the
practice of law is the proper penalty.
Garcia vs Bala
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence
/2005/nov2005/ac_5039.htm
Republic vs Arro
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/
session/0000015b9f47ee556cb38d5f0
03600fb002c009e/t/?o=False
Legarda vs CA supra ^
PHHC v. Tiongco
G.R. No. L-18891 November 28, 1964
FACTS:
Appellants Melchor Tiongco and Melchor
Escasa were registered squatters of lot No. 23
Block No. E-156, containing an area of about
460 sq. meters. Long before the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation declared a
parcel of land embraced in TCT 1356 of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. Appellants
were already occupying the portion and have
introduced improvements thereon and had
declared the property for taxation purposes. In
the census list of the corporation, the
appellants were considered as bonafide
occupants of the property and during the same
period, they had applied to purchase the
property from the PHHC. They found out later,
that the same had already been awarded to
Asuncion Enverga, a relative of a Congressman,
in spite of the fact that she had not occupied
the property at any time, nor introduced any
improvements. Immediately upon the
discovery of the award a complaint was lodged
by Tiongco and Escasa with the appellee PHHC.
After a preliminary investigation of the
complaint, Eugenio Alvarado, Jr., Chief of
Investigation & Research Section, PHHC
Investigating Committee, with the
recommendation that they have priority rights
to the property, which was given after two
investigations. The matter has been submitted
to the Executive Committee to render their
judgment.
However, no action has been taken on the
report. Four months after the filing of the
complaint, the PHHC instituted an action for
Recovery of Possession in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, the appellant
interposes the defense of Priority of Right to
Purchase and ability to pay, which was found in
the investigation made by the appellee. The
case was set for hearing on February 7, 1961.
The appellants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio Taega
failed to notify the appellants of the scheduled
hearing. The case was heard, the plaintiff
introduced evidence showing ownership of the
property. The judgment held that the plaintiff is
the owner of the land situated in Quezon City,
and that the defendants without the consent
and knowledge of the plaintiff entered and
constructed their houses upon then premises,
depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the
same parcel of land. Tiongco and Escasa were
ordered to remove their houses and the
improvements on them, and pay the plaintiff
the sum of Php 26.00 per month from the date
of occupation, until premises in question is
restored to the plaintiff, and Php. 200.00 in
attorneys fees.
Although the above judgment was received by
counsel for the appellants, he never informed
the latter about the matter. Neither did he take
steps to protect the interests of his clients, by
presenting a motion for reconsideration and/or
filing a petition to set aside judgment.
Appellants only came to know that an adverse
decision had been promulgated when on May
12, 1961, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City,
served them a copy of writ of execution
ordering them to vacate the premises and to
pay the amounts ordained therein. Appellants
lost no time in contacting their counsel, Atty.
Taega, and failing to do so, they engaged the
services of Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, who presented
with the lower Court a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, accompanied by affidavits of merit.
The Presiding Judge cited Atty. Taega to
appear before him, because of the seriousness
of the charges. Atty. Taega admitted to the
court that he did not inform the appellants of
the hearing, as he forgot all about the same;
that he received the decision but did not also
inform the appellants about it, because he
forgot all about the case, explaining that he
had so many ejectment cases then, that the
orders and decisions in the case just escaped
his attention.
Issue: whether or not Atty. Taegas conduct
constitutes negligence of his duties as a lawyer.
HELD:
There was something fishy and suspicious
concerning the actuations of former counsel
Atty. Taega in this case. He did not give any
significance at all, to the processes of the
court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights
of his clients. There was nothing which could
have prevented the appellants from attending
the trial of the case themselves, or moving for
a reconsideration of the decision or taking the
necessary appeal from the judgment, if only
their counsel had informed them of the court's
processes. Counsel had simply ignored the
rights of his clients by giving a lame and flimsy
explanation that the court's processes just
escaped his attention. He deprived them of
their day in court.
There should be no dispute regarding the
doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has
beneficient effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a
given case, however, should be looked into and
adopted, according to the surrounding
circumstances; otherwise, in the court's desire
to make a short cut of the proceedings, it might
foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous
collusions to the detriment of justice. It would
then be easy for one lawyer to sell one's rights
down the river, by just alleging that he just
forgot every process of the court affecting his
clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a
notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a
notice to his clients.
The attention of the trial court is invited to the
censurable conduct of Atty. Bonifacio Taega in
this particular case, and to take such action as
may be warranted in the premises
Escudero vs Dulay
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri198
8/feb1988/gr_l_60578_1988.html
Republic vs Arro Supra
BLANZA VS ARCANGEL
Facts:
On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered
to help them in their respective pension
claims in connection with the death of
their husbands, both P.C. soldiers.
They handed Arcangel pertinent
documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers.
After which, they noticed that respondent
lost interest and no progress was made.
After 6 years they finally asked respondent
to return the said documents but the latter
refused.
Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom
the case was referred by the Solicitor
General respondent admitted having
received the documents but explained
that it was for photostating purposes only.
His failure to immediately return them was
due to complainants refusal to hand him
money to pay for the photostating costs
which prevented him from withdrawing the
documents.
Anyway, he had already advanced the
expenses himself and turned over the
documents to the fiscal.
Fiscal found respondents explanation
satisfactory and recommended the
respondents exoneration.
However, Sol Gen feels that respondent
deserves at least a severe reprimand
considering:
1) his failure to attend to complainants
pension claims for 6 years;
2) his failure to immediately return the
documents despite repeated demands
upon him, and
3) his failure to return to complainant
Pasion, allegedly all of her documents.
Issue: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of
professional non-feasance
Held: No.
Respondents explanation for the delay in
filing the claims in returning the
documents has not been controverted by
complainants.
On the contrary, they admitted that
respondent asked them to shoulder the
photostating expenses but they did not
give him any money. Hence,
complainants are partly to blame.
Moreover, the documents and their
photostats were actually returned by
respondent during the fiscals
investigation with him paying for the
photostating costs himself.
As for the alleged failure of the respondent
to all her documents to complainant
Pasion, the former denies this. the
affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning
respondent cannot prejudice
complainant Pasion because res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
RBCI v FLORIDO
A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
According to RBCI, respondent and his clients,
Nazareno-Relampagos group, through force and
intimidation, forcibly took over the management
and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly
evicted Cirilo A. Garay, the bank manager,
destroyed the banks vault, and installed their
own staff to run the bank.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint
for malicious mischief filed against him by
RBCI was already dismissed; while the
complaint for grave coercion was ordered
suspended because of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Respondent said that the
disbarment complaint was filed against him in
retaliation for the administrative cases he filed
against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges
of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed
to present any evidence to prove their
allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits
attached to the complaint were never identified,
affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that
none of the documentary exhibits were originals
or certified true copies.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his
oath and the CPR Canon 19.
HELD: The Court held that respondent was
guilty as charged and suspended for a year. The
first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the
land. It is the lawyers duty to promote respect
for the law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law. It is his duty to counsel his
clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in
seeking justice and refrain from doing an
intentional wrong to their adversaries.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics.Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to
by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion
to his clients cause, is condemnable and
unethical.

FERNANDO MARTIN PENA vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO
A.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007
Facts:
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal
counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against
complainant Fernando Martin Pena.
Hufana is praying for claim for separation
pay, but Pena rejected the claim as
baseless.
Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter
reiterating his client's claim for separation
pay. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should Pena fail to pay
the amounts they propose as settlement,
he would file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages, as well as
multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and
cancellation of business license to operate
due to violations of laws.
Issue:
WON Aparicio violated Canon 19 (and
19.01) of the CPR, enjoining every lawyer to
represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law? YES
NB: Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding."
WON it is proper to disbar Aparicio? NO,
reprimand only
Held:
Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file
or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to
secure leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer's client.
In the case at bar, the threats are not only
unethical for violating Canon 19, but they
also amount to blackmail. Blackmail is
"the extortion of money from a person by
threats of accusation or exposure or
opposition in the public prints,obtaining
of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation
against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice."
The letter in this case contains more than
just a simple demand to pay. It even
contains a threat to file retaliatory
charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his client's claim for
separation pay. Indeed, letters of this
nature are definitely proscribed by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
It was not respondent's intention to point
out complainant's violations of the law as
he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the
letter even contains an implied promise to
"keep silent" about the said violations if
payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.
DECISION: While the writing of the letter
went beyond ethical standards, we hold
that disbarment is too severe a penalty to
be imposed on respondent, considering
that he wrote the same out of his
overzealousness to protect his client's
interests. Accordingly, the more
appropriate penalty is reprimand.
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO,
respondent.
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment
from the MTC which ordered respondents
client to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case. respondent as counsel,
appealed the decision. CA dismissed Co's
appeal from the decision of the RTC for
failure to comply with the proper
procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted
to devious and underhanded means to delay
the execution of the judgment rendered by
the MTC adverse to his client.
Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02.
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04.
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client "within the bounds of
the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to
employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client (Rule
19.01) and warns him not to allow his client
to dictate the procedure in handling the case
(Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun
for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or
wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious
litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment.
A judgment can be annulled only on two
grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law, or (b) that it has been
obtained by fraud.
Judging from the number of actions filed by
respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of
forum shopping. Forum shopping exists
when, by reason of an adverse decision in
one forum, defendant ventures to another
for a more favorable resolution of his case.
A.C. No. 528 October 11, 1967 ANGEL
ALBANO vs.ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA
Facts: This proceeding for disbarment
was filed by complainant Angel Albano
against respondent Perpetua Coloma,
a member of the Philippine Bar. In a
letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed
to this Court, complainant alleged that
during the Japanese occupation his
mother, Delfina Aquino, and he
retained the services of respondent as
counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4147 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which
came the accusation that after
liberation and long after the courts
had been reorganized, respondent
failed to expedite the hearing and
termination of the case, as a result of
which they had themselves
represented by another lawyer. This
notwithstanding, it was claimed that
respondent intervened in the case to
collect her attorney's fees. It was then
alleged that during the hearing they
were surprised when respondent
presented in exhibit a document
showing that they as well as their co-
plaintiffs in the case promised to pay
her a contingent fee of 33-/3% of
whatever could be recovered whether
in land or damages.
Issue: May a lawyer be removed for
her failure to comply with her
obligations as counsel as she served
faithfully, efficiently, continuously and
to the best of her knowledge and not averse to having such a risk
capacity? minimized. Where, as in this case, the
good name of counsel was traduced
Held: no, a lawyer be removed
by an accusation made in reckless
without just cause. The Solicitor
disregard of the truth, an action
General could thus rightfully assert
prompted by base ingratitude, the
that if there was anyone guilty of bad
severest censure is called for.
faith in this case "it is complainant and
his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147
who, after benefiting from the valuable
services of respondent in said case,
tried to renege on their agreement for
the payment of the latter's contingent
attorney's fees by dismissing her as
their counsel after she had already
won for them said case in the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, and
later, by attempting to impugn the
authenticity and genuineness of their
written agreement for the payment of
attorney's fees, . . . ." Counsel, any
counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is
entitled to be fully recompensed for
his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, Traders Royal Bank Employees
acquired at tremendous cost not only Union- Independent vs NLRC and
in money but in the expenditure of Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz
time and energy, he is entitled to the G.R.No. 120592 14March1997
protection of any judicial tribunal
against any attempt on the part of a FACTS OF THE CASE:
client to escape payment of his fees. It That TRB Employees Union, had a
is indeed ironic if after putting forth retainer agreement with Atty. Cruz, for
the best that is in him to secure justice 3,000.00 in consideration of the law
for the party he represents, he himself firms undertaking to render the
would not get his due. Such an services enumerated in their contract.
eventuality this Court is determined to During the existence of the agreement
avoid. It views with disapproval any the union referred to the private
and every effort of those benefited by respondent the claims of its members
counsel's services to deprive him of for holiday, mid-year and year-end
his hard-earned honorarium. Such an bonuses against their employer TRB.
attitude deserves condemnation. The NLRC granted the petition of the
There is this additional point to union with regard to the demand for
consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: bonuses. After, the S.C. acting upon
"Reputation [in the legal profession] is the challenge of TRBank of the NLRC
a plant of tender growth, and its decision in its decision on August 30,
bloom, once lost, is not easily 1990 modified the decision of the
restored."14 This Court, certainly is NLRC by deleting the award of mid-
year and year- end bonus differentials
while affirming the award of holiday
pay differential.
After TRB voluntarily complied with the
decision, the respondent on
September 18, 1990 notified the
union, TRB management, and the
NLRC of his right to exercise and
enforce his attorneys lien over the
award of holiday pay differential
through a letter dated October 8,
1990.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the lien made by the respondent
attorney over the award as attorneys
fees valid?
- Yes, Because the contract between
the Union and the attorney stipulates
that the 3,000.00 paid as retainer fees
is intended merely as a consideration
for the law firms commitment to
render the services enumerated on
PART A and B of the retainer
agreement.
- The retainer fee paid by the Union is
not a payment for the firms execution
or performance of the services listed
in the contract, subject to the
particular qualifications.
- Obligations do not emanate only
from contracts. One of the sources of
extra- contractual obligations found in
our civil code is the quasi contract
premised on the roman maxim
that nemo alterius detrimento
locupletari potest
- As early as 1903 the court has
allowed the payment of reasonable
professional fees to an interpreter, not
withstanding the lack of understanding
with his client as to his remuneration,
on the basis a quasi-contract. It is not
necessary that the parties agree on a
definite fee for the special services
rendered by the firm in order that the
union may be obligated to pay
compensation. Equity and fair play
dictate that petitioner should pay the
same after it accepted, availed itself
of, and benefited from the firms
services.
- The measure of compensation for
private respondents services as
against his client should be properly
addressed by the rule of quantum
meruit is used as the basis for
determining the lawyers professional
fees in the absence of a contract.
HELD:
The resolution of the NLRC with regard
to the attorneys fees is modified, and
Union is hereby ordered to pay 10,000
for the firms rendered services.