G.R. No.

103877 June 23, 1992

BENJAMIN F. ARAO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and WARLITO PULMONES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari 1 seeks to set aside, for having allegedly been issued with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of jurisdiction, the Decision of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in EPC No. 88-1, 2promulgated January 23, 1992, which reconsidered the Resolution of its
First Division of December 11, 1991, 3finding petitioner (protestee therein) "winner of the election protest
by a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the original lead of protestee of 417 votes over protestant at the time of
the former's proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers of Pagadian City," and declaring instead
private respondent (protestant therein) duly elected mayor thereof.

Petitioner Benjamin Arao and private respondent Warlito Pulmones were candidates for the Office of City
Mayor of Pagadian City on the January 18, 1988, local elections. After canvass, petitioner was shown to
have garnered 12,447 votes, while private respondent, only 12,030 votes 4 or a margin of 417 votes in
favor of petitioner. Consequently, on January 21, 1988, petitioner was proclaimed City Mayor elect of
Pagadian City. 5

On January 28, 1988, private respondent filed his Protest with COMELEC 6 more particularly alleging that
"while fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically all the voting centers of Pagadian City, the
violations were glaringly and notably perpetrated in the following districts and/or precincts, to wit: (a) (I)n
all the three (3) precints of Kawit District . . . (b) (I)n Tuburan District . . . particularly in Precincts 77 and
80 . . . (c) (I)n Bonifacio District, particularly Precinct 69 . . . (d) [I)n Sta. Lucia District, particularly Precinct
No. 42 . . . (e) (I)n all of the seven (7) precincts in Sto. Nio District . . . (f) (I)n San Jose District,
particularly Precinct No. 32 . . . (g) (I)n Precinct No. 33 at San Jose District . . . (h) (I)n Precinct No. 34 of
San Jose District . . . (i) (I)n all of the precincts in San Pedro District . . . (i) (I) n Precincts 19 and 22 of
Gatas District . . . (k) . . . in all the precincts in Balangasa District but more notably in Precincts 8 and
11 . . .

On February 8 1988, petitioner filed his Answer with 7 Counterprotest However, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the courterprotest per its Resolution of February 7, 1991, for failure to pay the required filing
fee within the reglementary period. 8

On February 15, 1988, or after the 10-day period to file an election protest, private respondent filed an
Amended Protest enumerating therein thirteen (13) precincts which were not previously specified:
Precincts I-A, 4, 6, 9, 17, 20, 21, 30, 31, 35, 36, 50 and 70. 9 Actually, other precincts, i.e., Precincts 101,
110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153 108 and 131, which were not particularly mentioned in
the Petition, were included in the Amended Protest. 10

On March 3, 1988, petitioner filed his Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest,
although received by COMELEC only on April 4, 1988. 11

On February 7, 1991, COMELEC (First Division) issued the following Resolution:

 Apparently, the Commission taking into consideration the comments and observations of
protestee, was convinced that the amended protest was not admissible as the record
failed to yield any formal order admitting the amended protest. 12

On December 11, 1991, COMELEC (First Division) issued a Resolution par. 4 of which states:

4. Protestant filed his Amended Protest on February 15, 1988, although there is nothing
on record that shows the same was duly admitted; the record shows, however, that the
Protestee submitted his "Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest" in a
formal document dated March 3, 1988 and received by this Commission on April 4,
1988. 13

In holding that there was nothing on record showing that Protestant's Amended Protest was duly
admitted, public respondent's First Division apparently overlooked its Order of April 7, 1988, which reads:

For consideration is the Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Amended

Protest dated March 3, 1988, filed by Counsel for Protestee praying that the amended
protest dated February 15, 1988, filed by Protestant be denied admission. It appearing
from the records of the case that Protestant's Amended Protest was filed in accordance
with Sec. 17, Rule X of COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, the Commission hereby denies
the herein Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Protestant's Amended
Protest.

In the Resolution En Banc of this Court dated September 7, 1989, in G.R. No. 88036, where petitioner
questioned the "transfer of the questioned ballot boxes to Cagayan de Oro in view of the serious peace
and order problem in Pagadian City, it clearly appears that the Amended Protest was in fact admitted,
thus

. . . Besides, the Order of April 7, 1988, admitting the amended protest was questioned
only on May 11, 1989, when the herein petition was filed, or way beyond the 30-day
reglementary period prescribed in Article IX-A. Section 7, of the Constitution.

On December 11, 1991, after revision of ballots and hearing, COMELEC (First Division) promulgated a
Resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE . . . the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to DISMISS Election Protest Case No. 88-1 and DECLARES protestee winner of the
election protest by a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the original lead of protestee by 417
votee over protestant at the time of the former's proclamation by the City Board of
Canvassers of Pagadian City. 14

15
On December 16, 1991, private respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner claims that on January 15, 1992, he filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration of private respondent 16 raising the following points:

(a) examination and appreciation of ballots should have been confined to 31 protested
precincts per original protest filed January 28, 1988, considering that amended protest
was decreed as "not admissible"' in the February 7, 1991, Resolution of COMELEC (First
Division);
 (b) examination of ballots to determine identical handwritings should be limited to
Precincts 19, 22, 8 and 11 as alleged in the original protest;

(c) it was contrary to basic rules for COMELEC to pass upon ballots (in favor of
protestee) as identical with each other when they were not even questioned by
protestant, thus depriving protestee the right to present controverting evidence;

(d) COMELEC failed to consider its records showing that there were 139 assisted
illiterate or disabled voters, hence, to invalidate their votes is technically a
disenfranchisement and a subversion of sovereign will;

(e) it is statistically improbable for a candidate to have utilized 332 groups (persons) to
write 723 ballots (a ratio of 1 person for 2 ballots);

(f) mathematical computation of protestant in his motion for reconsideration is erroneous

and self-serving; and,

(g) COMELEC should have credited 10 more votes for protestee as affirmed/admitted
during the revision of ballots.

However, in his Comment, private respondent Pulmones denies all these averments of petitioner, and
claims that they contain "baseless and unfounded" allegations which are precisely to be rejected in this
petition.

On January 23, 1992, COMELEC En Banc promulgated its Decision

thus

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby renders judgment: a. GRANTING

Protestant Pulmones' Motion for Reconsideration; b. DENYING Protestee Arao's
Manifestation for the dismissal of Protestants Motion for Reconsideration; c. AFFIRMING
the factual findings at the Commission (First Division) relative to the examination of the
contested ballots of both Protestant and Protestee; d. DECLARING Protestant Warlito
Pulmones as the duly elected Mayor of Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988 elections
with a margin of 516 votes against Protestee Benjamin F. Arao; and, e. ORDERING
Protestee Arao to VACATE his office and surrender the same no Protestant Pulmones
once this decision becomes final and executory. 17

Meanwhile, on February 28, 1992, acting on the motion of Pulmones, respondent COMELEC granted the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its Decision of January 23, 1992.

On March 4, 1992, petitioner filed with Us an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order against the February 28, 1992, Order of public respondent.

On March 5, 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for by petitioner, and
required private respondent to comment thereon.

In his petition, Arao raises five issues which nevertheless may simply be reduced into whether respondent
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction: (1) when it examined and invalidated
426 ballots for petitioner in precincts not included in the original protest but only in the amended protest
filed beyond the ten-day period; (2) when it invalidated 466 ballots for petitioner as having identical
handwritings although protestant did not raise such issues, nor impugn the validity of the ballots on such
ground; and, (3) when it concluded that certain ballots were with identical handwritings, some marked and
others stray, and deducting them from the total votes of petitioner without stating the grounds therefor.

Before resolving these issues a distinction should at the outset be drawn between an original action
for certiorari, as in this case brought under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution, and an appeal
by certiorari or petition for review. In the special civil action for certiorari, the main issue is lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, while an appeal
by certiorari or petition for review is limited to the consideration of questions of law. Thus, in the oft-cited
case of Padilla vs. COMELEC, 18 We ruled:

The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, explained in Aratuc
vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), "not as broad as it used to be" under the
old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process" . . . Moreover, the legislative
construction . . . of the constitutional provision has narrowed down
"the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is
strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo .
. . a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief
Justice Concepcion. ruled that "this Court cannot . . . review rulings or findings of hot of
the Commission an Elections . . . as there is "no reason to believe that the framers of our
Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory
administrative organs (whose factual findings are not disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support
of such findings") . . . Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in
proceedings brought either ":as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal
by certiorari . . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while
"petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law."

The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier . . . Indeed, as
early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution . . . this
Court held that the Electoral Commissions "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the
language of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except . . . "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process
of law" . . . Originally lodged in the legislature that exclusive function of being the "sole
judge" of contest "relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the
legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935
Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel.
"was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature . . . These observations remain valid and applicable to the exercise of that
function, as now vested in the respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution.

Earlier, in Sidro v. Commission on Elections, 19 it was held

. . . This Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any
jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the
utmost respect. So it has been reiterated time and time again.
Although the Padilla case herein before quoted was decided under the 1973 Constitution, the doctrine
therein enunciated is still applicable under the 1987 Constitution considering that Sec. 11, Art. XII-C of the
1973 Constitution, invoked therein has been retained in the 1987 Constitution except for the limitation "as
may be provided by this Constitution or by law". Consequently, unless it is shown that the Constitution
itself or any law modifies the provision that ". . . any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission 20 may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof," and none is pointed to Us, our interpretation of the pertinent provisions adverted to in both
Constitutions, as well as our adherence thereto, cannot be any less firm and faithful.

What is certain from the above disquisition is that the extraordinary power of this Court to pass upon an
order or decision of COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution, while giving at the
highest regard and respect due a constitutional body. For, not every abuse of discretion justifies the
original action of certiorari; it must be grave. Nor any denial of due process within its ambit; it must be
patent and it must be substantial. The test therefore is whether petitioner has demonstrated convincingly
that COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to patent
and substantial denial of due process in issuing the challenged decision. Here, petitioner has utterly
failed.

As regards the first issue of petitioner, it appears that the original Protest of private respondent Pulmones
did in fact cover all the forty-five (45) precincts the COMELEC took cognizance of in resolving EPC No.
88-1. As alleged in par. 5 of his Protest

5. That while fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically all the voting centers of
Pagadian City, the violations were glaringly and notably perpetrated in the following
districts and/or precincts . . .

The prayer in the same Protest also confirms that it refers to forty-five (45) precincts as it seeks the
"opening and recounting of votes cast in all a precinct s in Kawit District; Precs. 77 and 80 in Tuburan
District; Precs. 77, 42, 58, 80 and 70 all of Pagadian City; Precs. 69 of Bonifacio District; Precs. 42
and all precincts in Sta. Lucia District; all seven precincts in the District of Sto. Nio; Precs. 32, 33 and 34,
and all precincts of San Jose District; all the precincts in San Pedro District; Precs. 19 and 32 and all
other precincts in the Gatas district; and Precs. 8 and 11 and all other precincts of Balangasan District, all
of Pagadian City" (emphasis supplied). Specifically, the precincts covered are: (a) all precincts of Kawit
(63, 64 and 65; (b) two in Tuburan (77 and 80); (c) one in Bonifacio (69); (d) all in Sta. Lucia (42 and 50);
(e) all in Sto. Nio (11-A, 12, 13-A, 14, 15 and 16); (f) all in San Jose (30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36); (g)
all in San Pedro (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62); (h) all in Gatas (17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22); (i) all in Balangasan (1-A, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 11); and, (j) Prec. 70 (unspecified district). The sum total of
these precincts is forty-five (45), which tallies with the total number of precincts contested by protestant,
now private respondent.

It may be noted that while protestant did attempt to int roduce new precincts in his Amended Protest filed
on February 15, 1988, namely, Precincts Nos. 101, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153, 108 and
131, which were not enumerated in the original Protest, these precincts were not taken into consideration
by COMELEC in deciding EPC No. 88-1. Hence, the first issue clearly appears to be based on a wrong
premise.

On the second issue, the failure or omission of protestant to raise the question of identical handwriting or
of impugning the validity of the ballots on that ground, resulting in the invalidation of 466 ballots for
petitioner, does not preclude respondent COMELEC from rejecting them on that ground.
Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern. The rights a of the contending
parties in the position aspired for most yield to the far greater interest of the citizens in the sanctity of the
electoral process. This being the case, the choice of the people to represent them may not be bargained
away by the sheer negligence of a party, nor defeated by technical rules of procedure. Thus, COMELEC
cannot just close its eyes to the illegality of the ballots brought before it, where the ground for the
invalidation was omitted by the protestant. As held in Yalung v. Atienza: 21

. . . Inasmuch as it is not necessary to specify in detail in the motion of protest in which of

the ballots the frauds and irregularities were committed, such a procedure being well-nigh
impossible, and it being enough to allege in what the fraud and irregularity consisted, and
that had it not been for such anomalies. the result of the election would have been
otherwise, all of which have been alleged in the motion of protest in question, the court or
the commissioners appointed by the same may revise all the ballots, admitting the valid
and legal ones and rejecting the others, with a view to arriving at the lawfully expressed
will of the electors. The institution or popular suffage is one of public interest and not a
private interest of the candidates, so that if in the revision of the ballots some illegal
ballots are found which have not been specifically impugned in the motion of protest, the
court may reject them motu proprio, since it is not essential that the contestant set forth
the grounds of his contest with the same precision required of pleading in ordinary civil
cases (20 Corpus Juris, 227; emphasis supplied).

In the case of Lucero vs. De Guzman (45 Phil., 852), this court stalled the following: "The
purpose of the legislature in declaring that contests should not be conducted upon
pleadings or by action was to free the courts as far as possible from the technicalities
incident to ordinary proceeding by action and to enable the courts to administer justice
speedily and without complication."

The trial court, then, did not err in taking into account in the revision of the ballots,
irregularities not set forth in the motion of protest.

With regard to the third issue, the complaint of petitioner against the alleged omission of COMELEC to
state the reasons for its conclusion that certain ballots were with Identical handwritings, some marked and
others stray, does not in any magnitude diminish the straightforward statement of the public respondent
that it painstakingly examined and appreciated individually the contested ballots for both protestant and
protestee in accordance with existing norms . . . 22

Petitioner did not question this alleged irregularity by bringing the matter to the attention of COMELEC
(First Division) immediately after the promulgation of its Resolution. The Resolution containing the alleged
jurisdictional defect was promulgated on December 11, 1991. However, it was not until he filed his petition
on February 17, 1992, that petitioner complained for the first time. Certainly, that Resolution having been
rendered by division of COMELEC could have been subject of a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly,
petitioner did not take steps to have the matter reconsidered by public respondent before coming to Us.

Having been declared winner in the Resolution of December 11, 1991, petitioner would not ordinarily be
expected to initiate a motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, he could have brought up his objections in
his Memorandum in opposition to the Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration so that public respondent
could have properly ruled thereon. Consequently, petitioner may be deemed to have waived his right to
question the Resolution when he failed to act accordingly despite the opportunity so to do. He should not
be permitted, in other words, to remain mute and "unaffected in the face of a perceived jurisdictional
defect and. worse, profit from his quiescence, only to grumble in the end when it turns out to be prejudicial
to his interest. As it has been said, [n]either equity nor the law relieves those who seek aid in Court merely
to avoid the effects of their own negligence . . ." (Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo 1, 36 [1912]).

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, patent and substantial, the petition is
DENIED.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 3, 1992, is hereby lifted and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107979 June 19, 1995

DANILO F. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE IBARRA S. VIGILIA (Branch 17, RTC of BULACAN) and GREGORIO
N. ARUELO, JR., respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28621.

Danilo F. Gatchalian and Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr. were rival candidates for the office of the Vice Mayor of
Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 11, 1992 elections.

On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Gatchalian as the duly elected Vice
Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan by a margin of four votes.

On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a verified petition docketed
as SPC No. 92-130 seeking to annul the proclamation of Gatchalian.

On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, an election
protest docketed as Civil Case No. 343-M-92. In said election protest, Aruelo alleged that the protest was
filed ex abundante cautela, there being a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. It
likewise contained a claim for damages in the amount of P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. On the
same date, Aruelo paid the amount of P610.00 as filing fees.

On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian received an amended summons from the clerk of court of the trial court,
giving him five days within which to answer.

Instead of filing an answer, Gatchalian filed a motion to dismiss on June 15, 1992 on the following
grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending pre-proclamation case before the
COMELEC, and hence the protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees
and cash deposit upon filing of the petition. Aruelo filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, to which
Gatchalian filed a reply.

Meanwhile, on June 17, 1992, the COMELEC denied Aruelo's pre-proclamation case.
In its Order dated July 10, 1992, the trial court denied Gatchalian's motion to dismiss and ordered him to
file his answer within five days from notice thereof. Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration was denied on
August 3, 1992.

On July 23, 1992, Gatchalian, instead of filing his answer, filed a motion for a Bill of Particulars. This
motion was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 5, 1992.

On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
28621) alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration.

On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision concluding that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Gatchalian's motion to dismiss. It further ruled
that the election protest was timely filed and that Gatchalian's averment that the election protest should
be dismissed on the ground of non-payment of filing fee was devoid of merit.

Hence, this petition.

II

Gatchalian claims that the election protest was filed only on June 2, 1992 or nineteen days after his
proclamation on May 13, 1992 as Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in violation of Section 3, Rule 35 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner's contention is without merit.

Said Section 3, Rule 35 provides as follows:

Period to file petition. The petition shall be filed within ten (10) days following the date
of proclamation of the results of the election.

Under the above-cited section, Aruelo had ten days from May 13, 1992 to file an election protest. Instead
of filing an election protest, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a pre-proclamation case against Gatchalian
on May 22, 1992, or nine days after May 13, 1992. The filing of the pre-proclamation case suspended the
running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings (B.P. Blg. 881,
Sec. 248). Aruelo received the COMELEC resolution denying his pre-proclamation petition on June 22,
1992. Hence, Aruelo had only one day left after June 22, 1992 within which to file an election protest.
However, it will be noted that Aruelo filed on June 2, 1992 with the trial court an election protest ex
abundante cautela.

Gatchalian further contends that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the election protest for
failure of Aruelo to pay the filing fee of P300.00 as required by Rule 35, Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.

This contention of petitioner is meritorious.

Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Filing fee. No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention shall be given due

course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three hundred pesos
(P300.00) for each interest.

Each interest shall further pay the legal research fee as required by law.
 If a claim for damages and attorney's fees are set forth in a protest, counter-protest or
protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee shall be paid in accordance with the
schedule provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines.

Under said Rule, a protestant has to pay the following:

a) filing fee of P300.00; b) legal research fee; and c) additional filing fee if there be a claim for damages or
attorney's fees.

Aruelo, upon filing the election protest with the trial court on June 2, 1992, paid the following amounts:

O.R. No. Amount

2084419-R P450.00 Docket Fee-Judiciary

Development Fund

8760129S 150.00 General Fund

1,407,317.00 10.00 Legal Research

1,406,063.00 5.60 Summons Fee

2,084,420.00 46.00 Summons Fee

From the above itemization, it is clear that Aruelo failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 for the election
protest prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The amount of P600.00, consisting of P450.00 (Judiciary Development Fund) and P150.00 (General
Fund), refers to the docket fee for Aruelo's claim of attorney' s fees in the amount of P100,000.00 in
accordance with the schedule provided for in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court
(Cf. Rule 35, Section 9, third paragraph, COMELEC Rules of Procedure).

The trial court cannot simply deduct from the P600.00 the filing fee of P300.00 because the former
amount is specifically allocated by law (P.D. No. 1949) and by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
31-90 dated October 15, 1990 to the Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. A separate set
of receipts is used for the collection of docket fees.

It is the payment of the filing fee that vests jurisdiction of the court over the election protest, not the
payment of the docket fees for the claim of damages and attorney's fees. For failure to pay the filing fee
prescribed under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the election protest must be
dismissed. Under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, "[n]o protest . . . shall be
given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00) for
each interest.

In Pahilan v. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205 (1994), we had occasion to rule as follows:

In the case now before us, and in election cases in general, it is not the amount of
damages, if any, that is sought to be recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction
to try the same . Rather, it is the nature of the action which is determinative of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28621
is SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 343-M-92 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139853. September 5, 2000]

FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M.
SAULONG, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on August 31, 1999,
in COMELEC special relief case SPR No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed petitioner's petition to set
aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, dated October 1, 1998 and
February 1, 1999, which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the election protest filed by private
respondent against petitioner and the motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.

On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a "petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return".[1] On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner
docketed as EC-31-98.

On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to dismiss
private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state
cause of action.[2]

On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent.

On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election protest.
 On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The election tribunal held
that private respondent paid the required filing fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a
mere technical defect which should not bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election
tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to speak of.

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is
prohibited except in a case involving an election offense. [3] Since the present controversy involves no
election offense, reconsideration is not possible and petitioner has no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Accordingly, petitioner properly filed the instant petition
for certiorari with this Court.

On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status quo ante prevailing as of
September 17, 1999, the date of filing of this petition.

Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction:

[I]

... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION

PROTEST DESPITE HIS (sic) LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME BY REASON OF THE
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE REQUISITE FILING FEES.

[II]

... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT'S RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S

ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE
AND ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

[III]

...IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST BELOW
ON THE GROUNDS OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME
COURT CIRCULAR REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THEREOF.[4]

In our view, notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of issues, the principal question presented for
our resolution is whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election protest.

At the outset, even if not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to resolve the question
concerning COMELEC's jurisdiction. Unless properly resolved, we cannot proceed further in this case.

Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:

"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc."
 Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC[5] and in subsequent cases,[6] we ruled that the COMELEC,
sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-
proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first
instance is null and void.

As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was
not referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission en
banc. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss private
respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not
end the trial court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities
as regards each other.[7] In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental
issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but
an incident of the election protest. If the principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on
appeal by a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to
incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a division of the COMELEC for
resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner's
petition in the first instance.

Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the petition herein is
without doubt meritorious and has to be granted. But in order to write finis to the controversy at bar, we
are constrained to also resolve the issues raised by petitioner, seriatim.

Petitioner contends that private respondent's protest should have been dismissed outright as the
latter failed to pay the amount of P300.00 filing fee required under the COMELEC rules. [8] Petitioner's
contention is supported by Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure [9] and corresponding
receipts[10] itemized as follows:

P368.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;

P 32.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;

P 46.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;

P 4.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;

P 10.00 -- Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;

P 5.00 -- Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979

-----------

P465.00

Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00
for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752 was
issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the entries in the cash book of the clerk of court.
[11]
Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478 credited to the general fund could be considered as filing fee paid
by private respondent for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee.[12]Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent's
election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's
protest case.

We have in a string of cases[13] had the occasion to rule on this matter. In Loyola vs. COMELEC, the
clerk of court assessed private respondent therein the incorrect filing fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of
the election protest. Upon filing his counter-protest, petitioner was assessed to pay the same
amount. Subsequently, the trial court remedied the situation by directing the parties to pay the balance of
P268.00. On review, we held that the lapse was not at all attributable to private respondent and there was
substantial compliance with the filing fee requirement. The error lies in the Clerk's misapplication and
confusion regarding application of Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this
Court's resolution dated September 4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. An election protest
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, in which case the Rules of Court
will apply, and that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is primarily intended to govern election cases
before that tribunal. But the Court declared that this decision must not provide relief to parties in future
cases involving inadequate payment of filing fees in election cases. Our decisions
in Pahilan and Gatchalian bar any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to
pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases.

In Miranda vs. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of P465.00 as
filing fees. Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P 10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for
victim compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was regarded as filing fee. The Court considered
the amount as partial payment of the P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required payment
of the deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the caveat that in view
of Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the
full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 27,
1997.

Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. And the
dismissal of the present case for that reason is, in our view, called for.

Besides, there is another reason to dismiss private respondent's election protest. We note that the
verification of aforesaid protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he
caused the preparation of his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations therein.
[14]
Certainly, this is insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest
are true and correct of his persoral knowledge.[15] Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be
treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.[16]

Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with the required certification against forum
shopping. Private respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of
election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed
a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.

It could be argued that private respondent's petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of

election returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation
and appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the municipal board of canvassers. But note
that such petition was filed after the proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition
was no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC
after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be claimed with some reason that
private respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy, abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed.
[17]
 Nonetheless, private respondent's belief that he no longer had a pending case before the COMELEC
because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the
pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that the COMELEC dismissed private respondent's pre-
proclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending
resolution. Similarly, the fact that private respondent's protest was not based on the same cause of action
as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required disclosure in the
certification against forum shopping. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that a party is not guilty
of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading,
regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum
shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where the parties themselves
would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule, and compliance therewith
would depend on their belief that they might or might not have violated the requirement. Such
interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very purpose of the rule. [18]

Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuaded that respondent
Regional Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss private
respondent's election protest against petitioner. And to reiterate, respondent COMELEC en banc had no
jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private respondent's election protest.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent
COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on September 21, 1999, is made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 42, is hereby ordered to DISMISS election protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158466 June 15, 2004

PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because
the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a
plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected.1

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by
petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
herein public respondent, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing in HRET Case No. 01-
024, Pablo Ocampo vs. Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution2 dated March 27, 2003 holding
that "protestant" (herein petitioner) cannot be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th
District of Manila since being a second placer, he "cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining
qualified candidates"; and (b) Resolution3 dated June 2, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are uncontroverted:

On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent Mario B.
Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant
to the May 14, 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over
petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.

On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral protest4 against private respondent,
impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila on the following
grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by petitioner; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution
of election returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written
by one person or two persons. The case was docketed as HRET Case No. 01-024. Petitioner prayed that
a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that,
thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with counter-protest 5 vehemently denying that he
engaged in massive vote buying. He also opposed petitioners allegation that there is a need for the
revision and appreciation of ballots.

After the preliminary conference between the parties on July 12, 2001, the HRET issued a
Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying was committed by private
respondent; and second, whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th
District of Manila.

Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio
Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023, Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions
declaring that private respondent is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of
Manila for lack of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his office."7 Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 8

On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, 9 which
reads:

"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong."

Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified in HRET Cases Nos. 01-
020 and 01-023, the votes cast for him should not be counted. And having garnered the second highest
number of votes, he (petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioners motion to implement the afore-
quoted provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private respondent was guilty of vote-
buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of
whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held:

"x x x Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be
proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office. x x x

It is of no moment that there is only a margin of 768 votes between protestant and protestee.
Whether the margin is ten or ten thousand, it still remains that protestant did not receive the
mandate of the majority during the elections. Thus, to proclaim him as the duly elected
representative in the stead of protestee would be anathema to the most basic precepts of
republicanism and democracy as enshrined within our Constitution. In effect, we would be
advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the voters of the sixth district of
Manila.

Congressional elections are different from local government elections. In local government
elections, when the winning candidate for governor or mayor is subsequently disqualified, the
vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as the case may be, succeeds to the position by virtue of the
Local Government Code. It is different in elections for representative. When a voter chooses his
congressional candidate, he chooses only one. If his choice is concurred in by the majority of
voters, that candidate is declared the winner. Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a
substitute congressman in the eventuality that their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in
any other way leaves the post vacant. There can only be one representative for that particular
legislative district. There are no runners-up or second placers. Thus, when the person vested with
the mandate of the majority is disqualified from holding the post he was elected to, the only
recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election. x x x

This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative District of Manila will be without adequate
representation in Congress. Article VI, Section 9 of the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 6645
allows Congress to call a special election to fill up this vacancy. There are at least 13 months until
the next congressional elections, which is more than sufficient time within which to hold a special
election to enable the electorate of the Sixth District of Manila to elect their representative.

For this reason, the Tribunal holds that protestant cannot be proclaimed as the duly elected
representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila.

In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is unnecessary to rule on the recount and
revision of ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to:

xxxxxx

2) DENY protestants (petitioner) Motion to Implement Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646
by declaring the votes cast for Mario Crespo as stray votes."
Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that "it is
unnecessary to rule on the recount and revision of ballots in the protested and counter-protested
precincts." He maintains that it is the ministerial duty of the HRET to implement the provisions of Section
6, R.A. No. 6646 specifically providing that "any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted."

In his comment, private respondent counters that what the law requires is that the disqualification by
final judgment takes place before the election. Here, the HRET Resolutions disqualifying him as
Representative of the 6th District of Manila were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections. He
also claims that the Resolutions are not yet final and executory because they are the subjects of certiorari
proceedings before this Court. Hence, all his votes shall be counted and none shall be considered stray.

The HRET, in its comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General, merely reiterates its ruling.

The petition must be dismissed.

The issues here are: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of private respondent should not be counted
pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646; and (2) whether petitioner, a second placer in the May 14, 2001
congressional elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia,10 we expounded on the application of
Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must be a final judgment before the
election in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered "stray", thus:

"Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final
judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray."
Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day
and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides."

The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified
to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.11

In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost twenty-two (22) months after the
May 14, 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment before election" is absent.
Therefore, petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of
a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner.12 This principle has been reiterated in a
number our decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,13 Abella vs. COMELEC,14 Benito vs.
COMELEC15 and Domino vs. COMELEC.16 As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the
candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who
won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. 17
In Geronimo vs. Ramos,18 if the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to
which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that, a second
placer he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could
not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule
otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electroral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind voters preferences. 19

At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on
June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the
duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

In the recent case of Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal,20 we ruled that a case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits. Worth reiterating is our pronouncement in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, thus:21

"It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998]

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B.

TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set
aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division inSunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,
[1]
dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of
Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then
incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.

On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint [2] for disqualification against
Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec.
261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended).On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed
another letter-complaint[3] with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261,
par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election
Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by
an Amended Petition[4] for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint,
including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The
case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, [5] the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to
its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his
accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while
Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.However,
notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another
motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC
2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [6] to the COMELEC En
Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment,
vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise
recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of
Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath
and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the
corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad.Accordingly, four (4)
informations[7] for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for
hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution,
the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050
that

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds
specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission
before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed x x x x

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or on
motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the
instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws x x x x
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6
of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as
a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the
complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case.However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department.If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with
the court before which the criminal case is pending and said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed before
the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the
election and before the proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election
and after proclamation.

If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on
April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed to have been filed
upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case,
Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the
instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the
disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of
office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second, COMELEC Resolution No.
2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized
the filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and
he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if
petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General concurred
with petitioners arguments.

Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sungas letters-complaint of 22 April
1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the
letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no s ummons was ever issued by the
COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13
May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-
213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the
8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the
Silvestre v. Duavit[8] ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted
that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted under any of the following
circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending
(unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the
proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election and after the
proclamation of the winner.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondents arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile.COMELEC

itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995 election in the
form of letters-complaint, thus

This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter from
petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the
latters immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC
Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioners prayer while alleging that respondent and his men
committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban.Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was
filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the
previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.

That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no
consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private respondent on
26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted to
such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the
complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. [9]

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of
petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, If the fees above described
are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or proceeding. The use of the word may indicates that it is permissive only and operates to confer
a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal
fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment
of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the
procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and private respondent
was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private
respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or that
he was not required to answer.

Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before
the election but which remained unresolved after the election.What the Resolution mandates in such a
case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified.
The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is
totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification
case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the
proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
 Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No.
6646,[10] which provides:

SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (underscoring supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signifies
that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.
[11]
The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification
case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which
remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires.This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative
rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative
or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidateguilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the
dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for
any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying
tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be
decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main
intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest
the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the
disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC[12] this Court held -

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to
annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of
where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is
precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this
issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x x x Really, were a victim of
a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the
assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification
is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
 It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal
aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate.Like in any other
criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a
conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of
whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding
which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due
notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate may
be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.[13]

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to suspend the proclamation of
Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that the Commission may
order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidads guilt was strong as
shown in the Report and Recommendationof the COMELEC Law Department

Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioners petition against the respondent for disqualification for the
alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as use of
armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly
supported by affidavits of witnesses and other documents.Consequently, the petitioners evidence
supporting the disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has expressly
waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to the
presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995, thus the waiver is the intentional
relinquishing of a known right of respondent TRINIDAD.

In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of four (4)
criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that there was
indeed prima facie evidence of violation of election laws.

However, Sungas contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law
and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified
person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast
in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.[14]

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the sociological
and psychological elements behind voters preferences. Election is the process ofcomplete ascertainment
of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by
giving them direct participation in choosing the men and women who will run their government. Thus, it
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.[15]

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was
not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. [16] In Aquino v. COMELEC,[17] this Court
made the following pronouncement:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost
the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the
first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.

Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No. 7160,
[18]
which provides in part -

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-
Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x x

For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office x x x x

This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code of 1991.

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but
merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to
be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said
office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996
Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE
SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, for disqualification, and ACT on the case
taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

54 OG 1348 People vs. Ferrer

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208 January 26, 1995

JACINTO MAPPALA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CRISPULO A. NUEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuez, the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela for gross inefficiency, serious
misconduct and violation of the code of Judicial Ethics.

In 1989, the Provincial prosecutor of Isabela filed: (1) an information against Alejandro Angoluan for illegal
possession of a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 22-954); (2) an information
against Angoluan and five other co-accused for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 22-955); and (3) an
information against Alejandro and Honorato Angoluan for violation of the Omnibus election code (Criminal
Case No. 22-965). The complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 22-955 was Jacinto Mappala, the
complainant against respondent in this administrative case. All the actions were consolidated and
assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, presided by respondent.

On December 20, 1993, respondent rendered a consolidated decision in the aforementioned cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and considerations, in Criminal Case No.
955, this Court finds that the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. The prescribed penalty is six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree lower
which is prision correcional. He is therefore sentenced to suffer imprisonment from TWO
(2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correcional as Minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the complainant
Jacinto Mappala the sum of P18,514.00 representing hospitalization and medical
expenses; and to pay the costs. The accused Honorato Angoluan, Bienvenido Angoluan,
Jr., Zaldy Angoluan, Teodoro Zipagan, Jr., and Ramon Soriano are hereby ACQUITTED
FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

In Criminal Case No. 954, this Court finds the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in
Violation of P.D. No. 1866.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law. The penalty imposed is governed by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 of which provides:

Sec. 1 . . . If the offense is punished by other law, the court shall

sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

The prescribed penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms under P.D. 1866 is Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua. The Court hereby sentences him to an imprisonment
from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY. The firearm, Exhibit "H", is forfeited to the government.

And in Criminal Case No. 965, for Violation of the Omnibus election Code against
Alejandro Angoluan and Honorato Angoluan, this Court finds both accused "NOT
GUILTY" of the crime and therefore are ACQUITTED (Rollo, pp. 45-46).
The said decision is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In his letter-complaint dated March 28, 1994, complainant alleged that while the trial of the three cases
was terminated in December 1992 and the last pleading in the case, the prosecution's memorandum, was
submitted on May 27, 1993, respondent rendered his decision only on December 20, 1993 (Rollo,
p. 14).

Complainant charged respondent with: (1) gross inefficiency for rendering the decision beyond the
reglementary period of ninety days or seven months after the cases were submitted for decision; (2)
serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of violation of the Omnibus Election Code in
Criminal Case No. 22-965; and (3) violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics for giving credence to the alibi
of the accused Rizaldy Angoluan in Criminal Case No. 22-955 in the absence of any corroborating
testimony of any witness (Rollo, pp. 10-11). Complainant likewise accused respondent of accepting bribes
in connection with cases pending before him (Rollo, p. 11).

In his comment, respondent averred that the three actions involved grave offenses that required more
time in the preparation of the decision. He alleged that he had to await the memorandum of the public
prosecutors who requested additional time for the submission thereof (Rollo, p. 6).

He justified the acquittal of Alejandro of violation of the Election Law in Criminal Case No. 965 on the
ground that ". . . the firearm was not taken from his person within the precinct but was not taken . . . more
than 50 meters away from the precinct" (Rollo, p. 7).

Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime was the "carrying of firearms within (50)
or 100 meters away from the precinct. The firearm was not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100
meters distance from the precinct because in truth and in fact the said firearm was surrendered by the
accused two (2) days after the elections. The mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error. But be it 50
meters or 100 meters, still the accused could not be convicted under the said provision, specifically
Section 261, Subsection (p) of Article XXII of the Omnibus election Code" (Rollo, p. 7).

Respondent claimed that the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics was utterly irresponsible
and baseless, being the handiwork of a disgruntled litigant with the purpose of discrediting his reputation
(Rollo,
pp. 7-8).

Respondent denied having received bribes.

II

As to complainant's charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent rendered the decision beyond
the reglementary period of ninety days, reckoned from May 27, 1993, the date when the last pleading was
filed.

We are not impressed with respondent's excuse that it took time to resolve the three consolidated actions
involving grave offenses. If respondent required more time to resolve the cases, he is not without
recourse. He should have asked for more time to decide the cases from this Court, giving the justification
therefor.

In Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482 (1993), we emphasized "for the guidance of the judges
manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned
period and that failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge" (citing Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51 [1983]).

Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of Section 261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Said provision reads as follows:

Deadly weapons. Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and
within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for
the registration of voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of
the election returns. However, in cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or
public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry
firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the law.

In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at
the elementary school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on March 28,
1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the
surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in shooting
complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly
weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was the precinct.
According to respondent:

. . . With respect to the other accused Alejandro Angoluan, although there is evidence to
prove that he shot the complainant Jacinto Mappala, the gun which he allegedly used
was surrendered by him two (2) days after the incident and he was not apprehended in
possession of the gun within 100 meters radius of the precinct. This Court believes that
he should not be prosecuted (sic) in violation of Article 22, Section 261, Subsection (p) of
the Omnibus Election Code (Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis supplied).

To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not necessary that the
deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius
of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place
and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After
respondent himself had found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to understand
why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code.

The charge of serious misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics in connection with the
acquittal of Rizaldy Angoluan after sustaining his defense of alibi pertains to respondent's judicial
functions in the appreciation and evaluation of evidence. there is not enough evidence to set aside said
finding of fact.

For failure of complainant to substantiate his charge that respondent accepted monetary favors in
resolving the cases pending before him, we dismiss the same. While the Judiciary is in the process of
cleansing its ranks, we do not favor complaints based on mere hearsay.

WHEREFORE, respondent is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to be paid within thirty days from
receipt hereof, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or of acts calling for disciplinary action will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Manila and BUENAVENTURA C.
MANIEGO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul and
set aside the orders dated September 23, 1993 and January 25, 1994 of respondent Judge Wilfredo D.
Reyes, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-120275.

The facts reveal that respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II,
Bureau of Customs, Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP Customs Personnel Order
No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the
Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. 1 The actual transfer of
Ebio was made on January 14, 1992.

On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting
his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section
261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the
civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.

After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B. P.
Blg. 881 committed as follows:

That on or about January 14, 1992 which was within the election period of the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections and within the effectivity of the ban on transfer or detail of officers and
employees in the civil service, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public official, being the Collector of Customs VI,
Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs, by taking advantage of his position and
abuse of authority, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, transfer Jovencio D. Ebio, Chief of
the Piers and Inspection Division, Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs, to
Special Assistant in the office of the Deputy Collector for Operations, of the same office, without a
prior written authority from the Commission on Elections. 2

Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not
violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It
purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner, through the COMELEC, opposed the
motion to quash.

On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 93-120275. 3 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied on January 25,
1995. 4 Petitioner forthwith elevated the case to this Court on a pure question of law.
We affirm.

The basic law supposed to have been violated by respondent Maniego is Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881
which reads as follows:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts. The following shall be guilty of any election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. Any public official who makes or
causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including
public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution has fixed the election period for all elections to commence ninety (90) days before the
day of election and end thirty (30) days thereafter, unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the
COMELEC. 5 For the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC fixed a
longer election period of one hundred twenty (120) days before the scheduled elections and thirty (30)
days thereafter. It issued Resolution No. 2314 on September 23, 1991 primarily adopting therein a
calendar of activities. In the process, it designated January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992 as the election
period, viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. 2314

Pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and Republic Act No. 7166, the Commission on Elections
has RESOLVED to adopt, the following calendar of activities for the May 11, 1992 elections:

Date/Period Activities

November 28, 1991 Start of the period of nomination and selection of official candidates for
President, Vice-President and Senators (165 days, SEC. 6, R.A.7166)

January 2, 1992 Last day for appointment of members of boards of election inspectors
(Sec.164, OEC) (Subject to appointments which may be extended later in account of lack of
public school teachers and disqualifications due to relationship to candidates.)

January 12, 1992 ELECTION PERIOD (120 (Sunday) todays, per Res. No. ____ )
June 10, 1992 Bans on carrying of firearms Wednesday suspension of elective local officials,
organization of strike forces, etc. (Sec. 261,
OEC) 6

xxx xxx xxx

On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2328 for the sole and specific purpose
of fixing for the said elections the election period from January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992. 7 This
Resolution was published in the January 5, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the January 6, 1992 issue
of the Philippine Times Journal. 8
On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC also passed Resolution No. 2333 which promulgated the necessary
rules to enforce Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881. We quote its pertinent portions:

RESOLUTION NO. 2333

WHEREAS, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts, The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee
in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, to enforce effectively the foregoing provisions, there is need to promulgate the
necessary rules for the guidance of all concerned;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the power vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission has
RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules to implement the
provisions of Sec. 261, subsections (g), (h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Request for authority of the Commission. Any request for authority to make or cause
any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, including public school
teachers, shall be submitted in writing to the Commission indicating therein the office and place to
which the officer or employee is proposed to be transferred or detailed, and stating the reason
therefor.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effectivity. This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day after its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

Resolution No. 2333 was published in the January 8, 1992 issues of Malaya and the Manila Standard.
Hence, it took effect on January 15, 1992, the seventh day after its publication.

It is undeniable that the transfer of complainant Ebio on January 14, 1992 was made during the election
period. The question, however, is whether this transfer ipso facto makes respondent Maniego liable for an
election offense under Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.

We rule in the negative.

We start with the constitutional injunction that no officer or employee in the civil service shall engage,
directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. 9 This prohibition is reiterated in
the Administrative Code of 1987. 10 Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 implements this constitutional
prohibition.

It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the
transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the transfer or detail
of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. 11 It is necessary to meet the
exigencies of public service sometimes too difficult to perceive and predict. Without this inherent
prerogative, the appointing authority may not be able to cope with emergencies to the detriment of public
service. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of government officer or employee will not be penalized by
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2
of Resolution No. 2333 provides that the COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the proposed
transfer or detail, viz: "Any request for authority to make or cause any transfer or detail of any officer or
employee in the civil service, including public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing to the
Commission indicating therein the office and place to which the officer or employee is proposed to be
transferred or detailed, and stating the reason therefor. 12

Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261
(h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election
period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the
COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.

In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the Customs Operation Chief, MICP to
the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant on January 14, 1992.
On this date, January 14, 1992, the election period for the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections had
already been fixed to commence January 12, 1992 until June 10, 1992. As aforestated, this election
period had been determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 2314 dated November 20, 1991 and
Resolution No. 2328 January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect
on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval on the
transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election period. Before the effectivity of these
rules, it cannot be said that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable.
Needless to state, respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the
COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on
the subject were yet in existent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and the orders dated September 23, 1993 and January 25,
1995 of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 93-120275 are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61998 February 22, 1983

ROGELIO DE JESUS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.

Jaime G. Fortes for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

The question of law posed for determination in this petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan may be propounded thus: Which of these entities have the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office the
Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan
and the Sandiganbayan?

After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party
for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint
charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978
Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of Justice which endorsed the same to the
Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that petitioner was being charged in relation to his
office, Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan
prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a resolution finding the
existence of a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 1 and sub-sections [x] 2 and
[mm] 3 of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. After approval thereof by the Tanodbayan, the
following information, dated January 27, 1982, was filed before the Sandiganbayan:

That on or about January 30, 1980 and sometime thereafter to February 6, 1980, in the
Municipality of Casiguran Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while discharging the Office of the
Election Registrar in the Municipality of Casiguran, Province of Sorsogon, taking
advantage and abusing his official position, did there and there wilfully unlawfully and
feloniously by reason of his being a registrar knowingly registered persons in order to
vote on January 30, 1980 being an election day and at the same time issuing
Identification cards during election day, thereby violating the provision of the Election
Code of 1978 and at the same time tampering with the election reports by mag it appear
that 10,727 persons were the total number of registered voters for the election of January
30, 1980, when in truth and in fact the actual total number of voters as - sported on
January 27, 1980 by the accused was only 10,532 but then changed to 10,727, thereby
violating the provisions of Section '89' and Section.'178' under Article XVI specifically sub-
section 'X' and sub-section 'MM' which is a violation of the Election Code of 1978 to the
erosion of public faith and confidence.

The case, docketed as SB Criminal Case No. 5054, was raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense

xxx xxx xxx

[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or causes the
issuance of a voter's certificate of registration or cancels or causes the cancellation
thereof the violation of the provisions of this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

 [mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs any -function of a
member of the election committee, or the board of canvassers, or deputy of
representative of the Commission.

charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate,
prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its opposition, the
prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan's exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.

The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as amicus curiae,
and through its law department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr., submitted a memorandum supporting
petitioner's stand. 4

On August 13, 1982, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to quash.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The legal question posed being one of first impression, this, Court resolved to give due course to the
petition, treating the same as an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
proper mode by which relief from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan could be obtained from this
Tribunal. Petitioner and respondents rely on different provisions of the 1973 Constitution as bases for their
respective contentions. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XII[c] of the 1973 Constitution which vests
upon the COMELEC the power "to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
and its implementing legislation, Section 182 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides the following:

Section 182 Prosecution. The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal officer,
have the power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the government.

Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which invests the court of first instance with
"exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts. ... The Solicitor General supports the petitioner's views. 5

Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, in its resolution of August 13, 1982, 6 asserts its jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 5054 on the authority of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which mandated
the creation by the Batasan Pambansa of "a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall
have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices, and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned and
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

To the Sandiganbayan, as set forth in the challenged resolution, ... the key phrase in the determination as
to which of the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts of first instance should take cognizance of an
election offense, is the phrase, 'in relation to their office'." Thus, it would distinguish between election
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and those committed not in
relation to their office, in this manner:

If the election offense is committed by a public officer or employee NOT in relation to their
office, generally, jurisdiction will be assumed by the regular courts. If, on the other hand,
the offense was committed by a public officer or employee in relation to their office, then
 there is no other tribunal vested with jurisdiction to try such offense but this court, in
consonance with the mandate of the Constitution that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, lover ... offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office.

We find the position of the Sandiganbayan devoid of merit.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not
without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in
the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of
every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness
in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive
neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as
contra-distinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code
of 1978.

Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ... offenses committed by public
officers ... in relation to their office as may be determined by law" [Sec. 5, Art. XIII]; while the Office of the
Tanodbayan shall "receive and investigate complaints relative to public office." [Sec. 6, Art. XIII]. The
clause, "as may be determined by law" is, to Our mind imbued with grave import. It called for a legislation
that would define and delineate the power and jurisdiction of both the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and 1607,
creating the said entities.

Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

[a] Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

[b] Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and,

[c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.

Plainly, the above quoted paragraph [c] is but a re-statement of the constitutional provision relating to the
Sandiganbayan. It is also to be noted that it is phased in terms so broad and general that it cannot be
legitimately construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal the exclusive and
original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance to
hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of the accused.
Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored. it is noted that while Section 184 of the
Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c] of P.D. No, 1606 speaks generally of
"other crimes or offenses committed by public officers ... in relation to their office." Needless to state, as
between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than a general statute does. 7 And where a reconciliation between the statute is possible, as in the
case at bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the latter. 8

The same principle of statutory construction should be applied with respect to the powers vested upon the
COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in so far as election offenses are concerned.

Moreover, as aptly observed by the COMELEC as well as the Solicitor General, splitting the jurisdiction
over election offenses would serve no beneficial purpose but would rather spawn much controversy
"complaints about unequal protection, about inconsistent decisions, etc. (which are) not conducive to a
fair and speedy administration of justice." [p. 17, Comment, Solicitor General].

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second Division dated August 13, 1982 is hereby set
aside and Criminal Case No. 5054. entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rogelio de Jesus" is
ordered dismissed. The COMELEC is hereby directed to forthwith conduct an investigation, and if the
evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against petitioner before the proper court of first
instance. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

Gervasio Diaz for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding
the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:

A eso de las once de la maana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las
elecciones generales en el precinto electoral numero 4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del
Municipio de Pilar, Provincia de Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio,
que era entonces el representante del Departamento del Interior para inspecionar las elecciones
generales en la Provincia de Capiz, y por el comandante de la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que
iba en aquella ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de
calibre 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para el
citado colegio electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de 22 metros del referido colegio electoral.
Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del revolver en cuestion.
 La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de
establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la calle que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a
invitacion de dicho Jose D. Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para
llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya habian terminado de votar, y
que cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en
la calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el acusado
cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una distancia de 27 metros.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del
cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como
colegio electoral.

2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral

querrellada y, por consiguiente, al condenarle a prision y multa.

As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record shows
that both Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the
Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the Province of Capiz,
testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio
took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that part of the
argument under the second assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant was in a public
road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument under the second
assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is
nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend and merely
approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many
people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in his
automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a
violation of the law.

As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of
losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for
the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had
called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that
occasion.

The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for
electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election precincts
are within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd, because members
of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could
not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral
precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their own residences on
registration and election days;

That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence
in any way the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;

That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in
question should only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for
the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the
decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20,
1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the
request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is
no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of
anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the
electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election
was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the
defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.

We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The
law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the
law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence
surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act
prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere
otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender
actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he
intended to intimidate the voters.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient
if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14
Phil., 128.)

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be
held criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at
least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the
power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great
master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128;
U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in
the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and
Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)

The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the
enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within
fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a
criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who
merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be
carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs.
Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a
policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose
of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not
proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell
intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.

As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question, that
is a matter for the Chief Executive or the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.