History and Uniforms 000 ENG

Magazine devoted to military history, uniformology and war equipments
since the Ancient Era to 20th century
Publishing Director:
Bruno Mugnai
Art Directors:
Sonia Zanat; Silvia Orso
Redational:
Bruno Mugnai; Antony J. Jones; Andrew Tzavaras
Collaborators:
Chun L. Wang;Andrs K. Molnr; Ciro Paoletti; Riccardo Caimmi; Massimo
Predonzani
***
Scientific Committe:
John Gooch; Peter H. Wilson; Bruce Vandervort; Frederick C. Schneid; Tth
Ferenc; Chris Stockings; Guilherme d'Andrea Frota; Krisztof Kubiak; Jean
Nicolas Corvisier
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2015 Bruno Mugnai
ISSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Contents:
Articles:
Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare: Neolithic China

Chun L. Wang
The Venetian Army and Navy in the Holy League War, 1684-99(part one)
Bruno Mugnai
Red Grenadiers and red Chasseurs: The Life Guard of the Princedom of Lucca
and Piombino, 1806-1814
Bruno Mugnai
Forgotten Fronts of WWI: German Samoa(part one)

Andrs K. Molnr
Rubrics:
Books Review
The Best on the Net
Editorial
Dear Reader, dear Friend:
with the number 'zero' begins a new adventure for the divulging of uniformology and
military history. The idea of making available to the public of enthusiasts an agile and
easily accessible instrument was for some time in my mind, thanks to the many tools
that modern technology provides us, and this could be due to lucky meeting with
other scholars and enthusiasts, known in the vast and unexplored world of the
Internet. History & Uniforms has the ambition to become an instrument 'in progress',
able to accommodate new contributions, increasing the arguments with the flexibility
allowed by the electronic devices. As someone may have noticed, the main edition is
in English, though at least half of the subjects are of Italian themes. In fact, the idea
to make the magazine an international instrument is the other great ambition of this
initiative, which received the support of a scientific committee comprising specialists
from all over the world. My special greeting is directed to them.
Bruno Mugnai
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Yangshao warrior, Yellow River Valley; 3300 BC

(Illustration by Bruno Mugnai after Authors reconstruction)
Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 4

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare
by Chun L. Wang
The military history of Ancient China - and in general the Chinese history before the half of
20th century is less known in Europe and in the Western world as well. However, there are
several aspects which may involve the people interested in military history, as well as the
history enthusiasts. The huge variety of subjects and relative equipment, dress and
insignias may be topics of special favour for military history readers and modellers. One
may note all these various and diverse particularities just considering the single subjects,
namely focusing structure, organization, development and warfare of the ancient and
medieval Chinese armies, which could open new horizon of interest.
As rightly outlined by Endymion Wilkinson in her excellent Chinese History, A Manual,
sinology and the writing of Chinese history are both heavily dependent upon scholarly
output in China1, whether this output is understood in the broad sense of archaeology
epigraphy or historical writing. All these aspects contribute to complicate the Western
approach to the ancient Chinese and medieval history as well. Further, also for scholars
accustomed to Chinese historical topics, the access to the primary sources remains difficult.
Historical archives have opened doors that until the 1980s were shut. Joint archaeological
researches have been permitted since 1991 after a hiatus of more than 40 years.
Previously Chinese history was seen either as part of world history in a Marxist-Maoist
framework or as the glorious story of the formation of the modern Chinese nation2. In the
recent times, the number and diversity of historical works compilations and reprints of
Chinese historical texts have increased constantly. Primary sources too, including
archaeological materials, are becoming more accessible, even if the original items may still
be scattered in collections in many countries, transcriptions have been made and
comprehensive editions published in United Kingdom or USA.
Periodization and concept of Ancient Era and Middle Age in Chinese History
Under several aspect is not possible to use a unique criteria for framing Chinese ancient era
and Middle Age, with the periodization used for the Western history. Historical reasons and
1
From 1949 to 1979, the writing of history in China became more directly subordinate to politics
than it had been in Imperial China. However, the past was no longer regarded as a mirror for the
present, but as the night at the end of which, following liberation in 1949: a new era had
dawned. What happened during the course of the long night of Chinese feudal history and even
during the pre-class age, was analysed in Marxist-Maoist terms. All other forms of historical
studies were proscribed and the research limited to a few topics: peasant rebellions; formation of
the Han nation; landholding systems of feudal China; capitalist sprouts in Ming and Qing ages.
2
There are some signs that new cross border and cross cultural comparisons are now being made,
even though many Chinese and not Chinese authors still have predilection to regard history
principally as a means to glorify national pride.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
substantial diversity between Europe, Northern Africa and Near East respect Inner Asian
societies makes impossible to categorize it under a unique frame. Further, for a Western
observer, Chinese Middle Age lasts until 19th century, while in China the ancient era finish
many years before the fall of West Roman Empire. Then, to categorize the various age,
cultures and dynasties in the Chinese ancient era, we adopt the effective division proposed
in the more recent studies3.
Prehistoric and Ancient Era:
Neolithic: c. 10,000 c. 2100 BC
Xia dynasty: c. 2100 c. 1600 BC
Shang dynasty: c. 1600 1027 BC
Zhou dynasty: 1027 256 BC
These periods are classified as the actual ancient era, preceding the Imperial Age lasted
until the dissolution of the empire in 1911.
The 1920s and 1930s saw the first modern archaeological digs and important discoveries,
including Peking Man and the late Neolithic culture of Yangshao and Longshan: the alpha
and the omega of Neolithic China. The next period of discovery was in 1950s and early
1960s. Planned excavation concentred on the traditional core area, the Yellow River valley
and on the ancient capitals such as Luoyang4. One of the most notable and today still
controversial excavation was the first opening of an Imperial tomb by archaeologists, that
of the Ming Wanli emperor5. Nevertheless some extremely important discoveries were
made during the first half of the 1970s, such as the bamboo and silk manuscripts at
Mawangdui, Shuihundi, Yinqueshan, Wuwei and Juyan. Some of the finds have become
household words: perhaps the best-known example being the 7,000 terracotta warriors of
the underground army found in 1974 in the guard chambers to the tomb of the first
emperor Qin Shi Huang. Although the most spectacular archaeological finds have come
from prehistoric and ancient China, these researches has contributed much to later Chinese
archaeology. Take the example of the discovery of tomb frescoes and tomb brick paintings.
These items have survived from every period from the Neolithic through the Ming.
China has been inhabited since the dawn of time and Paleolithic remains have been found
in various provinces. That being said, the prelude to Chinese history is the Neolithic period.
3
Endymion Wilkinson: Chinese History. A Manual; revised and enlarge edition; Cambridge and
London, 2000.
4
Excavations have concentrated on ancient capital cities and their walls and palaces, Buddhist
temple, workshop, for example kilns and foundries; imperial mausoleums; more ordinary tombs
and on the artifacts from all of these.
5
The excavation here and elsewhere was interrupted by the government in 1957. There was also a
large interruption and much destruction during the Cultural Revolution (1966-72), which delayed
the excavations up to 30 years and archaeological studies suspended for several years.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Up to now more than 6,000 Neolithic sites have been identified in various parts of the
country and excavations have been undertaken at more than a hundred.
The Neolithic Chinese culture was principally spread along the Huang Ho (Yellow River)
and the Liao River in Northern China. Both these regions were the cradle of cultures dating
back in the early Holocene. In the north area the scholars have identified a succession of
several cultures: Xinglongwa (8500-7000 BC); Xinle (7000-5000 BC); Hongshan (4500-
2800 BC)6.
The best known, the most expanded and the first discovered in 1920 by the Swedish
geologist Johan Gunnar Anderson is the Yangshao culture (5000-3000 BC), settled in the
Yellow River area. It takes its name from the village where this culture was discovered in
the district of Mianchi, in Henan province. More than a thousand of archaeologist sites have
been found distributed in the Yellow River valley from Zhengzhou in the east to the upper
reaches in Gansu and Qinghay.
There are many regional subdivisions; the most interesting from the point of view of early
civilization are those to the northwest of the area of distribution in the province of Gansu.
Here some late Yangshao sites of the variants known as Majiayao (3100 2000 BC),
Banshan (2500 2300 BC), and Machang (2400 2000 BC) have yielded the earliest
evidence for a knowledge of earliest bronze casting7.
The Yangshao culture emphasizes the importance of women. So, there are more female
tombs and graves here than male ones, and the women graves contain more objects and
valuables than their male counterparts do. These everyday objects reveal the high degree
of technical proficiency achieved by the Neolithic craftsmen. The changes and
developments of form, decorative motifs and techniques of firing identify different
subcultures, enabling us to date them and revealing the relationships and reciprocal
influences between the various groups8.
6
Earliest sites of Neolithic culture was excavated near Nanzhuangtou village in Xushi, centre of the
culture of Peligang dated very close to 10,000 years ago. See in Kwang-Chih Chang, China in the
eve of the Historical Period, p. 44-45; in: The Cambridge History of Ancient China, Cambridge, 1999.
7
Charles F. W. Higham, Encyclopaedia of Ancient Asian Civilization; New York, 2004; p. 400.
8
The remains unearthed in the excavations in the villages in the district of Lintong, are another
typical examples of the Yangshao culture, See in Zhongmin Han-Delahaye Hubert, A Journey
Through Ancient China, Beijing, 1985, p.12-13

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Anthropomorphic figure (of warrior ?) on a vessel of Yangshao-Majiayaoculture, 3000 BC.
Liangzhu axe in jade, 3350-2500 BC. Recent discoveries reveal that sophisticated developments
were already under way in the Middle Neolithic across a much broader expanse of the Mainland.
From north to south, the host cultures were Hongshan in the western Manchurian Basin,
Dawenkou on the east coast, and Liangzhu in the Shanghai Delta region. Trends towards status
differentiation, craft specialization and public architecture are evident in these societies. These
trends continue in the Late Neolithic, but an insidious new addition at that time is violence,
especially in the Central Plain region.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The village communities of the Majiayao phase of the Yangshao culture, which is dated in
the vicinity of 3000 BC, typically include houses sunk into the soft loess soil as a protection
against the bitter winter cold. The inhabitants cultivated millet and maintained domestic
stock. They fashioned and kiln-fired pottery vessels and used polished stone tools such as
jade. The longevity of these stable villages led to the formation of large inhumation

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
cemeteries. Their millet was stored in underground pits for winter consumption, and in one
of these pits at the site of Linjia, Liangzhou district, Gansu, a bronze knife that was
between 6 and 10 percent tin was found. It was cast in a double mold and represents one
of the earliest bronzes, if not the earliest, from China. Other excavations at the same site
have yielded fragments of bronze as well, but the knife is the only actual bronze artifact
from this extensively excavated site. It presents a problem of interpretation in that major
excavations at sites of the succeeding Banshan phase (27002350 BC) of the late
Yangshao in this region have revealed no other bronzes. This lack is particularly notable at
Liuwan, where more than 1,000 graves have been opened. Of these, 257 belong to the
Banshan phase, and 872 to the following Machang phase (24002000 BC). Yet no items of
bronze were recovered, while pottery is still abundant.
Sadly, the huge number of pottery shows very few human figures, except for some items
discovered in Bnp, a village six kilometers east of Xian. This excavated site of a
Yangshao village was discovered in 1953 and dates back to 4500 BC. Bnp site is the
largest and best-preserved Neolithic Yangshao cultural sites of China's Yellow River basin.
The Neolithic village museum is built around a historical site consisting of the remains of a
6,000 year-old village once home to a matriarchal clan community. It is the first Prehistoric
site museum in China. The living section of the ancient village occupied an area of 30,000
square meters. It was surrounded by a moat to protect the village against enemies, wild
animals and floods. The largest among the remains of the 46 houses, located in the centre
of the living area, is possibly a meeting hall. There are cellars to store grain and tools
outside the houses, and they illustrate the equal distribution and communal features of the
society. They may also have practiced an early form of silkworm cultivation. A pottery of
Bnp portray a human face possibly with a proto-helmet and fish figures ona basin, and
another one with a human face with hair braids and paints.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
All these items help us to form an idea about natural colours employed and decorative
motifs for clothes and other garments. Black, carmine red, brown and natural ochre are the
most common paints used, while geometrical patterned decorations, as roundels and
triangles, are already typical in this era, namely around 5000-3000 BC. These examples
are enough to introduce our first reconstruction of a Yangshao warrior at page four.
Although the warrior illustrated is a male, the matriarchal structure of the Yangshao culture
could perhaps include female warriors too. Nothing is known about the history of the
Yangshao culture and if these groups were always allied or sometimes enemy. Possibly, the
exchange of handicraft items and other products could push some villages to join a
federation, but some evidence seems to suggest that each community had to be a state-
village clans structured in a characteristic chiefdom societies9. Warfare was practiced
principally for defensive purposes against nomadic groups coming from the north-western
regions. The defensive attitude of their settlements could be reflected in the weaponry, like
slingshot, javelin and spear. It is not sure if they knew bow and arrows, due to the absence
of any kind of remains of both. It is hard to suppose whether in some villages there were
groups of men and women considered just as warriors, while the other members continued
to deal with the routine. In any case, archaeological deductions seem to indicate that the
whole community was called upon to defend the settlement in case of assault.
***
Toward the end of the Yangshao culture in the central plains, cultural changes quickly led to
the emergence of new societies. From the mid-third millennium BC, the northern regions of
Central Eurasia, east of the Urals, were transformed by the shift from an economy of
predation to an economy of production. The steppe regions became populated with
diversified communities of Neolithic hunters and fishermen as well as pastoralists and
agriculturalists. Pastoralists occupied the higher mountain pastures, such as those in the
Tien-shan and the Altai regions, whereas along the lower course of the Amu Darya, in
Central Asia, animal breeding co-existed with irrigated agriculture modeled after the
system of irrigation such as in the early Mesopotamia or in ancient Egypt. Chinas internal
frontier has been often understood as an ideal line dividing two ecological zones: the
steppes and deserts of the north and the farmland of the south. Although this line may
have shifted north or south in response to climatic variations over time, from the viewpoint
of human agency this interpretation of the frontier remains fundamentally static and tells
us little about cultural exchange and political interaction. Until the half of the third
millennium BC- when a clearly demarcated political boundary between the north and south-
9
Organized communities under the control of a single chief or a couple formed by wife and husband.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
central China emerged with the formation of the first empires - the northern frontier of
China remained extremely fluid. However, at least three interconnected but independent
processes played roles in defining the northern frontier: one ecological and economic,
another cultural, and the last political. With agriculture, human settlements tend to be tied
to a fixed place for longer than is the case for hunters and shepherds; hence, several
farming cultures adopted the first examples of structured self-government.
The so-called Longshan culture (3000-2000 BC)10, settled in an area close to the
Yangshao culture, are among the most significant discoveries that archaeology had made in
recent years. Very rich in themselves, they are of great importance providing tangible and
reliable clues to the reasons why and how the state first came to being. Such remains
indicate a society at a stage of development between that of the Yangshao culture and the
earlier Shang dynasty.
Human face in jade, Longshan culture. The decorations could be represent tattoos or paints.
10
Longshan culture was first discovered in 1931-2 at Chengziyai, near the former Longshan district
of Licheng, Shandong.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Longshan monile in stone with carved decoration.
Longshan jade axe with the typical composite decoration. The Longshan communities that
expanded in the Huang (Yellow) River Valley and Shandong Peninsula reveal a quickening of social
complexity. Archaeologically, this is manifested in villages with defensive walls, rich burial
assemblages, the adoption of metallurgy, and an increase in artifacts associated with armed conflict.
Bones, Jades and, especially, bronzes, which were to reflect high social distinction for millennia to
come, made their first appearance.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
However, the mechanism of this transition did not become clear until much more evidences
were discovered. The emergence of complex society on the China Mainland is usually
discussed in terms of the Late Neolithic era, or Longshan cultures of the Central Plain.
Recent discoveries reveal that sophisticated developments were already under way in the
Middle Neolithic across a much broader expanse of the Mainland. The most important of
these new data consist of the settlement pattern of the towns excavated in Shandong
peninsula and Henan. The graduating of furnishing and spatial distributions of graves and
some ritual objects, especially ritual jades, show a more structured and complex society
which had become more stratified and complex, as the decorative motifs, towns structure,
and handicraft clearly suggest. The Late Neolithic Longshan cultures were characterized by
advanced ceramic and jade technologies; an increased reliance on domestic animals,
especially sheep and cattle; varying degrees of social differentiation, including stratified
clans; and the utilization of exotic items such as jades, bones, ivories, and turtle shells in
ritual and exchange. The graves, for example, were built in cemeteries outside the villages
and towns; material wealth buried with the dead become concentrated into the graves of a
small number of presumably special personalities. This particular cultural mix had been
brewing since the middle of the period. The outstanding additions in the Late Neolithic were
social conflict and the resulting emergence of new settlement forms and larger human
groups.
The existence of a larger number of ordered communities in this period lasted for more
than five centuries and it is known in China as wan gwo: the ten thousand states: an era
dominated by wars. Interestingly, these Late Neolithic trends of conflict and warfare were
resolved with the ultimate stratification of Longshan society, which was possibly facilitated
by the application of a new technology - bronze casting and to the social stratification
marked by the prestigious activity of elite rituals.
Warfare and military organization of these cultures are still mysterious topics, but in the
Longshan culture, certain well-placed communities grew further in size and commanded
sufficient resources to construct large walls and platforms to defend elite buildings.
Extensively excavated cemeteries11, provide evidence for social distinctions. This trend was
accompanied by a growing density of sites and a sharp rise in population. Growth took
place at a time of increasing evidence for violence and warfare. More weapons were
manufactured, and some sites reveal evidence for the disposal of men who had been
severely handled.
The prominence of Longshan culture was possibly the result of better organized fighting
11
The finest example is the site of Taosi, Xiangfen district, Shanxi.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
units. There are some evidences which confirm the presence of a structured military force
fighting as organized unit of footmen. Warriors could be recognized with special signs and
headdress and naturally by the weapons. Jade axe, bow and long spear are typical
weapons of the Longshan culture, and in the late age is very probable the use of the first
examples of dagger axe shaped like that common in the following Shang dynasty.
War was a means of legitimizing the power of the new aristocracy, and the main aim of
foreign policy was the sending out of expeditions to parade this power and gather tribute.
Some traces and remains suggest that Longshan expeditions could cover hundreds miles
through uninhabited regions. Details of how expeditionary forces were supplied are lacking,
but they covered very impressive distances on occasion. Longhsan explorers probably
reached the lower Yangtze, while it is not unlikely that they occasionally penetrated in the
Inner Mongolian steppe.
Surrounding peoples were deliberately left unconquered to serve as an excuse for war and
a reservoir of booty and prisoners. This represents a primitive stage in the evolution of
external relations, in which the resources of other communities at a lower technological
level are exploited in a manner analogous to a hunting expedition. This was also probable
examining the military campaigns led by the following ancient reigns of Xia and Shang. In
fact, hunting trips and military campaigns were organized in the same way and the
distinction between them is often vague.
Early Chinese histories, such as the Shiji, refer to a distant period of Five Emperors. They
name kings, cities and many battles between innumerable rival kingdoms. The Han Shu
(the book of Han), in referring to this remote predynastic period, also cites the existence of
walled cities. It is an intriguing possibility that the much later Chinese historians were still
in touch with the very origins of their civilization.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The Longshan culture typical sites were discovered in 1928 on the Shandong peninsula. Several
walled settlements are now known and these vary greatly in size, but all seem to have encompassed
dwellings and some craft facilities, with pottery and stone tools among their artifact repertoires. This
form of settlement layout and defence stands in stark contrast to the village patterns preceding it.
The walled settlement of Pingliangtai had guard houses on each side of its southern gate (F1 and
F2) and several dwellings in its interior, all built of adobe bricks (a). Some of these houses were
distinguished from others by being raised on tamped-earth platforms (b). Scattered among similar
earthen foundations within the enclosure were found more than a dozen ofl underground pits, filled
with skeletons of both adults and children, sandwiched between tamped-earth layers.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Longshan noble and warrior.

(Illustration by Bruno Mugnai after Authors reconstruction)

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The Venetian Army and Navy in the Holy League War, 1684-1699
by Bruno Mugnai
(part one)
CorazzaVeneta; Greece, summer 1685. Contemporary accounts relate that the Venetian
heavy cavalrymen employed more metal plates respect their foreign colleagues. Also later
documentary sources tells that this trend will long survive in Venice: for this reason the
Venetian cuirassiers were nicknamed Padelloni (iron pot).
The Venetian Army and Navy in the Holy League War (part one) 19
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
- Introduction: Wars and Venetian Singularities

Although Venice had never pursued a military policy in the modern sense, during the
17th century the Serenissima Repubblica was forced to increase its armed strength to
counterbalance the growing external threats. For centuries, the fleet - commonly
referred to as the Armada - had represented the Venetian main instrument of war. In
fact, the navy had always been the main weapon against the greatest enemy of the
Republic - the Ottoman Empire - but in the early 17th century war fronts had moved
on land and this time the opponents were the troops of the Austrian Habsburgs. The
Uskok War of 1615-18 had compelled Venice to come to grips with completely new
strategic problems. The conflict against the Austrians represented a new challenge for
the Republic, because the conflict centre of gravity was not on the sea, but moved its
forces to the borders, leaving the fleet just with the task of liquidating the presence of
pirates under Viennas pay. Now the attack came from the north and, above all, the
technological escalation generated by a conflict against a modern European army
forced the government to reconsider its military policy. Further troubles for Venice
arose during its involvement in the first War of Castro (1641-44), when its troops and
galleys had to face the Papal Army in Emilia and in the Adriatic. There were now
choices which Venice could not escape and - in the fierce combat against the
Ottomans - would later require even more drastic changes. The exhausting conflict for
the possession of Crete (1645-1671) proved even more crucial in the evolution of the
Venetian army and navy for the future wars. If the great island represented the centre
of gravity, the strategic duel was bound to take place on the seas. The scenario of war
influenced the choices and so, during the whole 17th century, despite the gradual
increase of other war involvements, Venice continued to consider 'fleet' and 'army' as
a single instrument. Seaborne assaults with landing troops continued to be perfectly
coherent to its strategy, especially against targets far from its domains, combined with
a huge net of garrison in the mainland and overseas.
The result was the creation of an entirely original instrument of war unlike any other
European armies: a result which was probably not the best possible one to defend
itself, but surely the most appropriate way to face any political contingency and war
emergency. In this context, the aristocracys atavistic conservationism contributed to
slow the development of military armed forces in the modern meaning, but even more
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
decisive was the attitude derived from the garrison system12 to influence the
Venetian military policy.
The resistance against the modernization of the army was nourished by the State-
City ideology. In Venice, the government continued to pursue the goal of managing
the mosaic of peoples and military corps in a rather conservative way. These military
choices seems to suggest what Hocquet has called "the double paradox of Venice",
unable to free themselves from the state-city's role to become the capital of a
territorial state, but also to rule its territories beyond the traditional schemes of
domain13. Notwithstanding this attitude, the Venetian Republic represented the only
multiethnic state of Italy, where different languages and religions coexisted until its
dissolution in 1797.
Because the Venetian political doctrine obeyed to a principle of balanced power, this
aspect contributed ultimately to maintain separate the land forces in the rigid
classification of the troops according to their composition, origin and economic
remuneration. The Holy League War could be represent a reversal in this trend, thanks
to the reforms introduced by Francesco Morosini, interrupted, however, by his death in
1694. Historians have long considered the Venetian military trajectory as an
unsuccessful parable, neglecting the innovative tactics and weaponry introduced in the
campaigns on the sea. Even when they investigated the naval strategy focusing on
tactical and technical improvements, historians had assumed some not completely
right common views14, or they considered the matter as a mystery just to elude it.
12
See in Piero Del Negro, Il Leone in Campo: Venezia e gli Oltramarini nelle Guerre di Candia e
di Morea, in Mito e Antimito di Venezia nel Bacino Adriatico (secoli XV XIX); Roma 2001, p.
331.
13
Jean Claude Hocquet, cited by P.L. Tamburrini, L'Organizzazione Militare di Venezia nella
prima met del Settecento, Collana SISM, 2014; pag. 9.
14
It is remarkable to observe how the military history of Venice in the modern age is known
especially on outdated stereotypes. The studies of John Hale and Michael Mallett opened a
window to investigate the Venetian military structure, but unfortunately their contributions
have arrested to the 16th century. The accurate works of Jeremy Black, Warfare Renaissance
to Revolution 1492-1792, Cambridge 1995 and John Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth
Century, London, 2001, have both neglected the Venetian wars. The same oversight occurred
in the excellent book of John Glete, Warfare at Sea, London 2000, closing his study just before
the Candian war and the development of the sea warfare in the Mediterranean. The 17th
century military history of Venice remains then Terra Incognita outside Italy and although in
the recent years important contributes by Piero Del Negro, Pietro Marchesi, Guido Candiani,
Luca Porto, Alberto Prelli, Guido Ercole, Pier Luigi Tamburrini, Luciano Pezzolo, Marco Morin
and Riccardo Caimmi had appeared, these works are yet scarcely diffused outside Italy.
Recently, Mario Infelise and Anastasia Stouraiti had been the editors of an important
contribute about the Morean War. This book includes research by Italian and foreign specialists
focusing the political and cultural scenario of the campaigns (for further information see in the
Bibliography chapter).
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Even contemporary sources show some difficulty in understanding the Venetian

warfare. Several 17th century commenters agreed that Venice entrusted its safety to
the fleet, making its military forces strongly asymmetric, which were considered too
skewed towards the navy compared to the land forces. From a broad perspective, a
strong dichotomy seemed to exist between the navy, made up of officers and sailors,
who were mostly Venetian, and the army, composed in a high percentage of
mercenaries recruited from all over Europe and commanded by foreign officers. The
decision to rely on mercenaries was, in effect, a calculated price to guarantee political
stability, avoiding the formation of a class of professional soldiers who could change
the internal balance of the state. Differing from it, would have meant questioning the
political and social order. Moreover, the appointments to military positions of prestige
were useful to manage the network of diplomatic relations to which Venice had always
attributed great importance15.
Scipione Pannocchieschi, papal nuncio to Venice between 1647 and 1652, tried to give
a personal explanation of the particular Venetian military structure:
The Armies (of Venice) are regularly composed by Italians who are not
subjects, Germans and Slavs, and even captains are foreign. And this
happens to maintain people untrained for war. Of course, the people feel
always little friendship for the nobles; and Venice did not need nobles to the
command, because wants to preserve the government from the tyranny,
fearing more the condition of its subjects that the foreigners one.
Other commenters, more maliciously, attributed this trend to the poor warrior attitude
of the ...avid merchants of the lagoon16. Unlike the above mentioned quotation, the
native Venetian presence in the army was not a minority as claimed by certain sources
and, although throughout the 17th century defining the army as 'Venetian' was almost
like defining Francisco Francos forces in the civil war of 1936-39 as Spanish, officers
and soldiers from the Venetian mainland and from the capital itself remained relevant
throughout the century17.
15
In this context, something exemplary is the enlistment of the Marquis Jacques de
Grmonville in 1647, namely the brother of the French ambassador in Venice, with the rank of
lieutenant general of the infantry.
16
This term was used by pope Giulio II during the War of the League of Cambrai (1508-1516)
and became popular in the European courts to deplore the mercantilist behaviour of the
Republic.
17
See in Gregory Hanlon, The Twilight of a Military Tradition, Italian Aristocrats and European
Conflicts, 1560-1800, London 1998; pp. 221-261.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Another interesting view about the Venetian army is its presumed weakness in
campaigns. This poor attitude appears to rely on considerations related to its military
policy - which took place mainly in the 18th century after the war against the
Ottomans in 1714-18 - claiming it as well-identified in the previous century as the
beginning of the demilitarization and the renunciation to play a role of territorial
power in Europe. The fact that in less than a century, from the heavy investment in
armaments, fortifications and in the fleet, a phase of actual demilitarization followed,
has distracted historians from investigating the real objectives that Venice pursued in
the last phase of the century and especially from the dynamics which led to these
choices: to control its domains in the Mediterranean Levant with a fleet capable of
carrying relatively numerous but efficient troops; to be protected on Milanese and the
Eastern Alps; to obtain all this at low cost. The image of Venice, which was powerful
on the sea and weak in its terrestrial device, should therefore be re-interpreted in a
different perspective, namely the substantial unity of the Venetian military structure,
where all the land forces were regarded as garrisons or 'landing troops'. This latter
aspect became clear considering that the supreme military command remained
invariantly committed to the Capitano Generale da Mar (Sea General Captain).
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Venetian Domains in 1683.
In addition to service aboard ships, until the war against the Austrian Habsburgs in
1615-1618, Venetian troops operated mainly for passive defence and internal security,
as can be clearly deduced from their distribution in the fortified centres of the
Mainland and overseas. The elementary military functions minimized the need to
increase the forces, which in the early 17th century barely reached 7,000 regular
soldiers in all. Despite this, since the outbreak of the war against the Austrians, the
army had quickly grown to a total of 26,000 soldiers of all the specialties. In spite of
its unconventional military structure, Venice still appeared as one of the most
remarkable European powers and certainly one of the first in Italy, capable of
deploying substantial numbers of troops, as the 24,000 men employed to counter the
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
rebellion of the Valtellina in 1625-27. Later on, the undertakings against Northern
African corsairs and the successive international political crises acted as modifiers of
these numbers, resulting in an alternating pattern of consistency quotas. In the
1630s, the government decreased the provisionati - namely professional soldiers
less than 10,000 men, reducing this number to 6,900 when the Republic recruited this
force for the war against the Pope of 1641-44. The economic crisis that affected the
Mediterranean in the 17th century made it difficult to maintain a large standing army,
forcing Venice to adopt a policy of rigid parsimony. The decision to maintain a
standing army below 10,000 men found comfort assuming as model the army of the
United Provinces of the Netherlands. Although Venice adapted the military policy of
the Netherlands to itself in a rather incongruous way, all facts and events regarding
both the Dutch army and fleet were held in high regard. Therefore, since the
beginning of the 17th century, the government subscribed to the declaration of Maurice
of Nassau, who considered a well-trained force of 8,500 foot soldiers and 1,500
cavalrymen, supported by a powerful fleet and by a modern network of fortresses, as
able to stand up to any opponent18.
However, the conflict against the Pope, initially considered as just a regional crisis, in
a few years led to a new increase in mobilization and, at the end of the hostilities,
Venice fielded more than 20,000 men including professional soldiers and militiamen.
In 1640, the Senate had determined for the standing army in peacetime 9,000 regular
soldiers, of which 2,200 in Terraferma Mainland, the Italian provinces - divided into
15 main towns and fortresses, and another 6,800 men in Dalmatia, Corfu, Zante,
Cephalonia, Cerigo (today Cythera in Greece), Egina, Tinos and Crete. The
government specified that all these troops could be transferred on the fleet if
necessary. In the mid-century, the Venetian permanent troops were completed with
1,600 cavalrymen, 600 artillerymen and another 200 including bombardieri, engineers
and other specialists. Besides these soldiers and officers under contract, the
government could associate, if necessary, hired foreign troops and finally turn to the
mobilization of militias - the Ordinances or cernide in Italy and Greece, and craine in
Dalmatia - with a physiologically heterogeneous level of efficiency, but they could
increase the army by several thousands of men. In fact, in 1645, the militia numbered
on paper 20,000 men in the Mainland and additional 18,000 in the Archipelago and in
18
Contarinis relation, cited in: Ian Heath, Armies of the Sixteenth Century, Guernsey, 1988; p.
107.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Dalmatia.
The huge extension of its borders and the expansion of the conflict against the
Ottomans in defence of the kingdom of Candia, urged the Republic to face strategic
decisions which could not be postponed, and which could not disregard a policy of
heavy investment to increase the strength of the army, and especially the infantry to
protect the fortresses, to attack the islands with amphibious landings, and to besiege
the enemy strongholds in Bosnia and in Greece. The whole forces deployed in the
Candian War had reached unprecedented levels, scoring at various times more than
30,000 professional soldiers, 25,000 sailors, gunners and oarsmen, and about 30,000
militiamen of the cernide and craine with several mounted or foot irregulars recruited
in Dalmatia, Greece and Albania. Between 1659 and 1660 - when Venice undertook
the plan to expel the Ottomans from Crete with a landing assault - contingents were
recruited in every corner of Europe. In the summer of 1660, 11,200 infantrymen and
1,200 horses were assembled at Cerigo, who landed in the following September in
front of La Canea (today Chania). Six years later, during the last attempt to deprive
the Ottomans of the major islands ports, 8,295 foot soldiers and 1,008 horses landed
in Crete. The last three years of fighting around Candia demanded an even larger
number of soldiers to support the resistance of the besieged city. Every week
hundreds of lives were consumed in the fierce fighting, like in a furnace. Without
counting the irregulars, in just two and a half years, Venice enlisted no less than
25,000 professional soldiers, most of which out of their borders. After a period of
disengagement and demilitarization between 1670 and 1683, the War of the Holy
League increased the forces again, with the deployment of landing corps composed of
thousands of men, but the numbers reached fifteen years earlier were never equalled
and rarely totalled more than 15,000 professional soldiers.
In 1684, for the first action of the war, the siege of Santa Maura (today Levkas,
Lefkada island in Greece), the force available totalled 10,000 Italian, German,
Maltese, Croatian and Greek infantrymen with some cavalry companies19. One year
later, for the upcoming campaign in the Peloponnese, more than 10,000 men were
gathered in Corfu, but the actual fighting force totalled 9,500 soldiers20; then, in
1686, at the initiative of the Capitano Generale da Mar Francesco Morosini, the
'Italian' infantry was organized into six regiments, totalling 6,200 men21, out a total
19
Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Savio alla Scrittura, 1684, Milizie esistenti in Corf, (without date)
f. 1, ff. 102.
20
Giacomo Diedo, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, Venezia, 1751; t. III, p. 369.
21
Dal Negro, cited work; p. 329.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
strength of 11,289 men, included infantry from Braunschweig-Lneburg, Neaples, the

Milanese, Tuscany and Malta; the total force comprised 1,000 horse with four
companies of Spanish dragoons from Milan22. In 1687, at the siege of Napoli di
Romania (today Nauplia in Greece), the land force totalled 14,000 infantrymen and
800 horsemen23. In 1688, the Venetian effort produced the considerable strength of
15,874 men24, displayed at the costly siege of Negroponte of Eubea (today Chalkis, in
Greece), but this force included in the final phase significant percentage of sailors and
even armed oarsmen25. One year later, the outbreak of the Augsburg's League War
(1688-97) represented the turning point not only for the Imperial offensive against
the Porte, but also for the Venetians strategy in Greece, due the growing difficult to
enlist further German mercenary contingents. For the campaigns of 1689, Francesco
Morosini could deploy just 11,248 soldiers from the Mainland and overseas domains26;
while on the Bosnian border the professional force consisted in 4,000 men supported
by local militia and irregulars27. Between 1690 and the end of the war, every year
Venice mobilized about 18-25,000 soldiers and militiamen, necessary not only for the
War theatres in Greece and Dalmatia, but also to secure the unsafe Italian western
border, lapped by the passage of the armies that faced each other in the war of the
Augsburgs League. Years before, the menace coming from European belligerents
became a real threat in the Mediterranean too. Already in the summer of 1652, Dutch
and English vessels engaged themselves in a fierce battle in front of Leghorn; 20
years later the French fleet landed soldiers to support the rebellion against Spain in
Messina, attracting the Spanish and Dutch fleet close to the Ionian Sea, then in 1683
even more worrying - the French navy bombarded Genoa and then landed infantry
to occupy Sampierdarena, to punish the Republic for its aid to Spain. Moreover, the
Northern African corsairs did not diminished their presence in the Mediterranean and
their commanders introduced new tactics employing squadrons of sail ships to repulse
enemies and better intercept the merchant sea trade.
The new scenario, at least, favoured a gradual strategic turning of Venice from a fleet
based on galleys to one based on vessels and in 1675 the Senate decided to proceed
to a significant increase of sail warships through the construction of new vessels. The
22
ASVe, Savio alla Scrittura, 1686, f. 1, ff. 342.
23
Ibidem, 1687, f. 1, ff. 390.
24
Ibidem, 1688, f. 1, ff. 401-412
25
Diedo, cited work, p. 407.
26
ASVe, Savio alla Scrittura, f. 1, ff. 478.
27
Ibidem, ff. 479.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
following year, the initial anti-foreign trade policy was directed towards the most
traditional rival Ottoman Empire, based on the report presented to the Senate by bailo
(ambassador to the Ottoman Porte) Giacomo Querini after his return from Istanbul.
Querini emphasized as the Sultan was without an actual warships fleet and suggested
recuperating the supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. The Candian War had
demonstrated the Ottoman weakness faced to the Dutch and English vessels in
Venetian service. Then the Republic could replace the costly and sometimes unreliable
foreign units with new vessels provided by the Venetian Arsenal to form a larger
Armata Grossa28. 1675 was the turning year for the Venetian navy. Over the years, 5
new vessels came from the Arsenal to drop anchor in Corfu. In 1683, on the eve of
the war, Venice possessed 7 warships and 12 others were under construction, ready to
join the war fleet in less than five months. Usually in peacetime the strength of the
navy included the light fleet with 20 or 21 fully equipped and armed galleys; 4 galleys
were permanently displayed in Corf, Zante and Cephalonia, joined by 4 more in
summer; 4 or 6 were at anchor in Venice, while another 4 galleys formed the
Dalmatian squadron; the last squadron, based in the Aegean Sea, was usually
composed of 4 galleys. In Venice there were always hulls in reserve for 40 new
galleys, 20 of which armed and ready to sail: a significant decrease in comparison
with twenty years before, when 60 hulls were normally available29. During the Candian
War the galleys fleet had displayed 50 and more galleys, a number never equalled in
the following conflicts. For the first campaign the Venetians displayed 28 galleys in
overall, joined by two more from Dalmatia, two from Cephalonia and two from Zante
and Corfu30. In peacetime the flotta sottile (the light fleet of rowing ship) still
comprised, in Venice, 2 galeazze with another 4 in reserve.
When the war against the Ottomans ended with the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699, and
notwithstanding the conquest of the Peloponnese, the accumulated debt of Venice had
reached unprecedented levels, which heavily influenced the future military policy. In
the new century, the increasingly unfavourable economic situation would force the
government to pursue a policy of armed neutrality destined to sharpen the
contradictions of a military organization now launched towards an irreversible
disarmament.
Despite a reduced effort on the sea respect the previous conflict, the Venetian fleet
28
The first Venetian-built sail vessel was the Giove Fulminante, with 62 cannons, launched in May 1667.
29
Mario Nani-Mocenigo, Storia della Marina Veneziana, Roma, 1935; pag. 257
30
Michele Foscarini, Degli Istorici delle Cose Veneziane, 1722, p. 134; these figures are confirmed in the
Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Senato Mar, ff. 656, 1684.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
and army improved successfully several war tactics. The use of the galleys to wide
radius to paralyse the Ottoman supply in the Aegean sea (technique and methods
employed resemble those used by the German U-Boat in the two world wars to be
unnoticed), the strategic massive use of amphibious operations and the special role
played by the irregular formations to keep on alert the opponents on the secondary
fronts, such as in Dalmatia and Albania, represent very innovative aspects with results
greater than those achieved by the great European navies in the 17th century, except
the Dutch navy.
Map of Morea (Peloponnese) by Vincenzo Maria Coronelli (ca 1690)

(Authorscollection)
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Francesco Morosini, 1619-1694
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
In 1684, at the outbreak of the war, Francesco Morosini took the military command and over
the next years, he conquered most of the Peloponnese after an impressive series of successes.
His fame reached such heights that he was given the title of Peloponnesiacus, and was the first
Venetian citizen to have a bronze bust placed during his own lifetime in the Grande Sala, with
the inscription Francisco Mauroceno Peloponnesiaco, ad huc vivendi, Senatus. Elected Doge
in 1688, he resigned the command, but in 1693, aged and sick, as Doge he directed the
military action against the Ottoman Empire until his death in Nauplia. Morosini was possibly
the best captain in the Venetian History and one of the most inventive Italian navy
commander. During the Candian War (1645-1671), when he was appointed as Sea General
Captain, Morosini planned aggressive and successful amphibious campaigns in the Egean Sea
to cut the Ottoman supplies for the besieging army at Candia (Heraklion). Despite the negative
outcome of the war and the final loss of Crete, Morosini could improve the amphibious tactics
introduced twenty years before, achieving the uninterrupted triumphs in 1684-1687.
In this graphic reconstruction, Morosini wears a lobster three-quarter corselet in black
polished metal after the one reproduced in the portrait painted by Bartolomeo Nazzari in
1688 - over a buff coat, as related in several sources when he was in active service as General
Captain snce 1684. As supreme commander, he hold the baton in crimson red velvet with
gilded lions, and the cross of Procuratore di San Marco.
Illustration after the Trattato di Artiglieria, by Tommaso Moretti, Bresciano, written before
1665. This fine work presents main caliber of the bronze guns produced in the Venetian
foundries and employed by both the Navy and the Army in the last quarter of the 17th century
(Authors archive).
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Focus on: Guns Production in the Venetian Republic during the Holy League
War (part one)
The bronze artillery production of the whole state was managed by the Arsenal of
Venice. The cast of bronze took place in the arsenal foundry and in other places in the
immediate vicinity - the most important one was the foundry of the Alberghetti family
- while the carriages were built inside the main Arsenal, in the carreri (carters
workshops) located next to the artillery storage. There was also a workshop for
models and compasses where prototypes of machines, equipment and ships produced
in the Arsenal31 were designed.
The progressive increase of large vessels, since the Candian War, had increased the
need for naval artillery. Bronze weapons destined to galleys and galeazzas could be
easily produced in Venice, but the production of a larger number required by vessels
obliged the government to look for alternatives. Moreover, the heavy bronze guns
were less suitable for vessels. The need for iron guns, instead, in 1675 was risen to
more than 600 pieces, and this forced the Senate to procure the weapons abroad. In
1682 the foundry technician Sigismondo Alberghetti was sent to England to buy guns
of 20lb and, at the same time, to learn the technology for the production of iron
pieces. Alberghettis mission lasted four years. In 1686 he signed the last delivery,
bringing the total of the guns purchased in England to 450, 250 of which were 20lb
guns32. In 1689 the War of the Augsburgs League involved England, leaving the
Venetian market without the main supply source. However, the steel technology found
in the state an important weapons manufacturing industry in the provinces of Brescia
and Bergamo33, where fine quality metal with characteristics of resistance and purity
was mined. Although they began late, both Lombard foundries, after ten years of
studies and experiments, provided first rate iron guns to the fleet, comparable to the
contemporary northern European weapons34.
The need to promote the production of iron artillery originates from the fundamental
transformation of the Venetian war fleet. Until the half of the 17th century the fleet
was based almost exclusively on rowing ships, namely galleys and galeazzas, known
31
Guida per lArsenale di Venezia G. Antonelli; Venice, 1829.
32
ASVe, Senato Mar, f. 589, 1686.
33
The entrepreneurs who produced the largest number of iron cannons for the Venetian navy were
Tiburzio Bailo in Sarezzo (Brescia) and Carlo Camozzi in Clanezzo (Bergamo).
34
In 1697, the goodquality of the guns produced in the Lombard foundries was confirmed also by
Alessandro Molin, the last Capitano Straordinario delle Navi appointed during the Holy League War; see in
Guido Candiani, Tiburzio Bailo e i Cannoni di Sarezzo, Politica Militare e Forniture Militari nella Repubblica
di Venezia durante la Prima Guerra di Morea (1684-1699), in Societ e Storia n. 103; 2003, p. 700.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
as the Armata Sottile. The need for guns aboard these ships was not a problem,
considering that a galley had normally 4 cannons and the galeazza no more than 20.
In overall, the fleet required no more than 300 guns, a figure that could be provided
by the production of the bronze artillery foundries which were active in the State.
Although four or five times more expensive than iron, the bronze cannons showed
numerous advantages: lighter, less stressing for the hull structures; they were subject
to higher heating, but they resisted better to a long shot and were safer; particularly,
they could be easily cast a second time, so much so that they were considered by
governments a relatively precious metal reserves. Thanks to the artillery bronze mass
accumulated in the past and the relatively limited quantities requested, Venice had
never seriously faced the problem of exploiting the mineral resources of the Mainland
to plant a production of iron artillery, similarly to the major European sea powers. The
need of iron artillery was not increased even after the introduction of sail warships,
initiated during the undeclared conflict that opposed the Republic to the Spanish
Viceroy of Naples between 1617 and 1620. A ship with bronze cannons meant facing a
cost, and a significant financial loss in the event of sinking. The Serenissima bypassed
this problem by relying on the rental of a long series of armed merchant ships -
especially Dutch and English, but even from the Hanseatic town of Hamburg - whose
owners rented the ships already equipped with iron artillery. With these units a new
Armata Grossa was formed, which was joined by the traditional Armata Sottile. The
long and difficult war fought against the Ottoman Empire from 1645 to 1669,
however, highlighted the limitations of an approach so closely tied to the mercenary
naval market. Rents were too onerous, and relations with foreign crews and captains
was not always serene. The difficulties encountered with private ship-owners, in
addition to the new French naval ambitions in the Mediterranean, pushed the Venetian
government to a radical reconsideration of the composition of its fleet. The Senate
recognized the need to launch sailing warships financed by the State - "public vessels"
in the terminology of Venice - and in 1675 a major program was voted to provide the
fleet with modern sailing vessels, after the first two sail ships launched at the end of
the Candian War. The creation of a modern war fleet of sail ships necessarily involved
the revision of the artillery provision methods. Despite the availability of some mines
in the Mainland, the Republic had not iron foundries, and to initiate a new industry
would have required considerable technical and financial capacity, with poor
expectations of success. Not surprisingly, a nobility of merchant origin who controlled
the government preferred to operate through the market, a simpler method instead of
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
starting a complex and uncertain industrial activity. Previously, the government had
purchased iron cannons in the capital - Venice remained a major market, attended by
the major naval powers - or in Leghorn and Genoa. Trade exchanges were frequent
with the aforementioned towns and their governments enjoyed good diplomatic
relations with Venice. The new naval program demanded not only a greater number of
guns, but also higher calibres than those available in the Italian markets, originally
designed for merchant ships but not suitable for modern vessels. The research was
then extended to the two main European emporiums of iron artillery, Amsterdam and
London, where the Venetian technician, Sigismondo Alberghetti, was sent in mission.
Thanks to his commitment and the network of relationships he implemented, in the
three years 1683-85 the Republic managed to import nearly 500 iron cannons from
England. The English guns seemed to be the optimal solution: fine workmanship;
reasonable price, benefiting from the easy and cheap transport ensured by the
merchant who sailed from the Thames to the Laguna. They went to supplement - and
in some cases to replace the bronze artillery of the public vessels, which rose to 20
units in 1684, after the outbreak of the new conflict against the Porte. However, the
Senate realized early that the international market, and in particular the one of
weapons, had made its fleet highly dependent on the political scenario. The fall of the
Stuarts in 1688, the Venetian lack of recognition of the new sovereign William III of
Orange in order not to compromise the already difficult relationships with Louis XIV
and the English participation in the League of Augsburg, made impossible the supply
of iron artillery across the Channel. If Venice wanted to continue to arm its vessels,
and get free from what now appeared as a dangerous dependence from foreign
countries, it was necessary to start a new iron artillery industry within its domains.
Already in the late '70s, coinciding with the new naval policy, the Republic had
attempted to implant a cannon foundry in Schio, near Vicenza, an area close to
Venice. In 1679 the production started with mortar bombs and artillery projectiles in
iron, but when it came to the casting of cannons, technical difficulties became
insurmountable. Further tries failed in other places and, although many had guessed
that the new industry could be a good economic deal, this outcome appeared difficult
to achieve. The management of technology made it difficult, as iron required higher
fusion temperatures and much more care in the working process. In these events
Sigismondo Alberghetti was also involved, whose mission in England coincided with
the end of the attempts in Vicenza. The failure prompted to move interest into the
Brescia area, the province of major metallurgical traditions of the state. A First
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
attempt failed here too, when in 1683 the musket barrels factory of the Chinelli family
in Gardone Val Trompia experimented with a greater iron casting. Sigismondo
Alberghetti who returned from England two years later was sent to Brescia to
study the possibility of implanting new foundries conceived in the English method of
fusion. The incoming war caused this project to be delayed, because all the foundries
concentrated their production in the new mortar bombs introduced in France and used
with good results in the Peloponnese campaigns under Morosini. Moreover, on several
occasions, the Venetian Arsenal completed the armament of the vessels with bronze
guns, turning to its larger collection of weapons, including the Ottoman guns captured
during the war.
However, the research was not suspended. In the spring of 1688, the Captain of
Brescia, Girolamo Corner, reported that, among samples of minerals extracted near
the village of Sarezzo, one revealed itself of "exquisite quality" for casting cannons. At
the beginning of 1689, taking advantage of the presence of a French engineer enlisted
for the production of mortar bombs, Corner forwarded to Venice the news of the
successful casting of two small iron cannons in the foundry of Tiburzio Bailo. He
belonged to a rich family of Val Trompia, who had been active in the foundry industry
and local ownership, as well as forests, land and livestock, for at least a century. A
friend, and perhaps a relative of Chinellis, in 1686 Tiburzio Bailo had, in turn, started
a production of mortar bombs, focusing on the largest and most difficult ones, even
casting projectiles weighing 1000 Venetian lb. (300 kg). He had found the mine
reported by Corner and, later on, he studied the composition to create the suitable
mixture for casting cannons. He had even anticipated money in this project as
evidence of his loyalty to the public service35. The good results achieved with the
minor calibres encouraged the fusion of greater guns for the warships. In the first
months of 1689 the first 12 lb. and 20 lb. iron guns were cast in Sarezzo. The
success, however, was not enough to begin a regular production. In Arsenal, the
construction of new vessels had been suspended after the initial wave of great
successes had stopped in front of the fierce Ottoman defence at Negroponte.
(continue)
35
ASVe, Senato Dispacci Rettori, Brescia, f.94, 1689.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Artillery tools and projectiles after the Trattato di Artiglieria by Tommaso Moretti (Venice,
1665).
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Officer and private of the Alabardieri (Halberdiers, Life Guard), 1694. The origin of this corps
was very old and dates back to the early '500. The unit was a palace guard corps, employed to
escort the Doge and other important personalities in Venice or in the Domains. The corps had a
size of two companies, each with 24 and 30 private halberdiers; the complete strength
includes 14 musicians, 18 staffieri (lackeys) and 1 captain with 1 lieutenant. In the Correr
Museum in Venice, the halberdiers are portrayed in Nauplia while they are escorting the burial
service of Francesco Morosini. Possibly, in that occasion, the corps members wore the high
uniform with gold laced doublet, breeches and stockings in yellow, azure-blue waist for
privates and yellow for officer and musicians. Note the false sleeves for the privates doublet.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The ordinary uniform of the Alabardieri is described in the documents preserved in the States
Archive of Venice. This uniform was less aulic respect the precedent, although it was completed
by large plumed hat in black felt piped of yellow and rich gilded laces. Uniforms included
azure-blue stockings for private halbediers and red for musicians and officers.
A) velada (coat); B) camisiola (waist); C) braghe (breeches); d) detail of sword bandolier for
both uniforms.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Found in the Archives - Red Grenadiers and Red Chasseurs:
the Guardie del Corpo of the Princes of Lucca and Piombino
(1806-1814)
By Bruno Mugnai
Small and virtually unarmed, the princedom of Lucca and Piombino inaugurated a
series of states entrusted to Napoleons relatives. In 1805, the ancient princedom of
southern Tuscany, which already belonged to the Boncompagni-Ludovisi family, was
ceded to Felice Baciocchi, husband of the emperors sister, Elisa Bonaparte. A few
weeks later, on 12 June 1805, the Democratic Republic of Lucca demanded that
Napoleon receive Prince Felice Baciocchi and his wife as the new rulers. Thus, a new
state was born, comprised of the strategic outpost of Piombino, which guarded the
Elba Channel, and the city-state of Lucca, where the new court resided. The creation
of this state did not occur by chance. Napoleon always considered Italy a political
laboratory to introduce new systems of power and to experiment with methods of
government. The Kingdoms of Italy and Naples were consolidated into the new order
and Italian became the second language in the Empire. 4,800,000 Italians lived in the
new French departments created in the Peninsula, the so-called France-Italienne36.
Moreover, after 1806, there existed in Italy 22 duchies, 2 princedoms, and other
major fiefs37allotted to the Bonaparte family and the most valiant military
commanders. These new states clearly indicate that, for Napoleon, no Frenchman
could rule in the Empire better than his brethren, ensuring the hegemonic policy
foreshadowed since 1804.
Naturally, the existence of a small state like Lucca and Piombino was guaranteed by
complete obedience to the Napoleonic order, as the Republic of Luccas swift
involvement in the French continental blockade against England in 1803 clearly
demonstrates. Despite its limited sovereignty, the Princedom of Lucca and Piombino
distinguished itself as the only state in the French Empire where military conscription
remained unknown. The Baciocchi princes seemingly ruled an island in the stormy
Napoleonic ocean, and their experience represented a considerable change in the
history of both states. The rise of the Corsican Felice Baciocchi in the Napoleonic
Parnassus was mostly due to the ability and initiative of his wife Elisa. She possessed
36
The Italians represented in 1809 about 11% of the whole Imperial population; see in Roger
Dufraisse, Le Rle de lItalie dans la Politique Napoleonienne, p. 41, in the Congress Acts Il
Principato Napoleonico dei Baciocchi, Lucca, 1984.
37
12 fiefs in the Kingdom of Italy, 4 in the Kingdom of Naples and further 3 comprised in the
territory of Parma and Piacenza.
Napoleonic Uniforms 39
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
extraordinary organizational skills, an undoubted talent for economic matters, and
tireless energy. Contemporaries recognized these qualities and she earned the
nickname: The Female Napoleon.38Elisas illuminated policies promoted effective
benefits in public institutions, and as a result, Lucca become an important cultural
centre in Italy.
38
F. Masson, cited by Roger Thomas, in Les Gardes dHonneur dElise, Le Briquet, February
1992.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Despite the Princedoms modest military force, the princes reorganized the little army
by raising new units and reforming the militia. In 1806, the army consisted of the
Prince Felice Battalion five companies of light infantry, additional soldiers from
Piombino that numbered nearly a quarter of the Battalion - two outnumbered artillery
companies, one company of Gendarmerie, which included seven mounted Gendarmes,
and one Veterans company garrisoned in Lucca. The army of the line totalled 828
men39, while on paper, another 20,000 militiamen could be enlisted by the state.
Another 168 men secured the sovereigns residences and their escort. This unit,
established in 1806, was inspired by the French Imperial Guard.
The Life Guards of Princes Baciocchi

Prince Felice Baciocchi recognized the first company of the Guardie del Corpo on
29April 1806, and on 1 May, the first company of 78 Private Grenadiers, NCOs, and
officers entered service in Lucca. The decree also established a minimum height of the
unit, 5 feet and 4 inches (177 cm.). Forming the company necessitated extracting
some troops from the Grenadier Company of the line battalion. Previously, on 30 April,
the ancient company of the Swiss Guards was dissolved, and step-by-step like a
mosaics tiles, Swiss guards aged under 50 completed the new unit. Just 14 Privates,
2 NCOs, and 1 officer could be enlisted in the company, while another 50 soldiers
came from the infantry quartered in Lucca and Piombino40. The company was finally
completed in January 1807, when the Prince appointed the officers. In the same
period, another company with equal strength was organized, designated Compagnia
Cacciatori. The Princes secretary administrated the Life Guards, a unit that belonged
to the Maison des Princes and was directly commanded by Prince Felice, ranked
Gnral de Division in the French Army by his contemporaries. As expected for a unit
established for the Princes safety, the Life Guard received the greatest care: a high
salary and first quality equipment. Finally, in January 1807, the commander, General
Inspector Mariotti, informed the prince that les Gardes du Corps ont retire tous les
effets darmament que leursont destines.41
Although the service assigned to the Guards certainly lacked risk, itwas also less
stimulating. The main tasks were carried out at the Government Palace in Lucca and
39
Archivio di Stato di Lucca (ASLu), Gran Giudice, f. 419: Stato Sommario di tutte le truppe al
servizio di S.A.S. 1807.
40
Bollettino delle Leggi del Principato Lucchese, decree issued on 23rd July 1806.
41
ASLu, Segreteria di Stato e Gabinetto; 1807, Gardes du Corps, protocollo. n. 46.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
in the Princes residence in Marlia where he posted 4 soldiers and 1 officer. Primarily
due to his presence, or lack thereof, in his residence, the Prince eventually modified
the composition of the Marlia unit. After Baciocchis princedom absorbed the territory
of the ancient Apuan duchy, another detachment of the Life Guards formed for the
sovereigns residence in Massa in September 1807. The new unit consisted of 1
Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 1 Drummer, and 20 Grenadiers. Command alternated between
1 Lieutenant of the Grenadiers and 1 of the Chasseurs, who had under him 1
Sergeant, 1 Corporal, 1 Musician, but only 8 soldiers. Moreover, when aged members
resigned at the end of the year, the strength of the Corps further diminished, and the
gaps were only partially filled with other troops. A large proportion of Italian and
Corsican soldiers remained in the ranks, but soldiers with unmistakably French names
were also enlisted.
The sovereigns of the Princedom, Felice Baciocchi and Elisa Bonaparte. The legacy left by
Elisa deeply marked the history and society of Lucca and Tuscany. Her imperial brother also
recognized her expertise in governance issues: "She knew the affairs of her Cabinet like the
most veteran diplomats. To their merit, the princes also protected their subjects from
conscription. This probably saved many young lives and spared their families from the blood
tribute required by the Napoleonic wars.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Despite the attention and the care dedicated to the Life Guards, in June 1807, 14
chasseurs simultaneously deserted. Mariotti informed Prince Felice about the
unpleasant episode, which incidentally only involved Corsican soldiers42. To prevent
the fugitives from embarking for Corsica, the commander passed a note to the French
authorities in Leghorn and provided a brief physical description of the deserters. The
port of Viareggio was also alarmed and other dispatches were sent to Pisa, Florence,
and even Corsica. Finally, on 21 July, the French Gendarmerie informed Mariotti that
Corporal Colonna, the mastermind of the desertion, had been arrested in Ajaccio.
Despite the recommendation to retrieve uniforms and equipment, nothing was
found43.
The desertions outcome left a visible mark on the Life Guards. The review of the
Grenadiers Company on 20 June 1807 registered 4 Officers, 6 NCOs, 8 Corporals, 3
Drums, and 53 Privates; while in the Chasseurs Company, there remained 3 Officers,
5 NCOs, 7 Corporals, 3 Drums, and just 35 Privates44. Periodic resignations requested
by soldiers also decreased strength of the unit. From 1808 until 1813,resignations
were accorded for reasons of retirement, disease, and for voluntary transfer to other
units. By July of 1807, barely a year after the unit formed, 6 guards had already
transferred to the Gendarmerie. Periodically, upon satisfactory completion of service in
the Guards, other transfers were registered. These transfers were usually directed to
the line infantry, where each guard could apply to increase his rank. In such instances,
a guard obtained a position immediately above the rank he held in his unit of origin.
When these rotations occurred, however, further displacements arose in other units,
especially in the line battalion and in the Gendarmerie. Simultaneous movements
were an obvious consequence of a small army, where the opportunity to ascend the
hierarchy remained very poor.
After Elisa Bonaparte-Baciocchi was appointed Grand Duchess of Tuscany, in July of
1809, the Life Guards had the honour to escort the sovereign to Florence. Through a
notice sent by the State Secretary, the prince ordered the troops stationed in Marlia
and Lucca to assemble in the Tuscan capital. On the morning of 12 July, the Life
Guards marched and, including a one-day stop in Pistoia, covered the distance in
42
Ibidem; 1807, f.36-III. The investigation revealed the complicity of determining a Corsican
corporal named Piero Colonna. The corporal had not only conceived the night escape, but
he would have favoured even sabotaging the alarm.
43
Ibidem. It is interesting to note how the Princedoms authorities insisted to recover the
uniforms, considered their concrete economic value.
44
Fondo Segreteria di Stato e Gabinetto, f. 36-IV
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
three and a half days45.
Since both princes increasingly resided in Florence, the Guards duties decreased.
When combined with the difficulties faced in maintaining the strength of the
companies, the government was forced to reform the entire corps. The Decree of 30
August 1810 merged the two companies: 1 Captain Commander, 1 Second Captain, 1
First Lieutenant, 1 Second Lieutenant, 2 Sub Lieutenants, 1 Sergeant Quartermaster,
1 Sergeant Major, 4 Sergeants, 1 Corporal Quartermaster, 2 Drums, and 48 Guards. In
October, the s was increased to 75 men with an additional 22 Privates and 5 NCOs46.
The new unit became known as Compagnia delle Guardie del Corpo di Sua Altezza
Serenissima.
In the winter of 1813-14, a project was presented to reform the company to 78 men
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Giacomo Maestroni. This Corsican officer
had commanded the line battalion and arrived in the Princedom alongside the
Baciocchi family. This transformation of the Guards was only partially completed. At
the eve of the Neapolitan occupation, the company numbered a higher strength,
totalling 95 Privates, 6 NCOs, and 4 officers47. In March, when the companys final
commander, Lieutenant Sebastiano Donati, reviewed the Life Guards for the last time,
his forces numbered 68 men in Lucca with another 29 quartered in Marlia, 1 officer
and 1 NCO assigned in Florence to the Major Staff of Prince Felice, 4 soldiers
hospitalized, and 2 more assigned to other duties48. On 19 March 1814, a Neapolitan
colonel, Count Gaetani, requested the consignment of all weapons, equipment, and
uniforms. Deprived of any exterior military sign, the Life Guards ceased to exist.
The Uniform of the Life Guards: a Political Message

Important French scholars and historians, such as Paul Marmottan, have been
interested in the military history of the Princedom of Lucca and Piombino. This
authoritative member of the Sabretache travelled to Tuscany several times in search
of items and information concerning the Princedoms soldiers49. After Marmottan,
Roger Forthoffer discovered other important details concerning the uniforms of Prince
Baciocchis small army. Both authors demonstrated a great interest in the history of
Napoleonic Lucca and Piombino regions that sharply contrasted the rest of French-
45
ASLu; Segretera di Stato e Gabinetto; 1809 - Forza Armata, protocollo n. 723.
46
Ibidem, protocollo n. 1024.
47
Ibidem, Stato Nominativo delle Guardie del Corpo di S.A.S. 31st January 1914.
48
Ibidem, Disposizioni per la Forza Armata, vol V, 1814-18.
49
Paul Marmottan, Bonaparte et la Rpublicque de Lucques, Paris, 1896, and Le Bataillon de
Piombino, in Carnet de la Sabretache, 1929/5.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
ruled Europe, yet contained an ambivalent respect for the Imperial order. In many
respects, the Princedom of Lucca and Piombino had been: the most French of the
Italian States and possibly more Napoleonic than France50.
Sometimes, the notion that military uniforms have some sort of relationship to the
society that created them is extremely clear. The difficulty, however, is untangling the
numerous threads that link these items to the institutions that conceived and
produced them. In several aspects, the choice of colours for the Life Guard Company
uniforms encrypted a signal of self-determination. Uniforms of glowing colours,
designed by the prestigious scenographer and painter Jean-Baptiste Isabey, were
manufactured for this unit51. For Princess Elisa, these colours provided a worthy frame
for her court, which, from the beginning, she wished to appear magnificent and
gorgeous. The features of this uniform possibly followed the same pattern of the
French Imperial Guards, but with very different colours to those normally employed in
the Empire. Perhaps scarlet red and pistachio green could be attributed to Elisas
personal taste, but at the same time, these colours proclaimed a state committed to
emphasize its political and cultural autonomy within the French order.
As typical in ancient documents, even in 19th century documents, details and
descriptions regarding uniform costs, but not always colours and forms, are explained.
The Life Guards uniform is well described in the Bulletin of Laws and Decrees of the
Princedom52, but the lack of specification on accessories and other details obliges us
to resort to comparison and suppositions. Furthermore, there is no pictorial evidence
for the Princedoms Life Guards, and regarding the accessories, the text only specifies:
to be taken from the models. Even when the second company was created, deficient
information persists. Despite the uncertainties, the bearskin cap and equipment could
be similar to the objects of the French Imperial Guard. Similarly, the uniform pattern
of the Compagnia Cacciatori could have followed the line of the light infantry habit-
veste. Fortunately, some discoveries in the state archive reveal other significant
accounts regarding this uniform. A memorandum attached to a State Secretary
document indicates that white metal buttons with the emblem of the Panther, a
symbol of the ancient Republic of Lucca53, had been recovered from the coats of the
disbanded Swiss Guards and were destined for the new uniforms of the Life Guards
50
Vito Tirelli, Prolusione agli Atti del Congresso Il Principato Napoleonico dei Baciocchi, Lucca,
1984.
51
Bruna Niccoli, Costume a Lucca, contenuti e problemi di moda dalla Repubblica al Principato,
Lucca 1995; p. 110.
52
Decree dated 29th April 1806, art. V.
53
ASLu, Segretera di Stato e Gabinetto; 1806 - Forza Armata, protocollo n. 73.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
a measure of good economics, but also a strong reference to the past.
Another document discovered in the archives recounts a change of the uniform in
1812. Some letters sent to Florence in the winter 1811-12 contained projects
submitted to Prince Felice regarding the new Life Guard Company. Unfortunately, the
unintelligible handwriting obscures which colours would be chosen, but it is certain
that the uniform received significant changes. Two years later, thanks to a note
attached to documentation concerning the requisitions ordered by the Neapolitan
occupants, we learn that the Company was completely dressed in white with carmine
red facings. Hypothetically, this change is confirmed in an otherwise unidentified
source showing a front and back uniform model with some particular elements. The
grenadier bearskin headgear had a brass plate with a panther, the same distinctive
symbol that appeared in 1806. Once again, the link with the past as a political
declaration of autonomy had not disappeared.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Guardie del Corpo di Sua Altezza Serenissima il Principe di Lucca e Piombino (1812)
(Private Collection)
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Guardie del Corpo:
- Company Staff: Compagnia Granatieri (May 1806)
1 Capitano Comandante (Commander Captain)
1 Capitano in Seconda (Second Captain)
2 Tenenti (Lieutenants)
2 Sottotenenti (Sub Lieutenants)
1 Sergente Maggiore (Sergeant Major)
4 Sergenti (Sergeants)
1 Caporale Furiere (Quartermaster Corporal)
4 Tamburi (Drums)
60 Granatieri (Private Grenadiers)
The Compagnia Cacciatori had the same staff and strength.
Compagnia delle Guardie del Corpo di Sua Altezza Serenissima:

- Company Staff (1812)
1 Capitano (Captain)
1 Tenente (Lieutenant)
1 Sottotenente (Sub Lieutenant)
1 Sergente Maggiore (Sergeant Major)
4 Sergenti (Sergeants)
1 Caporale Furiere (Quartermaster Corporal)
8 Caporali (Corporals)
2 Tamburi (Drums)
60 Guardie (Private Guards)
2 Enfants de Troupe (Boys)
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Guardie del Corpo, 1806-1812 (Reconstruction by Bruno Mugnai)

1) Lieutenant, Grenadier Company; 2) Private, Grenadier Company; 3) habit-veste for the
Chasseur Company ; a) details of the buttons; b) bearskin cap for both companies; c) Private
Grenadier Company sabre strap and d) for the Private Chasseur Company.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
This copper engraving by Antonio Verico, after a drawing of Giovanni Matraia, is a unique
illustration depicting the Guardie del Corpo preserved in the States Archive of Lucca: Fondo
Stampe 26. The view of the Piazza Reale in Lucca (today piazza Napoleone) shows the picket
guard at the entrance of the Government palace, clearly uniformed in a Napoleonic Grenadier
Guards style.
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Forgotten Fronts of WWI
The German Pacific Colonies - Part One: Deutsch Samoa
by Andrs K. Molnr
Western Samoa became a German protectorate in the last years of 19th century, following
the expanding influences of the German trade companies in the South Pacific area after
1886. Competition in the trading operations in the Archipelago involved foreign companies,
particularly British ones54. Tensions caused in part by the conflicting interests of
the German traders and plantation owners opposed to British business enterprises and
American business interests led to the Samoan Civil Wars55. These wars involved the
American and British naval squadrons in the area, but. notwithstanding these ante facts,
54
The London based trade company Ruge, Hedemann & Co, established in 1875, was succeeded by
H. M. Ruge and Company until that firm went bankrupt in about 1887, leaving the Germans free to
expand their base in the area.
55
The war was fought roughly between 1886 and 1898, primarily between Samoans, though the
German military intervened on several occasions in defence of Tamasese, their candidate for
Tafa'ifa(King) of Samoa. Tamasese became the new monarch after the reigning king Malietoa
Laupepa, who was usurped and exiled by the new king. Tamasese and his German allies faced a rival
faction headed by the popular Samoan chief, Mata'afa Iosefo. In 1887, tensions grew with
the United States after a German shelling of Mata'afa's rebel villages, which involved American
owned properties. One battle was fought at Vailele in September 1888, following German
bombardment of a rebel village. The encounter resulted in Mata'afa's warriors repulsing an invading
German contingent and later plundering the plantations. The three western powers finally agreed
that Malietoa Laupepa would be restored as King of Samoa in 1889 after a cyclone destroyed both
American and German warships at Apia harbour, halting hostilities. Nine years later, with the death
of Malietoa, hostilities broke out again but they were quickly ended by the partitioning of the island
chain at the Tripartite Convention of 1899.
Forgotten Fronts of WWI 50

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
German Samoa remained a less strategic base for Berlin, which did not show great interest
in militarizing the islands.
War was not on the agenda of the German colonies in the Pacific. The cannons available in
the German Pacific were useless for defensive purposes because they had always been
used exclusively for firing salutes, and no actual ammunition had been ordered.
Unprepared for a war at sea, the Germans had given equally little thought to the defence of
their colonies by land. The only fortifications, those in Kolonia on Ponape in Micronesia, had
been razed after having been taken over from the Spanish. The failure to take defensive
measures could be interpreted as the result of a rather naive belief in a general consensus
among Europeans to leave the colonies out of any military conflicts in Europe. Although the
Congo Act did not apply to the Pacific, it may have nourished such ideas. Moreover, there
was a historical precedent. During the Franco-Prussian War, the naval commanders of the
French and Prussian fleets in the Far East had come to a private agreement not to attack
each other. The Pacific under German administration was at the periphery, a world of its
own where exceptions were possible and local solutions could be found. Those who
benefited from this situation had no wish to be dictated to by military constraints and
pressures from outside. The fact that Berlin did not initiate any moves to put its Pacific
colonies in a position at least to defend themselves against attacks indicates how little
strategic and politic value was placed on them. On closer inspection, all talk of the Islands
economic value proves to have been empty. These were merely show colonies to boost
Germanys prestige as a world power56. This also meant that Germany did not want to
know about developments that would have required an urgent change of policy. During the
Agadir crisis of 1911, the British warship Challenger, under the command of Captain (later
Admiral) Ernest F. A. Gaunt, entered the harbour of the German-Samoan chief town of Apia
at night and unannounced. The circumstances surrounding this event - all the ships lights
had been put out, and the regulation that a German pilot was to be taken on board had
been ignored - suggest that there was more than a grain of truth in the rumour soon
circulating that the Challenger had received orders to occupy Samoa on the outbreak of the
war in Europe. As the ship arrived, the British settlers in Samoa gathered at the harbour to
welcome it, while the Germans fled into the bush in panic. Even after this, the German
administration saw no reason to revise its naive idea that its paradise of harmony was not
under threat.
56
Until 1914 the German Reich was not in a position to back up its claim to be a world power, with
all this entailed. The Pacific colonies reveal as a sham a self-professed world power that suffered
from imperial overstretch even before it became a real world power. See in Joseph Hermann, The
Neglected War. The German South Pacific and the Influence of World War I, Honolulu, 1995; p. 11-
12.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Until 1914 the German protectorates in the Pacific remained almost undefended. No marine
stations had been established and the crews of warships from Tsingtao (the German base
in China) regarded the visits to the Pacific as welcome recreational breaks. There were no
military laurels to gather there; nor were they sought. Even in the worst case, East Asia
and the Pacific were of only secondary significance to the German fleet. The German navy
had made no contingency plans to defend Germanys Pacific colonies. Provision had not
even been made for the fleet to have adequate access to coaling stations in the case of a
conflict. Most of the coal depots in the German sphere of influence in the Pacific were under
the control of private companies, the most important of which were the Norddeutsche Lloyd
and the Neuguinea-Kompanie. The Imperial Navy had only a contractual right to use these
depots. No colonial troops were stationed in German Samoa. The Germans had not
introduced obligatory military training for the colonial population. Nor had any attempt
been made to organize a civil defence or military reserve for the contingency of an
invasion. In 1914 less than 3.000 Germans lived in Samoa along with other Europeans, out
of 80,000 natives and 2,000 seasonal Chinese workers. A large number of German planters
had evaded military service at home: in Samoa, not even the governor had served. Except
for the Brgerwehr European militia on voluntary basis, the native police was all that
existed in the way of military support. This Polizei could join occasionally the native militia,
but in Samoa they had been both disbanded in January 1914 and replaced by Melanesian
policemen. There had been no military training for the eventuality of countering a European
or Asian invasion. The only thing that had been started before 1914 was a planned network
of Pacific radio links.
Historically, the German rule was the most economically progressive that the country had
ever experienced. The German protectorate was well accepted but also feared. Its actions
and conduct became paternal, fair and absolute57. In 1908, when the non-violent Mau a
Pule resistance movement arose, the German authorities did not hesitate to banish the Mau
leader Lauaki Namulauulu Mamoe to Saipan in the German Northern Mariana Islands. The
German colonial administration governed on the principle that there was only one
government in the islands.58 Thus, there was no Samoan Tupu (king), nor
an aliisili (governor), but two Fautua (native advisors) joined the colonial government.
Traditional forms of self-government were for a time silent; all decisions on matters
affecting lands and titles were under the control of the Governor appointed from Berlin. All
57
McKay, Cyril Gilbert Reeves, Samoana, A Personal Story of the Samoan Islands; Wellington and
Auckland, 1968; p. 18.
58
Lewthwaite, Gordon, Life, Land and Agriculture to Mid-Century in Western Samoa. Christchurch,
1962; p. 148.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
the Pacific nations under German colonial governments demonstrated dedication and
loyalty to the Kaiser and from the point of view of social order they never created serious
problems. If Germany had not been able to gain economically or strategically important
territories in the South Pacific, it had at least acquired the best people, inspiring the envy
of the other European powers.
German Pacific colonies were, in every sense, at the periphery of the word. The fact that
they were so far away from Europe - much farther than Africa - had a variety of
consequences. The German public, like German politicians, were much less concerned
about developments in the Pacific than in Africa. Germanys Pacific possessions were
certainly regarded as conclusive evidence that Germany had finally attained the status of a
world power. But there was little strategic value in extending the Reich to the Pacific.
Indeed, as the world war was to show, it brought Germany more disadvantages than
advantages. As early as December 1898, the German Naval High Command had advised
against the acquisition of Micronesia, pointing out that the islands were too remote from
Germany to be of any military use, and similar opinion was concerned with Samoa.
Nonetheless, pride in having acquired a real place in the sun at last, harboured by the
future German chancellor von Blow, the Kaiser, and many other Germans, gave the Pacific
colonies something like collectors value. They represented an ideal that allowed Germany
to show off, enhancing the prestige of a country still striving to be acknowledged as an
equal by the old, traditionally accepted world powers. Germanys Pacific empire was like
beautiful jewellery, which is of value only to its collector and does not yield a profit, but
which gave us pleasure.
German governors in the Pacific enjoyed also great influence. Wilhelm Solf, the German
governor in Samoa. was a law graduate and a doctor of philosophy. He was a clever man
who had worked in Apia for eleven years, spending ten as governor.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Samoa Surrenders
Once the war had broken out, Berlin did not take significant measures to strengthen the
defence. The only decision taken was to extend the so-called "Australian Station"
(encompassing all German South Seas protectorates, not the British dominion with the
same name). The small gunboat Geyer and the unarmed survey ship Planet were assigned
to the Station, but Geyer never reached Apia.
The New Zealand conquest of Western Samoa was one of the few not human cost military
actions of World War One. Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Logan, the 1400-strong
Advance Party of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force landed at Apia on 29 August 1914.
There was no resistance from German officials or the general population, and the New
Zealanders conquered unopposed the archipelago in less than a couple of days. Logan
realized that the German military force in Samoa consisted in just 20 troops with
policemen and special constables armed with 50 aging rifles. The single artillery piece at
Apia was fired every Saturday afternoon but took half an hour to load. It was clear that
German administration had ordered not to oppose an Allied invasion. Even if the German
East Asia squadron were to stay in the Pacific for the rest of the war, the colonies could not
hold out for long, because both the European population and the plantation laborers were
totally dependent on food supplies from Australia, New Zealand, and Eastern Asia. It is
therefore not surprising that on 5 August 1914 an expanded governing council decided,
with only one dissenting vote, to accept the expected military occupation of Samoa without
offering resistance. The islands colonial population of British background were allowed -
after giving their word of honor - to continue their normal daily lives in freedom. The
Amtmann (district officer) of SavaiI Island, a British citizen, naturally had to give up his
position, but he was not subject to any restrictions on his movements either. The Germans
in Samoa quite clearly believed that the good relations between the different nations which
had existed so far could continue in the future, even under changed circumstances. In any
case, there was no alternative to this course of action59.
Samoa was the second German territory, after Togo in Africa, to fall to the Allies in the
WWI. Vice-Admiral Count Maximilian von Spee, the commander of the German East Asia
Naval Squadron, gained knowledge of the occupation and hastened to Samoa with the
armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, arriving off Apia on 14 September 1914.
However, he determined that a landing would only be of temporary advantage in an Allied
dominated sea and the cruisers departed. The idyllic low impact war scenario lasted for a
few days; after leaving Apia, von Spee raided Tahiti on 22 September, sinking a French
59
Joseph Hermann, cited work; p. 41.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
gunboat and bombarding Papeete.
Military Organization in German Samoa

The first military corps under German control was created in 1888 by the experienced
veteran Hauptmann Eugen Brandeis, who serviced in Samoa as military advisor for king
Tamasese. He trained 18 young Samoans as military policemen, decreased to 14 in August
1888. Military service on voluntary basis lasted initially two years and later three, recruiting
well bodied men aged 20, especially the subjects belonging to the most important families.
The Deutsche-Samoanishe Polizei mustered up to 150 men in the following years.
Searching the original muster roll, we come to know even the physical characteristics of
these policemen: the shortest measured mt. 1,64, the tallest mt. 1,87.60 The corps
assumed the original denomination o fitafita o le malo (Samoan: government soldiers),
directed by a German officer with a native NCO. The ranks filled by the native were indeed
Gemeiner, Gefreiter, Korporal and Sergeant as the highest rank. Fitafita received a salary
depending on his rank, but each member could increase his own income with further
service and regalia, for example on the Kaisers or Kaiserins birthday. On such special
occasions, the governor organized a festive banquet for the Samoan and German members
of the corps. Ordinary service consisted in guard duty for the Governors residence and in
the custom houses of the archipelago. The well-educated and disciplined Fitafitas were
promoted as members of the special police corps of Leoleo. In 1902 there were seven
Loeoleos and this number increased to 22 in 1906. The Leoleos formed a kind of school for
the police and may be compared to modern NCO investigators, but their duty included the
control of the Chinese workers in Samoa, the surveillance of the convicted people detained
in the Vaimea jail. Fitafitas and Leoleos were both employed with the task of arresting the
drunken whites and beating the most violent and unruly ones. From this and other aspects,
it can be understood how part of the white population of the island despised these
policemen. So the Samoa living German landowner Fritz von Tyska demanded the dismissal
of some policemen, because their services allegedly consisted mainly in taking walks and
talking to their tribal brethren61. But for each Samoan to have serviced in the Fitafita and
especially in the Leoleo represented a great encouragement to get a place in the public or
in the maritime affairs. Despite the paternalistic attitude and benevolence of the German
governor, confidence in the Samoans was not total. Therefore, at different times, it was
necessary to land in Apia several Melanesians soldier-policemen from New Guinea. In
60
See in Thomas Morlang, Askari und Fitafita. Farbige Sldner in den deutschen Kolonien; Berlin,
2008; p. 128.
61
Idem, p. 131.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
January 1911, the new governor Erich Schultz-Ewerth considered the annual expense of
18,000 Marks for Samoan military police as excessive and asked Berlin to disband both the
Fitafita and the Leoleo corps. The welcome opportunity for this resolution was offered by
the multiple murder which involved four Fitafitas in January 1914. The causes that
provoked the incident were never clarified. The massacre took place at a cinema in Apia
and involved the Fitafitas and some Chinese workers. The inquiry commission issued a
disconcerting statement, citing as fundamental cause the excitement deriving from the
subject of the movie - the American wild west - which triggered the reaction of Samoans
against the Chinese public in the cinema62. On the eve of the invasion, only 8 or 10 former
Fitafitas were serving in Apia for the surveillance of the governor's residence, replaced for
other duties by 60 Melanesian Polizeitruppen under German NCOs and Officers. Apart from
a few dozen of volunteers of the European Brgerwehr, the policemen were the only
military force active in Samoa at the eve of the New Zealand invasion.
62
Joseph Hermann, cited work, p. 12.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
This figure is based after a photograph of an Officer or NCO of the Deutsch-Samoanische

Brgerwehr in 1913-14. Like the other members he wears a khaki tunic. He has matching khaki
trousers, civilian white tropical helmet and boots. Probably all these items were privately purchased.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
German Melanesian Policeman in Samoa, 1914, photographed just after their surrender to the
New Zealanders (Authors Archive).
Samoan Fitafita; Apia, 1911 (Authors Archive).

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
We know uniforms and equipment of the German troops in Samoa thanks to the well preserved
photographic archives in Germany and New Zealand, while other information is available in official
ordinances of the German colonial uniforms. Other good sources are represented by original objects
and contemporary drawings.
This Illustration is based on photographs of Samoan Fitafita ceremonial guards. The native
military-policemen NCO to right wore a white uniform piped in blue consisting of a sarong, tunic
(known in Samoa as a Lava Lava) and peakless field cap with a small German Imperial cockade.
This NCO wears the same field cap as the private soldiers but with two blue stripes around the cuff
of the jacket. The red sash edged with gold with an brass imperial eagle in brass on the chest is the
ceremonial sash for Fitafita NCOs assigned to the governors residence
The other figure is based on a photograph of a German Officer on parade with the Fitafita. He
wears a standard white tropical uniform of the imperial navy (without Schutztruppe blue piping) and
a matching peaked field cap with a hatband and piping in red, as common to most German colonial
police units, with the black/white/red imperial cockade on the front of the hatband. A shade of dark
pink was authorised as the facing colour for German Samoa in 1912, but it was almost certainly not
issued before 1914. White tropical helmets with small imperial eagles and cockades were also
common. He is armed with only a navy ceremonial sword although pistols were issued.
Brass eagle and yellow-gold lace on the red Fitafitas ceremonial sash.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The illustration is based on a photograph of a Military Policeman taken in Apia in 1914, probably
by a member of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force that captured the islands. This military-
policeman, possibly a Melanesian from New Guinea, wears a white tropical helmet and a khaki
uniform. The tunic is of a style seen before by the East Asian Expeditionary Corps, with a standing
collar and one left breast pocket. The pockets (including the two hip pockets) appear to have no
pocket flaps. Above the breast pocket is a seven pointed star badge. This policeman has a dark
coloured band around each cuff, probably dark red. He is armed with a Dreyse Zndnadelgewehr
(aging rifle) 15,43 cm. calibre with bayonet.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The original photograph on which illustration is based shows four policemen. They all wear
the same uniforms except that one has no cuff bands, one has one (Gefreiter),another has
two (Korporal) and the final one has three (Sergeant). Also in the original photograph two
soldiers wear puttees as seen here while the other two wear their trousers loose around the
ankles. Most of the policemen photographed on Samoa in the early years of German rule
show them wearing white naval fatigues or with a dark red sarong like those worn by the
Neuguinea Polizeitruppen, with the same naval style peakless caps as the Samoan
Fitafita, or straw hats held up on the right hand side with a large imperial cockade as
originally issued to the East Asian Expeditionary Corps during the Boxer Rebellion.
East Asia German bayonet, issued to the garrison in the Pacific colonies.
Brass German Colonial Police Badge.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
Focus on: the Fate of German Civilians in Samoa
Despite the occupation had taken place without bloodshed, the fate of the civilian
population gradually became unhappy. In his book of 1995, Joseph Hermann tells, not
without polemical purposes, the harsh treatment received by German residents in Samoa
by the New Zealanders. In comparison with other foreign occupations in German Pacific
colonies - according to Hermann - the Germans in Samoa had the worst time of all. After
the retreat of the German fleet, Samoa was a complete backwater as far as the European
war was concerned. Relations between the German and the British colonists had been
affected by the war, but in general good personal relations stood up to its strains. The
Samoans gave no cause for concern. Nonetheless, Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, the New
Zealand military governor, ruled the islands with extraordinarily coercive measures that
were otherwise used only in direct war zones. The fact that the island had been occupied so
quickly did nothing for relations between Germans and New Zealanders. In the absence of
an official treaty of surrender, the guidelines for the military administration of an occupied
territory laid down in the Hague Convention applied to relations between the German
civilian population and the occupying troops. Logan interpreted these guidelines in an
unconventional way. His basic idea was continually diluted, until all that remained of the
German law theoretically still in force was the marriage law. For the rest, the Lieutenant-
Colonel ruled by means of proclamations, military decrees, and courts martial. Hermann
argues that: All Germans, including those who lived in the remote parts of the archipelago,
had to report in Apia once a week, and they had to observe a complete blackout between 9
p.m. and 6 a.m. A general curfew was in force from 6 p.m. The post to and from Germany
came to a complete halt from 6 November 1914. Even censored letters were no longer
carried, and the last consignment of German mail that reached Samoa was burnt in sight of
the Germans. Higher German officials, including the governor, were sent to New Zealand as
POWs immediately after the occupation of Samoa. They were interned on the island of
Motuihi off Auckland. The wooden barracks in which they were housed were dirty, not
weatherproof, and unheated. Almost all the Germans therefore suffered from skin diseases
and rheumatism. Complaints were punished by confinement in the dark and not being
allowed to wash. The German governor, accustomed to special treatment, suffered
especially. There had already been tension between him and his deputy, who came from
German South West Africa; under these conditions it simply exploded. After the United
States entered the war, the situation was made even worse by the fact that the Swiss
consul in Auckland was an Englishman who did not pass on any complaints made by the
civilian POWs. Gradually, the remaining German officials on Samoa were also sent to New
Zealand as POWs. They were taken to Somes Island in Wellington Bay, where the suspect

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
New Zealand Germans were also interned. More and more German civilians from Samoa
joined them there. They had fallen victim, for various reasons, to the rapid mood-swings of
the unpredictable Logan. Conditions on Somes Island were even worse than on Motuihi. A
public investigation undertaken on the request of Count Felix von Luckner, a New Zealand-
German who was widely admired in New Zealand and himself detained on Motuihi, revealed
extremely harsh conditions. The Samoan-Germans, accustomed to the tropical heat of
Samoa, were forced to sleep on muddy floors in clammy rooms, which were freezing cold in
winter. Little straw was provided. At least as many as three hundred prisoners were
exposed to constant harassment by the warders. Their specialty was ordering the prisoners
to do physical exercises. This included the prisoners bending over backwards to pass
under sticks that the warders held at a higher or lower level, depending on their view of the
prisoner, leapfrogging, and running around in a circle: they were kicked, shoved, and
slapped to make them move at the proper speed (...).
Circumstances worsened further after the news coming from Europe. The death of Edith
Cavell, the British nurse who was executed by a German firing squad in 1915 for helping
Allied soldiers escaped from occupied Belgium, impressed the public opinion of the whole
Empire. Outrage echoed across the oceans and she was extensively memorialised in New
Zealand.
According to Hermann, nor did the Germans who remained in Samoa have an easy time:
their businesses were sequestered in 1915. If anyone complained about the extreme
application of martial law in Samoa, Logan replied that compared with what the Germans
were doing in Belgium it was nothing. He pointed out that he could personally shoot every
German with his own revolver. Legal proceedings against Germans accused of crimes were
a farce. There were cases where the Administrator set the maximum penalty by
proclamation only after a trial. Among the most unfairly treated were three employees of
the Deutsch Handels und Plantagengesellschaft (trading and plantation company) who were
stopped by a military patrol on their way home and subsequently sentenced to six months
of prison with hard labour for breaking the curfew. In Motuihi Prison they spent their time
breaking stones with ordinary criminals. Thereafter they were taken into captivity as POWs.
During their trial, in which they were denied a defence counsel, the presiding military judge
refused their application to call witnesses for the defence. When they insisted, they were
threatened with an additional punishment for contempt of court. So many POWs were sent
from Samoa to New Zealand that the government eventually refused to accept any more. A
special prison camp was therefore set up in Samoa. Men who had hung German flags from
their windows or had been caught singing Heil Dir im Siegerkranz, Die Wacht am Rhein, or
Deutschland ber Alles were sent there. Toward the end of the war, the situation in Samoa

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
escalated. An unsuccessful attempt by German POWs to escape from Sogi, the internment
camp, gave Logan occasion to issue a special decree placing all Germans, including
children, under house arrest. He wanted to execute the POWs by court martial. When
Wellington telegraphed that according to international law an attempt by POWs to escape
was not a statutory offense, Logan reacted by deciding to intern all Germans in Samoa,
including Samoans of German descent. Before Samoa could be transformed into a giant
POW camp, however, the armistice was signed in Europe.63
(AM)
63
Idem, p. 43-44.

#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
BOOKS REVIEW
CARDINI,Franco; Il Turco a Vienna; storia del grande assedio del 1683 (The
Turkat Vienna; History of the Great Siege of 1683). Bari, Laterza, 778 p.; hardcover,
maps, bibliography, index. ISBN: 978-88-420-8879-0; 28,00.
Frequenting military themes is no secondary occupation for Franco Cardini, who
- though eminently a medievalist - addressed an issue of inordinate complexity with
the great Ottoman siege of Vienna: perhaps the most significant episode of synthesis
in the confrontation between East and West. Cardini organizes his book by first
recalling the historical events from Poitiers to Lepanto, then continues through the
major westward expansion, which began with the war of Candia (1645-71), and,
finally concludes with the Ottoman defeat at Belgrade and the peace of Passarowitz in
1718.
Cardinis work paints a detailed reconstruction of the international context in which
the contrasts between the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Habsburgs appeared. For
Christian Europe, the siege of Vienna is the last 'Great Fear' and from this context
arose tones of apocalyptic struggle capable of distorting, for centuries, the actual
vision of the facts. Rightly, this book deconstructs many of the principal myths,
namely the 'clash of civilizations and religions' that is today evoked with unpardonable
weakness and superficiality of historical content. In fact, it is impossible to ignore that
counting among the enemies of Emperor Leopold I were the Orthodox Christians of
Moldavia and Wallachia, and with a political temperament more developed in an
anti-Austrian and anti-Catholic trend the Hungarian Calvinist magnates, led by Imre
Thkly.
Equally developed is an analysis of the relationship between Istanbul and Paris, where
Louis XIV managed his relationships, more or less secretly, with the Sultan to obtain a
free pass in Germany. On the opposite side, the Shah of Persia received Christian
emissaries who urged war against the Sultan, a Muslim like him, and - when the
Ottomans were defeated - rejoiced no less than the Pope. Despite this scenario, the
author emphasizes that this confrontation was not an actual religious conflict,
however, it was a war between men belonging to different faiths, and that faith was
the foundation of their vision of the world, with its own laws and morals .Therefore,
the fronts could be distinguished in their respective religious symbols. This was the
more specifically Western vision, elaborating the traditional image of the cross
opposing the crescent: a distinction which did not hold the same meaning to the
Ottomans as that attributed to them in the Christian world.
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#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
The author addresses the military aspects by reconstructing warfare in the Baroque
age using analysis of the latest research in the political, economic and social historical
fields. The analysis of complex Ottoman military organizations, long regarded as a
military based exclusively on its ability to mobilize large numbers of contingents, here
reflects deeply on Ottoman military capabilities. These reflections form a scenario
much more complex than, superficially, offered a few years ago. For the Sultan, defeat
in Vienna was not only the military disaster that arrested his imperial expansion in the
West, but also represented an end to a system of relationships - including military -
within the social structure of the State. Turkish inability to control the regional, social
and religious tensions, due to the aforementioned collapse of social relationships,
erupted into chaos before the advent of the viziers Kprl, sparking fierce riots in
Lebanon, Syria and Anatolia. After Vienna, it became necessary for the Porte to
compromise with local realities, not only in the Balkans - where occurred a marked
increase of Albanian and Bosnian presence in the army - but also with the Corsair
states in North Africa, who, in a few years, were able to free themselves almost
completely from the Sultans sovereignty. Paradoxically only in appearance, in some
provinces the military crisis brought relaxation of ties with Istanbul, while in others
Ottoman control increased, until the suppression of guarantees that had regulated
relations with the Federated and Tributaries states. The case of Transylvania, formed
into an Ottoman paalik and then abandoned to the Habsburgs, and, especially, the
destiny of Wallachia and Moldavia, ruled by men appointed directly by the grand vizier,
marked the turning point in relations with peoples and clergy in those regions, both of
whom were interested in finding an agreement with the Catholic monarchy in Vienna
and, within a short time, Orthodox Moscow. The siege of Vienna was no less crucial for
the other main actor in this event: the House of Austrias army. Focusing solely on the
development of Austrias standing army, the war of 1683-99 acted as a crucial engine
of growth for the Imperial military structure. With around 30,000 soldiers at the start
of the war, the army totalled some 88,600 when the peace of Carlowitz was signed.
Although these are partly theoretical numbers, which do not take full account of
absences and other physiological shortages, this data reveals that the increase in the
Habsburgs armed forces was 57% for the cavalry and 62% for the infantry.
The book includes more than 200 pages of notes, maps, bibliography and an
interesting glossary of contemporary terminology.
(BM)
69
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
ZOPPI, Massimo; La Spada di Radetzky; le armate imperiali dalla Restaurazione
alla rivoluzione, 1836-49 (Radetzkys Sword; the Imperial Armies from Restoration
to Revolution). Bassano del Grappa (VI), Itinera Progetti; 179 p.; hardcover,
illustrations, bibliography, maps, index. ISBN: 9 78888-542447; 27,00.
Despite being one of the most powerful armies in Europe during one of the
most important moments in its history, the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the years
of the Italian Wars of Independence has few studies with fewer of recent examination.
The book accurately discussed organic structures, weaponry, combat tactics, uniforms
and equipment of all specialties of the army, military police and navy. The different
topics are analyzed within their political and strategic context in the interior and
Lombardo-Veneto, closing with an analysis the military fronts in Lombardy and
Hungary between 1846 and 1849. The substantial effectiveness of Austrias military
emerged in all its evidence. Beginning in mid-March of 1848, in less than three weeks,
all major cities of the Austrian Empire revolted; Hungary, while not breaking the link
with the Habsburg dynasty, declared its independence. Paralleling these
developments, Germany seemed on the verge of coalescing into a national unit, which
would have resulted in few positive outcomes for the existence of the Habsburg state.
In the Italian peninsula, following decades of vassalage, almost all local governments
declared war on Austrias Ferdinand I.
Within a few days, thirty years of peace, guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna,
vanished and Europe seemed to slip back into 1792.Few thought the army, after thirty
years of inaction, would be able to reverse a seemingly hopeless situation. In that
fateful period, the less reputed among its instruments saved the Austrian state from
collapse, ignoring and often contravening directives from an evanescent government
committed to facing a revolution in its own capital, which navigated between two
parliaments - Vienna and Frankfurt both equally hostile. Starting with 62,000 soldiers
in arms in the mid-1840s, the Austro-Hungarian army, despite many difficulties,
amassed a force of 100,000 men, garrisons excluded. The reorganization of this force
began with the appointment to chief commander the sixty-five year old Radetzky von
Radek, who introduced to all units: theory education in winter, field exercises in spring
and manoeuvring in opposing parties in summer.
In this book, the author sheds a different light on the contributions of the many
Italians present under the banner of the House of Austria. The historiography born
after the Risorgimento argued that the Habsburgs employed their soldiers from one
region to oppress another nationality. In fact, as related by Zoppi: "if it was ever
70
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thought a plan to separate and disperse the hostile forces or those of dubious loyalty,
one has to wonder why in March 1848 many troops found themselves in the wrong
place, at the wrong time and why they were there so long, nor were able to move
where they served or where there would be in less danger". In 1848, one-third of
Radetzkys army were Italians, and 25,000 of the 30,000 enlisted in the Lombardo-
Veneto region, had quartered in the Peninsula, where their insubordination could
cause deleterious effects. It appears that the military commanders doubted little the
fidelity of their Italian regiments; in fact, allegations in this regard raised in Vienna
were even considered an affront to military honour.
(AM)
DE LUNA, Giovanni; Il Corpo del Nemico Ucciso, Violenza e Morte nella guerra
contemporanea (The body of the Killed Enemy, Violence and Death in the
Contemporary War). Milano, Torino; Giulio Einaudi; XXVIII-302 pages; hardcover,
illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. ISBN: 8806178598; 25.
The link between war and death and between war and cruelty may, at first,
appear trivial, in the sense that all wars are cruel and deadly, but not all cruelties are
free. In an era in which we are spectators, often distracted by many episodes of war
more or less traditional, De Luna reminds us that killing an enemy and punishing him
are not exactly the same thing. What is new in this work is the central context of
images showing killed enemies, although the final conclusion comes down to using
images as examples fourteen; thirteen in the text and one on the cover - and
describing, through text, hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of others. This view
opens up entirely new considerations, such as, for example, penetrating the analysis
of violence and death in contemporary wars through the stories 'written' on the body
of the killed enemy.
A body whose symbolic value is established in the individual and collective needs of
each society involved in a conflict. This then becomes, in turn, a source which can be
interrogated in addition to the narratives of writers, journalists, military historians and
chroniclers, medical reports and, especially, among the structures of the visual images
in which the bodies are in their majority: "put posing, dramas, exposed to light to be
photographed". For this reason, it happens frequently that the images of slain
enemies represent two contradictory realities. To demonstrate a picture in the book
which shows its ambivalence and real-staged drama, the author chose the photo
portraying the Executioner posing by the gallows alongside the witnesses to the
71
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execution of Cesare Battisti, who was hanged by the Austrians in the castle of Trento
on July 12th, 1916.
The book tells of war and dead bodies, and traces a route from Brazil in the sixteenth
century through the Boxer Rebellion, and reaches the conflict in contemporary Iraq,
going through all the wars of the last century. The author proposes: "the image of a
mass death unprecedented in history, both for the impressive figures, and for
coordinates within which it is inscribed". Photography in the twentieth century has
formed the iconography of death more extensively than any other period in history.
About these type of images De Luna writes no coincidence: "The most poignant and
disturbing is certainly photographic documentation currently available on the Nazi
concentration camps. The historian who approaches those images does so with a kind
of awe, knowing that this is documentation pertaining to the history of humanity. The
scholars are on the edge of a 'black hole' in which they risk plunging both their
professional and existential dimension: the presence of those documents not allows
any methodological naivety, no complacency narrative; in this case the test of 'true'
and 'false' - the backbone of any criticism of the sources - is aimed at overcoming the
meaning attributed to it within the methodology of historical research, to take on
much more wide significance, connected to a debate that touches the ultimate
reasons of our civilization".
Obviously, the difficulties of reading this book appear, in this way, to investigate
properly the characteristics of the new documentation, to which historians today often
subvert, for example, the intent of the photographer (who portrays the man's body
often as a victim and not as an enemy); without considering the visual structures of
the images that can inspire models of representation consolidated in the
contemporary imagination. For those who have the will to choose this path, the
methodological strength resulting from investigating the images in a new and different
way remains intact, without relegating them to the role of illustrative frame, a fact
certainly not very common. Impulses for reflection (as well as for a proposal based on
a language not yet fully shared, and therefore easy to misunderstand) will inevitably
characterize the discussion around Lunas thesis. However, it is important that these
issues open a serious debate: in fact, the essay puts forth, indirectly, an important
methodological problem.
(CP)
72
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REID, Stuart; Scots Armies in the Great Rebellion 1638-1658; Nottingham,
Partizan Press; 236 p.; hardcover; illustrations; bibliography; index. ISBN: 978-1-
85818-693-1; GBP 29,50 (. 40,27)
Stuart Reid has provided a new study on the Scottish armies during a historical
period of great change in the British Isles. The rebellion began with the accession of
the Scottish Covenanters to the cause of King Charles I. The armies fielded were not a
mass of irregulars and rebels, but the actual army of Scotland. While the conflict
began as yet another fight by Scotland against England, the war produced
international repercussions by drawing the interests of France and, especially, Spain.
The author reviews the major components of the army and expands the
understanding of a period of military history marked by transition and tactical
experimentations, destined to leave a lasting impact for all the nations involved. Of
great interest is the remarkable collection of insignias used by Scottish units on
campaign: a heraldic narration of the Scottish political scene in the mid-seventeenth
century. Equally interesting are the historical notes and organics of the regiments
involved in the war.
(BM)
73
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The Best on the Net
A guide to the best websites of military history and uniformology
There are many websites that tell a story or follow defined paths, within which collect,
and make available, images and texts. On the other hand, there are sites that can instead be
defined as generalist and include everything to do with the history, uniforms and milestones
at large. One of the more interesting syntheses of these websites, and without doubt one of
the richest offered by the net, is the German site Deutsche Militrgeschichte
http://www.grosser-generalstab.de/which has operated for the past fifteen years with regular
updates of new contents.
Apart from the unusual graphical interface, which can be a cause of some concern to more
demanding Internet users, the appeal of the pages is very worthy of the typical Germanic
rigor in historical narration. Most of the content is devoted to the German army in the
74
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
imperial age, with beautiful, detailed images of the original uniforms of the early 1900s.Do
not overlook the high definition series of plates from the Grosse Uniformenkunde by Richard
Kntel. The site offers the opportunity to access a twin site devoted to the Austrian army,
with many interesting regimental histories starting from the eighteenth century. The only
drawback, for those unfamiliar with German are the texts, written in the language of Kaiser
Wilhelm II.
Another site devoted to the imperial Germanarmy, but unlike the previous, focuses only
on the colonial period.
German Colonial Uniforms, http://www.germancolonialuniforms.co.uk/ managed since
2004 by the talented Chris Dale, is completely in English, and for this reason, perhaps,
accessible to a greater number of Internet users.
The richness and abundance of the material is extraordinary and each topic is accompanied
by a remarkable quantity of images. Just to give a brief list of the topics covered on the site,
they range from uniforms in the western German colonies to Asia and the South Pacific. Much
space is also dedicated to the Austro-Hungarian armed forces on the overseas fronts during
the First World War. The site contains an archive of beautiful military decorations, badges and
ranks of different specialties of the imperial army and navy in the years before the Great War,
as well as an extensive photo gallery of souvenirs, postcards and regalia of the German
colonies. Chris has also been of great help in realizing the illustrations for the article on
German Samoa in Forgotten Fronts of WWI.
75
#HISTORY&UNIFORMS
One of the best examples of the philosophy of the blog can be foundin the excellent
site Anno Domini 1672 http://rampjaar.blogspot.it/ maintained and updated by Edwin Groot
in the Netherlands.
The main theme is the Dutch War of 1672-1678, although the site offers contents ranging
from the Anglo-Dutch conflicts throughout the seventeenth century. The posts, updated more
or less sporadically, are always interesting and never banal, but, above all, address a theme
that outside the Netherlands is sparsely attended. Thanks to the Dutch-English bilingual
edition, we can access this information with relative ease. This website stands as a model of
clarity and passion for the history that really deserves top marks.
(BM)
76

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Magazine devoted to military history, uniformology and war equipments

since the Ancient Era to 20th century

Number 0 available for free

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Subscriptions on the Magazine website: www.historyanduniforms.com or through Soldiershop,

Original illustrations are on sale contacting: webmagazine.director@gmail.com

2015 Bruno Mugnai

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare: Neolithic China

Forgotten Fronts of WWI: German Samoa(part one)

The Best on the Net

Yangshao warrior, Yellow River Valley; 3300 BC

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 4

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 5

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 6

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 7

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 8

Anthropomorphic figure (of warrior ?) on a vessel of Yangshao-Majiayaoculture, 3000 BC.

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 9

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 10

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 11

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 12

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 13

Longshan monile in stone with carved decoration.

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 14

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 15

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 16

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 17

Longshan noble and warrior.

Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Chinese Warfare 18

- Introduction: Wars and Venetian Singularities

Even contemporary sources show some difficulty in understanding the Venetian

Venetian Domains in 1683.

strength of 11,289 men, included infantry from Braunschweig-Lneburg, Neaples, the

Map of Morea (Peloponnese) by Vincenzo Maria Coronelli (ca 1690)

Francesco Morosini, 1619-1694

The Life Guards of Princes Baciocchi

The Uniform of the Life Guards: a Political Message

The Compagnia Cacciatori had the same staff and strength.

Compagnia delle Guardie del Corpo di Sua Altezza Serenissima:

Guardie del Corpo, 1806-1812 (Reconstruction by Bruno Mugnai)

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 50

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 51

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 52

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 53

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 54

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 55

Military Organization in German Samoa

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 56

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 57

This figure is based after a photograph of an Officer or NCO of the Deutsch-Samoanische

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 58

Samoan Fitafita; Apia, 1911 (Authors Archive).

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 59

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 60

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 61

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 62

Brass German Colonial Police Badge.

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 63

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 64

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 66

Forgotten Fronts of WWI 67

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