Janine Karla A.

Aranas 2B
EPA Atty. Marquez

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

Cases:

I. FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(Findings of administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts Doctrine of Res
Judicata)

The petitioner sought the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration. He stated that after the Government
had made an order canceling his logging concession pursuant to presidential instructions, a part
of the area was allowed to be logged by Filipino companies without a license; and, that the latter
entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not
public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past
regime.

A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. It was
an established doctrine in its jurisdiction that the orders of administrative agencies had upon their
finality, the force of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders were as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the
same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Court expressed its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of
timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.
II. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

(Judicial recourse and review of administrative agencies decisions)

BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors,

was granted by the BOI to have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to
be based in Bataan. One year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation
applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite resistance
from Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application,
stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they
are the ones who takes all the risk for the project.

In general, the courts are bound by the decisions of administrative agencies. Re-
examination by the courts in the exercise of their judicial power in a case instituted by an
aggrieved party is proper when there has been an issue on the invalidity of a decision rendered
by an administrative agency. Such decision will be determined to be valid, invalid or whether it
should be nullified, affirmed or modified. To avail of judicial review, relief from the
administrative agency must first be sought. One of the questions reviewable by the court is
questions of facts. Generally, courts will not disturb the findings of administrative agencies
acting within the parameters of their competence. An exception is if the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, there was no final hearing and final notice
given to the petitioner and BOI immediately proceeded to the granting of the site transfer.

III. RAFAEL A. LO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GREGORIO LUGUIBIS

(Findings of administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts Doctrine of Res
Judicata)

Luguibis began working as a mechanic at the Polangui Rice Mill, Inc., owned by Jose
Lo. Private respondent was paid P4.00 daily. In 1959, in addition to his work at the rice mill, he
was asked to render services as a mechanic at the Polangui Bijon Factory also owned by Jose
Lo.His wage was later increased, and from 1964 to 1970, when he resigned due to illness, he was
receiving a daily wage of P10.00. He applied for retirement benefits with the Social Security
System (SSS). His application, however, was denied since per SSS records he became a member
only in 1983, and contributions in his favor were remitted only from October 1983 to September
1984. The SSS Commission directs Lo to pay and remit the withheld contributions. Lo now
questions the finding of the Commission that private respondent was a regular employee of the
rice mill and bijon factory when the compulsory SSS coverage took effect in 1957. He alleges
that the Court of Appeals findings are unsupported by evidence, and committed grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at its decision.

Time and again we have ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions . . . the findings
of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence,
even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence; that the
administrative decision in matters, within the executive jurisdiction, can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. Administrative agencies decisions
may not be disturbed by the courts except for questions of facts due to lack of substantial
evidence and questions of law. These agencies are deemed to have the knowledge, competence
and technical expertise to deal with issues that may go under their jurisdiction.

IV. PANCHO YAP YOUNG vs. ROBERTO M. MOMBLAN

(Ministerial and Discretionary Powers of Administrative Agencies)

This is an Administrative Complaint against respondent, Roberto M. Momblan, for

alleged neglect of duty in the performance of his functions as Deputy Sheriff. Petitioners contend
that The Writ of Execution, explicitly commanded respondent to execute the RTC Decision,
dated 24 June 1987, which had already become final and executory. He was commanded to seize
"lands and buildings of the said defendants/third-party-defendants" should their personal
property be insufficient to satisfy the Writ and its lawful fees. All that Respondent had to do then
was to merely execute the same in accordance with its mandate. Duty of a sheriff as to execution
of process. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of
instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. He has no discretion whether to execute it or not.

A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for discretion,
an officer or tribunal just follows a prescribed legal mandate on a given set of facts.
Discretionary duty is one that needs the exercise of judgement; it gives the officer or tribunal the
right to decide upon the propriety of the act done. According to Lamb vs. Phipps and Asuncion
vs. De Yriate, a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done and discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he
may decide the question either way and still be right.

Respondent's only duty was to have implemented the Writ of Execution according to its
terms, without exception. Thus, he should have also enforced the Writ insofar as the cross-
defendants and the third-party defendants were concerned. Not having done so, Respondent must
be held to have been remiss in the performance of his functions.

VI. METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. CHATHAM PROPERTIES, INC.

(Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies; Administrative Agencies as Quasi-judicial bodies;

Judicial Recourse and Review)

CHATHAM and Metro Construction, Inc. entered into a contract for the construction of a
multi-storey building known as the Chatham House. In April 1998, MCI sought to collect from
CHATHAM a sum of money for unpaid progress billings and other charges and instituted a
request for adjudication of its claims with the CIAC. CIAC rendered judgement in favor of MCI
and ordered CHATHAM to pay MCI 16,126,922.91 pesos. CHATHAM instituted a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the decision of the CIAC, the Court of Appeals
confirmed the jurisprudential principle that absent any showing of arbitrariness, the CIAC's
findings as an administrative agency and quasi judicial body should not only be accorded great
respect but also given the stamp of finality.
 E.O. No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the
Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the
abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19 thereof, the arbitral award of
the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which are appealable to the
Supreme Court. Decisions of administrative agencies are binding on the courts and not subject to
review except on questions of law, questions of facts and question of law and fact.

When Circular No. 1-91 was promulgated, the Supreme Court intended to establish a
uniform procedure for the review of the final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and
other quasi-judicial agencies provided that an appeal there from is then allowed under existing
statutes to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (The right to appeal from
judgments, awards, or final orders of the CIAC is granted in E.O. No. 1008). Circular No. 1-91
covers the CIAC. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very
definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical
knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts. The CIACs primary function is that of a quasi-judicial agency, which is to adjudicate
claims and/or determine rights in accordance with procedures set forth in E.O. No. 1008.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from final orders or decisions of the
CIAC is further fortified by the amendments to B.P. Blg. 129, as introduced by RA. No. 7902.
With the amendments, the Court of Appeals is vested with appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except "those within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Under questions (administrative agencies) reviewable by the courts, questions of law, the
judiciary cannot be deprived of its inherent power to review all decisions on questions of law. In
the case at bar, there was contradicting purposes between E.O. 1008, Circular No. 1-91 and BP
129, hence a question of law.

VII. MAXIMINO FUENTES vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(Judicial Review; Substantial Evidence Rule)

Maximino Fuentes and Virgilio Uy, are owners of adjoining parcels of land situated in
Dela Paz, Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Relocation surveys were conducted, by Engineer
Norberto Iyog thru a court order on the litigated portion consisting of 411 square meters which
according to the plaintiff was forcibly taken and entered into by herein private respondents.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as
its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. Just like the decisions of administrative agencies, it is
generally binding subject only to exceptions like questions of law. The Supreme Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions. The findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this
Court:

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion;

(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

The Court finds that the petition raises no substantial question of law. The question
raised, as to who has prior actual possession over the contested portion of land is patently a
question of fact which is not reviewable by the court.

VIII. SALVADOR APRUEBA and ASUNCION MODOC vs. HON. RODOLFO GANZON

(Ministerial and Discretionary Powers of Public Officers)

Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a
petition for mandamus against respondent City Mayor of Iloilo City, alleging among others, that
they are owners and operators of a cafeteria located in Stall 17-C of the city market. Respondent
city mayor ordered his policemen to close it for alleged violation of city ordinance as they did on
same date despite their protest. When petitioner Aprueba saw respondent on October 3, 1960, he
was informed by the latter that the store could only be reopened if petitioners paid all their back
accounts but after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to allow reopening of the
store.

Mandamus cannot be issued to control exercise of discretion. The privilege of petitioners

to obtain a renewal of the permit rested on the sound. discretion of respondent and refusal on his
part to grant continuance of the privilege (especially after petitioner Aprueba's alleged violation
of a city ordinance by allowing co-petitioner Modoc to operate business in stall-17-C) cannot be
the subject of an action for mandamus. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise
of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. In refusing to
grant mandamus, the trial court premised its action on the fact that petitioner's occupancy of stall
17-C in question in Iloilo City market "is but a privilege which the respondent mayor may or
may not grant, but not a duty enjoined upon him by law, by reason of his position". Mandamus
will not lie because the duty the petitioners are praying to be performed is a discretionary duty.
Mandamus may only lie for ministerial duties or those that does not require any discretion on the
officers part.

VIII. Evelyn Abeja vs Judge Taada

(COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests; public office as a public
trust and not a property right which passes to one's heirs)

Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were
contenders for the office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992, national
elections. Rosauro Radovan was declared the winner of the mayoralty elections in Pagbilao,
Quezon. His rival, Evelyn Abeja, filed an election protest where she questioned the results in 22
precincts. Radovan filed a counter protest where he questioned the results in 36 precincts with
counterclaim for damages. Taada agreed with Radovan that the 36 precincts may only be
revised if Abeja can show that she leads by at least one point vote over Radovan. Radovan died
and was substituted by his wife, Ediltrudes. Court held that none of the heirs may replace him in
that position. The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for
damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to
occupy the contested office. But death did not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim. The
estate of the deceased could be substituted in the proceedings on the unextinguished money
claim.

Considering that this petition involves an election protest heard by a regional trial court,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling. In view of the fact that the subject election
contest was filed on May 26, 1992, Section 2, Rule 17 and Section 11, Rule 35 of the
aforementioned COMELEC rules are applicable. Rule 17 treats of Hearings whereas Rule 35
treats of Election Contests before Courts of General Jurisdiction. Venue will not be controlling,
jurisdiction will be controlling.

IX. ERNESTO T. PACHECO and VIRGINIA O. PACHECO vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS

(Review by the Higher Courts of Factual Findings of the Lower Court Exception)

Due to financial needs of petitioner spouses who were engaged in the

construction business, they secured loans from Vicencio. The lender compelled the spouses
to issue an undated check despite the admission of spouses that their bank account has
insufficient funds or as on a later date, already closed. Lender assured them that the issuance of
the check was only evidence of indebtedness, that it would not be presented to the bank but they
were surprised that a case of estafa was filed against them.

The rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this court is not absolute but admits
of exceptions such as when the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculation, surmise, and
conjecture and when the findings of the lower court is premised on the absence of evidence and
is contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is constrained to depart from the general
rule. Equally applicable is what Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet once said: Evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.

In the case, there were six checks given by petitioners to Mrs. Vicencio but only two were
presented for encashment. If all were issued in payment of the alleged jewelry, why were not all
the checks presented? Another, complainant is not engaged in the sale of jewelry and neither are
petitioners. If the pieces of jewelry were important to complainant considering that they were
with him for more than twenty-five years already, he would not have easily parted with them in
consideration for unfunded personal checks in favor of persons whose means of living or source
of income were unknown to him. Applicable here is the legal precept that persons are presumed
to have taken care of their business.
X. DOLORES A. PAREDES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD AND REMEDIOS A. AMOR

(Qualification Standard for CSC Appointments; Appeals to the Civil Service Commission)

Atty. Remedios A. Amor, H.S. Project Officer IV, contested the promotional appointment of
petitioner Paredes as H.S. Project Supervisor, on the ground that she is the qualified next-in-rank
pursuant to Section 9 (16) and (20) of P.D. 807 and the Qualification Standards of the HSRC.
The MSPB rendered its decision that Paredes is found not at all qualified for the contested
position of HS Project Supervisor as well as of the higher position of HS Program Coordinator
which she presently occupies. Accordingly, the CSC approval on said appointments are hereby
revoked and the subject appointment is consequently considered ineffective.

A qualification standard must exist to guide the appointing authority not only in extending an
appointment, but also in settling contested appointments. The absence of a Qualification
Standard does not give good reason for the appointment of petitioner Paredes or. Without a duly
approved Qualification Standard it would be exceedingly difficult for the appointing authority to
determine the qualification and fitness of the applicant for the particular position. Without an
approved Qualification Standard the appointing authority would have no guide in extending a
promotional or original appointment in filling up vacant positions in its department or agency.
Public interest therefore requires that a Qualification Standard must exist to guide the appointing
authority not only in extending an appointment but also in settling contested appointments. The
contested position specifically requires a lawyer, architect, engineer or a holder of a masteral
degree for appointment thereto; that petitioner's length of service in the government cannot be
used to make up for her educational deficiency; that even if the two year educational requirement
can be substituted, petitioner is only a holder of a two year elementary teachers certificate so that
she is still one year short of the minimum educational requirement of the contested position.

Petitioner, not being the party adversely affected by the decision, has no legal personality to
interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Based on the above provisions of law,
appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party
adversely affected by the decision. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not
appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for
not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. As correctly ruled
by private respondent, Paredes is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has
no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative
case, the complainant is a mere witness. She is merely a witness for the government in an
administrative case. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is
committed against the government. The government is the affected party.