TURLA, REGINAL M.

2014-120321 JD 3A
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias KAWIT, appellant.

G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were
on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga.
They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar,
through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. 3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn
that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay
home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the
house.

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel.
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. 6 She
later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth
at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house
of Isabel Dawang.

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he
had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were reddish and sharp.
Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband
then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were
off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She
noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was
tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid.

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter
of Isabel, Cion, called the police.
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2014-120321 JD 3A
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ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficiency of circumstancial evidence.

HELD:

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of
the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25
in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias Kawit to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED
to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is
DELETED.
TURLA, REGINAL M.
2014-120321 JD 3A
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ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004

FACTS:

On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press
conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the
press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused
Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among
the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against
Binay.

Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. Angel Gonong,
a writer for the Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of
Rivals. It was cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-
Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the Peoples Journal. Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a
similar article entitled Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco which was cleared for publication by Augusto
Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of
the News Today.

The open letter was subsequently published under the title Plea to CorySave Makati in newspapers
such as the Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.5 The pertinent portions of the
open letter read:

4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr. Augusto
Bobby Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION HAD ALREADY

PRESCRIBED WHEN THE SAID INFORMATION WAS FILED.

HELD:

NO.The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive period for libel should be reckoned from
the date of filing of the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the Court
in Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,
which applies to the complaints filed against Brillante as of October 1988.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are GRANTED in part.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainant Dr. Nemesio Prudente in
Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos \
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(P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainants Atty.

Jejomar Binay and Francisco Baloloy is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in
Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 88 3060, respectively.
TURLA, REGINAL M.
2014-120321 JD 3A
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FIDEL T. SALAMERA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent.

G.R. No. 121099. February 17, 1999

FACTS:

On February 2, 1988, petitioner was elected to and assumed the position of mayor of the municipality of
Casiguran, province of Aurora.

Later that month, he received from Casiguran Barangay Captain 1 Antonio Benavidez one .38 Caliber
Smith & Wesson Revolver, with Serial No. 879886. The gun was owned by and licensed to Ponciano
Benavidez, an uncle of Antonio, who mortgaged it to him. Petitioner placed the gun in an attache case.

After about a week, petitioner together with his security men, went to Manila, and brought with them the
attache case with the gun in it. On their return to the province, their car was stopped at a spot checkpoint
in Quezon City, where Pat. Alfredo B. Villanueva of the Quezon City Police saw the revolver. On
petitioners instruction, his security men surrendered the gun to police officer Villanueva.

Back in the municipality of Casiguran, Ponciano Benavidez, the licensed owner of the gun claimed it
from petitioner. The latter informed Ponciano that the gun was confiscated by the Quezon City Police.

On September 30, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora
a complaint for theft against petitioner and Antonio Benavidez.

On December 13, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the Department of Local Government, an
administrative complaint against petitioner for abuse of authority, ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming of a public servant.

On January 20, 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora dismissed the case for theft.

On April 6, 1989, complainant Ponciano Benavidez filed a complaint for theft against petitioner with the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila.

On August 21, 1990, during the investigation of the administrative case by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Aurora, complainant Ponciano Benavidez executed an affidavit of desistance acknowledging that
petitioner had paid the value of the gun, and withdrawing the administrative case and the criminal case he
filed against petitioner with the Ombudsman.

On August 22, 1990, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved a resolution dismissing the administrative
case against petitioner.

On March 9, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing by Special Prosecution Officer Prospero G.
Pelayo of an information against petitioner for malversation of public funds, which was duly filed on
March 12, 1992, with the Sandiganbayan, Manila.

On March 30, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest. On March 30, 1992, petitioner posted a
cash bail of P20,000.00, which he deposited with the provincial treasurer of Aurora, duly approved by
Regional Trial Court Judge Filemon N. Tan of Baler, Aurora.
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2014-120321 JD 3A
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Upon arraignment on June 1, 1992, before the Sandiganbayan, First Division, petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty, and accordingly, the court scheduled the case for pre-trial conference.

Meantime, on or about August 14, 1992, petitioner was able to contact Pat. Villanueva in Camp Karingal,
Quezon City. The latter said that he returned the gun to Patrolman Orgas, one of petitioners security men
on the very next day after he had confiscated it. Unfortunately, Pat. Orgas did not inform petitioner about
the recovery of the gun, and, at the time Villanueva so informed petitioner, Pat. Orgas had died.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE GUN WHICH IS OWNED BY A PRIVATE PERSON CONVERTED INTO A PUBLIC
PROPERTY WHEN IT WAS ENTRUSTED TO A PUBLIC OFFICER.

HELD:

NO. By turning over the gun to petitioner mayor, the gun did not become public property because it was
not intended for public use or purpose nor was it lawfully seized. The gun continued to be private
property, that is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its return to him, not to be turned over to the
public coffer or treasury. Petitioners failure to return the gun after demand by the private owner did not
constitute a prima facie evidence of malversation. The property was private and the one who demanded
its return was a private person, not a person in authority. The presumption of conversion will not apply.
TURLA, REGINAL M.
2014-120321 JD 3A
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997.

FACTS:

That on or about May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in gross disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control dried marijuana leaves weighing
800 grams, more or less, which he transported to Surigao City from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship,
well knowing that such acts are expressly prohibited by law.

Before arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra, offered to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, i.e., illegal possession of prohibited drugs. The trial court requested the prosecution to study the
offer, but the records do not show any agreement on such proposal.

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After the prosecution presented its
evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a Demurrer to Evidence dated September 1,
1993, questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly was illegally seized from appellant.
The court a quo denied the motion, ruling:

For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1, 1993 of the accused, Roel Encinada,
praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of the inadmissibility of the evidence for
the prosecution consisting of the marijuana (seized) from him by the police. The accused raised the
following issues, to wit: (1) Whether the arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall
under the doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject
marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused.

ISSUE:

WON THE EVIDENVE SUFFICIENLY SHOWS THE POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA BY

APPELLANT

HELD:

Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of the plastic baby
chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers
riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant
consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant
sat inside the motorela. This claim, aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of
stenographic notes.

In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs, stressing that he was
not holding them when the search was conducted.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PANTALEON PACIS, ELISEO
(ELY) NAVARRO, GUILLERMO AGDEPPA, and GINES DOMINGUEZ, defendants,
GUILLERMO AGDEPPA, defendant-appellant.
Nos. L-32957-8. July 25, 1984

FACTS:

That on or about November 15, 1967, in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pantaleon Pacis, Ely Navarro, Guillermo
Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez, together with three other John Does who are still at large and
unidentified, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation, with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one Macario Basco, inflicting upon him
several gunshot wounds; that the accused have performed all the acts of execution, which would produce
the crime of Murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their own will.

After hearing the evidence adduced by the parties during a joint trial, the trial court found the accused
Pantaleon Pacis and Elly Navarro guilty of the crime of Murder, as charged in Crim. Case No. 288-S and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the deceased Manuel Franco in the amount of P1,200.00 plus P25,000.00 for the loss of earning
capacity, P12,000.00 indemnity for the death of the said Manuel Franco and P10,000.00 as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Their co-accused
Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez were acquitted of the charge.

Gines Dominguez was also acquitted in Crim. Case No. 289-S, a prosecution for Frustrated Murder.
Guillermo Agdeppa, however, and his co-accused Pantaleon Pacis and Elly Navarro were found guilty of
the charge and sentenced to suffer the penalty heretofore stated.

From this judgment, the accused Pantaleon Pacis, Elly Navarro, and Guillermo Agdeppa appealed to this
Court. However, sometime later, the accused Pantaleon Pacis and Elly Navarro withdrew their respective
appeals.1 Under consideration is the appeal of Guillermo Agdeppa from the judgment of the trial court
which found him guilty of Frustrated Murder.

ISSUE:

WON FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE?

HELD:

The maxim of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, however, is not a positive rule of law. Neither is it an
inflexible one of universal application. If a part of a witness testimony is found true, it cannot be
disregarded entirely. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.

Counsel for the appellant also claims that the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the highly
improbable, contradictory, and incredible tale of the witnesses for the prosecution, since all the bullet
pock marks on the cement wall show conclusively that the shooting came from the street where the
gravel and sand truck was, and not from the top of the stairs where Pacis, Navarro, and Agdeppa were
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standing; and that the said witnesses failed to notify the authorities or anyone until after the lapse of
several months.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the accused-appellant should be given 4/5 credit for the period of preventive imprisonment he had
undergone, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6127, approved on June 17, 1970. With proportionate costs against
the appellant in this instance.
TURLA, REGINAL M.
2014-120321 JD 3A
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO DUCAY, accused.
SANTOS DUCAY, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 86939. August 2, 1993

FACTS:

Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, father and son, were charged with the complex crime of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder in an Information 1 filed on 16 October 1986 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, allegedly committed as follows:

that on or about the 12th day of October, 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and shoot
with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina
Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, hitting them on their body, thereby causing them
serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos; thereby, also,
with respect to Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos performing all the acts of
execution which ordinarily would have produced the crime of murder but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to said Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos which prevented their
death.

ISSUE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS POSITIVE PROSECUTION WITNESSES EDWIN

LABOS AND LINA LABOS IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED; HENCE, IT ERRED WHEN IT
REJECTED ACCUSEDS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

HELD:

No.

Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to Edwin and Linas
testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it should, pursuant to the maxim falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit him.
In People vs. Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a
permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In People vs. Pacada, we stated that the
testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs.
Osias, we ruled that: It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are
found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he
positively identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged xxx. Professor
Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary: It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in
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itself worthless;first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a
kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life;
and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what
they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice
pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because
it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly
unimportant in themselves.
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2014-120321 JD 3A
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGR. CARLOS GARCIA y
PINEDA, PATRICIO BOTERO y VALES, LUISA MIRAPLES (at large), accused, PATRICIO
BOTERO y VALES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 117010. April 18, 1997

FACTS:

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 93871
convicting accused-appellant Patricio Botero of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

In an Information dated July 21, 1992, accused-appellant Patricio Botero together with Carlos P. Garcia
and Luisa Miraples were charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale defined by Article 38
(b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1920
and 2018, committed as follows:
That on or before March 2, 1992, and subsequently thereafter, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, representing
themselves to have authority, license and/or permit to contract, enlist and recruit workers for overseas
employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise job
placement/employment abroad.

ISSUE:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT PATRICIO BOTERO IS SUFFICIENT FOR
CONVICTION.

HELD:

In effect, accused-appellant Botero wants this court to apply the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus (false in one part, false in everything) and to disregard the entire testimony of Esclada. Under
present jurisprudence, this maxim of law is rarely adhered to by the courts. It is possible to admit and lend
credence to the testimony of a witness whom the Court has earlier found to have willfully perjured
himself. x x x (T)he testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending
upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. In the case at bar,
we hold that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Esclada against appellant
Botero since it was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of other witnesses. In fact,
Escladas testimony against Botero is trustworthy as he gave it after his conscience bothered him for not
telling the truth.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PAUL BANDIN Y NARCISO @
ABLING, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 104494. September 10, 1993

FACTS:

In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, an informer reported to the office of the 5th Narcotics Regional Unit,
NARCOM, PNP, stationed at Camp Simeon Ola (then Camp Bagong Ibalon) in Legazpi City that drug
trafficking by a pusher named Abling was rampant at Bagtang Terminal, Daraga, Albay.

Upon receipt of the report, the Commanding Officer of the NARCOM organized a buy-bust operation
to be led by Sgt. Felipe Tuzon, Jr., to whom marked money bills amounting to P20.00, bearing serial
numbers: QR738352 (P10.00), WA 837855 (P5.00), and ZN121085 (P5.00) were given to be used in the
purchase of marijuana cigarettes. The raiding team composed of Staff Sgt. Felipe Tuzon, Staff Sgt.
Evangelico Intia, Sgt. Galvan and Sgt. Tugado, with the informer in tow, proceeded to the Bagtang
Terminal and strategically positioned themselves.

The informer approached the appellant, Paul Bandin alias Abling, who was seated in a trimobile, and
asked him if he had marijuana for sale. The appellant replied that he had. The informer left and returned
after a short while with Sgt. Tuzon, who, acting as poseur-buyer, bought a tea bag of marijuana (Exh. B)
from the appellant. As payment, Sgt. Tuzon gave him the marked bills amounting to P20.00 (Exhs. E, E-
1, and E-2).

Thereafter, Sgt. Tuzon Jr. gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions by combing his hair. The latter
approached the appellant and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. A body search was conducted
on the appellant which resulted in the recovery from him of the marked money bills and a stick of
marijuana cigarette (Exh. C).

The appellant was brought to the NARCOM office for investigation and there, Sgt. Tuzon prepared a
document known as a Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. F or 4) which was signed by the appellant (Exh.
F-3 or 4-A). C1C Orlando Deria prepared a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exh. G or 5), which the
appellant, unassisted by counsel, signed (Exh. G-1 or 5-A).

Sgt. Tuzon made an initial field test of the confiscated evidence (Exh. B) by burning a small quantity of it,
as shown in the Certificate of Initial Field Test (Exh. H or 3) which reads in part:
Field Test conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test as Marijuana, a
prohibited drugs.

This certification is issued for inquest of said case pending final result of the Laboratory Examination
which will be conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region 5, Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legazpi City.
(p. 14, Exh. H. Records.)

On June 25, 1991, Sgt. Tuzon, Jr. forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory one (1) small transparent
cellophane bag containing suspected marijuana dried leaves (Exh. B) and one stick of suspected
marijuana cigarette (Exh. C), as indicated in his letter request (Exh. A).

The Chemistry Report No. D-157-91 (Exh. D or 1) of the forensic chemist shows that the qualitative
examination that was conducted on the specimens gave POSITIVE results to the tests for
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MARIJUANA, and the conclusion was that the abovementioned specimens are MARIJUANA
(prohibited drug).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in:

1. admitting in evidence Exhibit F (Receipt of Property Seized) and Exhibit G (Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report), the same having been signed by the accused without the assistance of counsel;
2. admitting in evidence the tea bag of marijuana, the marijuana stick and the marked money despite
the fact that they were obtained through an illegal search;

3. giving credence to the testimony of the forensic chemist.

HELD:

1. With regard to the appellants signature on the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exh. G), the Court
reiterates its ruling in People vs. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, that when an arrested person signs a Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to
any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accuseds being booked
and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges
of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extrajudicial statement and cannot be the
basis of a judgment of conviction.

2. The accused was caught in flagrante dehcto for he was carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime,
at the time of his arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid.

3. The field test conducted by Sgt. Tuzon is judicially admissible. This Court has held that a chemical
analysis is not an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of whether a certain substance offered in
evidence is a prohibited drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without a knowledge
of chemistry to such an extent that testimony of a witness on the point may be entitled to great weight.
Such technical knowledge is not required, and the degree of familiarity of a witness with such drugs only
affects the weight and not the competency of his testimony.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO MAUYAO y LORENZO,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 84525. April 6, 1992

FACTS:

On 20 April 1987, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, after relating with an informant who admitted
having acted as a runner (or a person who approaches would-be buyers) for the accused-appellant
Arturo Mauyao (ibid), P/Sgt. Jimmy Carbonell formed a raiding team composed of himself as team
leader, and four (4) others as members, among them, Pat. Rizal Papa and Pat. Ramon Alferos. Pat. Alferos
would be the poseur buyer and thus, was handed two (2) ten-peso bills, both initialled by Pat. Papa
(ibid., 7-8). P/Sgt. Carbonell would be the arresting officer, while the others would act as back-up
security.

The apprehending party then boarded a civilian Ford Fiera (ibid., 10) and proceeded to Leyte del Sur
Street, stopping a few meters away from where the suspect was expected (ibid., 11). Pat. Alferos walked
with the informant towards the residence of the accused-appellant. P/Sgt. Carbonell, who was then in
short pants and slippers, positioned himself on the other side of the street across the residence of the
accused-appellant, pretending to buy fish balls from a fish ball stand. He was, more or less, four (4)
meters away from where the transaction was to take place. The others likewise took their respective
positions (ibid., 12; 31-33).

Upon seeing the accused-appellant, who was just standing outside his house at 923 Leyte del Sur Street,
the informant introduced Pat. Alferos. Pat. Alferos was described to the accused-appellant as a drug
addict. Pat. Alferos then told the accused-appellant that he wanted to buy five (5) tea bags. Pat. Alferos
gave him the two (2) marked ten peso bills. The accused-appellant, in turn, handed over to Pat. Alferos
five (5) tea bags and two (2) sticks of marijuana cigarettes as free.

At this point, Pat. Alferos introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the accused-appellant.
Meanwhile, after witnessing the exchange, P/Sgt. Carbonell, who was across the street, immediately ran
towards the suspect, (accused-appellant) and assisted the poseur-buyer to arrest the suspect. The other
team members, upon seeing P/Sgt. Carbonell, also closed in on the accused-appellant.

The accused-appellant then voluntarily surrendered the red clutch bag tucked to his waist which turned
out to contain ten (10) more tea bags of marijuana leaves and four (4) more sticks of marijuana cigarettes
(ibid., 16-17). The two (2) marked ten pesos bills and some other bills were likewise recovered from him
(ibid., 36). The place where the transaction took place was well-lighted by a street light. There was no
search and seizure warrant for the subject operation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
despite irreconcilable inconsistencies and improbabilities.

HELD:
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It was rule by the Supreme Court that Minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declaration of
witnesses do not destroy their credibility, but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either their substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony.

Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Trial Court except in case of an evident abuse thereof.
This Court, in a long line of decisions, has repeatedly held that the findings of fact of a trial judge who
has seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and conduct while on the witness
stand are not disturbed on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked
which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO TURLA Y BATI, defendant-
appellant. GR No. L-70270. November 11, 1988.

FACTS:

The evidence shows that on September 23,1984 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Sgt. Venusto
Jamisolamin of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga received
information from an informer that at dawn the following day a drug pusher was going to steal a car at the
vicinity of 3rd Street, Balibago, Angeles City.

"On the same date, Sgt. Ruben Bazar, also of the 3rd Regional Narcotics Unit, with the aid of an informer,
met the herein accused at the Hongkong Restaurant in Angeles City. In that meeting, Sgt. Bazar, who
pretended to be a civilian, proposed to buy from the accused a kilo of marijuana for P1 ,000.00. It was
then agreed that the accused would deliver the marijuana on the following day between 5:00 and 6:00
o'clock in the morning at the Pampanguea Restaurant in San Fernando, Pampanga.
"Acting on the information supplied by his informant, Sgt. Jamisolamin together with Sgts. Daniel M.
Guillermo and one Sgt. Nava, left Camp Olivas at around 3:45 in the morning of September 24, 1984 for
the purpose of arresting the would be thief. On reaching 3rd Street, Balibago, Angeles City, at around
4:10 in the morning, the three PC sergeants, together with Sgt. Jamisolamin's informer, who was already
waiting for them, positioned themselves inconspicuously near the place where the Toyota car was parked.
After waiting for about fifteen minutes, a man appeared, proceeded to the car, opened its left door and
drove the car away. Sgt. Jamisolamin recognized the man as the same man he had previously arrested for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. That man was Danilo Turla, alias Danny Bangus. The PC sergeants
attempted to pursue the accused but lost sight of him when their car developed engine trouble. Having
failed to apprehend the accused, the PC soldiers, together with the informer, decided to return to San
Fernando, Pampanga to assist Sgt. Bazar in arresting a drug pusher whom the latter would meet at the
Pampanguea Restaurant. Upon reaching Barangay Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga, the informer
noticed the red Toyota Corona, which they had earlier pursued, parked at a Shell gasoline station. The PC
soldiers, after their attention was called to such fact, immediately drove to the gasoline station to effect an
arrest. There, the soldiers confronted the accused as to the ownership of the car and asked him to show his
driver's license and the car's registration papers. The accused could not show neither of the documents
asked but explained to the soldiers that the car belonged to his sister. The PC soldiers then directed the
accused to open the back compartment of the car. At first, the accused hesitated but finally opened it.
Inside the trunk, the PC soldiers found a sack. Upon further inspection, the sack yielded a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana leaves weighing at about one kilo (Exhibit E-1). When asked as to the
ownership of the marijuana leaves, the accused declared that he does not know anything of the articles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that he is guilty of the
crime charged, since he was not caught in the act of selling marijuana, and his ownership or possession of
the marijuana leaves, said to have been found inside the trunk compartment of the car, has not been duly
proved.

HELD:

It is claimed for the defense that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are contradictory and
conflicting so that they do not deserve credence. It would appear, however, that the contradictory and
conflicting statements pointed out by counsel for the accused-appellant refer to minor details which
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cannot destroy the credibility of witnesses. Again, the issue posed is one of credibility of witnesses which,
as this Court has often said, is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had
first-hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the
prosecution and the defense, at the time of their testimony. We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial judge. APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Br. 41.
TURLA, REGINAL M.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO ARAPOK y
CUTAMORA,accused-appellant. G.R. No. 134974. December 8, 2000*

FACTS:
That on or about the 29th of November, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with four (4) other persons whose true names and whereabouts have not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, armed with firearms with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence against and intimidation of persons, to wit: by entering the residence of one
CLAUDELIA MESIONA Y JAVIER located at No. 044 Gold Street, Barangay Commonwealth, this City
and once inside by poking their firearms at the persons inside the said house and announcing that it was a
holdup did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following:

One (1) VHS Video Cassette Player P7000, One (1) Lenon Instamatic Camera P900, One (1) Small dark
blue ladiesbag P50, One (1) LadiesWallet P120, One (1) Small blue ladies bag P75, One (1) Seiko wrist
watch P1600, One (1) goldring P2500 and One (1) gold bracelet P15000 in the total amount of
P27,245.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said CLOUDELIA MESIONA Y JAVIER against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the said amount of P27,245.00, Philippine Currency.

That on the occasion of the said offense of robbery for the purpose of enabling the said accused to take,
steal, and carry away the aforesaid personal properties and in pursuance of their conspiracy the said
accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strengths, did then and there
treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon PO2 ROMEO D. CALCITAS, one of the
policemen from the PNP Criminal Investigation Group CID, NCRIO, Camp Crame, Quezon City who
responded at the scene by then and there shooting the latter several times with a firearm, thereby inflicting
upon said PO2 ROMEO D. CALCITAS mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediately
cause of his death thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant considering that he was not
clearly positively identified and absent any proof of conspiracy.

HELD:
Yes. In seeking the conviction of an accused in a criminal case, the first, if not the basic foundation upon
which the prosecution builds its case against the former is proof beyond reasonable doubt that it is the
said accused who committed the crime charged. In other words, the identity of the accused is the first duty
of the prosecution.

In cases such as the instant one, where the identification made by the principal eyewitness Claudelia
Mesiona was uncertain, a little extra effort on the part of the prosecution to acquire appropriate
corroborating evidence goes far towards achieving the proper ends of justice. Whatever flaw attended the
out-of-court identification of accused-appellant could have easily been cured by a subsequent positive
identification in court by Editho Mesiona himself. Stated in another way, inadmissibility or unreliability
of an out-of-court identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-
court identification.

Once again we stress that the correct identification of the author of a crime should be the primal concern
of criminal prosecution in any civilized legal system. Corollary to this is the actuality of the commission
of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.
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Thus, even if the defense of the accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence
dictates that it is for the people to demonstrateguilt and notfor the accused to establish innocence.

J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., VITALIADO P.
ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
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G.R. No. 74336. April 7, 1997

FACTS:

On February 28, 1977, the Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a Board Resolution, authorized and
empowered petitioner and private respondent Vitaliado Arrieta, Intertrades President and Executive Vice-
President, respectively, to jointly apply for and open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank.
Pursuant to such authority, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed several trust receipts from
May to June, 1977, the aggregate value of which amounted to P562,443.46, with Intertrade as the
entrustee and private respondent Metrobank as the entruster.

On March 14, 1977, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement whereby both bound themselves jointly and severally with Intertrade to pay private
respondent Metrobank whatever obligation Intertrade incurs, but not exceeding the amount of
P750,000.00.

In this connection, private respondent Metrobanks Debit Memo to Intertrade dated March 22, 1978
showed full settlement of the letters of credit covered by said trust receipts in the total amount of
P562,443.46.

On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, a bookkeeper in the employ of
Intertrade, obtained a P500,000.00 loan from private respondent Metrobank. Both executed a Promissory
Note in favor of said bank in the amount of P500,000.00. Under said note, private respondents Arrieta and
Perez promised to pay said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of
P20,000.00 each starting on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum, and in case of default, a
further 8% per annum.

Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments, thus resulting in
the entire obligation becoming due and demandable. In 1979, private respondent Metrobank instituted suit
against Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only the
unpaid principal obligation, but also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit.

More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an Amended
Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of impleading petitioner as liable for the loan made
by private respondents Arrieta and Perez on March 21, 1978, notwithstanding the fact that such liability is
being claimed on account of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977 executed by
petitioner and private respondent Arrieta specifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and
granted to, Intertrade, through petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were specially given
authority by Intertrade on February 28, 1977 to open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. The
obligations incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines were completely paid as evidenced by private
respondent Metrobanks debit memo in the full amount of P562,443.46.

ISSUE:
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THE CONCLUSIONS AND CONSTRUCTION REACHED BY RESPONDENT COURT FROM THE
FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF RECORD, ARE INCORRECT RESULTING IN AN ERRONEOUS
DECISION GRAVELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.5

HELD:

The Court says we note that the only document to evidence the subject transaction was the promissory
note dated March 21, 1978 signed by private respondents Arrieta and Lilia Perez. There is no indication in
said document as to what capacity the two signatories had in affixing their signatures thereon.

It is noted that the subject transaction is a loan contract for P500,000.00 under terms and conditions which
are stringent, if not onerous. The power to borrow money is one of those cases where even a special
power of attorney is required. In the instant case, there is invariably a need of an enabling act of the
corporation to be approved by its Board of Directors. As found by the trial court, the records of this case
is bereft of any evidence that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon Arrieta and Lilia
Perez the authority to contract a loan with Metrobank and execute the promissory note as a security
therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a stockholders resolution was presented by Metrobank to show
that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were empowered by Intertrade to execute the promissory
Note

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 11, 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the trial court dated February 29,
1984 is hereby REINSTATED.

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
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G.R. No. 119845. July 5, 1996

FACTS:

On November 19, 1980, respondent Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) granted Dynetics, Inc. a short-
term EXPORT loan line in the amount of P25 million pursuant to an Advisory Letter-Agreement (Exh. A,
A-1). The loan was secured by a deed of assignment with pledge on export letters of credit and/or
purchase orders equivalent to 100% of their face value. The said credit line was subsequently renewed on
various dates and in various amounts, the last renewal having been made on January 24, 1985 in the
increased amount of P26 million evidenced by the Renewal Credit Line Agreement (Exh. B).

Pursuant to said Renewal Credit Line Agreement, Dynetics availed itself of the export loan for the period
of February to May 1985 in the total amount of P25,074,906.16, executing and signing for said purpose
34 promissory notes of various dates covering the aforementioned period (Exhs. C to JJ), and trust
receipts (pp. 7-8, CA Decision; pp. 155-156, Rollo).

Prior to this 1985 availment, particularly on April 20, 1982, Dynetics obtained another credit
accommodation or SWAP loan from SBTC in the amount of $700,000.00. To secure payment thereof,
petitioner Antonio Garcia, with Vicente B. Chuidian, executed an Indemnity Agreement in favor of SBTC
on April 26, 1982 (Exh. NN).

It appears that Dynetics did not avail itself of this SWAP loan. Subsequently, however, in 1983, the SWAP
loan facility was renewed in the reduced amount of $500,000.00 and it was this loan which Dynetics
availed of in 1985 and concerning which it issued a promissory note (Exh. PP). The SWAP loan was
renewed in 1984, this time on a quarterly basis, the last quarterly renewal having been made on April 22,
1985. By this time, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a continuing suretyship undertaking (Exh. OO,
OO-1) in accordance with, and in pursuance of, which petitioner Garcia bound himself jointly and
severally with Dynetics to pay all the latters obligations with respondent SBTC. Subsequent thereto,
however, and without the consent and knowledge of Garcia, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a chattel
mortgage over various pieces of machinery to secure the SWAP loan (Exh. LL).

Dynetics failed to pay the SWAP loan upon its maturity on July 22, 1985, prompting SBTC to foreclose
on the chattel mortgage. The mortgaged chattels were sold at public auction on September 15, 1985 to
SBTC as highest bidder for the amount of P6,850,861.30. This amount was applied as partial payment of
the SWAP loan, leaving a deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72.

Dynetics also defaulted in the payment of the EXPORT loan which amounted to over P464 million,
exclusive of attorneys fees and costs, as of June 30, 1989 (Exh. KK).

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE ABOVE ADMISSION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION IS CONCLUSIVE AGAINST

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO.

HELD:

YES.

Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same and
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cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA
194; 204 [1992])

We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court, more so after the
opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the
fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require
proof. The record here does not show any attempt on the part of SBTC to contradict such judicial
admission on the ground of palpable mistake.

LA YEBANA COMPANY, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TIMOTEO SEVILLA ET AL., defendants and
appellants. [No. 4123. November 16, 1907.]
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FACTS:

The complaint filed in this action alleges that on February 23, 1907, the defendant Timoteo Sevilla was
indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P4,363.42; that on that day the defendant admitted this indebtedness
and promised to pay the same; and that, although demand had been made for payment, neither the amount
due nor any part thereof had been paid at the time of the filing of the complaint.

The defendant Sevilla in his answer admitted the truth of the allegations of the complaint, but alleged by
way of special defense that, while it was true he had promised to pay the debt, the plaintiff had agreed to
accept payment either at the rate of P500 weekly until the entire amount was paid or from time to time in
such sums as he, Sevilla, might be able to collect or recover from the owners of certain stores in the
Province of Bataan who had received on credit goods furnished Sevilla on commission.
Counsel for the plaintiff thereupon prayed for judgment upon the pleadings; and the trial court, without
taking evidence as to the truth of the allegations of the defendant, gave judgment against Sevilla and in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P4,362.42, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the
filing of the complaint. In support of this judgment the trial judge holds in his opinion "that the special
defense set up by the defendant Sevilla, in so far as it consists of allegations of facts, alleges the existence
of an agreement by virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly installments of
P500," and that, the complaint having been filed on the 21st day of March, 1907, "it is evident that,
admitting the truth of the allegations set up by the defense, the debt in controversy has become due and
payable."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the existence of an agreement, by virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his
indebtedness in weekly installments.

HELD:

YES. The Court would be compelled to reverse the judgment upon the mere allegation of the defense of
the existence of an agreement, by virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly
installments of P500, without an allegation as to an alternative mode of payment. It appears from the
pleadings that the alleged agreement as to the mode of payment of the admitted indebtedness was entered
into on the 23d day of February, 1907. The complaint was filed on the 21st day of March, 1907, so that
not quite four weeks had elapsed from the date of the alleged agreement to the date of the filing of the
complaint. Where a debt is payable in installments, recovery can be had only for those installments due
and payable when the action was commenced, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the
contract. (La Compania General de Tabacos vs. Araza, 7 Phil. Rep., 455; Artadi y Compania vs. Chu
Baco,1 5 Off. Gaz., 711.) It is evident, therefore; that, since it does not appear from the pleadings that it
was expressly stipulated that upon the failure to pay any one of the weekly installments the whole debt
should thereupon become at once due and payable, the most that could be recovered would be the sum of
P1,500, being the weekly installments of P500 for the three full weeks which had elapsed from the date of
the agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint. The judgment appealed from should be, and is
hereby, reversed without costs in this instance to either party.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO;
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN
PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias TISOY TAGALOG;
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias WANG-WANG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
MM, appellants.
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

FACTS:

On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn,
her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with
masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After
almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated
in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in
the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a
red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly.

2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they
met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu
City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.

3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started
to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.

4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a
state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants
guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that
court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in making Rusia a state witness hence affecting the competency and
quality of the testimony of defendant

HELD:

No. The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Minessotta does not render his
testimony inadmissible. In People vs. De Guzman, we held that although the trial court may have erred in
discharging the accused, such error would not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of
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the defendant. In Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan, we ruled: Anent the contention that Delia Preagido
should not have been discharged as a state witness because of a previous final conviction of crimes
involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that this Court has time and again declared that even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In the discharge
of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an accused
has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle that such error of the court does not
affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged defendant.
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LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004.

FACTS:

Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from Allied Banking
Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire
obligation became due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank. The Bank filed with the RTC a
complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and solidarily, of the sum
representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs.

The Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that Tan obtained the loans in his
personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he
furnished the Bank. The Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his
capacity as its President any promissory note and that the Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were
made in Tans personal capacity and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or
indirectly, there from.

For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his personal capacity. The parties,
however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of Tans shares of common stocks in the
Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which
were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until
such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.

ISSUE:

May the Foundation correctly raise as a defense that it did not authorize Tan to obtain the loans involved
and therefore it may not be held solidarily liable for them?

HELD:

NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners cannot hide behind the corporate veil under the
following circumstances:

The evidence shows that Tan has been representing himself as the President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc.
He opened a savings account and a current account in the names of the corporation, and signed
the application form as well as the necessary specimen signature cards twice, for himself and for the
foundation. He submitted a notarized Secretarys Certificate from the corporation, attesting that he has
been authorized, inter alia, to sign for and in behalf of the Lapulapu Foundation any and all checks, drafts
or other orders with respect to the bank; to transact business with the Bank, negotiate loans, agreements,
obligations, promissory notes and other commercial documents; and to initially obtain a loan for P100,
000.00 from any bank. Under these circumstances, the Foundation is liable for the transactions entered
into by Tan on itsbehalf.

Per its Secretarys Certificate, the Foundation had given Tan ostensible and apparent authority to inter alia
deal with the Bank. Accordingly, the petitioner Foundation is estopped from questioning Tans authority
to obtain the subject loans from the Bank. It is a familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits
TURLA, REGINAL M.
2014-120321 JD 3A
reggieturla.pnp@gmail.com

one of its officers, or any other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to
the public as possessing the power to do those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who
has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agents authority.